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The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) proudly participated in the T20 South Africa Midterm Conference , held on 19 and 20 June 2025. Hosted by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) , the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) , and the Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation (IPATC) , the event brought together a rich tapestry of global thought leaders, researchers, and policymakers to review progress and deepen collaboration ahead of the upcoming G20 Leaders’ Summit . The Midterm Conference marked a crucial milestone in the Think20 (T20) process, offering a timely opportunity to evaluate the work being undertaken by the five thematic Task Forces . These include pressing areas such as sustainable development, multilateral reform, digital transformation, and inclusive economic growth. The gathering enabled cross-regional engagement and strategic policy refinement to ensure that recommendations remain responsive to emerging global dynamics. Beyond its formal agenda, the conference provided a platform for building solidarity across disciplines, geographies, and sectors . It created a collaborative environment where diverse perspectives converged  around shared global challenges—from climate action and social justice to economic resilience and innovation. On 20 June, the focus shifted to the broader purpose of the Think20 , the G20’s official ideas bank , which convenes global think tanks and research centers. In the face of uneven economic recovery , rising inequality , and escalating geopolitical tensions, the T20’s role in crafting evidence-based, forward-looking policy recommendations has become more vital than ever. The conference reaffirmed the value of inclusive and informed dialogue in shaping a coordinated global response to today’s complex challenges. The Inclusive Society Institute’s participation reflects its ongoing commitment to advancing inclusive, evidence-based policymaking  that bridges the divide between government, business, and civil society—both at home and abroad.

Occasional Paper 8/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. J U L Y 2 0 2 5   Dr Samantha Williams PhD (Environmental and Geographical Science), University of Cape Town, 2013     Abstract   Small-scale fishing (SSF) in South Africa has long been a cornerstone of coastal livelihoods, identities and cultures. Despite its historical and socio-economic significance, SSF continues to face persistent challenges related to resource access, governance and socio-economic vulnerability. This paper provides an overview of the status of SSF in South Africa within the broader framework of the Blue Economy, emphasising sustainable ocean-based livelihoods and equitable resource use by drawing on a review of relevant academic and policy literature. It describes the evolution of policy reforms aimed at improving SSF governance and identifies gaps between policy intent and local realities, crucial for South Africa’s new blue/oceans economy agenda ambitions.   The paper examines how socio-economic and ecological challenges affect SSF, with particular attention given to the structural inequalities that continue to marginalise small-scale fishers despite national and international frameworks promoting inclusive ocean governance.   In conclusion, this research proposes pathways for advancing SSF within the Blue Economy paradigm, focusing on sustainable governance and equitable resource distribution. This approach highlights the importance of enhancing SSF's livelihoods through capacity building, long-term policy support and the adoption of equitable and just principles within governance structures and processes. These conditions are essential for fostering a sustainable and inclusive ocean economy in South Africa, ensuring that small-scale fisheries contribute to shaping an equitable ocean future.   Introduction   On a global scale, small-scale fisheries (SSF) are recognised as fundamental to food security, nutrition, livelihoods and cultural identity, particularly in developing regions (Cheungpagdee & Jentoft, 2019). A recent study, quantifying the value and contribution of small-scale fisheries (SSF), indicates that globally, the livelihood of 1 in every 12 people, nearly half of them women, depends on SSF for their livelihoods (Basurto et al., 2025). These figures underscore the sector’s significance as a source of food and income, for instance, and especially for vulnerable populations in coastal and inland communities.   Various studies have highlighted the contribution of SSF in combating hunger and malnutrition with catch from small-scale fisheries supporting human nutrition in two key ways: first, through the direct consumption of seafood and second, through income earned from fisheries that are used to purchase nutritious food (Viana et al., 2023; Smith & Basurto, 2019). When seafood is sold within communities or at local markets, it is often more affordable than other animal protein sources, such as beef or chicken, making it a vital and affordable source of nutrients for communities with limited access to broader food markets.   This, for example, in Africa, supports the food security of over 200 million people (March & Failler, 2022).  In Asia, similar contributions are noted where small-scale fisheries support the livelihoods of around 46 million people. Women make up 40 per cent of those engaged in the sector, which accounts for nearly half of the region's total fish catch, with an estimated landed value of USD 53.3 billion (FAO, 2025).   Beyond their nutritional and economic value, SSFs are deeply embedded in the cultural fabric of many societies. Fishing is not merely an occupation but a way of life that shapes community identities and social relations (Delgado-Ramírez et al., 2022; Fabinyi & Barkley, 2022). In South Africa, as in many coastal regions worldwide, SSFs support diverse livelihood strategies and are integral to the social and cultural identity of many coastal communities (Solomon, 2023; Williams, 2023).   While small-scale fishing livelihoods are characterised by their diversity, flexibility and dynamism (Fabinyi & Barkley, 2022), it is accepted that there is no universal definition of what constitutes small-scale fisheries. Various definitions consistently highlight that small-scale fisheries vary widely across regions, cultures, and policy contexts, reflecting differences in gear types, vessel sizes, target species, socio-economic role and the organisation of labour (Smith & Basurto, 2019). The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries [1] explicitly recognise this diversity and the absence of a single definition, instead describes SSF as encompassing a wide range of activities along the value chain, undertaken by men and women in both inland and marine environments (FAO, 2015).  Many studies note that national and scientific definitions often emphasise technological dimensions, such as boat length or engine power. Therefore, small-scale fisheries are best understood as a heterogeneous and context-dependent sector embedded in complex socio-ecological systems and shaped by local realities (Smith & Basurto, 2019).  This connection to place and tradition is a defining feature of SSF, distinguishing it from large-scale industrial fisheries.   Despite the significant contribution that SSF makes to the livelihoods of millions, many SSF-dependent communities still face significant socio-economic challenges and remain vulnerable to poverty, resource access constraints, limited participation in governance, insecure tenure rights, and exposure to environmental and market shocks (Cheungpagdee & Jentoft, 2019; Sowman et al., 2014). Climate change poses risks to SSF through the altered distribution of harvested resources, habitat degradation and increased frequency of extreme weather events (Villasante et al., 2022; Galappaththi et al., 2021). These impacts threaten both the ecological sustainability of these fisheries systems and the socio-economic well-being of SSF communities.  Their vulnerability is further exacerbated by their historical marginalisation in policy and governance frameworks (Cheungpagdee & Jentoft, 2019).   Various national and international policy instruments have aimed to address the challenges faced in small-scale fisheries. The FAO's Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries, along with the inclusion of SSF in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), underscore the importance of equitable access to resources, social protection, and capacity building. In particular, the FAO’s SSF Guidelines were developed to support the visibility, recognition and enhancement of the role of SSF and to contribute to global and national efforts to eradicate hunger and poverty (FAO, 2015). It, therefore, provides guidance that States and stakeholders can consider for the development and implementation of participatory policies, strategies and legal frameworks to enhance responsible and sustainable SSFs.   In this regard, when considering the role and integration of SSFs into the blue economy and ocean governance frameworks, it is essential to ensure that SSFs are not overlooked in the pursuit of economic growth. The Blue Economy has rapidly become a key feature in ocean governance discourse and is hailed as a strategic approach that presents both opportunities and challenges for Small-Scale Fisheries (SSF) (Yousef, 2024). Fisheries form one part of the Blue Economy agenda, which encompasses a broad spectrum of ocean-based economic activities. These include aquaculture, maritime transport, coastal tourism, renewable energy, marine biotechnology and ecosystem services. Within this framework, fisheries, when managed sustainably and equitably, can contribute to economic growth, improved livelihoods and the sustainable use of marine resources.   The following section provides an overview of small-scale fisheries in South Africa, examining their socio-economic significance as a foundation for community livelihoods, identities and cultures. It is also essential to discuss the persistent challenges related to resource access and governance, as the sector has historically been marginalised. Acknowledging these issues is crucial to ensure that small-scale fisheries are not overlooked and that their contributions and livelihoods are fully recognised and supported in Blue Economy frameworks and plans.  It is critically important to explore the role of SSF within the oceans economy framework and how it can enhance and strengthen the sector.    The role and relevance of SSFs in South Africa   Given South Africa’s colonial and later apartheid history, it is not surprising that natural resource use, distribution and access rights are contested issues that the country still grapples with. As in the case of land, so too does the fisheries sector bear examples of this complex nature.  Historically, the small-scale fisheries sector has been neglected in fisheries discourses, policies and management (Auld & Feris, 2022; Sowman, 2011; Hara & Raakjaer, 2009). This is the case as the country's marine resources and activities were dominated by a few large-scale, white-owned enterprises during the country's apartheid era. Access to resources for most of the country’s population and coastal fisher communities was predominantly gained through employment in the commercial fishing sector or by obtaining access through recreational or resource-use permits (Sowman & Cardoso, 2010; van Sittert, 2003).   Despite these restrictions, however, many individuals and communities have been engaged in subsistence and small-scale fishing activities for decades (van Sittert, 2003; Clark et al., 2002). These activities, although labour-intensive, do not require significant financial investments or extensive operations. Typically, small-scale fishers harvest fisheries resources for household consumption and limited sale to local markets (Fabinyi & Barclay, 2022). With South Africa's democratisation and the development of new legislation, small-scale fishers were recognised as part of a formal sector for the first time. Recognition of these individuals and communities was the first step in a long process of transformation that is continuing.   While recognition of this sector was a positive step forward, little information was available about fishers and how they are organised, what and where they harvested, the nature of their communities and their livelihoods. In broad terms, this recognition confirmed that there was a significant level of poverty in fishing communities and that transformation in the industry was urgently required (Sunde & Isaacs, 2008). More specifically, it highlighted the need to accommodate small scale fishers in new policy developments. In September 1993, a 'Fishing Forum' was established, comprising various stakeholders such as the trade unions, large companies, various government departments, all tasked with managing fisheries resources. It was agreed that immediate steps were needed to address the poverty crisis in coastal fishing communities, and the new government promised "the upliftment of impoverished coastal communities through improved access to marine resources" (ANC 1994, p. 104).   The post-apartheid period was, therefore, marked by a series of commissions, interim resource rights allocation measures and processes, policy development, protests and legal actions that all collectively shaped the trajectory of the small-scale fisheries sector (Williams, 2023; Sowman, 2011). Sowman (2011) notes that the promulgation of the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) of 1998 (RSA, 1998) gave recognition to subsistence fishers as a legal category of fishers and demonstrated the new government's commitment to redress for marginalised fishers and their communities.   However, the MLRA's restrictive definition of 'subsistence' resulted in the exclusion of a significant number of traditional and small-scale fishers from the new fisheries policy framework, leaving many without formal recognition or access to the resources they had historically depended on (Auld &Feris, 2022). A pivotal moment in the policy process occurred in 2005, when fishers, their communities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academics approached the Equality Court to challenge the exclusion of small-scale fishers from access to fishing rights (Sowman & Sunde, 2021). This action resulted in the 2007 court ruling that required the (n) Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) to allocate interim rights to excluded fishers and to develop a dedicated policy for small-scale fisheries.   After extensive consultation and negotiation, the Policy for the Small-Scale Fisheries Sector in South Africa was gazetted in June 2012, followed by the promulgation of regulations and amendments to the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) in March 2016 (DAFF 2012). The Small-Scale Fisheries Policy (SSFP) explicitly recognises the unique character and needs of small-scale fishers, defines access rights and aims to facilitate their effective participation in resource management. Central to the policy is a commitment to a human-rights-based approach, emphasising food security, poverty alleviation, the recognition of customary practices and equitable access to marine resources (DAFF 2012). South Africa has approximately 147 small-scale fishing communities, with around 28,338 fisher households and 29,233 subsistence fishers (Issacs et al, 2022).   The Blue Economy concept   The Blue Economy has rapidly emerged as a dominant discourse in global and national discussions about value creation in ocean spaces, emphasising the sustainable use of marine resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods and ecosystem health. Ocean governance, which encompasses the frameworks, policies and institutions that regulate human interactions with the ocean, has become central to this agenda. As the world’s oceans have witnessed a proliferation of anthropogenic pressures, they can no longer be viewed as inexhaustible resources.   In response to the mounting challenges posed by these pressures, the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goal 14 (SDG 14: Life Below Water) establishes a global mandate for the conservation and sustainable management of the world’s oceans, seas and marine resources. It, therefore, explicitly recognises the ocean's role in future economic, social and ecological development.    Gunter Pauli is credited with coining the term ‘Blue Economy’ in 1994. In his book entitled “ The Blue Economy: 10 Years, 100 Innovations, 100 Million Jobs ”, the economist outlines a blue economy paradigm which seeks to balance economic development with ocean and environmental sustainability (Pauli, 1994). In this model, it is emphasised that the Blue Economy, as an economic model, involves the sustainable use of coastal and marine resources, aiming to stimulate economic growth, support livelihoods and maintain the health and integrity of ocean ecosystems. This approach encompasses all commercial activities associated with ocean and coastal environments, including fisheries, aquaculture, maritime transport and engineering, renewable energy, marine biotechnology and coastal tourism. By integrating economic development with environmental stewardship, these activities aim to strike a balance between value creation and long-term ecological sustainability, as well as social benefits.   The concept of the Blue Economy gained traction following its introduction at the United Nations (UN) Rio+20 conference held in 2012 (Lee et al., 2020). During the preparatory phase for Rio+20, many coastal nations expressed concerns about the relevance and applicability of the Green Economy framework to their specific contexts (UN, 2014). As a result, strong advocacy emerged for the adoption of a "Blue Economy" approach that would more directly address the priorities and realities of ocean-dependent countries, especially Small Island Developing States (SIDS), leading to increased visibility and integration into global policy discussions.   Various definitions and interpretations of the Blue Economy are cited in the growing body of literature (see Das, 2023; Smith-Godfrey, 2016; Voyer et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2020; Picken, 2023). The concept has also given rise to related terms such as Blue Justice, which emphasises social equity and fair access for marginalised coastal communities (Reis-Filho et al., 2024; Arias-Schreiber et al., 2022); Blue Growth, which focuses on the sustainable expansion of ocean-based industries (Eikeset et al., 2018); Blue communities, a concept that draws on the multi-dimensional concept of well-being to foreground social, cultural and environmental factors alongside economic growth and Blue Sustainability, which stresses the long-term health of marine environments alongside economic and social objectives. Given the increasing recognition of the Blue Economy’s importance for sustainable development in coastal nations, these interconnected frameworks are likely to continue expanding and shape ocean governance and policy in different countries and contexts (Voyer et al., 2018).    The Blue/ Oceans Economy in South Africa   Like many other coastal nations, South Africa was also motivated by the economic and social benefits of the Blue Economy and its potential impact on the country's economic, social and developmental needs (Sowman & Sunde, 2024; Loureiro et al., 2022).  With a coastline that stretches nearly 2800 kilometres (the second largest on the African continent), the country is strategically positioned along one of the world’s key maritime shipping corridors. It, therefore, plays a vital role in global marine transportation. Its rich coastal environment is influenced by the convergence of three oceans, which are central to South Africa's economy. With approximately 30% of the population residing within 60 km of the coast and over 90% of all trade involving a maritime element, South Africa has been described as a 'maritime economy' (Struwig et al 2023; Walker, 2018).   Given the country’s maritime nature and developing plans for its ocean economy, the South African government approved the adoption of the Malaysian Big Fast Results (BFR) methodology in 2014 to accelerate economic development across various sectors, including the ocean economy. This initiative, known locally as Operation Phakisa-Oceans Economy ( Phakisa  means hurry in Sesotho, one of South Africa’s 12 official languages), was launched to fast-track the implementation of key objectives outlined in the country’s 2030 National Development Plan (NDP), particularly the eradication of poverty, unemployment, and inequality (Stuwig et al., 2024; Vreÿ, 2019). In his speech to introduce Phakisa, former South African president Jacob Zuma noted that the starting point for this process was “ that South Africa is surrounded by a vast ocean and yet we have not fully taken advantage of the immense potential of this untapped resource. The oceans have the potential to contribute up to 177 billion rand to the Gross Domestic Product and create just over one million jobs by 2033. To further explore this potential, we brought together teams from government, labour, business, academia and other sectors to work together in experimental laboratories to explore all possibilities and further unlock the potential of our country's vast coastline ” (Presidential speech, 2014). From Phakisa’s introduction, it was also outlined that six priority areas and two cross-cutting themes were identified for South Africa’s ocean economy. These included marine transport and manufacturing, offshore oil and gas exploration, fishing and aquaculture, marine protection services and ocean governance, small harbour development, coastal and marine tourism, skills and capacity building, and research, as well as technology and innovation (OEMP, n.d.).    Since its launch and introduction, the implementation of Operation Phakisa-Oceans Economy has yielded mixed and modest economic results and impacts (OEMP, n.d) that also demonstrate variations across the six priority areas. A comprehensive economic analysis undertaken on behalf of the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment (DFFE) was conducted in 2021 and estimated that Operation Phakisa-Oceans Economy had the potential to contribute between ZAR129 to ZAR177 billion to South Africa’s GDP by 2033 (compared to ZAR54 billion in 2010) and create between 800 000 and 1 million jobs (compared to 316 000 in 2010) (OEMP, nd). Further forecasts to 2035 suggest that the ocean economy will contribute approximately 4.5% to South Africa's GDP (around ZAR 166.6 billion) and support about 608,253 jobs, representing 2.9% of total employment (Zimmerman, 2021 quoted in OEMP, n.d).   The priority areas highlighted above comprise various subsectors, each with its own targeted and projected gains from the value creation process in South Africa’s ocean spaces. The scope of this research paper does not allow for a detailed examination of all these sectors and subsectors. Instead, this forthcoming section aims to expand on the fisheries sector (with particular reference to SSF) and how these features within South Africa's ocean economy framework [2] . Efforts to expand on South Africa's plans to grow its ocean economy have resulted in a relatively new Oceans Economy Master Plan (OEMP), whose broad vision aims “ to sustainably unlock the socio-economic potential of the Oceans Economy so that South Africa is globally recognised as a fully-fledged maritime nation by 2035”.   The OEMP presents a comprehensive sub-sector plan for fisheries and acknowledges that the industry (which consists of industrial, commercial, subsistence, recreational or artisanal activities) is highly complex.  Regarding the role of SSF, the OEMP describes this sector as recently recognised in law, where basic gear and small boats are used to earn a living and many coastal communities have fished South Africa's waters for generations. Fishing is, therefore, deeply rooted in their culture and heritage. It further highlights that these fishers are granted rights through fishing cooperatives, and about 95% of their diverse catch, ranging from mussels and finfish to seaweed and abalone, is consumed locally (OEMP, n.d).   Challenges identified for the sector and those specifically relevant to SSF are also outlined in the OEMP. Key issues include the overexploitation of marine resources and the impacts of climate change, both of which threaten the sustainability and ecological integrity of these ecosystems, as well as the livelihoods that depend on them. For small-scale fisheries, the situation is further compounded by limited access to essential resources, such as vessels and equipment, as well as access to technology.  The absence of storage and processing facilities, poor infrastructure and high operational costs further hinder their ability to operate effectively. Environmental threats from offshore oil, gas and other mining activities add to the pressures faced by fishing communities.    Discussion   Advancing sustainable small-scale fisheries in the Ocean’s economy of South Africa The question of whether the Blue Economy can offer sustainable livelihoods for small-scale fisheries (SSF) and ensure ecological sustainability in South Africa is complex and multifaceted. Many challenges faced by SSF communities, such as continued marginalisation, limited access to resources and vulnerability to environmental and economic pressures, are longstanding and also acknowledged in sector-specific ocean economy frameworks.   Critiques in South African academic literature highlight that while the Blue Economy promises economic growth and sustainable oceans, its implementation and associated processes may exacerbate the precarious conditions of SSF communities (Sowman & Sunde, 2024; Bond, 2019). For example, Operation Phakisa’s focus on rapid economic development and industrial ocean sectors raised concerns and sparked resistance from SSF communities, NGOs and activists, among others. Widespread media attention and academic critiques have emphasised that Phakisa’s strong economic growth focus has sidelined social and environmental concerns. For example, Bond (2019) argues that the initiative, especially under the Zuma administration, was overhyped and failed to deliver meaningful benefits to communities that also faced exclusion from marine spaces due to industrial developments promoted by Phakisa.  Moreover, the framing of the ocean primarily as a site for capital accumulation conflicts with the cultural and livelihood values of communities, who experienced dispossession and exclusion from fully benefiting from coastal and marine resources.   Local resistance movements, such as the "Oceans Not Oil" coalition, emerged, uniting small-scale fishers, indigenous groups, scientists, and environmental NGOs in opposition to offshore oil and gas activities promoted by Phakisa, demanding a shift toward ocean-centred, socially just and ecologically sustainable policies (Solomon, 2023). Protests led and organised by the coalition opposed a seismic survey aimed at exploring petroleum beneath the ecologically sensitive Pondoland region on the Wild Coast of South Africa. This survey was to be conducted by BG International, a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, in collaboration with Shell Exploration and Production SA and the local consortium Impact Africa Limited. The protests sparked widespread mobilisation among civil society groups both across Africa and internationally (Healy 2022 quoted in Solomon 2023). Following two court interdicts, one of which was successfully revoked, Shell's reconnaissance permit, along with all its subsequent renewals, was revoked, and the company was ordered to pay legal costs. Solomon (2023) further notes that what many protesters were attempting to make visible was not only the public accountability of Shell and Impact Africa but, more specifically, a meaningful reconnection of the marine environment with paradigms of relation and critical care. In South Africa, the sea holds sacred significance for many, regarded as a source of ancestral power, a place for spiritual grounding and healing and therefore deeply embedded in the cultural practices of local communities (Sibeko 2020, quoted in Solomon 2023). A key tension lies in balancing economic expansion with social equity and environmental protection, all of which are core pillars of the Blue Economy. South Africa's SSF policy, for instance, legally recognises small-scale fishers and their communities, aiming to promote equitable access and co-management as part of its overarching objectives. This, therefore, aligns with the Blue Economy principles of sustainability and inclusion (WWF, 2018; DFFE, 2012). However, there have been delays and slow, uneven implementation of policies, which present challenges that will impact and leave many SSF communities vulnerable to exclusion from Blue Economy initiatives (Sowman & Sunde, 2024). This marginalisation is what Bennette et al. (2021) describe in their literature review, which identifies ten injustices that can result from an unjust ocean economy: (1) dispossession, displacement, and ocean grabbing; (2) environmental justice concerns arising from pollution and waste; (3) environmental degradation and the reduction of ecosystem services; (4) undermining the livelihoods of small-scale fishers; (5) restricting access to marine resources essential for food security and well-being; (6) inequitable distribution of economic benefits; (7) social and cultural impacts; (8) marginalisation of women; (9) abuses of human and Indigenous rights; and (10) exclusion from decision-making and governance processes. These interconnected injustices underscore the complex social and environmental challenges that blue economy initiatives can pose, particularly to coastal communities such as small-scale fishers. Effectively advancing small-scale fisheries (SSF) within South Africa's Blue Economy requires a multidimensional approach that addresses and promotes socio-economic empowerment while ensuring ecological sustainability. Building on this foundation, four key pathways are identified here as essential for strengthening small-scale fisheries (SSFs) and ensuring their effective integration into the broader ocean economy. Firstly, securing equitable access to marine resources is foundational. The South African Small-Scale Fisheries Policy (2012) establishes community-based rights allocation, moving away from individual rights toward collective resource management. However, challenges remain in the effective implementation and allocation of these rights, which include bureaucratic delays. Scholarship on promoting sustainable and effective co-management regimes advocates that empowering local communities has demonstrated success in balancing resource sustainability with livelihood security (Pomeroy & Rivera-Guieb, 2006; Gelcich et al., 2019). It is, therefore, imperative to build and support these models by strengthening cooperative governance structures, improve capacity building and ensuring that SSF communities have meaningful participation in decision-making processes.  The contribution and inclusion of SSF community perspectives are paramount.   Secondly, improving economic opportunities through value chain development and infrastructure investment is vital. A recent 36% increase in key fish species to SSFs by South Africa’s DFFE (2025) provides a crucial resource base, but maximising benefits from these allocations requires better access to processing facilities, markets and finance. These remain ongoing challenges for the sector, and therefore, it necessitates support for cooperative entities that can help convert resource access into tangible socio-economic gains (Sowman & Sunde, 2021). Thirdly, addressing environmental sustainability and climate resilience is essential, considering the vulnerability of SSFs to ecosystem degradation and climate change. Blue Economy initiatives often focus on industrial sectors, such as offshore energy and aquaculture, which can spatially and ecologically compete with Small-Scale Fisheries (SSF). Examples of these concerns have been discussed above; hence, integrating SSF concerns into marine protected area (MPA) planning and ecosystem-based management approaches can reduce conflicts and promote biodiversity conservation alongside livelihoods (Sowman & Sunde, 2021). Furthermore, building adaptive capacity through community empowerment, monitoring and diversification of fishing practices can support Small-Scale Fisheries (SSF) resilience to climate variability (Barange et al., 2018).   Finally, strengthening policy coherence and multi-level governance is vital. The fragmentation of governance approaches and the slow pace of policy implementation have hindered the progress of SSF in South Africa. Aligning national policies with regional and local governance frameworks and fostering collaboration among government departments, civil society, traditional and local authorities, communities as well as other relevant stakeholders can create an enabling environment for SSF development (Phiri et al., 2025). Internationally, integrated ocean governance frameworks that embed social justice and human rights principles, such as the FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries (FAO, 2015), offer valuable guidance for achieving ocean economy goals. Embedding these principles into South Africa's Oceans Economy landscape is essential not only for the resilience of small-scale fisheries but also for realising a just, inclusive and sustainable ocean economy.   Conclusion   Small-scale fisheries (SSF) in South Africa have evolved amidst a complex history of marginalisation, policy reform and shifting ocean governance priorities. Its enduring importance for food security, livelihoods and cultural identity is now being re-examined in light of Blue Economy strategies that promise both opportunities and may present challenges for coastal communities. Within this context, this paper considered the integration of SSF into national ocean economy frameworks and highlighted persistent gaps between policy ambitions and the realities faced by small-scale fishers.   The paper’s contribution lies in its examination of how structural inequalities, historical marginalisation and evolving governance frameworks continue to shape the experiences of small-scale fishing communities. It emphasises the value of participatory governance and community-oriented pathways for fostering sustainable livelihoods. By foregrounding the needs and values of SSF communities, the research contributes to advancing the discourse on equitable and sustainable ocean governance in South Africa. Looking forward, the contribution proposes that meaningful progress for SSF within the Blue Economy will require sustained policy support, capacity building and the adoption of just and equitable governance principles. Strengthening multi-level collaboration, ensuring genuine participation of SSF communities in decision-making and aligning national strategies with international best practices will go a long way in realising a sustainable ocean economy. Ultimately, fostering a truly inclusive and sustainable ocean economy in South Africa will depend on bridging the gap between policy and practice and ensuring that small-scale fisheries are recognised as vital contributors to both local livelihoods and the country’s equitable ocean future.   References:   African National Congress. (1994). The Reconstruction and Development programme (RDP): A policy framework. African National Congress.   Arias-Schreiber, M., Chuenpagdee, R., & Jentoft, S. (2022). Blue justice and the co-production of hermeneutical resources for small-scale fisheries. Marine Policy, 137, 104959. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2022.104959   Auld, K., Feris, L (2022). 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Environmental Science & Policy, 116, 160-170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2020.11.009   Gelcich, S., Martínez-Harms, M. J., Tapia-Lewin, S., Vasquez-Lavin, F., & Ruano-Chamorro, C. (2019). Comanagement of small-scale fisheries and ecosystem services. Conservation Letters, 12(2), e12637. https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12637   Hara, M., & Raakjær, J. 2009. "Policy evolution in South African fisheries: the governance of the sector for small pelagics," Development Southern Africa, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(4),  649-662.   Isaacs, M., Hara, M. M., Dennis T. L., Rouhani, Q. A., Mannarino, C., Jaffer, N. (2022). A  Situational Analysis of Small-Scale Fisheries in South Africa: From Vulnerability to Viability.  V2V Working Paper 2022-9. V2V Global Partnership, University of Waterloo, Canada.   Isaacs, M. (2019). Is the Blue Justice concept a human rights agenda? Policy Brief 54. Bellville: Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies.   Lee, K.-H., Noh, J., & Khim, J. S. (2020). The blue economy and the United Nations’ sustainable development goals: Challenges and opportunities. Environment International, 137, 105528. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envint.2020.105528   Loureiro TG, Du Plessis N, Findlay K. Into the blue – The blue economy model in Operation Phakisa ‘Unlocking the Ocean Economy’ Programme. S Afr J Sci. 2022;118(11/12), Art. #14664. https://doi.org/10.17159/ sajs.2022/14664   March, J., & Failler, P. (2022). Mapping the blue economy: A critical review of global discourses. Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, 9 (1), Article 3. https://doi.org/10.15351/2373-8456.1120   Picken, F. (2023). Tourism and the blue economy. Tourism Geographies, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616688.2023.2291821   Pomeroy, R & Rivera-Guieb, R. (2006) (Eds). Fishery Co-management: A Practical Handbook. CABI.   Reis-Filho, J. A., Hatje, V., & Barros, F. (2024). 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Integrating environmental sustainability and social justice principles into South Africa's blue economy initiative: Re-imagining the political economy of our ocean. Frontiers in Ocean Sustainability, 2, https://doi.org/10.3389/focsu.2024.1459496   Sowman, M., & Sunde, J. (2021). A just transition? Navigating the process of policy implementation in small-scale fisheries in South Africa. Marine Policy, 132, 104683. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104683   .   Sowman, M., Sunde, J., Raemaekers, S., & Schultz, O. (2014). Fishing for equality: Policy for poverty alleviation for South Africa's small-scale fisheries. Marine Policy, 46, 31-42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2013.12.005   Sowman, M. (2011). New perspectives in small-scale fisheries management: challenges and prospects for implementation in South Africa. African Journal of  Marine Sci 297-311.   Sowman, M., & Cardoso, P. (2010). 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Ocean & Coastal Management, 46(1-2), 199-219. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0964-5691(02)00135-7   Viana, D. F., Gaines, S. D., Schmidhuber, J., & Golden, C. D. (2023). Nutrient supply from marine small-scale fisheries. Scientific Reports, 13(1), 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-37338-z   Villasante, S., Macho, G., Silva, M. R., Lopes, P. F., Pita, P., Simón, A., Balsa, J. C., Olabarria, C., Vázquez, E., & Calvo, N. (2022). Resilience and Social Adaptation to Climate Change Impacts in Small-Scale Fisheries. Frontiers in Marine Science, 9, 802762. https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2022.802762   Voyer, M., Quirk, G., McIlgorm, A., & Azmi, K. (2018). Shades of Blue: What Do Competing Interpretations of the Blue Economy Mean for Oceans Governance? Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 20, 595-616. https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2018.1473153   Vreÿ, F. (2019). ‘Operation Phakisa: reflections upon an ambitious maritime-led government initiative’, Scientia Militaria - South African Journal of Military Studies, 47(2), 85-103. https://doi.org/10.5787/47-2-1285     Walker, T. (2018). ‘Securing a sustainable oceans economy, South Africa’s approach’, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), June 2018.   Williams, S. (2023). Surviving the tides: A study of small-scale fisheries and community livelihoods in selected coastal towns of the Western Cape, South Africa. In R. Donaldson (Ed.), Socio-Spatial Small Town Dynamics in South Africa (pp. 107–133). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37142-4_5   WWF. (2018). Principles for a sustainable blue economy. WWF International. https://ocean.panda.org   Yousef, M. (2024). Blue Economy: A Review of Concepts, Definitions, Benefits, and Risks. American Academic & Scholarly Research Journal, Vol 14:4 (16-27). [1] FAO- The Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (SSF Guidelines)  Available at: https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/edfffbfc-81e5-4208-a36f-334ff81ac10f/content   [2]  While the term blue/ oceans economy has been used interchangeably in this work, it is also commonly used in other scholarly literature. However, Sowman and Sunde (2024) argue that South Africa's gradual shift from referring to the "blue economy" to the "ocean economy" suggests a growing emphasis on economic growth while downplaying broader goals related to sustainability and social justice. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On the evening of Friday, 11 July 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute, in collaboration with the South African Chinese Economic and Trade Association (SACETA), hosted an exclusive launch dinner at the offices of the Bank of China in Johannesburg.   The event brought together prominent representatives from the Chinese business community, policymakers and other stakeholders to discuss the importance of foreign investment in South Africa.   The primary purpose of the dinner was to officially launch a comprehensive research initiative into investor sentiment toward South Africa, led by the Inclusive Society Institute.   The research will be conducted in three phases:   Phase one  focuses on gauging investor sentiment from China and the broader East Asian region. Phase two  will explore the perceptions and sentiments of investors from Europe and the West. Phase three  will provide a global overview of international investor sentiment toward South Africa.   The insights gained from this study will inform the development of investor-friendly foreign direct investment (FDI) policies aimed at attracting more investment into South Africa. Ultimately, the goal is to stimulate economic growth and job creation.   Speakers at the event included Mr. Zhang Chaoyang, chairperson of the South African China Economic and Trade Association and chairman of the Bank of China; Mr. Daryl Swanepoel, chief executive officer of the Inclusive Society Institute; His Excellency Ambassador Wu Peng, representing the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in South Africa; and the Honourable Dr. David Masondo, deputy minister of finance in South Africa.   The programme was directed by Ms. Jenny Wu, an advisory council member of the Inclusive Society Institute.   Through this event, the Inclusive Society Institute has taken an important step in strengthening economic cooperation between South Africa and international investment partners, starting with China.

The Inclusive Society Institute was invited to attend the Third Session of the European-African Progressive Network on 8 July 2025. The session took place under the theme: “Navigating peace, human rights and democratic concerns in the EU-Africa partnership”. This initiative of progressive European organisations sought to gain perspective from various African partners, including think tanks, on their views as pertaining Europe’s engagements with the continent. The Institute, represented by Dr Klaus Kotzé, impressed upon the forum that their consideration of the views of the various continental stakeholders is laudable. When asked about how best Europe can engage with the continent, Kotzé made two suggestions. First, for Europe to engage constructively, it must distinguish between its values and interests. There can be no constructive engagement when Europe behaves as both a player and a referee in international relations. Furthermore, it is imperative that African states, and the African Union as a whole, are not made to choose between global forces. Instead, African players, as should be the case for all states, should be respected for the pursuit of their own interests. A fruitful partnership will flow out of respect and support for reciprocal interests.

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   July 2025 Author: Daryl Swanepoel CONTENTS FOREWORD 1 INTRODUCTION 2 BACKGROUND: CLIMATE CHANGE, EMISSIONS INEQUITY AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD'S MARGINAL ROLE 2.1 The origins and drivers of climate change 2.2 What needs to be done 2.3 Emissions responsibility: Who polluted most? 2.4 Africa's marginal role and major vulnerability 3 THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE AND ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS 3.1 Historical emissions and climate liability 3.2 Moral responsibility beyond legal liability 3.3 Ethics of intergenerational and global justice 3.4 The failure of existing finance mechanisms 3.5 Climate justice is global justice 4 CLIMATE ACTION REQUIRES RESOURCES: A PRACTICAL IMPERATIVE 4.1 The high cost of climate solutions 4.2 Fiscal constraints in developing economies 4.3 The role of developing countries in global climate solutions 4.4 The costs of inaction are even higher 4.5 A moral and strategic imperative combined 5 COP29 PLEDGE: A STEP FORWARD WITH STRUCTURAL FLAWS 5.1 The composition of the pledge: Loans over grants 5.2 The flawed logic of burden-shifting 5.3 Case in point: The South African JETP experience 5.4 The danger of repackaged finance 5.5 A partial victory in need of structural correction 6 THE HIDDEN DANGERS OF CURRENT CLIMATE FINANCE STRUCTURES 6.1 South African case study: Currency volatility and escalating costs 6.1.1 Example 1: 10-year loan with capital redemption at maturity date 6.1.2 Example 2: 10-year loan: capital & interest redemption in 10 equal instalments 6.2 The solution: Denominate climate loans in local currency 6.2.1 Structural risk transfer: A hidden injustice 6.2.2 Fiscal sovereignty and planning certainty 6.2.3 A debt trap in the making 6.2.4 A modest reform with profound impact 6.3 Integration into the broader argument 6.4 Tied climate finance: Technology conditionality 7 RECOMMENDATIONS 8 CONCLUSION REFERENCES ANNEXURE A Cover phote: istock.com - Stock photo ID:2172817661 FOREWORD   The global climate crisis exposes deep historical and structural inequalities between the developed and developing worlds. Although the latter, particularly Africa, contributes the least to greenhouse gas emissions, it is disproportionately vulnerable to climate-related shocks. This paper builds a two-pronged argument: first, that the "polluter pays" principle demands that developed nations shoulder the primary responsibility for funding climate mitigation and adaptation efforts in the Global South through targeted grants; and second, that even if developing countries are to contribute to climate solutions, they must be adequately resourced through fair, predictable and accessible financial mechanisms. These arguments are substantiated through ethical reasoning, historical emissions data and a critique of the current climate finance architecture. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations aimed at reimagining a just climate finance framework grounded in global justice and intergenerational equity. 1 INTRODUCTION   Climate change is the defining existential challenge of our time, but it is neither a neutral nor evenly distributed threat, since it exposes and often exacerbates the structural inequalities entrenched in the global economic and political order. While the entire planet faces the dangers of a warming world, it is the countries least responsible for causing the crisis that suffer its worst effects. This asymmetry between causation and consequence sits at the heart of the climate justice debate and it demands a transformative rethinking of global climate finance.   The current climate finance paradigm is built on a system that does not adequately differentiate between historical emitters and vulnerable nations. It fails to reflect the core principle that those who caused the problem must shoulder the primary responsibility for solving it. For over two centuries, the industrialised countries of the Global North have built immense wealth through carbon-intensive development, externalising environmental costs to the atmosphere and, increasingly, to the Global South. Meanwhile, the developing world, especially in Africa, South Asia, and small island states, has contributed the least to global emissions, yet faces the most devastating consequences, including droughts, floods, food insecurity and displacement.   At the centre of the contemporary climate discourse lies a pivotal question: how should climate action be financed, by whom and under what terms? The answers to these questions are not merely technical or economic, they are deeply moral and ethical. They shape the prospects for global solidarity, for sustainable development and for climate stability. A failure to answer them justly risks not only climate failure, but also geopolitical fragmentation, humanitarian crises and a collapse of trust between North and South.   This policy brief argues that climate finance must be rooted in justice, accountability and pragmatic solidarity. It must shift decisively from a paradigm dominated by loans and conditionalities to one centred on grants, equity, and risk-sharing. Developed countries must lead by acknowledging their historic responsibilities and fulfilling their pledges, not through unfair, even unethical burden-shifting mechanisms that exacerbate debt, but through meaningful financial transfers that enable vulnerable countries to act. At the same time, climate finance structures must be reformed to ensure accessibility, predictability and respect for national sovereignty.   Furthermore, climate finance is not merely a matter of reparations or compensation; it is also a matter of enlightened self-interest. Global decarbonisation, biodiversity preservation and climate resilience cannot succeed without the full participation of developing countries. That participation, however, depends on whether they are equipped with the financial tools, policy space and technological support needed to engage effectively. Without it, the world risks locking in a cycle of inaction and deepening injustice.   This brief advances a dual argument. First, that the "polluter pays" principle must be operationalised into real financial commitments from the Global North, primarily through non-repayable grants. Second, that climate finance must be restructured to eliminate mechanisms that entrench dependency, such as foreign-currency denominated loans or tied aid. Through historical data, ethical analysis and a focused case study, this document seeks to make a compelling case for a just, equitable and functional climate finance regime, one that recognises climate justice as an indivisible part of global justice.   2 BACKGROUND: CLIMATE CHANGE, EMISSIONS INEQUITY AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD'S MARGINAL ROLE    2.1 The origins and drivers of climate change   Scientific consensus confirms that climate change is driven by human activities, especially the burning of fossil fuels, industrial processes and deforestation (IPCC, 2021). These activities release greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄) and nitrous oxide (N₂O), which trap heat in the Earth's atmosphere and disturb the planet's energy balance (NASA, 2023). Since the Industrial Revolution, global atmospheric CO₂ levels have increased from 280 ppm to over 420 ppm today (NOAA, 2023).   2.2 What needs to be done   The IPCC (2021) recommends limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, requiring global net-zero emissions by mid-century. This involves deep decarbonisation, the protection of carbon sinks and major adaptation investments. The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) outlines these goals but relies heavily on equitable climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for success.   2.3 Emissions responsibility: Who polluted most?   Cumulative emissions, rather than annual emissions, offer the fairest gauge of historical responsibility. The United States, EU and other industrialised countries account for over 70% of total historic emissions (Our World in Data, 2023). Africa, by contrast, contributes less than 4% despite comprising 18% of the global population (IEA, 2022). 2.4 Africa's marginal role and major vulnerability   Despite minimal emissions, Africa faces disproportionate climate threats: droughts, floods, sea-level rise and reduced agricultural yields. It stands to lose up to 15% of its GDP by 2030 due to climate impacts (AfDB, 2021). Yet African nations often lack the fiscal space and access to finance necessary to mitigate or adapt effectively (Oxfam, 2023).   3 THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE AND ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS   At the heart of the climate finance debate lies a simple and powerful principle, yet from which those in power, shy away: Those who caused the damage must pay to repair it. Also known in environmental law as the polluter pays principle , it is a doctrine that is both a matter of historical accountability and ethical justice. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) explicitly endorses this principle, affirming that parties should act “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (UNFCCC, 1992).   3.1 Historical emissions and climate liability   The developed world’s industrialisation, spanning more than two centuries, was powered by coal, oil and gas, with no regard for the environmental consequences. The data is unambiguous: the United States, European Union, Russia, Japan and other high-income countries are together responsible for over 70% of cumulative CO₂   emissions since 1850 (Our World in Data, 2023). These emissions have built the wealth, infrastructure and technological dominance of the Global North.   In contrast, Africa contributes less than 4% of global emissions (IEA, 2022). Countries like Malawi, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have per capita emissions thousands of times lower than developed countries, yet they face the harshest impacts: desertification, failed crops, floods and rising sea levels. This asymmetry in contribution versus consequence forms the foundation of the ethical argument for reparative climate finance. 3.2 Moral responsibility beyond legal liability   The moral obligation of the Global North is not simply about numbers, it is about justice, fairness and restoring dignity. Climate change is not a random act of nature. It is the consequence of identifiable behaviours by specific actors in specific places over time. While developing countries are not without emissions today, their historical contribution is negligible and their capacity to mitigate or adapt is vastly limited.   Just as nations are expected to pay reparations for war, colonisation or human rights abuses, there is now a growing consensus that climate reparations are not merely charity, but a form of accountability (Caney, 2010; Gardiner, 2011). By failing to act on this responsibility, injustice is perpetuated and the burden of climate solutions placed disproportionately on those least responsible and least able to pay.   3.3 Ethics of intergenerational and global justice   Climate change also raises critical questions of intergenerational justice. Developed countries enjoyed centuries of carbon-intensive growth without constraint. Now, just as developing nations begin to grow, they are being asked to limit their emissions, often at great developmental cost. Without appropriate financial and technological support, this demand becomes morally untenable. Moreover, climate change is a collective problem, but responsibility for its origins is not collective. To treat all countries the same, regardless of historical role or current capacity, is to ignore the essence of fairness. As philosopher Henry Shue (1999) argued, fairness in burden-sharing must reflect both the ability to pay and the causation of harm.   3.4 The failure of existing finance mechanisms   Current climate finance mechanisms fail to reflect this principle. As of 2022, over 70% of climate finance to developing countries came in the form of loans, often on concessional terms, but loans nonetheless (Oxfam, 2022). This means that countries who have polluted the least must go into debt to protect themselves from a crisis they did not cause. This inversion of justice is not only inefficient, it is morally indefensible.   Grants are not a gift; they are reparative instruments that recognise historical responsibility. Climate finance, if it is to be ethical and just, must shift from a paradigm of risk-sharing to one of liability and redress. 3.5 Climate justice is global justice   The polluter pays principle must therefore underpin every aspect of the global climate regime, from the structuring of finance to the governance of institutions. It is not enough to commit volumes of funding. The form, fairness and function of that funding must reflect the reality that the climate crisis is rooted in inequality.   To ignore this foundational truth is to compound the injustice. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu once stated, “climate change is a deeply moral issue” (Democracy Now, 2014). Without addressing its root causes, historical emissions and economic imbalance, the world will not only fail to solve the climate crisis but will deepen the very inequalities it seeks to overcome. 4 CLIMATE ACTION REQUIRES RESOURCES: A PRACTICAL IMPERATIVE   While the moral argument for climate finance rests on historical responsibility, there is also a pressing pragmatic imperative for a massive and well-structured mobilisation of resources to the developing world. Put another way, climate action cannot happen without climate financing, particularly in the Global South, where the bulk of climate vulnerability exists but where capital, technology, and fiscal space remain limited.   4.1 The high cost of climate solutions   Mitigating and adapting to climate change entails significant costs. According to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP, 2022), adaptation alone in developing countries will require up to US$340 billion per year by 2030, while the estimated annual cost of mitigation across all developing nations exceeds US$600 billion. These figures do not account for losses and damages resulting from extreme weather events, that are projected to rise sharply with increased global warming.   Despite these needs, current levels of climate finance remain woefully inadequate. In 2020, developed countries collectively mobilised only US$83.3 billion, falling short of the US$100 billion annual pledge made under the Paris Agreement (OECD, 2021). Even more concerning is the disproportionate allocation of these funds - over 70% are disbursed as loans rather than grants (Oxfam, 2023) and a significant share is skewed toward mitigation rather than adaptation, despite the latter being more urgent in low-income, high-risk countries.   4.2 Fiscal constraints in developing economies   Most developing countries, particularly in Africa, face high levels of debt, narrow tax bases and competing developmental priorities. COVID-19 further strained public finances, with many governments forced to divert funds away from climate commitments toward immediate health and economic recovery needs (World Bank, 2023). Without substantial external support, the idea that these countries can fund ambitious climate programmes on their own is both unrealistic and unjust.   For example, in 2022, debt service in sub-Saharan Africa averaged over 15% of government revenues, leaving little room for investment in clean energy, climate-resilient infrastructure or disaster preparedness (AfDB, 2022). Climate action is not merely a matter of political will, it is a matter of financial capability, therefore, demanding climate ambition without supplying the resources is akin to demanding that a drowning man swim harder while denying him a lifebuoy.   4.3 The role of developing countries in global climate solutions   Ironically, many of the most effective and affordable climate solutions lie in the Global South. Africa hosts vast forests that act as carbon sinks, abundant solar and wind potential and untapped blue carbon ecosystems along its coasts (IEA, 2022). Likewise, many countries in Asia and Latin America offer low-cost pathways to decarbonisation if early investment is provided in renewable energy, clean transportation and sustainable agriculture.   In this sense, climate finance is not only a matter of justice but also of strategic efficiency. Every dollar invested in clean energy or climate resilience in a developing country often yields a higher carbon abatement return than the same dollar spent in an advanced economy (CPI, 2022). Yet without upfront finance, these opportunities are lost and the world’s ability to meet its 1.5°C target is severely jeopardised.   4.4 The costs of inaction are even higher   Inaction is not a neutral option, it carries costs that are exponentially higher. The World Bank (2021) estimates that climate change could push over 130 million people into poverty by 2030 without urgent adaptation and mitigation measures. Food insecurity, forced migration and social unrest are likely to intensify, particularly in fragile and conflict-prone states. The costs of dealing with such crises after the fact, through emergency relief, humanitarian aid or peacekeeping, far exceed the costs of preventive climate investment.   From a global economic standpoint, the Climate Policy Initiative (2022) has shown that every US$1 spent on climate resilience yields at least US$4 in avoided losses. This return on investment makes climate finance one of the most cost-effective public policy tools available.   4.5 A moral and strategic imperative combined   Thus, even setting aside the ethical arguments for reparative justice, there is a strong rational case for developed countries to urgently scale up climate finance to the developing world. Doing so is not just the right thing, it is the smart thing. It enables the world to decarbonise quickly and cheaply, averts humanitarian crises and reduces the geopolitical instability that inevitably follows environmental collapse.   In short, climate action in the developing world is a global public good. It must be treated as such in international policy and finance architecture. To continue under-resourcing the Global South not only entrenches injustice, it imperils the climate goals of the entire planet.   5 COP29 PLEDGE: A STEP FORWARD WITH STRUCTURAL FLAWS   The 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29) in Azerbaijan marked an important moment in global climate diplomacy. For the first time, developed countries formally committed to mobilising US$300 billion per annum over the next decade to assist developing nations with their climate mitigation and adaptation programmes (UNFCCC, 2024). This represents a tripling of the previous US$100 billion pledge made at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, which itself had consistently failed to be met in full (OECD, 2021). While the scale of ambition has grown, the structure and quality of the finance remain deeply problematic, raising serious concerns about both equity and effectiveness.   5.1 The composition of the pledge: Loans over grants   Of the US$300 billion annual commitment made at COP29, only 18% (US$54 billion) is to be provided in the form of non-repayable grants. The overwhelming majority, 67% (US$201 billion), is structured as concessional or soft loans, primarily disbursed through multilateral development banks (MDBs), bilateral financial institutions and climate-focused lending mechanisms. A further 15% (US$45 billion) is earmarked for risk guarantees and blended finance instruments, designed to de-risk private sector participation in climate-related investments (CPI, 2024).   While these mechanisms can mobilise additional funding, they often come with trade-offs, especially for low-income and climate-vulnerable countries. The heavy emphasis on repayable instruments, particularly in foreign currencies, undermines the very purpose of climate finance as a tool for supporting sustainable development. Loans, even on concessional terms, increase sovereign debt and restrict fiscal policy space in countries already struggling with high debt burdens (AfDB, 2022; UNCTAD, 2023).   5.2 The flawed logic of burden-shifting   The structural flaw lies not merely in the dominance of loans, but in the underlying philosophy that continues to guide international climate finance: that the Global South should assume partial financial responsibility for fixing a crisis it did not create. This approach ignores the historical responsibility of developed nations and effectively shifts the cost of climate adaptation onto the victims of environmental harm.   Moreover, while concessional loans are often touted as favourable, the conditionalities attached to them, such as fiscal discipline, regulatory reforms or the use of donor-country technologies, can limit policy autonomy and inflate implementation costs (World Bank, 2020). In essence, climate finance becomes a tool not of empowerment, but of control.   5.3 Case in point: The South African JETP experience   South Africa’s experience with the 'Just Energy Transition Partnership' (JETP), which was first announced at COP26 and then subsequently expanded at COP27, COP28 and COP29 is a good illustration of both the potential and the pitfalls of this model. Of the initial US$8.5 billion pledged, only a small fraction came as grants. The remainder consisted of concessional loans tied to the procurement of renewable energy technologies from donor nations, some of which were not the most cost-effective or suited to South Africa’s grid infrastructure (German Embassy, 2022; Meridian Economics, 2023).   The arrangement raised concerns domestically over sovereignty, debt sustainability and developmental alignment, since it highlighted the risk of adopting a cookie-cutter financial model without accommodating local economic realities.   5.4 The danger of repackaged finance   Another critical flaw in the COP29 pledge is that it includes a significant proportion of repackaged or relabelled finance. For instance, many donor countries count existing development aid or export credit as part of their climate finance contributions, thus blurring the lines between new and additional funding (Oxfam, 2023), which practice not only inflates reported figures, but also diverts resources from other pressing development needs, creating a zero-sum game for developing countries.   Furthermore, the complexity of accessing these funds remains a major barrier, since countries must navigate bureaucratic application processes, competing eligibility criteria and technical reporting requirements, which favour wealthier and more administratively capable nations (UNEP, 2022). This gatekeeping through bureaucracy perpetuates inequality within the developing world itself, resulting in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) being left behind.   5.5 A partial victory in need of structural correction   While the COP29 commitment is laudable in scale, it is deeply flawed in structure. A just climate finance system cannot rest on debt-heavy instruments, currency risk exposure and donor-driven procurement models. For climate finance to be truly effective, it must be:   Predictable, to support long-term planning; Accessible, to all developing countries regardless of administrative capacity; Transparent, in accounting and disbursement; and Most importantly, equitable, recognising historical emissions and present vulnerabilities.  Unless these structural flaws are corrected, COP29 may be remembered not as a breakthrough, but as a missed opportunity to recalibrate the global climate finance architecture toward fairness and functionality.   6 THE HIDDEN DANGERS OF CURRENT CLIMATE FINANCE STRUCTURES     6.1 South African case study: Currency volatility and escalating costs    6.1.1 Example 1: 10-year loan with capital redemption at maturity date   A prime illustration of the risks of foreign currency-denominated climate loans is South Africa's experience following the $8.5 billion climate finance pledge made at COP26 in 2021 (German Embassy, 2022). Though these were concessional loans, the requirement to repay in euros exposed South Africa to severe exchange rate risk.   To illustrate, consider a hypothetical €100 million loan issued on 1 January 2015, at 3% annual interest, with capital repayment due on 31 December 2024. The euro-to-rand exchange rate was R13.98 in 2015 but rose to R19.52 by 2024 ( Investing.com , 2025).   Table 1: Euro vs Rand exchange rates from 2015 to the end of 2024   Year €:ZAR Year €:ZAR 2015 13.98 2020 15.70 2016 16.80 2021 17.79 2017 14.38 2022 17.96 2018 14.86 2023 18.10 2019 16.48 2024 20.19 Source: Investing.com   Annual interest payments fluctuated, starting at R41,94 million and ending at over R58 million. Total interested repaid over the ten-year period would equate to R498.72 million The capital repayment alone amounted to R2,019 billion at the 2024 exchange rate. Total repayment (interest + capital) over 10 years reached R2,517 billion – 38,52% more than if the loan had been denominated in South African rand, because :   Were the loan to have been denominated in South African rand the repayments would have been as follows:   Annual interest payments would remain the same for entire period, namely R41.94 million per annum. Total interested repaid over the ten-year period would equate to R419,4 million. The capital repayment alone amounted would have been fixed at R1,398 billion. Total repayment (interest + capital) over 10 years reached R1,817 billion   The detailed data underpinning the above numbers is contained in Annexure A, but the high-level calculations are set out hereunder:   To calculate the percentage difference between two values, specifically, how much more R2,517,720,000 is compared to R1,817,400,000,  the following formula is used:    Applying the numbers:   Final Answer:   Approximately 38.52% more is paid when repaying R2.52 billion (when loan is denominated in Euro) versus R1.82 billion. when the loan is denominated in South African rand).   The glaring difference between the two funding models is illustrated in the figure below:   Figure 1:  Data – Investing.com ; Graphic - Author   Even with a relatively stable currency like the rand when compared to many other developing countries, the cost escalation is stark. Of course, for countries with more volatile currencies, the financial impact can be crippling.   Some economists argue that it is better to denominate the loans in local currency and then to compensate the funders for the currency exchange losses, the interest rate can be increased. However, calculations done in this study have shown that were the interest rate to be increased by 50% (i.e. 4,5%) then the premium will still amount to 16%. And were the interest rate to be doubled to 6%, it would no longer constitute a soft loan, but a normal commercial loan.    6.1.2 Example 2: 10-year loan: capital & interest redemption in 10 equal instalments   An alternative illustration based on the same loan over the same period and at the same rate of interest, but where both interest and capital is repaid in ten equal annual instalments, revealed an equally unfavourable outcome.   To recap, we assume a €100 million loan (denominated in Euro), 3% interest rate in 10 equal instalments. The mathematical formula will thus be:     Where :   A = annual payment (equal instalment) P = loan principal (€100 million) r = annual interest rate (3% or 0.03) n = number of periods (10 years)    Thus :      Results :   Payment each year: €11,719,751 Total interest over the period in €17,197,510 Total repayment interest and capital: €117,197,510       Conversion to South African rand at prevailing exchange rates as indicated in Table 1   Year Instalment €:ZAR rate ZAR value 2015 11,719,751 13.98 163,607,724 2016 11,719,751 16.80 196,891,817 2017 11,719,751 14.38 168,530,019 2018 11,719,751 14.86 174,155,500 2019 11,719,751 16.48 193,141,496 2020 11,719,751 15.70 184,000,091 2021 11,719,751 17.79 208,494,370 2022 11,719,751 17.96 210,486,728 2023 11,719,751 18.10 212,127,493 2024 11,719,751 20.19 236,621,773 Total in ZAR 1,948, 057,011 Total  @ 3% and no currency fluctuation (13.98) 1638421189 Premium in ZAR 309,635,822 Premium % 18,89% Under any of the scenarios highlighted above , the rich countries remain rich, the poorer countries get poorer.    6.2 The solution: Denominate climate loans in local currency   One of the most pressing yet overlooked reforms in climate finance is the need to denominate concessional loans in the local currencies of recipient countries. The current system, because the financiers are primarily developed world nations and/or developed world dominated multilateral institutions, predominantly issues climate loans in hard currencies like the US dollar, euro or yen, exposing developing nations to exchange rate volatility that can drastically inflate their repayment obligations, undermine budgetary planning, driving them deeper into debt. This structure is not only economically inefficient, it must also be said, ethically indefensible (Oxfam, 2023; UNCTAD, 2023).   6.2.1 Structural risk transfer: A hidden injustice   By denominating loans in foreign currencies, donor countries and institutions externalise the financial risk onto recipients, so a country may, for example, enter into a concessional loan agreement with seemingly favourable terms, such as a 1–3% interest rate, only to find that depreciation of their local currency increases their repayment burden by 30 - 40% or more over the life of the loan (UNCTAD, 2023). This is not a theoretical risk; it is a well-documented and recurring reality in many African, Asian and Latin American economies (World Bank, 2023).   This kind of risk transfer is neither fair nor sustainable. It effectively punishes countries for global market volatility over which they have no control. Developed countries have the institutional and financial capacity to absorb this risk; developing countries do not. If the Global South must borrow to survive the climate crisis, the very least the Global North can do is absorb the currency risk (Caney, 2010; UNEP, 2021) . 6.2.2 Fiscal sovereignty and planning certainty   Local currency loans would give developing countries the ability to anchor their debt servicing within their own fiscal and monetary frameworks, where repayments would be tied to revenue streams collected in the same currency, allowing finance ministries to project their debt-to-GDP ratios, plan multi-year expenditure frameworks and manage national budgets without the destabilising uncertainty of fluctuating exchange rates (UNCTAD, 2023).   Contrast this with the status quo, where exchange rate shocks force governments to either increase taxation, reduce social spending or incur new debt to meet old obligations, thus perpetuating cycles of austerity and dependency (Oxfam, 2023; World Bank, 2023). Currency-denominated climate finance is not only fairer; it is smarter macroeconomic policy (AfDB, 2021). 6.2.3 A debt trap in the making   The existing model is quietly but effectively sowing the seeds of a new debt crisis. Countries already constrained by shrinking fiscal space are being pushed to assume obligations whose real costs cannot be forecast at the time of signing. This is not just risky, it is reckless (UNCTAD, 2023). It creates a scenario where the more a country complies with global climate expectations, the more it suffers financial strain.   It is inconceivable that such a system could be tolerated in trade or defence agreements. Why then should it be acceptable in the most existential issue of our time? Climate finance that leaves the recipient worse off than before is not development, it is extraction by another name (Caney, 2010; Stone, 2011).   6.2.4 A modest reform with profound impact   Adopting local currency denomination is neither radical nor unfeasible. In fact, the tools already exist. Currency risk can be mitigated through international financial instruments such as:  Global reserve buffers or guarantees from institutions like the IMF, GCF or World Bank. Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as stabilising mechanisms (IMF, 2022). Regional pooling of risk across multilateral development banks. Hedging instruments subsidised by climate funds (UNCTAD, 2023).   The cost of implementing such mechanisms is a fraction of the cost of issuing full grants, and yet the benefit in terms of stability, dignity and ownership for the Global South is transformative.   6.3 Integration into the broader argument   This case study highlights a fundamental injustice in the current climate finance architecture. Developed countries, whose emissions caused the crisis, not only offer loans instead of grants, but they also impose the financial risk of currency fluctuation on the very countries least equipped to manage it.   This is not climate justice, it is climate exploitation.   If the global community is serious about achieving an equitable climate future, then developed nations must not only increase the volume of finance, but fundamentally change its structure. Issuing climate finance in local currency is not an act of generosity, it is the bare minimum for a fair and just global compact.   6.4 Tied climate finance: Technology conditionality   Tied climate finance refers to financial arrangements in which climate-related loans or grants are contingent upon the recipient country purchasing specific goods, services or technologies, usually from the donor country. This practice, while often rationalised under the banner of ensuring “quality control” or “technical support,” represents a covert form of economic conditionality that erodes the developmental sovereignty of recipient nations. It also distorts local markets, drives up project costs and stifles domestic innovation.   At its core, technology conditionality undermines the principles of equity and partnership that should characterise climate finance. Instead of empowering developing countries to chart their own low-carbon development trajectories based on national contexts, needs and comparative advantages, it locks them into supply chains and technological ecosystems designed and controlled by the Global North. This compromises the autonomy of climate policy and perpetuates dependency rather than resilience.   The World Bank (2020) found that technology-tied procurement inflated renewable energy project costs in sub-Saharan Africa by up to 30%, a staggering figure in regions where every dollar must stretch across vast developmental needs. In many cases, donor-imposed technologies are not optimised for local climatic, infrastructural or maintenance conditions, leading to implementation inefficiencies, cost overruns, and operational failures. Furthermore, this undermines local industrial development by crowding out domestic firms and local entrepreneurs who might otherwise contribute to innovation, employment and sustainable development.   South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) again illustrates this risk. Reports by Meridian Economics (2023) and others have highlighted that large portions of JETP-linked funds were structured in such a way that procurement of renewable technology was effectively steered toward suppliers in donor countries. Not only did this create concerns over cost and compatibility with South Africa’s energy grid, but it also limited the potential for localisation, skills development and domestic industrial participation in the transition.   Technology conditionalities also contradict the broader objectives of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, which call for technology transfer  and capacity building , not technology imposition . A conditional approach benefits the commercial and geopolitical interests of donors at the expense of climate justice and genuine partnership. By prioritising their own exports and strategic influence, donor nations risk undermining both the effectiveness and legitimacy of climate finance, so to remedy this, there must be a clear de-linking of finance from technology procurement. Recipient countries must be granted full autonomy to select, adapt, and develop technologies that are appropriate to their national circumstances and development strategies. This includes the right to engage local firms, adopt indigenous solutions and build technological capacity through open, competitive and transparent procurement processes.   Moreover, international climate finance should actively promote technology co-development and/or technology transfer, where donor funding supports collaborative innovation with local stakeholders, ensuring that knowledge, intellectual property and production capabilities are shared. This would foster self-reliance, enhance climate resilience and stimulate sustainable growth in developing economies.   Finally, conditionality-free financing would also better align with Sustainable Development Goal 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), which calls for inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and innovation in the Global South. By removing technology restrictions, climate finance could become a catalyst for endogenous growth, rather than a channel for perpetuating economic hierarchies. 7 RECOMMENDATIONS   To advance a climate finance system that is truly equitable, will require the urgent introduction of structural reforms that both acknowledges the historical responsibility for the current climate crisis and that creates a sustainable path forward for developing nations.   First and foremost, the proportion of climate finance allocated as grants must be significantly increased. A minimum threshold of 50% in grants should be adopted to reflect the principle that those who polluted the most must shoulder the financial burden of fixing the problem. Loans, particularly those requiring repayment in foreign currency, should not dominate climate assistance in contexts where vulnerability and debt exposure are already high.   Equally critical is the denomination of climate loans in local currencies, because by shifting this financial risk to the creditor, typically a developed country or multilateral financial institution, recipient countries are empowered to engage in long-term budgetary planning. This shift will promote debt sustainability and instead of perpetuating the financial dependency of the developing world on the developed world, it will serve to promote a spirit of partnership between the developed and developing world.   Furthermore, it is imperative that loan conditionalities be overhauled, especially the tied financing arrangements that mandate the use of donor-country technology or consultants not only inflate project costs but also stifle local innovation and industrial development. Climate finance must serve the developmental interests of recipient countries, not the commercial interests of donors.   Access to global climate finance should also be streamlined and made more accessible, especially for countries with weaker institutional capacity. This includes simplifying application procedures, reducing bureaucratic hurdles and providing technical assistance where necessary.   Importantly, developed nations must accept that currency volatility risk is a cost of justice and one they must bear. Absorbing this risk as part of international development cooperation is far less expensive than providing full grant funding, yet it significantly relieves fiscal pressure on developing nations.   Finally, the upcoming UN Finance for Development Summit presents a unique opportunity to institutionalise these reforms in a new global compact. This summit should serve as the turning point where the world commits to a just and inclusive climate finance architecture, one that is not merely adequate in volume but fair in design.   8 CONCLUSION   The climate crisis is not merely an environmental emergency. It is a profound test of our global moral compass and at its core lies a question of justice, namely whether those who caused the damage will bear the cost of repair or will the burden be shifted onto those least responsible and least equipped to cope? The current climate finance architecture, unfortunately, perpetuates the very injustices it claims to address. It continues to treat finance as a privilege rather than a right, exposes vulnerable nations to debt traps through foreign-denominated loans and undermines sovereignty through tied aid and conditionalities that prioritise donor interests over developmental needs.   The current architecture is structurally flawed, since it prioritises volume over equity, complexity over accessibility and debt over dignity. This has resulted in a model where climate finance acts less as a tool for empowerment and more as a mechanism of dependency, reinforcing the same global asymmetries that contributed to the crisis in the first place. As such, the demand for reform is not a call for charity, but a call for accountability. The global South does not seek favours, but fairness. It does not demand handouts, but a restoration of balance in the climate compact.   A just climate finance system must embody four essential principles: historical responsibility, equitable burden-sharing, fiscal sovereignty and developmental autonomy. This means scaling up grant-based finance, denominating loans in local currencies to reduce risk, eliminating technology conditionalities and ensuring access for all, regardless of institutional capacity. These are not radical ideas, they are the minimum ethical and functional requirements for a global climate finance regime that seeks to be just and effective.   The time for rhetorical commitments is over. What is needed now is political courage and institutional innovation. The upcoming UN Finance for Development Summit must seize this opportunity to pivot toward a finance framework that is not only adequate in volume but just in design and implementation. Anything less would amount to betrayal, not just of the developing world, but of future generations everywhere.   In sum, the way forward is clear: finance must be fair, risk must be shared, sovereignty must be respected and justice must be done. Only then can the world hope to meet the climate challenge with unity, resolve and moral clarity. REFERENCES   African Development Bank (AfDB). 2021. Climate Change and Green Growth . Abidjan: African Development Bank.   African Development Bank (AfDB). 2022. African Economic Outlook 2022: Supporting Climate Resilience and a Just Energy Transition in Africa . Abidjan: African Development Bank.   Caney, S. 2010. Climate change and the duties of the advantaged, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , 13(1): 203–228.   Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2022. Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2022 . Climate Policy Initiative.   Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). 2024. Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2024/ [accessed: 13 June 2025].   Democracy Now. 2014. Momentum on Fossil Fuel Divestment Grows as Harvard Professors, Desmond Tutu Call for Action.  [Online] Available at: https://www.democracynow.org/2014/4/11/momentum_on_fossil_fuel_divestment_grows [accessed: 10 June 2025].   Gardiner, S. M. 2011. A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change . United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.   German Embassy in South Africa. 2022. Germany hails landmark International Partnership on Just Energy Transition in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://southafrica.diplo.de/sa-en/04-news/2494406-2494406 [accessed: 10 June 2025].   Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2021. Sixth Assessment Report . Geneva: IPCC.   International Energy Agency (IEA). 2022. Africa Energy Outlook 2022 . Paris: IEA.   International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2022. Special Drawing Rights . Washington DC: IEA.   Investing.com. 2025. EUR/ZAR Historical Data . [Online] Available at: https://za.investing.com/currencies/eur-zar-historical-data [accessed: 10 June 2025].   Meridian Economics. 2023. Review of the IRP 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://meridianeconomics.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/IRP2023-Modelling-Submission-20240318.0.pdf [accessed: 10 June 2025].   National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 2023. Climate Change: Vital Signs of the Planet . [Online] Available at: https://climate.nasa.gov/%C2%A0%C2%A0/ [accessed: 10 June 2025].   National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 2023. Global Monitoring Laboratory – CO₂ Trends . [Online] Available at: https://gml.noaa.gov/ccgg/trends/ [accessed: 10 June 2025].   Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2021. Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries: Aggregate Trends . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2021/09/climate-finance-provided-and-mobilised-by-developed-countries-aggregate-trends-updated-with-2019-data_aedc24d6/03590fb7-en.pdf [accessed: 10 June 2025].   Our World in Data. 2023. Cumulative CO₂ Emissions . [Online] Available at: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cumulative-co-emissions [accessed: 10 June 2025].   Oxfam. 2023. Climate Finance Shadow Report 2022 . [Online] Available at: https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/climate-finance-shadow-report-2023-621500/ [accessed: 10 June 2025].   Shue, H. 1999. Global Environment and International Inequality, International Affairs , 75(3): 531–545.   Stone, C. D. 2011. Should Trees Have Standing? United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.   United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2023. A New Financial Architecture for Climate Action . Geneva: United Nations.   United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2021. State of the Climate in Africa 2020 . Nairobi: UNEP.   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 1992. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change . [Online] Available at: https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf [accessed: 10 June 2025].   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2015. The Paris Agreement . [Online] Available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/parisagreement_publication.pdf [accessed: 10 June 2025].   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2024. COP29 UN Climate Conference Agrees to Triple Finance to Developing Countries, Protecting Lives and Livelihoods . [Online] Available at: https://unfccc.int/news/cop29-un-climate-conference-agrees-to-triple-finance-to-developing-countries-protecting-lives-and [accessed: 10 June 2025].   World Bank. 2020. Evaluation of Climate Project Procurement . Washington, DC: World Bank.   World Bank. 2021. Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2021: Reversals of Fortune . Washington, DC: World Bank.   World Bank. 2023. Debt and Development in a Changing World . Washington, DC: World Bank.    ANNEXURE A   Data supporting the calculations as set out in paragraph 6.1. South African case study: Currency volatility and escalating costs     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Mr. Daryl Swanepoel, attended the International Conference on Cohesive Societies, organised by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University and held in Singapore from 24 to 26 June 2025.   Under the theme "Cohesive Societies, Resilient Futures,"  the conference aimed to champion this global endeavour in order to inspire hope, foster inclusion and build momentum towards establishing harmonious and resilient multicultural societies.   The conference brought together more than 1,100 policymakers, academics and leaders from diverse civic and religious organisations representing more than 50 countries. This diverse gathering created a valuable platform for the exchange of ideas and best practices on strengthening social cohesion and intercultural understanding.   The conference was officially opened by the President of the Republic of Singapore, Tharman Shanmugaratnam , who, in his opening address, emphasized the importance of mutual respect, trust, and collaboration as the foundation for building cohesive and resilient societies. The Sultan of Perak and Deputy Yang di-Pertuan Agong, His Royal Highness Sultan Nazrin Muizzuddin Shah , also delivered a keynote address.   Mr. Swanepoel participated in various plenary sessions and workshops focusing on countering polarisation, promoting interfaith dialogue and building more inclusive communities. Some of the themes, among many, were:   Unpacking multiculturalism Navigating uncertainty Presentation of the Southeast Asian Social Cohesion Radar Forging societal resilience   In his contributions, he highlighted the vital role of institutions such as the Inclusive Society Institute in creating spaces for open dialogue and fostering trust between diverse communities.   Attending this conference provided valuable insights and international perspectives that will strengthen the work of the Institute, particularly in its mission to help build a more cohesive and just South African society.

The 2025 ACUNS (Academic Council on the United Nations System) Workshop, held from 23–25 June in Nairobi, Kenya, convened leading global scholars, policy practitioners and civil society actors under the theme Environmental Multilateralism and Human Development . The workshop provided a critical platform to explore the nexus of climate governance, sustainable development and social justice in a multilateral context.   Among the notable participants was Dr Samantha Williams, representing the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), who contributed significantly to the workshop’s discourse through a well-received presentation titled Advancing Small-Scale Fisheries in South Africa: Pathways to Sustainability and Equity within the Blue Economy Framework . Her participation underscored the Institute’s commitment to inclusive and sustainable development, particularly within the marine and coastal sectors that are vital to vulnerable communities in South Africa and beyond.   Dr Williams' presentation formed part of a broader dialogue on how environmental multilateralism can be reframed to include historically marginalised communities, such as small-scale fishers. Her work focused on the South African context, where nearly 30,000 subsistence fishers across 147 coastal communities depend on marine resources for their livelihoods. She highlighted the crucial socio-economic and cultural roles that small-scale fisheries (SSFs) play, noting that they contribute 40% of the global fish catch and support over 500 million people worldwide.   One of the key messages in her presentation was the urgent need to address the marginalisation of small-scale fishers within South Africa’s growing Blue Economy agenda. Dr Williams traced the policy evolution from post-apartheid reforms to the landmark 2012 Small-Scale Fisheries Policy, and the subsequent Oceans Economy Master Plan (OEMP) under Operation Phakisa. She argued that despite legal recognition, many SSF communities continue to face exclusion, inadequate infrastructure and environmental threats, particularly from offshore mining and seismic exploration.   For full report click here For the presentation click here

The Inclusive Society Institute continues to make significant strides in advancing constitutional literacy and democratic values among secondary school learners in Gauteng Province. On Monday, 23 June 2025, learners from Hercules High School in Pretoria participated in the “Taking the Constitution to the People”  workshop, facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, the Institute’s Gauteng Schools Coordinator. This dynamic workshop was designed to deepen learners’ understanding and appreciation of South Africa’s democratic Constitution, exploring its history, structure, and the fundamental rights and responsibilities enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights. Through an interactive and thought-provoking session, students were guided through the development of the Constitution, the principles that informed its creation, and the critical role it continues to play in shaping governance and society. The session also explored the Founding Provisions, highlighting the core values and freedoms that underpin the Republic of South Africa. A key focus of the workshop was on responsible citizenship, encouraging learners to reflect on their role in upholding the Constitution and contributing to a society that is inclusive, just, and equitable. The learners actively engaged with the content, asking insightful questions and sharing perspectives that demonstrated a growing sense of civic awareness and empowerment. The Inclusive Society Institute’s efforts in Gauteng are part of a broader, ongoing initiative. Similar workshops will be rolled out across various districts, ensuring that more learners are reached and empowered through this important constitutional education programme. By fostering informed and engaged young citizens, the Institute aims to help safeguard the democratic principles on which South Africa was built and to inspire the next generation of civic-minded leaders.

The Inclusive Society Institute is making strides in promoting constitutional literacy and democratic engagement across South Africa, with a strong presence in both the Gauteng and North West Provinces. Through its civic education initiative, “Taking the Constitution to the People”, the Institute has been delivering impactful workshops to Grade 11 and 12 learners, focusing on the imperatives and core principles of the South African Constitution. These workshops are part of a broader mission to empower young people with the knowledge and understanding necessary to become active, informed, and responsible citizens. On Monday, 23 June 2025, the Institute conducted one of these workshops at Daspoort Secondary School in Pretoria. The session was facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, the Institute’s dedicated Schools Project Coordinator for both Gauteng and North West Provinces. His depth of experience and engaging presentation style created an environment that was both educational and inspiring for the learners. The workshop content was carefully curated to align with the learners’ academic curriculum while also broadening their civic knowledge. Topics included the Preamble to the Constitution, which sets out the vision and values of the Republic; the Founding Provisions, which establish the democratic foundations of the state; the Bill of Rights, which articulates the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed to all citizens; and the Chapter 9 Institutions, which serve to protect and strengthen constitutional democracy. Learners responded with great enthusiasm, actively engaging in discussions and asking probing questions. Topics raised included the nature and functioning of democracy, the responsibilities of political parties in governance, and how ordinary citizens can hold public institutions accountable. The learners' curiosity and thoughtfulness were clear indicators of the effectiveness of the workshop in stimulating critical thinking and civic awareness. In addition to delivering constitutional content, the workshop aimed to foster a sense of ownership and responsibility among the youth regarding the democratic processes that shape their country. By emphasizing the role of each individual in sustaining democracy, whether through voting, community involvement, or civic activism, the session encouraged learners to view themselves as key contributors to the nation’s future. This workshop at Daspoort Secondary School is one of many being conducted across districts in Gauteng and the North West, with plans to expand to additional provinces in the near future. The Inclusive Society Institute is firmly committed to building a generation of learners who are not only knowledgeable about their constitutional rights but are also empowered to defend and exercise them in their everyday lives. Through this growing outreach programme, the Institute seeks to nurture a culture of constitutionalism, where democratic values are understood, respected, and lived out by all citizens—starting with the youth in our schools. The journey toward a more inclusive, equitable, and participatory democracy begins with education—and the Inclusive Society Institute is proud to be leading the way.

Occasional Paper 7/2025 This paper is published jointly by the  Inclusive Society Institute and School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University   PO Box 610 Bellville, 7550 South Africa    Copyright © 2025   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute and the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University.    D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University.   JUNE 2025 by Nicola Jo Bergsteedt (BA Drama; BA Hons Journ; MA Journ; PGDip Futures Studies) & Daryl Swanepoel Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University (ND Co Admin; BPAHons; MPA) This is the third in a series of three occasional papers on managing social cohesion in diverse communities. They explore the mechanisms that Singapore, Finland and the United Arab Emirates have deployed in forging socially cohesive societies within their very different environments.  The three papers will ultimately be integrated into a comprehensive synthesis report with the objective of providing a menu of tools for South African policymakers to contemplate for purposes of strengthening their efforts within the South African context. Abstract   The GovDem Survey of the Inclusive Society Institute has revealed that social cohesion in South Africa has not made sufficient progress post-Apartheid. In fact, the level of cohesion has declined of late, reversing the early gains made at the onset of the democratic order ushered in in 1994. This is worrying given the need for cohesion to underpin peace and security, and economic growth in a country, both of which are at worryingly levels in South Africa.   This occasional paper has as its objective the development of a menu of policy interventions aimed at advancing social cohesion, that the policymakers in South Africa may wish to ponder. The paper forms part of a broader study that explores the practices in other diverse communities, notably Singapore, Finland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This paper discusses proposals informed by the UAE case study, notably the Ministry of Tolerance & Co-Existence and the Happiness Programme. It discusses the findings thereof, and advances recommendations for South African policymakers to consider. 1. Introduction   In analysing its extensive 2023 GovDem Survey , the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), an independent public policy research institute, concluded that thirty years into the new South African dispensation, social cohesion had not advanced to optimal levels. In fact, trends were worrying. Context   In 1994 South Africa transitioned from Apartheid South Africa, in which the minority white community controlled all political power, to a new democratic dispensation in which universal suffrage ensured that all South African, regardless of race, shared political power in the country. Hopes were high that a rainbow nation could be forged from the divisions of the past (Austin, 2021). South Africa is celebrating its 30 years of democracy during 2024. In the poll, less than half (48%) of the respondents were of the view that a united nation could be forged out of all the population groups in the country. 31 percent believed it possible. 18 percent did not express a view one way or the other. This sentiment held true across all the major race groups in the country. Only 46 percent of whites believed it feasible, 48% of blacks believed it so, and for Indians and coloureds it was 44 percent and 50 percent respectively (ISI, 2023).   Even more disquieting is the finding that only 39 percent of South Africans believed reconciliation in South Africa is moving in the right direction. This held true across all the race groups, where similar trends existed.   In its definition of social cohesion, the Inclusive Society Institute includes dimensions wider than just race. It also considers religious tolerance, and attitudes towards immigrants, amongst other criteria, as contributors towards social cohesion. The Institute’s recently released South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI), is built on three pillars: demographic integration, extent of connectivity to the country, and sense of community (ISI, 2024). These pillars respond to the three dimensions of social cohesion as argued by Langer et al. (2017), namely inequality, trust and identity. Figure 1: Social Cohesion Triangle (Langer et al., 2017) High levels of inequality, Langer et al. argue, threatens social cohesion in society, in that it erodes relationships, which, in turn, could cause conflict. When trust is missing between members of society, the ability for individuals to collaborate to build the nation is weakened. And a national identity, in contrast to group or ethnic identity, may cause aggressive behaviour amongst members of society to the detriment of stable coexistence.   In South African society, trust amongst the various groups is worryingly high. For example:   In the same GovDem Survey, only 40 percent of White South Africans completely or somewhat trusted their Black compatriots, and similarly only 41 percent Black South Africans completely or somewhat trusted their White compatriots.   Only 48 percent of South Africans completely or somewhat trusted people from a different religion to their own. Only 43 percent of South Africans completely or somewhat trusted people from different nationalities. Similar trends existed across all the major race groups. Of particular concern was the finding that 68 percent of South Africans did not trust immigrants from other African countries. So too, some 66 percent did not trust immigrants from overseas. And likewise, similar trends were registered across all the race groups. (ISI, 2023)   These disappointingly low levels of trust suggest that, as a nation, in terms of demographic integration, South Africa has a long way to go in consolidating social cohesion in the country.   That said, the ISI survey finds that South Africans are slowly starting to forge a nation. Already, 46 percent of South Africans - with similar trends across all race groups - are in favour of associating with compatriots across racial lines, as opposed to only 31 percent who do not like associating with people from different population groups. And already, 52 percent of South Africans – with a similar trend across all race groups – are socialising (entertaining) with compatriots from across racial lines.   Likewise, some 49 percent of South Africans – with similar trends from across all race groups - do attend the church/shul/mosque/religious services of their fellow South Africans.   And 69% of respondents indicated that they wanted a united South Africa.   In considering the second pillar of the ISI’s SASCI, the extent of connectivity to the country, the findings of the survey were equally disappointing. Nine percent of the respondents indicated that they were seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so. Of particular concern was the number of high-income earners and those with tertiary education. Eleven percent of the high-income earners and those with tertiary qualifications were considering emigration. South Africa is experiencing a critical skills shortage across almost all sectors (Business Tech, 2023). For the country to lose more skills and taxpayers would be quite tragic for the country.   The minority communities are the most vulnerable. Fifteen percent and 14 percent of Whites and Indians respectively were considering emigration, as opposed to 8 percent of Black South Africans.   There were two main reasons driving the sentiment:   ·                A lack of confidence in the ability of the economy to deliver jobs for themselves and their family, and a sense that South Africa was failing. Twenty-five percent of respondents cited work opportunities as the reason for them contemplating emigration, and only 23 percent were confident that their children will be able to become part of the South African labour market and that they will find a good job. ·                A sense that South Africa was failing. Twenty one percent of respondents were of the view that the country was failing. Once again, apart from the Coloured community, it was the minority communities – particularly the Indian community – that were most vulnerable. Twenty-three percent of Whites and 41 percent of Indians cited South Africa’s failure as a state as the reason for them considering emigration.   In considering the third pillar of the ISI’s SASCI, namely a sense of community, a far healthier picture emerged. Seventy-five percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that it important to get involved in the community in which they lived, 47 percent agreed or strongly agreed that it was important to actively work for the welfare of their community, and 58 percent said that they actively looked for ways in which they could support people that were less fortunate than themselves. Similar trends were registered across all the race groups.   The survey was however silent as to the extent to which the individual race groups involvement extended across demographic lines. 1.1 About the survey   The aforementioned data is drawn from the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey, which forms part of IPSOS’ Khayabus Survey, the methodology of which is illustrated in the diagrams contained in Figure 2 below   Figure 2: The IPSOS Khayabus (ISI, 2023)   Against this backdrop one must ask: Is enough being done to promote, nurture and ensure social cohesion in South African society? The country’s National Development Plan (NDP) after all recognises that the strategy set out therein needs to be underpinned by social cohesion (NPC, N.d.).   The NDP argues that “leaders throughout society have to balance the power they hold with responsibility, including…promoting social cohesion”, and that it is necessary to broaden social cohesion and unity while redressing the inequities of the past. “South Africa’s own history and the experiences of other countries”, it says, “show that unity and social cohesion are necessary to meet social and economic objectives”. It also argues that social cohesion in society is necessary to narrow the inequality divide (NPC, N.d.).   The NDP is correct, because in socially cohesive societies, where there is a general absence of underlying social conflict, people work together as one towards the well-being of all in society. It works against exclusion and marginalisation, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its people the opportunity of upward mobility (SFRI, N.d.). It enables people to be engaged in “a common enterprise”, wherein they can face shared challenges as members of the same community (Maxwell, in SFRI. N.d.). It allows society to share equitably in its prosperity, because cohesive societies are politically stable, thereby allowing them to focus on economic growth (Bris, 2014).   It is therefore encouraging that the National Planning Commission recently proposed the establishment of a Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Council with the objective of developing and monitoring strategies for the promotion of tolerance and the embracing of diversity …for the emergence of a shared South Africa identity and pride” (NPC, 2023).   Some progress has been made in setting up the structures and mechanisms to advance the goal of social cohesion in South Africa.   The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (CRL Rights Commission) has been established in terms of Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution. The primary objectives of the CRL Commission is “(a) to promote respect for the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities; (b) to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tolerance and national unity among cultural, religious and linguistic communities, on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and free association; and (c) to recommend the establishment or recognition, in accordance with national legislation, of a cultural or other council or councils for a community or communities in South Africa” (RSA, 1996).   Since its establishment the CRL Commission has tackled several topics that impede social cohesion. The full list of reports contained on the CRL Commission’s official website include: The commercialisation of religion and the abuse of people’s belief systems. Challenges that lead to deaths and injuries at initiation schools in South Africa; The reuse  of graves by local governments: Seeking a solution to the violation of cultural and religious rights of communities through the reuse of graves by local governments; Ukuthwala (the abduction that involves kidnapping a girl or a young woman by a man and his friends or peers to compel the girl or young woman's family to endorse marriage negotiations). The use of official languages by organs of state. Violations of religious rights by members/congregants of church missions; and Civil unrest in Phoenix that allegedly resulted in racially motivated deaths. (CRL Commission, N.d.)   Scrutinisation of the annual and other reports will suggest that the bulk of the Commission’s work has been limited and reactive in nature. No wonder given that the Commission’s annual budget in the 2021/22 financial year amounted to a mere R46,4 million rand (CRL Commission, N.d.). Given the extent of the work needed to tackle the social cohesion deficit, the commission has not been adequately resourced to properly carry out their work.   So too, the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture (DSAC), is mandated to lead nation building and social cohesion through social transformation, but the unit tasked to carry out this mandate is inadequately resourced. The DSAC social cohesion programme includes activities such as the celebration of national days, advocacy platforms on social cohesion, and community conversations (DSAC, N.d.). The unit tasked with carrying out the social cohesion mandate comprises four members of staff (Anon., 2023) and the annual budget for 2024/5 amounts to mere R59,8 million (Treasury, 2024).   On paper it suggests that the government is committed to securing social cohesion in South Africa. It forms an integral part of the NDP, a constitutionally committed commission has been established to promote and protect the rights of the country’s diverse communities, and DSAC has established programmes aimed at promoting social cohesion in South Africa. The lived reality tells a different story: activities are few and limited in nature, the programmes are wholly under-resourced and as evidenced in the ISI’s GovDem Survey, the level of social cohesion is disappointingly low.   What to do?   There are many other countries around the world that have/are faced/facing social cohesion challenges.  Three come to mind, each with different mechanisms to nurture and promote social cohesion within their societies. These are Singapore, Finland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is the focus of this paper. The UAE experience may hold lessons for South Africa, the exploration of which is the object of this dissertation. 1.2 Research question and methodology   The departure points of this study, based on the empirical evidence contained in the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey, as highlighted in the introductory chapter, is that:   Social cohesion, of which, in the South African context, nation-building and reconciliation are crucial elements, is not at an acceptable level. South Africans desire a united nation in which the different communities that compose the nation can work together to build a common future. The South African Constitution places a high premium on a non-discriminatory environment underpinned by social cohesion. That all three spheres of government, that is the executive, legislative and judicial spheres, at its heart, recognise and promote the ideals of the Constitution, that is a united and reconciled South Africa culminating in a socially cohesive society. That the current structures, programmes and resources allocated by the authorities have not yet – thirty years since the transition from Apartheid - delivered the desired level of social cohesion in South Africa.   It recognises the importance of social cohesion in any society that wishes for harmony, stability and prosperity. Thus, more needs to be done to promote such.   What that is, is an open question.   In a case study, the United Arab Emirates model for managing diversity and social cohesion is examined. It aims to provide new options for South Africa’s policymakers to contemplate, by identifying a set of practices that do not currently form part of the South African toolset.   2. The United Arab Emirates Case Study   2.1. Introduction   In today's globalised world, countries are confronted with significant challenges in nurturing social cohesion and tolerance among their diverse populations. Due to its extensive expatriate community that comprises more than 200 nationalities, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stands out as a unique model. This paper explores the frameworks and programmes deployed by the UAE in order to promote tolerance and social cohesion through its Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, and the Happiness Programme. And it considers how these insights may inform similar initiatives in South Africa. The need for social cohesion is underscored by the reality that societies are becoming increasingly diverse due to globalisation, migration, and changing demographics. For post-apartheid South Africa, where previous policies enforced racial division and inequality, the quest for a unified and inclusive society is both a challenge and an imperative. 2.2. Historical Context   To appreciate forming the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence in the UAE, it is important to understand the historical context of the country. It comprises seven Emirates:, namely, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al-Quwain, Fujairah, and Ras Al Khaimah. Prior to its unification in 1971, each of the Emirates had distinct identities which were rooted in shared cultures, traditions, religions, and heritage (Salah, 2024).   Since unification the country has development rapidly, and, together with its phenomenal economic growth, it has attracted expatriates from many diverse countries. This has led to its demographic transformation. The influx of various nationalities since the twentieth century, has resulted in the drastically altered social fabric of the nation. Whilst the diversification brought the richness of different cultures, it also raised the questions as how to maintain social harmony (Salah, 2024).   The majority of residents in the UAE now hail from abroad, which has led to the UAE government's recognition of the importance of ensuring that the Emiratis and the expatriates need to coexist peacefully and productively. This recognition has led to the establishment of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence. It was a strategic response to these developments, since the government needed to foster an environment of mutual respect and understanding among the different communities inhabiting the UAE and considered it crucial for social stability. Its creation signified a proactive approach to potential friction arising from cultural and linguistic differences (Salah, 2024).   2.3. The background to the need for promoting tolerance in the UAE   The UAE is a multi-national and multi-cultural society. The Emirati nationals make up just 10% of the population. The vast majority are expatriates, who have relocated to the UAE from various countries in search of opportunity and a better life (Olimat, 2025).   Expatriates number around 9 million and the Emirati only around 2 million. Accordingly, the UAE hosts a vast array of cultures, languages and traditions. This has created a unique demographic landscape that has brought about both opportunities for enrichment and challenges in terms of social cohesion (Salah, 2024).   The UAE government has recognised the importance of promoting tolerance and understanding among its varied population. As a nation, the UAE has shifted its focus toward fostering a harmonious society where individuals from different backgrounds can coexist peacefully. This recognition led to the establishment of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, which focuses on initiatives that foster respect and acceptance among the of myriad cultures present in the nation. This ministry’s initiatives have been designed to address the challenges posed by diversity whilst simultaneously harnessing the potential that such diversity offers (Olimat).   2.4. The Ministry of Tolerance   The Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence was founded in 2016 and is tasked with promoting the values of tolerance, inclusiveness, and social cohesion within the UAE. The ministry's formation testifies to the UAE's commitment to addressing the issues which can emerge in a multicultural society, such as prejudice and discrimination (Olimat, 2025).   The Ministry of Tolerance functions on several principles:   Promotion of Cultural Understanding: The ministry implements programmes aimed at promoting awareness and appreciation of the various cultures that exist within the UAE. Initiatives have been designed to promote and encourage dialogue and understanding between the Emiratis and the expatriates with regard to their traditions, values, and beliefs. Development of Comprehensive Policies: The ministry has formulated a range of policies that support a culture of tolerance in schools, workplaces, and communities Engaging the Community: Community engagement is important for ensuring the success of initiatives aimed at promoting tolerance. The ministry therefore focuses on outreach programmes that involve various stakeholders, including local communities, businesses, schools, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Monitoring and Evaluation: The ministry assesses the impact of its initiatives through surveys and studies that evaluate the levels of tolerance and cohabitation among residents. This data helps in refining and enhancing programs. (Olimat, 2025).   2.4.1. The role, structure and functions of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence   The UAE's Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence is the country's authority which is dedicated to promoting tolerance, coexistence and respect among its diverse communities. Its work extends beyond mere toleration. It also seeks to promote an understanding and appreciation amongst its citizens for the various cultures that make up the nation.   Outreach and community engagement   Central to the ministry's strategy is community outreach. By engaging with the different cultural groups and organisations, the ministry endeavours to bridge the gaps between the various cultures. These engagements comprise activities such as the hosting of cultural events, forums and workshops, which are intended to facilitate dialogue and cultural exchanges.   The initiatives help to demystify the different customs and traditions of the various communities, which allows for a greater appreciation among community members. Moreover, the ministry focuses on providing platforms that are inclusive and wherein individuals can express their cultural identities. This helps to promote a better understanding between the various ethnic and religious groups. The approach reinforces the idea of diversity being a strength as opposed to being a challenge.   Education as a tool for promoting tolerance   Education is the basis on which of the ministry's mission has been developed. By integrating concepts of tolerance and coexistence into school curricula, the ministry inculcates these values in future generations. Educational workshops and training programmes shed light on the importance of intercultural understanding to both students and educators. This is done in collaboration with educational institutions. Through such collaboration, the ministry develops the resources needed to promote awareness about the diverse cultures within the UAE. These educational initiatives are intended to prepare students to thrive in a multicultural environment and to embrace diversity from a young age.   Legislative provisions   In order to achieve its objectives, the ministry operates within a robust legislative environment. The government has developed laws that are aimed at promoting tolerance and respect among its citizens and residents. The laws provide the foundation for the ministry's actions and initiatives.   Apart from the obvious laws establishing the Ministry of Tolerance & Coexistence, specific laws have been decreed to protect everyone in the UAE, via a solid legislative ground for the environment of tolerance, co-existence and acceptance. For example, the “Federal Law by Decree No (34) of 2023 Concerning Combating Discrimination, Hatred and Extremism” aims to fights discrimination against individuals or groups based on religion, caste, doctrine, race, colour or ethnic origin (UAE, 2023).    So too, Article 25 of the UAE’s highest law, the Constitution, states that “All individuals are equal before the law, and there is no discrimination between citizens of the Union on the basis of origin, nationality, religious belief or social status” (UAE, 1971).   Framework of tolerance   The ministry’s has established guidelines and policies to prohibit discrimination based on race, nationality, or religion. Legal provisions create a safeguard for individuals belonging to minority groups, thereby ensuring their rights are protected under the law. Additional regulations also encourage businesses and other organisations to adopt practices that promote inclusiveness. By promoting a culture of respect in workplaces and public spaces, the ministry helps to nurture a society that embraces diversity and fosters understanding among its members.   Organisational structure and resources   The ministry has a well-defined organisational structure in order to facilitate the effective implementation of its initiatives. In follows a multi-faceted approach so that it can address the various aspects of tolerance and coexistence in a comprehensive manner. Departments and their activities   The ministry has various departments. Each department is tasked with a specific responsibility, such as cultural integration, the development of coexistence regulations, and community outreach.   Cultural integration programmes aimed at promoting mutual understanding and appreciation between Emiratis and expatriates are designed to facilitate cultural exchanges. Education initiatives focus on developing programmes and resources aimed at embedding tolerance-related topics into school curricula and community workshops.   Through community engagement, outreach initiatives that actively involve diverse cultural communities in events, discussions, and collaborative projects are developed.   Facilitated workplace dialogues: The goal is to promote a spirit of inclusiveness and cooperation amongst workers from different backgrounds and nationalities within the workplace. The Ministry started rolling out these workshops within the government departments. Now that most government departments have been covered, it is looking to implement similar workshops within the private sector.   Legislative Affairs: This department focuses on ensuring that rules, guidelines, and regulations promote a culture of inclusivity and respect across the nation.(Salah,   2024)   Resources allocated to the ministry stem from both governmental budgets and partnerships with private organisations and non-profits. By collaborating with various stakeholders, the ministry expands its capacity to implement effective programmes that resonate with the community's needs (Salah, 2024).  2.4.2. Successes, challenges and important Initiatives   Since establishing of the ministry, the UAE has seen considerable progress in the furthering of a tolerant and inclusive society. Several initiatives and events have contributed to this achievement (Salah, 2024).   One of the major successes of the ministry is the promotion of national events that celebrate diversity, such as the 'International Day for Tolerance'. These events highlight the importance of tolerance but they also engage various communities in a manner that brings them together to share experiences and learn from each other.   Additionally, the ministry's partnership with organisations and institutions has resulted in numerous programmes aimed at youth, empowering them to take an active role in promoting tolerance among their peers. Workshops emphasising leadership and interfaith dialogue have proven successful in encouraging young people to appreciate diversity, and to respect their fellow citizens (Salah, 2024).   Despite these successes, the complex nature of cultural integration, management of differing viewpoints, misunderstanding, friction, and even hostility, have meant that challenges still remain (Salah, 2024).   The ministry must navigate these challenges with sensitivity, recognising that some individuals may struggle to adapt to a multicultural society. The ministry is also tasked with addressing concerns surrounding cultural appropriation and the respect of traditions while promoting their integration. Striving for an equilibrium between preserving cultural identities and promoting a unified national identity is an ongoing challenge that requires thoughtful consideration (Salah, 2024).   2.4.3. Governance and stakeholder engagement   Governance within the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence emphasises collaboration, transparency and accountability. The ministry operates in partnership with various governmental and non-governmental entities, fostering open lines of communication among stakeholders.   Stakeholder collaboration   Engagement with community representatives, civil society organisations, and international entities is crucial in shaping the ministry's policies and initiatives. Through consultation with stakeholders, the ministry ensures that diverse perspectives are included in its programmes, thereby allowing for more effective solutions. This collaborative governance model also helps build trust between communities and governmental institutions. When various stakeholders feel involved in the decision-making process, they are more likely to support initiatives that aim to bolster social cohesion.   Community resilience and responses to global events   The ministry is not only tasked with promoting tolerance but it is also tasked with responding to challenges brought on by global events, such as economic crises, geopolitical tensions, or humanitarian crises. (Salah, 2024)   During challenging times, the ministry's response has been crucial in reinforcing the values of respect and understanding among communities. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the ministry organised initiatives aimed at countering misinformation and fostering a spirit of cooperation between communities. By emphasising shared experiences, the ministry helped to mitigate divisions and reinforce social bonds (Salah, 2024).   The ministry also actively participates in dialogues related to global issues, such as climate change, migration, and human rights. These interactions not only position the UAE as a responsible global citizen but also demonstrate the country's commitment to fostering a culture of tolerance that transcends geographic boundaries (Salah, 2024).    2.4.4. Future directions   As the UAE continues to evolve and grow, so too does the role of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, which needs to be poised to adapt its strategies to meet changing and emerging challenges and opportunities that arise within the multicultural landscape.   Innovation in engagement   It is envisaged that future initiatives leverage technology in order to reach a broader audience and to engage individuals in innovative ways. Digital platforms can facilitate virtual cultural exchanges, social campaigns, and online educational resources, making it easier for communities to connect and interact. Moreover, the ministry may focus on strengthening its partnerships with private sector organisations and universities to develop more tailored programmes that target specific cultural groups or demographics. By aligning their initiatives with the needs of particular communities, the ministry can foster deeper connections and encourage wider participation.   Fostering Inter-religious dialogue   In an increasingly interconnected global environment, inter-religious dialogue is vital for promoting understanding and respect among diverse faiths. The ministry is likely to expand its efforts in this area by organising interfaith events, building bridges between religious leaders and communities, and creating platforms for dialogue that emphasise common values. By nurturing inter-religious understanding, the ministry can further reinforce its core mission of fostering a harmonious society that embraces diversity. (Salah, 2024)    2.5. The Happiness Programme   Closely aligned with the work of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, is the UAE's Happiness Programme. The programme has as its objective the creation of an environment in which all residents feel valued and included.   The programme recognises that happiness and social well-being are deeply interconnected. A happy society is one where individuals respect and support each other. The programme therefore encourages government departments and entities to think creatively about how they can enhance the lives of individuals in the UAE. Happiness more often than not leads to a better understanding and acceptance of others, which in turn promotes a more tolerant society (Olimat, 2025).   2.5.1. Key aspects of the Happiness Programme   The key aspects of the programme are:   Public interface design: Initiatives have been tailored to enhance user experiences with public services. The government aims to ensure that citizen engagement with government services is positive since it fosters a sense of belonging and good interaction between the state and its citizens.   By working with the private sector, businesses are encouraged to adopt practices that promote workplace happiness. Happy workers positively impact attitudes in communities. Mental Health Awareness: Mental well-being is recognised as a core component of happiness. Programmes addressing mental health stigma and promoting services play a vital role in community health. (Olimat, 2025)   2.5.2. The programmes and initiatives of the Happiness Programme   The programme employs several initiatives which are aimed at enhancing tolerance and happiness in the community. Often overlapping with those of the Ministry of Tolerance and Co-Existence's, they include:   A cultural awareness programme that involves educational activities tailored to facilitate understanding among different cultural groups. Through workshops and events, shared values and common goals are emphasised to break down barriers between communities. For example, cultural exchange workshops allow residents to engage with art, music, cuisine, and customs from different cultures so as to create empathy and understanding amongst them.   Public campaigns that highlight stories of multiculturalism, that reflect the nation’s values, and which encourage unity among residents are regularly implemented. The UAE has implemented national campaigns that promote coexistence: Campaigns reminding residents of the dignity of every individual, respect across communities, and historical situations of cooperation help mitigate prejudice and foster a collective identity.   Engagement with Youth   The youth are engaged through programmes that promote volunteerism, cultural exchange and civic responsibility. This is done so as to instill the principles of tolerance and understanding at a young age. In so doing, future generations that value inclusivity are cultivated. The youth programme includes activities such as community service days, and interschool cultural events. Furthermore, youth councils provide platforms for young people to contribute to the social dialogue.   International cooperation   The UAE actively seeks to promote its tolerance initiatives on a global scale. This it does by engaging international organisations and by participating in global dialogues called to address tolerance. It aims to position itself on global platforms as a leader in promoting peace, and cultural understanding and tolerance.   The role of policy and infrastructure   The UAE’s approach to governance significantly contributes to social cohesion. It is of the view that the effectiveness of its infrastructure - from advanced technology in government services to a robust legal system - creates an environment of assurance for residents. Seamless and quality public service experiences nurtures and promotes trust in government - trust which is vital for social stability. The satisfaction with government services is often cited as a major factor in residents’ overall happiness.   Government services and technology   To improve access to all necessary services for residents, the UAE government harnesses technology that promotes transparency and efficiency. The availability of online portals for government services allows residents to conveniently interact with government departments and entities. Processes are more efficient and barriers are removed. Enhanced administrative practices ensure responsiveness to community needs. Rule of law and civic responsibility   The country's firm adherence to the rule of law has a positive impact on the fabric of society. The legal and judicial systems are designed to ensure fairness and equity, which creates a sense of security for residents in that they better understand their rights and responsibilities. When grievances arise, mechanisms for resolution reinforce the norms of civic order and mutual respect. With clear legal frameworks in place, citizens know that conflicts will be resolved efficiently and equitably. This creates confidence in the judicial system. and because residents can expect justice and fairness to prevail when disputes occur, community interactions tend to be civil (Olimat, 2025)   2.5.3. Evaluating Social Cohesion in the UAE   There seems to be a dearth of empirical research measuring social cohesion and the impact of the UAE's tolerance programme's on it. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests a positive trend. In various surveys conducted by government bodies, the perception of safety and acceptance among residents is highlighted. This would indicate that tolerance is indeed part of the cultural fabric of the UAE (Olimat, 2025).   Listening to community members’ experiences provides insights into the successes and challenges of ongoing initiatives. Feedback from citizens indicate increasing levels of cultural exchange, participation in community events, and general acceptance of diversity (Olimat, 2025).   Surveys focusing on perceptions of security and community engagement also suggest an increased sense of belonging among residents. The heightened sense of safety seems crucial, since it encourages individuals to participate fully in social and cultural events. This participation promotes a deeper connection to the UAE as a shared home for all its citizens (Olimat, 2025). 3.     Conclusion and recommendations   The journey toward tolerance and social cohesion is of the highest importance for social stability in both the UAE and South Africa. Drawing lessons from the UAE's model can provide valuable insights into initiatives that could be effectively adapted for a South African context. Therefore, a society founded on mutual respect and understanding needs to be constructed through strategic thinking, collaborative actions, and the development of innovative solutions.   To cultivate a culture of tolerance is not merely a governmental responsibility but a shared societal one that requires participation from all citizens.   In South Africa, embracing diversity as a strength rather than a division is essential for holistic national growth. Building a cohesive society rooted in appreciation and respect will lay the foundation for a brighter future where tolerance reigns, enabling all citizens to feel they have a place in their shared national identity.   The world is grappling with rising intolerance and conflict. So the importance of learning from models of successful integration cannot be overstated. By focusing on building communities where individuals embrace differences while recognising shared humanity, we can create pathways toward a more peaceful and harmonious future for all.   By continuously updating policies, fostering intercultural dialogues, and by encouraging engagement at all levels of society, nations can work collaboratively toward a common goal of tolerance — with the ultimate aim of enriching human experience and promoting a culture of acceptance and understanding across the globe.   The establishment of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence, and the introduction of the Happiness Programme, have been significant steps towards nurturing a more tolerant and happy society. One that accepts diversity and promotes social cohesion and harmony. Through sustained community engagement, sound legislation, educational initiatives, and innovative responses to world challenges, the ministry is playing a critical and essential role in fulfilling the UAE's commitment to coexistence and mutual respect.   Whilst the journey toward achieving a fully tolerant and harmonious society is ongoing, the continuous efforts of the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence and the Happiness Programme affirm its dedication to ensuring that individuals from all walks of life feel valued and respected.   The UAE is a model to other nations needing to manage their diverse communities and to promote social cohesion. As the complexities of cultural diversity is grappled with around the globe, the principles and practices established by the Ministry of Tolerance and Coexistence serve as a guide for creating inclusive societies. By nurturing the values of tolerance, coexistence, and harmony, the ministry contributes to the nation's internal social fabric. It also positions itself as a global leader in promoting harmonious relationships among diverse populations.   Through its ongoing commitment to the promotion of tolerance, and by creating understanding and respect amongst the different cultures and communities calling the UAE their home, the country's national identity is enhanced.   3.1. Insights for South Africa   South Africa, has a complex history of division and inequality. It can therefore can benefit from the UAE's experiences of promoting social cohesion, since it remains a central challenge requiring initiatives to promote understanding among its diverse communities. The cultural landscape of South Africa is rich, and leveraging this diversity can create a vibrant nation rooted in mutual respect.   The establishing of a structure for tolerance, coexistence and happiness   South Africa should consider the establishment of a dedicated institution or the expansion of the mandates of the existing constitutional Chapter 9 institutions, for purposes of designing and implementing social cohesion programmes alike to those of the UAE. This will help focus efforts aimed at fostering social cohesion in the country. Similarly, a national body with the authority to coordinate social cohesion, tolerance and harmony initiatives could ensure that the various stakeholders involved in the development and implementation that policies are linked. This will encourage its effective implementation at all levels.   Cultural awareness programmes   Implementing comprehensive educational programmes that encourage cultural exchange can promote respect and tolerance among South African communities. Collaborations between schools, community organisations, business and local governments are crucial in implementing these initiatives. Programmes should emphasise the contributions of various cultural groups to South African history and development, highlighting shared values and experiences. Through interactive workshops, local festivals, and shared storytelling events, communities can build bridges of understanding.   Implementing public campaigns and community engagement   Through the implementation of public campaigns that celebrate diversity and shared values, prejudice is eased and inclusivity promoted. They can highlight success stories of intercultural friendships, shared community projects, and mutual support among different groups. The engagement initiatives should involve the various stakeholders, such as businesses, educational institutions, and civil society, in order to strengthen the reach and effectiveness of the campaigns. Incorporating voices from diverse backgrounds ensures that the public relates to and invests in the changes being made.   The utilisation of technology   By leveraging technology to improve access to government services, trust in public institutions is built. This ultimately contributes to greater civic responsibility among citizens. Similarly, enhanced digital platforms for community engagement enables feedback and connection in real time, thereby allowing residents to effectively articulate their needs and concerns. Online platforms can be used to share best practices, facilitate dialogue, and create virtual spaces for cultural exchange, and for broadening the community’s engagement radius.   Youth Engagement   The targeting of young people with programmes aimed at promoting leadership, service, and community involvement can help engender a culture of tolerance and understanding for future generations. Providing mentorship programmes that connect youth from diverse backgrounds can promote understanding and collaboration. Education plays a central role in shaping perspectives. Schools can implement curricula celebrating diversity while emphasising the importance of understanding, empathy, and civic duty.   References   Bris, A. 2014. Social Cohesion – Why it matters. [Online] Available at: https://www.imd.org/research-knowledge/articles/com-april-2014/ [accessed: 7 February 2024]   BusinessTech, 2023. There’s a critical shortage of these shills going into 2023.  [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.sa/news/lifestyle/653227/theres-a-critical-shortage-of-these-skills-in-south-africa-going-into-2023/ [accessed: 7 February 2023]   CRL Commission. N.d. Annual and Other Reports . [Online] Available at: https://www.crlcommission.org.sa/reports/ [Accessed: 7 February 2024]   Department of Sport, Arts and Culture (DSAC). N.d. Annual Performance Plan 2023/24 . [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.dsac.gov.za/sites/default/files/2023-05/DSAC%20APP%202023-2024.pdf [Accessed: 7 February 2024]   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), 2023. GovDem Poll . Cape Town: Inclusive Society Institute.   Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2024. The South Africa Social Cohesion Index: Measuring the well-being of a society . [Online] Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/the-south-africa-social-cohesion-index-measuring-the-well-being-of-a-society  [accessed: 11 March 2025]   Langer, A.; Stewart, F., Smedts, K. & Demarest, L. 2017. Social Cohesion Index. [Online] Available at: https://www.socialcohesion.info/concepts/arnim-langer-/-francesstewart-/-kristien-smedts-/-leila-demarest [accessed: 7 February 2024].   National Planning Commission (NPC). N.d. National Development Plan 2030. Our future – make it work. [Oline] Available at: ndp-2030-our-future-make-it-workr.pdf [accessed: 7 February 2024]   Olimat, M. 2025. Interview with Dr Muhammed Olimat, Professor, Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, United Arab Emirates.   Republic of South Africa (RSA). 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 . Pretoria: Government Printer.   Salah, M. 2024. Structured interview with on 20  August 2024 with Ms Mai Salah, Senior Official at the Ministry of Tolerance & Coexistence, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.   Scanlon Foundation Research Institute (SFRI). N.d. What is social cohesion?  [Online] Available at: https://scanloninstitute.org.au/what-social-cohesion [accessed: 7 February 2024]   Treasury. 2024. Vote 37: Sport, Arts and Culture . [Online] Available at: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2024/ene/ENE24-Vote37_ChapterTables.xlsx [accessed: 2 April 2024]   United Arab Emirates (UAE). 1971. The Constitution . [Online] Available at: https://uaecabinet.ae/en/the-constitution [accessed: 19 March 2025]   United Arab Emirates (UAE). 2023. Federal Law by Decree No (34) of 2023 Concerning Combating Discrimination, Hatred and Extremism . Aby Dhabi: Presidential Palace.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This paper is published jointly by the  Inclusiv e Society Institute and School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University                      www.inclusivesociety.org.za             www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/economy/sp

The Inclusive Society Institute participated in the Electoral Commission of South Africa’s Symposium on Political Funding, which was held in Durban on 18 and 19 June 2025. The symposium brought together a diverse array of stakeholders, including political parties, researchers, regulators, civil society organisations and representatives of the media, to interrogate and reflect on the current state and future trajectory of party political funding in South Africa.   Representing the Institute was its Chief Executive Officer, Mr Daryl Swanepoel, who contributed to the robust discussions on funding transparency, equity and the sustainability of South Africa’s multiparty democracy.   A multi-sectoral engagement on the Future of political funding   The symposium was convened by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and structured over two days, with a series of high-level thematic sessions, which included:   A public session in which the objectives of the symposium were set out, focusing on strengthening transparency, fairness and institutional integrity within the South African political funding regime. A deep dive into the architecture of political funding in South Africa, which featured a keynote address by IEC Deputy CEO Mr George Mahlangu, who offered insights into the Commission’s work in monitoring political finance and enforcing the Political Party Funding Act. A presentation of key findings from new research conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), examining the legal and policy framework regulating political finance in South Africa, as well as public perceptions around compliance and enforcement. A global comparative perspective on political funding, with inputs from international experts exploring best practices and emerging challenges in other electoral democracies. A focused session on cross-jurisdictional research, drawing from comparative experiences around the world to identify policy lessons for South Africa’s regulatory environment.   On the second day, the symposium resumed with a keynote address by the Minister of Finance, who highlighted the critical intersection between public finance management and democratic integrity. Subsequent sessions included:   Reimagining the Purpose, Role and Mandate of Political Funding, which interrogated whether South Africa’s current funding model adequately supports a vibrant and inclusive democratic order. Transparency in Political Funding, featuring new research on the capacity and commitment of key stakeholders, political parties, oversight institutions and civil society, to uphold the principles of openness and accountability. A closing session that examined Transparency in Public and Private Political Funding, addressing the persistent challenges of disclosure, enforcement and public trust, and proposing forward-looking reforms.   The institute’s contribution   Mr Swanepoel’s contribution on day one of the symposium highlighted several pressing concerns around the funding framework. In his remarks, he noted the apparent mismatch between the financial disclosures reported by political parties to the IEC and the scale of expenditure observed during election campaigns.   He cautioned that South Africa had adopted a high-disclosure of private funding of political parties' regime without adequately increasing public funding for political parties, a mismatch that risks undermining the objectives of the Political Party Funding Act, particularly in preventing corruption. Citing research conducted by the Inclusive Society Institute, he pointed out that South Africa spent approximately R20 per eligible voter per year on public funding in 2021, well below international norms for proportional representation systems. While funding has increased since that time, it remains inadequate to support a healthy democratic system.   Swanepoel further warned that if political parties remain underfunded and unable to meet their obligations. They may feel compelled to circumvent the law to secure sufficient campaign resources, thereby weakening the very transparency and integrity the Act seeks to protect.   In response to concerns raised by delegates at the symposium around the revised formula for distributing public funding, now based on a 10% equal share and 90% proportional allocation, he proposed a more inclusive three-tiered approach. This would begin with a small basic allocation to all represented parties to ensure operational viability, followed by the current 10-90 split, because such a model, he argued, would strike a better and more acceptable balance between the need for fairness and electoral performance, while enhancing the sustainability of South Africa’s multi-party democracy.   Conclusion   The ISI welcomed the opportunity to contribute to this important dialogues, since it the Institute was of the view that it helped advance the consolidation of South Africa’s democracy. The Institute remains committed to promoting policy reform that enhances transparency, fairness, and inclusivity within the political landscape.

The Inclusive Society Institute continues to make meaningful progress in promoting democratic values within secondary and tertiary institutions across the North West Province. On Thursday, 19 June 2025, learners from Rabboni Christian High School took part in the “Taking the Constitution to the People”  workshop, facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, the Institute’s Gauteng Schools Coordinator. The workshop aimed to deepen the learners’ understanding and appreciation of South Africa’s democratic Constitution, its historical development, structure, and the fundamental rights and responsibilities enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights. Through an engaging and interactive session, participants were guided through the constitution-making process, the principles that shaped its formation, and its critical role in underpinning the country's governance and social cohesion. The workshop also highlighted the Founding Provisions, which articulate the core values of the Republic and the freedoms to which all South Africans are entitled. A key focus of the session was the idea of responsible citizenship. Learners were empowered to see themselves not just as beneficiaries of constitutional rights, but as active participants in safeguarding democratic ideals and contributing to a more inclusive, equitable, and just society. This workshop forms part of a broader and ongoing initiative by the Inclusive Society Institute to strengthen constitutional literacy and democratic engagement. Similar programmes will continue to be rolled out across various districts of the North West Province, targeting both secondary schools and tertiary institutions. Through these efforts, the Institute seeks to nurture a generation of informed, engaged, and civic-minded individuals who will play a vital role in upholding and advancing South Africa’s democratic legacy.

On Thursday, 19 June 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute’s School Project Coordinator in the North West Province, Patrick Motsepe, facilitated an engaging and insightful constitutional education workshop for Grade 11 learners at Lighthouse Academy. The workshop aimed to equip students with a deeper and more practical understanding of South Africa’s supreme legal document—the Constitution. Moving beyond textbook theory, the session explored the Constitution’s historical context, its structure, and key components such as the Preamble and the country’s national symbols, including the National Anthem and the national flag. Carefully aligned with the learners’ Life Orientation and History curricula, the session offered an enriching learning experience that enhanced both content knowledge and critical thinking skills. As the workshop progressed, learners became increasingly engaged—posing thought-provoking questions, offering their own insights, and actively participating in discussions. Motsepe skillfully facilitated the dialogue, creating an inclusive space where each learner felt empowered to express their views. The workshop also focused on fostering a clearer understanding of the rights, limitations of rights, and responsibilities that come with citizenship in a democratic society. By the end of the session, students left with a greater appreciation of the Constitution’s relevance in their daily lives and their roles as active, informed citizens. To conclude, learners completed a survey designed to assess their comprehension of the workshop content and its application, providing valuable feedback for future programming.

Occasional Paper 6/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. J U N E 2 0 2 5   Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPAHons, ND: Co. Admin   Abstract   As the rivalry between the United States and China intensifies under the Trump administration, the global order is being reshaped in profound and often unpredictable ways. This paper explores how a potential second Trump presidency could escalate this competition and what that means for the rest of the world, particularly Africa.   Drawing from the author’s extensive engagements with US policy experts, think tanks and lawmakers, this position paper offers a forward-looking analysis of how Trump’s likely return to office, with his characteristic emphasis on economic nationalism, strategic decoupling and ideological confrontation, would redefine US-China relations. While much attention is focused on the Indo-Pacific, the paper makes a compelling case that Africa has become a significant, if underacknowledged, theatre in this global rivalry.   Africa finds itself caught in the middle of competing superpowers offering infrastructure, investment and ideological influence, each with strings attached. Whether through trade wars, military posturing or the ideological framing of governance models, the US-China standoff is already shaping African policy choices, development trajectories and diplomatic alignments. The paper uses South Africa as a case study to illustrate how Washington's growing skepticism toward Beijing’s influence could lead to economic, diplomatic and reputational consequences for nations perceived as drifting too close to China.   At its core, the paper argues that African nations must navigate this turbulent period with strategic clarity and assertive diplomacy. Instead of being pulled into a zero-sum competition, countries should leverage the rivalry to diversify partnerships, build institutional resilience and assert a form of updated non-alignment rooted in their own developmental priorities.     1. Introduction: US - China relations as the defining global axis   The global geopolitical landscape is being redrawn by intensifying strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. A prospective second Trump administration, characterised by economic nationalism, ideological confrontation and unilateralism, will define its approach to US - China relations: renewed rigidity and hostility.   While much of the focus centres on the Indo-Pacific, the implications of this rivalry will ripple globally. Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa, which, while not the core battleground, serves as a critical theatre in which the great-power contest for influence, resources, ideology and markets plays out in consequential ways.   This paper repositions US - China relations as the central lens through which we examine the evolving international system, with Africa presented as an illustrative case study of what smaller and developing states can expect in an era of heightened bipolarity. The objective is not only to project possible scenarios under a second Trump administration, but also to understand how this intensification of global rivalry constrains or enables agency among Global South nations, particularly those like South Africa that play an influential role on their continent.   2. Escalation in US - China relations under a Trump Presidency   2.1 Tariff wars, technology sanctions and economic decoupling   Trump’s first term launched a major economic confrontation with China through a combination of tariffs, export bans and the weaponisation of trade policy. A second term is expected to deepen this decoupling trend.   In 2025, the Biden-Trump transition period has been marked by increasing trade policy uncertainty. Trump-aligned Republicans in Congress have already tabled bills proposing expansion of the 60% blanket tariff on Chinese goods to include categories such as EV batteries, solar panels and rare earth imports and there will be increased scrutiny of US firms sourcing inputs from China through new guidance on "supply chain transparency" (USTR, 2025).   Trade measures:  Trump’s first term launched a major economic confrontation with China through a combination of tariffs, export bans and the weaponisation of trade policy (Bown, 2020; Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2020). Now tariffs are flip-flopping, rising as high as 145%, then down again to 30%, temporarily, but the final outcome is still up in the air. Export controls:  Huawei, ZTE and other Chinese tech firms were blacklisted under national security grounds. Campaign rhetoric (2024):  Trump proposed a 10% baseline tariff on all imports and a 60% tariff specifically on Chinese goods (WSJ, 2024; Trump Campaign, 2024).   Likely Implications:   The world may witness a bifurcated economic order, with separate trade and technology ecosystems, forcing countries to choose sides or hedge with complexity. African nations that rely heavily on Chinese capital and technology, such as Ethiopia, Kenya or Zambia, could find themselves caught in the crosshairs of this decoupling. If African manufacturing sectors are integrated into Chinese supply chains, they risk being cut off from US and European markets due to compliance restrictions related to forced labour, technology origin and sanctions.   2.2 Military posturing in the Indo-Pacific   Trump’s “peace through strength” foreign policy led to a bolstered US military presence in Asia and revitalised alliances. The emphasis on containing Chinese military expansionism will likely sharpen further.   The Quad (US, India, Japan, Australia)  was enhanced to counterbalance China’s Indo-Pacific rise (The White House, 2019). Freedom of navigation  operations increased in the South China Sea. Intermediate missile development  resumed after US withdrawal from the INF Treaty.   Likely implications:   Heightened military tensions with the possibility of flashpoints over Taiwan, maritime boundaries and alliances with regional players. The military dynamics will extend diplomatically to Africa as the US scrutinises Chinese military cooperation with African states, including port access in Djibouti and arms trade in southern Africa. African governments that engage militarily or logistically with China may attract US countermeasures.   We have already seen the US Navy in early 2025 resuming joint exercises with the Philippines and expanded rotational deployments in Guam and Darwin, Australia. China’s PLA Navy responded with increased activity around Taiwan and the construction of another artificial island in the South China Sea (DoD, 2025). Trump campaign surrogates have promised to re-enter the INF Treaty only if China agrees to verifiable dismantlement of its medium-range missiles.   2.3 Democracy versus autocracy framing   Trump’s foreign policy often used ideological language to delegitimise China’s global rise, framing it as an existential threat to the liberal order.   Pompeo (2020):  "If we bend the knee now, our children’s children may be at the mercy of the CCP" (Pompeo, 2020). Legislation:  The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act bans imports from Xinjiang linked to forced labour. Human rights reports:  The Trump State Department sharply criticised repression in Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang.   Likely implications:   This ideological framing bleeds into foreign aid, partnerships and multilateral diplomacy, especially in Africa where governance models are diverse. Governments seen to be drifting towards China’s governance template, that is centralised authority, party-dominated institutions and limitations on civil society, may find their partnerships with the US becoming strained or withdrawn. Public diplomacy tools will amplify this divide, painting a dichotomy that forces African states into uncomfortable positions.   2.4 Countering China's global expansion   Trump’s team viewed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as “debt trap diplomacy” and advocated alternatives.   Blue Dot Network (2019):  Created to vet infrastructure projects for transparency and sustainability. Prosper Africa:  Meant to scale up US private-sector investment on the continent. PGII (G7):  Though formalised under Biden, Trump-era momentum laid groundwork for infrastructure competition.   Likely implications:   Washington will likely increase pressure on states accepting BRI deals while offering conditional US and Western-backed infrastructure alternatives. For Africa, this means potential access to new finance, but with expectations around transparency, governance reforms and alignment with US-led frameworks like the Build Back Better World agenda or the DFC guidelines. The competition is no longer just about roads and ports; it is about ideological allegiance, digital sovereignty, and strategic dependency.   3. Africa as a strategic testing ground   Africa, rich in natural resources, a rapidly growing population, and critical voting power in international forums, is an increasingly vital arena in the US - China strategic rivalry. While China has deepened its footprint through infrastructure development, concessional lending and digital expansion, a renewed Trump administration would likely see Africa not only as a market, but as a battleground for global influence.   3.1 Pressure to reassess partnerships   A Trump administration is likely to exert strategic pressure on African governments to reduce their dependency on Chinese financing and infrastructure. Washington may leverage bilateral aid, trade access and diplomatic relations to discourage certain forms of Chinese engagement.   Technology and cybersecurity:  The US will oppose the deployment of Huawei and ZTE technologies in African telecoms and surveillance networks, citing risks of espionage. Strategic infrastructure:  Ports, railways and government buildings constructed by Chinese firms may be seen as dual-use facilities, prompting diplomatic concern. Debt diplomacy:  Countries highly indebted to China, such as Angola and Kenya, may be urged to adopt more transparent and multilateral lending frameworks and coerced into aligning with US and Bretton Woods institutions.   Likely outcome:   African states could be forced to reassess relationships not only based on economic benefit, but on the strategic optics and consequences of alignment.   3.2 Competing economic offerings Trump’s economic strategy would likely focus on enhancing US competitiveness in Africa through the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), targeted bilateral trade deals and the mobilisation of private capital.   Reinforced AGOA strategy:  The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) may be restructured to provide preferential access to US markets for countries aligning with US geopolitical interests. Critical minerals engagement:  The US may enter joint ventures with African governments in mining sectors to secure cobalt, lithium and rare earth elements vital to green and defence technologies. Private sector incentives:  US businesses could receive tax benefits and risk insurance to invest in African infrastructure and technology.  While not matching China's scale or speed, these initiatives may appeal to African governments seeking diversification and reduced exposure to Chinese leverage. In March 2025, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) announced a $5 billion investment guarantee facility for American firms investing in African digital infrastructure. The initiative explicitly excludes partnerships involving Huawei or Hikvision technologies (DFC, 2025).   3.3 Ideological influence and civil society tools   In addition to economic levers, the Trump administration would likely amplify ideological messaging through public diplomacy tools.   Civil society support:  US-funded NGOs may be bolstered to promote transparency, democracy and anti-corruption efforts. Narrative framing:  Agencies like USAID and media platforms like Voice of America may cast Chinese influence as undermining good governance. Think-tank engagement:  US institutions may increase collaboration with African academic and policy groups to challenge Beijing’s development model.  These instruments serve not just to compete for hearts and minds, but also to signal to African elites the reputational risks of leaning toward China.   4. Key Congressional and Senatorial role-players and legislative proposals   The US Congress is increasingly active in shaping policy to counter China’s global influence, with several lawmakers taking a leading role in advancing legislation that directly or indirectly impacts Africa.   4.1 Senator Jim Risch (R-ID)   Co-sponsored the Strategic Competition Act , prioritising diplomatic and development expansion to confront China’s influence. Supports increased US diplomatic staffing in African embassies and expanded civil society engagement to counter Chinese investments (U.S. Congress, 2021).   4.2 Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), now Secretary of State   Sponsored the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act , banning imports linked to forced labour in China. It advocates revoking China’s PNTR status, potentially impacting African manufacturing hubs linked to Chinese supply chains, such as Ethiopia (U.S. Department of State, 2020).   4.3 Representative John Moolenaar (R-MI)   Co-founded the Critical Minerals Policy Working Group . Promotes US partnerships in Africa’s mining sector, especially in countries like DRC and Zambia, while discouraging Chinese joint ventures. 4.4 Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) Supports the Outbound Investment Transparency Act , increasing scrutiny of US firms involved in Chinese-linked projects in Africa. 4.5 Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT)   Introduced the Sanctioning Russia Act, a piece of legislation which could impose tariffs on countries that buy sanctioned Russian oil, through which China is directly targeted, African nations with non-aligned foreign policies are nevertheless going to be affected.   In addition to previously mentioned roleplayers, the 2025 Congressional China Strategy Caucus was formally launched, co-chaired by Senator Tom Cotton and Representative Elissa Slotkin. Their proposed “Supply Chain Sovereignty Act” would introduce sanctions on Chinese firms operating in sectors deemed critical to US national security, including medical devices, green tech components, and telecommunications. African nations trading heavily in these sectors may face secondary compliance challenges.   These legislative efforts signify bipartisan momentum in Congress to build a legal framework that will serve to deter deeper African engagement with China. Countries seen are seen as being too closely aligned with Beijing may find themselves penalised economically or diplomatically. 5. Case Study: South Africa in the crosshairs of great- power rivalry   South Africa’s foreign policy, trade orientation and ideological alliances have drawn increasing scrutiny from US policymakers, particularly under a Trump-aligned strategic worldview. As one of the continent’s most politically and economically influential nations and a core BRICS member, South Africa’s trajectory offers an insightful example of how US - China rivalry is reshaping bilateral and regional relations. 5.1 The US - South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act of 2025   Introduced in early 2025, this Act mandates the Executive to do a comprehensive review of all diplomatic, military and economic engagements between the United States and South Africa, with provisions that reflect mounting concerns in Washington over Pretoria's growing closeness with both Beijing and Moscow. Specific US concerns include:   Military cooperation:  Reports of joint naval exercises between the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), China’s PLA Navy and Russia’s fleet. Digital sovereignty:  Widespread adoption of Huawei, ZTE and Hikvision technologies in South Africa’s security and telecommunications networks. Ideological alignment:  Continued high-level party-to-party ties between the ANC and the Chinese Communist Party.   Likely US responses:   Suspension or redirection of specific development assistance programmes, particularly in digital infrastructure and defence cooperation. Enhanced scrutiny of dual-use infrastructure projects funded by Chinese entities. Diplomatic signalling to, and subtle coercion of, its regional allies to start distancing themselves from Pretoria’s trajectory.   As of May 2025, the Act has cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Amendments now require a full audit of South African universities’ research partnerships with Chinese state-linked entities. There is increased concern in Washington over reports of joint AI labs co-funded by Huawei and local academic institutions (GAO Report, 2025). 5.2 Reputational and regional implications   The US review of its relationship with South Africa could serve as a warning to other African nations, that they too could follow, thereby reinforcing the risks of overt alignment with China. As South Africa holds prominent roles in continental institutions such as the African Union and SADC, its choices may influence the strategic posture of neighbouring states. Countries that emulate Pretoria’s engagement model may find themselves subject to similar scrutiny, while those that hedge or diversify may be rewarded with deeper Western partnerships. 6. Anticipated impact on China and China - Africa Relations 6.1 Impacts on China   Economic constraints:  US trade and technology restrictions have already begun to limit Chinese export capacity and innovation in high-tech sectors. Semiconductor and rare earth supply chain disruptions could worsen under a renewed Trump presidency. Diplomatic isolation:  Countries such as Australia, Lithuania and Sweden have resisted Chinese pressure, strengthening Western diplomatic coordination. If the US further isolates China in multilateral bodies like the WTO or the UN, its normative influence will shrink. Strategic withdrawal:  Chinese firms increasingly de-risk by delisting from US exchanges and focusing on South - South cooperation or domestic markets. This may reduce Beijing’s presence in contested or high-risk regions, including parts of Africa.   In the first quarter of 2025, China's GDP growth slowed to 4.5% amid tightening US and EU export restrictions on AI chips and advanced semiconductors. The Chinese government announced an acceleration of "dual circulation" policies to reduce reliance on foreign technology. 6.2 Impacts on Africa   Tactical reassessments:  African countries are already re-evaluating the terms of Chinese debt, with loan disbursements from China dropping from $29 billion in 2016 to under $9 billion in 2022 (China Africa Research Initiative, 2023)Strategic. Diversification of funding:  Africa now has access to competing Western initiatives, such as the G7’s PGII and the EU’s €150 billion Global Gateway, offering alternatives to BRI finance with potentially better terms and transparency. Increased scrutiny:  Nations adopting Chinese digital infrastructure (e.g., Kenya, Nigeria) may see reduced eligibility for US aid or face political consequences, which adds pressure on African states to reassess the long-term costs of Chinese technological integration.   According to a World Bank Africa Briefing (2025), concessional finance from China dropped below $7 billion in 2024. By contrast, PGII and Global Gateway disbursements in Africa exceeded $10 billion combined for the first time. Moreover, at least five African countries (Ghana, Senegal, Namibia, Uganda and Rwanda) have launched regulatory reviews of existing BRI agreements due to rising public debt concerns. 7. Strategic Recommendations for African Policymakers   The African experience provides practical lessons for navigating US - China rivalry. Policymakers must proactively shape foreign policy to preserve autonomy while capitalising on opportunities from both East and West. 7.1 Strategic non-alignment as policy doctrine   Africa must revive the spirit of the Non-Aligned Movement and update it for a multipolar 21st century. Rather than neutrality, this entails actively managing relationships with all powers based on developmental needs.   Maintain working ties with both US and Chinese partners. Avoid exclusive alignment with either bloc. Practice competitive diplomacy to extract the best offers.     7.2 Institutional strengthening and resilience   Improve public financial management and debt transparency. Strengthen legal protections around national assets. Enhance policy coordination across ministries to evaluate foreign proposals holistically.   7.3 Continental coordination and multilateralism   Use AU frameworks to issue collective positions on digital governance, foreign investment and debt sustainability. Operationalise AfCFTA to enhance intra-African trade, reducing dependence on external powers. Promote African agency in multilateral reform discussions.     7.4 Monitor legislative risks from the global north   Track new US and EU legislation that could affect African supply chains. Build forecasting units within foreign ministries to anticipate external regulatory shocks. Develop local content requirements and compliance capacity to avoid sudden disqualifications.   New EU legislation in 2025 requires traceability of all critical minerals entering its market. This indirectly affects African exporters who partner with Chinese firms lacking such compliance mechanisms. The African Minerals Transparency Index, developed by UNECA and launched in April 2025, is helping African governments prepare for these evolving standards. 8. Conclusion: Navigating the age of rivalry   The rivalry between the US and China defines the geopolitical epoch and whilst dynamics may have originated in trade and technology, they now affect every global region, especially Africa. As the case of South Africa demonstrates, alignment choices have consequences. The continent must tread a careful path, asserting strategic autonomy, embracing multilateralism and building resilient institutions.   While a renewed Trump administration may intensify the rivalry, the broader arc of global affairs is clear: developing nations must act with vision and conviction if they are to shape their futures rather than be shaped by external powers. Africa’s response to this challenge can serve as a model for the Global South, a model of pragmatic independence, proactive diplomacy and principled engagement.   References   Bown, C.P., 2020. US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart . Peterson Institute for International Economics. [Online] Available at: https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart [Accessed 7 June 2025].   China Africa Research Initiative (CARI), 2023. Chinese Loans to Africa Database . Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. [Online] Available at: https://www.sais-cari.org/data [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Development Finance Corporation (DFC). 2025. DFC Announces $5 Billion Africa Investment Guarantee Facility.  [Online] Available at: https://www.dfc.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). 2025. Guidance on Supply Chain Transparency in Strategic Sectors.  [Online] Available at: https://ustr.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2020. Economic Impact of the US-China Phase One Agreement . [Online] Available at: https://ustr.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Pompeo, M., 2020. Communist China and the Free World's Future . Speech at the Nixon Library, 23 July. U.S. Department of State. [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future/ [Accessed 7 June 2025].   The White House, 2019. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report . [Online] Available at: https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF [Accessed 7 June 2025].   Trump Campaign, 2024. Campaign Rally Transcript, January 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.donaldjtrump.com [Accessed 7 June 2025].   U.S. Congress, 2021. Strategic Competition Act of 2021 . [Online] Available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1169 [Accessed 7 June 2025].   U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). 2025. Annual Indo-Pacific Defense Posture Report. [Online] Available at: https://www.defense.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   U.S. Department of State, 2020. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices . [Online] Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ [Accessed 7 June 2025].   U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2025. Audit of Foreign Research Partnerships at US Academic Institutions.  [Online] Available at: https://www.gao.gov [Accessed 7 June 2025].   United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (UNECA), 2025. African Minerals Transparency Index Launch Report.  [Online] Available at: https://www.uneca.org   Wall Street Journal, 2024. Trump Proposes Sweeping Tariff Plan . [Online] Available at: https://www.wsj.com [Accessed 7 June 2025].   World Bank, 2025. Africa’s Economic Outlook and Financial Flows Briefing Q1.  [Online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org [Accessed 7 June 2025]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   June 2025 This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGPT. Original transcripts of the presentations made during the meeting have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.   Co-Convenors: Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability Inclusive Society Institue Rapporteur: Daryl Swanepoel CONTENTS   1 FOREWORD 2 THEMATIC OVERVIEW 2.1 Conceptualising Middle Powers in a fragmented world 2.2 Middle Powers as agents of global balance 2.2.1 A multipolar opportunity 2.2.2 Normative leadership 2.2.3 Strategic tools and leverage 2.3 Strategic incentives for engagement 2.4 Institutional reform and global governance 2.5 From dialogue to action 2.6 Digital transformation and strategic sovereignty 2.7 Conclusion: Claiming agency in a multipolar world 3 GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THE ROLE OF MULTILATERALISM Introductory remarks by HE Tarja Halonen, former President of Finland (pre-recorded message) 4 THE ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS IN REBALANCING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE - AN ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE Dr Georgios Kostakos, Executive Director, Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS) 4.1 The geopolitical context: Strains on the global governance system 4.2 Defining middle powers: Criteria and candidates 4.3 Roles in rebalancing global governance 4.4 Tools and leverage available to middle powers 4.5 What’s in it for the middle powers? Incentives and strategic gains 4.6 Constraints and limitations 4.7 Strategic proposals for institutionalising middle power influence 4.8 Conclusion: Strategic necessity and moral imperative 5 REIMAGINING PEACE, POWER, AND JUSTICE IN GLOBAL POLITICS - A CRITICAL REFLECTION ON MULTILATERALISM, THE GLOBAL SOUTH, AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER Ms Febe Potgieter- Gqubule, Head of Policy, African National Congress and former South African diplomat and senior official at the African Union 5.1 The crisis of the Liberal Order and the role of Middle Powers 5.2 Crises as opportunities: Reshaping the global system 5.3 Multilateralism under contestation and reconstruction 5.4 African perspectives on peace, governance, and development 5.5 Regional integration and economic sovereignty 5.6 Education, science and Pan-African solidarity 5.7 Global partnerships and African agency 5.8 Narrative, hope and political imagination 5.9 Coalitions of the willing and Lessons from experience 5.10 Conclusion: Toward a better Africa and a better world 6 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INEQUALITY AND RIGHTS Professor Sakiko Fukudu-Parr, Studley Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School, New York 6.1 Evolution of development thinking 6.2 The human development approach 6.3 Inequality: A structural and normative challenge 6.4 A Rights-based approach to development 6.5 Ethics and measurement in development policy 6.6 The Political economy of intellectual property and innovation 6.7 Institutional and structural obstacles 6.8 Capacity, information and epistemic justice 6.9 Civil Society and participatory approaches 6.10 Rethinking multilateralism and global governance 6.11 Conclusion 7 DISCUSSION: INSIGHTS FROM THE EXPERT DIALOGUE 7.1 Reframing the Middle Power concept: Identity versus agency 7.2 Middle Powers as builders of multilateralism and strategic coalitions 7.3 Africa–US relations: A case study in asymmetric engagement 7.4 Structural constraints and strategic gaps in Africa 7.5 Youth, education and technological transformation 7.6 Towards Implementation: From dialogue to action 7.7 Conclusion: Middle Powers as architects of a multipolar future ANNEXURE: PROGRAMME   Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:2183261550 1 FOREWORD   A loose association of think tanks and individual experts mainly from the Global South, the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) aspires to influence upcoming decisions on the future of global governance. This includes decisions on the reform of the United Nations, so that the states, the communities and the citizens of the Global South no longer feel that they are guests at the mercy of Northern hosts in the halls of global governance, but that they are equal partners, with their own valid perspectives, equal right- and obligation-holders in decision-making and action.   There is a growing realisation and acknowledgement that the “middle power” countries have unique agency to assist developing nations in attaining a dispensation that is fairer, more equitable and just. To this end the GSPN partnered with the Africa Think-tank Dialogue (ATD) to present a session at the ATD’s annual Africa Consultative Meeting - hosted by the Inclusive Society Institute -  over the period 25 – 26 March 2025 in Cape Town, South Africa. The session further explored how the middle powers’ agency could be deployed to find a new balance for the global governance system so that it also serves the interests of the Global South.   Under the theme “The role of the middle powers in (re)balancing the global governance system and reviving multilateralism and the UN”  the meeting surveyed characteristics of these middle powers and pondered potential tactics and strategies that could potentially be employed to advance the ideals of the developing world in an effort to bring about a mutually beneficial outcome that contrasts with the current monopoly of the ‘developed world’ – especially the P5 - in global affairs.   As was concluded when wrapping up the seminar: Middle powers are indispensable to the vision of a fairer, more balanced international order. They represent a bridge between the aspirations of the Global South and the corridors of global power.   What remains is for those in the GSPN and likeminded thinkers and activists around the world, to harness their efforts in activating these powers, to ensure they grasp their strategic agency and to motivate them to use it in order to build the just and equitable world we all deserve.   DARYL SWANEPOEL CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER INCLUSIVE SOCIETY INSTITUTE   2 THEMATIC OVERVIEW   The contemporary global system is being tested by overlapping crises - climate change, geopolitical fragmentation, rising inequality, pandemics and technological disruption. In this period of flux, the traditional power structures that shaped the post-World War II international order are being challenged. Amidst these shifts, middle powers - countries with moderate but meaningful global influence - have emerged as vital actors capable of bridging divides, generating consensus and advancing a more equitable world order.   The Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN), in partnership with the Inclusive Society Institute, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), HumanizaCon and the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD), convened a strategic dialogue in Cape Town (26 March 2025) to examine how middle powers, particularly from the Global South, can recalibrate global governance, revive multilateralism and help democratise international institutions (see the dialogue programme in the Annex). This thematic overview synthesises insights from the expert presentations, as well as critical reflections and exchanges from the policy-oriented dialogue session, underscoring the strategic and moral imperatives of middle power leadership in the 21st century. Summaries of the expert presentations, the dialogue session and the closing remarks follow this overview of issues brought up in the strategic dialogue.   2.1 Conceptualising Middle Powers in a fragmented world   Rather than viewing middle powers through a purely material lens - based on population size, GDP, or military expenditure - this report embraces a behavioural and normative framework. Middle powers are those that:   Operate through diplomacy and consensus-building rather than coercion Champion multilateralism, rule-based governance and equitable development Act as moral voices, mediators and norm entrepreneurs Possess regional legitimacy and policy innovation capacity   This broader conceptualisation includes states like South Africa, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Norway and Singapore - diverse in geography, governance systems and capacities, yet united by their strategic behaviour and global orientation. These countries are not passive “followers” of great powers but active agenda-setters with distinct priorities rooted in their domestic values and historical experiences. 2.2 Middle Powers as agents of global balance   2.2.1 A multipolar opportunity   The erosion of U.S. hegemony, the assertiveness of China, and the proliferation of regional power centres have opened new diplomatic spaces for middle powers. These states, operating in the interstices of bipolar rivalries, have an opportunity to shape norms, negotiate institutional reforms and promote inclusive coalitions. Middle powers have a strategic role in preventing global fragmentation. They can counterbalance unilateralism, resist coercive diplomacy and encourage convergence on pressing issues such as climate action, global health governance, peacebuilding and technological standards. Their ability to connect the Global North and South and the East and West, positions them as indispensable facilitators of global consensus.   2.2.2 Normative leadership   In addition to their mediating role, middle powers carry significant normative weight. Countries like South Africa - through its peaceful transition from apartheid - have moral authority that resonates across the world. Similarly, the development diplomacy of Brazil and the peacebuilding initiatives of Nordic countries exemplify how middle powers can define and diffuse norms related to justice, development and peace.   Their ability to challenge dominant discourses is critical in a world where the liberal order faces a crisis of legitimacy. Middle powers have the opportunity to redefine multilateralism not as a preserve of power politics but as a space for equity, dialogue and pluralism.   2.2.3 Strategic tools and leverage   Middle powers employ a wide array of tools to advance their foreign policy objectives:   Institutional participation   Active roles in the UN General Assembly, the E10 group of non-permanent Security Council members, ECOSOC and other bodies provide platforms for visibility and influence. Though lacking veto power, middle powers can shape debate, rally support and propose reforms.   Multilateral coalitions and forums   Groupings such as BRICS, MIKTA, IBSA and the G20 enable issue-based coalition-building that amplifies middle power voices. These forums often facilitate innovation in trade, technology policy, global finance and development cooperation.   Moral authority, historical legacy, diplomatic capacity and guiding vision   The historical struggle for liberation in South Africa, non-alignment in India, and disarmament leadership in Nordic states imbue these countries with moral legitimacy in the eyes of other nations. This soft power is a key source of diplomatic capital, which can go a long way if served by a competent diplomatic / civil service and is guided by leaders with vision.   Civil society and knowledge networks   Middle powers often benefit from vibrant think tanks, universities and civil society organisations that generate policy knowledge and normative frameworks. These actors support public diplomacy and create policy continuity across electoral cycles.       Development and climate finance   While not comparable to the budgets of great powers, some middle powers (e.g., the Nordics) have leveraged sufficient resources to fund strategic initiatives in climate adaptation, health diplomacy and post-conflict reconstruction, often yielding significant global returns.    2.3 Strategic incentives for engagement   Middle powers pursue global leadership not purely out of altruism but also due to enlightened self-interest. Benefits include:   Enhanced diplomatic influence:  Elevates national profiles and provides leverage in bilateral negotiations. Soft power dividends:  Leadership in global norms enhances product recognition, touristic attraction, education exports and international investment. Crisis resilience:  Active participation in global governance can insulate middle powers from geopolitical coercion and economic shocks. Leadership roles in institutions: Consistent engagement improves the likelihood of securing leadership roles in international organisations, shaping rules from within. Public legitimacy:  Foreign policy that aligns with national identity and democratic values can strengthen domestic support for international engagement. 2.4 Institutional reform and global governance   A core message of the dialogue was that middle powers are essential to the reform of global institutions. The UN Security Council, IMF, World Bank and WTO all reflect outdated power dynamics that exclude or marginalise the Global South.   Reform proposals include:   Semi-permanent Security Council seats  for middle powers to enhance inclusivity without expanding veto power A Global Resilience Council , possibly under ECOSOC, to coordinate responses to climate, health and technological crises New metrics of power  that go beyond military and economic might, focusing on sustainability, well-being and social resilience South-North Think Tank Networks  to harmonise policy research and build shared agendas across geopolitical divides   These reforms require persistent advocacy, coalition diplomacy and innovative institutional design - areas where middle powers can lead effectively.   2.5 From dialogue to action   While much of the discourse affirms the strategic potential of middle powers, a recurring theme is the “implementation gap.” Many well-articulated strategies are undermined by weak follow-through.   Recommendations for action:   Develop concrete roadmaps  with timelines and assigned responsibilities to institutionalise dialogue outcomes. Engage regional bodies  (e.g., AU, Regional Economic Communities) in translating ideas into actionable policies. Involve civil society and diaspora  in monitoring implementation and holding governments accountable. Use strategic moments  such as AU and BRICS summits to coordinate positions and influence global agendas. Invest in leadership development , with a focus on ethics, vision and pan-African solidarity.   These steps must be supported by think tanks, academic institutions and transnational networks like GSPN that provide expertise and continuity. 2.6 Digital transformation and strategic sovereignty   The dialogue identified digital governance as a critical frontier where middle powers can exercise leadership. Technological transformation is reshaping everything from labour markets to geopolitics.   Action areas:   Data sovereignty:  Developing countries must craft their own data protection and regulation frameworks. AI and tech ethics:  Middle powers should advocate for inclusive global AI standards that prioritise rights and sustainability. Tech education and infrastructure: Investment in STEM and vocational training is key to digital agency. Cross-regional innovation hubs:  South-South tech partnerships can accelerate homegrown solutions to local problems.   Middle powers must ensure that digital transformation reinforces, rather than undermines, democratic governance and social equity. 2.7 Conclusion: Claiming agency in a multipolar world   The GSPN dialogue concluded with a compelling vision: middle powers, especially from the Global South, are not peripheral actors in global governance - they are central to its renewal. Their ability to mediate, innovate and build bridges across divides positions them as architects of a more just and multipolar future.   But agency is not automatic - it must be claimed. Strategic clarity, institutional coherence and collective courage are needed. Middle powers must align national interests with global justice, translating ideas into policies and speeches into impact.   As one participant aptly noted: “Let us not allow the report of our dialogue to gather dust on a shelf. Let it walk. Let it speak. Let it lead.”   3 GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THE ROLE OF MULTILATERALISM Introductory remarks by HE Tarja Halonen, former President of Finland (pre-recorded message) The current global landscape is marked by increasing instability. The number of wars and conflicts is on the rise, while geopolitical divisions continue to deepen. Simultaneously, inequality, hunger and poverty are worsening worldwide. Fundamental human rights are under severe assault, and democratic institutions along with the rule of law are increasingly threatened in many countries. On top of these socio-political challenges, the planet is rapidly approaching several environmental tipping points - critical thresholds beyond which recovery may be impossible.   Despite these alarming trends, there remains hope through collective action. A just and sustainable future is achievable if nations work together. Historical evidence supports this vision. Although multilateralism is inherently complex and often slow, the progress made in the eighty years since the founding of the United Nations (UN) is significant. The UN has emerged as the leading forum for international cooperation, playing a pivotal role in advancing peace and security, human rights, sustainable development, disarmament and the global response to climate change.   However, the current moment reveals a troubling reality: global divisions appear to be growing stronger than the ties that unite us. To meet the demands of today’s world, a fundamental transformation of the multilateral system is required. The UN must undergo reform and global trust must be rebuilt. This process hinges on mutual respect for international norms, agreements and the rule of law. A rules-based international order remains the cornerstone of peace, stability and shared prosperity.   South Africa, and Africa more broadly, hold an essential role in fortifying the global multilateral framework. There is a pressing need to move beyond confrontation and division and instead focus on collective responses to global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, desertification and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).   To this end, international institutions (including the United Nations) must adapt to the realities of the contemporary world. This includes comprehensive reforms, such as changes to the composition and functioning of the UN Security Council. Proposals like the establishment of a Global Resilience Council under the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) offer promising avenues to accelerate implementation of international agreements like the Paris Climate Accord and enhance development financing.   Think tanks from the Global South also have a crucial role to play. They serve as important partners to their governments and can significantly contribute in international discussions. Collaborations between Global South and Global North think tanks have the potential to amplify voices, enhance policy effectiveness and demonstrate that globalisation can yield mutual benefits.   The call to action is clear: joint efforts must continue. The road ahead demands unity, innovation, and commitment. Although physical presence at meetings such as the one in Cape Town may not always be possible, the shared commitment to dialogue and cooperation remains vital. With dedication and mutual respect, meaningful progress can be achieved. 4 THE ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS IN REBALANCING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE - AN ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE Dr Georgios Kostakos, Executive Director, Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS) In a rapidly evolving global order marked by geopolitical tensions, institutional fatigue, and transnational crises, the concept of "middle powers" has re-emerged as a focal point in discussions on global governance. Georgios Kostakos, in his presentation, articulated a compelling case for the strategic and moral importance of middle powers in shaping a more equitable, effective and resilient international system. This report analyses Dr Kostakos’ s key arguments, examining the geopolitical context, defining characteristics of middle powers, their potential roles, tools at their disposal and the structural challenges they face. 4.1 The geopolitical context: Strains on the global governance system   Kostakos begins by situating the middle power discourse within the broader context of a global system under severe strain. Several trends converge to undermine global cooperation: the rise of new power centres, such as China and the BRICS bloc, the relative decline of traditional Western hegemons and the resurgence of nationalism and populism, which have eroded trust in multilateralism. These shifts are taking place against the backdrop of a fragmented international order where major institutions - particularly the UN Security Council - are often paralysed by power politics and vetoes.   This weakened institutional framework is particularly concerning given the scale and complexity of today’s global crises: climate change, pandemics, cyber warfare, biodiversity loss and economic inequality. These are not isolated challenges but interconnected threats that require sustained, collective action. Yet, the existing global governance structures have largely failed to respond adequately, often bogged down by geopolitical rivalries and bureaucratic inertia. Kostakos described this moment as a form of global adolescence - an unstable yet potentially transformative phase. 4.2 Defining middle powers: Criteria and candidates   The concept of “middle powers” was central to the presentation, and Kostakos took care to outline their distinguishing features. Unlike great powers or small, middle powers hold a unique position - strong enough to influence global affairs but not so dominant as to provoke fear or opposition. They are, in effect, trusted brokers with both credibility and capacity. To qualify as a middle power, a state should possess:   A demonstrated commitment to good governance and respect for the rights of its citizens Relative economic and diplomatic capacity A constructive international role, characterised by adherence to multilateral treaties and norms No engagement in active conflicts and no possession of nuclear weapons.   This definition is deliberately inclusive and globally representative. Kostakos mentioned South Africa, Brazil, Norway, Singapore and Indonesia as examples. He also emphasised the importance of regional forums and alliances, such as the African Union, the Pacific Island Forum, AOSIS and the Non-Aligned Movement, as vehicles for middle power cooperation.   Importantly, the list of middle powers is not fixed. States may grow into or fall out of the category depending on changes in their governance, capacity or international posture. This fluidity reinforces the need for constant evaluation and dynamic coalition-building. 4.3 Roles in rebalancing global governance   Middle powers, according to Kostakos, have a unique opportunity and responsibility, that is to fill the leadership void left by disengaged or self-interested superpowers. Their central location in the global hierarchy makes them well-suited to act as mediators, facilitators and norm-setters. Their ability to interact credibly with both large and small powers provides an essential link in a fragmented international community.   Key roles include:   Mediators and bridge builders:  In an age where big power rivalries often obstruct progress, middle powers can act as neutral arbiters. Historical examples from the Nordic countries in peace negotiations, including in the Middle East and Latin America, illustrate the effectiveness of such states in conflict resolution. Preventive diplomacy:  Kostakos highlighted overlooked crises such as rising tensions between Burundi and Rwanda or Venezuela’s territorial claims on Guyana. These situations, while not globally dominant in media narratives, carry the potential for regional destabilisation. Middle powers could spearhead early intervention mechanisms to de-escalate such conflicts. Advocates for disarmament:  Despite decades of inaction, the UN Charter mandates the eventual reduction of global armaments. Middle powers, free from vested interests in military supremacy, are ideally positioned to reignite discussions on both nuclear and conventional disarmament. Champions of economic equity and development: In the realm of global economics, middle powers can promote alternative models of development that prioritise employment, sustainability and human capital over purely trade-driven growth. They can support equitable implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly in the Global South. Institutional reformers:  Reforming global governance requires both ideas and coalitions. Middle powers can propose new institutional structures, such as a Global Resilience Council or a revamped Security Council membership model, to enhance representation, transparency and functionality. 4.4 Tools and leverage available to middle powers   While not as resource-rich as major powers, middle powers have several underutilised tools at their disposal. Kostakos detailed a diverse arsenal of mechanisms for influence, ranging from formal institutional roles to informal networks and moral authority.   UN platforms:  The General Assembly and E10 (the 10 elected members of the Security Council) are primary forums that offer visibility and strategic access to decision-making. G77 and coalition voting blocs:  Within the UN, middle powers often anchor coalitions such as the G77, where their leadership can sway major decisions, especially on development, human rights and climate action. Moral and political legitimacy: Countries like South Africa, with legacies of peaceful democratic transitions, carry moral weight that can help frame global debates and mobilise support from both governments and civil society. Catalytic financing:  Nordic countries have historically funded global initiatives with relatively small investments that have had outsized impacts, especially in climate diplomacy and peacebuilding. Civil society networks:  By partnering with NGOs, academic institutions, and think tanks, middle powers can develop and disseminate innovative policy ideas. These partnerships are crucial for shaping global norms and applying domestic pressure for international engagement. North-South bridging:  One of the most significant strengths of middle powers is their capacity to transcend regional and ideological divides. Whether through the G20, BRICS, or regional organisations, they can forge pragmatic partnerships across traditional fault lines. 4.5 What’s in it for the middle powers? Incentives and strategic gains   Beyond altruistic global engagement, middle powers stand to gain substantially from a proactive role in international affairs. Kostakos presented a strong case for the strategic and reputational benefits of middle power leadership:   Greater diplomatic clout:  Taking initiative in multilateral affairs enhances a state’s diplomatic profile and influence over international norms and policy agendas. Geopolitical insulation:  In a world where major powers increasingly weaponize economics and alliances, middle power coalitions can provide a buffer against coercion or marginalisation. National prestige and economic spillovers: Global leadership often translates into increased tourism, investment and export opportunities, particularly in sectors like education, healthcare, and clean energy. Enhanced domestic legitimacy:  Engagement in international initiatives that align with national values (e.g., anti-apartheid history, climate leadership) can bolster domestic support for governments. Access to multilateral positions: Active participation in global governance enhances prospects for securing leadership roles in international organisations - creating pathways for influence and norm-setting.   This logic of “enlightened self-interest” is crucial to building domestic support for international engagement, particularly in societies where immediate socio-economic challenges dominate the political agenda. 4.6 Constraints and limitations   Kostakos acknowledged the many obstacles middle powers face:   Resource scarcity:  Many middle powers lack the military, financial or institutional capacity to drive global change. This is especially true for smaller economies or states with domestic crises. External pressure:  Major powers may attempt to curtail the international ambitions of middle powers through political threats or economic penalties. Examples abound in diplomatic history where small initiatives were quashed under pressure. Institutional inertia:  Multilateral institutions often favour continuity over change, with secretariats and leadership structures closely aligned with dominant powers. Middle powers must work harder to gain traction. Domestic ambivalence:  Citizens may question the relevance of international engagement when facing unemployment, poverty or inequality at home. Leaders must communicate the long-term value of global leadership clearly and persuasively. Coalition management:  Middle power coalitions can be difficult to sustain due to differing priorities, ideological diversity and regional rivalries. Building and maintaining trust across such a diverse group is a persistent challenge.   Nonetheless, Kostakos argued that strategic collaboration, targeted initiatives and creative diplomacy can overcome many of these limitations. 4.7 Strategic proposals for institutionalising middle power influence   To maximise their impact, Kostakos proposed the institutionalisation of middle power roles through several creative avenues:   Security Council reform:  Instead of expanding permanent membership, he proposes semi-permanent, elected positions for middle powers. These would provide continuity without replicating the dysfunctional veto system. Global Resilience Council:  A new body, outside traditional power hierarchies, that could coordinate global responses to transnational threats - climate change, pandemics, cybercrime - with middle powers at its core. Informal networks and precedents: Drawing on past examples like the “The Six Nation Peace Initiative,” Kostakos called for nimble, cross-regional groupings that can develop and promote common positions on issues like disarmament, development and peacebuilding.   These proposals blend pragmatism with vision, emphasising reform over revolution and building on existing diplomatic capital. 4.8 Conclusion: Strategic necessity and moral imperative   Dr Kostakos presented a compelling vision of middle powers as the pivotal actors in the 21st-century global order. They possess the balance of credibility, capacity and principle needed to navigate an increasingly fragmented international landscape. While not free from limitations, their unique position allows them to mediate, innovate and lead where others cannot or will not.   In a world where multilateralism is increasingly endangered, the proactive engagement of middle powers is not merely desirable, it is essential. Their ability to create inclusive coalitions, propose realistic reforms and lead by example offers a pathway toward a more just, equitable and sustainable global order.   If the international community is to avoid sliding into prolonged disorder or bipolar competition, the centre must hold. And at the centre are the middle powers - steady, principled and indispensable. 5 REIMAGINING PEACE, POWER, AND JUSTICE IN GLOBAL POLITICS - A CRITICAL REFLECTION ON MULTILATERALISM, THE GLOBAL SOUTH, AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER Ms Febe Potgieter- Gqubule, Head of Policy, African National Congress and former South African diplomat and senior official at the African Union In a world shaped by shifting geopolitical dynamics, overlapping crises and rising disillusionment with Western-dominated systems of governance, the time has come to reassess the meanings of peace, power and justice. Drawing exclusively from the insights presented by Ms Potgieter-Gqubule, this report explores the evolving role of middle powers, the struggles and aspirations of the Global South and the imperative of inclusive multilateralism in crafting a more equitable international order. The reflection is grounded in historical developments, regional dynamics in Africa and global structural trends, offering a layered understanding of how transformation can be imagined and enacted in the 21st century. 5.1 The crisis of the Liberal Order and the role of Middle Powers   The liberal international order, long championed by the West as the foundation of global peace and cooperation, is undergoing a legitimacy crisis. This moment should not be seen as an anomaly but as part of a broader historical pattern in which international orders are reshaped through crises. Middle powers - states that are not hegemonic but hold significant regional or strategic influence - emerge in this landscape as critical agents of balance, reform and advocacy.   Historically, middle powers have played vital roles in fostering cooperation and navigating bipolar or unipolar tensions. From the establishment of the United Nations after World War II to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, these states have asserted alternative paths that resist binary choices between great powers. The Bandung Conference of 1955 and the creation of the G77 in 1964 were emblematic of efforts by middle and developing powers to reclaim agency and promote developmental and peace-oriented agendas outside the rigid Cold War framework.   Today, the identity and influence of middle powers are more heterogeneous. Countries such as South Africa, Brazil, India, Türkiye and Singapore represent different economic sizes, political systems and geographic roles, yet they share a commitment to multilateralism, regional leadership and a broader understanding of development and justice. Their influence is not always rooted in hard power but often in moral authority, regional legitimacy, or economic strategy. South Africa, for instance, derives part of its middle power identity from its role in the African continent, its moral standing post-apartheid and its active participation in multilateral forums such as BRICS, the African Union (AU) and the G20.   5.2 Crises as opportunities: Reshaping the global system   Potgieter underscored that crises - be they global health emergencies, conflicts, or economic disruptions - are not merely destructive; they are also generative. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the vulnerabilities of global systems and the shortcomings of Western-led responses. Countries in the Global South, often left behind in vaccine access and economic recovery, began to question the fairness of global governance structures. Yet, these same crises sparked new forms of cooperation. Africa’s collective response through the Africa CDC, the AU’s health diplomacy and joint procurement strategies revealed the continent’s potential for self-determination.   These responses show that crises can open political and strategic space for innovation and transformation. They expose the fragility of dominant systems while simultaneously demonstrating the value of coordinated regional and multilateral action. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa (2013–2016) was another such moment. While Western nations divided responsibilities along former colonial lines, the AU launched ASEOWA, mobilising African health workers and institutions to deliver frontline assistance. This pan-African initiative not only saved lives but also strengthened regional infrastructure and laid the foundation for the Africa CDC.   Crucially, these actions highlight a broader lesson: effective responses to global crises are not the monopoly of the powerful. Middle powers and regional institutions - when acting in solidarity and with strategic vision - can forge new pathways for peace, development and justice.   5.3 Multilateralism under contestation and reconstruction   A central concern raised by Potgieter is the fate of multilateralism in a fractured global order. The post-war multilateral institutions - the United Nations, IMF, World Bank, WTO - have been instrumental in shaping norms and rules. However, they have also been complicit in reproducing inequalities. Their governance structures are often skewed in favour of the Global North, with decision-making power concentrated in the hands of a few.   Middle powers have responded by pushing for institutional reform and alternative platforms. South Africa, India, Brazil and others have used their participation in BRICS, the G20 and the Non-Aligned Movement to advocate for a fairer global economic architecture. Reform of the United Nations Security Council, democratisation of the World Bank and IMF voting shares,and restructuring global trade rules are among the long-standing demands.   Potgieter emphasised that middle powers tend to be strong proponents of multilateralism, not only because it offers a counterweight to great power domination, but also because it aligns with their vision of collective problem-solving. For countries that cannot unilaterally impose their will, multilateralism becomes both a shield and a vehicle for change. Their advocacy is thus rooted in both pragmatism and principle.   Additionally, the role of middle powers in shaping norms around peace, security and development is deeply tied to their commitment to inclusive governance. South Africa’s role in G20, its focus on integrating the African agenda into global discourse and its calls for solidarity and justice are part of this broader effort. This is not merely about representation, it is about reorienting the normative foundations of global cooperation. 5.4 African perspectives on peace, governance,and development   A significant portion of the presentation reflected on Africa’s role in the world, both as a site of marginalisation and as a source of innovative thinking and leadership. Despite its historical exclusion from the commanding heights of global governance, Africa possesses immense strategic assets: abundant natural and mineral resources, a youthful population, expanding urban centres and growing regional institutions.   Yet, the continent continues to face challenges related to governance, conflict and socio-economic development. Potgieter was candid about the need for good governance, transparency and citizen empowerment. She highlighted the African Peer Review Mechanism as a promising tool for promoting accountability. Similarly, she acknowledged the growing participation of young people and women in political leadership as positive trends that must be nurtured.   Peace and development are framed not as sequential but as mutually reinforcing. The African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the NEPAD initiative stress that without investing in human development and economic transformation, peace will remain fragile. This integrated approach rejects the narrow “peace first, development later” logic that has often dominated international peacebuilding frameworks.   The AU’s African Standby Force, the continental peace architecture and the emphasis on “silencing the guns” are examples of efforts to localise conflict resolution and security governance. They demonstrate a move away from dependence on external actors and a growing belief in African solutions to African problems. 5.5 Regional integration and economic sovereignty   The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a landmark initiative aiming to accelerate intra-African trade, industrialisation and regional integration. Potgieter pointed to its significance not only in economic terms but as a political project of continental unity. Its success depends on regional infrastructure, harmonised regulations and the political will to overcome nationalistic barriers.   Encouragingly, African countries have exceeded infrastructure investment targets under the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), with substantial contributions coming from within the continent. This counters the narrative of dependency and illustrates Africa’s capacity for self-financed development.   Potgieter invoked the words of Desmond Tutu, who criticised African leaders’ dependency on foreign aid for basic infrastructure. Her message is clear: Africa must recognise its achievements, build on its successes and claim its agency in defining its developmental path. 5.6 Education, science and Pan-African solidarity   Human development, especially education and scientific collaboration, is emphasised as a foundation for long-term transformation. The Pan-African University, a flagship initiative of the AU, exemplifies efforts to create a network of postgraduate centres across the continent that nurture scientific excellence, build transnational academic networks and foster a sense of pan-African identity.   This investment in education has concrete political and social implications. It promotes mobility, dialogue and mutual understanding among African scholars and professionals, laying the groundwork for future cooperation. The example of RUFORUM (Regional Universities Forum for Capacity Building in Agriculture), which grew from a handful of universities to over 130 members, shows how small initiatives can scale up into transformative networks when driven by clear purpose and vision. 5.7 Global partnerships and African agency   Africa’s engagement with external partners, whether in the US, Europe, China, or the Middle East, must be guided by a clear and strategic understanding of its own interests. Potgieter stressed that Africa must define what it wants from these relationships, moving away from passive recipient roles to assertive partnership-building.   The African Union Commission is tasked with coordinating these engagements and ensuring that continental priorities are reflected. Africa's diaspora, referred to as the continent's “sixth region,” is identified as an underutilised resource for investment, knowledge exchange and narrative reshaping.   Institutional capacity is key to all these efforts. The African Union, the African Development Bank and the Africa CDC are examples of institutions that have demonstrated their value in times of crisis. While leadership challenges have sometimes hindered their effectiveness, there is a clear recognition that strengthening these institutions is vital for Africa’s voice on the global stage. 5.8 Narrative, hope and political imagination   Perhaps one of the most profound interventions in the text is the discussion on narrative. Africa, Potgieter argued, must reclaim its story - not as one of perpetual crisis, but as one of resilience, creativity and potential. She recounted how an outsider described Africa as a bird surrounded by poisonous snakes, so paralysed by fear that it forgets it can fly. This metaphor speaks to the psychological and political work of decolonisation: remembering one's agency, asserting one's worth and imagining futures beyond inherited constraints.   Reclaiming narrative is about more than positive messaging - it is about shifting power. The way Africa is perceived affects how it is treated, funded, engaged with and respected. It influences diplomatic priorities, investment patterns, and global solidarity. Telling a fuller story - one that includes successes, innovations and leadership - helps dismantle Afro-pessimism and rebuild confidence in the continent’s future. 5.9 Coalitions of the willing and Lessons from experience   Change often begins with a few. Potgieter shared the story of RUFORUM as an example of how small groups of actors can catalyse continental change. The lesson here is that waiting for consensus from all 55 African countries can stall progress. Instead, coalitions of the willing, that is those ready to act, can pilot innovations that others later adopt.   This approach applies to peacebuilding, industrialisation, education and governance reforms. Africa must embrace experimentation, learn from both failures and successes and remain agile in the face of complexity. 5.10 Conclusion: Toward a better Africa and a better world   Potgieter concluded her reflection with two powerful historical and contemporary examples. The liberation of African countries from colonialism was a long, difficult process, but it was ultimately successful because of collective commitment and perseverance. Similarly, Africa’s response to the Ebola crisis demonstrated the power of regional solidarity, institutional coordination and indigenous leadership.   The message is clear: transformation is possible. But it requires courage, imagination, solidarity and sustained effort. Middle powers, the Global South and African actors are not just passive subjects of global systems - they are co-creators of future orders.   In times of uncertainty and flux, there is an opportunity to redefine the rules of the game. The principles of justice, equality, diversity and mutual respect must be the foundation. And Africa, with its youth, institutions and ideas, is not on the margins of that future - it is at its centre.     6 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INEQUALITY AND RIGHTS Professor Sakiko Fukudu-Parr, Studley Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School, New York This report is based on the insights shared by Professor Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, an eminent development economist and former Director of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Reports (HDRs). Through her speech, Fukuda-Parr offered a compelling reflection on the transformation of development thought over the past several decades, particularly through the lens of human rights, inequality and the political economy of global governance. Her insights are shaped by decades of professional experience and personal commitment to justice-oriented development policy. 6.1 Evolution of development thinking   The trajectory of development thinking, according to Fukuda-Parr, can be divided into distinct intellectual and policy paradigms. The dominant paradigm of the post-World War II period was heavily growth-centric, prioritising industrialisation and GDP growth as the primary indicators of national progress. This model, grounded in modernisation theory, viewed development as a linear transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ societies, largely measured in economic terms.   However, by the late 1980s, this growth-focused approach faced growing criticism. Rising income inequality, persistent poverty, and environmental degradation exposed the shortcomings of equating growth with prgress. The turning point came with the 1990 launch of the first Human Development Report, which Fukuda-Parr was intimately involved in producing. The HDR introduced a paradigm shift by asserting that “people are the real wealth of nations.” This marked the emergence of a new approach that emphasised the expansion of people’s capabilities and freedoms.   6.2 The human development approach   The human development approach reframed the goals of development around people’s well-being, rather than material wealth alone. Fukuda-Parr explained how this approach drew heavily from the work of Amartya Sen, who argued that development should be about increasing people’s freedoms to lead the kinds of lives they value. These freedoms span multiple domains, such as health, education, political participation and cultural inclusion.   A major innovation was the development of new indicators, particularly the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI combines measures of life expectancy, education and income to provide a composite picture of well-being. Although imperfect, it provided a more multidimensional view of development and challenged the primacy of GDP as the sole metric of success.   Over time, additional indices were introduced to better capture disparities, such as the Gender Development Index (GDI), the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). These tools helped reveal inequalities and deprivations that GDP alone could not. Fukuda-Parr underscored that these indices are not just technical instruments but also normative statements about what societies should value. 6.3 Inequality: A structural and normative challenge   Fukuda-Parr identified inequality as a central and persistent challenge to human development. While many countries have made strides in reducing poverty, the gap between the richest and poorest - both within and across countries - has widened dramatically. This inequality is not incidental but systemic, driven by economic structures, policy choices and global institutions that favour the wealthy and powerful.   She drew attention to how inequality is not merely about income, but about access to power, voice, resources and opportunities. Inequality undermines the democratic process, exacerbates social tensions and limits the potential for inclusive development. Importantly, she critiqued mainstream economic theories for treating inequality as a natural or necessary byproduct of growth, rather than as a problem to be solved.   She also critiqued the idea that the market is the best mechanism for allocating resources. Markets can be efficient, but they are not inherently fair. When left unchecked, they produce and reproduce inequalities. Fukuda-Parr called for development policy to explicitly tackle inequality through redistributive measures, affirmative action and social protection. 6.4 A Rights-based approach to development   A significant part of Fukuda-Parr’s address focused on the rights-based approach to development. She asserts that framing development in terms of human rights provides both a moral and legal foundation for policy. Rights are not gifts from the state but entitlements that all individuals possess by virtue of their humanity.   This framework shifts the focus from charity to justice and from needs to obligations. Governments are duty-bearers, legally obligated to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. Citizens are rights-holders, entitled to claim their rights. This approach fosters accountability, participation and equality.   The Human Development Reports gradually adopted this perspective, beginning with the 2000 report, which emphasised human rights and development. Fukuda-Parr notes that this was a controversial move at the time, as some governments and institutions resisted the integration of rights into development. Nonetheless, it marked a crucial evolution in thinking, highlighting that freedom from want and freedom from fear are integral to development. 6.5 Ethics and measurement in development policy   Fukuda-Parr is particularly attentive to the ethical dimensions of development. She emphasised that development is not a neutral or purely technical endeavour. It involves value judgments about what matters, who matters and how benefits and burdens are distributed.   Measurement tools like the HDI are useful, but they can also mask underlying injustices. For example, an increase in average income may conceal deepening inequalities. She warned against technocratic reductionism - the tendency to focus on what is easily measurable rather than what is important. She calls for an “ethical audit” of development policies to assess their alignment with values of dignity, justice and equity.   Furthermore, she critiqued the global dominance of Western-centric knowledge systems that often marginalise alternative epistemologies. Development discourse, she argued, needs to be decolonised to reflect diverse experiences, particularly those from the Global South. This includes acknowledging the contributions of non-Western thinkers, valuing indigenous knowledge and resisting the imposition of universal solutions. 6.6 The Political economy of intellectual property and innovation   One of the most critical topics Fukuda-Parr addressed was the political economy of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and technological innovation. She discussed the paradox that, although developing countries fought for flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement (such as compulsory licensing), they seldom utilise them.   Fukuda-Parr highlighted how intellectual property laws, originally designed to incentivise innovation, have evolved into tools of monopoly capitalism. Wealthy nations and corporations use patents to consolidate control over knowledge and restrict access, particularly in essential sectors like health and agriculture. During the COVID-19 pandemic, vaccine inequities starkly illustrated how IPRs can obstruct equitable access.   She underscored that many developing countries have legal provisions - enshrined in the TRIPS agreement - that allow them to circumvent patents during emergencies. However, fear of political retaliation, lack of legal infrastructure and ideological adherence to strong IP protection prevent their use. She argued for a reassessment of IPR policies and calls on national governments to prioritise public health and development over corporate profit.   6.7 Institutional and structural obstacles   Fukuda-Parr outlined several institutional barriers that hinder effective use of development tools and flexibilities. She identified three interrelated obstacles: vested interests, ideological bias and institutional silos.   Powerful actors - both domestic elites and international corporations - often resist reforms that threaten their economic interests. Ideologically, the belief in market solutions and private property as the ultimate good limits policy imagination. Institutions like the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and national IP offices operate in silos, disconnected from broader development goals.   Additionally, regional institutions in Africa, such as OAPI and ARIPO, historically failed to integrate compulsory licensing or prioritise development objectives. Their frameworks were influenced more by legal formalism than developmental pragmatism. She called for these institutions to be reformed, democratised and reoriented toward public welfare.   6.8 Capacity, information and epistemic justice   Another critical point raised is the so-called “capacity gap.” Fukuda-Parr questioned whether the issue is truly a lack of capacity or rather a lack of information and appropriate knowledge. She identified a deep-seated epistemic injustice in how development knowledge is produced, validated and disseminated.   Much of the prevailing knowledge on IP and innovation is based on Euro-American experiences, which are not always relevant for African countries or other parts of the Global South. She emphasised the importance of building local knowledge systems that reflect local realities and needs. She also advocates for the democratisation of development education and policy spaces to include more diverse voices. 6.9 Civil Society and participatory approaches   Fukuda-Parr strongly supports participatory development and the role of civil society. She recognises that real change is often driven from below, by communities demanding rights, transparency and justice. Participatory development is not just a methodology but a principle - it respects people as active agents, not passive recipients.   She highlighted that civil society organisations were instrumental in challenging TRIPS and advocating for health rights during the HIV/AIDS and COVID-19 crises. Such efforts demonstrate the power of collective action and the importance of political agency in development. 6.10 Rethinking multilateralism and global governance   In her concluding reflections, Fukuda-Parr critiqued the current model of multilateralism as deeply unequal. While multilateral institutions provide important platforms, they often reproduce global power hierarchies. High-income countries dominate agenda-setting, resource allocation and rule-making, marginalising the voices of the Global South.   She called for a more democratic and equitable multilateral order, one that supports national policy autonomy and development-oriented reform. This includes revisiting global trade rules, reforming institutions like the WTO and IMF, and creating spaces for Southern-led initiatives.   Multilateralism, she insisted, must be rooted in solidarity - not just cooperation among elites but genuine engagement with marginalised peoples and nations. National policies, too, must be aligned with international frameworks in a way that reflects local priorities and ensures justice. 6.11 Conclusion   Sakiko Fukuda-Parr’s address offered a profound and multifaceted analysis of the state of development thinking today. From the evolution of the human development approach to the critique of intellectual property regimes, from the ethics of measurement to the politics of global governance, her insights underscore a simple yet powerful truth: development must serve people, not markets.   Her reflections compel us to reimagine development as a deeply ethical, political and participatory process. It must be grounded in justice, guided by rights and informed by diverse knowledge systems. Addressing inequality, resisting neo-colonial structures and embracing alternative paradigms are essential steps toward a more equitable global order.   In an era marked by uncertainty, crisis and profound injustice, Fukuda-Parr’s vision is both a critique and a call to action. It reminds policymakers, practitioners, scholars and citizens alike that human dignity, freedom and solidarity must be at the heart of any meaningful development agenda.      7 DISCUSSION: INSIGHTS FROM THE EXPERT DIALOGUE   This comprehensive report synthesises key reflections and perspectives from the high-level multi-stakeholder dialogue on the evolving role of middle powers in global politics. Drawing extensively from African perspectives, the discussion reframes traditional assumptions about middle power diplomacy and highlights the urgent need for strategic agency, cohesive continental voice and bold institutional innovation.    7.1 Reframing the Middle Power concept: Identity versus agency   Conventional definitions of middle powers, which rest heavily on tangible indicators such as economic output, population, or military strength, have often proved inadequate in capturing the diverse strategic behaviours of these states. This dialogue urged a shift from positional metrics to behavioural frameworks - understanding middle powers by what they do rather than what they are.   Participants emphasised that middle powers exhibit dynamic agency: they actively shape international norms, mediate disputes, form strategic coalitions and promote multilateralism. This reconceptualization rejects a passive, derivative view of middle powers as simply “followers” of great powers and instead recognises them as norm entrepreneurs, agenda-setters and system reformers.   For Africa, this rethinking is not just  -  is political and developmental. It means moving beyond the reactive posture that often characterises engagements with major powers like the United States, and toward a more assertive, coherent and principled diplomacy that reflects African priorities.   7.2 Middle Powers as builders of multilateralism and strategic coalitions   Middle powers have historically found strength through coalition-building and issue-based alliances. The dialogue highlighted how this continues to be a primary mechanism through which such states amplify their influence. Coalitions like MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, Australia) and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) serve not only as coordination platforms but as laboratories of policy innovation and norm diffusion.   For Africa, regionalism and pan-African initiatives such as the African Union (AU) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are central to projecting middle power influence. However, the fragmentation within African diplomatic stances and the inconsistent alignment of national, regional and continental interests weaken these platforms.   The discussion underscored the necessity for Africa to speak with one voice on key global issues. Unity, it was argued, is not about uniformity, but coherence - agreeing on fundamental principles of sovereignty, self-determination and equitable global governance. Only then can Africa wield moral and strategic authority in shaping international discourse.   7.3 Africa–US relations: A case study in asymmetric engagement   The dialogue offered a candid assessment of Africa’s strategic relationship with the United States, framed largely as a partnership of non-equals. While diplomatic language often invokes mutual respect, real-world practice is marred by dominance, unilateralism and a divide-and-rule approach from Washington.   One illustrative example is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which, while providing some market access to African exports, has disproportionately benefited a handful of countries, with South Africa receiving the bulk of trade advantages. Even so, its share remains marginal on the global trade scale. Participants emphasised that Africa must recalibrate trade frameworks to better align with domestic industrialisation and development strategies.   Criticism was also directed at how US foreign policy adapts to changing administrations - oscillating between engagement and neglect, often dictated by ideological swings, such as those seen under Trump’s “America First” doctrine. These shifts tend to undermine long-term policy consistency and multilateral cooperation.   Nonetheless, it was acknowledged that within certain institutional arrangements, relations between Africa and the US remain characterised by respect for democratic principles and shared objectives in areas such as health, education and peacekeeping. This  duality - coexistence of dominance and cooperation - requires African diplomats to engage with finesse, as one speaker put it, navigating these contradictions without compromising national and continental integrity.   7.4 Structural constraints and strategic gaps in Africa   While the discussion celebrated the continent’s vast potential, it was also unflinching in its critique of internal challenges. Several enduring constraints undermine Africa’s ability to exercise middle power diplomacy effectively:   Underdeveloped intra-African trade, which limits regional economic integration. Corruption and governance weaknesses, which erode public trust and state legitimacy. Lack of strategic economic independence, leaving African states vulnerable to debt cycles and conditional aid. Incoherent foreign policy coordination, which often leads to contradictory stances on the global stage.   The speakers also flagged Afro-pessimism - a persistent narrative that views Africa through a lens of dependency and dysfunction - as a psychological and political barrier to agency. Challenging this narrative requires deliberate intellectual, cultural and policy reorientation, spearheaded by Africans themselves. 7.5 Youth, education and technological transformation   Another key focus of the discussion was the future of African agency, particularly as it relates to intergenerational renewal, education and technology. The youth expressed concern about the lack of opportunities for meaningful participation and succession in leadership. Their call was simple yet urgent: Create space for us. Equip us. Trust us.   The shift in the global economy, driven by digitalisation and automation, demands a radical overhaul of Africa’s education systems. A mismatch between qualifications and market needs - especially the surplus of humanities graduates and the shortage of skilled artisans - has created a paradox of educated unemployment.   The example of Singapore’s vocational education reforms was cited as a possible model, where national strategies align educational curricula with the future economy. In Africa, this will require not only investment in TVET colleges and STEM education, but also a cultural shift that recognises the dignity and value of technical skills.   If middle powers are to shape the global technological order, they must also invest in data sovereignty, digital governance and artificial intelligence policy. Africa must not be a passive consumer of global tech trends - it must become a regulator, innovator and norm-setter in its own right. 7.6 Towards Implementation: From dialogue to action   Perhaps the most important theme emerging from the dialogue was the implementation gap. Africa, as noted, is rich in ideas but poor in follow-through. The failure to implement resolutions, policies and frameworks has become a chronic impediment to progress. To remedy this, several recommendations were made Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, the Deputy Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute:   Develop a roadmap for implementing the outcomes of such dialogues, with clearly assigned responsibilities and timelines. Engage AU institutions, regional economic communities (RECs) and national governments in translating insights into policy. Mobilise civil society, academia and diaspora communities to advocate for accountability and inclusion. Leverage strategic moments, such as AU Summits, to present united positions and influence continental agendas. Invest in leadership development, with a focus on ethics, vision and pan-African solidarity.   In this regard, the role of organisations like the Inclusive Society Institute and collaborative platforms such as the Africa Think-tank Dialogue (ATD) are seen as pivotal. These bodies must not only convene but consolidate knowledge, sustain momentum and embed implementation mechanisms. 7.7 Conclusion: Middle Powers as architects of a multipolar future   Middle powers, particularly from the Global South, are indispensable to the vision of a fairer, more balanced international order. In the African context, they represent a bridge between the continent’s grassroots aspirations and the corridors of global power.   However, this role will not be inherited - it must be claimed through strategic clarity, institutional coherence and collective courage. Africa’s future as a middle power actor depends on its ability to mobilise internal strengths, confront its weaknesses honestly and assert its place in the evolving multipolar world.   The dialogue ended with a call not just to remember the insights shared, but to act on them decisively. As one participant noted, “Let us not allow this report to gather dust on a shelf. Let it walk. Let it speak. Let it lead.” ANNEXURE: PROGRAMME     - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) continues to advance its constitutional education initiative across the Gauteng and North West provinces through its flagship programme, Taking the Constitution to the People: Know Your Rights and Responsibilities . This outreach initiative is designed to educate Grade 11 and 12 learners, as well as students in tertiary institutions, about the significance of the South African Constitution and the role it plays in shaping democratic citizenship. As part of this campaign, a workshop was conducted on 27 May 2025 at Langeni City College in Brits, facilitated by Patrick Motsepe, ISI’s Schools Project Coordinator. A total of 34 Grade 12 learners participated in the session, which provided them with a comprehensive overview of the historical context, formulation, and structure of the Constitution. The workshop also emphasized the practical implications of constitutional rights and responsibilities in the daily lives of South African citizens. The initiative aims to empower young people - particularly those of voting age - with the knowledge necessary to participate meaningfully in democratic processes and uphold the principles enshrined in the Constitution. Further workshops are scheduled to take place throughout educational institutions in Gauteng and North West, as the Institute strengthens its commitment to fostering constitutional literacy and civic responsibility among South Africa’s youth.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is intensifying its civic education efforts across the Gauteng and North West provinces through its initiative, “Taking the Constitution to the People: Know Your Rights and Responsibilities.”  This outreach programme, aimed primarily at Grade 11 and 12 learners in schools and tertiary institutions, is designed to deepen young South Africans’ understanding of constitutional democracy and active citizenship. On 29 May 2025, Patrick Motsepe, ISI Schools Project Coordinator, facilitated one such workshop at Rock of Springs College in Brits. The session was attended by 30 Grade 12 learners, many of whom are approaching or have reached voting age. The workshop provided a comprehensive overview of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, including its historical development, structure, and significance in everyday life. Special emphasis was placed on the rights and responsibilities of citizens under the Constitution, and how these underpin a democratic and socially cohesive society. The session was designed to be highly interactive. Learners were encouraged to engage with the material through open dialogue, asking questions and responding to real-life scenarios presented by the facilitator. This participatory format helped to reinforce key concepts and promote critical thinking. At the conclusion of the workshop, participants completed a survey to assess their understanding of the content, with particular focus on constitutional principles, democratic governance, and social cohesion. This initiative forms part of the ISI’s broader mandate to foster informed, responsible citizenship. Additional workshops are scheduled to be rolled out in various educational institutions across Gauteng and North West in the coming months.

As part of its commitment to promoting democratic values and active citizenship, the Inclusive Society Institute continues to deliver on its initiative of “Taking the Constitution to the People.”  Through a series of targeted educational workshops, the Institute is actively working to foster a culture of constitutional literacy, civic responsibility, and social cohesion among young South Africans. The initiative has gained considerable momentum in both the Gauteng and North West provinces, where the Institute has been engaging directly with learners in secondary schools and students at tertiary institutions. These engagements are tailored to promote a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, particularly among youth who are approaching or have reached voting age. Central to this initiative is Patrick Motsepe, the Provincial Schools Project Coordinator for the Inclusive Society Institute. With diligence and a deep sense of purpose, Motsepe has been instrumental in coordinating and delivering these sessions to ensure they are impactful, accessible, and aligned with educational objectives. On Tuesday, 27 May, the Institute conducted a workshop at Excellers SA College for a cohort of Grade 12 learners. The session provided students with an interactive and insightful exploration of South Africa’s foundational legal framework. Designed with the developmental needs of young people in mind, the workshop covered key constitutional principles, the Bill of Rights, democratic governance, and the responsibilities of citizens in a constitutional democracy. Importantly, the content of these workshops is directly aligned with the Life Orientation and History syllabi prescribed by the national curriculum. These subjects already address themes of values, human rights, and social cohesion - making the workshop a powerful complementary tool in reinforcing classroom learning through a practical, real-world lens. By bridging academic content with lived civic realities, the workshops aim to not only educate but also inspire a generation of young people to take ownership of their role in a democratic society. The reception from learners and educators has been overwhelmingly positive, with many participants noting the relevance and timeliness of the sessions, especially in a year where the country continues to reflect on three decades of constitutional democracy. Looking ahead, the Inclusive Society Institute plans to expand the reach of this programme, with more workshops scheduled at various educational institutions across both provinces in the coming months. This expansion reflects the Institute’s strategic objective of embedding constitutional values at the grassroots level, particularly among youth who are key to sustaining and advancing South Africa’s democratic project. Through initiatives such as these, the Inclusive Society Institute reaffirms its role as a catalyst for meaningful dialogue, civic empowerment, and inclusive nation-building — ensuring that the Constitution remains not just a document, but a living, guiding force in the lives of all South Africans.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, participated in the International Tax Reform Summit which was held in Johannesburg on 27 May 2025. The summit was organised by the Alternative Information and Development Centre, the Institute for Economic Justice, Oxfam, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation.   The programme included four sessions:   Session 1: International Tax Reform: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa in the context of the G20 Session 2: Towards a Shared Progressive Tax Agenda for Africa at the UN Session 3 : Taxing the Super-Rich to Finance SDGs, Climate Action, and Addressing Inequality Session 4 : Joint Advocacy strategy discussion with comms teams ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Background as provided by the Summit organisers   There are fundamental shifts in the international political economy. As the world grapples with climate change, poverty, and inequality, there is an opportunity to tackle these challenges by reforming the international tax system.   Negotiations for a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax and Cooperation (UN Tax Convention) are ongoing and at the same time, South Africa has taken up the G20 presidency in 2025 - a first for an African country, which provides a great opportunity for South Africa to advance developing countries' proposals in international tax negotiations.   The SARS commissioner highlighted that the country has a tax gap of R700 - R800 billion, of which R300 - R560 billion is due to tax evasion, aggressive tax planning, and the rest is in uncollected debt and outstanding tax returns and debt currently under dispute. This is not limited to South Africa. It is estimated that in 2024, global revenue losses due to cross-border abuse amounted to $492 billion, of which $347.6 billion was due to corporate tax abuse by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), and $144.8 billion was due to undeclared assets by wealthy individuals. There are increasing calls to capacitate the South African Revenue Services (SARS) to address tax abuse and illicit financial flows (IFFs) and introduce a wealth tax.   Africa faces a disproportionate burden of these harmful tax practices. For instance, from 1980 to 2018, Africa lost $1.3 trillion due to illicit financial flows and $88.6 billion annually due to capital flight. Therefore, SA’s G20 presidency should ensure that the international tax system effectively tackles IFFs and capital flight, and taxes the wealthy to advance Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The G20 under the Brazilian presidency championed an initiative for taxing high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs) globally with a minimum tax of 2% of their wealth, which would enhance progressivity in tax systems across the world while mobilizing between $200–$390 billion annually. Brazil managed to include language on taxing HNWIs both in the Ministerial G20 Declaration on International Taxation and on the G20 Head of States Declaration , marking a historic milestone for the group of 20 that addressed this issue for the first time. South Africa   has a unique opportunity to provide full political support to this agenda during its presidency, playing a coordinating role by outlining a strategy to ensure the continuity of Brazil’s agenda.   The SA G20 Presidency provides an opportunity for South African key stakeholders to develop a coherent response advocating for the G20 - SA Presidency to make progress from the steps taken in Brazil. This is even more relevant considering the recent call from President Ramaphosa, alongside President Sanchez (Spain) and President Lula (Brazil), to protect and reinforce multilateralism, having the taxation of global wealth as a key component of this initiative.   Against this context, it is important for progressive civil society actors such as trade unions, civil society organisations, academic experts, parliamentarians, think tanks, and policymakers to discuss these developments and build a long-term strategy on international tax that takes into account domestic and international developments. Noting that SA is one of the high-ranking unequal societies in the world, it is important to reflect on the contemporary tax reforms and consider their gendered impacts.   The symposium will focus on international tax reform efforts such as the UN Tax Convention and the proposal to tax the super-rich led by Brazil’s G20 presidency.

A meeting of the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue organised by the Inclusive Society Institute Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members. This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during the meeting have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context   MAY 2025   Rapporteur: Daryl Sw anepoel CONTENTS   1 AFRICA THINK-TANK DIALOGUE 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2.1 US - Africa relations from an African perspective 2.2 US–Africa relations from a US perspective 2.3 Convergences and Divergences 2.4 Conclusion 3 OPENING SESSION 3.1 Welcoming remarks Prof Zweli Ndevu, Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa) 3.2 Setting the Scene - Navigating Africa’s Future: Multilateral Reform, Global Relations, and Development  Finance Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer, Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa) 3.3 Navigating Geopolitical Currents: South Africa–United States Relations During the 2025 G20 Presidency Dr Philani Mthembu, Executive Director, Institute for Global  Dialogue (South Africa) 3.4 Navigating Global Shifts: South Africa’s Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World Hon. Alvin Botes, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa) 4 SESSION 1: US AFRICA RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AFRICA 4.1 Beyond Rhetoric: Reimagining Africa - U.S. Relations in a Multipolar World Prof. Efem Ubi, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Nigeria) 4.2 United States–Africa Relations — Historical Legacy, Contemporary Challenges, and Future Perspectives Ms Aïcha Karafi, President, Tunisian Association of Local Governance (Tunisia) 4.3 The Importance of African Agency in US–Africa Relations Dr Melha Rout Biel, Executive Director, Institute for Strategic and Policy Studies (South Sudan) 4.4 Evolving US–West Africa Economic Relations - Implications for Côte d’Ivoire Prof Assi Kimou, Deputy Director, CIRES Economic Policy Analysis Unit (Cote d’Ivoire) 4.5 Pan-Africanism, African Diplomacy, and Development - A Critical Analysis Prof. Francis Matambalya, Chief Executive Officer, Kamanda Rajabu Diwani Centre (Tanzania) 4.6 Africa and the United States - Reimagining a Strategic and Equitable Partnership Amb Omar Mjenga, President and CEO, Centre for International Policy Africa (Tanzania) 4.7 Reimagining US–Africa Relations - Priorities, Challenges, and Strategic Pathways Dr Zine Barka, Independent Public Finance Analyst (Algeria) 4.8 US–South Africa Relations in the Era of Trumpism - A Critical Reflection Dr Sizo Nkala, Senior Researcher, Centre for Africa-China Studies, University of Johannesburg (South Africa) 4.9 US–Africa Relations in the Era of ‘America First’ - A Kenyan Perspective Brigadier (Rtd) Dr Robert Kabage, Executive Director, Mashariki Research and Policy Centre (Kenya) 5 SESSION 2: U.S. – AFRICA RELATIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES 5.1 Understanding African Fragility Through U.S. National Security Perspectives Dr Dylan Craig, Associate Professor, Department of Security Studies, U.S. National War College (United States of America) 5.2 U.S. - Africa Relations in a Time of Geopolitical Transition - Policy, Challenges, and the South African Case Ambassador Michelle Gavin, Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (United States of America) 5.3 The Changing US-Africa Policy Dynamic - Context, Challenges, and Opportunities Dr Anne Griffin, Independent US-Africa policy expert associated with the Centre for American Progress (United States of America) 5.4 Discussion 1 AFRICA THINK-TANK DIALOGUE   The Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD) is an informal collaboration of African think-tanks that have African socio-economic development, governance and a fairer, more inclusive, multilateral order at the heart of their work.   As such, the ATD discusses, amongst others:   Africa’s governance within the framework of the African Union Arica’s relationship with other regional structures such as the European Union, BRICS, the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the G20 Africa’s relationship with world powers such as the United States of America and China Reform of the United Nations and other multilateral organisations in order to reposition Africa's role in the global order How to improve sustainable development in Africa, including required adaptation resulting from Climate Change    Activities   The African Consultative Meeting is held annually in Cape Town, South Africa Participation in the conferences, seminars, workshops and webinars – both ATD organised and those organised by the participating organisations Participation in the programmes of the Global South Perspectives Network Research Advocacy Early warning mechanism on emerging issues for the continent Promote African reform for more inclusive governance and economic development Act as a catalyst for African reformation and unity     2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   The 2025 Africa Consultative Meeting (ACM), held under the auspices of the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD), convened a diverse range of African policy experts, academics, diplomats, and civil society actors to assess the evolving contours of US - Africa relations in a multipolar world.   Against the backdrop of shifting geopolitical alliances, intensifying global competition, and mounting demands for reform in multilateral governance, the meeting sought to interrogate both historical legacies and contemporary dynamics shaping engagement between the United States and African nations.   This report synthesises the insights and debates that emerged over the two-day event, offering a nuanced and multidimensional account of the challenges, opportunities, and strategic imperatives underpinning this complex relationship.   2.1 US - Africa relations from an African perspective   African scholars and policymakers presented a deeply reflective and, at times, critical account of the trajectory of US - Africa relations. A recurrent theme was the persistence of asymmetry in the partnership—where Africa is often treated as a recipient of aid and influence, rather than as a strategic actor with agency and voice. This imbalance, rooted in colonial legacies and exacerbated by Cold War geopolitics, continues to shape both the form and content of American engagement on the continent.   One of the key critiques raised was the framing of engagement through the lens of “relations” rather than “cooperation.” As Prof. Efem Ubi argued, “relations” imply a hierarchical connection with limited mutuality, while “cooperation” denotes equality and shared purpose. African actors expressed dissatisfaction with rhetorical commitments to democracy and development that are not matched by consistent action or genuine partnership.   Security engagement was another focal point of concern. African leaders noted that while US military aid and counterterrorism support may yield short-term stability, they often fail to address root causes such as poverty, youth unemployment, and poor governance. Moreover, US military presence on African soil - especially in the Sahel - led to governance vacuums and unintended civilian harm, raising questions about long-term effectiveness.   Finally, there was a strong emphasis on African agency. As Dr. Melha Rout Biel noted, African nations must set their own priorities, drive their own development strategies, and assert their voices in multilateral forums. Institutional mechanisms such as the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offer blueprints for such autonomy, but realising their potential requires external partners, including the US, to support - not supplant - Africa-led initiatives.    2.2 US–Africa relations from a US perspective   From the American perspective, Africa represents both a challenge and an opportunity. The continent’s demographic dynamism, natural resource wealth, and emerging consumer markets make it an area of strategic interest. However, US policy remains heavily influenced by security imperatives, geopolitical rivalries, and concerns about governance.   Recent years have seen a mix of engagement strategies. Under the Biden administration, there has been a renewed emphasis on multilateralism, democracy promotion, and climate finance. Yet, inconsistencies remain. For example, the absence of key US officials at G20 meetings hosted by South Africa was seen by many Africans as a sign of waning American commitment to multilateral dialogue.   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has been a cornerstone of US economic policy toward Africa, offering duty-free access to US markets. Yet its uneven implementation, selective eligibility criteria, and limited support for value-added exports have diminished its impact. Moreover, its potential termination looms as a key concern for countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa.   Investment and trade remain robust in certain sectors. US firms have a significant footprint in mining, manufacturing, and services in South Africa and Nigeria, among others. However, much of this investment is concentrated in resource extraction rather than industrial transformation or skills development. American stakeholders acknowledge that a shift is needed - from short-term interests to long-term partnerships that contribute to Africa’s structural transformation.   Soft power remains a key asset in the US approach. Programmes in education, health, and cultural exchange - along with historic anti-apartheid solidarity and ongoing collaboration among think tanks and civil society - offer a foundation of goodwill. The challenge is to translate these people-to-people ties into a more coherent and strategic policy framework.   2.3  Convergences and Divergences   Despite tensions and asymmetries, there are important areas of convergence between African and American interests. These include:   Climate resilience and just energy transitions : Both sides recognise the need for urgent climate action, and there is agreement on the importance of increased climate finance. African leaders, however, stress that such finance must come in the form of grants, not loans that exacerbate debt burdens. Peace and security:  There is mutual interest in stabilising regions such as the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. However, there is disagreement over the methods - Africans favour holistic, locally led peacebuilding, while the US often favours militarised responses. Democracy and governance:  Both parties support democratic governance, but African actors are wary of what they perceive as moralistic or inconsistent US advocacy - particularly when American strategic interests override democratic principles. Digital technology and innovation: Africa’s young population and growing tech sector represent opportunities for collaboration. Programmes that support digital infrastructure, STEM education, and startup ecosystems are potential win-win areas for partnership.    Conversely, several divergences persist:   Trade and economic policy:  Africa seeks more inclusive trade frameworks and diversification, whereas US trade policy remains fragmented and protectionist in certain sectors. Moreover, unilateral mechanisms like AGOA do not always align with continental initiatives such as AfCFTA. Multilateralism and global governance reform: African countries are calling for structural changes in the UN Security Council, IMF, and World Bank to better reflect contemporary power dynamics. The US has shown limited support for these reforms, preferring to retain its dominant position. Superpower rivalries:  African states seek to engage with a variety of global actors—China, Russia, India, the EU - based on national interests. US pressure to “choose sides” undermines Africa’s preference for non-alignment and strategic autonomy. Perceptions and narratives:  Misperceptions, media stereotypes, and historical grievances continue to complicate relations. For example, African nations resent being summoned to summits in Washington and treated as passive recipients of aid rather than equal partners.    2.4 Conclusion   The ACM’s discussions reveal that US-  Africa relations are at a pivotal juncture. The relationship is evolving, but still constrained by historical baggage, policy inconsistencies, and structural inequalities. For the partnership to be sustainable and mutually beneficial, several principles must guide future engagement:   Equity and respect:  The US must recognise Africa as a co-equal actor in international affairs. This requires a shift from paternalism to partnership, from aid dependency to co-investment. African agency:  African nations must lead in defining the terms of engagement. US policy must align with continental frameworks such as Agenda 2063 and AfCFTA, not circumvent them. Institutional reform:  The United States should support Africa’s call for reform of global institutions to ensure fair representation and voice. This includes backing permanent African seats on the UN Security Council. People-centred diplomacy:  Engagement must go beyond government-to-government interaction. Civil society, academia, youth, and the diaspora have critical roles to play in deepening ties and countering misinformation. Strategic vision:  Both sides must move beyond transactionalism and embrace a long-term vision grounded in shared prosperity, global justice, and sustainable development.   The ACM reaffirms that Africa’s time is now. With strategic foresight, united leadership, and supportive international partnerships, the continent can rise as a global force. The United States has a vital role to play - but only if it is willing to listen, learn, and evolve alongside a continent that is increasingly shaping its own future. 3 OPENING SESSION   3.1 Welcoming remarks Prof Zweli Ndevu, Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa)  The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) was honoured to once again host the Africa Think-tank Dialogue (ATD) in Cape Town. We drew together think-tanks from all corners of Africa to deliberate, strategize and develop policy positions that will promote sustainable development on the continent and a fairer and more just international order that aims to advance greater equitability in development cooperation.   The Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD) is an informal collaboration of African think-tanks that have African socio-economic development, governance and a fairer, more inclusive, multilateral order at the heart of their work.   As such, the ATD discusses, amongst others:   Africa’s governance within the framework of the African Union Arica’s relationship with other regional structures such as the European Union, BRICS, the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the G20 Africa’s relationship with world powers such as the United States of America and China Reform of the United Nations and other multilateral organisations in order to reposition Africa's role in the global order How to improve sustainable development in Africa, including required adaptation resulting from Climate Change   The ATD has in the past discussed weighty issues such a multilateral reform, the superpowers rivalry in relation to influence in Africa. At the last African Consultative Meeting, the ATD deliberated Africa-China relations.   The theme of this year’s Africa Consultative Meeting was US-Africa relations. It came at an opportune time when the US administration is challenging the status quo as it relates to international cooperation and the multilateralism. How Africa responds today will establish the international hierarchy and define the social structure for years to come. It is the responsibility of African think tanks, such as those that were gathered at the African Consultative Meeting, to contemplate a roadmap that will both advance the African cause, whilst retaining good bilateral and multilateral relationships. And then to promote these proposals within their individual spheres of influence.   That said, as Africans we should not fall into the trap of talking to and about ourselves. We also need to understand and talk to our international partners in order to retain and expand mutually beneficial cooperation across the globe. We were therefore blessed to have amongst us influential think-tanks and experts from both the United States and beyond.   We were struck by the frankness of the engagement and the genuine desire from all sides to find a way forward that serves both the American and African people and our shared future. Together we are all stronger, divided we are all weak. 3.2  Setting the Scene - Navigating Africa’s Future: Multilateral Reform, Global Relations, and Development  Finance Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer, Inclusive Society Institute (South Africa) Africa finds itself at a defining historical moment—straddling the challenges of sustainable development, climate resilience, fragile peace, and global inequality. As the world’s youngest continent with vast natural resources and strategic geopolitical importance, Africa must assert itself more forcefully in global decision-making forums. The continent’s leadership, intellectuals, and civil society are increasingly stepping up to make meaningful contributions towards transforming governance systems, both domestically and internationally. In this presentation, Daryl Swanepoel drew from the recent deliberations at the Africa Think-Tank Dialogue (ATD) to set the scene for the two-day dialogue, He examined three critical themes: Africa’s relations with global powers, the need for multilateral reform, and the pursuit of climate justice through equitable finance.   3.2.1  Evolving relations with global powers   Africa's relations with major global actors, particularly the United States, form a cornerstone of its broader foreign policy objectives. These relationships have historically been complex and uneven, shaped by a blend of development aid, security partnerships, and economic dependencies. The legacy of colonialism and Cold War-era interventions left behind a framework that often placed Africa in a reactive rather than proactive position.   Today, there is growing consensus that Africa must recalibrate its relations with global powers toward mutual respect and strategic partnership. Under President Joe Biden, the United States has taken steps toward a more constructive and collaborative approach, emphasising trade, investment, and shared growth. However, this trajectory is neither linear nor guaranteed. The prior Trump administration pursued a more transactional model, centred on short-term security interests and reduced foreign aid - policies that raised legitimate concerns about long-term development sustainability.   The return of such an administration, or similar ideological shifts elsewhere, could again marginalise African interests. Particularly worrying are recent changes to U.S. tariff policies that could jeopardise access to trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). As such, Africa must not only engage more proactively but also diversify its partnerships beyond traditional allies. Increasing engagement with emerging powers like China, India, and Brazil provides a broader diplomatic and economic base, but must be balanced carefully to avoid new forms of dependency.   In this regard, Africa’s approach to foreign policy must be guided by clarity of interest, regional cohesion, and strategic assertiveness. While external powers will continue to play an important role, the continent's internal unity and capacity to speak with one voice will determine its leverage in global negotiations.   3.2.2  The demand for multilateral reform   Africa’s exclusion from key decision-making bodies, particularly at the United Nations, has long been a source of frustration and activism. The UN Security Council, arguably the most powerful body in global governance, still reflects the post-World War II power structure. Despite comprising more than 50 countries and 1.4 billion people, Africa has no permanent representation on the Council. This lack of representation undermines Africa’s ability to influence international peace and security policies that directly impact its own stability.   African leaders, through platforms like the African Union (AU), are pushing for structural reforms to address this disparity. The AU’s Common African Position on UN Security Council reform is one such initiative aimed at achieving a fairer distribution of power within the international system. This demand is not merely symbolic; it is about institutional equity and the right to co-determine global norms.   Multilateral reform also extends to economic and financial institutions. Africa remains underrepresented in the decision-making bodies of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). These institutions have significant influence over African economies through loan terms, trade rules, and macroeconomic policy prescriptions. Reforming their governance structures is essential to ensure that African voices shape policies rather than merely respond to them.   Strengthening regional mechanisms is also critical to Africa’s multilateral strategy. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a landmark achievement, aiming to unify African markets, enhance competitiveness, and foster regional value chains. By leveraging such platforms, Africa can present a united front in global trade and investment negotiations, enabling the continent to drive rather than follow international economic trends.   3.2.3  Climate Finance and the Pursuit of Justice   Climate change presents one of the most existential threats to Africa’s future. The continent is experiencing rising temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, droughts, and flooding—disrupting agriculture, livelihoods, and ecosystems. Yet, Africa contributes less than 4% to global greenhouse gas emissions. This stark imbalance has become central to Africa’s advocacy for climate justice. At COP29 and other climate summits, wealthier nations pledged financial support to help developing countries transition to clean energy. While these commitments appear promising, their implementation reveals deeper issues. Much of the financial support is being offered in the form of concessional loans rather than grants. This shifts the financial burden to the very countries least responsible for the climate crisis.   As discussed in the ATD, there are two key concerns with this model. First, concessional loans add to Africa’s debt burden. Many African countries are already struggling to meet existing debt obligations. Asking them to borrow more – under the guise of climate support - essentially forces them to pay for the damage caused by others. This is not only unjust; it is economically unsustainable.   Second, most concessional loans are issued in strong currencies like the U.S. dollar or the euro. Because African countries must repay in these currencies, they face significant currency risk.   A compelling example cited was the effect of a €100 million loan to South Africa’s. Due to exchange rate fluctuations between 2015 and 2024, the total repayment costs increased by nearly 23%, even though the loan carried a low interest rate. These risks often go unacknowledged in global policy circles, yet they have devastating effects on African economies.   To address these challenges, the ATD should propose three policy recommendations:   Shift from loans to grants:  Wealthy nations must offer more grant-based finance to ensure climate transitions do not trap developing countries in unsustainable debt cycles. Currency risk management:  Financial instruments should be structured to allow African countries to borrow and repay in local currencies. Lenders, who are better equipped to manage currency volatility, should absorb this risk as a form of developmental aid. Reform Bretton Woods Institutions:  The IMF and World Bank must adopt more flexible, inclusive, and climate-sensitive lending policies. This includes reducing interest rates, extending grace periods, and factoring in vulnerability to climate risks.   In short, without just climate finance, Africa’s development aspirations will be continually undermined. The world cannot claim to fight climate change while perpetuating financial mechanisms that disadvantage the most vulnerable.   3.2.4  Governance, peace, and security: A continental challenge   Africa’s aspirations for development are also contingent on peace and political stability. While there have been notable improvements in certain regions, persistent conflicts, civil unrest, and extremist violence continue to undermine progress. From terrorist activities in the Sahel and Somalia, to conflicts in Ethiopia’s Tigray region and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), insecurity remains a widespread challenge.   Governance failures, corruption, and weak institutions exacerbate these security threats. Poor governance often erodes public trust, increases inequality, and provides fertile ground for extremist ideologies. At the same time, conflicts consume public resources that could otherwise be used for social services and infrastructure development.   Yet, African nations are increasingly recognising the importance of addressing these root causes. The AU and regional economic communities like ECOWAS are becoming more proactive in conflict mediation and peacekeeping. The AU’s Peace and Security Council has deployed missions to conflict zones and facilitated diplomatic negotiations. ECOWAS has shown leadership in addressing military coups and political crises in West Africa.   One of the more promising developments is the establishment of the African Standby Force, designed to enable rapid and coordinated responses to crises. It reflects a growing commitment to African-led solutions, grounded in the continent’s specific realities. However, implementation remains uneven due to resource and capacity constraints.   Funding remains a significant hurdle. Security operations are expensive, and most African states operate under tight budgets. Competing needs - such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure often take precedence, leaving security underfunded. This shortfall has made African nations reliant on foreign assistance, creating a paradox: the continent needs external support to manage security but also seeks sovereignty and ownership over these very issues.   The influence of external powers, while helpful in the short term, can also realign local priorities in ways that do not serve Africa’s long-term interests. This calls for a delicate balancing act - leveraging global support without surrendering agency.   3.2.5  Toward African agency and strategic sovereignty   The Africa Think-Tank Dialogue and other consultative forums are vital in nurturing a new generation of African thought leaders and policy-makers. These platforms serve as incubators for ideas, strategies, and early warning systems that feed directly into national and regional policy-making. They also create opportunities for cross-border knowledge exchange, allowing for more coherent and context-sensitive strategies.   The goal is to build resilient institutions that can withstand external shocks, adapt to changing global dynamics, and promote African-led solutions. From multilateral diplomacy to climate finance, and from peacekeeping to economic integration, the journey toward self-determination is multifaceted and ongoing.   3.2.6  Conclusion   Africa stands at a crucial juncture in its development trajectory. The choices made today will shape the continent’s ability to address climate change, secure peace, and assert its rightful place in global governance. This report has highlighted the urgent need for more equitable global partnerships, reforms in multilateral institutions, and just climate finance mechanisms.   Africa’s challenges are significant - but so are its opportunities. With bold leadership, strategic unity, and sustained investment in governance and institutions, Africa can redefine its future.   The international community must also ensure that it plays its part by acknowledging the historical responsibilities, honouring financial commitments, and reforming global systems to reflect the realities of the 21st century.   Only through mutual respect, fairness, and solidarity can we build a future that is not only greener and safer but also more just and inclusive for all. 3.3  Navigating Geopolitical Currents: South Africa–United States Relations During the 2025 G20 Presidency Dr Philani Mthembu, Executive Director, Institute for Global  Dialogue (South Africa)  As South Africa assumes the presidency of the G20 in 2025, it does so amid a complex and evolving geopolitical climate. Its leadership is under the global microscope, tasked not only with setting a compelling agenda for inclusive economic growth and sustainability, but also with navigating intricate diplomatic relationships, particularly with the United States. In this presentation Dr Philani Mthembu explored the evolving dynamics between South Africa and the US, focusing on the G20 context, historical diplomatic trends, current tensions, economic interdependence, and the role of non-state actors and misinformation.   3.3.1  South Africa’s G20 presidency and US participation   The year 2025 is a pivotal one for South Africa, as it undertakes the responsibilities of G20 presidency. Under the banner of solidarity, equality, and sustainability, South Africa aims to influence global discourse and policy. The G20 foreign ministers and finance meetings held in Johannesburg earlier this year endorsed these themes, reinforcing South Africa’s capacity to steer international attention.   However, the absence of US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio and US Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, from these early high-level G20 meetings signalled ambivalence. While officials from the US were present, the lack of high-level participation raised concerns about the US's commitment to multilateralism, particularly in the wake of a renewed "America First" approach and scepticism toward international commitments. This absence, while not a formal boycott, hinted at the de-prioritisation of the G20 within US foreign policy calculations.   South Africa must therefore calibrate its diplomatic strategies to manage both high-level government relations and second-track diplomacy involving think tanks, civil society, and business. These parallel channels of engagement are not only essential for bridging diplomatic gaps but also for ensuring continuity of cooperation amid shifting political leadership in Washington.   3.3.2  Managing a strategic but tense relationship   Despite the visible friction, South Africa has made strides in engaging key international stakeholders, notably receiving support from the European Union and China. The EU-South Africa Summit demonstrated strong solidarity and resulted in key agreements, further reinforcing South Africa’s leadership role within the Global South and the broader G20 context.   The bilateral relationship between South Africa and the US remains strategic but marked by inherent tensions. Over the past 30 years, despite common values such as democratic governance, their international policy postures have often diverged. South Africa’s reformist stance toward global governance structures contrasts with the US’s defence of the existing international order.   This divergence has historical roots.   In 1990, Nelson Mandela's remarks during a US town hall, in response to criticism of his engagements with leaders such as Fidel Castro and Yasser Arafat, underscored South Africa's independent foreign policy tradition. Mandela reminded audiences that during the apartheid struggle, the US government was largely absent, whereas other nations, now often labelled as adversaries by the US, offered concrete support. This ethos of foreign policy independence continues to shape South Africa's global outlook.   3.3.3  Historical and current points of friction   Past frictions between the US and South Africa have been sharpened during both Trump administrations. During the first Trump presidency, South Africa resisted pressures to align with the US in its geopolitical confrontation with China. This included continued engagement with Chinese firms such as Huawei, despite US objections. South Africa also opposed the US’s pro-Israel policies, including moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem and recognising Israeli settlements in Palestine.   In addition, US recognition of Morocco’s claim over Western Sahara contradicted South Africa’s longstanding support for Sahrawi self-determination. These policy differences were exacerbated by the imposition of tariffs on South African steel and aluminium—measures perceived by some as indirect responses to South Africa’s foreign policy stances.   Significantly, these tensions are not solely tied to one administration. Under President Biden, the US House of Representatives passed the South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act in 2024, which questioned whether South Africa’s foreign policy undermined US interests. This bipartisan scepticism reveals deep-seated differences in global outlook between the two nations.   3.3.4  The economic dimension: Trade and investment   Despite political friction, the economic relationship between South Africa and the US remains robust and mutually beneficial. South Africa is the United States’ largest trading partner in Africa. In 2023, the US exported goods worth $7.1 billion to South Africa, while importing $13.98 billion—primarily composed of critical metals and minerals like platinum, chrome, manganese, and gold. These resources are essential for US national security, particularly in high-tech manufacturing and defence.   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has facilitated duty-free access for specific South African goods into the US market since 2000. AGOA was instrumental in boosting South Africa’s automotive exports from $195 million in 2000 to $1.8 billion in 2013. However, the future of AGOA is uncertain. Discontent among US lawmakers about the agreement’s scope and utility could lead to its reconfiguration or dissolution.   If AGOA is terminated, the economic repercussions for South Africa would be relatively modest but still noteworthy. The Brookings Institution estimates a 2.7% decline in total exports to the US and a 0.06% decrease in GDP. Sectors like automotive manufacturing and food and beverages would be disproportionately affected. However, South Africa’s exports have diversified significantly, especially toward the European Union. By 2022, only 10% of automotive exports went to the US, down from 25% in 2013.   Moreover, many of South Africa’s exports—particularly metals and minerals—do not rely on AGOA preferences, limiting the impact of a potential withdrawal. Most of these goods face tariffs between 3% and 5%, and South African exporters are already accustomed to these non-preferential trading conditions.   3.3.5  Investment and employment interlinkages   Beyond trade, the investment landscape underscores the mutual benefits of the bilateral relationship. Approximately 600 US companies operate in South Africa, employing around 148,000 South Africans. Meanwhile, 22 South African firms have operations in the US, employing about 7,000 American citizens. These cross-border economic linkages create a web of interdependence that makes full-scale disengagement unlikely.   These figures also emphasise that South Africa is not a passive recipient of aid or trade favours. It is an active investor, a producer of globally essential resources, and a regional economic leader. As such, its relations with the US should be understood within a framework of mutual strategic interest rather than aid dependency.   3.3.6  Role of non-state Actors and multi-track diplomacy   A defining feature of US–South Africa relations has been the strength of non-state actor engagement. South African think tanks, civil society groups, and research institutions continue to collaborate with US-based counterparts, especially within the G20’s Think-tank 20 (T20) framework. This networked diplomacy fosters continuity and mitigates the effect of short-term political turbulence.   Indeed, the legacy of anti-apartheid solidarity in the US remains a powerful reservoir of goodwill. South African actors can—and must—engage with diverse US audiences, including those who do not share their worldviews. The country must broaden its reach beyond historical allies, engaging business groups, faith communities, and academic networks that can serve as conduits for diplomatic dialogue.   3.3.7  Countering misinformation and reframing the narrative   Another significant challenge is the proliferation of misinformation. This has manifested in public statements and even executive orders from the US accusing South Africa of human rights violations, land grabs, and anti-minority policies. These claims, largely unfounded, have had real diplomatic consequences, including the expulsion of ambassadors and legislative investigations.   South Africa must adopt a multi-pronged strategy to counteract such narratives. This includes direct engagement with critics, proactive public diplomacy, and mobilising its diaspora and international allies. Domestic outreach is equally important. Speaking with groups like AfriForum, Solidarity, and other Afrikaner organisations—not just to defend policies, but to listen and explain—is crucial for defusing disinformation.   Moreover, South Africa should work with figures who maintain influence in both societies, such as renowned sportspeople, business leaders, and cultural icons. These individuals can serve as informal ambassadors, reshaping perceptions and building trust.   3.3.8  Ambassadorial vacuums and strategic appointments   Currently, neither South Africa nor the US has an ambassador in the other’s capital. While this reflects diplomatic strain, it also presents an opportunity. South Africa must carefully consider the profile of its next ambassador—someone capable of engaging not only with policymakers but also with the business community, media, and civil society.   This is not a moment for panic but for strategic planning. The ambassadorial appointment should reflect South Africa’s long-term vision for the relationship and its evolving role in global affairs.   3.3.9  Conclusion   The relationship between South Africa and the United States is layered and multifaceted, marked by both cooperation and contestation. In 2025, as South Africa holds the G20 presidency, it must manage this relationship with strategic foresight and diplomatic agility. While the US may not prioritise the G20 or multilateralism in the current geopolitical climate, this should not deter South Africa from pursuing its broader goals of reforming global governance and promoting inclusive development.   Despite policy differences, the mutual economic dependency, robust civil society links, and shared democratic values offer a foundation for continued engagement. South Africa must maintain a multi-pronged strategy—combining diplomacy, economic partnerships, and public engagement—to assert its sovereignty, defend its interests, and shape a new geopolitical landscape.   This moment represents not only a challenge but also an opportunity for South Africa to reaffirm its role as a pivotal middle power in a changing world order. Through strategic engagement, pragmatic diplomacy, and diversified alliances, South Africa can turn this complex geopolitical moment into a defining one for its international standing. 3.4  Navigating Global Shifts: South Africa’s Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World Hon. Alvin Botes, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation (South Africa) South Africa’s foreign policy is currently being tested by a range of internal and external pressures—from domestic socio-economic challenges to major transformations in the global geopolitical order. In his address Deputy Minister Botes laid out the foundations of the country’s evolving foreign policy stance. The speech emphasised themes such as Pan-Africanism, the shift towards a multipolar world, the significance of trade relations, and the critical role of both state and non-state actors in advancing the African developmental agenda.   The speech offered a comprehensive analysis of how South Africa is navigating the increasingly complex global landscape while trying to uphold its developmental objectives and regional commitments.    3.4.1  Pan-Africanism as the ideological anchor   Pan-Africanism remains the ideological foundation of South Africa’s foreign policy, shaping its diplomatic engagements and multilateral alignments.   The speech opened with a tribute to the late Sam Nujoma, founding President of Namibia and a towering figure in Africa’s decolonial struggle. Quoting Nujoma’s call for Africans to support each other and heal the wounds of colonialism themselves, the deputy minister reaffirmed that African unity and agency must underpin any foreign policy discourse.   This ideological commitment manifests through South Africa’s support of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, particularly its emphasis on regional peace, prosperity, and integration. The AU’s “Silencing the Guns” initiative is framed as a vital step toward creating a conducive environment for development. Without security and stability no meaningful progress can be made on economic transformation or social upliftment.   3.4.2  The global order in flux: From Unipolarity to Multipolarity   The deputy minister outlined the erosion of unipolarity and the emergence of a new multipolar world order, in which power is more evenly distributed among various global actors. He traced this development historically, beginning with the Cold War era’s ideological bipolarity—between the capitalist bloc led by the United States and the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union.   Following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the United States emerged as the singular global hegemon. However, as the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted in a referenced quote, this unipolarity was an anomaly—a product of specific historical conditions. The world is now reverting to a more balanced configuration, featuring multiple centres of power including China, Russia, the European Union, and emerging middle powers like India and South Africa.   This shift has deep implications for global governance and multilateralism. While South Africa supports a rules-based international order, the speaker warned of a "spirited pushback" against multilateralism from some quarters, particularly in the West. He highlighted recent U.S. withdrawals from key multilateral organisations and agreements as a cause for concern.   3.4.3  Multilateralism and global governance reform   South Africa envisions itself as a champion of multilateralism. The country’s diplomatic efforts are increasingly focused on reforming global governance institutions to make them more inclusive and representative of the Global South. The UN, World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank continue to reflect outdated power structures, often marginalising African voices.   The upcoming 80th anniversary of the United Nations in 2025 is seen as a critical opportunity to renew global commitments to cooperation and justice. South Africa has been vocal at forums like the Summit of the Future and UN General Assembly (UNGA) in advocating for transformation of these institutions.   What should also be stressed is the need for genuine multilateralism that goes beyond rhetoric. Token representation of African countries without meaningful influence must give way to more equitable participation in global decision-making.    3.4.4  The Strategic imperative of BRICS+   South Africa’s participation in BRICS+ — an expanded configuration that now includes Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran — has elevated its profile but also increased scrutiny. The deputy minister observed that this membership brings both opportunities and challenges. It enhances South Africa’s bargaining power but may also expose it to punitive trade measures from Western powers wary of BRICS' growing influence.   For instance, proposed U.S. tariffs on imports from developing countries—20% for most and up to 60% for China—could indirectly affect BRICS+ partners like South Africa. The country must therefore prepare for a more confrontational global economic environment where alignments carry real economic consequences.    3.4.5  Revisiting AGOA and the AfCFTA Imperative   The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a key trade instrument enacted by the U.S., is up for review in September. South Africa has historically benefited from AGOA, but Botes suggested a reassessment will be made of its current structure.   As Africa moves toward greater economic integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), unilateral trade arrangements must align with the continent’s collective interests.   The concern is that AGOA, in its current form, may undermine AfCFTA if it encourages bilateralism over multilateralism. Some African states have already begun negotiating separate trade deals with the U.S., bypassing the AfCFTA framework. Such practices, the speaker warned, threaten to fragment Africa’s economic vision and reduce its collective leverage.    3.4.6  The Sahel and non-state actors in African security   Africa’s security landscape is increasingly influenced by both external powers and non-state actors. Deputy Minister Botes cited examples from the Sahel and Djibouti, regions that host multiple foreign military bases—including from the U.S., China, and France. These deployments, while ostensibly aimed at stabilising conflict zones, also reflect a contest for strategic influence.   Non-state actors are also gaining prominence. However, their role is often ambiguous. While some contribute positively to peacebuilding and development, other - like the former Wagner Group, Blackwater, or domestic entities like AfriForum and Solidarity - are accused of distorting national narratives or promoting destabilising agendas. He emphasised that South Africa must redefine the role of such actors, ensuring they support rather than subvert the country's foreign policy objectives.    3.4.7  Economic diplomacy and industrial development   Economic diplomacy is a cornerstone of South Africa’s international engagement. The country’s largest bilateral trading partner is the People’s Republic of China, with trade commitments totalling over R100 billion in recent years. However, the deputy minister stressed that trade volumes alone are insufficient—what matters is their impact on domestic employment, skills development, and local industrialisation.   South Africa must insist on value addition and beneficiation in its trade deals, especially with strategic partners. For instance, the automotive sector’s growth has historically depended on G7 investment, creating a paradox where former colonial powers now play a vital role in industrialisation. The challenge is to convert this dependency into a mutually beneficial relationship that aligns with national interests.    3.4.8  The dilemma of bilateralism within multilateral aspirations   Botes highlighted a critical tension: while Africa champions collective development through the AfCFTA, many countries continue to pursue bilateral trade deals with external powers. This undermines the spirit of Pan-Africanism and weakens the continent’s bargaining position in global forums.   South Africa finds itself in a difficult position, torn between advancing its national interests and preserving continental unity. He argued that true Pan-Africanism must be reflected not just in rhetoric but in economic strategy. Countries must resist the temptation to pursue short-term gains at the expense of long-term regional solidarity.    3.4.9  Ubuntu diplomacy and core foreign policy principles   Ubuntu - a Southern African philosophy centred on human dignity, mutual respect, and solidarity - serves as the moral compass for South African diplomacy. The deputy minister reiterated that the country’s foreign policy must reflect Ubuntu principles, particularly in its treatment of vulnerable populations and engagement with international crises.   This commitment was evident in South Africa’s submission to the International Court of Justice in 2024 regarding allegations of genocide. He called this act a moral high point, reflecting the country's ethical obligations on the global stage.    3.4.10  Domestic realities and international posturing   Domestic conditions continue to influence foreign policy decisions. Deputy Minister Botes pointed to high unemployment, poverty, and inequality as national grievances that foreign policy must address. He criticised groups that promote false narratives - like the claim of a white genocide in South Africa - as distorting public discourse and diverting attention from real challenges.   Official statistics from Stats SA reveal that 73% of white households fall within the top income quintile, contradicting claims of systemic marginalisation. He called for a clear and honest portrayal of South Africa’s socio-economic realities as a foundation for both domestic cohesion and international credibility.    3.4.11  G20 Presidency and global responsibilities   As South Africa chairs the G20, it faces the responsibility of representing African interests on a global platform. Botes welcomed the U.S.'s willingness to participate in the G20 Troika but emphasised the need for sustained engagement and leadership. He noted that U.S. disengagement from global forums has weakened multilateral cooperation and called for a recommitment to shared global responsibilities.    3.4.12  The SDG crisis and Africa’s developmental lag   Only 17% of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have been met globally, with just five years remaining before the 2030 deadline. Africa’s performance, in particular, is hindered by conflict, weak institutions, and underinvestment. The deputy minister  emphasised the need for intensified efforts from both African states and international partners.   South Africa expects the new African Union Commission leadership to play a transformative role in achieving Agenda 2063 and SDG targets. The AU must act as a unifying force and advocate for Africa’s interests in global governance structures.    3.4.13  Conclusion: A foreign policy of balance and vision   South Africa’s foreign policy is defined by its quest for balance - between competing global powers, between multilateralism and national sovereignty, and between ideological commitments and practical realities. The country seeks to leverage its middle-power status to advocate for a more just, equitable, and multipolar world order.   While significant challenges lie ahead - including trade tensions, regional instability, and domestic socio - Africa remains committed to a foreign policy grounded in Pan-Africanism, Ubuntu diplomacy, and strategic autonomy.   Deputy Minister Botes’ speech offered a roadmap for the future, one in which South Africa asserts itself not as a passive participant, but as a principled actor in global affairs, deeply invested in the fate of Africa and the broader international community.