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On 17 September 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute, in partnership with Daily Maverick, hosted the third instalment of its Constitutional Insights by Albie Sachs  webinar series. Building on a four-part podcast with former Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs, the series explores the Constitution, social justice, and the promise of transformation in South Africa, while highlighting the ongoing challenges of building an inclusive and equitable democracy. The third conversation focused on The Power of Mother Tongue Education  — a foundational issue for both educational equity and social inclusion. Leading the discussion was Prof. Mbulungeni Madiba , Dean of the Faculty of Education at Stellenbosch University, whose scholarship and advocacy have been pivotal in advancing multilingualism and linguistic justice in South Africa’s education system. He was joined by public intellectual Prof. William Gumede  and diversity and multilingualism researcher Dr. Robyn Tyler , bringing together expertise from education, research, and public policy. The discussion examined how language policies intersect with identity, equity, and access . Prof. Madiba emphasised that mother tongue education is more than a pedagogical strategy — it is a constitutional imperative that empowers learners, strengthens communities, and affirms cultural and linguistic diversity. Gumede and Dr. Tyler explored the broader societal impact, highlighting how equitable access to mother tongue education can address historical inequalities, enhance learning outcomes, and reinforce the Constitution’s commitment to dignity and equality. The speakers underscored that centring mother tongue education fosters a more inclusive and just society, reflecting the Constitution’s core values in both practice and principle. The conversation also reinforced the idea that multilingual education is a key tool for social cohesion, democratic participation, and community empowerment. This third episode continues the series’ exploration of South Africa’s constitutional landscape, following earlier conversations on citizenship and belonging  and the role of state institutions in upholding democracy . The final episode will focus on creating an inclusive electoral system , completing the series’ examination of critical democratic and constitutional issues.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during the meeting have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   August 2025   Rapporteur: Daryl Swanepoel    CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 REFORM UN80: EFFICIENCY MEASURES OR POLITICAL RENEWAL? 1.1 The limits of technocratic reform 1.2 Fidelity to the Charter narrative 1.3 Leadership and the Global South 2 BUDGETARY CHALLENGES: BETWEEN SURVIVAL AND STRATEGIC FOCUS 2.1 The political nature of the budget crisis 2.2 The mandate trap and budget strain 2.3 Doing less, better 2.4 Reform proposals: Accountability and sustainability 2.5 The risk of collapse 2.6 Conclusion 3 UNILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND THE RISE OF REGIONALISM 3.1 The appeal and the limits of transactional unilateralism 3.2 Multilateralism under pressure 3.3 Regionalism: Substitute or complement? 3.4 The leadership vacuum 3.5 Reclaiming multilateralism 3.6 Conclusion 4 US - CHINA RIVALRY, SECURITY COUNCIL PARALYSIS AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 4.1 The dysfunction of the Security Council 4.2 Competing models of reform 4.3 Shifting influence of the United States and China 4.4 Implications for the Global South 4.5 Africa’s strategic role 4.6 Multipolarity and the Charter narrative 4.7 Conclusion 5 LEADERSHIP, ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE AND THE HUMAN FACTOR IN UN REFORM 5.1 Politicisation of senior appointments 5.2 A culture of risk aversion 5.3 Engineers, not only diplomats 5.4 Recruitment, talent and morale 5.5 Accountability and trust 5.6 Conclusion 6 IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA 6.1 Africa as the testing ground for UN relevance 6.2 Security Council reform and Africa’s stake 6.3 Complementarity with the African Union 6.4 Financing reform and Africa’s leverage 6.5 South Africa’s role 6.6 Risks of passivity 6.7 Conclusion 7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7.1 Recommendations 7.2 Final reflection ANNEXURE 1 ANNEXURE 2 ANNEXURE 3 ANNEXURE 4 Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:2153311089 INTRODUCTION In 2025, the United Nations (UN) marks its 80th year of existence and while for it has remained the central institution for fostering international peace, development and cooperation, now, as the global order undergoes profound shifts, the challenges confronting the UN system have grown more complex and urgent. Recognising the need for renewal, the UN Secretary-General launched the UN80 reform initiative, which is aimed at bringing about necessary reform to transition the organisation into one that is fit for purpose in the decades ahead.   As part of these deliberations, the Inclusive Society Institute has sought to deepen its understanding and develop its position on what comprehensive reform of the UN system should entail. To this end, the Institute convened a consultative webinar with a distinguished panel of experts, drawn primarily from former senior UN officials.   The discussion was guided by four questions. First, as the UN reaches its 80th anniversary and embarks on the UN80 reform agenda, what is the true aim of this initiative? Second, given the organisation’s persistent financial difficulties, which is being exacerbated by the withholding of funds by some member states, particularly the United States, alongside increasing demands for peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions, how can the UN realistically resolve its budget crisis? Third, how does the Secretary-General view the rising trend of unilateralism, which is in sharp contrast to the UN’s foundational and Charter commitment to multilateralism? And finally, in the context of the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China, who are both committed to expanding their global influence, what implications do their shifting roles, and sway, within the UN have for the broader institution and particularly for the Global South? 1 REFORM UN80: EFFICIENCY MEASURES OR POLITICAL RENEWAL?   The Secretary-General’s Reform UN80 initiative is framed as a necessary rationalisation exercise. It promises to streamline structures, consolidate offices and address the vast proliferation of mandates that have accumulated since 1945. According to internal estimates, the UN currently operates under more than 40,000 standing mandates, many of which are duplicative or obsolete. This “mandate trap” has become a drain on resources, since it obliges the Secretariat to produce thousands of reports annually with little political impact.   At a purely administrative level, Reform UN80 seeks to:   Cut across-the-board budgets by 20 percent. Relocate certain functions from high-cost centres such as New York and Geneva to lower-cost duty stations. Reduce the enormous reporting burden, freeing up staff for substantive work. Introduce a Mandate Implementation Review (MIR), which, if carried through, could retire obsolete resolutions and allow the UN to focus on current priorities.   These steps are not insignificant. They represent one of three main “tracks” of the reform, namely, efficiency measures, mandate review and structural changes. Together, these could address some of the organisation’s chronic inefficiencies. 1.1 The limits of technocratic reform   Yet, the consultation revealed broad scepticism about whether such measures alone can save the UN from decline. The critique aligns closely with other warnings that reform debates risk “putting the cart before the horse”. Administrative efficiencies, however desirable, cannot substitute for political renewal. Without addressing the UN’s legitimacy crisis, which is rooted in Security Council paralysis, politicised leadership and erosion of trust, technical reforms risk becoming little more than “housekeeping.”   This tension was summed up in the consultation as the difference between tidying the house and rebuilding its foundations. Reform UN80, if pursued only as a managerial exercise, risks repeating the pattern of previous reform cycles, which introduced efficiencies, but left underlying political dysfunction untouched. 1.2 Fidelity to the Charter narrative   What is missing, participants argued, is a compelling political narrative to accompany the reform. The reflection on the UN Charter emphasised that the institution’s legitimacy derives not from bureaucratic tidiness, but from fidelity to its founding ideals of peace, justice and collective security. Reform UN80 will be judged not by the number of reports eliminated or offices merged, but by whether it strengthens the UN’s ability to fulfil its Charter mandate in a 21st-century context. This requires more than efficiency. It requires political vision, linking reform to the UN’s core purpose of “freeing humanity from the scourge of war.” Without such a vision, the reform risks deepening cynicism within both member states and the Secretariat’s own staff.   1.3 Leadership and the Global South   Another concern is leadership. As pointed out, efficiency drives instil fear among staff when they are presented as across-the-board cuts rather than strategic choices. True reform requires leaders who can articulate priorities, protect the institution’s core functions and build confidence among member states. In this regard the Global South is presented with a unique opportunity. Instead of them being passive recipients of reform that is designed to appease Washington and/or Beijing, these Southern states can seize UN80 as a platform to demand inclusivity, equity and a stronger focus on peacebuilding. Moreover, by asserting their priorities in the reform agenda, they can help ensure that efficiency measures do not eclipse political renewal.   António Guterres Secretary-General of the Unted Nations [1]   2 BUDGETARY CHALLENGES: BETWEEN SURVIVAL AND STRATEGIC FOCUS   The financial crisis of the United Nations is not new, but the scale and persistence of the current crisis place the organisation in uncharted territory. The UN today faces chronic arrears, deliberate late payments and mounting demands from peace operations, humanitarian emergencies and global crises.   The Inclusive Society Institute consultation described the financial situation as “existential.” A briefing note underscored the gravity: as of 2024, the UN faced $2.4 billion in unpaid contributions to the regular budget and $2.7 billion in unpaid peacekeeping contributions. Of this, $1.5 billion was owed by the United States alone. With nearly half the UN’s budget tied to two major powers, the US and China, both of whom are increasingly unreliable payers, the risk of systemic collapse is real. 2.1 The political nature of the budget crisis   The consultation made clear that the UN’s financial problems are not simply technical, they are deeply political. It was argued that “the budget is not the problem, politics is the problem”. Arrears reflect member states’ political ambivalence toward the UN, particularly when they disagree with its actions or priorities. For example:   The US Congress has long used budget withholding as a tool to influence UN policies on Israel/Palestine, peacekeeping or human rights. China, while paying its dues in full, increasingly delays contributions until late in the financial year. Because of budget rules, these late payments cannot be programmed in time, creating artificial liquidity crises and often resulting in refunds.   This undermines not only cash flow, but also confidence in collective responsibility. Smaller states may ask why should they pay on time when the largest powers manipulate the system? 2.2 The mandate trap and budget strain   A critical link between finances and mandates was emphasised. The UN has accumulated over 40,000 standing mandates since 1946. Few have ever been retired, even when they are obsolete. The Secretariat remains obliged to produce reports, run offices and maintain activities that no longer reflect current priorities. This “mandate trap” stretches already limited resources across too many fronts, diluting impact and increasing perceptions of waste.   Reform UN80’s Mandate Implementation Review (MIR) could help rationalise this overload by pruning outdated mandates, but as participants cautioned, unless politically supported, such reviews risk stalling. Member states may resist letting go of mandates they perceive as symbolic victories, even if obsolete, because without discipline at the political level, the budgetary strain will persist.   2.3 Doing less, better   The consultation was unequivocal, saying that the UN cannot continue trying to “do more with less.” Instead, it must do less, but better. This requires a sharper focus on the organisation’s comparative advantages:   Norm-setting and compliance by maintaining and monitoring universal rules on human rights, development, climate and disarmament. Convening and coordination by bringing states and stakeholders together to generate collective responses. Political mediation and peacebuilding by serving as an impartial mediator in crises and by supporting post-conflict transitions.   Conversely, the UN should reduce and/or exit roles where others are better placed, such as, for example, large-scale operational development delivery that could be led by governments, NGOs or regional bodies, which reorientation would not be about downsizing for its own sake, but about applying strategic focus. 2.4 Reform proposals: Accountability and sustainability   The consultation and external commentaries converged on several possible reforms to enhance financial sustainability, which includes:   Linking payments and voting rights : Enforce Article 19 of the Charter, which suspends voting rights for members in arrears, more strictly and extend this principle to Security Council veto rights, where chronic non-payers would lose their ability to block Council action. Revising refund rules : End the practice of refunding late contributions that cannot be spent and instead, retain these funds for future programming. Stabilising peacekeeping finance : Consider assessed contributions to be channelled through regional organisations, such as the African Union, backed by predictable UN funding streams. Political narrative : Above all, strengthen the case for why the UN deserves funding and understanding that no amount of technical efficiency will secure resources without trust in the UN’s political legitimacy.   2.5 The risk of collapse   The consultation drew parallels to the collapse of the League of Nations, which faltered both financially and politically when its largest members refused to sustain it. The UN today faces similar risks. If arrears persist and mandates remain unreformed, the organisation could become hollowed out, be technically alive, but politically impotent.   Yet the UN also retains unique strengths. No other body has its universal membership, legitimacy in norm-setting or convening power. The challenge is to safeguard these by focusing resources strategically and by ensuring financial commitments are honoured. 2.6 Conclusion   The budgetary crisis is the canary in the coal mine for the UN’s future. It reveals the erosion of trust, the paralysis of collective responsibility and the unwillingness of powerful states to sustain the system they helped create. Reform UN80’s administrative measures are necessary, but insufficient. What is required is a political compact on finances, whereby member states must recommit to timely payment, mandate discipline and strategic prioritisation.   If the budget crisis is treated merely as an accounting problem, the UN will continue to limp from one liquidity crunch to the next. If it is treated as a political problem, requiring rules, enforcement and leadership, the organisation can regain stability. In short, fixing the UN’s budget is less about spreadsheets and more about political will. United Nations budget: Who has paid their dues? [2] 3 UNILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND THE RISE OF REGIONALISM   The United Nations was founded on the conviction that peace and security can only be sustained through collective action. The Charter narrative, as the consultation reminded us, was one of binding the use of force to universal rules, taming unilateral power through law and yet, at its 80th anniversary, the UN faces an erosion of this multilateral ethos. This is because states increasingly pursue unilateral and/or transactional arrangements, often sidelining the UN’s mechanisms.   The consultation convened by the Inclusive Society Institute warned that unilateralism, while it may deliver short-term bargains, undermines the foundations of sustainable peace. 3.1 The appeal and the limits of transactional unilateralism   Conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and Asia increasingly feature unilateral or mini-lateral deals, brokered by powerful states or regional actors that prioritise immediate stability or access to resources. These arrangements are pragmatic, but often fragile, because they avoid tackling root causes such as governance failures, inequality or exclusion.   The warning about “putting the cart before the horse” applies here. When quick deals are prioritised over long-term legitimacy, short-term stability may be achieved, but the cycle of conflict is likely to continue. The UN’s comparative advantage, namely sustained mediation and inclusive political frameworks, risks being eroded. 3.2 Multilateralism under pressure   The consultation stressed that the UN itself has contributed to the decline of multilateralism by under-investing in its peace and security role. As conflicts doubled over the past two decades, the organisation cut back on peacekeeping and underfunded political missions. The obsession with efficiency and cost-saving, driven by member state pressure, has left the UN less politically engaged at precisely the moment when engagement is most needed.   It was argued that the key challenge is to “operationalise multilateralism”, to make cooperation more than rhetoric, which meant investing in the tools of prevention, mediation and peacebuilding and not just in administrative reshuffles. Multilateralism must be tangible in outcomes, not only aspirational in speeches. 3.3 Regionalism: Substitute or complement?   As the UN’s authority weakens, regional organisations have stepped into the vacuum. The African Union (AU) has deployed peace operations in Somalia, the Sahel and elsewhere; ASEAN has mediated disputes in Southeast Asia; BRICS has positioned itself as a forum for alternative global governance. The consultation viewed this trend with nuance. On one hand, regionalism can act as a substitute when the UN fails to act. But on the other hand, it can serve as a complement to a UN that provides universal legitimacy and normative grounding.   The challenge is institutional design. Currently, UN - regional partnerships are ad hoc, improvised in crises. The mandate trap compounds this problem and the Secretariat is burdened with outdated obligations, leaving little bandwidth to invest in structured regional cooperation. To bring relief and create space for itself Reform UN80 could use the Mandate Implementation Review to prune obsolete obligations, freeing resources to deepen UN - AU frameworks. 3.4 The leadership vacuum   Underlying the drift towards unilateralism and the reliance on regionalism is a leadership vacuum. The UN Secretariat has become risk-averse, more focused on process than on problem-solving. Member states, especially great powers, prioritise national interests over collective responsibility. The result is that multilateralism is often invoked rhetorically, but rarely organised in practice.   Here too, external commentary reinforces the consultation. It was argued that trust and legitimacy must precede structural reform. Without leadership that inspires trust, no amount of efficiency will restore multilateralism and so the UN must demonstrate through practice, through operationalised missions and results that is, that multilateralism delivers. 3.5 Reclaiming multilateralism   The way forward a requires deliberate reinvestment in the UN’s political role, which should include, amongst others:   Strengthening preventive diplomacy by ensuring that political missions are given adequate funding and authority to act early in crises. Institutionalising UN - regional partnerships by creating standing arrangements with the AU, ASEAN and others for financing, planning and joint operations. Cultivating leadership for outcomes by appointing leaders that are willing to take risks, prioritise results over process and articulate a vision for collective action. Mandate discipline, which should include the retiring of obsolete mandates so the UN can focus on present conflicts and avoid spreading itself too thin. 3.6 Conclusion Unilateralism reflects not only the ambitions of powerful states, but also the weaknesses of multilateral institutions. If the UN is to reclaim its Charter promise, it must organise multilateralism, not merely proclaim it. This means freeing itself from outdated mandates, reinvesting in peace and security and institutionalising complementarity with regional organisations.   The consultation and external commentaries converge on the same lesson, namely that without leadership, legitimacy and political will, multilateralism risks becoming a hollow slogan. With them, however, the UN can still embody what one paricipant described as the Charter’s enduring narrative, namely that law, not unilateral power, should govern international relations.   United Nations Peacekeeping [3] 4 US - CHINA RIVALRY, SECURITY COUNCIL PARALYSIS AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH   Among the most destabilising forces in the current international system is the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, because for the United Nations, this rivalry is not an external factor, but a structural crisis, playing out directly within its institutions and paralysing its ability to fulfil its Charter mandate.   Participants attending the Inclusive Society Institute consultation emphasised that the effects of this rivalry are felt most acutely in the Security Council, but it also permeate the wider UN system. This assessment is reinforced by external analysis introduced into the discussion, which analysis highlights how geopolitical competition has transformed the UN into an arena of contestation, rather than a platform for consensus. 4.1 The dysfunction of the Security Council   The Security Council, which is intended to be the engine of collective security, has instead become the primary site of paralysis. US and Chinese positions, often compounded by Russian obstruction, have, for example, blocked decisive responses to conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, Gaza and beyond.   There is persistent gridlock in that resolutions are vetoed or watered down to meaninglessness and even humanitarian carve-outs, once considered non-controversial, are now hostage to great-power bargaining. There has been a decline of peacekeeping due to traditional UN peacekeeping authorisations that have all but ceased and instead, mandates are fragmented or outsourced to regional actors, often with weaker legitimacy and fewer resources. Legitimacy has been lost due to the Council’s inability to act on issues of mass violence, which has eroded confidence among member states and publics alike. This amounts to a betrayal of the Charter’s narrative, which promises that power would be restrained by law.   The consultation argued that without Council reform, no administrative or financial reforms will save the UN from irrelevance. 4.2 Competing models of reform   Several proposals for reforming the Security Council were raised:   Instead of endlessly debating which states deserve new permanent seats, allocate representation by region, where Africa, Asia, Latin America and other regions could hold rotating seats, ensuring inclusivity, while avoiding entrenched hierarchies. Introduce a qualified veto by restricting veto use to cases where proposed resolutions demonstrably contravene the Charter and in so doing, independent legal review, through the UN Office of Legal Affairs or advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, could introduce accountability. Or there could be hybrid approaches thereof, for example, expanded elected membership combined with regional representation and legal limits on the veto, could collectively enhance legitimacy and functionality.   These ideas echoed those in the briefing notes that were introduced into the consultations, which also argued that only bold innovation and not incremental tinkering, will allow the UN to adapt to multipolar realities. 4.3 Shifting influence of the United States and China   Beyond the Council, US and Chinese rivalry manifests across the UN system:   The United States  remains the single largest financial contributor, but increasingly uses budget leverage to constrain the organisation. Arrears and withholding are tools of political influence as much as fiscal policy. China  has expanded its influence and has become the second-largest contributor, has asserted leadership roles in specialised agencies and has positioned itself as a champion of South - South cooperation. But these advancements are also accompanied by concern that Beijing is seeking to align the UN norms with its own governance model.   This dynamic has transformed the UN into a battleground of narratives, with Washington framing itself as a defender of rules-based order and Beijing as a leader of equitable development; and for smaller states, the challenge has become how to navigate these competing visions without being marginalised.   4.4 Implications for the Global South   The consultation emphasised that US - China rivalry is both a risk and an opportunity for the Global South, because:   The South risks becoming an arena of competition, its conflicts instrumentalised by external powers and its priorities sidelined in the process. Rivalry creates strategic space in that just as some states leveraged the Cold War competition to secure aid and concessions, today’s Global South can use competition to advance its own priorities.   Three strategies were emphasised:   First, coalition-building by articulating collective positions through platforms such as the African Union, G77 or BRICS, Southern states can negotiate from strength rather than as isolated actors. Second, agenda-setting. The South must seize initiative by proposing its own frameworks for Security Council reform, financing rules and sustainable development. Waiting passively leaves space for great powers to impose their agendas. And third, leveraging multipolarity. In a world where no single hegemon dominates, the South has more room to assert its agency if it acts collectively. 4.5 Africa’s strategic role   Africa, in particular, emerged in the consultation as central to the future of UN reform. It accounts for the majority of active conflicts addressed by the UN, it contributes the largest number of uniformed peacekeepers, it is home to 54 member states, over a quarter of UN membership and yet it has no permanent seat on the Council.   This imbalance cannot be sustained. Reform UN80 provides an opportunity for Africa to demand regional representation in the Council, structured complementarity between the UN and the African Union and more equitable financial governance.   South Africa was singled out as especially well placed to lead. Its history of negotiated transition gives it symbolic authority, while its role in BRICS and the AU provides practical platforms for influence. As one participant put it, the Global South must not only seek inclusion, but lead in shaping reform. 4.6 Multipolarity and the Charter narrative   One of the analyses of the Charter narrative is instructive here. The Charter was meant to constrain great powers under law, ensuring that smaller states would not be permanently subordinated. The current paralysis of the Security Council is therefore not merely dysfunctional, it is a profound breach of the Charter’s spirit.   The Global South’s demand for reform is, at its core, a demand for fidelity to the Charter itself. The caution is again relevant in that structural reforms without political will mean little. Reform will only matter if it restores trust in the UN as an impartial forum of collective security. 4.7 Conclusion   The US - China rivalry is both the UN’s greatest challenge and, paradoxically, its greatest opportunity. It paralyses the Security Council, distorts agency agendas and corrodes trust in multilateralism. Yet, it also creates the conditions for the Global South, especially Africa, to assert a stronger role.   The consultation, reinforced by external analyses, points to a clear path, namely that bold innovation in Security Council reform, coalition-building by the South and leadership that reclaims the Charter’s promise that law, not power, governs the international system.   At 80, the jury is still out as to whether the UN will decide to remain a stage for great-power competition or whether it will evolve into a genuinely multipolar platform for collective security. 5 LEADERSHIP, ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE AND THE HUMAN FACTOR IN UN REFORM   Beyond mandates, budgets and geopolitics, the fate of UN reform ultimately rests on people. Those who lead the organisation, those who staff it and the cultures they inhabit. The Inclusive Society Institute consultation stressed that without a fundamental renewal of leadership and organisational ethos, even the most elegant reform packages will falter. External commentary echoes this. It cautions that reforms that focus on bureaucratic rearrangements without tackling political trust and leadership are “putting the cart before the horse”. 5.1 Politicisation of senior appointments   The UN’s leadership deficit is rooted in the politicisation of appointments, where senior positions are often awarded through bargaining among powerful states, rather than through meritocratic and transparent selection. This produces:   Variable quality when competence and vision is subordinated to nationality. When leaders feel beholden to their patron states, rather than the UN’s mandate, accountability may be compromised. A patronage culture is instilled when appointees replicate political logics in their own hiring, which perpetuates a cycle of politicisation.   One of the participants highlighted this directly when he cautioned that structural reforms cannot succeed without leadership accountability and warning that without changing how leaders are chosen and held to account, Reform UN80 will repeat past cycles of limited results. 5.2 A culture of risk aversion   The consultation with the UN experts identified a pervasive risk-averse culture that spread across the Secretariat, where leaders and staff are often more concerned with avoiding mistakes than they are with solving problems and this has manifested in:   Process obsession which has resulted in decision-making being slowed down by endless consultations and burdensome procedures. Political cautiousness, resulting in reluctance to act decisively for fear of antagonising powerful states. Conformity being rewarded with career advancement being linked to compliance, not innovation.   The “mandate trap” analysis mentioned earlier in the report reinforces this diagnosis and charges that the accumulation of thousands of outdated mandates has created a bureaucratic environment where staff are trapped in servicing obsolete processes, which leaves little space for creative problem-solving. The risk aversion is not just cultural, it is institutionalised through workload and reporting requirements. 5.3 Engineers, not only diplomats   The consultation proposed a cultural shift, namely that the UN must cultivate leaders who are not only diplomats, but also engineers of solutions, which would mean valuing leaders who:   Are prepared to take calculated risks in pursuit of results. Focus on innovation rather than to merely manage. Will hold themselves accountable to outcomes and not just procedural compliance. Ground their decisions in field realities and not just headquarter dictated  processes.   The Charter was not designed to create a self-perpetuating bureaucracy, but, rather, a living institution of political problem-solving and therefore leaders who embody this spirit are essential, if the UN is to remain true to its founding ideals. 5.4 Recruitment, talent and morale   A related concern is recruitment and staff morale. The UN was envisioned as a forum for the “best and brightest” from across the globe, however, today, politicisation, quota pressures and bureaucratic stagnation seem to limit diversity and innovation.   Reform proposals from the consultation and external analyses converged on the need for the UN to:   Broaden its recruitment pipelines beyond entrenched networks so as to ensure diversity of geography and expertise. Strengthen meritocracy by establishing independent search committees with public shortlists and performance-based contracts for senior officials. Encourage mobility be requiring senior staff to gain field experience, thereby ensuring a leadership hat is grounded in realities. Reward innovation by recognising risk-taking and creativity and not only compliance with procedure.   It was noted that leadership renewal cannot be separated from accountability and therefore, senior officials must be tied to measurable outcomes. Without such mechanisms, staff morale will continue to decline under cycles of reform fatigue and uncertainty. 5.5 Accountability and trust   Both the consultation and external sources converge on a central insight, namely that trust is the true currency of reform. It stresses that without political trust, structural or bureaucratic reform is meaningless and it therefore needs accountability mechanisms that restore confidence in leadership.   Recommendations include:   Binding performance contracts for senior officials. Independent oversight of leadership performance, with consequences for failure. Transparency in appointments to restore trust in impartiality.   Only by linking leadership to accountability can the UN cultivate the credibility necessary for member states to sustain it financially and politically. 5.6 Conclusion   Leadership and culture are the linchpins of UN reform. Politicised appointments, risk-averse culture and weak accountability have created an organisation that manages process, but struggles to deliver results. Reform UN80 will succeed only if it goes beyond administrative streamlining to address the human factor and moreover, who leads, how they are chosen, what culture they embody and how they are held accountable.   The ISI was reminded that the UN was designed as a political project of collective will, not as a technocratic machine, and that should warn us that efficiency without trust is hollow. Outdated mandates embed inefficiency and inertia and leadership accountability must be central.   Together, these insights affirm the consultation’s conclusion that without cultural renewal, even the most carefully designed reforms will falter. 6 IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA   The 80th anniversary of the United Nations is not only a global milestone, but a decisive moment for Africa. The continent is both a primary stakeholder in the UN and one of its most underrepresented voices. Africa hosts the majority of active conflicts on the UN agenda, provides the largest share of peacekeepers and absorbs a disproportionate share of humanitarian assistance. Yet, Africa has no permanent seat on the Security Council, limited influence in budgetary decisions and often finds its priorities overshadowed by great-power rivalries.   The Inclusive Society Institute consultation, reinforced by recent analyses, underscored that the success or failure of Reform UN80 will be judged most visibly on the continent. 6.1 Africa as the testing ground for UN relevance   The UN’s credibility is often tested in Africa. From the peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to humanitarian operations in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, Africa has been the proving ground for the UN’s capacity to deliver. Yet, repeated shortcomings, underfunded mandates, ambiguous missions and abrupt withdrawals, have left deep frustrations.   As was emphasised, this is not only a resource problem, but a political problem. Missions falter because they are shaped more by the interests of external powers than by the needs of African populations. For the UN to remain relevant, reform must prioritise political renewal in Africa, not just administrative reshuffles. 6.2 Security Council reform and Africa’s stake   Africa’s exclusion from permanent Security Council membership is the most glaring example of systemic inequity, because in spite of accounting for over a quarter of UN membership and the majority of peacekeeping mandates, Africa remains a bystander in the Council’s permanent decision-making.   Participants supported innovative proposals that could break the deadlock:   Regional representation , with the allocation Council seats to regions and allowing Africa to hold a permanent voice through rotational arrangements. Qualified veto restrictions , which will prevent the abuse of the veto by subjecting it to legal review under the Charter and hereby ensuring that Africa’s concerns are not perpetually blocked by great-power rivalries.   This aligns with the insights that affirm that the Charter was designed to prevent domination by the strongest and to guarantee universality of voice. Africa’s demand for Council reform is thus not only about representation, but also about fidelity to the Charter’s spirit of equality. 6.3 Complementarity with the African Union   The African Union (AU) has increasingly taken on peace and security roles where the UN has been absent or gridlocked, with examples that include AMISOM in Somalia and regional interventions in Mali, but AU missions often face crippling funding shortages.   The UN experts consulted stressed the need for structured complementarity between the UN and AU, which would require predictable financing arrangements, joint planning mechanisms and burden-sharing that respects both global legitimacy and regional ownership.   Here, the “mandate trap” analysis is relevant, because freeing the UN from outdated mandates could allow resources to be redirected into deeper partnerships with the AU, ensuring missions are fit for purpose and sustainable. 6.4 Financing reform and Africa’s leverage   The UN’s budget crisis affects Africa disproportionately, since many of its largest missions are based on the continent. When the US withholds funds or China delays payments, African operations are the first to suffer. $2.4 billion in arrears to the regular budget and $2.7 billion to peacekeeping, translates directly into resource gaps in African missions.   The consultation therefore suggested that Africa has a vested interest in budgetary reform. Proposals such as suspending veto rights for chronic non-payers or revising refund rules for late contributions are not abstract governance issues but immediate survival strategies for African operations. 6.5 South Africa’s role   South Africa, as one of Africa’s most prominent states, has both an opportunity and a responsibility to shape Reform UN80. Several avenues were highlighted:   South Africa can use its credibility as a mediator to convene African and Global South voices around a unified reform agenda. As a member of BRICS, South Africa can channel Southern perspectives into global reform debates, thereby ensuring that multipolarity does not marginalise Africa, but serves rather to empower it. By generating proposals on Security Council reform, financial accountability and UN - AU complementarity, South Africa’s role can move beyond advocacy to actual agenda-setting. South Africa’s negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy offers it symbolic weight when advocating for inclusive and negotiated solutions in the UN.   Unless Africa more broadly, and South Africa in particular, starts to insist on trust and political will before structure, the continent risks being sidelined by technocratic reforms that do not address its core concerns. 6.6 Risks of passivity   The greatest risk for Africa is passivity, because by doing nothing, the US - China rivalry could easily reduce the continent to an arena of competition, where its conflicts are instrumentalised and its priorities sidelined. That said, however, it should also be noted that the rivalry also creates strategic space in that by building coalitions through the AU, BRICS and other platforms, Africa can advance its own agenda and prevent being marginalised.   The Global South must not merely seek inclusion, but lead reform debates. For Africa, this means moving from the margins to the centre of UN reform, not as petitioners, but as co-authors of the future multilateral order. 6.7 Conclusion   Africa stands at the heart of the UN’s 80th anniversary reform debates given the continent’s disproportionate exposure to conflict and humanitarian crises, which is coupled with its systemic underrepresentation, thereby making it both the UN’s greatest stakeholder and its greatest test.   Reform UN80 will be judged in Africa. If reform strengthens Security Council representation, institutionalises UN - AU complementarity and stabilises financing, Africa stands to gain. If reform remains narrowly technocratic, the continent risks deeper neglect.   For South Africa, the opportunity is to act as a bridge and thought leader, turning rhetorical commitments into concrete proposals. By doing so, it can help ensure that Reform UN80 is not another cycle of administrative tinkering, but a genuine renewal of the Charter’s promise, namely that all voices, especially those of the Global South, matter in shaping international peace and security. President Cyril Ramaphose at the United Nations [4] 7 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS   The UN at its 80th anniversary stands at a crossroads. It was founded on the bold promise of the Charter, to free humanity from the scourge of war, to affirm faith in rights and equality, and to ensure that power was restrained by law. As the meeting observed, the Charter is more than a legal instrument, it is a narrative of global hope and collective restraint, but that narrative is under unprecedented strain.   The Inclusive Society Institute consultation’s assessment is stark:   Reform UN80 is necessary, but insufficient, because whilst the streamlining of structures, the consolidation of offices and the cutting reports may improve efficiency, without political renewal these measures risk becoming a hollow exercise. Participants warned that focusing on bureaucracy without addressing legitimacy is “putting the cart before the horse”. The budget crisis is political, not technical. It was pointed out that arrears now exceed $5 billion, with the US responsible for $1.5 billion. This suggests that the matter is not merely about liquidity, but about political ambivalence as powerful states use finances as leverage. Unilateralism and mandate overload is eroding multilateralism, with 40,000 mandates weighing down the UN and this, combined with the rise of transactional unilateral deals, risks the UN being sidelined unless it operationalises multilateralism with real outcomes. Great-power rivalry paralyses the Security Council, but empowers the Global South, because whilst the US - China contest threatens to hollow out the UN, it also creates strategic space for Africa, BRICS and other Southern actors to assert leadership. The reforms will require a decisive leadership and culture. Moreover, politicised appointments, the risk-averse culture and the weak accountability within the UN system need to changes, because the current ways are undermining the UN’s ability to adapt. Without a shift to accountable and outcome-driven leadership, reforms will stall.   The choice is therefore stark: renewal or decline. Renewal requires courage, vision and fidelity to the Charter’s spirit. Decline will follow if reform remains technocratic and timid. 7.1 Recommendations   Based on the consultation and reinforced by external analysis, the following recommendations are advanced:   A. Re-anchor reform UN80 in the Charter’s promise Prioritise peace and security . Place political engagement, conflict prevention and mediation at the heart of Reform UN80, not just managerial restructuring. Connect reform to the Charter narrative . Efficiency should be framed not as an end in itself, but as a way to deliver on the Charter’s vision of peace, rights and justice.   B. Address the political nature of finances Arrears need to be linked to accountability . Enforce Article 19 suspensions more consistently and explore extending this principle to veto rights for chronic non-payers. End perverse refund rules . Retain late contributions for future programming instead of reimbursing them. Focus the budget on comparative advantage . Do less, better, concentrate resources on norm-setting, convening and mediation while scaling back duplicative delivery roles. C. Escape the mandate trap Mandate Implementation Review (MIR).  Use Reform UN80 to prune obsolete mandates. Without political discipline from member states, efficiency reforms will collapse under the weight of outdated obligations.   D. Rebuild multilateralism Operationalise multilateralism . Demonstrate its value through preventive diplomacy, political missions and field outcomes, not rhetoric. Institutionalise regional complementarity . Predictable financing and planning frameworks need o be established with the AU, ASEAN and others. E. Security Council reform Pursue regional representation . Break the deadlock on Council reform by allocating seats by region rather than states, with provisions for internal rotation so as to ensure inclusivity. Introduce a qualified veto , which restricts the use of the veto to cases which demonstrably contravene the Charter and such a veto should be subject to legal review. F. Leadership and organisational culture Depoliticise appointments . Create independent recruitment committees, introduce public shortlists and introduce performance contracts for senior leaders. Shift culture from process to outcomes . Promote leaders who innovate, take risks and deliver, and address the structural roots of risk-aversion by reducing reporting burdens and mandate overload.   G. Empower the Global South Move from inclusion to leadership . The South must not only demand seats at the table, but it should propose its own frameworks for reform. Leverage multipolar platforms .  Use the AU, G77 and BRICS to articulate collective positions and resist fragmentation by avoiding to be sucked in by the great-power rivalry.   H. Africa and South Africa Seize Africa’s central role .  Press for Council representation, predictable UN - AU financing and budget accountability. South Africa as thought leader .  Use its diplomatic credibility and platforms to bridge divides, articulate Southern perspectives and ensure Africa is not marginalised. 7.2 Final reflection   The UN at 80 faces a decisive choice. The organisation can continue to be hollowed out by arrears, unilateral deals and geopolitical rivalry, sliding toward the irrelevance that doomed the League of Nations or it can reclaim its Charter promise by focusing on peace and security, disciplining mandates, reforming finances, renewing leadership and amplifying the voices of the Global South.   The consultation and external analyses converge on one clear lesson, namely that technical reforms alone will not save the UN. What is required is political imagination, trust and courage. Reform UN80 will only succeed if it goes beyond efficiency to fidelity, that is fidelity to the Charter’s spirit of collective security, equality and justice.   If this challenge is met, the UN’s 80th anniversary will be remembered not as the beginning of decline, but as the rebirth of multilateralism for a multipolar century.   ANNEXURE 1   What is the aim of reform UN80?   Reform UN80 is framed by the Secretary-General as a comprehensive effort to modernise and streamline the United Nations system on the occasion of its 80th anniversary. At its core, the reform seeks to:   Enhance efficiency by reducing duplication across the Secretariat, consolidating structures and relocating some functions to lower-cost duty stations. Reduce administrative burden by cutting the excessive number of mandated reports required by the General Assembly and Security Council, many of which add little political value. Rationalise mandates through the proposed Mandate Implementation Review (MIR), which aims to prune thousands of outdated or duplicative mandates that date back decades.   However, the consultation and supporting analyses stress that the true aim of reform must go beyond managerial efficiency. Without political renewal, Reform UN80 risks being another cycle of bureaucratic housekeeping. The UN was created to prevent war and foster peace, unless reform strengthens its ability to mediate conflicts, engage in preventive diplomacy and uphold the Charter’s principles, it will not restore legitimacy.   Thus, the aim of Reform UN80 should not be narrowly understood as cost-saving or restructuring. Its deeper purpose must be to re-anchor the UN in its founding mission, ensuring that efficiency gains are harnessed to deliver political results, strengthen multilateralism and meet the expectations of member states and peoples in a multipolar world.   ANNEXURE 2   How does the UN solve its budget problem, given the withholding of funds by some (the USA in particular), coupled with increased peace missions and humanitarian crises?   The UN’s budget crisis is one of its most pressing existential challenges. The organisation currently faces billions of dollars in unpaid contributions, as of 2024, $2.4 billion in regular budget arrears and $2.7 billion in peacekeeping arrears, with the United States alone responsible for $1.5 billion. At the same time, demands on the UN are expanding, with a rising number of conflicts, complex humanitarian emergencies and peace operations.   The consultation concluded that this is not simply a financial problem, but a political one, since arrears and delayed payments are being deployed as deliberate tools of influence This is especially true for powerful states who create artificial liquidity crises, which then undermine trust and destabilise missions, particularly in Africa.   The UN can address this only through bold reforms by:   Ensuring   accountability for arrears by strictly enforcing Article 19 of the Charter, which provides for the suspension of voting rights for chronic non-payers, and consider linking veto powers in the Security Council to financial compliance. Revising financial rules to end the practice of refunding unspent late contributions and instead the funds should be retained for future programming in order to stabilise budgets. Introducing strategic prioritisation which adopts a “do less, better” approach, thereby focusing resources on areas of unique comparative advantage (norm-setting, convening and mediation), while reducing overstretched delivery roles. Changing the political narrative with the aim of rebuilding trust and legitimacy by connecting financial reforms to outcomes and showing member states that resources will translate into results.  In short, solving the budget problem requires political will, accountability mechanisms and strategic discipline, without which the UN risks following the League of Nations into irrelevance. ANNEXURE 3   What is the Secretary-General’s view concerning the growing trend towards unilateralism compared with the UN’s notion of multilateralism?   The Secretary-General’s consistent position is that unilateralism cannot substitute for multilateralism. And yet, transactional deals are often brokered by powerful states or coalitions. But while they may provide short-term stability, they fail to resolve the structural causes of conflict. Moreover, in developing the deals, key stakeholders are frequently excluded, which deals  then lack legitimacy and collapse once immediate incentives shift.   In contrast to the transactional deals, the UN’s commitment to multilateralism is grounded in its Charter and in the principle that collective action is the only sustainable basis for peace and security. The UN provides legitimacy, inclusivity and the capacity to mediate disputes impartially, attributes that unilateral or mini-lateral arrangements cannot replicate.   The consultation noted, however, that the UN has not lived up to this role. Years of underinvestment in peace and security, combined with the “mandate trap” of servicing outdated obligations, have left the organisation less engaged just as unilateralism has gained ground. The Secretary-General therefore urges member states to support reforms that operationalise multilateralism, not just invoke it rhetorically. This means:   Reinvesting in preventive diplomacy and political missions. Institutionalising partnerships with regional organisations, for example, the AU and ASEAN) to act as first responders within a global framework. Cultivating leadership that delivers outcomes, not just process.  The Secretary-General’s view is clear: multilateralism must be made tangible through results. Without this, the world will slide further toward fragmented unilateralism, undermining the very foundations of the UN system. ANNEXURE 4   Given the stand-off between the USA and China, how does the UN consider their changing influences and roles within the UN system? And what does this mean for the Global South?   The rivalry between the United States and China is reshaping the UN from within.   On the one hand, the United States , the UN’s the largest contributor, is using its arrears and late payments to exert influence and to weaken the UN’s financial stability in order to coerce support for its foreign policy interests. On the other hand, China, now the second-largest contributor, is expanding its leadership in UN agencies and presenting itself as a champion of South - South cooperation, while also promoting its own governance models.   This rivalry has paralysed the Security Council and is turning it into an arena of obstruction, where vetoes block action on crises from Syria to Ukraine and beyond. Furthermore, it also polarises the broader UN debates, as each side seeks to advance their own competing visions of world order.   For the Global South, this rivalry presents both risks and opportunities, in that the South could either be reduced to a passive arena for great-power competition, with its conflicts instrumentalised and its priorities sidelined or it could tactically use the multipolarity to creates space for its own agency. By building coalitions through the African Union, BRICS, G77 and other platforms, the South can articulate and advance its own reform agenda and it can leverage rivalry to extract commitments and ensure its voices are central.   Africa stands at the centre of this dynamic. It is the testing ground for the UN’s legitimacy, the largest contributor of peacekeepers and yet systemically underrepresented in decision-making. Reform UN80 provides an opportunity to press for regional representation on the Council, predictable UN - AU financing and a stronger African voice in governance.   For South Africa in particular, this moment is pivotal. As a bridge between Africa, the Global South, and emerging powers, it has both moral authority and strategic positioning to shape the reform agenda. The implication is clear: if Africa and the South act collectively and proactively, they can turn great-power rivalry from a risk into a historic opportunity for influence. Top of Form   [1]  United Nations (n.d.) Secretary-General speaking at a media briefing  [Photograph]. UN Cyprus Talks. Available at: https://uncyprustalks.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/styles/full_width_image/public/field/image/sg3.jpg (Accessed: 29 August 2025). Reproduced under fair dealing in South Africa. No permission obtained. [2]  Statista via Newsweek (n.d.) United Nations member contributions to UN budget  [Infographic]. Available at: https://d.newsweek.com/en/full/1534981/unites-nations-member-contributions-statista.jpg?w=1200&f=d66b63c5cbd3385e0117d0e131988928 (Accessed: 29 August 2025). Reproduced under fair dealing (review/reporting purposes) in accordance with South African law; permission not secured. [3]  United Nations (n.d.) UN peacekeepers at the 2023 Ghana Ministerial  [Photograph]. United Nations Peacekeeping. Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/styles/1200x500/public/field/image/ghana_ministerial.jpeg?itok=MLjHVz3B (Accessed: 29 August 2025). Reproduced under South African fair dealing (reporting/commentary). No permission obtained. [4]  United Nations (2023) Speaker at the UN General Assembly, 2023 UN General Debate  [Photograph]. United Nations General Assembly. Available at: https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/styles/max_1300x1300/public/2023-09/un71000505.jpg?itok=dzDGdPF_ (Accessed: 29 August 2025). Reproduced under South African fair dealing for reporting/commentary on current events. No permission obtained.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On 15 September 2025, the Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society, Daryl Swanepoel, participated in the FOGGS Open Consultation on “Shaping Global Governance Through Middle Power Capabilities.” This virtual consultation formed part of the FOGGS Open Consultation Mondays series, a platform designed to explore critical issues in global governance and the evolving role of middle powers.   Background and purpose of the event   As geopolitical rivalries intensify and competition among major powers grows, existing governance structures have revealed their limitations. In this shifting landscape, middle powers have emerged as crucial actors, recognised for their diplomatic skill, commitment to multilateralism, and capacity to build consensus. These states are uniquely positioned to act as bridges within a fractured global system, advancing peace, sustainability and fair economic practices. The session’s objectives were to:   Identify areas of influence where middle powers can make a difference, including peacebuilding, climate action and sustainability. Map out institutional pathways within the UN, regional organizations and bilateral relations that enable middle powers to exert influence. Define their unique capabilities, from leadership approaches and economic positions to legacies of global engagement. Empower middle power policymakers to take initiative and foster change on the global stage.   CEO’s intervention   In his contribution to the discussion, Mr Swanepoel addressed a central challenge confronting middle powers: how to navigate potential sanctions or punitive measures from superpowers that seek to constrain their autonomy. He underscored that when middle powers attempt to advance alternative pathways of governance or justice that do not align with the interests of dominant states, they often face retaliation.   As an example, he referred to the US push-back against South Africa’s action at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning Israel, framing it as a case where a middle power’s principled stance in defence of international law attracted resistance from the global superpower.   Significance of the discussion   Mr. Swanepoel emphasised that such dynamics highlight the importance of collective resilience among middle powers, the diversification of partnerships and instruments to withstand coercive measures and the advancement of inclusive multilateralism where all states, not only the most powerful,  have a voice in shaping global rules.   By raising this issue, he contributed to a broader debate on how middle powers can move from being vulnerable actors caught in superpower competition to becoming proactive shapers of fair and sustainable global governance.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 31 July 2025 which have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   August 2025   Rapporteur: Odile Bulten Editor: Daryl Swanepoel CONTENTS 1 SETTING THE SCENE: Rethinking development financing in Africa’s age of uncertainty 2 FINANCING AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT IN A COMPLEX GLOBAL ORDER: Insights from Amb Fébé Potgieter-Gqubule 2.1 Global dynamics and emerging complexities 2.2 Historical legacy and the African development agenda 2.3 The political economy of bilateral aid and its limitations 2.4 The African Union’s strategic financial reforms 2.5 Sector-specific challenges and the imperative for differentiated financing approaches 2.6 Conclusions and strategic recommendations 3 DELEGATE PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT FINANCING: Ground-level realities and strategic reflections 3.1 Enduring Aid Dependency and Its Institutional Impacts 3.2 The gap between fiscal discourse and budgetary commitment 3.3 Domestic resource mobilisation: An ambition yet to be realised 3.4 Mindset shift: Beyond material constraints 3.5 National case studies: Illustrations from the ground 3.6 Conclusion: Redefining responsibility in African development finance 4 INSIGHTS FROM THE DISCUSSION 5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND ROADMAP ROADMAP Cover photo (Africa): istock.com - Stock illustration ID:2090866893 Cover photo (Money): istock.com - Stock photo ID:484780166 1 SETTING THE SCENE Rethinking development financing in Africa’s age of uncertainty   Africa’s development trajectory remains intricately tied to how the continent mobilises, manages and governs its financial resources. Despite decades of reformist declarations and regional development strategies, much of Africa’s growth potential continues to be constrained by structural dependencies on external funding, narrow domestic revenue bases and fragmented financial governance. The imperative to reimagine how Africa finances its development is no longer a matter of long-term planning, it is a strategic necessity in the face of global shifts and declining aid flows.   Recent reductions in Official Development Assistance (ODA), most notably from the United States, have exposed the vulnerabilities of a model built on external goodwill and short-term commitments. Many African states remain heavily reliant on aid to fund critical sectors such as health, education and infrastructure. With donor priorities shifting inward and multilateral budgets tightening, the continent faces a growing risk of underinvestment in public services, institutional capacity and long-term development goals.   Private capital, heralded as the next frontier of development finance, has not delivered on its promise. Mechanisms such as blended finance and impact investing, though widely promoted in global frameworks like the Compromiso de Sevilla, have yet to gain meaningful traction in Africa. In practice, these models often prioritise risk minimisation for investors over developmental outcomes. Moreover, the absence of enforceable accountability structures, time-bound targets and alignment with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) priorities renders such instruments inadequate substitutes for traditional financing, especially in countries with weak credit ratings or limited financial markets.   This financial fragility is compounded by enduring issues such as capital flight, illicit financial flows, inefficient tax systems and limited institutional capacity to collect and manage public revenue. The consequences are far-reaching: reduced fiscal space for social spending, stagnating infrastructure development and constrained investments in education, innovation and job creation. These factors collectively undermine the continent’s ability to chart an independent and sustainable development path.   Amid these pressures, the conversation is shifting. There is growing consensus that Africa must adopt a more self-reliant, diversified and resilient financing strategy. Central to this is the need to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, from expanding tax bases to improving public financial management. Equally important is the pursuit of regional mechanisms for pooled financing, as seen in efforts by the African Union to operationalise frameworks like the Kigali Financing Decision. Such initiatives aim to fund continental priorities through internally generated revenues, signalling a shift away from donor dependency toward institutional sovereignty.   Furthermore, Africa’s position in global financial governance needs to be recalibrated. The continent’s ability to influence international norms on debt, aid and investment remains limited, even as these decisions have disproportionate effects on African economies. Coordinated negotiation strategies, stronger regional blocs and greater use of collective voice within institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO are critical steps toward reshaping the rules that govern financial flows into and out of the continent.   It is against this backdrop that the Africa Think Tank Dialogue (ATD) convened the July 2025 session on "Funding for Development." The aim was to interrogate the assumptions underpinning Africa’s current financing landscape, assess the viability of emerging models and explore actionable strategies for building a more autonomous and development-aligned financial ecosystem. The conversation recognises that Africa’s development challenge is not solely about mobilising more funds, but about gaining greater control over the sources, conditions, and uses of those funds.   The following section offers an in-depth reflection on these issues through a comprehensive analysis of Africa’s development financing architecture. Drawing from institutional history, policy evolution and emerging continental frameworks, the discussion explores how Africa can transition from reactive dependency to proactive financial sovereignty.   2 FINANCING AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT IN A COMPLEX GLOBAL ORDER Insights from Amb Fébé Potgieter-Gqubule Head of Policy at the African National Congress and former South African diplomat and senior African Union official   Ambassador Fébé Potgieter’s contribution to the African Think Tank Dialogue (ATD) offers a rare and incisive panorama of Africa’s evolving financial landscape. Drawing from extensive diplomatic engagement, institutional analysis and policy reform within the African Union (AU), Potgieter contextualises Africa’s development challenges within a shifting global geopolitical framework. Her intervention not only traces the historical and structural challenges associated with development financing, but also calls for a revitalised commitment to internal continental reforms and differentiated strategies that reflect the nuanced demands of peace, infrastructure, climate and human development.   In this report, her address is analysed in depth across six thematic axes: the shifting global context; the historical evolution of the African development financing agenda; the political economy of bilateral aid and its limitations; AU institutional reforms; differentiated sectoral financing approaches; and the critical policy lessons that must guide Africa’s path forward. 2.1 Global dynamics and emerging complexities   Ambassador Potgieter opened her remarks by situating Africa’s development predicament within a broader landscape marked by diminishing international support and increasing complexity in geopolitical relations. She underscored that Africa finds itself navigating a global environment where traditional donor support, particularly from the United States, has significantly waned. This reduction is not isolated to bilateral arrangements, but extends to support for multilateral institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and other developmental arms of the international system.   This retrenchment of multilateral financing directly undermines the capacity of African states to respond to pressing health, climate and economic challenges. The inability to rely on predictable, rules-based multilateral support has led to a funding vacuum that compromises the effectiveness of research, health systems and long-term developmental programming. It also restricts the continent’s agency in shaping global norms around health security, climate adaptation and post-conflict recovery.   Potgieter further noted a worrying trend in bilateral trade relations, where aid and trade are increasingly conflated under coercive conditionalities. Rather than advancing mutually beneficial trade, some powerful nations have imposed unilateral tariffs, as high as 30% to 50%, under the guise of market negotiations. These tariffs, presented as non-negotiable, are often tied to political concessions or commercial advantages for the donor country’s corporations, significantly undermining the negotiating power and economic sovereignty of African states.   In the domain of peace and security, Potgieter identified a paralysis within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), particularly in terms of supporting peacekeeping operations in Africa. While historically the UNSC has authorised missions across the continent, the current dysfunction, marked by geopolitical deadlock and resource withdrawal, has left many African conflicts underfunded and unresolved. This is particularly problematic given that most UN peacekeeping missions in recent decades have taken place in Africa.   Adding to this challenging context is the issue of climate finance. Potgieter emphasised the compounded impact of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the broader failure of developed nations to honour climate finance commitments. This not only leaves African countries vulnerable to natural disasters and environmental degradation, but also deprives them of the funding necessary for climate adaptation, resilience building and post-disaster recovery.   Taken together, these trends present a highly constrained global environment, where the traditional instruments of development cooperation are no longer reliable and where African agency is increasingly restricted by external priorities and internal fragility. 2.2 Historical legacy and the African development agenda   To better understand contemporary dynamics, Potgieter encouraged a retrospective examination of the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period she characterised as critical in shaping the trajectory of Africa’s development financing discourse. During this era, African leaders, responding to decades of underdevelopment and marginalisation, began articulating a more assertive continental agenda centred on debt forgiveness, institutional reform and integration into global governance structures.   One of the central debates of the time was the growing recognition that African countries were servicing debt at unsustainable levels. The cost of interest payments on sovereign debt often exceeded the total volume of development assistance received. This financial paradox became the rallying point for global debt cancellation campaigns, most notably the Jubilee 2000 movement, which was spearheaded by civil society actors, faith-based organisations and progressive political leaders. Potgieter recalled how this advocacy led to meaningful, if partial, debt relief initiatives and drew global attention to the structural imbalances embedded in the international financial system.   Concurrently, African countries were crafting the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which sought to reframe the continent’s development narrative from one of dependency to one of strategic partnership and homegrown solutions. The NEPAD agenda emphasised regional integration, institutional reform and engagement with global forums such as the G8, G20 and the World Trade Organization. This period marked Africa’s concerted effort to avoid marginalisation amid the rapid globalisation of trade and capital, particularly following what Potgieter termed the “dead development decades” of the 1970s and 1980s.   African countries also began engaging in bilateral partnerships designed to enhance trade and development cooperation. Initiatives such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), as well as similar engagements with the UK and EU, promised to channel resources into infrastructure and social development. While these engagements were symbolically significant, Potgieter hinted that they were often asymmetrical in nature, reflecting deeper power imbalances. 2.3 The political economy of bilateral aid and its limitations   Potgieter’s critique of bilateral aid was particularly compelling. She dismantled the illusion of donor altruism, arguing that most aid packages were embedded in a transactional logic designed to advance the strategic and commercial interests of donor countries. Aid was seldom unconditional. It came with clauses favouring donor-country companies in project implementation, a phenomenon she illustrated using the example of energy infrastructure development in the Democratic Republic of Congo.   This arrangement often meant that aid funds were effectively recycled back to donor economies via contracts awarded to firms headquartered in the Global North. In consequence, African economies saw limited gains in terms of local capacity building, employment or technology transfer. Industrial development stagnated and inter-African trade remained negligible despite decades of donor interventions.   She cited Nobel Peace Laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who in characteristically blunt terms criticised African leaders for “dancing for donors” while ignoring the fiscal contributions of their own citizens. This metaphor underscored a broader epistemic dependency, where external validation was sought at the expense of internal confidence and ownership.   While acknowledging that some least-developed countries remain structurally dependent on aid, especially for health and education, Potgieter urged a paradigm shift toward recognising and scaling up domestic resource mobilisation, reinforcing the principle that development must be funded and driven by Africans themselves. 2.4 The African Union’s strategic financial reforms   One of the most substantive elements of Potgieter’s address was her detailed account of the African Union’s institutional response to financial dependency. She identified two landmark initiatives: The first was led by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. This initiative assessed Africa’s external and internal financing patterns, providing a holistic overview of aid flows, loan repayments, foreign direct investment and infrastructural needs. Its key recommendation was that the African Union should significantly reduce its reliance on external funding. This led to the historic Kigali Financing Decision in 2016, which proposed that the AU finance at least 75% of its operational and programmatic budget internally, alongside 25% to 30% of its peace support operations.   To operationalise this vision, the AU introduced a 0.2% import levy, modelled after ECOWAS’s financing mechanism, to generate predictable and sustainable revenue. While conceptually sound, implementation has been uneven due to resistance from both external partners and AU member states, particularly in the SADC region.   The second initiative was spearheaded by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, who chaired the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs). This panel revealed that Africa loses billions annually due to capital flight, through tax avoidance, under-declaration of mineral exports and illegal financial transactions. The volume of IFFs far outstrips official development assistance, making it a central priority for reform. Importantly, the panel broadened the definition of IFFs to include legal but unethical corporate practices, thus spotlighting systemic enablers of underdevelopment both within and outside Africa.   Both initiatives advanced the principle of developmental sovereignty, arguing that the continent’s future cannot be outsourced to donor agendas, but must be rooted in sound domestic institutions, transparent governance and strategic resource retention. 2.5 Sector-specific challenges and the imperative for differentiated financing approaches   Potgieter was unequivocal in her assertion that financing African development cannot be approached monolithically. She advocated for a differentiated approach tailored to the unique needs and financing structures of various sectors.   In the realm of peace and security, for instance, she noted that African-led peace enforcement operations are frequently underfunded and strategically marginalised due to the UN’s preference for “peacekeeping” rather than “peace enforcement.” This hesitancy creates a gap that African institutions must fill independently. The Kigali Decision envisioned a more autonomous AU, capable of rapid deployment and intervention in fragile contexts, even when the UN fails to act.   Climate finance represents another sector where global commitments have fallen short. While Africa bears the brunt of climate change, it receives only a fraction of the promised adaptation funds. Financing here must be concessional, long-term and equity-based, with a focus on resilience, loss and damage and disaster preparedness.   In the health and education sectors, Potgieter acknowledged that aid remains vital for many LDCs. However, she emphasised the importance of enhancing domestic fiscal capacity and service delivery mechanisms to ensure long-term sustainability. These sectors also require predictable, recurrent funding, which external partners are often reluctant to guarantee.   On infrastructure, she noted a positive trend. Citing an AU-NEPAD review of the PIDA (Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa), Potgieter highlighted that Africa had exceeded some of its targets in attracting external financing for infrastructure projects. While the quality and strategic relevance of these projects vary, this progress signals that infrastructure may be an area of relative strength that can be scaled up. 2.6 Conclusions and strategic recommendations   Ambassador Potgieter concluded with a stark, but hopeful message: while Africa has made commendable progress in articulating its development priorities and designing institutional mechanisms, the challenge remains one of implementation and political will. The continent’s financing future hinges not only on external conditions, but on internal choices, alignments and reforms.   She called for a revival of the Kigali Decision, strengthened enforcement of AU member obligations and a renewed campaign to operationalise the recommendations of both the Obasanjo and Mbeki panels. Equally important is a shift in narrative, from one of dependence to one of agency. African leaders must centre their citizens’ contributions, challenge exploitative trade dynamics and reclaim the continent’s role as a proactive agent in global development.   Above all, Potgieter urged African institutions to adopt strategically disaggregated financing strategies. Peacekeeping, climate resilience, infrastructure, education and health all demand distinct financing models, tailored governance arrangements and sector-specific partnerships.   Her address stands as a compelling call to action, insisting that Africa's development trajectory is not merely shaped by global forces, but by the courage and coordination of its own institutions.   3 DELEGATE PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT FINACING Ground-level realities and strategic reflections   As the keynote concluded, the dialogue opened to participants from across the continent, think tank representatives, who brought national and regional perspectives into sharper focus. Their contributions revealed a shared concern about Africa’s entrenched reliance on external financing, as well as a collective desire to see greater fiscal ownership, institutional discipline and mindset transformation in how the continent finances its development priorities.   The contributions, grounded in lived national realities, provided compelling illustrations of how financing challenges play out at policy and operational levels. Despite differences in country contexts, a number of strong thematic threads emerged: an enduring dependence on external funding; limited progress in mobilising domestic resources; institutional misalignment between fiscal policy and development ambitions; and the urgent need for African governments to demonstrate greater political and budgetary ownership over national development agendas. 3.1 Enduring Aid Dependency and Its Institutional Impacts   Across multiple interventions, the extent to which African states remain dependent on donor financing was laid bare. A participant from Nigeria spoke candidly about the situation in their country, particularly within the health sector, where international donors continue to play an outsized role in sustaining essential services. “Most of our countries are largely dependent on external funding,” the participant said, adding that in many cases, donors provide 80 to 90 percent of the financial resources required to run health programmes. Governments may contribute the remaining 10 or 20 percent, but this often functions more as a symbolic gesture than a foundation for sovereignty.   This reality, the speaker emphasised, is not limited to Nigeria. It is reflective of a broader pattern across the continent, where reliance on bilateral and multilateral development assistance, particularly for social sectors, remains deeply entrenched. While such aid has filled vital gaps, its continued dominance raises questions about ownership, sustainability and accountability.   Another delegate echoed this concern, noting that donor-dependency distorts national priorities. With programmes and timelines often shaped to fit donor cycles, governments may find themselves aligning with external benchmarks rather than homegrown development plans. This, in turn, weakens the autonomy of national institutions and limits their capacity to build long-term financing frameworks tailored to local needs.   3.2 The gap between fiscal discourse and budgetary commitment   Several participants drew attention to the disjuncture between public policy discourse and actual fiscal behaviour. While national leaders routinely emphasise the importance of African self-reliance and ownership over development financing, national budgets frequently fail to reflect these priorities in meaningful terms.   For example, one participant pointed out that although domestic funding for health or education is often formally included in national plans, the actual disbursement of such funds is frequently delayed, incomplete or deprioritised. External donors are then called upon to fill the void. This reinforces the dependency cycle and signals to development partners that national leadership may not fully prioritise these sectors.   Delegates noted that this credibility gap has long-term consequences. Donors may become reluctant to transition financial and programmatic control to national governments if those governments appear unwilling or unable to take full fiscal responsibility. Thus, the absence of consistent and timely domestic funding undermines both national autonomy and international trust. 3.3 Domestic resource mobilisation: An ambition yet to be realised   The imperative to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) emerged as a core theme. One delegate observed that African countries often speak passionately about the need to take charge of their development, but continue to rely overwhelmingly on foreign funding when it comes to actual implementation. “We must take ownership,” a participant urged, emphasising that the continent already possesses the material and human capital necessary to drive its development, what is lacking is the coordination and resolve to marshal those resources effectively.   However, delegates were not naïve about the obstacles. A narrow tax base, large informal economies and limited administrative capacity to collect and manage revenue were all cited as structural constraints to effective DRM. Moreover, the legitimacy of taxation itself is often undermined by poor service delivery and weak public trust, which make citizens less willing to comply with tax obligations. One speaker summarised this cycle succinctly: “If people don’t see the benefits of paying taxes, they will continue to evade them.”   Nonetheless, there was strong support for DRM as the only viable path to sustainable development finance. Delegates called for reforms in tax administration, more equitable revenue policies and more transparent use of public funds. Several noted that when citizens believe their contributions are being used responsibly, they are more likely to accept taxation as part of a legitimate social contract. 3.4 Mindset shift: Beyond material constraints   Beyond technical and institutional constraints, some participants emphasised the importance of changing the way African states and societies conceptualise their own capabilities. “We must stop thinking we are poor,” one speaker urged, calling for a revaluation of Africa’s internal strengths, its people, its culture, its natural resources and its economic potential. This mindset, they argued, is not only necessary for building public confidence, but also for shifting how African countries position themselves globally, not as aid recipients, but as equal partners and contributors to global development.   This was not merely a rhetorical point. Several participants connected this mindset to concrete governance behaviour: When leaders believe they must rely on donors, they structure their budgets, policies and political strategies accordingly. But when they commit to mobilising internal resources, even modestly, they begin to invest in the systems and institutions that enable long-term transformation. 3.5 National case studies: Illustrations from the ground   Delegates offered insights from specific country contexts to ground these broader themes. A representative spoke of Côte d’Ivoire, saying that while strategic frameworks for national development are in place, the actual financial resources required to implement them often fall short. The speaker highlighted the tensions between national ambition and fiscal reality, a gap that too often results in underperformance or missed targets.   Another participant shared the Ugandan perspective, that while efforts are underway to increase domestic contributions to national priorities, challenges persist. The tax base remains narrow, enforcement mechanisms are weak and institutional coordination is inconsistent. Despite these hurdles, there was cautious optimism that gradual reforms and increased fiscal discipline could pave the way for more predictable and autonomous financing in the years ahead.   Other speakers echoed these sentiments, reinforcing the view that while no country is immune to constraints, each must find its own pathway to incrementally reduce its reliance on external financing and strengthen domestic systems of financial governance. 3.6 Conclusion: Redefining responsibility in African development finance   The delegate inputs underscored a crucial insight: that the question of financing development in Africa is not simply a matter of technical solutions or financial inflows. It is fundamentally a question of political will, institutional integrity and shared responsibility, between governments and citizens and among countries within the continent.   While donors will likely remain part of the financing mix in the near term, the overwhelming message was clear: Africa must take decisive steps to own its development trajectory, not only in policy, but in budgeting, implementation and accountability. This includes setting clear national priorities, committing adequate domestic resources, building trust with citizens through responsible governance and resisting the temptation to default to donor dependency.   In short, the dialogue confirmed that development financing is inseparable from development ownership. And until African governments prioritise the internal financing of their national ambitions, external actors will continue to shape the pace, scope and direction of Africa’s future. 4 INSIGHTS FROM THE DISCUSSION   This report presents an extensive overview of Africa's development financing landscape, integrating an in-depth discussion and insights from African perspectives, to outline pivotal conclusions, recommendations and a strategic roadmap.   Furthermore, it emphasises the need for integrated policy proposals that address funding, security and economic growth comprehensively. The success of these goals hinges on the pivotal role of governance and leadership in empowering African institutions to take ownership of their development and security challenges.   Key conclusions   Dependency on external funding   Africa's development has predominantly relied on external funding, like Official Development Assistance (ODA) and private capital. However, diminishing ODA and the limited efficacy of private capital mechanisms have exposed the vulnerabilities of this model.   Financial fragility   Factors such as capital flight, illicit financial flows, inefficient tax systems and constrained institutional capacity have exacerbated Africa's financial fragility, limiting fiscal space for essential social and infrastructure investments.   Shift Towards Self-Reliance   There is a growing consensus that Africa must adopt a more self-reliant, diversified and resilient financing strategy, focusing on strengthening domestic resource mobilisation and pursuing regional pooled financing mechanisms.   Global financial governance   Africa's influence in shaping global financial norms on debt, aid and investments remains limited, necessitating strategic recalibration.   Sector-specific financing challenges   Sectors like peace, security, climate finance, health and education require tailored financial strategies.   Inclusive economic growth   Emphasis was placed on fostering growth that benefits all citizens, addressing debt relief, equitable trade agreements and robust infrastructure development. Civil Society Engagement   Civil society’s role is critical in addressing security challenges, promoting good governance, accountability and ensuring efficient resource utilisation.   Leadership and institutional capacity   Strong leadership and robust institutions are vital for effective resources management, corruption mitigation and policy implementation.   Interconnected pillars   Security, funding, economic growth and governance are intrinsically linked. Inclusive sustainable development hinges on addressing these elements collectively when designing policies.    5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND ROADMAP   To achieve financial sovereignty, Africa must transition from external dependency to proactive internal strategies and reforms. This includes seizing potential opportunities for growth and investing in innovative technologies. These actionable recommendations offer an opportunity to shape the continent’s development future.   The proposed Roadmap  serves as a call to action for Africa to take decisive steps in shaping its development trajectory. This involves setting clear national priorities, committing sufficient domestic resources, fostering trust with citizens, including the Youth, through responsible governance, and resisting the allure of donor dependency.   Revive the Kigali Decision , which aims to reduce Africa's reliance on external funding by financing at least 75% of the African Union's operational and programmatic budget internally, alongside 25% to 30% of its peace support operations. Pursuing regional pooled mechanisms to fund continental priorities through internally generated revenues is crucial.   Enforce the AU member commitments in order to ensure compliance with agreed-upon financial obligations.   Implement the recommendations of the Obasanjo and Mbeki Reports, which recommendations focus on reducing external financial dependency and curbing illicit financial flows.   Adopt differentiated financing strategies, whereby African institutions are urged to tailor sector-specific approaches, such as concessional loans for infrastructure, long-term financing for climate resilience and predictable funding for peacekeeping, education and health.   Promote a narrative of agency in which African leaders are encouraged to highlight citizens' contributions, challenge inequitable trade dynamics and assert Africa’s proactive role in global development.   Strengthen domestic resource mobilisation by expanding tax bases, enhancing public fiscal management and boosting institutional efficiency to collect and manage public revenue.   Recalibrate Africa's position in global financial governance by coordinating negotiation strategies, strengthening regional blocs and amplifying Africa’s collective voice in global forums and institutions. Enhance political will and institutional integrity so as to align national priorities with budgeting, implementation and accountability.   ROADMAP   1. Short-Term (1-2 years) :   Reform tax and fiscal management systems to improve domestic resource mobilisation. Activate regional financing frameworks like the Kigali Financing Decision . Develop and implement sector-specific financial strategies.   2. Medium-Term (3-5 years) :   Strengthen regional blocs for global influence. Scale up and sustain successful domestic resource mobilisation initiatives. Align sector-specific financing models with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).   3. Long-Term (5+ years) :   Drastically reduce reliance on external funding. Position Africa as a key global development actor. Ensure resilient, sustainable financing aligned with long-term development objectives.     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The recent Daily Maverick: The Gathering  marked its 15 th  iteration of the flagship annual event. Held on 28 August, it brought together some of South Africa’s leading thinkers and doers. Including journalists, business leaders, activists and public officials, the event offered an interactive space for public discussion. Represented by Dr Klaus Kotzé, the Inclusive Society Institute actively participated in the day’s proceedings. More than just a conference, the Gathering serves as a dynamic platform for impact-driven reflection. Guided by the Daily Maverick’s Rebecca Davis, some of the stand-out panels included a session on fixing government. Here Home Affairs Minister Leon Schreiber, SARS Commissioner Edward Kieswetter, and Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions Ouma Rabaji-Rasethaba acutely shone light on the institutional challenges and avenues for restoring public trust. Perhaps the most insightful session featured BOSA leader Musi Maimane, ActionSA president Herman Mashaba and Songezo Zibi of Rise Mzansi. The speakers spoke to the fresh visions and bold politics needed to revitalise South African politics. The Institute notes with keen interest the commitment not only of these speakers, but of the event at large, for increased active participation of citizens in the political process. It is encouraging that the initiative sought to move the discussion towards the inclusive, political centre.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   September 2025   Author: Daryl Swanepoel    CONTENTS   ABSTRACT 1 THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 2 THE INCLUSIVE SOCIETY INSTITUTE’S CONCERN 3 ABOUT THE GOVDEM  SURVEY 4 SURVEY RESULTS 4.1 Overall trust in immigrants from Africa 4.2 Age, employment and gender differences 4.3 Trends over time 5 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 6 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1 Distinguish clearly between legal and illegal immigration 6.2 Curb unlawful vigilantism and uphold the rule of law 6.3 Anchor policymaking in empirical evidence 6.4 Enforce labour and immigration laws effectively 6.5 Strengthen integration programmes to promote social cohesion 6.6 Reaffirm constitutional and human rights commitments 7 CONCLUSION REFERENCES Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:2212407849 ABSTRACT   This paper presents the findings of the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Poll, undertaken with IPSOS as part of its Khayabus survey, on South Africans’ attitudes towards immigrants from elsewhere in Africa. Based on over 3,000 face-to-face interviews in respondents’ homes and home languages and weighted in line with national demographics, the survey provides a robust measure of public sentiment with a margin of error of three to five percent.   The 2025 results show high and rising distrust. 73.1 percent of respondents reported that they do not trust immigrants from Africa “at all” or “not very much. Longitudinal data confirms a worsening trend during the last five years, with distrust in immigrants from Africa rising from 62.6 percent in 2021 to a staggering 73.1 percent in 2025.   This paper includes further analyses by age, race, gender and employment status, it offers recommendations to guide evidence-based governance and concludes that South Africa must replace fear with facts and unlawful action with lawful governance, if we are to build an inclusive society.   1 THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA   South Africa has historically always been a destination for migrants from across the African continent. They have and continue to be drawn to the country due to its comparatively stronger economy, its advanced infrastructure and the opportunities for education and work (Okunade, 2024). However, at the same time, the country is grappling with deep rooted challenges, such as poverty, unemployment and inequality. It is these challenges which serve to heighten social tensions between the immigrants and the local communities (Faluyi & Olutola, 2024). It is in this context that immigration has become a sensitive and polarising issue.   The public discourse is frequently marked by debates over the perceived economic and social impact of immigrants. On the one hand, whilst migrants contribute meaningfully to local economies, by filling labour gaps, starting businesses and enriching South Africa’s cultural fabric (OECD/ILO, 2018), there are, on the other hand widespread perceptions, particularly amongst the vulnerable communities that are struggling with unemployment, that immigrants are competing for scarce jobs, housing and public services, such as healthcare and education. These pressures have, at times, spilled over into xenophobic violence and hostility and it is the migrants from elsewhere in Africa that have borne the brunt thereof (Yingi, Ncube & Benyera. 2023).   In recent years tensions between immigrants from Africa and local communities  have grown and immigrants have been provoked by locals in a more organised and confrontational manner. Movements, such as Operation Dudula, have been mobilising local communities to act against foreign nationals, which they often do so through intimidation and harassment.  Tactics also include demands for the removal of immigrants from state facilities, such as hospitals and schools and vigilantes also try to force immigrants out of their jobs, out of their businesses and out of the local neighbourhoods (HRW, 2024). These extra-judicial actions not only undermine the rule of law, they also deepen mistrust and resentment and moreover, it is ventured, immigrants often end up serving as an excuse for public service non-performance and as convenient scapegoats for the broader structural challenges facing the nation, such as crime, structural unemployment and poor service delivery. All of this reflects a societal environment that risks fuelling (some, including the author, may even argue already has) social division due to the fear-mongering and misinformation.   2 THE INCLUSIVE SOCIETY INSTITUTE’S CONCERN   The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), which works to strengthen democracy and to foster social cohesion in South Africa, has consistently warned against the dangers of inflated rhetoric and unlawful vigilantism. It has stressed that inflated figures about the scale of illegal immigration distort the debate, fuels resentment and helps creates conditions ripe for hostility between the immigrant and local communities.   Senior political leaders, such as Action SA’s leader, Herman Mashaba and the then Home Affairs Minister Aaron Motsoaledi,  have respectively bandied around figures as high as 15 million (Hoffman, 2025) and 13 million (ISI, 2022). Key findings from opinion surveys conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) suggest that many South Africans believe the number of illegal immigrants in the country to be as high as 17- 40 million (ISI, 2022).   Empirical data, however, such as that of Stats SA, suggest a far smaller illegal migrant population than often claimed. According to a Stats SA statement in August 2021 there were around 3,95 million foreign born persons (legal and illegal immigrants) in South Africa (Stats SA, 2021). Whilst data on the exact number of illegal immigrants is lacking, through deduction it is plausible to assume that around half of the foreign born persons are in the country illegal (Gordon in ISI, 2022). Home Affairs could, for example, only account for around 2 million foreign born persons (Iturralde in ISI, 2022). The Inclusive Society Institute has consistently argued that there is a profound difference between dealing with a challenge of 2 million versus figures that are higher than 13-15  million, which are frequently cited in public discourse without evidence.   For the Inclusive Society Institute, ensuring rational, evidence-based debate is not only a matter of good governance, it is necessary to safeguard South Africa’s fragile social fabric, because social cohesion is weakened when fear and populism drive public opinion, and strengthened when facts, fairness and inclusivity underpin policymaking. The Institute has therefore stressed the need for sober, evidence-based policy decisions and stronger institutional capacity, as opposed to populist interventions or unlawful acts by civic groups 3 ABOUT THE GOVDEM  SURVEY   The Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey  (ISI, 2025) is conducted in partnership with IPSOS as part of its long-standing syndicated Khayabus Survey (IPSOS, 2025), one of the largest and most reliable public opinion surveys undertaken in South Africa. It comprises around 3,600 respondents from across the nation. To ensure the accuracy of the responses and inclusivity, the respondents are interviewed face-to-face their own homes and in their home language and therefore eliminates many of the barriers that telephone or online surveys often present. This approach also helps to ensure that participants are comfortable, understood and able to express their views freely and authentically. The survey sample is carefully weighted in line with South Africa’s demographics, which means it reflects the diversity of the country in terms of age, gender, race, geography and socio-economic status and on this basis, the findings can be regarded as a fair representation of South Africans’ prevailing sentiment at the time of that the survey was conducted. In this case between May and July of 2025 (Harris, 2025).   As with all surveys of this scale and magnitude, a margin of error is to be expected. In this survey the margin of error is around 2 percent. This margin does not detract from the robustness of the insights, which policymakers, civil society and the public can comfortably consider as reliable evidence of the prevailing attitudes in the country at the time that the survey was conducted (Harris, 2025).   4 SURVEY RESULTS 4.1 Overall trust in immigrants from Africa   Having set out the broader context and outlined the GovDem Survey’s  methodology, we now turn to the results of the survey. The findings reveal a striking level of distrust among South Africans towards immigrants from elsewhere on the continent. When asked whether they trusted people from these groups and measured against the responses “I don’t trust them at all” or “I do not trust them very much,” 73.1 percent of respondents indicated such negative sentiment.   Notably, this distrust is not confined to one segment of society, but is broadly shared across South Africa’s racial groups. Among white respondents, 72.48 percent expressed distrust, among black respondents, it was 73.17 percent, among Indian respondents, 75.22 percent and among coloured respondents it was 72.61 percent. The sentiment therefore cuts across the racial divide, reflecting a widespread national attitude rather than an isolated viewpoint within a particular community.   4.2 Age, employment and gender differences   When analysing the survey results by age, it also emerges that all age groups reflect similarly high levels of distrust towards immigrants from elsewhere in Africa. Among the youngest group, 18–24 year olds, 74.12 percent indicated that they did not trust immigrants. For 25–34 year olds, the figure was 71.22 percent, for those aged 35–49, 71.74 percent and among respondents over 50 years old, 76.16 percent. These results show that the sentiment is broadly uniform across generations, with only marginal differences.   Where a more marked differentiation emerges is between those respondents who are employed and those who are not. Among respondents who reported being in employment, 70.06 percent indicated distrust of immigrants. By contrast, among those who reported being unemployed, the figure rises to 77.31 percent. This could suggest that joblessness intensifies the negative perceptions that local communities have of African immigrants, which is most probably due to the belief that they, the immigrants that is, are competing in the labour market to the detriment of the local job seekers.   Finally, when comparing survey results by gender, a slight divergence is evident, with men expressing distrust in immigrants from Africa at a rate of 71.39 percent, while women reflect a slightly higher distrust at 74.33 percent. Women are thus marginally more concerned about the presence of African immigrants in the country than their male compatriots, but, as already said, the gap is relatively small. Graphic 1: % of respondents distrusting of immigrants from African countries (various demographics)   (Source: Author, 2025) 4.3 Trends over time   The GovDem Survey  also provides disturbing insight into how attitudes towards immigrants from Africa have hardened over the past five years. In 2021, 62.63 percent of respondents indicated that they did not trust immigrants “at all” or “not very much”  and in 2022, the figure was almost identical at 62.72 percent. But by 2023, however, the percentage had risen to 67.74 percent and in 2024 it continued to remain elevated (66.98 percent). The most recent survey, that was conducted in mid-2025, shows that distrust has again risen sharply to an alarming 73.1 percent.   The results of the survey indicate that while anti-immigrant sentiment has consistently been high, hovering in the low sixty percent range, it has been steadily worsening over time and it has now (between 2024 and 2025) registered a particularly notable increase. This sharp rise may plausibly be argued to be linked to the heightened attention illegal immigration has received in public discourse, as well as the protest actions and vigilante campaigns, such as those driven by movements like Operation Dudula, which have amplified the issue in the national consciousness of late. Graphic 2: Distrust of immigrants from Africa – a five-year (2021 – 2025) trend   (Source: Author, 2025)   5 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION   The findings of the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey  underscores the persistence and intensification of the anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa and what is striking about it, is not only the consistently high levels of distrust, but so too the fact that these attitudes cut across race, age and gender. This would suggest that the distrust of immigrants hailing from elsewhere in Africa has emerged as a shared national concern, which can no longer be ascribed to any particular community and/or demographic cohort. The broad-based nature of the sentiment arguably reflects just how deeply woven into the nation’s shared socio-economic anxieties the immigration concerns have become. The sharp divergence between the employed and the unemployed respondents is particularly telling and it suggests that unemployment exacerbates the fears that the immigrants are competitors for scarce jobs and resources. This perception, whether or not borne out by evidence, points to a deeper structural problem, namely that the widespread economic insecurity is fuelling resentment. Moreover, immigrants are becoming the scapegoat for frustrations that are, at its source, about inequality and exclusion. The trend-data reinforces this interpretation, because while distrust has long hovered in the low to mid-sixties range, it has suddenly, between 2024 and 2025, risen sharply, which period also aligns with that of intensified political and media focus on immigration and increased protest and vigilante activity. Arguably, this would suggest that public sentiment is not static and that it can be inflamed by populist rhetoric, misinformation and highly visible acts of anti-immigrant mobilisation.   Read together, the results of the GovDem Survey  present a warning signal that South Africa faces a growing risk of the anti-immigrant sentiment eroding social cohesion and deepening societal divisions (if left unaddressed). Moreover, it will undermine the inclusive values enshrined in the Constitution. And so for the Inclusive Society Institute, the imperative is clear: Fear needs to be countered with facts and bridges of solidarity need to be built. Moreover, it is to ensure that immigration policy is guided by evidence and the principles of democracy, rather than by populism or unlawful vigilantism.   6 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS   The results of the GovDem Survey , when coupled and considered within the broader social context, point to the urgent need for a more coherent and balanced approach to immigration policy, from which the following recommendations emerge:   6.1 Distinguish clearly between legal and illegal immigration   Government must urgently draw a line of clarity between those immigrants who are in the country legally and those who are not. At present, the conflation of the two feeds public anxiety and undermines long-term social cohesion. A distinction is also critical to ensuring South Africa retains much-needed skills brought by legal immigrants, which contribute to building the economy, because whilst it is so that some immigrants may compete for jobs, many others fill gaps in scarce professions and therefore the presence of suitably qualified legal immigrants should be recognised as an asset, not a liability. 6.2 Curb unlawful vigilantism and uphold the rule of law   As the Inclusive Society Institute has emphasised, inflated rhetoric and unlawful actions by civic groups or individuals set a dangerous precedent and they, no matter their concerns, have no business in enforcing the laws of the country, that remains the role of the state. Allowing vigilante actions against immigrants undermines state authority, disrupts vital public services and risks legitimising illegality. The authorities must send a clear signal that unlawful enforcement will not be tolerated.   6.3 Anchor policymaking in empirical evidence   The Inclusive Society Institute has already cautioned against inflated figures, which fuel hostility and panic, and accordingly, accurate, evidence-based data on migration must inform public policy. This includes refining population counts, understanding the real scale of irregular migration and communicating these facts to the public in an accessible manner, because without this, populist claims will continue to dominate the discourse and in so doing, worsen mistrust.   6.4 Enforce labour and immigration laws effectively   Given South Africa’s strained economic position and persistently high unemployment, it is unrealistic to assume that growth alone will resolve competition over jobs and therefore a more immediate and practical step is to ensure the effective enforcement of labour and immigration laws.   Employers must be required to hire only South Africans and legal immigrants, with strong penalties for those found employing undocumented workers. To effectively police this, regular workplace inspections and transparent enforcement mechanisms should be instituted to protect vulnerable local job seekers. It appears current efforts are ineffective and lacking. Critically, government must demonstrate greater resolve in curbing the inflow of illegal immigrants into the country, because it is clear that the issue is progressively growing larger, which reflects gaps in enforcement and implementation. If the flow is properly managed, the conditions that fuel social unrest and vigilante actions would be diminished, making such unlawful responses unnecessary in the first place. 6.5 Strengthen integration programmes to promote social cohesion Distrust of immigrants is pervasive across race, age and gender groups, which points to the need for deliberate, state- and community-led initiatives to foster integration, such as public education campaigns, community dialogues and support for immigrant-owned businesses. So too, building broader public awareness of the positive contributions migrants make to society, can help counterbalance the narrative of fear and suspicion.   6.6 Reaffirm constitutional and human rights commitments South Africa’s Constitution and international obligations guarantee access to essential services and protects against discrimination and therefore the country’s immigration policy must remain aligned with these principles in spite of the growing populist onslaught against them. While the enforcement of laws need to be strengthened, dignity and human rights need to be ensured and safeguarded. 7 CONCLUSION   The findings of the GovDem Survey are clear, and that is that distrust toward immigrants from Africa is high, widespread and rising and the distrust cuts across race, gender and age groups, reflecting a national concern that can no longer be ignored. The sharp increase in negative sentiment over the past year suggests that public debate, populist rhetoric and unlawful campaigns, such as vigilante actions, have contributed to the inflaming of public attitudes. For the Inclusive Society Institute, whose mission is to strengthen democracy and foster social cohesion, the message is equally clear: South Africa cannot afford for the immigration debate to be driven by fear, inflated figures and unlawful action.   Policymaking must be anchored in empirical evidence and a clear distinction must urgently be drawn between legal and illegal immigrants. At the same time, government must do its job better, by enforcing immigration and labour laws effectively and by curbing the inflow of undocumented immigrants. Only then can the conditions that give rise to social unrest and vigilante action be eliminated.   The challenge now is to strengthen social cohesion, by countering mistrust and hostility with fact-based debate and to ensure that legal immigrants, many of whom bring scarce and much-needed skills, are seen as contributors to building a stronger economy. It is only through a balanced, lawful and dignified approach that South Africa can ensure that immigration does not weaken its democracy, but instead advances the constitutional ideal of an inclusive society.   South Africa must replace fear with facts and unlawful action with lawful governance, if we are to build an inclusive society.   REFERENCES   Faluyi, O.T. & Olutola, A.A. 2024.  Poverty in South Africa: Drivers of Perpetuation.  African Journal of Inter/Multidisciplinary Studies 2024,   6(1): 1-13   Harris, M. 2025. Zoom meeting between the author and Mari Harris, Director of IPSOS (South Africa) on 25 August 2025.   Hoffman, P. 2025. The rights of undocumented immigrants in SA . [Online] Available at: https://accountabilitynow.org.za/the-rights-of-undocumented-immigrants-in-sa/#:~:text=Previous%20claims%20by%20the%20party%20that%20there,when%20the%20most%20recent%20census%20was%20held. [accessed: 23 August 2025]   Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2024. World Report 2025: South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/south-africa#:~:text=Violence%20against%20women%20and%20girls%20is%20widespread%2C%20endemic%2C%20and%20an,the%20highest%20femicide%20rates%20worldwide  [accessed: 22 August 2024]   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2022. Developing an effective response to addressing xenophobia in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jAuVT3ePb-2Q0cjrihPxp6ua795UaV-i/view [accessed: 23 August 2025]   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2025. GovDem Survey . Cape Town: ISI   Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation/Internal Labour Organisation (OECD/ILO). 2018. How Immigrants Contribute to South Africa’s Economy . Paris:  OECD Publishing.   Okunade, S. K. 2024. Addressing irregular migration into South Africa: Paradiplomatic efforts of subnational governments in the Limpopo Province.  South African Journal of International Affairs ,  31 (4), 475–495.   Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2021.   Erroneous reporting of undocumented migrants in SA.  [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=14569 [accessed: 23 August 2025]   Yingi, E., Ncube, T. & Benyera, E. 2023. Situating Dashed Prospects of Independence into the Xenophobic Narrative in South Africa.  Journal of Black Studies ,  55 (1), 68-89.      - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute’s Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, participated in the 1st National Convention of the National Dialogue, held from 15–16 August 2025 at the University of South Africa’s Muckleneuk Campus, Pretoria.   This historic convention, initiated following the President of the Republic’s call for all South Africans to engage in shaping the nation’s future, marked the formal kick-off of the National Dialogue, a 12-month, citizen-led process aimed at developing a shared 30-year vision for South Africa.   Purpose of the Convention   The convention served as an agenda-setting platform for the National Dialogue. It brought together representatives from 30 sectors of society, including civil society, labour, business, government and political parties, ensuring broad inclusivity.   Key objectives included:   Launching the National Dialogue process and setting its guiding spirit. Introducing the citizen-led dialogue framework. Showcasing community-based and citizen-initiated model dialogues. Agreeing on organising principles and processes for ward-based and sectoral dialogues. Presenting the Eminent Persons Group and Steering Committee who will oversee the process.   Looking ahead   The National Dialogue Convention laid the groundwork for an extensive year-long process of public and sectoral dialogues across the country. Through these, South Africans from all walks of life will have the opportunity to reflect on the nation’s journey, confront difficult conversations and collaboratively imagine the path forward.   The Inclusive Society Institute remains deeply engaged in this process and will continue contributing to efforts aimed at strengthening democracy, inclusivity, and long-term nation-building.

On Monday, 25 August 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) hosted a high-level webinar entitled “Reform UN80: Renewal or Decline? The Future of Multilateralism at the United Nations’ 80th Anniversary.”  The event formed part of ISI’s ongoing consultations to shape its position on global governance reform.   The webinar brought together a distinguished panel of former senior United Nations officials and experts, who reflected on the UN Secretary-General’s Reform UN80 initiative, launched to ensure the organisation remains fit for purpose in a rapidly changing global order.   Key themes   Discussions were structured around four pressing questions:   The true aim of Reform UN80 and whether it represents genuine political renewal or merely administrative streamlining. The UN’s deepening budget crisis, including the political nature of arrears and the impact on peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The rise of unilateralism and its implications for multilateral cooperation. The consequences of US-China rivalry for the UN system and the opportunities and risks this creates for the Global South, particularly Africa.   Speakers emphasised that while efficiency measures, such as mandate reviews and budget rationalisation are important, they cannot substitute for political renewal and trust in the UN’s Charter principles. They argued that Africa, and South Africa in particular, have a pivotal role to play in shaping reform outcomes and ensuring that the voices of the Global South are heard.   Conclusion   The consultation concluded that the UN stands at a crossroads: it can either enter a cycle of decline marked by financial fragility and great-power rivalry, or seize this reform moment to rebuild legitimacy, strengthen multilateralism and amplify the Global South’s agency.

The Inclusive Society Institute, represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, attended the Social Services Cluster Media and Stakeholder Briefing held on Thursday, 21 August 2025.   The theme of the briefing was “Ensuring open access and provision of quality social services to the people.” During the briefing, the work undertaken by each of the Committees was discussed as follows:   The Portfolio Committee on Health, Dr Sibongiseni Dhlomo,   will talk about: Tobacco Products and Electronic Delivery Systems Control Bill Operation Dudula at healthcare centres   The Portfolio Committee on Basic Education, Ms Joy Maimela, will talk about: Bela Act Regulations Safety in schools   The Select Committee on Education, Sciences and Creative Industries, Mr Makhi Feni will talk about: Threat of disruptions of schools when they open for 2026 on account of foreign nationals Exploring better ways of working with all civil society organisations on foreigners Legislative interventions, including Labour Migration Policy and Border Management Authority   The briefing provided an important platform for stakeholders to engage on key social development initiatives, highlight progress, and address pressing societal challenges. The Inclusive Society Institute remains committed to contributing towards building an inclusive and equitable society, and its participation in the session reaffirmed this dedication.

On 20 August 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute, in partnership with Daily Maverick, hosted the second episode of its Constitutional Insights by Albie Sachs  webinar series. This series builds on a four-part podcast with former Constitutional Court Justice Albie Sachs, offering South Africans a deeper understanding of the Constitution’s founding values and exploring the challenges of building a more inclusive and accountable democracy. Following the inaugural conversation on “What does it mean to be South African?” , this episode brought together political analyst William Gumede  and constitutional law scholar Prof. Pierre de Vos  to discuss how state institutions can support and uphold South Africa’s constitutional democracy . The dialogue examined the critical role of institutions such as the judiciary, Parliament, Chapter Nine bodies, and the public service in protecting rights, ensuring accountability, and maintaining democratic stability. Both speakers emphasised that the Constitution provides a strong framework for institutional independence, but the effectiveness of these institutions depends on their practical functioning — resisting political interference, maintaining integrity, and remaining responsive to the public. Gumede highlighted the risks posed by corruption and institutional capture, noting that such threats erode public trust and weaken democracy. De Vos stressed the need for institutions to actively uphold constitutional values, enforce the law impartially, and hold those in positions of power accountable. The discussion underscored that South Africa’s democratic resilience relies as much on strong institutions as on an engaged and informed citizenry. The conversation also reflected on lessons from recent political and judicial challenges, demonstrating both vulnerabilities and the remarkable capacity of institutions to safeguard democracy when supported by law and public oversight. The speakers called for continued efforts to strengthen public trust, professionalise the state, and ensure that institutions serve all citizens equally. The remaining episodes in the series will continue to explore pressing constitutional themes, including: The power of mother tongue education What it will take to create an inclusive electoral system Through these conversations, the Constitutional Insights  series aims to foster public reflection, debate, and engagement with the Constitution as a living framework for an inclusive and just South Africa.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during the meeting have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   August 2025   Rapporteur: Daryl Swanepoel CONTENTS   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CONTEXT AND RATIONALE KEY THEMES AND FINDINGS POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 1 INTRODUCTION 2 BACKGROUND 3 EVOLVING GEOPOLITICS AND AFRICA’S STRATEGIC NAVIGATION: INSIGHTS FROM THE US-AFRICA-CHINA NEXUS 3.1 SHIFTS IN US FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 3.2 STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA AND AFRICA’S ROLE 3.3 THE US POLICY SHIFT AWAY FROM DEMOCRATIC NORMS 3.4 AFRICA’S STRATEGIC RESPONSE AND AGENCY 3.5 DE-DOLLARISATION AND ECONOMIC AUTONOMY 3.6 INTERNAL CHALLENGES AND FOREIGN POLICY COHERENCE 3.7 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD 3.7.1 ADOPT A POLICY OF STRATEGIC NON-ALIGNMENT 3.7.2 LEVERAGE NATURAL RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPMENT, NOT EXTRACTION 3.7.3 BUILD INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY FOR COHERENT FOREIGN POLICY 3.7.4 STRENGTHEN REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 3.7.5 REFRAME AFRICA’S NARRATIVE ON THE GLOBAL STAGE 3.7.6 PURSUE FINANCIAL AND DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY 3.7.7 ANCHOR FOREIGN POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC AND DEVELOPMENTAL VALUES 3.7.8 CONCLUSION 4 NAVIGATING THE AFRICA - CHINA - US NEXUS: STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES IN A LANDSCAPE OF GEOPOLITICAL TENSION: THE TRIANGULAR DIPLOMATIC DYNAMICS 4.1 CHINA’S ROLE IN AFRICA: MORE THAN INFRASTRUCTURE 4.2 THE US DIVERSION STRATEGY: COUNTERING CHINA THROUGH AFRICA 4.3 AFRICA’S STRATEGIC POSITIONING: DUAL ENGAGEMENT WITH A FOCUS ON AUTONOMY 4.4 HOW CHINA SHOULD RESPOND: BUILDING RESILIENCE IN AFRICAN PARTNERSHIPS 4.5 CONCLUSION: TOWARD A TRIANGULAR BALANCE 5 TRIANGULAR TRADE DYNAMICS: US, CHINA AND AFRICA IN ECONOMIC TENSION AND OPPORTUNITY 5.1 CHINA - AFRICA TRADE: SCALE, SPEED AND STRUCTURAL DOMINANCE 5.2 US - AFRICA TRADE: DECLINE, REDEFINITION AND OPPORTUNITY GAPS 5.3 TRADE AS GEOPOLITICAL LEVERAGE: THE RISK OF WEAPONISATION 5.4 AFRICA’S TRADE STRATEGY: TOWARD A BALANCED AND BENEFICIAL REGIME 5.5 CONCLUSION: TRADE AS A STRATEGIC LEVER, NOT A PASSIVE FLOW 6 CONTOURS OF CONTAINMENT: US – AFRICA - CHINA MILITARY AND SECURITY DYNAMICS 6.1 US SECURITY ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA: CONTAINMENT THROUGH COUNTERTERRORISM 6.2 CHINA’S EVOLVING SECURITY ROLE: FROM NON-INTERVENTION TO STRATEGIC POSITIONING 6.3 PEACE AND SECURITY AS A SITE OF COMPETITION, NOT COOPERATION 6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN AUTONOMOUS AFRICAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 6.5 CONCLUSION: FROM THEATRE OF RIVALRY TO ARENA OF SOVEREIGNTY 7 REFLECTIONS ON THE TRIANGULAR HORIZON: RETHINKING POWER, PARTNERSHIP AND PURPOSE 7.1 AFRICA AT THE CENTRE, NOT THE MARGIN 7.2 THE US AND CHINA: FROM COMPETITION TO CONSTRUCTIVE COEXISTENCE? 7.3 A CALL TO REIMAGINE PARTNERSHIP 7.4 CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE IS NEGOTIATED, NOT INHERITED 8 FINAL WORD: AFRICA AS THE AUTHOR OF ITS OWN FUTURE IMAGE REFERENCES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   This report sets out to explore the evolving triangular relationship between the United States, China and Africa, which is an increasingly significant nexus that is shaping global power dynamics, trade, security and development. In drawing upon insights from a high-level webinar conducted under Chatham House Rules and guided by supporting reflections and research by the Inclusive Society Institute, the report examines the underlying forces, challenges and strategic options that are available to African policymakers in navigating this complex geopolitical terrain. CONTEXT AND RATIONALE   The return of President Donald Trump to the White House, combined with a resurgent China that has growing global ambitions and the sharpening rivalry between these two global powers, place Africa at a critical juncture. Both Washington and Beijing seek to advance their strategic interests on the continent, economically, diplomatically and militarily and yet their engagement styles, priorities and philosophies differ markedly. And as for Africa, the challenge and the opportunity now lies in it resisting binary choices and instead it should focus on charting a course that is rooted in agency, coherence and long-term development. KEY THEMES AND FINDINGS   Africa must claim its strategic agency  by repositioning itself, not as a passive recipient of global influence, but as a deliberate and autonomous actor. This involves rejecting Cold War-style alignment, defining clear development goals and leveraging global competition so as to secure better terms for trade, investment and technology.   China has established itself as Africa’s largest trading partner and focuses on infrastructure, extractives and bundled finance, whilst  US - Africa trade has declined and remains narrowly focused, but both powers use trade as a geopolitical instrument, often prioritising influence over development outcomes. Africa must therefore factor in the geopolitical and trade dynamics  by pushing for value addition, local manufacturing and regional integration, through initiatives such as the Africa Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Economic autonomy and de-dollarisation   and other emerging trends, including BRICS-led financial alternatives and local currency trade,  now offer new pathways for economic independence, which can help mitigate Africa’s over-reliance on the US dollar, which exposes it to external shocks and limits monetary sovereignty, but it requires strong institutions, regional coordination and political will. Peace and security tensions  are primarily the responsibility of Africans themselves. Currently, the US’s security engagement with Africa is increasingly shaped by counterterrorism and anti-China containment, while China has chosen to move cautiously into peacekeeping and to position itself in strategic geographical locations, but both approaches, nevertheless, risk militarising diplomacy and sidelining African peace frameworks.  Africa must therefore reaffirm ownership of its security agenda and demand transparency, accountability and multilateral cooperation. Africa must control the narrative and norm contestation  by taking control of its own story, one that highlights innovation, leadership and dignity, rather than dependency or vulnerability. Shaping the global narrative is not cosmetic, it is strategic and essential to redefining Africa’s place in world affairs. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS   Pursue a policy of principled non-alignment  in which Africa must maximise its  leverage by avoiding binary choices and engaging with both the US and China, based on clearly defined interests.   Build institutional and negotiation capacity  by strengthening technical expertise across foreign ministries, trade departments and regional bodies so as to ensure effective, sovereign engagement.   Promote Continental coherence  ought to be promoted by using platforms like the African Union and AfCFTA in order to avoid fragmented bargaining and in so doing set minimum standards for trade, debt and digital governance.   Financial and digital sovereignty  ought to be asserted through the continued development of its regional payment systems and data governance frameworks, so that it reflects African priorities, not those imposed externally.   Recalibrate security engagements  by ensuring that external military partnerships align with African peacebuilding goals and support the continent’s own security institutions.   Foster strategic communication and trust-building  by creating platforms for trilateral dialogue, not as adversarial blocs, but as co-stakeholders in global peace, prosperity and reform.   CONCLUSION   Africa sits at the centre of a shifting global order, an order defined not only by who holds power, but also by how that power is exercised. The triangular relationship between the US, China and Africa is not static, it is being actively negotiated. This negotiation must be led by African voices, guided by African values and directed toward African visions of justice, development and dignity.   Therefore, in a world which is fast moving toward multipolarity, Africa must insist on not just being a partner, but so too, a peer. 1 INTRODU CTION   The global geopolitical landscape is undergoing a period of profound transformation, which is marked by the resurgence of the great power syndrome and with shifting global alliances and nowhere is this more evident than in Africa, whose strategic importance is continuing to grow in the eyes of global powers.   The return of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States in 2025 has reignited debates over the nature and trajectory of US foreign policy and in this report the focus is on the US’s engagement with Africa and its increasingly adversarial stance toward China.   In response to these evolving dynamics and to better understand them, the Inclusive Society Institute convened a high-level webinar titled “Building US-Africa relations under the Trump administration and its nexus with China” , which webinar was hosted on 22 July 2025. This platform brought together distinguished thought leaders, policy and military/intelligence analysts from both the United States and South Africa to assess the implications of renewed US leadership on Africa’s development, diplomacy and global positioning.   The core premise of the webinar rested on the assumption that the Trump administration is likely to pursue a more transactional and assertive approach to international relations. This will undoubtedly also apply to Africa. Moreover, its competitive posture against China, will simultaneously be amplified, particularly in areas such as trade, investment, military presence and human rights. The complexity that this evolving relationship between the US and China presents, demands urgent attention and nuanced understanding and for the purposes of this report, also its ripple effects across African nations, lest policymakers are to be caught ill-prepared.   China has an entrenched economic footprint across Africa that spans infrastructure construction and financing, trade partnerships and development aid, and it has over the last few decades presented both opportunities and challenges for African governments. The US, meanwhile, remains a key diplomatic, security and development actor on the continent, whose policies continue to significantly influence both regional stability and governance trends on the continent. It is the intersection of these two global players' interests in Africa, and the risks and openings that it presents, especially for African countries who seek to balance external relations in order to protect domestic priorities, that is the interest of this report.   The webinar therefore sought to interrogate four pivotal questions, namely:   Firstly, what are the expectations of US policy toward Africa under the new Trump administration? Secondly, how might the hardening of US-China relations impact Africa? Thirdly, what stance is the US likely to adopt with regard to its military presence in Africa under the new administration and how will it view the presence of other global powers, such as China, who have operations on the continent? And finally, how should African nations position themselves to engage both the US and China diplomatically, economically and strategically?   This report sets out to present a comprehensive overview and critical analysis of the discussions held during the webinar. Its aim is to distil the key insights offered by panellists, in order to provide contextual understanding of current US-Africa-China dynamics and to offer strategic guidance to African policymakers and stakeholders on how best to navigate this complex trilateral relationship in the years ahead. 2 BACKGROUND   The geopolitical landscape in which Africa operates has shifted dramatically in recent years and it has been propelled by intensifying competition between global powers and a growing awareness within the continent of its own strategic value. Whilst traditionally, the continent has been viewed as the object of foreign influence, and often courted or neglected in cycles, Africa today stands at the intersection of powerful global currents emanating from both East and West and at the heart of this evolving terrain lies the complex trilateral relationship between Africa, the United States and China, a nexus that is increasingly shaping Africa’s policy decisions and long-term developmental path.   With the return of President Donald Trump to the White House, the United States has adopted a more forthright and transactional foreign policy posture and the rhetoric from Washington has grown sharper, signalling a shift not only in tone, but also in strategic orientation. The Trump administration’s scepticism toward multilateralism and traditional alliances, along with its firm stance on countering Chinese global influence, has profound implications for Africa, because now it has to distinguish between rhetorical novelty and genuine policy shifts and it has to respond, not as passive recipients of foreign policy, but as active agents capable of setting the terms of engagement.   Simultaneously, China’s role in Africa has expanded dramatically and has been marked by deepening trade relationships, infrastructure investments and diplomatic outreach. This presence, while often framed in strategic or even ideological terms by external observers, has increasingly become a routine part of Africa’s economic ecosystem, yet, growing global scrutiny of China’s influence, particularly from the US, has added pressure on African states to clarify their positions. The Trump administration’s likely intensification of this contest with China raises questions about how far it may go in discouraging African engagement with Beijing and whether this will manifest through economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure or altered aid and investment patterns.   Beyond geopolitics, emerging global economic trends are also challenging Africa to rethink its place in the world economic order and so enters the de-dollarisation debate.   The rising interest in de-dollarisation and the development of alternative financial infrastructure, such as non-SWIFT payment systems and cross-currency trade settlements among BRICS countries, represent a broader push toward economic sovereignty and for many African policymakers, these innovations are more than technical adjustments, they are statements of autonomy and a reassertion of agency in a world where currency and finance remain tools of global influence.   Importantly, this moment presents not only risks, but also opportunities, given that Africa’s leverage is also increasing: its collective voice at the United Nations, its resource base, youthful population and rapidly expanding markets make it an indispensable player in any vision of global progress. Such leverage must, however,  be used wisely, since African countries face a fundamental choice, whether to align passively with the interests of foreign powers or to define their own path, one that is rooted in diversified partnerships, mutual benefit and long-term strategic thinking.   In this shifting environment, the notion that Africa has to “choose” between the East and West is becoming increasingly obsolete and instead, the continent must focus on achieving balance, asserting its priorities, cultivating agency and refusing to be cast merely as the arena in which others compete. As highlighted in the Inclusive Society Institute’s framing of this dialogue, the questions at hand are not just about policy, they are about sovereignty, vision and the role Africa wishes to play in shaping the 21st-century global order.   3 EVOLVING GEOPOLITICS AND AFRICA’S STRATEGIC NAVIGATION: INSIGHTS FROM THE US-AFRICA-CHINA NEXUS    3.1 SHIFTS IN US FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION   Since the return of President Donald Trump to the Oval Office in January, the US’s foreign policy has undergone a pronounced shift, both in terms of its tone and in its structure. Moreover, this transformation is grounded in a deeply nationalistic ethos that prizes unilateral decision-making and which is guided by transactional diplomacy and a reassertion of American primacy in global affairs. Africa, within this framework, is viewed by the administration less as a developmental or strategic partner in a collaborative sense, and more as a transactional space in which it the continent is valued by the Trump-administration primarily for its resources and its geopolitical position vis-à-vis rivals, such as China.   The “America First” paradigm being espoused by the Trump administration favours direct bilateral engagements over multilateral cooperation, resulting in the sidelining of traditional institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation and other multilateral frameworks that have historically been involved in structuring Africa’s global interactions. This approach not only alters diplomatic norms, but also undermines the collective decision-making processes, which leaves smaller nations more exposed to power asymmetries in bilateral negotiations.   Several participants at the webinar highlighted that this policy trajectory is not entirely new, but that it represents an unvarnished continuation of long-standing American ambivalence toward Africa. Past administrations have frequently engaged Africa in fits and starts, they have often reacted to crises or strategic necessities, rather than adopting a consistent and forward-looking longer-term strategy. However, what distinguishes the current administration is the degree of candour and rigidity in its objectives of securing economic benefit, geopolitical leverage and reduced US liabilities in foreign engagements.   Furthermore, the restructuring within the US State Department and the scaling down of USAID’s developmental footprint, signifies a retreat from values-based diplomacy, since the reductions in staffing, particularly in departments focused on democracy, human rights and labour, suggest that soft power tools are being deprioritised in favour of more commercially-driven and profit-centric engagements. In this emerging configuration, African countries are expected to present themselves, not as political partners, but primarily in terms of what economic opportunities they bring to the table, primarily measured by their contributions to US commercial and security interests.   This reorientation challenges African policymakers to critically assess their diplomatic toolkits, because the absence of traditional diplomatic courtesies and institutional platforms, once taken for granted, now necessitates a recalibration of how African states need to frame their bilateral relations with the United States. Instead of navigating established aid and development channels, African states are now having to increasingly deal directly with power centres, be they special envoys, corporate entities or more narrowly focused agencies that operate outside of the traditional diplomatic norms.   3.2 STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA AND AFRICA’S ROLE   One of the most critical geopolitical backdrops to US - Africa relations under the Trump administration is the intensifying competition between the United States and China, and Africa sits squarely within the crosshairs of this rivalry, not as a passive terrain, but as a strategic and economic theatre where influence and access and alliances are continuously contested. The Trump administration’s Africa policy cannot be fully understood without a deep examination of this nexus.   China is deeply entrenched and engaged on the African continent, with a plethora of investments that span infrastructure development, digital ecosystems, critical minerals and diplomatic influence. Moreover,  through mechanisms such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its expansive financing of roads, ports and energy projects, China has positioned itself as a key economic partner for many African nations, with a long-term investment strategy, which is often welcomed by African states, who desperately seek capital and rapid development, even when such investment raises concerns about debt sustainability or political leverage.   The United States, in contrast, has approached this competition with a clear intent to limit China’s influence and as several webinar contributors observed, the Trump administration sees China not only as a rival, but as a threat to American geopolitical primacy. This zero-sum framing has, of course, far-reaching implications for how the US will engage African countries, particularly those with existing or growing ties to Beijing.   Rather than presenting a compelling alternative development agenda, the US has responded with targeted commercial diplomacy, which emphasises trade, security cooperation and critical minerals. A prominent example is the convening of a “mini-summit” with five African leaders from Mauritania, Senegal, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, who were selected less for regional representativeness and more for their access to strategic natural resources. The focus of these engagements, panellists suggested, was not on governance, development or mutual goals, but rather on how the US could benefit from the relationships, especially through control of supply chains that counterbalance China’s hold on the global minerals market.   The selective nature of these partnerships reflects a divide-and-rule tactic that bypasses regional organisations and multilateral consensus, since instead of engaging the African Union or regional blocs, the Trump administration has preferred bilateral deals with countries deemed compliant or strategically expedient. This serves to undermine efforts at African unity and policy coherence and may erode hard-earned continental consensus on issues such as natural resource governance, environmental standards and regional infrastructure integration.   Several analysts expressed concern that African nations are being asked to choose sides in this geopolitical rivalry, but in doing, it would be strategically shortsighted, because African countries would then risk becoming pawns in a larger contest that prioritises external interests over domestic development. Furthermore, the transactional logic of the Trump administration lacks the long-term developmental framing that African nations require, such as commitments to, among others, value addition, industrialisation or human capital investment.   Critically, panellists emphasised that Africa’s best interest lies not in alignment, but in balance and thus by cultivating diversified relationships that extract maximum benefit from both Beijing and Washington, African states can mitigate dependency on either power and enhance their global agency. To do this effectively, however, requires sophisticated diplomacy and intra-African coordination with considerably more investment in policy design and institutional capacity.   The strategic competition between the US and China is likely to continue reshaping the global landscape for years to come, and for Africa, this contest presents both challenges and opportunities and so it will be essential for African leaders to avoid making binary choices. And they should resist short-term temptations, but instead focus on sustainable, inclusive partnerships that serve long-term development goals.   3.3 THE US POLICY SHIFT AWAY FROM DEMOCRATIC NORMS   One of the more consequential shifts under the Trump administration’s foreign policy has been the departure from long-standing US commitments to promoting democratic values abroad, particularly in Africa, where historically the US’s engagement with the continent has included significant investment in democratic institution building, human rights, civil society development and electoral transparency. While these efforts have, at times, been inconsistent or selectively applied, they broadly represented an important normative framework that set their expectations and which gave leverage to reformers across the African states.   Under the current administration, that framework has weakened considerably and as several participants in the webinar highlighted, the Trump administration has significantly de-emphasised both democracy promotion in its rhetoric and in its resourcing. Key offices within the US State Department, including the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, have all seen reductions in staffing and political support and USAID’s traditional development agenda, which often supported governance reform, civil society training and election integrity, is being reframed, marginalised and now cancelled under a more commercial and transactional mandate.   This shift has not gone unnoticed by African governments, with some leaders, particularly those with authoritarian tendencies or fragile democratic institutions, welcoming this change, which for them is interpreted as a reprieve from what they previously viewed as intrusive conditionalities. For them, the reduction in democratic scrutiny from Washington has created more political space for illiberal practices, weakened checks and balances and stalled, or even, reversed progress on constitutional governance and human rights protections in those countries. Several webinar participants noted the enthusiastic responses from authoritarian regimes, some of which have publicly praised the Trump victory as a signal that American pressure on governance issues would abate.   The implications of this retrenchment are far-reaching, because in the absence of strong democratic signals from Washington, autocratic actors are emboldened, while democratic actors, civil society organisations, independent media and reformist politicians, find themselves with fewer external allies and diminished moral and material support. This contributes to a chilling effect across the continent, where some leaders may no longer feel compelled to maintain even the facade of democratic performance, which could conceivably result in the possibility of a democratic and human rights backslide in those societies. Perhaps more troubling, however, is the accompanying shift in priorities within the US - Africa relationship, since where democracy and governance once featured prominently in their bilateral engagements, they have now been displaced by commercial focussed diplomacy and security cooperation. Trade, access to critical minerals and transactional peace agreements are prioritised by the US administration, often with little reference to political or human rights contexts and as one panellist put it, “what matters now is what you have, not how you govern”.   The move away from democracy promotion also serves to undermine long-standing US soft power. For decades, despite its contradictions, America’s reputation as a proponent of democracy lent it moral authority in Africa, particularly among youth populations and civil society, but the retreat from these principles has not only eroded US credibility, it has also opened space for other actors, such as China and Russia, to fill the normative vacuum with alternative governance models that emphasise state prominence in governance, socio-economic development and stability over pluralism and rights.   Webinar participants expressed their concerns that this recalibration of values could have a generational impact. Where democracy was once supported through tangible programmes and high-level diplomatic backing, they may be increasingly viewed by African leaders as optional or expendable. And in this context, it is imperative for African civil society and regional institutions to fill the void and to with renewed energy reaffirm democratic norms and the building indigenous capacity to resist ant possible authoritarian drift.   While there may be strategic logic in pursuing a more interest-driven foreign policy, the long-term costs of abandoning democratic norms - both for African societies and for global democratic order - are substantial, because if democracy is no longer a priority for global powers, the risks of political instability, social unrest and international disengagement with the continent, may very well increase.   In summary then: The US’s policy shift away from democratic norms represents a significant inflection point in Africa’s political trajectory and it now places the onus on African actors themselves to defend democratic gains and to build alliances within and outside the continent - alliances that prioritise accountable governance and the rights of citizens. For many, this may be the ultimate test of African agency and resolve in a rapidly changing world.   3.4 AFRICA’S STRATEGIC RESPONSE AND AGENCY   As global power dynamics evolve and as the great powers reposition themselves, African states find themselves at a pivotal crossroads and having to decide as how to respond to the changing dynamics. The challenge they face is not merely to respond to the external pressures from the United States and China, but, more importantly it is argued, how to reframe Africa’s role in global affairs from that of a reactive subject to a proactive and strategic actor. The continent’s ability to assert its agency in this fluid period of geopolitical transition will not only determine the outcomes of individual diplomatic engagements, but so too the future trajectory of Africa’s development, its autonomy and its global influence.   One of the central themes that was emphasised during the webinar was the need for Africa to reject the outdated binary argument of having to “choose sides” between the West and the East, with several contributors arguing forcefully that such a dichotomy is reductive and detrimental to Africa’s interests and therefore Africa must rather pursue a policy of principled non-alignment, not in the ideological sense of the Cold War era, but as a pragmatic strategy that maximises leverage, that preserves independence and that extracts the best possible terms from all partners.   This approach calls for a renewed focus on sovereign interest articulation, in other words, a clear definition of what each African country wants from its engagements with global powers. These interests must be rooted in long-term development goals, such as industrialisation, education, health, climate resilience, digital transformation and infrastructure and crucially, they must go beyond the allure of short-term financial inflows or extractive deals. Instead they should emphasise partnerships that transfer knowledge, build capacity and promote value addition on the continent.   Participants in the webinar stressed that Africa must professionalise and strengthen its negotiating institutions, which includes enhancing the technical capacity  its diplomatic corps, trade ministries and regional economic communities to effectively bargain with better-resourced counterparts from Washington or Beijing, with a recurring concern being raised about African states entering negotiations without coherent strategies or sufficient data on the true value of their resources and markets, which then puts them on the back footing, limits their bargaining power and reinforces dependency.   One practical example raised during the dialogue was the growing importance of critical minerals, such as lithium and rare earths, which are vital to the green transition and the digital economy, where it was argued by the panellist that instead of simply exporting these raw materials, African countries must negotiate deals during their bilateral trade consultations, that include local processing, employment guarantees, infrastructure investment and environmental protections. It was noted that current US efforts to secure access to these minerals often target smaller, less prepared states with weak regulatory frameworks, in that way exposing the risk of “divide and conquer” strategies.   To counteract this, the importance of regional coordination and integration was repeatedly underscored by the participants, with continental frameworks, such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and regional blocs, such as ECOWAS and SADC, identified as key tools for creating bargaining coherence and avoiding competitive underbidding among African states. A united African voice, particularly in areas such as, among others, digital governance, tax harmonisation and resource sharing, can shift the continent from the periphery to the centre of global decision-making.   Another dimension of Africa’s agency lies in narrative control, because too often, Africa is spoken about, rather than spoken with. The stories told about Africa in Washington, Brussels and Beijing frequently focus on conflict, poverty or foreign rivalry, rather than innovation, leadership and potential. Several webinar participants called for a concerted effort by African scholars, journalists and leaders to tell Africa’s story on its own terms by highlighting success stories in mobile finance, renewable energy, democratic reform and entrepreneurial growth.   There is also an urgent need for intra-African solidarity, because as countries negotiate with global powers, they must avoid undercutting each other for short-term gain. A race to the bottom in regulatory standards or concessionary tax regimes only benefits external actors at the expense of long-term continental development, so instead, states should adopt common principles for engagement, whether in environmental policy, labour rights or fiscal governance in order to ensure that Africa negotiates from a position of strength.   Of course, asserting agency does not mean ignoring geopolitical realities, since power asymmetries remain significant and the influence of global capital, technology and military infrastructure cannot be wished away. However, as multiple participants noted, Africa does have leverage, such as its growing markets, its young and dynamic population, its natural resources are vast and its strategic geography makes it indispensable to global trade, energy security and climate goals.   The question is whether African governments will seize this moment. Will they invest in long-term strategic thinking? Will they build institutions that outlast administrations? Will they collaborate rather than compete? And will they define and defend a vision of African development that transcends foreign agendas?   The opportunity exists, the stakes are high and/but the responsibility lies with Africa itself. 3.5 DE-DOLLARISATION AND ECONOMIC AUTONOMY   One of the most significant and far-reaching, but under-discussed themes that seems to be emerging in the current geopolitical reordering, is the gradual, but determined shift toward de-dollarisation, which can be vital for Africa’s economic sovereignty and its position in global finance. While this trend is certainly still in its early stages and although the stage of its development varies widely across countries and sectors, it nevertheless represents a subtle, yet powerful assertion of economic autonomy in a world that has traditionally been dominated by US monetary hegemony, but which now seeks de-linking. The process of de-dollarisation of course refers to the broader efforts by countries to reduce their reliance on the US dollar in international trade, financial settlements and foreign reserves and it is not just about adopting new currencies, such as the BRICS currency, for example. For Africa, this shift is partly driven by pragmatism, because dollar-based transactions often entail high costs due to multiple currency conversions, a reliance on correspondent banks and exposure to US monetary policy fluctuations over which they have no control. However, it is also increasingly being driven by political and strategic motivations, particularly in response to the US sanctions regimes and their financial surveillance systems like SWIFT, which give Washington considerable leverage over global capital flows and which African counties believe impacts their own sovereignty. During the webinar, participants highlighted several developments that reflected this shift, notably, the growing momentum behind bilateral trade settlements in local currencies, such as, for example, direct transactions from the South African rand to the Chinese renminbi, which is both economically sound and a symbolically potent step toward financial self-determination. These initiatives have the effect of reducing transaction costs, insulating trade from dollar volatility, as well as diminishing vulnerability to external shocks beyond domestic control. Moreover, the broader BRICS grouping, of which South Africa is a member, has also been actively exploring alternative financial architectures, including cross-border payment systems that bypass the SWIFT network and proposals for a digital or common reserve currency. And while panellists acknowledged that the realisation of a unified BRICS currency remains distant and politically complex, they emphasised that these conversations alone signify a major shift in how emerging economies are starting to think about their own financial sovereignty. For the Trump administration, however, the idea of de-dollarisation is perceived as a direct challenge to US global power, where historically, the dominance of their dollar afforded them unique privileges, not least the ability to finance their own deficits cheaply and to impose extraterritorially sanctions. So from their perspective, any attempt by a country, or a group of aligned countries, to reduce their dollar dependency, especially through coordinated efforts by the US’s geopolitical rivals, such as China and Russia, is met with US suspicion and, in some cases, retaliatory policy. The possibility that the US may respond with secondary sanctions, punitive tariffs and/or diplomatic pressure against countries that actively pursue de-dollarised arrangements was also discussed. These instruments, it was said, could be wielded, not only against the BRICS coordination thereof, but also against other bilateral efforts that are seen as undermining US’s strategic interests. And so, for African countries that are  already contending with economic fragility, high debt burdens and limited access to global capital, such penalties could be highly disruptive and even crippling.   Despite these risks, African governments finds the idea of de-dollarisation an option worth exploring, due to their nations being heavily dependent on the dollar and the tendency for local  currencies to be undervalued, inflation-prone and vulnerable to speculative attacks. And so, by moving away from the dollar and where feasible, it can enable countries to assert greater control over their own domestic monetary policy, thereby encouraging regional trade in local currencies and it can assist in developing homegrown financial instruments that reflect domestic priorities. However, the path to meaningful de-dollarisation it must be said, is not without significant hurdles, since many African central banks remain conservative in their policy orientation and are wary of challenging the existing dominant financial norms. There are also infrastructure challenges, such as underdeveloped financial markets, low digital penetration and regulatory fragmentation, that severely complicates the implementation of cross-border currency systems.   Moreover, intra-African coordination is critical, because without harmonised frameworks, countries may find themselves experimenting in isolation, with limited scalability and/or political support. Institutions such as the African Union, the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) have key roles to play in facilitating such regional financial integration and in standardising trade finance protocols.   Ultimately, de-dollarisation is not a panacea for all of Africa’s financial woes and it will not automatically insulate African economies from external shocks, nor will it eliminate structural weaknesses in governance, productivity or revenue collection. Nevertheless, it is an important step toward diversifying economic risk, asserting agency and reducing over-dependence on any single actor or system.   As the global financial order becomes more multipolar and contested, Africa must ensure that it does not merely adjust to the global new rules, it also has to help shape them. This requires not just technical reforms, but political vision and a recognition that economic autonomy is central to real sovereignty and that in an increasingly transactional world, self-reliance may be the most valuable currency of all.   3.6 INTERNAL CHALLENGES AND FOREIGN POLICY COHERENCE   While external geopolitical shifts command much of the attention in Africa’s engagement with the United States and China, as important are the internal dynamics that are shaping how African countries formulate, coordinate and project foreign policy. And so too, the continent’s ability to respond strategically to the US - China rivalry and to leverage global opportunities in its favour, depends heavily on its internal coherence, institutional maturity and its leadership unity.   A recurring theme discussed in the webinar was the fragmented nature of Africa’s foreign policy landscape, where, although the African Union (AU) and several regional bodies have made strides toward continental coordination, the individual countries’ national interests still dominate and it is often at the expense of the region’s collective strength. In a global system that is  increasingly defined by strategic competition, this fragmentation is counter-productive, because it weakens Africa’s bargaining power and opens the door to divide-and-rule tactics by more powerful states.   It was noted that many African countries lack long-term foreign policy strategies, resulting in diplomatic engagements often being reactive, rather than proactive, and this is due to them being shaped by short-term needs or the preferences of ruling parties, rather than through clear national or regional priorities. This makes it difficult for diplomats to articulate consistent positions and for countries to build reliable partnerships or to push back effectively when they are faced with exploitative or coercive behaviour by external actors. The lack of capacity and resources within many of the African foreign ministries, which is often combined with frequent leadership changes and where there is usually limited cross-party consensus on external affairs, serves to further exacerbate this challenge. Moreover, foreign policy decisions are concentrated in the hands of a few elite individuals and there is  minimal parliamentary oversight or public debate, which not only means diminished transparency, but it also undermines the legitimacy and durability of international countries’ international agreements.   South Africa was cited during the webinar as a case study in complexity. As a member of both BRICS and a partner of the West, it occupies a unique, yet difficult diplomatic space. Its constitutional commitment to values such as democracy, social justice and international solidarity is being tested in that it often clashes with the ideological posture of the Trump administration, which prioritises economic nationalism and which is suspicious of multilateralism. The balancing act that South Africa’s has to play by engaging both Beijing and Washington, while adhering to its constitutional and regional responsibilities, illustrates the nuanced diplomacy required in today’s global context.   But even in South Africa inconsistencies persist, because while rhetorically committed to multilateralism and African solidarity, its actual engagements often in practice reflect its own national self-interest or ambiguous priorities, particularly in contentious global debates such as UN Security Council reform, vaccine diplomacy or the war in Ukraine. These contradictions, participants argued, must also be acknowledged, and resolved, if African leadership is to be credible and effective on the world stage.   Beyond state actors there are frequently bureaucratic and institutional misalignments that hinder strategic coherence, where, for example, Ministries of finance, trade, defence and foreign affairs often operate in silos, with limited coordination or shared analysis. And as a result, their international negotiations on trade, investment or security often proceed without unified positions, which then leads to suboptimal outcomes or even internal contradictions. For instance, trade concessions made by one department may inadvertently undermine environmental protections that are overseen by another, or in another instance, security cooperation agreements may be in conflict with the country’s human rights obligations.   Intra-African dynamics too complicate the continent’s foreign policy picture, where rivalries between regional powers, competition for donor funding and divergent ideological alignments contribute to message fragmentation. While the African Union has sought to build a “One Africa” approach in diplomacy, the reality on the ground often reflects a patchwork of unaligned and sometimes contradictory national agendas which weakens the continent’s collective negotiating position and allows external powers to selectively engage with preferred partners, thereby exacerbating divisions.   To overcome these internal challenges a number of reforms are needed:   Institutional investment in foreign policy capacity, including dedicated think tanks, professional diplomatic training academies and inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms is urgently needed. Long-term strategic planning, anchored in developmental blueprints like Agenda 2063, but operationalised through detailed country-level foreign policy roadmaps that align with national interests and regional objectives have to be undertaken. Increased transparency and public engagement in foreign policy formulation, including the involvement of civil society, academia and parliamentarians in shaping international positions is required. Regional and continental diplomacy frameworks, including common guidelines for resource negotiations, cybersecurity, digital trade and external military cooperation, to reduce fragmentation and to promote African consensus, have to be developed.   The path to foreign policy coherence is not easy, but it is indispensable, because without it, Africa will struggle to navigate an increasingly complex international environment. With it, the continent can move from being a sphere of competition to a sphere of influence and a place where African priorities shape, rather than react to global power dynamics 3.7 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD The discussions culminated in a series of forward-looking insights and strategic imperatives for African nations to ponder. As they navigate a shifting global order that is characterised by intensifying US-China competition, deglobalisation trends and the erosion of traditional multilateral norms, they need to consolidate their efforts. Amid these uncertainties, one message was clear, namely that Africa’s future will be determined not by external decisions alone, but by the continent’s ability to act with clarity, coordination and conviction. Drawing from the insights of the panel, the following policy recommendations are made in order to provide a structured path for African policymakers, institutions and regional bodies that seek to engage global powers, particularly the United States and China, on equitable and sovereign terms.   3.7.1 Adopt a policy of strategic non-alignment   African states should avoid framing their foreign policy within the binary of East versus West and instead of “choosing sides,” the continent must adopt a position of principled non-alignment rooted in self-interest. This does not imply neutrality or disengagement, but rather a sophisticated diplomacy that maximises Africa’s leverage by engaging all actors based on merit, reciprocity and long-term development objectives, because by refusing to be drawn into ideological or strategic rivalries, African countries can create space for creative partnerships, negotiate better terms and avoid becoming proxy arenas for geopolitical competition.     3.7.2 Leverage natural resources for development, not extraction   Africa’s vast deposits of critical minerals and natural resources, such as cobalt, lithium and rare earth elements, should be seen as strategic assets to be carefully stewarded and systematically leveraged, and accordingly the current global demand for these materials, especially in the context of the energy transition and digital infrastructure, gives Africa unprecedented negotiating power.   However, the webinar participants also warned against repeating the same mistakes of the past, which saw raw materials being exported wholesale, with little benefit to local populations and so instead, African states must condition resource access on commitments to local value addition, technology transfer, infrastructure development and environmental sustainability. This will require enhanced geological data, coordinated policy frameworks and transparency mechanisms to prevent corruption and illicit capital flight. 3.7.3 Build institutional capacity for coherent foreign policy   Effective diplomacy begins with strong institutions and so African countries must invest in the professionalisation of their foreign ministries, build cross-sectoral coordination among trade, defence and development agencies and they ought to institutionalise long-term strategic planning.   Foreign policy should not be left to elite circles only or be influenced solely by short-term political calculations. It must be embedded within national development plans, be subjected to parliamentary oversight and it has to be responsive to citizen input. Moreover, governments should cultivate specialised cadres of technocrats who can lead negotiations in areas like digital policy, climate diplomacy and multilateral reform.   3.7.4 Strengthen regional integration and collective bargaining   No single African country, regardless of size or economic standing, can compete with global powers alone, which implies the need for regional and continental integration in order to amplify Africa’s voice and bargaining power. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) must be empowered and resourced to coordinate foreign policy positions, to manage trade disputes and to advance shared priorities.   This includes negotiating as blocs when engaging with external actors on issues such as digital taxation, climate finance or health diplomacy and so too, greater regional alignment can also help deter predatory tactics by external powers that exploit national divisions for strategic gain. 3.7.5 Reframe Africa’s narrative on the global stage   Africa must take charge of its image and the narrative that defines what the continent is about, because for too long, Africa has been portrayed primarily through the lenses of poverty, instability and external dependency, which framing undermines Africa’s agency and obscures the real innovation, leadership and transformation that is taking place across the continent.   Governments, the media and civil society must therefore actively promote a more accurate and empowering narrative, being one that emphasises Africa’s entrepreneurial ecosystems, technological ingenuity, youth-led movements and cultural influence. This is not just about soft power, it’s about setting the terms of engagement and it is needed to shape how the world sees and deals with Africa. 3.7.6 Pursue financial and digital sovereignty   Africa must continue exploring alternatives to traditional financial and digital infrastructures that entrench dependency, which includes, among others, developing regional payment systems, exploring local currency trade agreements and participating in emerging BRICS or South-South financial mechanisms.   Digital sovereignty is equally important, since African countries must assert control over their digital infrastructure, data governance and cybersecurity strategies, whether in negotiations over 5G infrastructure, AI development or digital tax policy. African states must ensure that their digital futures are shaped by their local needs and they should guard against it being dictated by external actors.   3.7.7 Anchor foreign policy in democratic and developmental values   Finally, while external partners may deprioritise democracy, African countries should not, as democratic governance, inclusive growth and social accountability remain the most sustainable foundations for peace and prosperity. Foreign engagement must be guided by these values, and it should not be subordinated to short-term economic or geopolitical expediency.   This means holding firm on human rights, resisting external pressures that undermine domestic institutions and ensuring that foreign partnerships align with the continent’s constitutional and developmental aspirations. 3.7.8 Conclusion   The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency, the strategic assertiveness of China and the broader reordering of the global system all present a moment of challenge and opportunity for Africa, but the choices made by African leaders, institutions and societies in this moment will shape outcomes more than the preferences of external powers.   Africa has leverage, it has agency and it has a voice. The task now is to use them, to negotiate from a place of strength, to pursue partnerships rooted in mutual benefit and to define its own role in a changing world.   As the webinar made abundantly clear: this is not the time to wait for direction. It is the time to act with purpose, unity and vision.   4 NAVIGATING THE AFRICA - CHINA - US NEXUS: STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES IN A LANDSCAPE OF GEOPOLITICAL TENSION: THE TRIANGULAR DIPLOMATIC DYNAMICS   Image: African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia   The triangular relationship between Africa, China and the United States represents one of the most consequential arenas of 21st-century geopolitics and as competition between Washington and Beijing intensifies, Africa’s strategic relevance grows, not only as a source of critical resources and expanding markets, but as a political and ideological battleground where both powers seek to define the norms and direction of global engagement. Under the Trump administration, the US has adopted an increasingly adversarial posture toward China’s role in Africa, which has manifested in direct rhetoric denouncing China’s infrastructure investments as “debt traps,” its technological offerings as security risks and its governance model as incompatible with democratic values. But behind this rhetoric lies a deliberate strategy and that is to counter Chinese influence by framing US engagement in Africa as the more transparent, values-driven alternative. But, this narrative often doesn’t match the financial scale, speed and political consistency that China has brought to the continent over the last two decades.   For Africa, the challenge is to navigate this tension without becoming collateral in a rivalry that is not of its own making. The continent must avoid being reduced to a passive prize in a East – West geopolitical contest and instead, it should adopt a multi-dimensional strategy that embraces the benefits of both relationships while insulating itself from coercion, dependency or forced alignment. 4.1 CHINA’S ROLE IN AFRICA: MORE THAN INFRASTRUCTURE China’s influence in Africa is vast and spans traditional infrastructure financing, such as ports and railways; digital development, for example, telecom networks and smart cities; resource extraction; medical diplomacy; and higher education. Over 50 African countries have signed onto the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Chinese firms are embedded across nearly every sector, from construction and energy to fintech and agriculture.   Importantly, China’s approach has resonated with many African leaders, because it emphasises speed of execution, non-interference in domestic politics and pragmatic engagement. Chinese loans, while often opaque, are usually tied to tangible infrastructure projects, which do not carry the governance conditionalities typical of Western donors and therefore, for states grappling with immediate development needs, this model has proven appealing.   However, this success has not been without consequences, to the contrary, it has been accompanied by rising debt burdens, concerns over labour practices and limited local content in Chinese contracts that have sparked public backlash in some African countries. And as the geopolitical rivalry with the US intensifies, these issues are likely to be amplified, either organically or as part of a deliberate American strategy to discredit China’s presence.   4.2 THE US DIVERSION STRATEGY: COUNTERING CHINA THROUGH AFRICA   The Trump administration’s Africa strategy, while thin on developmental substance, is heavily influenced by its overarching objective to contain China. This is evident in targeted engagements with mineral-rich African states, intensified anti-China rhetoric during bilateral talks and emerging policy tools such as trade incentives, digital infrastructure offerings, e.g. Open RAN, and diplomatic pressure brought to bear in order to have BRI contracts cancelled or revised.   This strategy of diversion and disruption seeks not necessarily to displace China from Africa outright, but to raise the cost of Chinese engagement and sow doubt about its intentions and ultimately aims to push African states toward re-alignment with US-backed alternatives. It is a geopolitical game of optics, influence and ideological framing, one that attempts to undermine trust in China’s partnerships, while at the same time offering selective inducements from Washington. 4.3 AFRICA’S STRATEGIC POSITIONING: DUAL ENGAGEMENT WITH A FOCUS ON AUTONOMY   To safeguard its interests, Africa must resist being pulled into a binary trap and therefore the continent’s strategic posture should rest on three pillars:   Diversified partnerships  in which Africa must maintain strong relationships with both China and the US, using competition between the two to drive better terms, technology transfer and concessional finance. Diplomatic hedging, not allegiance, is the path to sovereignty. Conditional engagement  through which African governments must condition economic access to strategic sectors, particularly digital infrastructure, critical minerals and energy, on clear and enforceable developmental outcomes, whether engaging with China or the US and deals must include provisions for skills development, local sourcing, environmental safeguards and long-term value addition to mineral extraction. Continental coherence  where the African Union and regional economic communities establish continental norms for foreign engagement, outlining standards on debt transparency, environmental sustainability, labour rights and technology governance, which will help curb external actors’ ability to exploit state-by-state fragmentation.   4.4 HOW CHINA SHOULD RESPOND: BUILDING RESILIENCE IN AFRICAN PARTNERSHIPS   China, for its part, must recognise that US strategy in Africa is increasingly designed not to merely offer an alternative development model, but also, for its own domestic foreign policy purposes, to erode trust in China’s intentions, so in response, China is advised to move from a purely transactional approach to one that strengthens political trust, operational transparency and mutual accountability.   Key steps China can take include:   It should increase contract transparency  by proactively publishing the terms of infrastructure and debt agreements which can pre-empt Western accusations of predatory lending and reinforce legitimacy. Deepen local integration  with more Chinese-funded projects incorporating local labour, firms and oversight mechanisms. This is in any event good business practice, since localisation builds goodwill and mitigates claims of neocolonialism. Support African agency  by instead of framing China as Africa’s “alternative” to the West, Beijing should rather openly support Africa’s push for non-alignment and greater international voice, whether at the WTO, IMF or UN Security Council. Invest in soft power  through cultural exchange, academic collaboration and media partnerships, which can prove critical in countering Western narratives and in embedding China’s presence in Africa as multifaceted, and not just infrastructural. Build multilateral development frameworks wherein China should be open to co-financing projects with African and even Western institutions, thereby showcasing a willingness to act collaboratively rather than competitively.     4.5 CONCLUSION: TOWARD A TRIANGULAR BALANCE   The Africa - China - US nexus will continue to define the strategic contours of the continent’s future, but Africa must neither be a buffer zone nor a battleground. It must be an assertive broker of its own destiny.   As the US and China recalibrate their Africa strategies, the one through rivalry, the other through long-term presence, the continent must rise above reactive diplomacy and it must demand fairness, transparency and partnership from both sides. Africa’s message should be clear: “We are open for business, but not for capture. Compete here, yes, but on our terms”. 5 TRIANGULAR TRADE DYNAMICS: US, CHINA AND AFRICA IN ECONOMIC TENSION AND OPPORTUNITY   Image: Coal Mining Operation, South Africa   Trade relationships between Africa, the United States and China form the backbone of the trilateral interactions between the three and it serves as both a point of contention and a platform for potential collaboration. Moreover, as global supply chains reconfigure and the more geopolitical competition has intensified, the more complex,  asymmetrical and strategically charged the trade dynamics among these three players have grown.   Each actor brings distinct motivations, instruments and vulnerabilities to the trading table and therefore an understanding of these dynamics is essential for African policymakers who seek to optimise their position, guard against economic coercion and chart a path toward structural transformation. 5.1 CHINA - AFRICA TRADE: SCALE, SPEED AND STRUCTURAL DOMINANCE   China’s trade relationship with Africa has expanded dramatically over the last two decades, making it the continent’s largest bilateral trading partner, registering trade volumes that have reached over $250 billion in recent years. China imports vast quantities of raw materials, such as oil, copper, cobalt and lithium from Africa, whilst it  exports manufactured goods, machinery, electronics and consumer products to Africa.   Chinese trade with Africa is often embedded in broader financing packages that include concessional loans, infrastructure development and tied procurement contracts, which bundling of trade and finance has allowed China to consolidate its presence in key sectors, particularly in extractives, construction, telecommunications and logistics. However, this relationship is structurally imbalanced, because Africa overwhelmingly exports primary commodities to China, whilst mainly importing finished goods from them. This reinforces a pattern of dependency. Local value addition is limited, despite periodic efforts to encourage Chinese companies to manufacture locally by relocating the manufacturing to  Africa, yet it has occurred only sporadically and at small scale.   Participants in the webinar emphasised that while China’s trade presence has brought short-term growth and infrastructure, it has also entrenched Africa’s position in the global economy as a supplier of raw inputs and if not recalibrated, this model could constrain Africa’s long-term industrial development and competitiveness. 5.2 US - AFRICA TRADE: DECLINE, REDEFINITION AND OPPORTUNITY GAPS In contrast, US - Africa trade has declined in relative terms. Where once a leading trading partner, US trade with Africa now lags behind China, the EU and even intra-African exchanges in some regions and while programmes like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) have offered preferential access to US markets, uptake has been limited to a handful of countries and sectors, primarily textiles, apparel and some agricultural goods.   AGOA, though symbolically important, is seen by many as outdated, unpredictable and skewed toward US commercial interests, moreover, the Trump administration has not prioritised trade with Africa in strategic terms, focusing instead on bilateral deals that align with domestic political imperatives or counter-China objectives.   Webinar participants noted that the US commercial footprint in Africa is thin and largely dominated by extractives, finance and defence-linked services and performing way below its potential, even though the private sector in the US is wa ell-capitalised and technologically advanced. This is because it often views Africa as high-risk and low-margin region, which has led to underinvestment and disengagement. Nonetheless, the US still offers comparative advantages that Africa can leverage, such as access to high-value markets, expertise in services and digital industries, and it has potential for technology partnerships that differ materially from China’s state-led model, however, to unlock these opportunities, Africa must demand more coherence and greater responsiveness from Washington, and particularly as it relates to simplifying market access. 5.3 TRADE AS GEOPOLITICAL LEVERAGE: THE RISK OF WEAPONISATION   Trade is no longer merely economic, in that it has now also become a geopolitical tool, with both China and the United States increasingly using it as a tool to reward allies, punish rivals and project influence, and for Africa, this weaponisation of trade poses serious risks.   The Trump administration’s trade strategy toward Africa is heavily influenced by its desire to counter China, for instance, countries deepening economic ties with China could face informal diplomatic pressure or even be excluded from US trade preference schemes. This coercive approach undermines Africa’s trade sovereignty and it exposes countries to strategic whiplash, depending on global alignments. Meanwhile, China’s own trade practices are becoming more selective and strategic. As Beijing responds to global backlash and domestic economic pressures, it may reduce exposure to high-risk African markets or tighten trade conditions and accordingly, African states that fail to meet debt repayment schedules or fail to align with Chinese diplomatic preferences could see disruptions in trade flows, financing or procurement.   This creates an urgent need for Africa to de-risk its trade policy, by building regional value chains, diversifying partners and localising production where possible, because relying on a single dominant partner, be it China or the US, is simply not wise. It makes African economies vulnerable to external shocks, policy shifts and political manoeuvring. 5.4 AFRICA’S TRADE STRATEGY: TOWARD A BALANCED AND BENEFICIAL REGIME   To thrive within this triangular dynamic, African countries will have to take a more deliberate and strategic approach to trade policy, which policy should be grounded in the following principles:   Africa must move beyond commodity exports and will accordingly have to integrate into regional and global value chains, with investment in agro-processing, green minerals refining, pharmaceuticals and digital goods being essential. Full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) must be prioritised, because it can reduce reliance on volatile external markets and moreover, intra-African trade is less exposed to geopolitical manipulation and more conducive to SME growth. African states should negotiate trade agreements collectively, whether with China, the US or the EU, regional blocs and the African Union taking the lead in setting minimum standards and trade objectives. African trade diplomacy must be agile, informed by data and grounded in national development strategies and technical expertise in trade law, digital regulation and investment arbitration will be increasingly critical. Trade agreements must be publicly debated, scrutinised and evaluated against national priorities, because citizens and civil society have a right to know how trade affects jobs, prices and public goods. 5.5 CONCLUSION: TRADE AS A STRATEGIC LEVER, NOT A PASSIVE FLOW The triangular trade relationship among Africa, China and the United States is not static and it is being reshaped by geopolitics, digitalisation and demographic change. While competition between Beijing and Washington presents risks, it also presents opportunities for Africa to demand better terms, deepen industrial capacity and to shift from the periphery to the centre of global commerce.   But, to  seize this moment it will require unity, clarity and resolve. Africa must no longer accept being a market for finished goods and a mine for raw materials, but instead, it must transform itself into a manufacturing hub, a trade rule-maker and a strategic broker that defines its own trade future, on its own terms. 6 CONTOURS OF CONTAINMENT: US – AFRICA - CHINA MILITARY AND SECURITY DYNAMICS   Image: Military Operation, Mozambique   The military and peace and security dimensions of US – Africa - China relations represent one of the most delicate and consequential aspects of the triangular engagement. While trade and development cooperation often garner public attention, it is in the realm of defence, counterterrorism, peacekeeping and strategic access where the geopolitical stakes are highest and where Africa’s sovereignty is most directly challenged.   The webinar discussions revealed a sobering truth, that is that Africa’s security landscape is increasingly entangled in a global competition, but not of its own making. Both the United States and China have intensified their military posturing on the continent, not primarily in response to African security needs, but as part of a broader global rivalry and so for African states, this creates a dual challenge, namely to manage internal and regional security concerns while also navigating external militarisation that may undermine long-term peacebuilding and regional autonomy. 6.1 US SECURITY ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA: CONTAINMENT THROUGH COUNTERTERRORISM   The United States has maintained a long-standing military footprint in Africa, primarily under the banner of counterterrorism, security sector reform and peacekeeping support and through initiatives such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and AFRICOM (US Africa Command), the US has built an extensive web of bases, partnerships and operations across the continent.   However, as participants in the webinar noted, the nature and tone of US military engagement worldwide have shifted significantly under the Trump administration, because now rather than being embedded within a broader developmental or governance framework, security cooperation has become increasingly transactional, bilateral and strategically competitive. This applies particularly in regions where China is expanding its influence and so one can expect a shift in US approach on the African continent as well. This is most evident in East Africa, where the US military presence near Djibouti is now operating alongside China’s first overseas military base in the very same vicinity. What was once framed as counterterrorism assistance is now also about containing the Chinese military ambitions, along with securing sea lanes and monitoring infrastructure corridors funded by Beijing. Critically, African security concerns, such as community-level conflict, state fragility and disarmament, are often subordinated to global counterterrorism priorities, which mismatch has contributed to the militarisation of diplomacy, where security actors become the primary US interlocutors. Governance, peacebuilding and reconciliation are marginalised through such an approach.   Participants expressed concern that such narrow security engagements do little to address the root causes of violence, inequality, youth unemployment and weak institutions and may even serve to exacerbate tensions by reinforcing coercive state behaviour. Moreover, selective partnerships with “strategically useful” regimes, regardless of their democratic credentials, undermines Africa’s long-term stability as envisaged, by for example, the African Union. 6.2 CHINA’S EVOLVING SECURITY ROLE: FROM NON-INTERVENTION TO STRATEGIC POSITIONING   China has traditionally adhered to a foreign policy of non-interference, focusing its Africa strategy on infrastructure, trade and diplomacy, however, over the past decade and particularly in response to US militarisation, China has begun to recalibrate its security posture on the continent.   This evolution is, as already mentioned, most visibly embodied in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base in Djibouti, a strategic site that supports Chinese naval operations in the Indian Ocean, anti-piracy patrols and logistical supply chains for Belt and Road projects. China has also increased its participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and has become one of the largest contributors of personnel and funding, particularly in South Sudan and Mali. Participants in the webinar interpreted these moves not as a wholesale shift toward US-style military projection, but as a strategic insurance policy and a means for Beijing to protect its citizens, investments and trade corridors in what has become a volatile global environment. However, they also warned that China’s increasing security footprint, if unchecked, could replicate the very patterns of dependency and instrumentalization that China itself once criticised in Western foreign policy.   Unlike the US, China’s security engagements are typically less visible, less conditioned and more state-centric, often focused on regime protection rather than human security. This has implications for how African civil society, opposition parties and fragile communities experience Chinese presence: as both stabilising and exclusionary. 6.3 PEACE AND SECURITY AS A SITE OF COMPETITION, NOT COOPERATION   What emerged clearly from the discussion is that Africa’s security arena is no longer governed by multilateralism, but by rivalry. Rather than cooperating on peacekeeping, conflict prevention or disarmament, the US and China are using Africa as a theatre to test power projection, technological capabilities and alliance-building.   This competition distorts peace and security norms. It diverts attention from African-led conflict resolution mechanisms, such as those under the African Union and ECOWAS, and prioritises short-term containment over long-term conflict transformation.   There is also a growing risk that African military forces may be drawn into proxy arrangements, trained, equipped and financed by competing powers with divergent doctrines and endgames which could fragment regional defence integration, militarise domestic politics and undermine the neutrality of African security institutions.   Moreover, the proliferation of dual-use technologies that is in the main supplied by external players, such as surveillance systems, cyber operations and AI-enabled border control, raises new ethical and governance challenges. African states must take heed of the potential threats and ensure that these tools are not used to entrench authoritarianism or suppress their own civic spaces, particularly when provided without transparency or safeguards.   6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN AUTONOMOUS AFRICAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE   To reclaim their agency in this domain, African nations must reassert ownership over their peace and security agenda, which his involves several strategic imperatives:   They must strengthen the operational and financial independence of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including the African Standby Force and early warning systems. Any external military engagement, whether with the US or Chinese, must be assessed against local security needs, conflict dynamics and constitutional mandates, in other words, conditionality should flow both ways. Security cooperation agreements should be transparent and they should therefore be subject to parliamentary scrutiny and to public debate, especially when they involve basic rights, technology transfer and/or counterterrorism laws. Africans must take the lead by creating forums where China, the US and African states can engage on shared security concerns, such as those presented by piracy, arms trafficking and peacekeeping. Moreover, the engagement must not be framed as a zero-sum contest. The root causes of insecurity, poverty, exclusion and environmental degradation, needs to be prioritised over militarised containment. Security must be people-centred, not power-centred.   6.5 CONCLUSION: FROM THEATRE OF RIVALRY TO ARENA OF SOVEREIGNTY   Africa must not be a chessboard for competing empires. Its security landscape is complex, nuanced and deeply rooted in local history and conditions, so while it is to be expected that external actors will inevitably seek strategic footholds, it is incumbent upon African leaders and institutions to themselves define the terms of engagement.   US - China competition on African soil must not be allowed to crowd out African agency, displace peacebuilding norms or militarise the continent’s diplomacy. Instead, Africa must articulate a clear, coherent and sovereign security strategy, one that is principled, pragmatic and centred on the well-being of its people.   7 REFLECTIONS ON THE TRIANGULAR HORIZON: RETHINKING POWER, PARTNERSHIP AND PURPOSE   As the world experiences a period of geopolitical turbulence and political  reconfiguration that has been introduced with the advent of the new Trump administration, so too the triangular relationship between Africa, the United States and China has emerged as a strategic contest. But it is more than that, it is also as a test of the principles of global engagement, sovereignty and solidarity, which are being redefined on the move.   The conversations captured in the webinar underscore a sobering reality, namely that Africa is no longer simply a stage on which others perform, but a site where power is contested, norms are negotiated and futures are forged. But in spite of this centrality, the risk remains that Africa is spoken for, acted upon and pulled in directions that may not serve its long-term aspirations, and so in this moment, a philosophical and strategic recalibration is necessary, not just for Africa, but for all three actors. 7.1 AFRICA AT THE CENTRE, NOT THE MARGIN   It is time for Africa to claim its place as an architect and not a mere accessory of the global order, considering that the continent is home to the world’s youngest population, some of its fastest-growing economies and a trove of critical resources essential for the planet’s energy transition and technological evolution. But beyond statistics lies a deeper truth, one that advocates Africa as a moral and political actor with its own vision, its own history of solidarity and its own stake in shaping what global justice should look like.   To fulfil this role, African states must transcend the temptation of short-term gains, whether mineral royalties or military aid and embrace the harder, longer path of institution building, regional integration and strategic independence. This is not about rejecting partnerships, to the contrary, it about entering into them with clarity, unity and a demand for reciprocity.   The era of passive engagement is over; the future requires Africa to be a broker, a convener and a challenger, capable of working with both East and West while refusing to be defined by either.   7.2 THE US AND CHINA: FROM COMPETITION TO CONSTRUCTIVE COEXISTENCE?   Both Washington and Beijing must re-evaluate their approaches to Africa, not only as a matter of, but as a test of the kind of global actors they wish to be.   For the United States, Africa cannot remain a secondary theatre in its broader competition with China. A truly meaningful US - Africa relationship must go beyond militarised counterterrorism and transactional diplomacy. It must reinvest in the very values that once made America compelling: democratic solidarity, inclusive development, human rights and multilateral cooperation. Africa should not be engaged out of fear of China’s rise, but out of respect for Africa’s rise.   For China, continued influence will depend on whether it can evolve from infrastructure financier to genuine development partner, transparent, responsive and grounded in mutual respect. If China wishes to avoid the pitfalls of the very powers it once criticised, it must support not only roads and rails, but also African governance, agency and accountability.   Both countries must recognise that the African continent is not a void to be filled or a risk to be managed, but a partner to be listened to. Triangular relations must mature from transactionalism to cooperative pluralism, where diverse approaches coexist and local ownership is non-negotiable. 7.3 A CALL TO REIMAGINE PARTNERSHIP   What is ultimately at stake here, is not only influence, but the very philosophy of global engagement raising the question as to whether international relations is doomed to be a zero-sum pursuit of power or whether it can evolve into the mutual recognition of interdependence, dignity and shared purpose.   The path forward will require all three actors to:   Move from suspicion to strategic trust, thereby recognising that cooperation is not capitulation. Institutionalise dialogue, not just bilaterally, but trilaterally as well, with Africa not considered as the object, but as the convenor. Embed development in diplomacy so as to ensure that security, trade and technology serve people before geopolitics. Invest in multilateral reform, through which Africa can be given a real voice in shaping global rules, from the WTO and IMF to the UN Security Council.   The triangular future to be sought for Africa is one that must not be about who dominates who, but it should rather be about design and the co-creation of a global system that is equitable, sustainable and anchored in the dignity of all. 7.4 CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE IS NEGOTIATED, NOT INHERITED   The triangular relationship between the US, China and Africa is at a crossroads. It can deepen into a vortex of rivalry, extraction and mistrust or it can be reshaped into a new grammar of cooperation: one that reflects a multipolar, multi-perspective and multi-stakeholder world.   Policymakers on all sides have a choice. They can double down on old logics of power, or they can imagine and enact a new logic, one rooted in fairness, foresight and mutual gain.   Africa will be central to this reimagining, but so too must be the willingness of the US and China to step beyond competition and towards co-existence.   The outcome is not inevitable, it must be negotiated and the time to begin is now.   8 FINAL WORD: AFRICA AS THE AUTHOR OF ITS OWN FUTURE   The triangular relationship between the United States, China and Africa is no longer defined by dominance and deference, it is now shaped by contestation, recalibration and unprecedented possibility for Africa, once written into the margins of global strategy, to now hold the pen.   The choices African leaders, institutions and citizens make in this decisive decade will reverberate far beyond the continent’s borders. They will reshape how power is distributed, how prosperity is pursued and how global partnerships are formed, not through coercion, but through vision.   To China and the United States, the message is clear: Africa will no longer be a passive recipient of foreign strategy. It demands respect, reciprocity and relevance. To Africa’s policymakers, the imperative is urgent: resist the false binaries, assert agency and forge a path that is neither dictated nor dependent, but distinctly African.   The continent is no longer navigating between giants. It is rising among them and those who understand this will not just win Africa’s markets, they will win its trust. IMAGE REFERENCES   Cover page:   African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Source: iStock. African Union Headquarters . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/african-union-headquarters-gm180957062-26498948  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Military, Mozambique, Source: iStock. Armed Forces Marching Holding Bayonets . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/armed-forces-marching-holding-bayonets-gm2174863525-594507140  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Mining, South Africa, Source: iStock. Piece of Large Machinery Used for Coal Mining in an Open Pit in South Africa . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/piece-of-large-machinery-used-for-coal-mining-in-an-open-pit-in-south-africa-gm1440533764-480488486  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Flag of the United States of America, Source: Wikipedia. Flag of the United States (Web Colors) . Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_the_United_States#/media/File:Flag_of_the_United_States_(Web_Colors).svg  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Flag of the African Union, Source: Wikipedia. Flag of the African Union . Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_the_African_Union#/media/File:Flag_of_the_African_Union.svg  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Flag of the People’s Republic of China, Source: Wikipedia. Flag of the People's Republic of China . Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_China#/media/File:Flag_of_the_People's_Republic_of_China.svg  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Page 16:   African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Source: iStock. African Union Headquarters . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/african-union-headquarters-gm180957062-26498948  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Page 20:   Mining, South Africa, Source: iStock. Piece of Large Machinery Used for Coal Mining in an Open Pit in South Africa . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/piece-of-large-machinery-used-for-coal-mining-in-an-open-pit-in-south-africa-gm1440533764-480488486  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   Page 24:   Military, Mozambique, Source: iStock. Armed Forces Marching Holding Bayonets . Available at: https://www.istockphoto.com/photo/armed-forces-marching-holding-bayonets-gm2174863525-594507140  (Accessed: 30 July 2025). Note: Image used without formal permission under fair use for academic and non-commercial purposes. All rights remain with the copyright holder.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is extending its constitutional literacy programme to schools in both Gauteng and the North West Province. These workshops, targeted at Grade 11 and 12 learners, aim to deepen young people’s understanding of the South African Constitution, with a particular focus on its imperatives and foundational principles. On Monday, 28 July 2025, the Institute held one such workshop at Soshanguve South Secondary School. The session was facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, ISI’s Schools Project Coordinator for both provinces. His engaging and interactive approach ensured that learners were not merely passive recipients of information but were actively involved throughout the workshop. The workshop content covered essential aspects of the Constitution, including: The Preamble, which encapsulates the vision and values underpinning South Africa’s democracy. The Founding Provisions, setting out the core principles on which the Republic is built. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of all South Africans. Chapter 9 Institutions, established to safeguard democracy and ensure accountability. Learners displayed a high level of interest and enthusiasm, asking a wide range of thoughtful and challenging questions. Their inquiries touched on topics such as the meaning of democracy in practice, the role and responsibilities of political parties in the governance of the country, and the duty of government to uphold constitutional values. Many learners also drew connections between the Constitution and their everyday lives, highlighting the relevance of such educational interventions. Feedback from both learners and educators at Soshanguve South Secondary School was overwhelmingly positive. Teachers expressed appreciation for the Institute’s efforts, noting that the workshop not only enriched classroom learning but also encouraged learners to think critically about their role as future leaders and active citizens. For many of the participants, this was their first detailed engagement with the Constitution beyond their textbooks, and it left a lasting impression. The Inclusive Society Institute views this initiative as part of its broader commitment to strengthening democracy through civic education. By equipping young people with knowledge about their constitutional rights and responsibilities, the Institute is helping to cultivate a new generation of South Africans who are empowered to participate meaningfully in the democratic process. Looking ahead, ISI intends to continue expanding the reach of these workshops beyond Gauteng and the North West Province. Plans are already underway to roll out the programme to schools in other provinces, ensuring that more learners across the country benefit from this vital educational opportunity. The Institute firmly believes that by investing in the constitutional literacy of today’s youth, it is investing in the democratic resilience of South Africa’s future.

The Vital Role of Participatory Democracy in Building a Just and Inclusive Society By the Inclusive Society Institute in collaboration with the Daily Maverick Participatory democracy acts as a fundamental pillar in our pursuit of a just and inclusive society. As responsible citizens and leaders, it is incumbent upon us to deeply comprehend and uphold the principles that underpin this vision. Justice Albie Sachs, a distinguished former Constitutional Court Judge, offers valuable reflections on a case that exemplifies the importance of Participatory Democracy, the Doctors for Life case. In 2005, Parliament passed four pieces of legislation relating to reproductive healthcare matters. Doctors for Life, a conservative organisation, objected to the passing of this legislation, alleging that the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) had not sufficiently involved the public in the process, in violation of sections 72 and 118 of the Constitution. Section 72 of the Constitution requires the NCOP to facilitate public involvement in legislative processes, while section 118 imposes the same obligation on provincial legislatures. Doctors for Life International, which had conservative views on the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, challenged the proposed law on the grounds that it had not been subject to sufficient public participation in a novel case that pitted representative democracy against participatory democracy. In this particular case's verdict, the Constitutional Court determined that the NCOP had not fulfilled its constitutional duty to encourage public participation in the process of creating laws. The Court established that the NCOP had neglected to request written input from the public regarding the Bills, had not conducted public hearings on the Bills, and had disregarded public opinions when making decisions about the Bills. The word "participatory" does not appear in the Constitution, but section 1(d) refers to a "multi-party system of democratic government." The meaning of this phrase was central to the judgment, which ultimately found that the NCOP had not met its constitutional obligations to facilitate public participation in the legislative process. The Doctors for Life case was a landmark decision that affirmed the importance of public participation in the law-making process. It also highlighted the tension between representative democracy, in which the people elect representatives to make decisions on their behalf, and participatory democracy, in which the people themselves have a more direct role in decision-making. The Doctors for Life matter served as a poignant reminder of the paramount importance of engaging the public in legislative processes. This landmark decision not only reaffirmed the need for participatory justice in South Africa but also continues to provide valuable insights for our democratic institutions. The case is a reminder that participatory democracy is not just an abstract ideal but a fundamental right enshrined in the South African Constitution. It is a right that must be upheld to build a truly democratic society. Our Constitution, as the foundational document of our democracy, envisions a system that goes beyond periodic elections. It calls for a dynamic democracy that actively engages citizens in decision-making. As Justice Sachs eloquently states, the vision is not akin to "sleeping beauty," where democracy is awakened solely during elections. Instead, it demands ongoing public engagement and the recognition of the diverse voices within our society. Participatory democracy yields several benefits for both governance and society. When people are knowledgeable about the law and have been involved in its formulation, they feel a sense of ownership and belonging. This fosters unity amidst diversity, ensuring that all sections of society have an opportunity to contribute meaningfully. Better outcomes are achieved when legislation reflects the realities and aspirations of those most affected by it. Participatory democracy is also particularly vital for groups traditionally marginalised or underrepresented in formal power structures. The Doctors for Life case highlighted the importance of engaging local healers and recognising their expertise. By involving such outlying groups, we strengthen our democracy by embracing the wisdom and experiences of all citizens. The recognition and inclusion of diverse perspectives lead to fairer outcomes and a stronger sense of social cohesion. The Constitutional Court's decision to strike down the law in question demonstrated the court's commitment to upholding participatory justice. It was not an encroachment on Parliament's authority but a necessary consequence of Parliament's failure to fulfil its promise of public engagement. This judgment affirms that reasonable measures must be taken to ensure genuine public involvement, thus emphasising the Court's role as the guardian of constitutional principles. South Africa stands out as a beacon of participatory democracy, with few precedents worldwide of legislation being struck down due to failures in public engagement. We must recognise this unique position and continue to lead by example. The global trend toward disillusionment with traditional political processes calls for revitalising participatory democracy. Rather than sporadic consultations, continuous public engagement is key to rebuilding trust and empowerment. In conclusion, The Doctors for Life case offers us valuable insights into the true essence of participatory democracy. As a living document, our Constitution demands more than just representative democracy; it envisions an active, engaged citizenry. We must embrace the principles of inclusivity, accountability, and openness. By taking reasonable steps to involve the public, we strengthen our democracy and ensure a fair and just society. Let us seize this.