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CLICK HERE TO GO TO THE PREVIOUS PAGE 8 INDIA    8.1 Right to Education   Score: 3/5 – Legal protection present; access improving, but large groups underserved or quality is uneven.   India recognises education as a right (free and compulsory 6–14 years), and enrolment at primary/secondary is generally high. However, learning outcomes are uneven and recovery from pandemic setbacks remains partial.   The Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) shows foundational gaps: only 20.5% of Grade 3 children could read a Grade 2 text in 2022 (improving in 2024 to 27% but still low), and Grade 5 reading and arithmetic are recovering but below desirable levels, indicating quality disparities by school type and geography.     8.2 Right to Health    Score: 3/5 – Legal right recognised; partial coverage with barriers.   India has made major gains in maternal and child health, supported by the expansion of public insurance schemes such as Ayushman Bharat – Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PM-JAY) and the continued reach of government health facilities.   According to the Sample Registration System (SRS) Special Bulletin on Maternal Mortality 2019–21, the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) fell to 93 per 100,000 live births, a sharp decline from 130 in 2014–16 (Registrar General of India, 2023).   A Press Information Bureau release in May 2025 confirmed further progress, highlighting that India’s reduction in maternal and child mortality outpaces global averages, with eight states already meeting the SDG target of MMR ≤70 (MoHFW, 2025).   The infant mortality rate declined from 39 per 1,000 live births in 2014 to 27 in 2021, while neonatal mortality fell from 26 to 19 per 1,000 in the same period (MoHFW, 2025). Life expectancy has risen to 72 years in 2023 (World Bank, 2024).   Despite these improvements, inequalities persist between states and between urban and rural areas, with health infrastructure and human resources still stretched in many regions.     8.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions    Score: 3/5 – Laws exist but weakly enforced; high unemployment or precarious work.   The official unemployment rate (usual status) was 3.2% in 2022–23, but this sits alongside very high informality and precarious work. Reforms (four Labour Codes, including the Code on Wages) are enacted in law but not yet fully implemented, and union freedoms are constrained: the ITUC Global Rights Index rates India “5 – No guarantee of rights”.   Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) data also show women’s labour force gains from a low base amid quality-of-work concerns. On balance: legal framework exists, yet enforcement and conditions lag.  8.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 3/5 – Legal basis but limited coverage; major gaps remain.   Social protection has expanded (e.g., health insurance, pensions, transfers), and the ILO’s World Social Protection Report 2024–26 documents rising coverage; the Government cites ILO estimates that effective cash-based social coverage rose from 24.4% (2021) to 48.8% (2024), while broader benefits (not necessarily cash-based, but at least one benefit) are provided to around 65% of the population as of 2025.   Even so, adequacy is mixed and exclusion persists in the informal sector.     8.5 Right to Housing    Score: 3/5 – Legal right recognised; major housing shortages or affordability crises.   India faces substantial urban informality. While UN-Habitat/World Bank show that around 5% of the national population live in slums, they also show that up to 18% of urban residents live in slum-like conditions (latest official series), while tenant protection modernisation via the Model Tenancy Act (2021) depends on state adoption (still limited).   Government programmes have scaled, with PMAY-Urban reporting 9.4 million homes completed as of the latest dashboard, but large needs remain in fast-growing cities and for affordability. Overall, legal/policy frameworks exist, yet shortages and informality remain pronounced.     8.6 Right to Food & Water    Score: 3/5 – Legal recognition but food insecurity or water shortages affect many.   Food and nutrition outcomes have improved but remain a concern: undernourishment (FAO/World Bank indicator) remains elevated by global G20 standards, and child malnutrition (NFHS-5) is significant (stunting, wasting, underweight). Safely managed sanitation reached 52% (2022) and drinking-water access is improving, but safely managed water is not yet universal and rural/poor gaps persist per JMP. In short, meaningful progress with sizable deficits.     Overall score (India): 3/5   India demonstrates steady progress but only partial realisation of socio-economic rights. Education and health indicators have improved, with declining maternal and child mortality and recovery in learning outcomes, yet quality and equity gaps remain pronounced across regions and social groups. The labour market is characterised by extensive informality and constrained union rights despite a formal legal framework. Social protection has expanded, but adequacy and effective reach are uneven, particularly for informal workers. Housing access and affordability remain pressing issues despite large-scale government programmes, while food security and WASH indicators show persistent deficits compared to G20 peers. Overall, India illustrates legal recognition and notable advances, but entrenched disparities and implementation challenges prevent a higher score.     References   ASER Centre. 2022. ASER 2022: National Findings. [Online] Available at: https://img.asercentre.org/docs/ASER%202022%20report%20pdfs/All%20India%20documents/aser2022nationalfindings.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    ASER Centre. 2024. ASER 2024: National Findings (Slides). [Online] Available at: https://asercentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/ASER-2024-All-India-ppt-Jan-27-11am.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    Government of India, Ministry of Education. N.d. Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act (RTE). [Online] Available at: https://www.education.gov.in/rte  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. 2023. PLFS, July 2022–June 2023: Press Note. [Online] Available at: https://dge.gov.in/dge/sites/default/files/2023-10/Press_Note_on_PLFS_JULY_2022_JUNE_2023.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    IIPS & ICF. 2022. NFHS-5 (2019–21): India National Fact Sheet. [Online] Available at: https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/OF43/India_National_Fact_Sheet.pdf   [accessed: 5 September 2025].  India rating referenced via: Labour Rights Index. 2024. India Country Note, stating ITUC score of 65 out of 100. [Online] Available at: https://labourrightsindex.org/lri-2024-documents/india.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    International Labour Organization. 2024. World Social Protection Report 2024–26. [Online] Available at: https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/WSPR_2024_EN_WEB_1.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). 2024. ITUC Global Rights Index 2024. [Online] Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.org/ituc-global-rights-index-2024   [accessed: 5 September 2025]. International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). 2025. Global Rights Index 2025. [Online] Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/en__global_right_index_2025__final_web.pdf?42561/2dadb6a0c1eacc71d32d3f2f6ef8702cb163d152bd2dc8e5cc9ae3e96e031476  [accessed: 17 September 2025].   Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW). 2025. India witnesses a steady downward trend in maternal and child mortality towards achievement of SDG 2030 targets. [Online] Available at: https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128024  [accessed: 17 September 2025]. Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs. N.d. PMAY-Urban Dashboard. [Online] Available at: https://pmaymis.gov.in/  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs. 2021. Model Tenancy Act, 2021 (Official text). [Online] Available at: https://mohua.gov.in/upload/whatsnew/60b7acb90a086Model-Tenancy-Act-English-02.06.2021.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    Press Information Bureau. 2025. ‘India’s social protection coverage doubles…’. [Online] Available at: https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2115391   [accessed: 5 September 2025].    WHO/UNICEF JMP. N.d. India WASH Country Page. [Online] Available at: https://washdata.org/countries/india  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    World Bank. N.d. Life expectancy at birth – India. [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=IN  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    World Bank. N.d. Population living in slums (% of urban population) – India. [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.SLUM.UR.ZS?locations=IN  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    World Bank. N.d. People using safely managed sanitation services (% of population) – India. [Online] Available at: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-using-safely-managed-sanitation  [accessed: 5 September 2025].   World Bank. N.d. Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population) – India. [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SN.ITK.DEFC.ZS?locations=IN  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    World Bank/WHO. N.d. Universal Health Coverage – Service Coverage Index (UHC SCI): India. [Online] Available at: https://data.who.int/countries/356  [accessed: 5 September 2025].  9 INDONESIA   9.1 Right to Education   Score: 3 – Legal protection present; access improving, but large groups still underserved or quality is uneven.   Education is compulsory from ages 7 to 15, and enrolment at primary level is nearly universal. Youth literacy is high at 99%  (UNESCO, 2024). Yet quality and equity are uneven: in PISA 2022, 18% of students attained at least Level 2 proficiency in mathematics, far below the OECD average (OECD, 2024).   Rural–urban disparities, teacher shortages, and dropout rates after lower secondary remain significant.     9.2 Right to Health   Score: 3 – Legal right recognised; partial coverage with barriers.   The UHC service coverage index  is 63/100  (World Bank/WHO, 2021), reflecting progress but uneven reach. Life expectancy  has risen to 71.8 years (2022) , but the maternal mortality ratio is high at 189 per 100,000  live births (2020) (World Bank, 2024a, 2024b).   Access is particularly challenging in rural and island communities, and out-of-pocket medical costs remain burdensome.     9.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 3 – Laws exist but weakly enforced; high unemployment or widespread precarious work.   Indonesia has a statutory minimum wage set by provinces, and ratified ILO core labour standards. However, informality is pervasive: 57% of workers were in informal employment in 2023  (ILO, 2023).   Unemployment is relatively low ( 5.5% in 2024 ), but youth unemployment is double that. Union rights are legally recognised but face restrictions in practice, reflected in the ITUC’s rating of “4 – Systematic violations of rights”. 9.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 2 – Minimal, poorly funded schemes and narrow reach.   Social protection has expanded through the BPJS health and employment schemes, but overall coverage is limited.   The ILO (2024) estimates only 31% of Indonesians are effectively covered by at least one social protection benefit , leaving the majority without meaningful protection. Programmes are fragmented, and adequacy is low, particularly for informal workers.     9.5 Right to Housing   Score: 2 – Large portions of population in inadequate/informal housing; weak protections.   Indonesia faces significant housing challenges: UN-Habitat estimates that over 20% of the urban population lives in slum-like conditions  (World Bank, 2024c). While the government has pursued large-scale housing initiatives, affordability remains limited and evictions from informal settlements have been reported by civil society organisations.     9.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 3 – Legal recognition but food insecurity or water shortages affect many.   Food security remains fragile: FAO estimates 6.5% of the population was undernourished in 2022  (FAO, 2023). Child stunting is high at 21.6% (UNICEF/WHO/World Bank, 2023).   Access to basic drinking water is widespread, but only 91% of households used safely managed drinking water  and 78% had safely managed sanitation in 2022  (UN-Water/WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2023). Disparities remain large between provinces and between rural and urban areas.     Overall score (Indonesia): 2.7 / 5   Indonesia’s composite profile yields an overall score of 2.7 / 5, reflecting mid-range but uneven rights realisation. The legal framework for education and health is well established and participation in schooling and basic healthcare has expanded. Yet serious challenges remain: weak learning outcomes, high maternal mortality, widespread informality in work, and major gaps in social protection. Housing and sanitation deficits particularly affect the urban poor and rural communities. Progress in access has been real, but persistent structural inequities and limited institutional capacity keep overall rights enjoyment constrained.     References   FAO. 2023. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/2023/en/  [accessed: 6 September 2025].   ILO. 2023. ILOSTAT – Informal employment by country: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/  [accessed: 6 September 2025].   ILO. 2024. World Social Protection Report 2024–26 . [Online] Available at: https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/WSPR_2024_EN_WEB_1.pdf   [accessed: 6 September 2025].   ITUC. 2024. ITUC Global Rights Index 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.org/ituc-global-rights-index-2024  [accessed: 6 September 2025].   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2024. Education GPS – Indonesia: Student performance (PISA 2022).  [Online] Available at: https://gpseducation.oecd.org/CountryProfile?primaryCountry=IDN&treshold=10&topic=PI  [accessed: 4 September 2025].    UNESCO. 2024. World Education Statistics 2024. [Online] Available at: https://inee.org/sites/default/files/resources/World-Education-Statistics-2024.pdf  [accessed: 4 September 2025].   UNICEF/WHO/World Bank. 2023. Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates – Country profile: Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://data.unicef.org/resources/jme/  [accessed: 6 September 2025].   UN-Water/WHO/UNICEF JMP. 2023. Progress on household drinking water, sanitation and hygiene 2000–2022 – Indonesia tables . [Online] Available at: https://washdata.org/data  [accessed: 6 September 2025].   World Bank. 2024a. Maternal mortality ratio (modelled estimate, per 100,000 live births) – Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=ID  [accessed: 6 September 2025].   World Bank. 2024b. Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=ID  [accessed: 6 September 2025].   World Bank. 2024c. Population living in slums (% of urban population) – Indonesia . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.SLUM.UR.ZS?locations=ID  [accessed: 6 September 2025].   World Bank/WHO. 2021. Tracking Universal Health Coverage: 2021 Global Monitoring Report.  [Online] Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240040618  [accessed: 6 September 2025]. 10 ITALY   10.1 Right to Education   Score: 4 – Strong laws and high enrolment; disparities remain.   Education is compulsory from 6–16 and guaranteed in national law; participation at primary/lower-secondary is near-universal (Eurydice, 2025; UIS, 2025).   Learning outcomes remain uneven, though. PISA 2022 places Italy close to the OECD average in mathematics, above average in reading and below in science, with persistent regional (north–south) and socio-economic gaps; early school leaving fell to 10.5% in 2023 ( OECD, 2023a) . 10.2 Right to Health   Score: 4 – Good system with broad coverage; some inequalities in access/outcomes.   The universal SSN delivers broadly strong outcomes, with life expectancy around 83 years in 2023 (rose to 83.4 in 2024 per ISTAT, 2025; Reuters, 2025; World Bank, 2025a).   Very low maternal mortality (5 per 100,000) (World Bank, 2025b). Italy’s UHC service coverage index is high (84.1) for 2021 (World Bank/WHO, 2025).   Persistent issues include regional access/wait-time disparities noted in comparative assessments.       10.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 3 – Laws exist but weakly enforced; high unemployment or widespread precarious work.   Legal protections and collective bargaining are established, but the labour market remains dualised. Unemployment fell to 6.0% in July 2025  (youth 18.7% ), yet precarious/temporary work and regional gaps persist (ISTAT/Eurostat reporting; OECD, 2023b; Reuters, 2025).     10.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 4 – Strong system, broad coverage; adequacy issues for some.   Italy spent 21.1% of GDP on social protection in 2023 (Eurostat, 2025). The anti-poverty Reddito di Cittadinanza  was replaced by Assegno di Inclusione  from 1 January 2024 , tightening eligibility criteria (INPS, 2025; Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, 2024).   Coverage is broad, but adequacy/exclusion concerns, especially for some working-age adults and informal workers, temper the score.       10.5 Right to Housing   Score: 3 – Legal right recognised; major housing shortages or affordability crises.   Affordability pressures and limited social housing capacity continue. Eurostat’s housing cost overburden  datasets show non-trivial shares of households spending >40% of income on housing (national and by tenure/age/urbanisation), with marked variation, and recent European overviews also note rising homelessness/energy-cost stress.   The best consolidated national estimate for homelessness is 96,200 people (2021)  from the OECD country note (based on the Permanent Census), highlighting a remaining need despite protections.       10.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 5 – Universal safe water and adequate nutrition; strong protections.   Italy has near-universal safely managed water and sanitation  per the JMP  country page and related tables; undernourishment is <2.5%  (FAO reporting convention). While food-bank demand rose during inflation spikes, national systems secure universal access overall.       Overall score (Italy): 3.8 / 5    Italy demonstrates a well-developed framework of rights and social guarantees, with overall good outcomes but unevenness across regions and population groups. The education system is comprehensive and participation strong, yet persistent north–south and socio-economic gaps in achievement hold back a higher score. The national health service secures broad coverage with excellent life expectancy and very low maternal mortality, though waiting times and regional disparities remain. Labour protections are solid in law, but high levels of precarious and temporary work – especially for younger workers – undermine fairness and security. Social security spending is significant and inclusive, but adequacy issues remain for certain groups, particularly informal workers. In housing, affordability pressures and homelessness highlight clear gaps despite legal recognition of the right. By contrast, access to safe water and nutrition is effectively universal and well protected. References    EACEA/European Commission. 2025. YouthWiki – Italy: 6.3 Preventing early leaving from education and training (ELET).  [Online] Available at: https://national-policies.eacea.ec.europa.eu/youthwiki/chapters/italy/63-preventing-early-leaving-from-education-and-training-elet [accessed: 18 September 2025].  EACEA/European Commission, Eurydice. 2025. Organisation of the education system and of its structure – Italy . [Online] Available at: https://eurydice.eacea.ec.europa.eu/eurypedia/italy/organisation-education-system-and-its-structure  [accessed: 18 September 2025].    Eurostat. N.d. Housing cost overburden rate – datasets . [Online] Available at: ilc_lvho07a: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/product/view/ilc_lvho07a ilc_lvho07c: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/product/view/ilc_lvho07c ilc_lvho07d: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/product/view/ilc_lvho07d [all accessed: 18 September 2025].    Eurostat. 2025. Government expenditure on social protection – Statistics Explained.  [Online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Government_expenditure_on_social_protection [accessed: 18 September 2025].    INPS. 2025. Assegno di Inclusione (ADI).  [Online] Available at: https://www.inps.it/it/it/dettaglio-scheda.it.schede-servizio-strumento.schede-servizi.assegno-di-inclusione-adi.html [accessed: 18 September 2025].    Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. 2024. Inclusion Allowance (Assegno di inclusione).  [Online] Available at: https://www.lavoro.gov.it/g7-labour/new-measures-inclusion-and-work-access/pagine/inclusion-allowance [accessed: 18 September 2025].    OECD. 2023a. PISA 2022 Results – Country Note: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/pisa-2022-results-volume-i-and-ii-country-notes_ed6fbcc5-en/italy_2e8d98df-en.html ; PDF: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/11/pisa-2022-results-volume-i-and-ii-country-notes_2fca04b9/italy_8c8fa86f/2e8d98df-en.pdf [accessed: 18 September 2025].    OECD. 2023b. OECD Employment Outlook 2023 – Italy  (country note/section). [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-employment-outlook-2023_08785bba-en/full-report/italy_7f527636.html [accessed: 18 September 2025].    OECD. 2024. Data on Homelessness 2024 – Country Note: Italy . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/11/data-on-homelessness-2024-country-notes_d0959ab4/italy_77072fe7/934f3b19-en.pdf [accessed: 18 September 2025].    Our World in Data. 2024. Prevalence of undernourishment (FAO series). [Online] Available at: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/prevalence-of-undernourishment   [accessed: 18 September 2025].  Reuters. 2025. Italy July jobless rate falls to 6.0%, with 13,000 jobs created.  [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/italy-july-jobless-rate-falls-60-with-13000-jobs-created-2025-09-01/ [accessed: 18 September 2025].    UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). 2025. Italy – Country profile (Education).  [Online] Available at: https://uis.unesco.org/en/country/it [accessed: 18 September 2025].    WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP). 2025. Italy – WASH country page . [Online] Available at: https://washdata.org/countries/italy [accessed: 18 September 2025].    World Bank. 2025a. Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – Italy (Indicator SP.DYN.LE00.IN ). [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=IT [accessed: 18 September 2025].    World Bank. 2025b. Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) – Italy  (Indicator SH.STA.MMRT). [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=IT [accessed: 18 September 2025].    World Bank/WHO. 2025. UHC Service Coverage Index (SDG 3.8.1)  – (Indicator SH.UHC.SRVS.CV .XD) (latest Italy data: 2021). [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.UHC.SRVS.CV.XD [accessed: 18 September 2025].  11 JAPAN   11.1 Right to Education   Score: 4 – Strong laws and high enrolment; disparities remain.   Japan guarantees nine years of compulsory education (primary and lower-secondary), with very high participation and near-universal youth literacy; upper-secondary enrolment at age 17 is among the highest in the OECD (MEXT, N.d.; OECD, 2024a; UIS, 2025).   PISA 2022 shows strong performance – 88%  of students at least Level 2 in mathematics (vs OECD 69% ), but equity challenges and regional/SES gaps persist despite overall high attainment (OECD, 2024a).       11.2 Right to Health   Score: 5 – Universal, affordable health care with strong legal guarantees; excellent outcomes.   Japan’s statutory system provides universal coverage in law and practice. Health outcomes are world-class: life expectancy is 84 years (2023) ; maternal mortality  is among the lowest globally; and a high UHC service coverage index (83/100, 2021) . Persistent issues include regional access and ageing-related pressures, but performance remains excellent (JETRO, N.d.; World Bank, 2025).   11.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 4 – Solid framework and generally fair conditions; enforcement gaps or informal sector issues.   Unemployment is very low ( 2.3% , July 2025), and collective bargaining and minimum wages are established in law; a record national-average minimum-wage hike to ¥1,118/hour  is being finalised for FY2025. Yet labour-market dualism and non-regular work remain significant – especially for women – with associated wage and security gaps.   Unionisation is modest ( 16.1% ), and certain public-safety workers (e.g., firefighters) are excluded from organising. Overall protections are solid, but gaps in job quality and coverage temper the score (ITUC, 2024; OECD, 2024b; Reuters, 2025; Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2025).   11.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 4 – Strong coverage but some groups excluded or benefits insufficient.   Japan operates comprehensive social insurance (pensions, health, unemployment, long-term care) with universal participation requirements; child allowance  was expanded from October 2024  (income cap removed; coverage extended to end of high school; higher amounts for 3rd+ child). Nonetheless, relative poverty – especially among single-parent and elderly households – remains high by OECD standards, pointing to adequacy gaps in parts of the system (government and municipal notices; Japan Pension Service, 2025; JETRO, N.d.; OECD, 2024b).       11.5 Right to Housing   Score: 4 – Good housing access for most; affordability challenges or regional disparities remain.   Japan combines broad housing availability with very low homelessness  (official point-in-time counts: 3,065 in 2023 ; 2,591 in January 2025 , continuing decline). Affordability pressures persist for low-income renters, especially in large metros, as reflected in OECD affordable-housing indicators; social-rental supply is limited relative to need. Protections exist, but the burden on vulnerable groups keeps this at 4 (Nippon.com, 2025 – summarising MHLW survey; OECD AHD, 2024).       11.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 5 – Universal access to safe water and adequate nutrition; strong protections and positive outcomes.   Household access to safely managed drinking water and improved sanitation is essentially universal per the WHO/UNICEF JMP ; undernourishment is very low and child malnutrition indicators are among the best in the region (Global Nutrition Report, 2024; WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2025).       Overall score (Japan): 4.3 / 5   Japan performs strongly across all six rights. Universal health insurance and near-universal access to safe water and sanitation underpin world-leading health outcomes. Education laws and attainment are high with top-tier PISA results, though regional and socio-economic gaps persist. Labour protections are established and unemployment is low, yet labour-market dualism and gendered inequalities limit job quality for many non-regular workers. Social security is comprehensive and recent child-allowance reforms broaden coverage, but adequacy gaps remain for single-parent and older households. Housing supply helps keep recorded homelessness very low, while affordability pressures endure for low-income renters in large cities. With an ageing population, the priority is to strengthen equity and benefit adequacy within otherwise robust systems.     References    Global Nutrition Report. 2024. Japan – Nutrition profile . [Online] Available at: https://globalnutritionreport.org/resources/nutrition-profiles/asia/eastern-asia/japan/ [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Government of Japan / Cabinet Secretariat. 2024–2025. Policies supporting children and child-rearing (child allowance reforms) . [Online] Available at: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/ongoingtopics/policies_kishida/childsupport.html [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Higashihiroshima City. 2024. Revision of the Child Allowance System 2024 (English notice) . [Online] Available at: https://www.city.higashihiroshima.lg.jp/en/8/40227.html [accessed: 18 September 2025]. ITUC. 2024. Global Rights Index 2024 – Overview . [Online] Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.org/gri-intro-2024 [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Japan Pension Service. 2025. National Pension System . [Online] Available at: https://www.nenkin.go.jp/international/japanese-system/nationalpension/nationalpension.html  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   JETRO. N.d. Japan’s social security system.  [Online] Available at: https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/setting_up/section4/page9.html [accessed: 18 September 2025].   MEXT. N.d. Overview of the education system.  [Online] Available at: https://www.mext.go.jp/en/policy/education/overview/index.htm [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Nippon.com . 2025. Government survey finds Japanese homeless population continues to decrease . [Online] Available at: https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h02407/government-survey-finds-japanese-homeless-population-continues-to-decrease.html [accessed: 18 September 2025].   OECD. 2023. PISA 2022 Results – Country Note: Japan.  [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/pisa-2022-results-volume-i-and-ii-country-notes_ed6fbcc5-en/japan_f7d7daad-en.html  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   OECD. 2024a. Education at a Glance 2024 – Country Note: Japan. [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/09/education-at-a-glance-2024-country-notes_532eb29d/japan_fb7f8db2/6ec65d8b-en.pdf [accessed: 18 September 2025].   OECD. 2024b. Economic Surveys: Japan 2024.  [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/01/oecd-economic-surveys-japan-2024_9289b572/41e807f9-en.pdf [accessed: 18 September 2025].   OECD Affordable Housing Database (AHD). 2024. HC1.2 Housing costs over income (method & indicators) . [Online] Available at: https://webfs.oecd.org/els-com/Affordable_Housing_Database/HC1-2-Housing-costs-over-income.pdf [accessed: 18 September 2025].   OECD Affordable Housing Database (AHD). 2024. Country note: Homelessness – Japan . [Online] Available at: https://webfs.oecd.org/Els-com/Affordable_Housing_Database/Country%20notes/Homelessness-JPN.pdf [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Reuters. 2025. Japan plans another record hike in minimum wage, Kyodo News says.  [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/japan-plans-another-record-hike-minimum-wage-kyodo-news-says-2025-08-01/ [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Statistics Bureau of Japan. 2025. Latest indicators – unemployment rate (July 2025) . [Online] Available at: https://www.stat.go.jp/english/ [accessed: 18 September 2025].   UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). 2025. Italy – Country profile (Education).  [Online] Available at: https://www.unesco.org/sdg4education2030/en/knowledge-hub/japan-country-profile [accessed: 18 September 2025].    WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP). 2025. Japan – WASH country page . [Online] Available at: https://washdata.org/countries/japan [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025. Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – Japan (Indicator SP.DYN.LE00.IN ) . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=JP [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025. Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) – Japan (Indicator SH.STA.MMRT) . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=JP [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025. UHC service coverage index (SDG 3.8.1) – Japan (latest available 2021) . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.UHC.SRVS.CV.XD?locations=JP [accessed: 18 September 2025]. 12 MEXICO   2.1 Right to Education   Score: 4 – Strong laws and high enrolment; disparities remain.   Mexico constitutionally guarantees free, compulsory education from preschool through upper-secondary (and mandates State responsibility for higher education) establishing a solid de jure baseline. Enrolment in basic education is high (e.g., SEP reports net enrolment in primary at 95% and strong progression to lower-secondary).   However, learning outcomes remain a systemic challenge. In PISA 2022 only about a third (34%) of 15-year-olds met at least Level 2 in mathematics, with persistent performance gaps by socio-economic background and geography (OECD, 2023).       12.2 Right to Health   Score: 4 – Broad coverage with some inequalities in access/outcomes.   Outcomes are mixed but broadly positive by upper-middle-income standards. Life expectancy rebounded to 75.1 years in 2023 after pandemic-era declines (FRED/World Bank, 2025), and maternal mortality has fallen to an estimated 42 per 100,000 live births in 2023 (World Bank, 2025a).    The UHC service coverage index stands at 75/100 for 2021 (World Bank, 2025b).   Current health expenditure is 5.7–6.1% of GDP (2021–2022).     Following criticism of the short-lived INSABI scheme, the federal government initiated a transition to IMSS-Bienestar. This occurred in two stages: first, on 31 August 2022, the decentralised public body IMSS-Bienestar was formally created; second, on 29 May 2023, reforms to the General Health Law transferred functions and responsibilities to the new body.     12.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 3 – Laws exist but are weakly enforced; widespread precarious/informal work.   Mexico’s open unemployment is low (2.8% in July 2025), but labour market informality remains very high (TIL1 at 54.8% in Q2 2025), undermining equal protections and benefits (INEGI, 2025).   Minimum wages have risen sharply – MXN 249.00/day nationally and MXN 375.00/day in the Northern Border Zone in 2025 (CONASAMI, 2024; DOF, 2022) – boosting earnings at the bottom, though enforcement is uneven in the informal sector.   Freedom of association has improved under recent labour reforms and USMCA enforcement, reflected in the ITUC Global Rights Index upgrade to rating “3 – Regular violations” in 2025 (from “4” in 2024). 12.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 3 – Legal basis but limited coverage; major gaps remain.   Mexico operates multiple contributory regimes (IMSS/ISSSTE) and non-contributory programmes, and is consolidating non-insured populations into IMSS-Bienestar (DOF, 2022).     Yet coverage gaps remain large, driven by informality. In 2024, 48.2%  of people experienced carencia por acceso a la seguridad social  (lack of access to social security), per the official multidimensional poverty release (INEGI, 2025).   ILO data similarly place “effective coverage” below universal and note uneven adequacy.       12.5 Right to Housing   Score: 2 – Large populations in informal/inadequate housing; weak protections.   The right to adequate housing is recognised and federal laws provide policy scaffolding (but not justiciable entitlements to affordability everywhere).   On conditions, UN-Habitat/World Bank estimate 17.6%  of Mexico’s urban population lived in “slum” or informal conditions in 2018 – a level that signals persistent deficits in habitability, services, and tenure for millions (World Bank, 2025c).     Affordability pressures (especially in large metros) and limited nationwide eviction-specific safeguards outside some local jurisdictions further constrain access.     12.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 3 – Legal recognition but food insecurity or water/sanitation gaps affect many.   Mexico has near-universal basic  drinking water access, but safely managed  water and sanitation are not yet universal – national JMP series indicate continuing urban–rural and wealth gaps; services are often intermittent and bottled-water dependence is high (FAO/IFAD/PAHO/UNICEF/WFP, 2023; sector briefs; WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2025).     Food security improved regionally in 2023; within Mesoamerica, Mexico recorded one of the lowest prevalences of moderate or severe food insecurity, 27.6% , but that still means over a quarter of people faced constrained access at times (FAO/IFAD/PAHO/UNICEF/WFP, 2023).       Overall score (Mexico): 3.2 / 5   Mexico’s score reflects upper-mid performance but with persistent gaps. Strong legal guarantees underpin education and health, and enrolment and coverage levels are comparatively high. Recent reforms, including the transition to IMSS-Bienestar and labour law changes under USMCA, signal institutional strengthening. Yet structural weaknesses remain: entrenched informality undermines labour rights and social security coverage, housing deficits persist for millions in informal settlements, and water/food insecurity continues to affect vulnerable groups. Mexico demonstrates clear progress and legal commitment, but implementation gaps and uneven equity keep overall rights enjoyment moderate rather than high.     References    Cámara de Diputados (vigente) Ley de Vivienda (texto consolidado). [Online] Available at: https://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LViv.pdf  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   CONASAMI. 2024. Incremento a los salarios mínimos para 2025 (nota oficial) . [Online] Available at: https://www.gob.mx/conasami/es/articulos/incremento-a-los-salarios-minimos-para-2025  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   DOF. 2022. Decreto por el que se crea el organismo público descentralizado IMSS-Bienestar . [Online] Available at: https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5658644&fecha=31/08/2022  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE). 2025. Resultados del segundo trimestre de 2025 (boletín, indicador 433/25) . [Online] Available at: https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2025/enoe/enoe2025_08.pdf  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   FAO/IFAD/PAHO/UNICEF/WFP. 2023. Latin America and the Caribbean – Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/d5796653-42c5-4de3-915b-a4d58c1308c9  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   FRED/World Bank. 2025. Life Expectancy at Birth, Total for Mexico (SPDYNLE00INMEX) – 2023 value 75.069 . [Online] Available at: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SPDYNLE00INMEX  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Gobierno de México. 2024. Tabla de salarios mínimos 2025 . [Online] Available at: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/960832/Tabla_de_Salarios_M_nimos_2025.pdf  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   INEGI. 2025. Indicadores Oportunos de Ocupación y Empleo – Julio 2025 (boletín) . [Online] Available at: https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2025/iooe/IOE2025_08.pdf  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   ITUC. 2025. Global Rights Index 2025 . [Online] Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.org/global-rights-index ; PDF: https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/en__global_right_index_2025__final_web.pdf  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   OECD. 2023. PISA 2022 – Mexico factsheet . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/11/pisa-2022-results-volume-i-and-ii-country-notes_2fca04b9/mexico_515c0d35/519eaf88-en.pdf  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Reuters. 2024. México aumentará el salario mínimo un 12% desde enero de 2025 . [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/latam/negocio/PNXT6UTPXBNPVK7PWVHP6NGZVA-2024-12-04/  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Secretaría de Salud / SEGOB. 2023. Acuerdo de bases para la transferencia de recursos y desincorporación por extinción del INSABI . [Online] Available at: http://sidof.segob.gob.mx/notas/5690905  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   WHO/UNICEF JMP. 2025. Mexico – WASH country page . [Online] Available at: https://washdata.org/countries/mexico  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025a. Gender Data Portal . [Online] Available at: https://genderdata.worldbank.org/en/home  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025b. Current health expenditure (% of GDP) – Mexico. [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.GD.ZS?locations=MX  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025c. Population living in slums (% of urban population) – Mexico . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.SLUM.UR.ZS?locations=MX  [accessed: 18 September 2025]. 13 RUSSIAN FEDERATION   13.1 Right to Education   Score: 4 – Broad Protection: Strong laws and high enrolment; disparities remain.   Adult literacy is effectively universal and participation through upper-secondary is high in law and practice. Russia did not participate in PISA 2022, so recent lower-secondary benchmarks are missing; however, PIRLS 2021 (Grade 4) placed Russia among the very top performers in reading, signalling strong foundations in early literacy (IEA TIMSS & PIRLS, 2023; OECD, N.d.).   Regional and rural–urban gaps in resources and outcomes remain a recurring theme in the research literature.      13.2 Right to Health   Score: 3 – Partial Protection: Good laws/coverage; outcomes uneven.   A statutory system provides broad entitlements and Russia’s UHC service coverage index sits in the mid/high-70s (2021). Key outcomes have been recovering since the pandemic: life expectancy rebounded into the low-mid 70s by 2023; maternal mortality is in low double digits per 100,000.   Yet total health spending as a share of GDP is modest by OECD standards, out-of-pocket burdens persist, and recent studies highlight substantial unmet need and rural access challenges (World Bank, 2025).      13.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 2 – Limited Protection: Laws exist but weakly enforced; high unemployment or widespread  precarious work.   Headline unemployment has hovered near historic lows in 2024–2025 amid labour shortages, but this co-exists with severe constraints on freedom of association and collective action. The ITUC Global Rights Index rates Russia “5 – no guarantee of rights”, citing systematic violations.   Informal employment remains sizeable – recent research estimates about 18.3% of workers in 2023 in the informal sector – undermining equal protections (Interfax, 2025a; ITUC, 2024, 2025; Kiselev et al., 2024; Reuters, 2024).  13.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 4 – Broad Protection: Strong coverage but some groups excluded or benefits insufficient.   Russia’s legislation spans pensions, family/child support, disability, unemployment insurance and targeted assistance, yielding high nominal coverage by international standards.   Regional inequalities and adequacy concerns have grown more salient with inflationary pressure; official data reported poverty at 7.2% for 2024, but analysts caution about vulnerability around the line (ILO WSPR, 2024–26 regional benchmarks; Interfax, 2025b).      13.5 Right to Housing   Score: 3 – Partial Protection: Legal right recognised; major housing shortages or affordability crises.   Housing stock is extensive, but affordability worsened after the roll-back of broad mortgage subsidies in mid-2024, with market rates jumping and a marked deterioration in purchase affordability; government has kept a narrower “family mortgage” subsidy to soften the shock (Reuters, 2024; The Moscow Times).   At the same time, widespread winter heating and hot-water outages in 2023–2024 exposed ageing municipal infrastructure and left tens of thousands without heat for days in multiple regions (ABC News, 2024; DW, 2024; The Bell, 2024).      13.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 4 – Broad Protection: Broad access but disparities between groups or regions.   Undernourishment in Russia is low by global standards (FAO REU tables, 2025), though it rose compared with the late-2010s and remains below the world average.   Water and sanitation access is broadly high, but “safely managed” services are not universal and rural service quality lags behind urban areas (WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2025).  Overall score (Russia): 3.3 / 5    Russia presents a complex rights landscape. The country secures near-universal access to education and broad social protection coverage, with notable achievements in early literacy (IEA TIMSS & PIRLS, 2023) and extensive legal entitlements. However, these gains are offset by uneven outcomes: persistent rural-urban disparities in education and WASH, affordability and infrastructure crises in housing, and significant barriers to healthcare access despite legal guarantees. Labour rights remain the weakest dimension, with systemic restrictions on freedom of association and widespread informality undermining protections despite low headline unemployment. Overall, Russia’s profile is characterised by solid frameworks and coverage, but with material deficits in equity, adequacy, and rights implementation that limit its progression towards full realisation.     References   ABC News. 2024. Freezing Russians plead for help from Vladimir Putin as heating fail leaves them “fighting for survival”.  [Online] Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-01-21/freezing-russians-make-plea-to-vladimir-putin-after-heating-fail/103323062  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   DW. 2024. Why are many Russians freezing in their homes this winter?  [Online] Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/why-are-many-russians-freezing-in-their-homes-this-winter/a-68025856  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   FAO et al. 2025. Europe and Central Asia – Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://openknowledge.fao.org/handle/20.500.14283/cd4739en  [accessed: 18 September 2025].    IEA. 2023. PIRLS 2021 International Results in Reading . [Online] Available at: https://pirls2021.org/results/  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Interfax. 2025a. Unemployment in Russia still at all-time low, labor shortage continues to decrease – CBR . [Online] Available at: https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/111906/ [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Interfax. 2025b. Level of poverty in Russia falls to historic low of 7.2% in 2024 — Rosstat . [Online] Available at: https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/110336/  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   ITUC. 2024. Global Rights Index 2024 – Country list & ratings . [Online] Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.org/russian-federation [accessed: 18 September 2025].   ITUC. 2025. Global Rights Index 2025 – Overview page . [Online] Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.org/ituc-global-rights-index-2025-en  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Kiselev, S.V., Seitov, S.K., Samsonov, V.A. & Filimonov, I.V. 2024. Employment in the informal sector of Russia: unemployment and other socio-economic factors, Population and Economics , 8(3): 197–219. [Online] Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/a/arh/jpopec/v8y2024i3p197-219.html  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Nikoloski, Z., Sulcebe, G., Mossialos, E. & Cylus, J. 2024. Unmet need for healthcare in the Russian Federation.  [Online] Available at: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11816418/  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   OECD. N.d. PISA Participants (past and present).  [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/pisa/pisa-participants.html   [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Reuters. 2024. Russia extends subsidised family mortgage programme until 2030 . [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-extends-subsidised-family-mortgage-programme-until-2030-2024-07-10/  [accessed: 18 September 2025].    The Bell. 2024. The Bell Weekly: A winter heating crisis strikes Russia . [Online] Available at: https://en.thebell.io/the-bell-weekly-30/  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   The Moscow Times. 2024. Russia’s real estate market rocked by the end of generous mortgage subsidies . [Online] Available at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/10/18/russias-real-estate-market-rocked-by-the-end-of-generous-mortgage-subsidies-a86738  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   WHO/UNICEF JMP. 2025. Russian Federation – WASH country page . [Online] Available at: https://washdata.org/countries/russian-federation  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025. UHC service coverage index ( SH.UHC.SRVS.CV .XD) – Russian Federation . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.UHC.SRVS.CV.XD?locations=RU   [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025. Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – Russian Federation . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=RU  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025. Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) – Russian Federation . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=RU  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025. Current health expenditure (% of GDP) – Russian Federation . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.GD.ZS?locations=RU [accessed: 18 September 2025]. 14 SAUDI ARABIA   14.1 Right to Education   Score: 4/5 – Strong legal framework and high enrolment; disparities remain.   Basic education is guaranteed in law, and public schooling is free for citizens and residents. Participation through lower and upper-secondary is high on international series; secondary gross enrolment has exceeded 100% in recent years (UIS, 2023).   Learning outcomes, however, lag behind OECD levels. In PISA 2022 only a minority of 15-year-olds reached at least Level 2 in mathematics, pointing to persistent quality and equity gaps that national reforms aim to address (OECD, 2023).      14.2 Right to Health   Score: 4/5 – Good system with broad coverage; some inequalities or shortfalls in access/outcomes.   Health indicators are strong for the region: life expectancy was around 79 years in 2023, and the UHC service coverage index stands in the mid-70s (2021) on the global SDG series (FRED / World Bank, 2025; World Bank, 2025).   Maternal mortality is low for an upper-middle/high-income setting (World Bank, 2025). Coverage is broad across national schemes, but access and affordability can vary for non-citizen groups and some services, and non-communicable diseases remain a policy priority (WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2025; World Bank, 2025).      14.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 2/5 – Minimal protections; exploitation common, rights to organise restricted.   Unemployment has fallen to historic lows (overall 2.8% in Q1 2025; Saudi citizens 6.3%) reflecting strong labour-market demand (GASTAT, 2025).   At the same time, independent trade unions and strikes are not legally recognised, and international monitoring continues to place the Kingdom in the worst-performing grouping for workers’ rights (ITUC, 2025). Credible reports in 2024–25 document ongoing risks for migrant workers despite reform initiatives (Amnesty International, 2025; BWI, 2025; HRW, 2025).  14.4 Right to Social Security    Score: 4/5 – Strong coverage but some groups excluded or benefits insufficient.   Citizens are covered by a wide social protection architecture (pensions, SANED unemployment insurance, disability and social assistance), and recent Social Insurance Law reforms were approved to consolidate and expand scheme design (GOSI, 2024). Nevertheless, gaps remain – particularly for many non-nationals’ old-age entitlements – and official SDG reporting shows coverage below universal levels (SDG 1.3.1).      14.5 Right to Housing    Score: 4/5 – Good housing access for most; affordability challenges or regional disparities remain.   The Housing Program reports homeownership rising to 63.74% (end-2023) and 65.4% (end-2024), surpassing the interim Vision 2030 target (SPA-carried releases). Progress reflects subsidised finance and supply programmes.   However, affordability pressures, especially in Riyadh, have intensified with rapid price growth, stretching lower- and middle-income households and some migrant groups (Financial Times, 2025).      14.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 4/5 – Broad access but disparities remain between groups or regions.   Access to at least basic drinking water services is very high (WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2025; World Bank, 2025), and undernourishment prevalence is low and stable at 3-4% on FAO/WB series (FAO, 2024; World Bank, 2025).   Service quality and the cost of healthy diets can still vary, with pockets of vulnerability among lower-income and non-citizen households.      Overall score (Saudi Arabia): 3.7 / 5   In Saudi Arabia, rights are broadly recognised in law and delivered at scale, yet uneven in practice. The Kingdom has made significant progress in education access, health outcomes, and social protection for citizens, and flagship Vision 2030 programmes have driven gains in housing and employment participation. However, structural gaps remain: migrant workers experience persistent labour-rights violations and weaker social security protections; housing affordability and basic service access are uneven for low-income groups; and learning outcomes lag behind enrolment levels. The combination of ambitious reforms, high coverage rates, and continued exclusion or quality disparities positions Saudi Arabia as a country with strong institutional scaffolding but needing sustained efforts to improve adequacy, equity, and enforcement to achieve full realisation of socio-economic rights. References   Amnesty International. 2025. Saudi Arabia/UN: Labour agreement must lead to comprehensive reforms to be a game-changer for migrant workers . [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/06/saudi-arabia-un-labour-agreement-must-lead-to-comprehensive-reforms-to-be-a-game-changer-for-migrant-workers/  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI). 2025. Beyond the Façade: The Realities of Labour Reforms in Saudi Arabia . [Online] Available at: https://www.bwint.org/BwiNews/NewsDetails?newsId=556  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   FAO. 2024. SOFI Statistics – Regional Near East and North Africa 2024, Annex I (Prevalence of undernourishment). [Online] Available at: https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/b64a7d04-6d70-488d-95e8-8a9beabb7483/content/sofi-statistics-rne-2024/annex-01.html  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Financial Times. 2025. Riyadh’s property boom puts home ownership beyond reach of many Saudis . [Online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/4cc29603-ec42-4a09-84e0-cc2b1a9aaf7b  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   FRED / World Bank. 2025. Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – Saudi Arabia ( SP.DYN.LE00.IN ). [Online] Available at: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SPDYNLE00INSAU  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   General Authority for Statistics (GASTAT). 2025. Unemployment rate of total population reaches 2.8% in Q1 2025 . [Online] Available at: https://www.stats.gov.sa/en/w/news/56  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI). 2024. Council of Ministers Approves New Social Insurance Law . [Online] Available at: https://gosi.gov.sa/en/MediaCenter/News/NewsDetails/1/02072024  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Human Rights Watch. 2025. Saudi Arabia: Protect Domestic Workers’ Rights . [Online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/16/saudi-arabia-protect-domestic-workers-rights  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   ITUC. 2025. ITUC Global Rights Index 2025 – Overview & country ratings. [Online] Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.org/ituc-global-rights-index-2025-en  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   OECD. 2023.  PISA 2022 Results (Volume I & II) – Country Note: Saudi Arabia. [Online] Available at:   https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2023/11/pisa-2022-results-volume-i-and-ii-country-notes_2fca04b9/saudi-arabia_f77dbf3a.html?utm   [accessed: 18 September 2025].   Saudi Gazette. 2025. Saudi household ownership rate reaches 65.4% in 2024, surpassing 2025 target . [Online] Available at: https://www.saudigazette.com.sa/article/654597/SAUDI-ARABIA/Saudi-household-ownership-rate-reaches-654-in-2024-surpassing-2025-target  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). 2023. Saudi Arabia – Education and literacy indicators . [Online] Available at: https://www.uis.unesco.org/en/themes/education-literacy [accessed: 17 September 2025].   WHO/UNICEF JMP. 2025. Saudi Arabia – WASH country page. [Online] Available at: https://washdata.org/countries/saudi-arabia  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025. People using at least basic drinking water services (% of population) – Saudi Arabia (SH.H2O.BASW.ZS). [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.H2O.BASW.ZS?locations=SA  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025. UHC service coverage index (SDG 3.8.1) – Saudi Arabia ( SH.UHC.SRVS.CV .XD). [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.UHC.SRVS.CV.XD?locations=SA  [accessed: 18 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025. Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) – Saudi Arabia (SH.STA.MMRT). [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=SA  [accessed: 18 September 2025]. 15 SOUTH AFRICA 15.1 Right to Education   Score: 3/5 – Legal protection and improving access; large groups underserved or quality is uneven.   Compulsory schooling to Grade 9 is guaranteed, and access is high by regional standards. Yet learning outcomes remain a central challenge. In PIRLS 2021, South Africa’s Grade 4 reading mean was 288, with most learners below the low international benchmark, and steep poverty/rural gradients (IEA, 2022).   Recent Department of Basic Education sector reviews confirm improvements in participation and completion but also highlight persistent inequalities in resourcing and learning (DBE, 2025). On the mathematics/science side, TIMSS 2023 shows gains from a low base and continuing gaps at Grade 9 (IEA, 2025).   Overall, strong de jure access, which is hampered by uneven learning quality.     15.2 Right to Health   Score: 3/5 – Legal right recognised; partial coverage with barriers.   Life expectancy has continued to recover post-pandemic (Stats SA, 2025a). Public spending is substantial for an upper-middle-income country (World Bank, 2025a), and the UHC Service Coverage Index places South Africa in the low-70s in 2021 on WHO’s tracer set – solid for the African region yet short of universal (Frontiers, 2023; World Bank, 2025b).   However, access and quality remain bifurcated between a well-resourced private sector and a stretched public system; non-communicable diseases and service bottlenecks continue to strain delivery (World Bank, 2025b).     15.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 3/5 – Laws exist but weakly enforced; high unemployment or widespread precarious work.   The legal framework protects a national minimum wage and collective bargaining. The National Minimum Wage increased to R28.79/hour from 1 March 2025 (DEL, 2025; gov.za , 2025).   However, unemployment remains extremely high: 33.2% (Q2 2025) on the official rate, with youth far higher (Stats SA, 2025b). Informality and long-term unemployment keep decent-work outcomes constrained despite the legal foundations in place. 15.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 4/5 – Broad Protection: Strong coverage but some groups excluded or benefits insufficient.   South Africa’s grant system provides wide coverage by middle-income standards. The General Household Survey (GHS) 2024 shows 50.4% of households receiving at least one social grant (Stats SA, 2025c).   SASSA’s latest annual report records very large beneficiary numbers across old-age, child-support, and disability grants (SASSA, 2024). Benefit adequacy and administrative frictions remain concerns, but breadth of legal coverage and de facto reach justify a high score.     15.5 Right to Housing    Score: 3/5 – Partial Realisation: Legal right recognised; major housing shortages or affordability crises.   The right to housing is protected in law and the PIE Act (1998) constrains arbitrary evictions.   Large-scale subsidy delivery and upgrading programmes are long-standing policy pillars (National Treasury, 2016). Conditions, however, remain uneven: 11.7% of households live in informal dwellings (GHS 2024 presentation), with affordability and basic services quality varying sharply by municipality.      15.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 3/5 – Legal recognition but food insecurity or water shortages affect many.   Food insecurity remains material: 22.2% of households reported inadequate or severely inadequate access to food in 2024 (Stats SA, 2025c). Water and sanitation access shows mixed progress. 87.7% of households have improved water, 83.1% have improved sanitation (GHS 2024 key findings), but only 76.3% have safely managed sanitation under the stricter JMP-aligned definition (Stats SA, 2025d).     Overall score (South Africa): 3.2/5   South Africa’s composite profile yields an average score of 3/5, placing it in the mid-range of rights realisation. The constitutional and legislative framework is strong, and in several domains – particularly social security – the scale of coverage is comparatively advanced. However, severe labour-market exclusion, persistent educational underperformance, and uneven access to health, housing, and sanitation clearly highlight the gap between formal guarantees and lived realities. The data point to a society with wide formal protections but structural inequalities and implementation deficits that continue to limit equitable enjoyment of rights.     References   Department of Basic Education (DBE). 2025. Review of progress in the basic education sector to 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.education.gov.za/Resources/Reports/tabid/92/ItemId/16243/Default.aspx [accessed: 19 September 2025].    Department of Employment and Labour (DEL). 2025. National Minimum Wage adjustment from 1 March 2025. [Online] Available at: https://www.labour.gov.za/national-minimum-wage-adjustment-2025 [accessed: 19 September 2025].    Frontiers (Editorial). 2023. Towards equitable health systems for UHC in sub-Saharan Africa (citing WHO 2021 UHC values; SA ≈ 71). [Online] Available at: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/health-services/articles/10.3389/frhs.2023.1217844/full [accessed: 19 September 2025].    Government of South Africa ( gov.za ). 2025. National Minimum Wage increases from 1 March 2025. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/speeches/national-minimum-wage-increases-1-march-2025-29-feb-2025-0000 [accessed: 19 September 2025].    IEA. 2022. PIRLS 2021 International Results in Reading – South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://pirls2021.org/results/ [accessed: 19 September 2025].   IEA. 2025. TIMSS 2023 International Results in Mathematics and Science – Highlights . [Online] Available at: https://www.iea.nl/publications/study-reports/international-reports-iea-studies/timss-2023-highlights-report [accessed: 19 September 2025].    SASSA. 2024. Annual Report 2023/24 . [Online] Available at: https://www.sassa.gov.za/annual%20reports/Documents/SASSA%20Annual%20Report%202023-24.pdf [accessed: 19 September 2025].    South African Government. 1998. Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE). [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a19-98.pdf [accessed: 19 September 2025].    Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025a. Inside the Numbers: SA population trends for 2025. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=18613 [accessed: 19 September 2025].    Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025b. QLFS Q2:2025 – Unemployment rate increases to 33,2%. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=18415 [accessed: 19 September 2025].    Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025c. General Household Survey (GHS) 2024 – Key findings. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=18435 [accessed: 19 September 2025].   Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025d. Nearly 1 in 5 South Africans lack access to safely managed sanitation. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=18433 [accessed: 19 September 2025].    Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). 2025e. GHS 2024 – Presentation. [Online] Available at: https://www.statssa.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/GHS2024-Presentation.pdf [accessed: 19 September 2025].   Treasury/CoGTA/DBSA (National Treasury). 2016. South African National Upgrading Support Programme: Policies and Programmes . [Online] Available at: https://csp.treasury.gov.za/DocumentsToolbox/006.SA.NUSP.Chapter-3-Policies-and-Programmes-May-2016.pdf [accessed: 19 September 2025].    World Bank. 2025. Current health expenditure (% of GDP) – South Africa ( SH.XPD.CHEX.GD .ZS). [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.GD.ZS?locations=ZA [accessed: 19 September 2025].    World Bank. 2025. UHC Service Coverage Index ( SH.UHC.SRVS.CV .XD) – South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.UHC.SRVS.CV.XD?locations=ZA [accessed: 19 September 2025].   16 SOUTH KOREA    16.1 Right to Education   Score: 4/5 – Strong laws and high enrolment; disparities remain.   Korea guarantees nine years of free compulsory education (Grades 1–9) and sustains near-universal participation across basic education (Framework legislation; MoE, N.d.).   Achievement is high by international standards: PISA 2022 places Korea in the top tier, with 84% of students reaching at least Level 2 in mathematics (vs OECD 69%), and strong reading and science profiles (OECD, 2023).   Nevertheless, equity pressures persist, including performance gaps by socio-economic status and an intense shadow-education market, which amplifies advantage and undercuts fairness in opportunity (MoE, N.d.; OECD, 2023).     16.2 Right to Health   Score: 5/5 – Universal, affordable health care with strong legal guarantees; excellent outcomes.   The national health insurance system achieves near-universal coverage, and outcomes are among the world’s best.   Life expectancy remains very high, maternal mortality is very low by global benchmarks, and the UHC Service Coverage Index records 89/100 (2021), reflecting broad access to essential services (WHO/World Bank, 2025; World Bank, 2025a; World Bank, 2025b).     16.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 3/5 – Laws exist but are weakly enforced; high unemployment or widespread precarious work.   Headline unemployment is low (2.4% in July 2025) and the statutory minimum wage rose to KRW 10,030/hour in 2025 (MOEF, 2025; NPR, 2024).   However, job quality concerns are pronounced. Non-regular workers account for roughly 38% of wage earners (2024), with attendant wage and protection gaps, and the ITUC Global Rights Index 2025 rates Korea “5 – No guarantee of rights”, citing serious constraints on freedom of association and collective bargaining (BusinessKorea, 2024; ITUC, 2025).   On balance, labour-market strength is tempered by precarity and rights deficits in the labour space, supporting a mid-range score. 16.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 4/5 – Strong system, broad coverage; adequacy issues for some.   A comprehensive architecture – National Pension, Basic Pension, Employment Insurance, Industrial Accident Compensation, Long-Term Care and social assistance – confers wide legal coverage.   Yet benefit adequacy is a persistent concern. South Korea continues to record one of the highest elderly-poverty rates in the OECD, signalling gaps in replacement rates and take-up for vulnerable groups despite formal coverage breadth (OECD, 2024).     16.5 Right to Housing    Score: 4/5 – Good housing access for most; affordability challenges or regional disparities remain.   Official data indicate low measured homelessness in population terms (OECD Affordable Housing Database, 2024), but affordability pressures, including the burden of jeonse  deposits and price-to-income ratios in the Seoul metro, strain lower-income renters (OECD Affordable Housing Database, 2024).   Recent country notes place the 2024 homelessness count in the low tens of thousands nationally (OECD Affordable Housing Database, 2024).   Protections and policy tools are extensive, yet cost burdens for specific groups remain.     16.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 5/5 – Universal access to safe water and adequate nutrition; strong protections and positive outcomes.   The JMP country page shows near-universal safely managed drinking water and sanitation services, and undernourishment sits at the FAO reporting floor (“<2.5%”) typical of high-income economies (WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2025).   While some sub-groups report food insecurity during shocks, service coverage and nutrition outcomes meet the threshold for a top score. Overall score (South Korea): 4.2 / 5    The combination of top-tier education performance, universal health coverage, and near-universal WASH and nutrition outcomes drives a strong overall profile. The main constraints are labour-rights enforcement and job quality (despite low unemployment), affordability pressures in housing, and equity gaps in schooling tied to socio-economic status and private tutoring. Continued focus on rights at work, social-protection adequacy for older adults, and housing affordability would close much of the remaining gap to full realisation. References    BusinessKorea. 2024. Non-regular Workers Account for 38.2% of Wage Earners . [Online] Available at: https://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=227540  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). 2025. ITUC Global Rights Index 2025 – Overview. [Online] Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.org/ituc-global-rights-index-2025-en  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    Korea Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF). 2025. Current Employment Situation, July 2025 . [Online] Available at: https://english.moef.go.kr/pc/selectTbPressCenterDtl.do?boardCd=N0001&seq=6228  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    NPR. 2024. South Korea raises minimum wage to 10,030 won for 2025 . [Online] Available at: https://www.npr.org/2024/07/10/nx-s1-5035478/south-korea-minimum-wage-2025 [accessed: 5 September 2025].    OECD. 2023. PISA 2022 Results – Country note: Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/pisa-2022-results-volume-i-and-ii-country-notes_ed6fbcc5-en/korea_4e0cc43a-en.html [accessed: 5 September 2025].    OECD. 2024. Society at a Glance 2024 – Income poverty of older people . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/society-at-a-glance-2024_918d8db3-en/full-report/income-poverty_53d4eac1.html [accessed: 5 September 2025].    OECD Affordable Housing Database. 2024. Data on homelessness 2024 – Country notes: Korea . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/data-on-homelessness-2024-country-notes_771d6cfd-en/korea_6db24dc7-en.html [accessed: 5 September 2025].    Republic of Korea Ministry of Education (MoE). N.d. Korean Education System (overview of 6-3-3-4 system; elementary & middle compulsory) . [Online] Available at: https://english.moe.go.kr/sub/infoRenewal.do?m=0301&page=0301&s=english [accessed: 5 September 2025].    WHO/UNICEF JMP. 2025. Republic of Korea – WASH country page. [Online] Available at: https://washdata.org/countries/republic-korea [accessed: 5 September 2025].    WHO/World Bank. 2025. UHC Service Coverage Index ( SH.UHC.SRVS.CV .XD) – Korea, Rep. [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.UHC.SRVS.CV.XD?locations=KR [accessed: 5 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025a. Life expectancy at birth ( SP.DYN.LE00.IN ) – Korea, Rep.   [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=KR [accessed: 5 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025b. Maternal mortality ratio (SH.STA.MMRT) – Korea, Rep.   [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=KR [accessed: 5 September 2025]. 17 TÜRKIYE   17.1 Right to Education    Score: 4/5 – Strong laws and high enrolment; disparities remain.   Türkiye guarantees free, compulsory basic education and participation at the primary and lower-secondary stages is near-universal in practice.   On quality, PISA 2022 places the system mid-pack among OECD countries: about 61% of 15-year-olds reached at least Level 2 in mathematics (OECD average 69%), 72% in reading (74% OECD), and 67% in science (76% OECD), with sizeable socio-economic and regional gaps (OECD, 2023).     17.2 Right to Health    Score: 4/5 – Broad coverage with some inequalities in access/outcomes.   Outcomes are generally strong for an upper-middle/high-performing health system. Life expectancy was around the mid-70s in 2023 on World Bank series, and the UHC service coverage index shows high service availability by regional standards (World Bank UHC indicator). Maternal mortality is low in recent data.   Coverage under the General Health Insurance scheme is very wide, yet pressures from non-communicable diseases and access gaps for lower-income and rural populations keep this domain short of “excellent”.      17.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 2/5 – Minimal protections; exploitation common, rights to organise restricted.   Headline unemployment has come down – 8.6% in June 2025 on the official monthly series (TÜİK) – and the minimum wage was lifted again for 2025 amid high inflation, supporting earnings at the bottom.   At the same time, international monitors place Türkiye among the “10 worst countries for workers” in 2025 (ITUC, 2025), citing pervasive restrictions on trade-union rights and collective action; these findings align with long-running concerns about enforcement and job quality. On balance, labour rights conditions, informality, and inflation-eroded purchasing power point to a lower score.  17.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 3/5 – Legal basis but limited coverage; major gaps remain.   The statutory architecture spans pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance and social assistance. Effective coverage under SDG indicator 1.3.1 remains well below universal in the latest available series, and multiple analyses highlight adequacy and inclusion issues for certain working-age and informal-sector groups.   The social security framework is substantial, yet the breadth and sufficiency of benefits are uneven.      17.5 Right to Housing   Score: 3/5 – Legal right recognised; major housing shortages or affordability crises.   Affordability pressures intensified after price and rent surges, exacerbated in major cities. The temporary 25% cap on rent increases, introduced as a crisis measure, expired on 1 July 2024, with adjustments reverting to the 12-month CPI average, a change associated with renewed rent shocks for lower-income tenants (Hürriyet Daily News, 2024).   Post-earthquake reconstruction and supply programmes continue, but cost burdens and security of tenure constraints prevent a higher score in this area.      17.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 4/5 – Broad access but disparities exist between groups or regions.   Access to improved services is high. World Bank/JMP-linked series report very wide access to basic drinking water and sanitation, and safely managed sanitation at about 79% (2022) on the national indicator pane.   Undernourishment is low, although food-price spikes have strained diet quality for vulnerable households. The overall picture is one of high coverage with affordability and equity concerns.  Overall score (Türkiye): 3.3 / 5   Strong laws and broad access in education and health sit alongside persistent equity and quality gaps. Labour rights conditions are weak despite improvements in employment and wages; social protection remains substantial in law but uneven in reach and adequacy; housing affordability and rent dynamics remain pressure points; water and sanitation access is high with some disparities. The evidence indicates solid statutory commitments, tempered by implementation gaps and distributional stresses across several rights domains.     References   Hürriyet Daily News. 2024. 25 percent rent increase cap removed . [Online] Available at: https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/25-percent-rent-increase-cap-removed-197957 [accessed: 19 September 2025].    ITUC. 2025. Global Rights Index 2025 – Overview . [Online] Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.org/ituc-global-rights-index-2025-en [accessed: 19 September 2025].    OECD. 2023. PISA 2022 Results – Country note: Türkiye . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/pisa-2022-results-volume-i-and-ii-country-notes_ed6fbcc5-en/turkiye_d67e6c05-en.html  [accessed: 19 September 2025].    Reuters. 2024. Turkey raises monthly minimum wage by 30% for 2025 to TRY 22,104.  [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-raises-monthly-minimum-wage-by-30-2025-2024-12-24/ [accessed: 19 September 2025].     SESRIC. 2025. SDG 1.3.1 – Effective social protection coverage: Türkiye (2022). [Online] Available at: https://www.sesric.org/sdg.php?ind=1.3.1&c_id=223 [accessed: 19 September 2025].    Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). 2025. Labour Force Statistics, June 2025 (unemployment 8.6%) . [Online] Available at: https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten [accessed: 19 September 2025].    World Bank. 2025. Country data: Türkiye  (includes life expectancy and WASH dashboard; safely managed sanitation 79% in 2022). [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=TR [accessed: 19 September 2025].  CLICK HERE TO CONTINUE TO THE NEXT PAGE

Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute   PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute   DISCLAIMER   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   D E C E M B E R 2 0 2 5   Author: André Gaum Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Language Editor: Olivia Main   CONTENTS   Introduction Scoring Methodology Socio-Economic Rights Matrices Scope of Socio-Economic Rights assessed 1 Argentina 2 Australia 3 Brazil 4 Canada 5 China 6 France 7 Germany 8 India 9 Indonesia 10 Italy 11 Japan 12 Mexico 13 Russian Federation 14 Saudi Arabia 15 South Africa 16 South Korea 17 Türkiye 18 United Kingdom 19 United States of America (USA) 20 Comparative Overview and Synthesis 21 Tabulated Scores Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:1551510273 INTRODUCTION   This Socio-Economic Rights Barometer builds on the earlier Civil and Political Rights Barometer prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) for the G20 countries. It applies the same methodology of comparative scoring but focuses on the lived realities of socio-economic rights.   The Barometer considers the socio-economic conditions in each country as reported by various sources, both domestic, regional and international, while also recognising the existence of legal protections and policies that contribute to these conditions. Accordingly, the scoring matrices integrate both practical indicators and the strength of the legal framework into a single measure.   The Barometer is designed to be concise and accessible. It does not provide a detailed narrative for each state, but it does offer a clear, comparative picture of where G20 countries stand in relation to one another and to a core set of socio-economic rights. These rights are drawn from international human rights law, aligning primarily with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and represent areas of daily importance to the dignity and wellbeing of people living in these countries.   Six rights are measured:   The right to education The right to health The right to work and decent labour conditions The right to social security The right to housing The right to food and water   Each right is assessed against a five-point scale, where a score of five reflects strong protections, effective implementation, and positive outcomes, while a score of one reflects serious deficits in both protection and lived reality. Although it is not feasible herein to provide an exhaustive evaluation of every aspect of each right, this barometer aims to establish a comparative framework that highlights patterns, progress, and areas of concern across the G20.   The ISI’s barometer measuring social and political rights compliance in the G20, together with this barometer measuring socio-economic rights, aim to offer a more complete picture of human rights conditions in the G20 and provide a basis for dialogue on shared commitments and responsibilities. SCORING METHODOLOGY   The Socio-Economic Rights Barometer uses a five-point scale (as set out in the matrices below) to assess the level of protection and realisation of each right across the G20 countries. The scoring reflects the lived reality of rights in practice, while also factoring in the strength of legal protections, institutions, and policies that underpin those outcomes.   The Barometer relies on a mix of indicators tailored to each right, such as enrolment rates for education, life expectancy for health, unemployment and labour protections for work, coverage rates for social security, affordability and adequacy for housing, and food security and water access for the right to food and water.   While the data draws from international sources such as the United Nations, World Bank, and specialised agencies, the scoring is comparative and relative. The objective is to enable meaningful comparison and dialogue, highlighting where progress has been made and where urgent attention is needed. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS MATRICES    SCOPE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS ASSESSED   1. Education   The right to education is recognised in Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and in Sustainable Development Goal 4. Education has a multiplier effect, equipping individuals with the knowledge and skills to participate fully in society, enhance their economic opportunities, and claim other rights. The Barometer evaluates this right through indicators such as enrolment and literacy rates, equality of access across socio-economic groups, and the existence and effectiveness of free and compulsory education frameworks. 2. Health   Article 12 of the ICESCR establishes the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, supported by Sustainable Development Goal 3. Health is central to dignity, well-being, equality and life, and it underpins the enjoyment of all other rights. Indicators for this right include life expectancy, maternal and child mortality rates, access to essential healthcare services, universal health coverage, and the adequacy of public health investment. 3. Work and Decent Labour Conditions   The rights to work and to just and favourable conditions of employment are guaranteed in Articles 6 and 7 of the ICESCR, and are echoed in International Labour Organisation standards and Sustainable Development Goal 8. Work is not only a source of income but also of autonomy, dignity, and social participation. The Barometer measures this right through employment rates, the existence and enforcement of minimum labour standards, workplace safety, freedom of association, and equality in employment. 4. Social Security   Article 9 of the ICESCR affirms the right to social security, recognising its essential role in protecting individuals from poverty, vulnerability, and the risks of unemployment, disability, or old age. This right is reinforced in Sustainable Development Goal 1.3. Indicators include the existence, coverage, and adequacy of social protection systems such as pensions, unemployment benefits, disability support, and child allowances, as well as the extent to which these systems are accessible to vulnerable groups. 5. Housing   Adequate housing is an integral component of the right to an adequate standard of living, set out in Article 11 of the ICESCR and reflected in Sustainable Development Goal 11. Housing is more than shelter; it provides security, privacy, and a base for family and community life. The Barometer evaluates this right using indicators such as homelessness rates, the availability of affordable housing, the prevalence of informal settlements or slums, and legal protections against forced eviction. 6. Food and Water   Also anchored in Article 11 of the ICESCR, the rights to food and water are fundamental to survival and human dignity, and are embedded in Sustainable Development Goals 2 and 6. Adequate nutrition and access to safe drinking water and sanitation are prerequisites for health, equality, and sustainable development. The Barometer measures this right through indicators including food security, malnutrition prevalence, access to safe drinking water and sanitation, and the effectiveness of related legal and policy frameworks. 1 ARGENTINA   1.1 Right to Education   Score: 3/5 – Law present; access improving, but large groups still underserved or quality is uneven.   Access is broadly high at lower-secondary level (completion close to universal in recent years), but learning outcomes are weak and unequal.   In the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2022, 15-year-olds in Argentina scored well below OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) averages and only 27% of learners reached basic proficiency in mathematics, signalling persistent quality and equity issues that disproportionately affect poorer students (OECD, 2023). These outcome gaps, alongside periodic disruption pressures, justify a mid-range score anchored in quality rather than access (OECD, 2023).  1.2 Right to Health   Score: 3/5 – Legal right recognised; partial coverage with barriers.   Argentina’s health service coverage is comparatively strong for an upper-middle-income country, but access and quality have been strained by fiscal consolidation and reported cutbacks in 2024–2025 (AP News, 2025; World Bank, 2021).   Outcomes remain middling for the region and inequalities persist; the overall picture is a system with broad coverage facing barriers for many, especially lower-income users (AP News, 2025; WHO, 2025; World Bank, 2021).      1.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 3/5 – Laws exist but weakly enforced; high unemployment or precarious work.   Labour law protections exist, but informality of labour is very high (42% of workers in Q4 2024), which weakens enforcement of minimum standards, social-security contributions, and workplace protections (INDEC, 2025; OECD, 2025).   Unemployment fluctuated around 6-7% into late-2024/early-2025, with pressure on purchasing power and job quality (INDEC, 2025; Reuters, 2024). This combination of laws on paper – high informality and uneven enforcement – points to a mid-low score (INDEC, 2025; Reuters, 2024).  1.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 3/5 – Legal basis but limited coverage; major gaps remain.   Argentina has a relatively broad system by regional standards, but effective coverage was about two-thirds of the population in 2021 and adequacy is uneven, especially under fiscal tightening (ILO via UN SDG/OWID, 2024).   The design spans contributory and non-contributory schemes, yet gaps persist for informal workers and some vulnerable groups. On balance, programmes are present but uneven in reach and adequacy (ILO via UN SDG/OWID, 2024).  1.5 Right to Housing   Score: 2/5 – Large portions of population in inadequate/informal housing; weak protections.   Housing deprivation remains significant in Argentina. The official slum registry (RENABAP) counts 5.3 million people (1 in 9) living in slums/informal settlements, with deficits in serviced land, tenure security and basic services (World Bank, 2023).   Affordability stresses and informality constrain effective protection against evictions and inadequate housing (World Bank, 2023).  1.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 2/5 – Basic services reach some, but malnutrition or unsafe water widespread.   Food security has deteriorated compared with the mid-2010s: the FAO’s (Food and Agriculture Association of the United Nations) FIES (Food Insecurity Experience Scale) estimates indicate around one-third of Argentines experienced moderate or severe food insecurity in recent years, and reporting through late-2024 described a grassroots “food emergency” (FAO, 2023; Reuters, 2024).   Water and sanitation lag on SDG 6: only 46% of people had safely managed sanitation (2016) and 24% of domestic wastewater was safely treated (2024). Diagnostics warn Argentina is off-track for SDG 6 without major reforms (UN-WATER/WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2023; World Bank, 2022). Overall (Argentina): 2.7/5 (rounded)   A system with high formal access in education and health but weak realisation due to poor learning outcomes, high labour informality, sizeable housing deficits, and serious food-security shortfalls. References   AP News. 2025. Argentines reel from health care cutbacks as President Milei’s state overhaul mirrors Trump’s . [Online] Available at: https://apnews.com/article/argentina-milei-trump-rfk-health-care-cancer-8f5c4101140e1859c11ef4baed214054  [accessed: 2 September 2025].   Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2023. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/2023/en/ [accessed: 5 September 2025].    ILO via UN SDG/OWID. 2024. Share covered by at least one social protection benefit (%), 2015–2023 . Oxford: Our World in Data (processed), citing ILO SDG 1.3.1. (Argentina c.66% in 2021). [Online] Available at: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/dataportal/countryprofiles/ARG   https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-covered-by-one-social-protection-benefit  [accessed: 5 September 2025].   INDEC. 2025. Mercado de trabajo: Indicadores de informalidad laboral (EPH)  (Informe anual). [Online] Available at:  https://www.indec.gob.ar/uploads/informesdeprensa/informalidad_laboral_eph_04_2529DEBE4DBB.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2025].   INDEC. 2025. Mercado de trabajo. Tasas e indicadores socioeconómicos. EPH – 4º trimestre 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.indec.gob.ar/uploads/informesdeprensa/mercado_trabajo_eph_4trim24083C6B9E41.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2025].   OECD. 2023. PISA 2022 – Country Note: Argentina . (Performance and proficiency shares). [Online] Available at: https://gpseducation.oecd.org/CountryProfile?primaryCountry=ARG&topic=PI&treshold=10&utm  [accessed: 5 September 2025].   OECD. 2025. OECD Economic Surveys: Argentina 2025, chapter ‘Devising a comprehensive strategy to foster formalisation’ . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-argentina-2025_27dd6e27-en/full-report/devising-a-comprehensive-strategy-to-foster-formalisation_a2bd1fe7.html   [accessed: 6 September 2025].   Reuters. 2024. In Argentina’s poverty-hit barrios a food emergency takes hold . [Online] Available at:  https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentinas-poverty-hit-barrios-food-emergency-takes-hold-2024-10-01/?utm  [accessed: 5 September 2025].   UN-WATER/WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP). 2023. Progress on household drinking water, sanitation and hygiene 2000–2022 . [Online] Available at: https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/jmp-2023-wash-households-launch-version.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2025].   UrbanNext. N.d. Risks of Informal Settlements in Argentina: Forms of Vulnerability in the Face of a Transforming Climate . [Online] Available at: https://urbannext.net/risks-of-informal-settlements/  [accessed: 11 September 2025].     WHO. 2025. Argentina – Country Data Overview . [Online] Available at: https://data.who.int/countries/032   [accessed: 2 September 2025].    World Bank . N.d. Argentina Water Security: Valuing Water - Brief for Policy Makers  (English). [Online] Available at:  http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/945671624438916229  [accessed: 5 September 2025].   World Bank. 2021. UHC Service Coverage Index (SDG 3.8.1), Argentina . [Online] Available at:  https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.UHC.SRVS.CV.XD?locations=AR  [accessed: 3 September 2025].   World Bank. 2023. International bank for reconstruction and development project appraisal document.  [Online] Available at:  https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099190002062318780/pdf/BOSIB05034f6d3015099380c897ff1a88ee.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2025].     2 AUSTRALIA   2.1 Right to Education   Score: 4 – Strong legal framework and high enrolment; disparities remain.   Education is compulsory nationwide (state/territory laws generally require attendance from about age six through at least 16 or Year 10/12), indicating robust de jure guarantees and near-universal access in practice.   However, system outcomes show material gaps: Australia’s PISA 2022 results place roughly 74% of 15-year-olds at or above baseline proficiency (Level 2) across reading, mathematics and science—solid but slipping relative to prior cycles (OECD, 2023).   Regular attendance has deteriorated: the 2024 national rate fell to 85.9%, the lowest in a decade. Disparities are sharp for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander students: attendance in Years 1–10 was 76.9% in 2024, and Year 12 retention/attainment remains well below non-Indigenous peers. These inequalities, combined with uneven quality signals, keep Australia at 4 rather than 5.  2.2 Right to Health    Score: 4 – Broad coverage with some inequalities in access/outcomes.   Australia has universal entitlement to subsidised care via Medicare and strong outcomes overall. The Universal Health Coverage service coverage index stands at 87 (2021, UN SDG profile). Life expectancy remains among the world’s highest, though Indigenous life expectancy lags substantially. Maternal mortality is very low at 5.6 per 100,000 (2018–2020) (AIHW, 2023).   Health spending in 2022–23 reached A$252.5 billion (9.9% of GDP), displaying strong resourcing with ongoing policy debates about illness prevention and wait-times experienced at healthcare facilities (AIHW, 2024).   Persistent gaps for First Nations people (e.g., outcome disparities and access in remote areas) prevent a top score.      2.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions    Score: 4 – Solid protections; generally fair conditions, but enforcement gaps.   Australia maintains comprehensive labour protections (Fair Work Framework) and has recently lifted the National Minimum Wage to A$24.95/hour (from 1 July 2025). Freedom of association and collective bargaining are recognised (ratification of ILO Conventions 87 and 98), though the right to strike is procedurally constrained to “protected” industrial action in narrow circumstances. Work safety performance is generally strong by OECD standards yet not flawless. Two hundred workers died of traumatic injuries in the course of their employment in 2023 (1.4 per 100,000) (Safe Work Australia, 2024).   Unemployment has hovered near 4.2% through 2025, with pockets of underemployment and precarious work. Net: strong laws and standards, but some enforcement and safety concerns keep this score at 4.      2.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 4 – Strong system, broad coverage; adequacy issues for some.   Australia’s social protection architecture (old-age pensions, unemployment benefits, disability support, family payments, rent assistance) delivers very high coverage: the UN SDG profile shows 94% of the population covered by at least one social benefit (2022). Reforms in 2024–25 boosted Commonwealth Rent Assistance (two successive 10% increases; cumulative lift of 45% since May 2023 when combined), acknowledging cost-of-living pressures.   Nonetheless, adequacy debates persist, especially for job-seeker and youth rates, and some cohorts (temporary migrants, people in insecure housing, remote communities) face practical barriers. A score of 4 reflects breadth with lingering adequacy/coverage gaps.     2.5 Right to Housing    Score: 3 – Legal right recognised; major shortages or affordability crises.   Homelessness (Census 2021) was experienced by 122,494 people in 2021, and homelessness services data suggest sustained pressure since. Affordability of housing has sharply deteriorated: the 2024 Rental Affordability Index reports the worst national rental affordability on record, with low-income households facing severe stress across major cities and regions (SGS Economics and Planning, 2024).   While state-based eviction rules and tenancy protections exist, strained supply and affordability crises, plus rising rough-sleeping/service demand in some jurisdictions, warrant a 3.     2.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 4 – Broad access but disparities between groups or regions.   Access to safe water and sanitation is near-universal : the JMP shows 99.5% of Australians using safely managed drinking water services  (2022), and sanitation coverage is similarly very high among high-income countries (WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2023).   However, food insecurity has escalated for vulnerable groups amid cost-of-living pressures. Foodbank’s Hunger Report 2024 documents persistently elevated household food insecurity (with particularly high rates in low-income and regional households), and ABS identifies 41% of First Nations households experiencing food insecurity at some point in 2022–23.     Overall score (Australia): 3.8   A high-income democracy with universal systems and strong legal guarantees translates into generally high de facto fulfilment of socio-economic rights. Nonetheless, equity gaps, especially affecting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, people in remote areas, and low-income renters, are significant across education, health outcomes, housing affordability, and food security.     References   Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 2023.  Estimating homelessness, 2021.  [Online] Available at: https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/housing/estimating-homelessness-census/latest-release  [accessed: 4 September 2025].   Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 2024. 10 insights into health of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, 2022–23 . [Online] Available at: https://www.abs.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/10-insights-health-aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-peoples-2022-23?utm  [accessed: 4 September 2025].    Australian Government Department of Education. 2024. Starting school (NSW).  [Online] Available at: https://education.nsw.gov.au  [accessed: 4 September 2025].    Australian Government Department of Education. 2025. Closing the Gap – School education.  [Online] Available at: https://www.education.gov.au/closing-the-gap/closing-gap-school-education  [accessed: 4 September 2025].    Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). 2023. Maternal deaths in Australia 2018–2020.  [Online] Available at: https://www.aihw.gov.au  [accessed: 4 September 2025].    Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). 2024. Health expenditure Australia 2022–23 – Summary & PDF.  [Online] Available at: https://www.aihw.gov.au  [accessed: 4 September 2025].     Foodbank Australia. 2024. Hunger Report 2024.  [Online] Available at: https://reports.foodbank.org.au  [accessed: 4 September 2025].    OECD. 2023. PISA 2022 Country Note: Australia.  [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/pisa/ [accessed: 4 September 2025].    Productivity Commission. 2025. Closing the Gap Dashboard – School attendance (Outcome 5).  [Online] Available at: https://www.pc.gov.au/closing-the-gap-data  [accessed: 4 September 2025].    Safe Work Australia. 2024. Key Work Health and Safety Statistics Australia 2024 (latest release).  [Online] Available at: https://data.safeworkaustralia.gov.au  [accessed: 4 September 2025].    SGS Economics and Planning. 2024. Australia’s rental crisis reaches new heights: 2024 Rental Affordability Index.  [Online] Available at: https://sgsep.com.au/publications/insights/rental-affordability-index-2024   [accessed: 4 September 2025].   The Guardian. 2025. School refusal, drop-outs and private enrolments on the rise  (summary of PC ROGS). [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com  [accessed: 4 September 2025].    United Nations (UN). 2025. SDG Country Profile: Australia  (UHC service coverage index). [Online] Available at: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/dataportal/countryprofiles/aus  [accessed: 4 September 2025].    Victorian Department of Education. 2024. Enrolment: School age requirements and age exemptions.  [Online] Available at: https://www2.education.vic.gov.au  [accessed: 4 September 2025].    Western Australia Department of Education. 2025. Education in WA. [Online] Available at: https://www.education.wa.edu.au  [accessed: 4 September 2025].    WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP). 2023. Progress on household drinking water, sanitation and hygiene 2000–2022 ; JMP data tables for Australia. [Online] Available at: https://washdata.org/reports/jmp-2023-wash-households  [accessed: 4 September 2025].      3 BRAZIL   3.1 Right to Education   Score: 3/5 – Legal protection present; access improving, but large groups still underserved or quality is uneven.   Brazil ensures compulsory basic education and has high participation, but learning outcomes remain weak and inequitable. In PISA 2022 , only 27%  of 15-year-olds reached baseline proficiency (Level 2) in mathematics, far below the OECD average ( 69% ), with similarly low performance in reading/science – signalling quality and equity problems that particularly affect poorer regions and schools (OECD, 2023).   Adult literacy improved but disparities persist . In 2022 the adult illiteracy rate was 5.6% , but much higher among older adults and in the northeast, and roughly double for Black and Brown Brazilians versus Whites (IBGE, 2023; IBGE, 2024a).       3.2 Right to Health    Score: 4 /5 – Broad coverage with some inequalities in access/outcomes.   Brazil’s health system  provides universal entitlement, and the UHC service coverage index  stands at 80/100 (2021) .   Life expectancy  recovered to 76.4 years in 2023 , and the maternal mortality ratio  has fallen long-term to 67 per 100,000 (2023) , though still high relative to OECD levels, and regional and socio-economic gaps remain (IBGE, 2024b; World Bank/WHO, 2025).   Overall coverage and outcomes are solid for an upper-middle-income country, but access/quality vary by region and income.   3.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions    Score: 3 – Laws exist but weakly enforced; high unemployment or widespread precarious work.   The labour framework is comprehensive, yet informality remains high. 37.8% of workers were informal in Q2 2025 (38.7 million people), undermining enforcement of minimum standards, social protection contributions, and workplace safety (IBGE, 2025a).   Unemployment hit a series-low 5.8% in Apr–Jun 2025 (annual 6.6% in 2024), but under-utilisation and precarious jobs persist, with informality concentrated in the north/northeast (IBGE, 2025a; Reuters, 2025).     3.4 Right to Social Security    Score: 3/5 – Legal basis but limited coverage; major gaps remain.   Brazil’s mixed system (contributory pensions, Bolsa Família , disability, and other transfers) provides substantial protection, but coverage of at least one social-protection benefit  was 71.2% (2022)  – leaving significant gaps, especially among informal workers and some vulnerable groups (UN, 2025; World Bank, 2025). Adequacy debates continue despite recent programme expansions.       3.5 Right to Housing    Score: 2/5 – Large portions of population in inadequate/informal housing; weak protections.   The 2022 Census  found 16.39 million  people ( 8.1%  of the population) living in favelas  and urban communities , highlighting extensive deficits in adequate, serviced and secure housing, with sharp regional disparities (IBGE, 2024c). While social-housing initiatives exist, the scale of informality and service gaps justifies a low score.       3.6            Right to Food & Water    Score: 3/5 – Legal recognition but food insecurity or water shortages affect many.   Food insecurity fell in 2023 but remains material : IBGE’s PNAD module shows 27.6%  of households experienced some food insecurity, and 9.4%  faced moderate or severe  insecurity, with worse outcomes in rural areas and in the north/northeast (IBGE, 2024d). Water and sanitation are mixed: 87%  of Brazilians used safely managed drinking-water  in 2022 , but only 50%  had safely managed sanitation , with large subnational gaps, meaning millions still lack safe household sanitation (UN-Water/SDG 6 Data, 2022).       Overall score (Brazil): 3/5   Brazil shows a profile of broad systems with improving outcomes , but quality/equity gaps  in learning, heavy informality  in work, substantial informal settlements , and sanitation shortfalls  keep most domains in the 3–4  range rather than top marks.     References   IBGE. 2023. Illiteracy rate is lower in 2022, but remains high among the elderly, Black and Brown persons and in the Northeast Region. [Online] Available at: https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/en/agencia-news/2184-news-agency/news/37103-illiteracy-rate-is-lower-in-2022-but-remains-high-among-the-elderly-black-and-brown-persons-and-in-the-northeast-regioneste-2  [accessed: 14 September 2025].    IBGE. 2024a. 2022 Census: Illiteracy rate falls from 9.6% to 7.0% in 12 years, though inequalities persist.  [Online] Available at: https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/en/agencia-news/2184-news-agency/news/40118-2022-census-illiteracy-rate-falls-from-9-6-to-7-0-in-12-years-though-inequalities-persist [accessed: 14 September 2025].    IBGE. 2024b. In 2023, life expectancy reaches 76.4 years; surpasses pre-pandemic level.  [Online] Available at: https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/en/agencia-news/2184-news-agency/news/42021-in-2023-life-expectancy-reaches-76-4-years-surpasses-pre-pandemic-level  [accessed: 14 September 2025].    IBGE. 2024c. 2022 Census: 16.4 million persons in Brazil lived in favelas and urban communities.  [Online] Available at: https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/en/agencia-news/2184-news-agency/news/41813-2022-census-16-4-million-persons-in-brazil-lived-in-favelas-and-urban-communities  [accessed: 14 September 2025].    IBGE. 2024d. Food security in Brazilian households increases in 2023 (PNAD Contínua – Food Security 2023).  [Online] Available at: https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/en/agencia-news/2184-news-agency/news/39857-food-security-in-brazilian-households-increases-in-2023   [accessed: 14 September 2025].    IBGE. 2025a. Unemployment rate reaches 5.8% in the quarter ended June, lowest level in the time series.  [Online] Available at: https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/en/agencia-news/2184-news-agency/news/44123-unemployment-rate-reaches-5-8-in-the-quarter-ended-june-lowest-level-in-the-time-series  [accessed: 14 September 2025].    IBGE. 2025b. Quarterly Continuous PNAD: unemployment drops in 18 of the 27 Federation Units in Q2 2025 (regional notes on informality).  [Online] Available at: https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/en/agencia-press-room/2185-news-agency/releases-en/44254-quarterly-continuous-pnad-unemployment-drops-in-18-of-the-27-federation-units-in-q2-2025  [accessed: 14 September 2025].    OECD. 2023. PISA 2022 – Country Note: Brazil. [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/pisa-2022-results-volume-i-and-ii-country-notes_ed6fbcc5-en/brazil_61690648-en.html  [accessed: 14 September 2025].    Reuters. 2025. Brazil’s jobless rate hits lowest yearly average ever in 2024.  [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazils-jobless-rate-hits-lowest-yearly-average-ever-2024-2025-01-31/  [accessed: 14 September 2025].    United Nations (UN). 2025. SDG Country Profile: Brazil  (UHC service coverage index). [Online] Available at: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/dataportal/countryprofiles/BRA  [accessed: 14 September 2025].    World Bank. 2024-2025. UHC Service Coverage Index (Indicator SH.UHC.SRVS.CV .XD) – Brazil (latest available value: 2021).  [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.UHC.SRVS.CV.XD  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025. Maternal mortality ratio (SH.STA.MMRT) – Brazil.  [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=BR   [accessed: 14 September 2025].  4 CANADA   4.1 Right to Education   Score: 4 – Strong legal framework and high enrolment, but some disparities remain.   Public schooling is compulsory (generally ages 6–16, varying by province/territory) and universally available without fees, with very high progression to secondary and strong quality signals (e.g., PISA). The 2022 PISA results show Canada well above OECD averages: 78% of 15-year-olds reached at least baseline proficiency in mathematics (Level 2+), with similarly strong reading and science performance – confirming overall quality and access (OECD, 2024).   However, there remain significant equity gaps for Indigenous learners and for learners in remote communities. Recent national analyses show lower high-school completion among First Nations, Inuit and Métis compared with non-Indigenous populations, with large geographic disparities; on-reserve completion has been about half in some data points (Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, 2024; Statistics Canada, 2025a).     4.2 Right to Health   Score: 4 – Broad coverage with some inequalities in access/outcomes.   Canada provides universal publicly funded health insurance; service coverage is among the highest globally (UHC service coverage index 91/100 in 2021), and life expectancy has largely recovered post-pandemic (81.7 years in 2023, both sexes) (Statistics Canada, 2025b; World Bank/WHO, 2023).   Maternal mortality remains relatively low by global standards for a high-income country, with recent modelled estimates around 12 deaths per 100,000 live births (World Bank Gender Data Portal, 2023) However, important inequities persist: Indigenous populations face substantially lower life expectancy and worse infant mortality than non-Indigenous Canadians, with new Statistics Canada series confirming sizeable gaps through 2016–2021 (Dion et al., 2024; Statistics Canada, 2025c).     4.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 4 – Solid framework and generally fair conditions, but enforcement gaps.   The legal framework for collective bargaining and association is robust (Canada ratified ILO Convention No. 98 in 2017), federal minimum wage is indexed and increased to C$18.00/hour on 1 April 2025, and union coverage remains high by OECD standards (around 30.4% of employees covered by a collective agreement in 2023) (Government of Canada, 2025; ILO, 2017; Statistics Canada, 2024a, 2024b).   Recent labour-market softness and cost-of-living pressures, however, have increased insecurity: the national unemployment rate reached around 6.9% mid-2025 (with pronounced youth unemployment), and concerns persist about precarious work and enforcement capacity in some sectors (Reuters, 2025; Statistics Canada, 2025d).     4.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 4 – Strong system, broad coverage; adequacy issues for some.   Canada’s social protection architecture is extensive (Old Age Security and Guaranteed Income Supplement; Canada/Quebec Pension Plans; Employment Insurance; Canada Child Benefit; provincial/territorial social assistance and disability supports).   Effective coverage across the life-cycle is high by global benchmarks (SDG indicator 1.3.1 framework), but adequacy concerns are evident in rising poverty since 2021 and record food insecurity in 2022–2023, signalling pressure on benefit levels and access, particularly for working-age households and single-parent families (Statistics Canada, 2024c; Statistics Canada, 2025e; UN SDG/ILO metadata).     4.5 Right to Housing   Score: 3 – Legal right recognised; major housing shortages or affordability crises.   Despite the National Housing Strategy Act (2019) recognising housing as a human right, outcomes have deteriorated: rental vacancy rates remain historically tight and rents elevated; CMHC’s latest reports show the average purpose-built rental vacancy at 2.2% in 2024 (up from a record-low 1.5% in 2023 but still below the 10-year average), with affordability pressures persisting (CMHC, 2024a; CMHC, 2025).   Core housing need is widespread and inequitable – around 11–12% of households by 2022 Canadian Housing Survey estimates, with affordability the main driver (CMHC, 2024b; Maytree, 2024). National PiT counts enumerated tens of thousands experiencing homelessness in 2024 across communities participating in federally coordinated counts (Infrastructure Canada, 2025).     4.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 3 – Legal recognition but food insecurity or water shortages affect many.   While access to safe drinking water is nearly universal for most Canadians, long-term drinking water advisories persist on public systems on many First Nations reserves (37–39 advisories in 35–37 communities through mid-/late-2025), showing stark inequities (Indigenous Services Canada, 2025; Statistics Canada, 2025f).   Food insecurity reached record highs: 22.9% of people (about 8.7 million) lived in food-insecure households in 2022, with particularly high rates among one-parent families and unattached working-age adults; 2023 data continue to show elevated risks for these groups (Statistics Canada, 2024b; Statistics Canada, 2025g).   Overall score (Canada): 3.7 / 5    The country performs very well in education and health, with universal frameworks and high global rankings, though equity gaps for Indigenous peoples and remote communities remain significant. Labour protections are robust and unionisation comparatively strong, but recent increases in unemployment and precarious work temper this strength. Social security coverage is extensive, yet adequacy challenges and rising poverty indicators highlight pressure on benefit levels. The most visible weaknesses are in housing and food/water, where affordability crises, homelessness, and persistent First Nations water advisories coincide with record household food insecurity. Taken together, Canada scores near the upper tier of the Barometer but falls short of full realisation, illustrating that a wealthy, high-capacity state can still struggle to close structural inequities.      References   Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC). 2024a. Fall 2024 Rental Market Report (Major Centres) . [Online] Available at: https://assets.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/sites/cmhc/professional/housing-markets-data-and-research/market-reports/rental-market-report/fall-2024/rental-market-report-fall-2024-en.pdf  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC). 2024b. Estimating Annual and Long-Term Flows In and Out of Core Housing Need . [Online] Available at: https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2025/schl-cmhc/NH18-33-83-2024-eng.pdf  [accessed: 14 September 2025]. ( Master record )    Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC). 2025. 2025 Mid-Year Rental Market Update . [Online] Available at: https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/observer/2025/2025-mid-year-rental-market-update  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (CAP). 2024. High school completion/graduation rates, Indigenous peoples, Census 2021 (Factsheet) . [Online] Available at: https://abo-peoples.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/High-school-graduation-Indigenous-Census-2021-CAP-RD-March-24th-2023-1.pdf  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Dion, P., Morissette, R. & Bougie, E. 2025. Life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rates of Indigenous populations in Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/250603/dq250603b-eng.htm  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Government of Canada (Employment and Social Development Canada). 2025. Increasing the federal minimum wage starting April 1, 2025 . [Online] Available at: https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/news/2025/02/increasing-the-federal-minimum-wage-starting-april-1-2025.html  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Indigenous Services Canada (ISC). 2025. Ending long-term drinking water advisories . [Online] Available at: https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1506514143353/1533317130660  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Infrastructure Canada. 2025. Everyone Counts 2024 – Highlights Report Part 1 . [Online] Available at: https://housing-infrastructure.canada.ca/homelessness-sans-abri/reports-rapports/pit-counts-dp-2024-highlights-p1-eng.html  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   International Labour Organization (ILO). 2017. Canada ratifies Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) . [Online] Available at: https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/canada-ratifies-collective-bargaining-convention  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Maytree. 2024. Below the Surface: What the latest Canadian Housing Survey data tells us about housing need . [Online] Available at: https://maytree.com/publications/below-the-surface-what-the-latest-canadian-housing-survey-data-tells-us-about-housing-need/  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   OECD. 2024. PISA 2022 Country Note: Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/pisa-2022-results-volume-i-and-ii-country-notes_ed6fbcc5-en/canada_901942bb-en.html  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Reuters. 2025. Canada unemployment rate rises to 6.9% in July 2025 . [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/canada-sheds-tens-thousands-jobs-tariffs-dent-hiring-plans-2025-08-08/  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Statistics Canada. 2024a. Collective bargaining coverage rate, 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/14-28-0001/2024001/article/00010-eng.htm  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Statistics Canada. 2024b. The Daily — Canadian Income Survey, 2022 . [Online] Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/240426/dq240426a-eng.htm  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Statistics Canada. 2024c. Modelled Market Basket Measure poverty rates for 2022 and 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/75f0002m/75f0002m2024001-eng.htm  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Statistics Canada. 2025a. High school completion for First Nations people, Métis, and Inuit, 2021 Census . [Online] Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/75-006-x/2025002/article/00002-eng.htm  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Statistics Canada. 2025b. The Daily — Deaths, 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/241204/dq241204a-eng.htm  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Statistics Canada. 2025c. The Daily — Life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rates of Indigenous populations in Canada . [Online] Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/250603/dq250603b-eng.htm  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Statistics Canada. 2025d. Labour Force Survey, October 2025 . [Online] Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/251107/dq251107a-eng.htm  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Statistics Canada. 2025e. Quality of Life Indicator: Poverty . [Online] Available at: https://www.statcan.gc.ca/hub-carrefour/quality-life-qualite-vie/prosperity-prosperite/poverty-pauvrete-eng.htm  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Statistics Canada. 2025f. Quality of Life Indicator: Drinking water . [Online] Available at: https://www.statcan.gc.ca/hub-carrefour/quality-life-qualite-vie/environment-environnement/drinking-water-eau-potable-eng.htm  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   Statistics Canada. 2025g. The Daily — Canadian Income Survey, 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/250501/dq250501b-eng.htm  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) / World Bank / WHO. 2023. Universal Health Coverage Service Coverage Index – Canada (value 91, 2021) . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.UHC.SRVS.CV.XD?locations=CA  [accessed: 14 September 2025].   World Bank Gender Data Portal. 2023. Canada – Gender Data Profile (including maternal mortality ratio, SH.STA.MMRT). [Online] Available at: https://genderdata.worldbank.org/en/economies/canada  [accessed: 14 September 2025].     5 CHINA    5.1 Right to Education   Score: 4 – Strong laws and high enrolment; disparities remain.   China guarantees nine years of compulsory education in law. In 2023, the Ministry of Education reported a 95.7% consolidation rate for compulsory schooling, with net primary enrolment above 99% and youth literacy essentially universal.   However, disparities remain. A major source of inequality is the hukou (household registration) system, which ties access to public services like schooling to a family’s place of official registration. Migrant children moving with their parents to cities often cannot attend regular urban public schools without meeting restrictive conditions and are sometimes diverted to under-resourced “migrant schools”. Local government research highlights both proactive measures to expand access and the barriers that persist in implementation (Zheng & Zhou, 2024; NBS, 2025)   Other studies show the presence of migrant children effects on household education spending patterns, underscoring systemic inequities (Zheng & Zhou, 2024). Rural–urban gaps in teacher quality, school funding, and progression beyond compulsory education remain significant. While select provinces perform strongly in PISA assessments, those results are not nationally representative.     5.2 Right to Health    Score: 4 – Broad coverage with some inequalities in access/outcomes.   China has achieved near-universal basic medical insurance, covering over 95% of the population (NHSA/SCIO, 2025). Life expectancy reached 78.2 years in 2023, and maternal mortality fell to the mid-teens per 100,000 live births (World Bank, 2025).   Nonetheless, inequalities remain. Out-of-pocket health spending is still significant, especially for rural households (World Bank, 2025). Urban residents have greater access to advanced care, while rural areas face shortages of facilities and trained staff.     5.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions    Score: 3 – Laws exist but weakly enforced; high unemployment or precarious work.   China has formal labour laws protecting minimum wages, working hours, and occupational safety. Yet enforcement is uneven, especially for migrant and informal workers.   Overall unemployment was around 5.1% in 2024 (NBS, 2025), but youth unemployment (16–24, excluding students) rose to nearly 19% in mid-2025 (Reuters, 2025). Informality remains widespread, with millions of workers in precarious, insecure jobs.     5.4 Right to Social Security    Score: 3 – Legal basis but limited coverage; major gaps remain.   China has expanded pensions, health, and unemployment insurance. Coverage is broad: contributory pensions reach most urban employees and a large share of residents (OECD, 2022; World Bank, 2023).   Yet adequacy and gaps remain. Urban employees receive higher benefits than residents, and migrant and informal workers often fall between schemes. Social assistance (Dibao) still covers over 40 million people, but benefit levels are modest relative to basic needs (UNICEF, 2024).     5.5 Right to Housing    Score: 3 – Legal right recognised; major shortages or affordability crises.   Homeownership is among the world’s highest (academic estimates commonly >80%, with survey-based figures around 93% in 2017), but affordability is strained in major cities and conditions for many migrants remain cramped (e.g., enterprise dormitories). Rights risks around forced evictions in redevelopment have been documented by human rights organisations.      5.6 Right to Food & Water    Score: 4 – Broad access but disparities between groups or regions.   China has made significant strides in eliminating hunger, with undernourishment below 2.5% and child stunting around 4% (Global Hunger Index, 2024).   Access to water and sanitation has improved dramatically but remains uneven: between 2000 and 2020, safely managed drinking water coverage rose from 45.7% to 91.3%, and sanitary toilets from 18.7% to 78.5%. Rural areas continue to lag behind urban areas, and eastern provinces maintain higher coverage than central and western regions (Li, Gong, Yin & Su, 2024).     Overall score (China): 3.5 / 5   China sits in the upper-middle range of the Barometer: broad protection in Education, Health, and Food & Water, alongside partial realisation in Work, Social Security, and Housing. Strong legal guarantees and near-universal basic services are tempered by persistent rural–urban and regional disparities, hukou-related barriers for migrant families, youth labour-market fragility, affordability pressures in major cities, and uneven benefit adequacy. Overall, China performs solidly but falls short of the top tier due to these structural inequities.     Notes on evidence & scope   PISA data in recent rounds cover only selected jurisdictions – Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang (B-S-J-Z) – and are not nationally representative. We therefore rely on legal guarantees and Ministry of Education system indicators for national-level claims. Health-financing burdens are illustrated with World Bank/WHO OOP metrics (country series).      References   Amnesty International. 2024. China – Country Report (Human Rights in China).  [Online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/asia-and-the-pacific/east-asia/china/report-china/  [accessed: 17 September 2025].   Financial Times (FT). 2025. China’s migrant dorm entrepreneur bets on demand for cheaper housing.  [Online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/47b4e2af-e1f9-442c-b811-937446231602  [accessed: 17 September 2025].   Global Hunger Index (GHI). 2024. China – Country Profile. [Online] Available at: https://www.globalhungerindex.org/china.html  [accessed: 17 September 2025].   Huang, Y., He, S. & Gan, L. 2020. Introduction to SI: Homeownership and housing divide in China, Cities , 108(102967). [Online] Available at: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7546956/  [accessed: 17 September 2025].   Li, S., Gong, A., Yin, Y. & Su, Q. 2024. Spatiotemporal characteristics and socioeconomic inequalities in water, sanitation, and hygiene access in China from 2000 to 2020: analysis of data from three national censuses, BMC Public Health , 24(3250). [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-024-20739-8  [accessed: 17 September 2025].   Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China (MOE). 2015. Compulsory Education Law of the People’s Republic of China (English translation). [Online] Available at: https://en.moe.gov.cn/documents/laws_policies/201506/t20150626_191391.html   [accessed: 17 September 2025].   National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). 2025. Statistical Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China on the 2024 National Economic and Social Development.  [Online] Available at: https://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202502/t20250228_1958822.html   [accessed: 17 September 2025].   National Healthcare Security Administration (NHSA) / State Council Information Office (SCIO). 2025. China’s basic medical insurance covers 95% of population. Xinhua . [Online] Available at: https://english.news.cn/20250724/c56018579bc645578bb20a657b444067/c.html   [accessed: 17 September 2025].   Reuters. 2025. China's youth jobless rate climbs to 18.9% in August . [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-youth-jobless-rate-climbs-189-august-2025-09-17/  [accessed: 17 September 2025].   UNICEF China. 2024. Budget Brief – Social Assistance (Dibao). [Online] Available at: https://www.unicef.cn/en/media/28346/file/Budget%20Brief%20-%20Social%20Assistance.pdf  [accessed: 17 September 2025].   World Bank. 2025. World Development Indicators: Out-of-pocket expenditure (% of current health expenditure) – China.  [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.OOPC.CH.ZS?locations=CN   [accessed: 17 September 2025].   World Bank/OECD. 2022/2023. China Economic Update: December 2023; Pensions at a Glance: Asia/Pacific 2022.  [Online] Available at: https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/cf2c1298e77c50bf1f1e7954ff560bc6-0070012023/original/China-Economic-Update-Dec23-EN.pdf  [accessed: 17 September 2025].   Zheng, X. & Zhou, Y. 2024. Are migrants a threat? Migrant children and human capital investments among local households in urban China, Humanities and Social Sciences Communications , 11: 672. [Online] Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-024-03199-8  [accessed: 17 September 2025]. 6 FRANCE    6.1 Right to Education   Score: 4 – Strong laws and high enrolment; disparities remain.   France guarantees free, compulsory education from ages 3 to 16 (Code de l’éducation). Enrolment is nearly universal in primary and secondary, with literacy at 99% among youth  (UIS, 2023).   In PISA 2022, 75% of 15-year-olds achieved baseline proficiency in maths  (OECD, 2023), close to the OECD average, but socio-economic disparities remain sharp: children of immigrant background and those from low-income households are less likely to achieve expected competencies (OECD, 2023). Regional inequalities also affect rural and overseas territories.     6.2 Right to Health   Score: 5 – Universal affordable healthcare; excellent outcomes; strong guarantees.   France has a universal health system (Assurance maladie) with high public coverage. Life expectancy was 82.5 years in 2023 , among the highest in the European Union (EU) (INSEE, 2025a; World Bank, 2024a).   The UHC service coverage index is 89/100  (World Bank/WHO, 2021). Maternal mortality is very low ( 8 per 100,000 live births in 2020 ) and infant mortality around 3.5 per 1,000  (INSEE, 2025b; World Bank, 2024b). While health disparities exist (notably in access to specialists in rural areas), overall outcomes and coverage justify a top score.     6.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 4 – Solid protections; generally fair conditions, but enforcement gaps.   France has comprehensive labour protections, strong unions, and a statutory minimum wage (SMIC), which rose to €11.65/hour in January 2025  (Ministère du Travail, 2025).   Unemployment has declined from double-digits a decade ago to 7.5% in mid-2025  (INSEE, 2025c).   Yet challenges remain: youth unemployment is still high ( 16% ), and informal/temporary contracts are prevalent, with labour-market duality between permanent and fixed-term workers (OECD, 2024). 6.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 5 – Comprehensive, universal and adequate social protection.   France’s welfare state provides broad coverage across pensions, unemployment, family benefits, and universal health. Social protection expenditure accounted for 31% of GDP in 2022 , the highest in the EU (Eurostat, 2024a). Coverage is nearly universal, with both contributory and non-contributory schemes. While debates about sustainability continue, adequacy and reach are among the strongest globally. 6.5 Right to Housing   Score: 3 – Legal right recognised; major housing shortages or affordability crises.   Housing is recognised as a right in French law (loi DALO, 2007), but access challenges remain acute. Homelessness affected an estimated 330,000 people in 2023 , nearly doubling since 2012 (Fondation Abbé Pierre, 2024).   Rental affordability has worsened, especially in Paris and other major cities, with average rent-to-income ratios exceeding 30%  for low-income households (Eurostat, 2024b). While strong legal guarantees exist, shortages and affordability issues justify a mid-level score. 6.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 5 – Universal safe water and adequate nutrition; strong protections.   France has virtually universal access to safely managed drinking water and sanitation ( >99%  of the population in 2022) (UN-Water/WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2023). Rates of undernourishment are negligible ( <2.5%) ( FAO, 2023).   Food insecurity rose modestly during inflationary pressures in 2022–2023 but remained limited compared to many countries; social programmes and food banks mitigate the impact (FAO, 2023). Overall, France achieves near-universal access to adequate food and water.     Overall Score (France): 4.3 / 5   France ranks at the top end of the Barometer, combining universal health care, robust social protection, and near-universal access to food, water, and education. Its welfare state and labour protections are among the strongest globally, underpinning high life expectancy, comprehensive safety nets, and broadly fair working conditions. The main constraints are structural inequalities, notably in educational outcomes by socio-economic status, persistent youth unemployment, and acute housing shortages and affordability crises despite strong legal guarantees. Overall, France demonstrates very high socio-economic rights protection, with housing standing out as the most significant weak spot.   References    Eurostat. 2024a. Social protection expenditure as % of GDP (indicator code tps00098) . [Online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/product/view/tps00098?lang=en   [accessed: 17 September 2025].    Eurostat. 2024b. Housing cost overburden rate (EU-SILC; dataset code ilc_lvho07a) . [Online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/product/view/ilc_lvho07a?lang=en   [accessed: 17 September 2025].    Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 2023. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023 . [Online] Available at: https://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/2023/en/ [accessed: 17 September 2025].    Fondation Abbé Pierre. 2024. 29e rapport sur l’état du mal-logement en France . [Online] Available at: https://www.fondationpourlelogement.fr/29e-rapport-sur-letat-du-mal-logement-en-france-2024/   [accessed: 17 September 2025].     INSEE. 2025a. Bilan démographique 2024 (life expectancy figures). [Online] Available at: https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/8327319 [accessed: 17 September 2025].     INSEE. 2025b. Un enfant sur 250 meurt avant l’âge d’un an en France (infant mortality) . [Online] Available at: https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/8547061 [accessed: 17 September 2025].    INSEE. 2025c. Chômage au sens du BIT – Résultats trimestriels (2025 T2).  [Online] Available at: https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/8627586 [accessed: 17 September 2025].     Ministère du Travail. 2025. Le SMIC (salaire minimum de croissance) – niveaux en vigueur autour du 1er janvier 2025 . [Online] Available at: https://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/le-smic-salaire-minimum-de-croissance [accessed: 17 September 2025]. See also INSEE monthly SMIC series: https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/serie/000879877 [accessed: 17 September 2025].    OECD. 2023. PISA 2022 Country Note: France.  [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/pisa/publications/PISA2022_CN_FRA.pdf [accessed: 17 September 2025].    OECD. 2024. OECD Economic Surveys: France 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-france-2024_bd96e2ed-en.html (PDF: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/07/oecd-economic-surveys-france-2024_ea032499/bd96e2ed-en.pdf ) [accessed: 17 September 2025].    UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). 2023. France – Education and literacy indicators . [Online] Available at: http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/fr [accessed: 17 September 2025].    UN-Water/WHO/UNICEF JMP. 2023. Household drinking water, sanitation and hygiene data portal (select “France”).  [Online] Available at: https://washdata.org/data/household [accessed: 17 September 2025].    World Bank. 2024a. Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – France ( SP.DYN.LE00.IN ) . [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=FR [accessed: 17 September 2025].    World Bank. 2024b. Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) – France (SH.STA.MMRT).  [Online] Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT?locations=FR [accessed: 17 September 2025].    World Bank/WHO. 2021. Tracking Universal Health Coverage: 2021 Global Monitoring Report.  [Online] Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240032090 [accessed: 17 September 2025].   7 GERMANY    7.1 Right to Education   Score: 4 – Strong laws and high enrolment; disparities remain.   Education is free and compulsory from ages 6 to 16 across Germany’s Länder, with near-universal enrolment in primary and lower secondary (UIS, 2023). Literacy among youth is essentially universal. In PISA 2022, 76% of students reached baseline proficiency in mathematics , slightly above the OECD average (OECD, 2023a).   However, socio-economic and migrant-background disparities remain acute, with children from disadvantaged households performing significantly below peers (OECD, 2023a). Early school leaving is low (9%), but regional variations persist between eastern and western states (Eurostat, 2024a).     7.2 Right to Health   Score: 5 – Universal, affordable health care with strong legal guarantees; excellent outcomes.   Germany has a statutory health insurance system covering 90%  of the population, with the remainder in private schemes, ensuring universal coverage (OECD, 2023b). The UHC service coverage index is 89/100  (World Bank/WHO, 2021).   Life expectancy was 80.8 years in 2023  (World Bank, 2024a), and maternal mortality is very low ( 3 per 100,000 live births ) (World Bank, 2024b). Infant mortality stands at 3.2 per 1,000  (Eurostat, 2024b). While some rural areas face doctor shortages, overall access and outcomes justify a top score.     7.3 Right to Work & Decent Labour Conditions   Score: 4 – Solid protections; generally fair conditions, but enforcement gaps.   Labour protections are robust: Germany enforces collective bargaining, strong worker participation, and a statutory minimum wage, raised to €12.41/hour in January 2025  (BMAS, 2025a).   Unionisation is lower than in Nordic states (16% of workers in 2023), but collective bargaining coverage remains high at 52%  (OECD, 2023c). Unemployment is among the lowest in the EU at 3.2% mid-2025  (Eurostat, 2024c). Yet precarious forms of work (mini -jobs, fixed-term contracts) are widespread, and wage gaps persist between eastern and western regions. 7.4 Right to Social Security   Score: 5 – Comprehensive, universal and adequate social protection.   Germany has one of the most extensive welfare systems globally, with contributory pensions, unemployment insurance, and extensive family, disability, and housing benefits. Social protection spending is high at 27% of GDP in 2022 , one of the top rates in the EU (Eurostat, 2024d). Coverage is near-universal, and adequacy levels are high, with poverty reduction effects well-documented. Structural debates remain (e.g., pension sustainability), but accessibility and adequacy support a “5”. 7.5 Right to Housing   Score: 3 – Legal right recognised; major housing shortages or affordability crises.   Germany faces an affordability and supply crisis in major cities. Average rent-to-income ratios exceed 30%  for low-income households, with rents rising rapidly in Berlin, Munich, and Hamburg (OECD, 2023d).   Homelessness numbers are high, and with a high level of variance between different estimates, depending on data collection methodologies, ranging between 263,000 and 607,000 people in 2022 , with refugee arrivals adding pressure (BAG W, 2023). Legal tenant protections are strong, but shortages and affordability challenges justify a “3”.     7.6 Right to Food & Water   Score: 5 – Universal access to safe water and adequate nutrition; strong protections.   Access to safe drinking water and sanitation is universal: 100% of households use safely managed drinking water and sanitation services  (UN-Water/WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2023).   Undernourishment is very low ( <2.5%) ( FAO, 2023). Food insecurity is among the lowest globally, though food bank usage has increased during inflationary spikes, affecting vulnerable groups (Tafel Deutschland, 2024). Nevertheless, national systems secure universal access.     Overall score (Germany): 4.3 / 5    Germany performs at a very high level across most socio-economic rights, anchored by universal health care, one of the world’s strongest welfare systems, and near-universal access to safe food and water. Education and labour protections are robust, though disparities remain for children from migrant or disadvantaged backgrounds and in the prevalence of precarious jobs. The most significant weakness lies in housing, where affordability crises in major cities and persistent homelessness contrast with otherwise strong protections. Overall, Germany demonstrates comprehensive protection of socio-economic rights, with housing standing out as the key area requiring urgent policy attention. References    BAG Wohnungslosenhilfe (BAG W). 2023. Zahl der wohnungslosen Menschen – Übersicht (Wohnungslosigkeit in Deutschland 2022).  [Online] Available at: https://www.bagw.de/de/themen/zahl-der-wohnungslosen/uebersicht  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    BMAS. 2025a. Allgemeiner gesetzlicher Mindestlohn  (current legal rate incl. 1 Jan 2025). [Online] Available at: https://www.bmas.de/DE/Arbeit/Arbeitsrecht/Mindestlohn/mindestlohn.html   [accessed: 5 September 2025].  (See also: Vierte Mindestlohnanpassungsverordnung (MiLoV4) confirming €12.41 from 1 Jan 2024 and €12.82 from 1 Jan 2025: https://www.bmas.de/DE/Service/Gesetze-und-Gesetzesvorhaben/vierte-mindestlohnanpassungsverordnung-milov4.html )    Eurostat. 2024a. Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) – edat_lfse_14.  [Online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/edat_lfse_14/default/table?lang=en  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    Eurostat. 2024b. Infant mortality rate – demo_minfind.  [Online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/product?code=demo_minfind&language=EN&mode=view  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    Eurostat. 2024c. Unemployment rate – monthly, seasonally adjusted (UNE_RT_M).  [Online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/product/view/une_rt_m  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    Eurostat. 2024d. Social protection expenditure, % of GDP (tps00098). [Online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00098/default/table?lang=en   [accessed: 5 September 2025].    FAO. 2023. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023.  [Online] Available at: https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/445c9d27-b396-4126-96c9-50b335364d01  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    OECD. 2023a. PISA 2022 – Country Note: Germany.  [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/pisa/publications/PISA2022CountryNoteGermany.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2025].    OECD. 2023b. 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The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) joined leading national and international stakeholders on 9 December 2025 for the inaugural Babita Deokaran Annual Lecture, hosted by Stellenbosch University’s School of Public Leadership and its Anti-Corruption Centre for Education and Research (ACCERUS). The event, held on the Bellville Park Campus, honoured the life, courage and sacrifice of whistle-blower Babita Deokaran, whose assassination in 2021 exposed the deep vulnerabilities faced by officials who act with integrity in the public interest.   ISI Chief Executive Officer, Daryl Swanepoel, addressed the gathering alongside government leaders, oversight institutions, academia, civil society, and several prominent whistle-blowers. In his remarks, Swanepoel emphasised that Babita’s murder was not an isolated tragedy, but a structural failure of South Africa’s whistle-blower protection regime. He argued that honouring her legacy requires more than symbolic gestures, it demands bold institutional reform.   Swanepoel called for the establishment of an independent, constitutionally anchored Office for Whistle-blower Protection, automatic protection triggers when disclosures are made, a secure digital reporting platform and a sustainably financed Whistle-blower Protection Fund. He stressed that whistle-blowers are the frontline of accountability, and that safeguarding them is a democratic imperative, not a bureaucratic courtesy.   The lecture brought together an impressive range of partners and speakers, as reflected in the programme: senior representatives from the Presidency, the Public Protector, the Public Service Commission, the Special Investigating Unit, the African Union Advisory Board Against Corruption, academic institutions and civil-society organisations including OUTA and IMPSA. Their contributions collectively underscored the urgent need to rebuild public trust through stronger systems of transparency, professional public administration and citizen protection.   ISI is proud to have contributed to this important inaugural lecture and remains committed to advancing ethical governance and strengthening South Africa’s anti-corruption architecture. As Swanepoel noted, “We cannot bring Babita back, but we can ensure that her courage becomes a foundation for a more honest and accountable state.”

On 8 December 2025, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) participated in, and chaired, an international dialogue on China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI). The session formed part of the Open Consultation Monday  series hosted by the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN), and attracted participants from across multiple continents.   The consultation explored one of the most pressing questions in contemporary international affairs: Is China filling a global leadership vacuum, or reshaping the rules of global governance in line with its own interests? These questions resonated strongly with the event’s theme: “Dissecting China’s Global Governance Initiative.”   ISI Chief Executive Officer Daryl Swanepoel chaired the session and delivered the opening analytical remarks, setting out the structural context in which the GGI has emerged. His presentation drew on the Institute’s ongoing work on multilateral reform and Global South agency, and offered a balanced, thought-provoking reading of China’s ambitions.   Key themes from the ISI presentation included a system frozen in 1945 and a vacuum created by stalled reform; China’s motivations: both corrective and strategic; global reactions reflect strategic anxieties more than principles; the Global South’s distinctive and pragmatic reading; and the future of multilateralism: adaptation or fragmentation.   The consultation saw extensive engagement from diplomats, academics and former UN officials. Participants interrogated questions of legitimacy, multipolarity, international law and the risks of parallel global systems. The discussion highlighted both the opportunities and uncertainties created by China’s expanding role in multilateral affairs.   This event forms part of the ISI’s broader commitment to shaping debates on inclusive multilateral reform, strengthening Global South agency and contributing to practical pathways for building a fairer international order.

The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) was established in 1961, with the aim of providing a nursery of ideas on what direction Nigeria should take on international affairs. Since inception, the Institute has been organising Conferences, Roundtables and Lectures. These are aimed at addressing current foreign policy issues and anticipating others still on the horizon. The Institute is a specialised instrument of foreign policy formulation in Nigeria. It serves as an intellectual base upon which decision-makers rely for informed opinion and expert advice to make rational choices between contending policy options. NIIA is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. ​ The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever-transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. ​ Whilst the institute undertakes research through the lens of social and national democratic values and principles, it is pragmatic, not dogmatic, in its approach.

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) took part in the African Union’s 5th APRM Youth Symposium, held from 10–11 November 2025 at the Pan-African Parliament in Midrand. The event brought together young leaders, policymakers and governance institutions from across the continent to reflect on the Symposium’s central theme, “Youth in Governance: From Promise to Prosperity.”   Attending in his capacity as CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute, Mr Daryl Swanepoel welcomed the Symposium’s strong emphasis on meaningful youth participation in Africa’s governance and development agenda. He noted that the APRM had succeeded in creating a platform not only for dialogue, but also for evidence-based engagement on the continent’s most pressing youth issues.   As part of the Institute’s contribution to the event, the ISI partnered with The Ichikowitz Family Foundation to facilitate the presentation of the Africa Youth Survey 2024, a comprehensive study capturing the attitudes, aspirations and concerns of young Africans. The survey’s findings were delivered during a dedicated session of the Symposium, offering delegates a data-driven understanding of youth perspectives on governance, democracy, economic inclusion, peace and security, and digital participation.   Mr Swanepoel underscored the value of grounding youth policy deliberations in rigorous empirical evidence. He reflected that the Survey’s insights, particularly around trust in institutions, expectations of political leaders, and the urgent need for economic opportunity, resonate strongly with the Institute’s ongoing work on inclusive governance and social cohesion. He further emphasised that Africa’s young population represents both the continent’s greatest asset and its greatest responsibility, and that governance systems must evolve to reflect this demographic reality.   The ISI applauds the APRM for advancing a continental conversation centred on youth inclusion and looks forward to continued collaboration with partners to strengthen evidence-based policymaking. The Institute will remain engaged in follow-up processes linked to the Symposium’s outcome document, particularly those aimed at deepening participatory governance and amplifying young people’s voices within Africa’s democratic institutions.   The Inclusive Society Institute extends its appreciation to The Ichikowitz Family Foundation for its partnership and for ensuring that the voices of Africa’s youth, captured through their robust continental research, were heard where it matters most.

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DevelopmentAid is the world’s premier information service provider for international development aid and economic and humanitarian assistance stakeholders. Our mission is to provide up-to-date and critically relevant information for donors, agencies, consultancies, non-government agencies, and individuals working the international development sector. DevelopmentAid is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

The Centre for International Policy – Africa is an independent, non-partisan, not-for-profit organization which aims at broadening the knowledge of international policy and affairs on the continent. The Centre aims to act as a resource for African governments and regional policy-makers to make informed and better foreign and public policy decisions for the betterment of Africa and the welfare of their people. Secondarily, the Centre also aims to promote the participation of academia, business executives, civil society, religious leaders, media and other key stakeholders in the process of decision making. The Centre is a succinct regional think-tank that analyses pressing regional and global challenges and contributes to actionable steps that leaders and citizens can adapt to address them. The centre consists of and is staffed by current and former national and international public policy practitioners, academia and experts who provide in-depth knowledge and skills in specialized areas such as diplomacy, regional integration, security, economics, media and the Sustainable Development Goals. In terms of methodology, CIP-Africa aims to stir up debate of international issues through research and publications, dialogues, media shows, build capacity and contribute actionably to the international development and global governance agenda through strategic projects, partnerships and trainings on the organizations focus areas. CIP-Africa is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

Mashariki Research and Policy Centre (MRPC) is a non-profit, interdisciplinary, and independent think tank headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya. MRPC is a security foresight-oriented institution that informs policy and action through tailored evidence-based analysis in the Greater Eastern Africa region. It provides insights derived from forecasting, trends analysis, simulations and scenario development to anticipate threats in the evolving geostrategic landscape in the fields of conflict trends, geopolitical shifts and environmental security. Since its inception, MRPC has produced research on key regional issues, including the security implications of the EU-Kenya Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the ongoing conflicts in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the impact of Trump-era tariffs on East Africa’s trade resilience. MRPC has also provided training on Preventing and Counter Violent extremism (PCVE) to strengthen counterterrorism efforts within the Eastern Africa region and supported governments with evidence-based forecasts and strategic analysis, solidifying its role as a leader in anticipatory governance in the region. MRPC is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

The Africa Policy Institute (API) is dedicated to policy-relevant research and analysis to inform policy-making, contribute practical ideas and solutions to Africa’s problems and to define the continent’s future. Founded in 2007, the Institute leverages its board, centres, knowledge hubs, experts, networks and partners to deliver on its grand vision of a peaceful and prosperous Africa in a just and equitable world. Through research and analysis, policy dialogue and advocacy, training and capacity development, technical and advisory services, API endeavours to bridge the gap between knowledge and policy-making and to inform policy action by governments, regional and global organisations and Africa’s international partners. Covering diverse issues in development, diplomacy, governance, security and geostrategy, the Institute has become a thought leader in China-Africa relations, the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa and climate Change. API's mission is to promote good governance, sustainable development, peace, and prosperity in Africa through research, policy analysis, capacity building, advocacy, and fostering regional and global cooperation. Conducting research and analysis to inform evidence-based policies and decision-making processes in Africa, focusing on governance, development, and security issues. API is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

The Institute for Strategic and Policy Studies is a national Non-Governmental Organization registered by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RCC) of Government of South Sudan under Chapter 3, Section 10 of NGOs Act, 2016. It was issued with Certificate of Registration by RRC. The Institute for Strategic and Policy Studies (ISPS) aims to foster greater understanding of the current issues through non-partisan Research and policy analysis, educational services, humanitarian support for the needy population in South Sudan and promotion of arts, music and culture in South Sudan. It aims to assist in capacity building of relevant institutions and individuals in respect to developmental fields. ISPS aims to promote informed and accountable policy and practice that responds to the needs, and well-being of the people of South Sudan. ISPS is aligned with the work of the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) by promoting development coordination between and within Think tanks in the Global South. It also emphasises the importance of inclusive dialogue and representation in global governance, advocating for the voices of marginalized communities to be heard and considered in decision-making processes.

The Transatlantic Institute for South-South Cooperation (TISSC) is a think tank that aims to strengthen South-South transatlantic cooperation, along the Cape Town, Dakar, and Rio de Janeiro axis. Three sub-regions, two continents, and enormous potential for South-South cooperation are at stake. Africa occupies a significant part of its discussions. Its relations with the South American continent and the Caribbean, with which it shares a common destiny, are a key element of its concerns. These regions have converging interests related to maritime geography, cultural history, and the geopolitics of the Global South, which are experiencing renewed interest. In short, it is a rich and unexpected area of regional, continental, transatlantic, and South-South reflection and activity. Its action plan is firmly aligned with the guidelines of the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOCSS). Affiliated with the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), the Africa Think Tank Dialogue (ATD), and the Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN), the TISSC shares their commitment to inclusive multilateralism, equity in addressing environmental challenges, and reforms in global financial governance. The TISSC is a progressive movement resolutely committed to structuring the Global South.

Occasional Paper 14/2025   Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   OCTOBER 2025   Dr Klaus Kotzé BA Social Dynamics, BSocSci Honours Political Communication, Master in Global Studies, PhD Rhetoric Studies Abstract   Thirty years into South Africa’s democratic project, the constitutional promise of participatory governance remains largely unrealised, because whilst the 1996 Constitution enshrines equality, accountability and public involvement, democratic practice has stagnated. Power has become concentrated within political elites and party structures, while citizens have retreated into passivity, thereby reducing democracy to episodic elections. This paper introduces republican constitutionalism as a normative and practical framework to revitalise South Africa’s democracy by re-centring authority in the country’s citizenry. Moreover, by building on transformative and participatory constitutionalism, republican constitutionalism insists that sovereignty should not be a static legal status, but rather, it should be an active, lived practice, which calls for a vigilant, engaged citizenry that demands justification for state action and participates in shaping public life.   This paper diagnoses the systemic failures, centralisation of executive power, weakened institutions and civic disengagement within the South African context. It situates these deficiencies within the historical patterns of exclusion and elite dominance and then goes on to explore how republican constitutionalism can operationalise constitutional ideals through concrete measures, such as the strengthening of local autonomy via subsidiarity, the reforming of the electoral system to introduce constituency-based representation and the institutionalising of public-private partnerships that serve to enhance governance capacity, but in a way that it does not undermine accountability within the governance system. By drawing on historical precedents from the Afrikaner and Black republican traditions, the paper argues for an inclusive and contemporary republicanism, which should be rooted in the country’s constitutional values and ubuntu, which it does by reframing democracy as a shared ethical and political responsibility, with the decentralising of power and the embedding of accountability at every level of governance.   Keywords:  Republican constitutionalism, Participatory democracy, Transformative constitutionalism, South African Constitution, Democratic renewal, Electoral reform, Local autonomy, Ubuntu, Citizen engagement, Decentralisation of power Introduction   After three decades of South African democracy, the citizenry has become detached and estranged from the active civic role the constitution anticipates. Elections have come to represent the only real channel of democratic engagement. The daily work of interrogating and shaping public life has largely been usurped, or left to, political elites. As a result, South African democracy has become unresponsive and unaccountable to the majority of citizens, who are left alienated and disempowered to influence the decisions that affect them.   This position paper proposes republican constitutionalism as a theoretical approach to recentre power to the citizen and revive democracy. As a contemporary expression of people’s power – directed not against  but through the state – it offers a corrective measure to overcentralised, party-centred politics. Given that the democratic order has tended to concentrate power within parties and the executive, a republican constitutionalist approach argues that citizens must practice and embody democracy in their daily lives. This approach reclaims political participation beyond the confines of episodic elections. It holds that power is not merely distributed but claimed and exercised collectively.   The Constitution is South Africa’s lodestar. Yet too little is being done to give expression to its ideals. Rather than waiting for state actors, citizens must employ the constitutional framework to assert their role in public life and demand openness, accountability and justification. Republican constitutionalism, as presented in this paper, proposes a pathway to embrace the Constitution as a living document. It promises to catalyse a people-centred politics that does not see citizens as rights takers, but as active players in reviving democratic energy.     Failures: Centralisation and citizen inaction   Democratic Stagnation South African democracy faces myriad challenges. Instead of strengthening and expanding, South Africa’s democratic gains have plateaued following the transition. Though formally established and functioning in many respects, South Africa’s democracy has not given expression to the Constitutional goals. It has not escaped the deep-seated legacies of the past.   Professor Steven Friedman explores the causes for and nature of South Africa’s democratic stagnation. South Africa’s political and economic institutions are deeply influenced by the past (Friedman, 2021). There is a path dependence in that patterns of exclusion, inequality, power relations and social structure persist from apartheid and colonialism. The negotiated settlement which brought equal rights has not led to the major economic and cultural reforms needed to give effect to democratic ideals. It has not sufficiently challenged existing hierarchies. Persisting structural inequality severely limits the extent to which society can transform. Furthermore, due to economic exclusion and spatial inequality, many South Africans remain outsiders in their own country. They do not have the influence, nor the voice, to effectively participate in the political process and thereby contribute to democratisation (ibid).   The Constitution established democracy. It put in place the ideas and ideals to which to strive. But while procedural democracy established the rule of law and civil liberties, it has not substantively addressed the myriad disparities. To do so would require substantial political as well as societal will.   The elite power, social norms and values formed under apartheid remain dominant. Democracy did not sufficiently change the institutional structure in South Africa. Many of the old institutions remain with minimal transformation. This continues to serve the privileged. The lack of substantive democratisation - adding real layers, meaning and culture to the democratic spirit and giving it substance and character - has resulted in formal but not practical democratic freedoms. The result is that in practice most people cannot exercise their rights; they cannot participate meaningfully or have their voices heard. To Friedman, South Africa has not developed the mechanisms to attend to the inherent tensions between the demands for social justice and existing hierarchies. When these tensions accumulate, they do not get addressed; rather the old patterns are reinforced (ibid).   South Africa remains a bifurcated society. Rather than expanding the meaning of democratic citizenship, pre-existing structures of power and economy endure. Some see this as a constitutional failure. Instead, it is the failure of the state and its citizens to implement what is needed. Democratic stagnation has set in. To escape this impasse, a new debate is needed to rekindle democracy and empower citizens.        State failures South Africa’s democracy has been dominated by political elites and mediated through party structures, with little space for citizen participation. Weak political parties and fragile institutions have undermined state capacity and fostered inertia. The politicisation has become an instrument of party power, creating dependency.   Ivor Chipkin notes that weak capacity is systemic and often results from the politicisation of the bureaucracy. Inconsistent standards in hiring and performance, as well as poor service delivery and oversight, reveal both a suspicion of competence and a lack of accountability. Weak institutional capacity and inadequate institutional machinery explain why so much of the state functions as a box-ticking exercise. Why so few take responsibility beyond procedure (Chipkin, 2023).   There is a clear gap between what policies and laws demand and the state’s capacity to deliver. Much like the Constitutional aims, laws and policies prescribe lofty tasks where the state simply does not have sufficient technical ability. Formal democratic institutions have become detached from the lived realities of citizens.   The government’s response to failures has typically been to consolidate power. The crises at State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the state capture scandal clearly illustrate excessive power centralisation. Roger Southall, in Liberation Movements in Power: Party & State in Southern Africa  (2013), examines how liberation movements in Southern Africa have typically seen themselves as the legitimate embodiment of the state. This leads to the centralised authority within the party, conflating party and state. Once in power, parties marginalise grassroots democratic movements and privilege loyalty over accountability. According to Southall, the ANC’s claim to authority as the liberation movement has been used to resist criticism and narrow the democratic space (Southall, 2013.)   Under the Zuma presidency, executive authority was concentrated in the presidency. The president controlled the appointment of ministers and SOE boards. By bringing the State Security Agency and Hawks under his direct control, it meant that investigations into corruption were selectively pursued or blocked.   The cabinet offered little check on presidential power, while Parliament functioned largely as a party loyalist body rather than a watchdog. The Nkandla scandal, in which state funds were illicitly used to unduly benefit Zuma’s homestead, exemplifies Parliament’s failure to hold the president accountable. It refused to act on the Public Protector’s findings. The extensive failures of MPs to investigate irregularities at SOEs such as ESKOM and SAA, now part of the State Capture saga, shows how executive excess went unchecked.   Centralisation of power is not unique to Zuma. Apart from President Mandela, who diffused power, ANC presidents have moved to consolidate power. The ANC’s cadre deployment committee has long run a parallel process for filling senior positions (Matiwane, 2022). The party has also taken de facto control of other state appointments. This undermines the principle of a professional, impartial civil service (Section 195 of the Constitution), hollowing out of state capacity.   While presenting himself as a reformer, President Ramaphosa has continued this trend, centralising power beyond the post-1994 settlement’s vision. He has amplified and expanded his presidential powers by involving the presidency in nearly every policy area; effectively creating a super presidency by establishing parallel structures, such as the Presidential Climate Commission. These structures often bypass his own ministries. Justified as a means to address state capacity, this consolidates power without adequate accountability.   Rather than practicing cooperative governance, the ANC has entrenched a top-down power command structure. Citizen participation is largely symbolic, not decisive. This elevates politicians above citizens, limiting transparency and accountability. In times of crises or incapacity, the response is to close ranks rather than open governance.   The concentration of power at the top has led to local government failures. Though municipalities are supposed to be autonomous, they are very often dominated by provincial and national party structures. Local decision-making is stifled, and accountability is weakened.   State failure goes beyond corruption and incompetence. It is actively reinforced by excessive concentration of political power in the executive and ruling party. A weakened Parliament, hollowed state institutions, and an incapacitated public service have contributed to democratic stagnation. Citizen acquiescence It is insufficient to blame South Africa’s democratic shortcomings solely on politicians. The citizenry has failed to maintain and to deepen democracy. The post-transition period has seen broad civic passivity, apart from protests largely driven by lower-income groups. Whereas the anti-apartheid struggle was largely powered by people’s power (unions, churches, youth movements), the post-apartheid South Africa has seen civic engagement decline. This is partly due to the ANC’s initial legitimacy following liberation and weakening of civic structures, leaving few channels for participatory, bottom-up democracy.   The Chapter 9 institutions, established as democracy-supporting institutions or a fourth arm of the state to empower citizens, have not been sufficiently engaged. Voter loyalty has maintained the ANC in power despite poor governance and poor service delivery.   While South Africans possess an many mechanisms for participatory power, very few use them in practice. Awareness, knowledge, and skills to engage meaningfully remain marginal. Instead, dependency on the state has become the norm. The Constitution provides for spaces like ward committees and public hearings, yet these are often seen as symbolic; with political parties seen as the real the domains of influence.   The influential community organisations of the 1980s and 1990s have declined or disappeared. Some have migrated into the NGO sector without strong foundations. Citizens continue to struggle to achieve political ends outside formal party structures. Rather than organising collectively, many withdraw from political engagements. Or they rely on the courts. While judicial action is important, legal dependency neglects the power of citizen movements. Courts are slow, costly, and reactive     Solutions: Recentring power to the citizen   If the democratic order’s systemic breakdown lies in concentrated power among political elites, then its renewal lies in power’s diffusion.    Direct citizen participation, the bottom-up democracy of the UDF’s approach, must find renewed expression today. Whereas apartheid’s illegitimacy was a clear target, contemporary grievances are more diffuse. Corruption, inequality, and unaccountability are all single vectors, not a systemic whole. Strategically, the focus should shift from opposition to affirmation. The legitimacy of the democratic state, its founding, institutions and ideals must be actively pursued. Actively lobbied. The constitution is the lodestar.    South Africa is not merely a state. It is a Republic, from the Latin meaning “concern of the people” or “belonging to the people.” As the term “citizen” implies belonging to the city, so too the Republic belongs to the people, and the people to the Republic. This citizen-centred order gives republicanism contemporary relevance as an expression of people’s power.  Republicanism is about enacting freedom. It demands an active and vigilant citizenry to enact legitimacy, to pursue accountability. It rejects passive dependence on political elites.   Drawing from the grassroots democracy of the anti-apartheid movement, republicanism envisages people claiming power, not opposing the state. It calls for a bottom-up democratic order where institutions are solicited, checks and balances prevent power concentration, and politicians held accountable. Republicanism rejects the government as the sole locus of power. Instead, power is dispersed across legislative bodies, the judiciary, civic institutions and local communities. The focus only on political offices is itself an aberration of the constitutional state.   These republican ideals are found in South Africa’s constitutional design. For several reasons (party dominance, party ideology, political centralisation) republicanism remains unrealised. Here the constitution must find expression.     Previous republicanisms   A strategic turn to republicanism promises to activate South Africa’s constitutional principles. To chart a path forward, it is useful to reflect on earlier republican iterations in South Africa. Doing so offers a rare opportunity to reconcile disparate historical experiences. Building a united, contemporary approach. Afrikaner republicanism and Black republicanism were both responses to existing power structures, were pursuant of principles, and were determined towards civil empowerment. Both were also reactions to changes in power relations in a new political reality. Both offer relevant insights for today.     Afrikaner republicanism   (White) Afrikaner republicanism emerged in the 19 th century. Fusing European republican and self-rule ideas in a distinct settler colonial context.  Developed as a reaction to British colonial rule, Afrikaner republicanism sought civic empowerment from British rule; they actively pursued their own interests.   Loyal to a collective identity and in pursuit of Calvinist theology and mythology, Afrikaner republicanism was conceptualised as a religious duty to protect and advance their own. It expressed itself in the desire for self-determination; independence from imperial interference (Giliomee, 2003).   This vision found concrete expression in the independent Boer republics, the Transvaal and Orange Free State, where interests were consolidated into a coherent state ideology, an active expression of independence.     Black republicanism Black republicanism sought a political order grounded in black self-determination. Similar to Afrikaner republicanism, it started as a response to misgovernance and exclusion. Earlier expressions of black republicanism can be traced to African intellectuals hailing from mission-educated circles. Politically mobilising in a principled pursuit for self-expression, it resisted race-based exclusion and persecution. Leaders such as John Tengo Jabuva and Pixley ka Isaka Seme articulated Pan-Africanist views. Positing that Africans both have the right and the capacity to govern themselves. (Lodge, 1983).   Freedom as non-domination, true popular sovereignty, was their central goal. The approach later became guided by the black consciousness movement, which emphasised psychological liberation as a precondition for civil freedom. Whereas Afrikaners had the means and liberties to build civic institutions, black republicanism, which was morphed into a broader democratic republicanism pursuing inclusive terms under the Freedom Charter, was driven by mass democratic movements such as civic associations and trade unions. While its realisation remains lacking, black republicanism found concrete expression in the new constitutional order which recognised the people as sovereign.      Towards a contemporary republicanism   Republicanism today exists in a space. Some opinions focus on the legal constitutional dimensions, others stress autonomy, while still others rally around grassroots organisations. The different views do not preclude a unified approach.   The debate has largely moved on. Equality, inclusivity and representation have been enshrined in the Constitution. The challenge is to turn form into function. To move beyond procedural democracy and make constitutional ideals real. To enact true, experienced transformation.     Transformative constitutionalism remains one of the most influential concepts in South African legal scholarship. Former Chief Justice Pius Langa championed this teleological framework for a just and equitable future. He explained how the constitution should serve as a tool for ongoing economic, social and legal transformation (Langa, 2006). Broad-based transformation, through reconciliation and access to justice should be made real. Not only procedural. This approach, as guided by the injunction of the constitution’s preamble to “recognise the injustices of the past…heal the divisions of the past” (South African Government, 1996) establishes transformation as a permanent, ongoing ideal.   Langa held that constitutional culture cannot simply be about obedience to the law – passive and unengaged. With a sovereign citizenry, state authority cannot summarily be imposed. Power must be justified, with reference to constitutional values. The work of Etienne Mureinik on the power of justification is at the heart of Langa’s framing of transformative constitutionalism. To Mureinik, every law and every act must substantively serve the citizenry. All power must be explained, must be justified. In South Africa, the power of justification is transformative (Mureinik, 1994). It establishes an ongoing relationship between the citizenry and the state.   Not only must power be justified, but it also requires an interrogating citizenry. If the government is to justify its decisions and actions, the citizen must have a meaningful opportunity to participated and deliberate. This is the participative democracy that the constitution makes requirements for under Sections 59, 72 and 118 (South African Government, 1996).   Participation is essential. Landmark judgments such as Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly  (2006) and Matatiele Municipality v President  (2006) confirm that public participation must be substantive. Participatory constitutionalism animates the culture of justification.   Substantive engagements between citizens and their representatives promise to shift democracy from episodic elections to an everyday practice where people participate on an ongoing basis. Justification promises accountability.       Republican constitutionalism   Republican constitutionalism builds upon the transformative and participatory frameworks. Mamphela Ramphele writes that too many South Africans treat democracy as if it were delivered by the state. Citizens wait for the state and consider episodic voting as their sole democratic duty (Ramphele, 2012). Yet, citizenship is not about entitlements. Citizens are not the clients of the state but co-rulers. They must actively exercise their responsibility and participate in shaping society (Ramphele, 2012).   Republican constitutionalism extends beyond liberal rights, which define citizenship merely as a legal status. It envisions a model where a republican ethos of vigilance, insistence on justification, and active involvement in governance prevails. At its core, a people-centred approach that stresses popular sovereignty.    The capture of the democratic project by party politics is a betrayal of the Constitution’s vision. The republican approach, whereby citizens reclaim their political subjectivity, is an assertion of autonomy from party-political or governmental control.   Republican constitutionalism offers a response to the failures of the democratic project. It provides a credible way to give expression to the Constitution’s aspirations. A contemporary, inclusive republicanism need not pursue only negative freedoms, as seen in Afrikaner and Black republicanism. Its pursuit should not only be limited to constraining executive dominance but should focus on broadening democratic life. With the Constitution as lodestar, republicanism can be reframed as an active process, one that pursues positive freedoms in everyday life.   Such an approach extends beyond formal institutions. It draws from Afrikaner republicanism's insistence on independence and unites it with Black republicanism’s emphasis on universal suffrage to establish an inclusive sovereignty. In so doing, it decentralises power: each citizen becomes a node of accountability, collectively opposing the arbitrary exercise of authority.   Pursuant of principles, constitutional republicanism moves the debate from form to function, focusing on governance, participation and accountability. Whereas earlier republicanisms opposed the system and viewed democracy as something to be won, democratic culture today must be practised in the present through shared leadership. It must be built through justification and oriented toward the common good. Instead of a single Volk, the republican identity is rooted in the constitutional values such as equality and dignity.   Republicanism insists that no one rules alone. The devolution of power, understood as relational between individuals, is a true expression of ubuntu. Ubuntu is grounded in mutual recognition, care and solidarity. It affirms the individual’s inalienable connection to the community. Ubuntu sees participation not as a duty imposed from the outside, but as an ethical response to belonging to a community. Shared life is the basis of political legitimacy.   South African democracy needs revitalisation through ubuntu, not only through elite bargains. While many fora and community initiatives are establishing laudable civic-driven solutions, such as fixing potholes or supporting local clinics, these should be driven by ubuntu, not captured by private or business interests. Initiatives that respond to state failure by serving private interests alone (e.g. private security) do not offer equitable or sustainable solutions to democratic stagnation. They fail to address the consolidation of power and public disillusionment. Such examples of elite capture avoid the root causes of democratic decay and risk precipitating systemic socio-political collapse.   Walking away from the state is not an option. Nor is it outsourcing agency and responsibility to private actors. The state will be empowered when the citizenry is collectively empowered.      Active citizenry: Giving expression to constitution   Active citizenry is more than symbolic. It is the most direct way to make the Constitution come alive in everyday life. From reporting issues to standing for public office, there are many ways to substantiate public life.  The Constitution provides for involvement in Parliament, provincial legislatures, and municipal councils. Community-based organisations such as school governing bodies and ward committees are spaces where citizens co-govern.   Citizens should not wait for the government to enact public participation processes. They must actively engage political process, including by pursuing:       Greater local autonomy Subsidiarity is the principle that demands decisions to be taken closest to the people. While not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, subsidiarity is an important concept in the constitutional design. Read together, Sections 151(3) and 151(4) of the Constitution entrench municipalities right to govern their own affairs, subject to national and provincial oversight only where necessary (South African Government, 1996).   Too often, municipal authority is undermined and usurped by higher spheres of power. Local decisions are overridden or stalled by provincial departments. Party politics lead to local interference, and capacity issues are used to justify top-down control. These actions erode accountability and obscure responsibility, leaving citizens in the dark.   Local authority can function better by reinforcing municipal self-government. Clearer limits on provincial oversight will create the conditions for genuine autonomy. An autonomy that depends on the requisite local skills and resources. It is critical to invest in local government training and retain professional skills locally. Communities can also develop frameworks where national government, universities and the private sector second professionals into the municipal systems.   When local governments are empowered, public participation becomes more practicable. When the chain of contact is shortened, when citizens see their inputs driving local decision-making, trust and cooperative relationships can grow.   Citizens should become directly involved in the business of politics. They must seek active involvement in ward committees, ratepayers’ associations and other fora to strengthen local oversight. Municipal budgets and service-delivery plans can then be monitored, and integrated development plans influenced to reflect community priorities. Such actions drive accountability from the lowest point possible.    A third, hybrid approach combining public and private participation is already developing in South Africa. This approach emerges where citizens step into vacuums left by the state. Filling potholes, forming community policing forums, or drilling boreholes where taps have run dry. These initiatives show civic energy and innovation.   However, at the risk of deepening inequality and establishing unaccountable structures, it is critical that these initiatives work with the state, not against it. Every effort must be made to institutionalise public-private partnerships with municipalities. The example of Business for South Africa (B4SA) offers a successful example for municipalities to emulate. B4SA has raised private sector funds for targeted initiatives, supporting technical experts and helping to solve acute problems.   When citizens commit to and invest in local public-private initiatives – beyond private services benefitting only themselves - they give effect to local autonomy and strengthen local governance capacity. For example, citizens can help municipalities improved procurement and service-tracking systems, thereby enhancing transparency and reducing undue provincial interference.     Electoral reform Appropriate reform of the electoral system stands to significantly move authority closer to the citizenry. The Electoral Reform Consultation Panel (ERCP) was established by Parliament in 2023 to study possible reforms, consult the public, and make recommendations for a more legitimate and accountable electoral system. Established in accordance with the Electoral Amendment Act of 2023, the ERCP is the most authoritative electoral reform panel to date.   On 18 September, the ERCP reports were tabled before Parliament. The panel submitted both an original as well as an alternative report. The key difference lies in their recommendations. Whereas the original report explicitly recommends reform that will give expression to greater political accountability, the alternative found that the current system, with minor tweaks, could be maintained. Parliament should now be lobbied to reject the latter.   The original report aligns with the arguments made in this paper. It makes a compelling case for reviving citizen-centred democracy in South Africa. It “strongly recommends that Parliament consider electoral reform to strengthen the relationship between voters and their representatives” (Home Affairs, 2025). It proposes that South Africa adopt a hybrid electoral model that retains proportional representation but introduces constituencies -  either with smaller multi-member or single-member constituencies (ibid). The recommendations are proposed “in light of the findings and concerns emerging from public consultations … we heard the same concerns over and over again. Across provinces, languages, stakeholder groups, rural and urban locations – the lack of accountability was the common theme” (ibid, 120 and 112).   The report presents a foundation for a republican-constitutionalist future. Not only is it influenced by public participation, but it also seeks to address democratic weaknesses by moving the political power closer to the citizen.  Constituency-based reform would not merely tweak representation but could help revive democracy along republican lines.   Under the current purely proportional representation system, voters do not directly elect Parliamentarians. Representatives are accountable upward to their parties, not downward to the voters. This arrangement fuels alienation. Parliament, controlled by parties, is distant and unresponsive to local concerns. Citizens thus become passive participants in episodic elections. Party centralism leads to power accumulation at the top, to party structures and to the government’s executive.   Constituency-based electoral systems promise to decentralise power. Giving effect to greater citizen involvement in public life. When Parliamentarians are directly elected by and therefore held accountable by citizens, power flows to (and from) the citizen, not to the party. A candidate’s electability will be determined by their reputation among voters. Party bosses will rely on local candidates, rather than the other way around.   The bottom-up power structure creates arenas in which citizens can substantiate public life. While municipal elections already function in this model, South Africa’s politics is dominated by the national level. Constituency offices and town-hall meetings, where Parliamentarians provide a direct link to national decision-making, could re-energise civic engagement at the municipal level.    When Parliamentarians derive their legitimacy from voters, they will be required to constantly justify and defend their decisions. Stronger deliberation will help revive and mobilise community-based politics. Disillusioned citizens, those who have withdrawn from politics due to corruption or unresponsiveness, may once again see politics as a shared public space. Skilled potential leaders, currently deterred by party dominance, could be drawn back into public life. Beyond leadership renewal, citizens themselves may feel empowered to organise and engage when representation is directly tied to where they live. Constituencies, therefore, not only promote pluralism but promise to breathe life into a new era of active citizenry.     Conclusion   This paper has proposed republican constitutionalism as a pathway to revive South African democracy. Thirty years after 1994, the promises of the Constitution remain largely formal. The substance of the constitutional project, its accountability and participatory spirit, has been undermined by weak institutions, political centralisation and the withdrawal of citizens from public life. As an effect, democracy has been hollowed out, reduced to a procedural politics revolving around elections and dominant parties. The top-down power structure treats citizens as bystanders rather than active participants.    Reviving democracy and giving real expression to the Constitution will empower citizens as sovereign. They must once again become the active subjects of political power, demanding openness, justification and accountability. Republican constitutionalism seeks to decentralise authority through greater local autonomy, reforms that empower citizens, and public-private partnerships that strengthen, rather than counter the state. Republican constitutionalism expands upon the participatory and transformative constitutionalist approaches to reactive civic culture and to restore the constitution as the lodestar of public life.   Republican constitutionalism responds directly democratic stagnation. It recognises that democracy cannot simply be left to the elites. It must be enacted, defended and lived by citizens themselves. Only through this active, shared engagement can South Africa reclaim the spirit of the Constitution and renew its democratic life.   References   Chipkin, I. (2023) South Africa: An Agenda for Reform . Policy Brief, 1(1). Johannesburg: New South Institute.   Friedman, S. (2021) Prisoners of the Past: South African Democracy and the Legacy of Minority Rule . Johannesburg: Wits University Press.   Giliomee, H. (2003) The Afrikaners: A Biography of a People . Cape Town: Tafelberg.   Home Affairs (2025) Electoral Reform Consultation Panel: Original Report . Department of Home Affairs. Available at: https://www.dha.gov.za  (Accessed: 7 October 2025).   Langa, P. (2006) ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’, Stellenbosch Law Review , 17(3), pp. 351–360.   Lodge, T. (1983) Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 . Johannesburg: Ravan Press.   Matiwane, Z. (2022) ‘Minutes show ANC ran “parallel process” to fill top government jobs: DA’, Sowetan Live , 5 January. Available at: https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2022-01-05-minutes-show-anc-ran-parallel-process-to-fill-top-government-jobs-da  (Accessed: 7 October 2025).   Mureinik, E. (1994) ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’, South African Journal on Human Rights , 10(1), pp. 31–48.   Ramphele, M. (2012) Conversations with My Sons and Daughters . Johannesburg: Penguin Books.   South African Government (1996) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 . Available at: https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-04-feb-1997  (Accessed: 7 October 2025).   Southall, R. (2013) Liberation Movements in Power: Party and State in Southern Africa . Cambridge: Boydell & Brewer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute participated in a high-level panel discussion titled “Türkiye’s Humanitarian Diplomacy and Assistance in the Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts”, organised by the Communication Directorate of the Türkiye Presidency and held in Johannesburg on 21 November 2025 on the margins of the G20 Leaders’ Summit. The event formed part of South Africa’s G20 Presidency programme, which is anchored in the theme “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability.” The panel explored Türkiye’s growing role in humanitarian diplomacy, its experience in mediation, and the emerging opportunities for deeper South–South cooperation in addressing global crises.   The session brought together leading academics, policy practitioners and civil society voices. The panel was moderated by Prof. Dr. Kılıç Buğra Kanat (Penn State University), with contributions from Prof. William Gumede, Prof. Dr. Erman Akıllı, Dr. Liaqat Alli Azam, Dr. Tunç Demirtaş and Mr. Daryl Swanepoel, Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute. The discussion examined Türkiye’s evolving humanitarian diplomacy model, which in recent years has become a central pillar of its foreign policy. The panel contextualised Türkiye’s increasing international footprint, from its role in peace facilitation in regions such as Karabakh, Libya, Syria and Ukraine, to its leadership in humanitarian operations through institutions like AFAD, TİKA and the Turkish Red Crescent. The Black Sea Grain Initiative was highlighted as an example of how results-oriented diplomacy can generate practical, confidence-building outcomes.   The panellists also reflected on the shrinking humanitarian capacity of the United Nations system, with global need expanding faster than the resources available to the multilateral system. This widening gap has created space, and necessity, for middle-income countries (MICs) to assume more proactive roles in humanitarian action and crisis mediation.   Contribution by the Inclusive Society Institute   ISI CEO Daryl Swanepoel delivered substantive remarks focusing on the opportunities emerging for greater middle-income country leadership in humanitarian diplomacy. Drawing on the South African and Turkish experiences, he emphasised that as the UN system comes under increasing fiscal and operational strain, middle-income countries must show greater solidarity with one another and step forward to help fill the vacuum in global humanitarian leadership. Mr. Swanepoel described Türkiye’s humanitarian diplomacy model as practical, agile and impactful, noting its visible interventions during crises such as the Syrian refugee emergency and its rapid mobilisation capacity in humanitarian response. He placed this within the broader African context as South Africa hosts the G20 for the first time on the continent.   Importantly, he underscored that humanitarian action serves both moral and national-interest objectives. While the primary beneficiaries are people in crisis, countries that step up gain durable diplomatic relationships, soft power, regional stability and opportunities for cooperation in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.   A proposal for Middle-Income leadership   In his remarks, Mr. Swanepoel tabled a concrete proposal for elevating MIC cooperation through a Türkiye-South Africa Humanitarian Solidarity Initiative, open to participation by other willing middle-income partners. The proposal comprises three pillars:   A joint humanitarian and mediation platform, combining diplomatic networks, analytical capacity and mediation experience to support peace efforts and humanitarian corridors in regions where MICs countries have longstanding ties. A South–South humanitarian facility, co-sponsored by Türkiye and South Africa and other interested MICs, focused on “forgotten crises” that receive limited attention from major donors. Contributions may include funding, logistics, medical teams, engineering support and training. A capacity-building partnership among think tanks, universities and civil society to train young diplomats and humanitarian professionals in mediation, negotiation and crisis response. He emphasised that such a platform would not replace the UN but complement it, providing agility and regional insight that traditional institutions sometimes lack.

The Shaanxi (China) - Western Cape (South Africa) Economic and Trade Cooperation Negotiation Conference, held on 19 September 2024, at the Rockefeller Hotel in Cape Town, brought together key stakeholders to foster economic collaboration. Organized by the CCPIT Shaanxi Sub-Council and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), with support from the China-Africa Silk Road Industry Cooperation Promotion Center, the event was a platform for discussions and the signing of agreements.   The conference began with opening remarks by Mr Li Jun, Vice Governor of Shaanxi Province, and Alderman James Vos, City of Cape Town’s Mayoral Committee Member for Economic Growth. This was followed by the signing of trade agreements between New Airline Group and VALUE Group, as well as between Shaanxi Tourism Group and Ridgemorvilla Estate, showcasing the potential for tourism and transportation sector growth.   Mr Tang Changan from the Chinese Consulate-General and Ms Erica Joubert from Wesgro, delivered speeches emphasizing the mutual benefits of China-South Africa trade partnerships. Deputy Chairperson of the ISI, Ms Buyelwa Sonjica also shared her insights. The event concluded with a business matching and negotiation session, paving the way for future investments and strengthened economic ties between the Shaanxi Province and the Western Cape.

Occasional Paper 12/2025   Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   OCTOBER 2025   Daryl Swanepoel Abstract   This analysis examines South Africa’s 2025 G20 presidency as a pivotal moment of moral and strategic redefinition in global governance. Guided by the theme “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability,” the presidency seeks to humanise multilateralism by placing values ahead of metrics. The report interprets the presidency’s agenda, which ranges from inclusive industrialisation and AI governance to financial reform, as a deliberate attempt to infuse justice into the economic discourse. It identifies both enthusiasm and resistance among G20 members, where the Global South views the presidency as emancipatory, whilst the advanced economies, particularly the United States, appear to react warily to its moral framing. The analysis anticipates a likely “19 + 1” outcome that will reflect partial consensus which suggests a new norm for diversity within unity. China’s constructive neutrality and Europe’s mediating role is predicted to sustain the dialogue amid philosophical divergence. Ultimately, the report concludes that South Africa’s leadership reorients the G20 toward a more equitable and humane multilateral order, which, if successfully concluded, will establish a precedent where solidarity and sovereignty may coexist within global cooperation Introduction   As the world moves toward the 2025 G20 Summit under South Africa’s presidency, the tone of global governance feels both unsettled and newly alive, and it is in this context that the forum, once regarded as an engine of macroeconomic coordination, now finds itself a stage for moral and strategic realignment. The South African presidency, framed under the theme “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability,”  arrives not merely as a logistical rotation, but as a philosophical intervention, one that asks whether a multilateral system forged in crisis can evolve toward equity, justice and shared accountability.   This report offers an interpretive and anticipatory reading of that presidency, a forward-looking analysis that does not claim privileged insight, but derives its conclusions from observation, inquiry and expert inference . It synthesises the official G20 Concept Note, the tone and substance of preparatory dialogues and the broader geopolitical mood. Rather than predicting events as foregone conclusions, it reads the atmosphere, the patterns of behaviour, the calibrated silences and the language of diplomacy to anticipate how this presidency may unfold and what its eventual declaration might signify.   South Africa’s leadership emerges at a moment when the G20’s cohesion is strained by geopolitical rivalries, competing economic ideologies and divergent visions of justice. Yet, precisely in this turbulence lies its significance. The presidency has introduced a vocabulary of values  into a forum that has long preferred the neutrality of metrics . It has brought back words such as solidarity  and equality , words that unsettle the technocratic rhythm of G20 deliberation, but resonate deeply with the developmental aspirations of the Global South.   The analysis that follows explores the aspirations, expectations and challenges of this presidency; the dynamics among major actors, including the United States, China, Europe and the broader Global South; and the probable contours of the final declaration. The report approaches these developments not as closed outcomes, but as evolving signals, to be read, interpreted and weighed.   Ultimately, the question this assessment seeks to illuminate is not whether the South African presidency will succeed in a conventional sense, but whether it can redefine what success means: whether moral conviction, strategic inclusivity and institutional endurance can coexist within a single multilateral frame. 1. Reading the room   Few presidencies in the G20’s two-decade history have carried the emotional and intellectual weight of South Africa’s. From the moment the theme “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability”  was announced, it was clear that this would not be an ordinary turn at the helm. It is a presidency animated not only by policy ambition, but by moral architecture, a determination to make the G20 mean something more than the sum of its communiqués.   In reading the room, one senses that this presidency is less about technocratic coordination and more about a quiet philosophical insurgency. It asks whether multilateralism, hollowed by transactionalism, can still feel humane. It asks whether a forum born in crisis can evolve into one capable of conscience. And it asks whether the world, fractured by mistrust, can rediscover solidarity, not as sentiment, but as practice.   These are not rhetorical questions. They are the animating logic behind every sentence of the South African concept note and the tone that underlies the diplomatic choreography captured in the year’s preparatory dialogues. 2. Aspirations: A rehumanised Global Agenda   The presidency’s concept note, both a manifesto and an agenda, lays out a triadic ethos: Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability.   Each term carries both historical weight and contemporary provocation:   Solidarity  recalls the moral economies of the liberation era, that no nation can prosper in isolation from others’ suffering. Equality  confronts the hierarchy implicit in the global financial and technological systems. Sustainability  refuses the notion that ecological balance can be divorced from social justice.   The note proposes to translate these into six concrete deliverables: inclusive industrialisation, food security, AI and data governance, a “Cost of Capital Commission,” a renewed Compact with Africa, and a twenty-year institutional reflection on the G20 itself. These are not random themes. Each theme connects a moral claim to a policy lever. Food security is recast as global stability. AI governance becomes a question of sovereignty. Cost of capital turns from a technical ratio into a justice issue.   From a reading of the note, one infers a conscious inversion of the usual order: values first, economics later. It is this inversion, humane rather than transactional multilateralism, that sets the stage for both inspiration and contestation. 3. The early signals: Promise meets resistance   Observers who have followed the preparatory meetings note two simultaneous currents: genuine curiosity and cautious resistance. The Global South delegations, particularly those long frustrated by slow reforms of financial architecture, find the presidency’s framing liberating. For them, it gives language to a frustration that has simmered for years.   Advanced economies, however, appear wary. The source of tension is not the policy content, since many of the deliverables overlap with ongoing G20 priorities, but rather the lexicon . To some, solidarity sounds like obligation and equality  like redistribution. The presidency’s moral language, though drawn from its own history of social negotiation, unsettles those who prefer the technocratic neutrality of “growth,” “resilience” and “innovation.”   From the pattern of reactions described in the transcript, one can infer that this is less a dispute over substance than semantics. Yet semantics in diplomacy are never trivial. Words determine ownership. To accept solidarity  is to admit interdependence; to accept equality is to acknowledge hierarchy; to accept sustainability  as justice is to concede moral responsibility. It is at that level — the symbolic rather than the structural — that the battle lines have been drawn. 4. Negotiating around philosophy: The US factor   The United States’ engagement with this presidency has been deliberate, but defensive.   Its representatives have participated in the working groups, but often with the stated concern that the thematic framing risks “ideologizing” the G20. In practice, this has translated into consistent efforts to reshape phrasing - “resilience”  instead of “solidarity” , “inclusion”  instead of “equality” .   The reasoning for predicting a non-unanimous outcome arises from several converging signs:   Repeated textual interventions aimed at diluting the moral vocabulary. Lower-level participation in key tracks, signalling reduced political investment. Public statements that challenge the very framing of the presidency’s theme.   Put together, these signals suggest a posture of participation without endorsement, what analysts often call “engaged abstention.” The United States will almost certainly attend the summit, but is expected to disassociate from the final declaration on principle.   This inference does not stem from conjecture, but from the pattern: a year-long choreography of distance. If consensus holds among all others, the most likely outcome will be a “19 + 1” scenario, a formula already anticipated within the presidency’s own contingency planning. It is a prediction drawn not from drama, but from diplomatic arithmetic.     5. The quiet centre: China’s constructive ambiguity   If Washington defines the opposition, Beijing defines the equilibrium.   Throughout the process, China’s behaviour has been marked by strategic neutrality, neither opposing the presidency’s themes, nor championing them. Yet this neutrality is not indifference, it is calculus.   China’s interests align naturally with several of South Africa’s priorities: reform of financial institutions, cost of capital fairness and digital sovereignty. However, overt alignment would risk deepening perceptions of bloc politics. Thus, Beijing has chosen the middle ground, an enabling silence.   In negotiation terms, this posture functions as lubrication. It prevents polarisation, allowing the Global South’s agenda to mature without triggering Western defensiveness. The reasoning for this inference lies in the recurring note of “China being neutral” and in the absence of recorded disputes in tracks where its positions would ordinarily provoke. In other words, neutrality becomes a form of quiet endorsement, a subtle diplomacy of presence without posture.     6. Europe between worlds   The European members, ever the custodians of consensus, have taken on the role of textual mediators.   They are sympathetic to the sustainability and climate aspects of the presidency’s agenda, but cautious about its justice rhetoric. Their behaviour, frequent proposals to “balance” language, encourage “shared ownership” and avoid “politicisation,” suggests a genuine effort to prevent a rift within the G20.   From these actions one can infer two motives:   A pragmatic desire to keep the G20 intact as one of the few surviving global forums. A self-perceived responsibility to bridge moral ambition and institutional realism.   Europe thus functions as the hinge by restraining US rigidity while moderating Global South assertiveness. It is precisely this middle-space diplomacy that has kept negotiations alive despite profound philosophical divergence.   7. Attendance as political semiotics   As the summit approaches, attendance itself has become a form of expression.   Every level of representation signals intent.   From available evidence and diplomatic briefings, it appears that all G20 members will participate, but not all equally.   The Global South  will attend in full force, at head-of-state level, projecting ownership of an agenda that speaks their vocabulary. The United States , by contrast, is expected to send a high-ranking representative, most probably Vice President Vance, rather than the head of state, a gesture that signifies both acknowledgement and disapproval. European leaders  will likely attend personally, underscoring their commitment to keeping the G20 functional.   This configuration, full attendance, but unequal enthusiasm, is telling. It implies that even in dissent, no member can afford absence. The G20, for all its ideological tension, remains the only round table where the G7 and BRICS sit together.   Thus, the presidency will measure its success not only by who signs the declaration, but by who shows up. In a divided world, presence itself is a form of legitimacy.     8. Consensus without unanimity   How, then, might a declaration emerge in such an atmosphere?   Diplomatic precedent suggests that unanimity, though desirable, is not essential for legitimacy. What matters is whether the declaration reflects the shared work  of the year’s process.   The reasoning follows a clear line:   The presidency has invested heavily in institutional discipline, strong sherpa coordination, thematic task forces and inclusive engagement groups. The major deliverables are technically sound and enjoy broad (if uneven) support. The textual disagreements are philosophical, not procedural.   This combination points to a partial consensus, a declaration signed by nineteen members, with one formal disassociation. In practical terms, this is the “efficient frontier” of agreement: maximal inclusion without surrendering principle. It allows progress while acknowledging plurality.   Such an outcome, rather than undermining the G20, may redefine its modern purpose, that is to reflect not unanimity, but honest diversity. The G20 becomes less a choir and more an orchestra, dissonant, but still capable of harmony.     9. Patterns beneath the process: What the presidency reveals   Through this presidency, several larger trends become visible:   The moralisation of multilateralism: The return of words like solidarity  and equality  to the diplomatic vocabulary marks a shift from managerial to moral leadership. The decentralisation of influence: With the Global South commanding both agenda and attention, the gravitational pull of global decision-making continues to move away from the North Atlantic axis. The normalisation of partial consensus: The “19 + 1” outcome, once unthinkable, may become a precedent, an institutional mechanism for managing irreconcilable difference without collapse. The rise of inclusive diplomacy: The expanded engagement groups and the planned Social Summit broaden legitimacy beyond states, anchoring global governance in civil participation.   Each of these conclusions emerges from triangulating the presidency’s written concept, its procedural innovations and the tone of deliberations recorded through the year.     10. Looking forward: The US presidency in 2026   The next rotation, the United States in 2026, looms large in every conversation.   Observers expect a retrenchment presidency, one that will seek to “return the G20 to basics.”   This forecast rests on observable precedents:   US interventions during the South African year consistently narrowed scope to macroeconomic stability, competitiveness and innovation. Early planning documents indicate a likely thematic pivot toward “Resilience, Growth and Opportunity.” Domestic political climate favours an agenda that is pro-market, sovereignty-oriented and sceptical of redistributive narratives.   From these elements, one can reason that the US presidency will likely re-centre the G20 around traditional economic coordination, pruning the moral and developmental expansion introduced by South Africa.   It may:   Replace the Cost of Capital Commission with a more technocratic financial transparency review. Replace the AI-for-development agenda to frameworks on AI safety and innovation. Reframe sustainability as a market opportunity rather than a justice imperative.   However, institutional inertia ensures that not everything can be rolled back. Once a concept is anchored in G20 working structures, as South Africa’s task forces already are, it tends to persist in some form. Thus, many of the presidency’s innovations will likely survive as diluted continuities rather than reversals. 11. The structural implications: A Tale of two G20s   By late 2025, one can discern the outlines of two G20s coexisting within a single architecture:   A Northern G20 , which is driven by economic orthodoxy and institutional preservation. A Southern G20 , which is animated by equity, reform and moral legitimacy.   The South African presidency serves as the hinge between them. Its experiment tests whether these two identities can coexist without rupture, whether solidarity and sovereignty can be spoken in the same forum.   If it succeeds in securing a declaration endorsed by nineteen, the precedent will be profound, that the G20 can tolerate principled dissent without losing cohesion. If it fails, the risk is not collapse, but trivialisation, a return to communiqués devoid of conviction. 12. Reading the road ahead   To “read the room” at this moment is to sense both fatigue and possibility.   The fatigue is palpable, years of crisis management have turned cooperation into routine. Yet the possibility lies in the presidency’s quiet insistence that meaning still matters .   The signals are everywhere:   Delegates debate words as though they were moral propositions. Smaller nations speak with a confidence born of shared grievance. Even the sceptics seem aware that the vocabulary of equality, once reintroduced, cannot easily be erased.   From these atmospherics, the prediction emerges organically, not as prophecy, but as deduction. A declaration will likely be achieved, bearing the triad Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability , endorsed by all but one. The dissent will be loud, but the message louder: that global governance no longer belongs exclusively to its architects, but increasingly to its participants. 13. Conclusion: The experiment in motion   The South African G20 presidency is not merely an event in diplomacy, it is a mirror held up to the world.   It reflects a longing for moral coherence amid geopolitical entropy and it reclaims the words solidarity, equality and sustainability that had become uncomfortable in the vocabulary of power.   Its success will not be measured by unanimity, but by endurance. By how long those words continue to echo in the communiqués and corridors of what comes next.   As the presidency nears its summit and the United States prepares to inherit the mantle, one suspects that the most lasting outcome will be intangible: a shift in tone, a change in expectation, a sense that the G20, for all its imperfections, might still be capable of conscience.     References   G20. 2025 . Conce pt note and calendar. G20 South Africa 2025 Presidency . [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/20241205v-FINAL-G20-CONCEPT-NOTE-SOUTH-AFRICA.pdf [accessed: 15 October 2025]   Diplomatic and policy experts. 2025. A series of interviews was conducted by the author with authoritative diplomats and policy experts.   T20. 2025. The author is a Co-Lead of the Solidarity for the Achievement of the SDGs Task Force - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Occasional Paper 13/2025   Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609, Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute.   D I S C L A I M E R   Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the  Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members.   OCTOBER 2025   Daryl Swanepoel Abstract   China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI), announced in 2025 by President Xi Jinping, has drawn extensive international scrutiny. Western commentators often frame it as an attempt to create a parallel system, a rival architecture to the UN-based, liberal order led by the United States and its allies. Yet this paper argues that such criticism, while not necessarily unfounded, is incomplete and at times misplaced.   China’s proposals stem from the manifest failure of the existing global governance framework to reform itself. The United Nations remains structurally frozen in 1945, the Bretton Woods institutions disproportionately represent Western economic power and the rhetoric of a “rules-based order” often masks selective adherence to those very rules by the West.   This paper contends that the West’s unwillingness to share institutional power and to genuinely reform multilateralism has created the vacuum that China now fills. Rather than dismissing the GGI as a threat, policymakers should recognise it as both a symptom of global governance stagnation and a test of whether an inclusive, pluralist order can still be built. The real challenge is not to condemn China’s initiatives per se, but to address the underlying legitimacy deficit of the current system. The West’s defensive rigidity, more than China’s assertiveness, is driving the fragmentation of multilateral governance.     1. Introduction   When President Xi Jinping announced the Global Governance Initiative  (GGI) in early 2025, the initiative was immediately labelled by many Western analysts as a bid by China to reshape the world order in its image (The Diplomat, 2025; Reuters, 2025). The GGI follows two earlier efforts, being the Global Development Initiative  (GDI, 2021) and the Global Security Initiative  (GSI, 2022), which together with the GGI outline China’s emerging normative vision of global governance. Critics argue that the GGI represents an attempt to construct a parallel system  that would displace, or at least undermine, the existing multilateral institutions created under US and European leadership after World War II (Schuman, Fulton & Gering, 2023), but this paper takes a different view. It argues that the conditions giving rise to the GGI lie not in Beijing’s ambitions alone, but in the stagnation, hypocrisy and exclusion that have paralysed existing global governance structures.   The question, therefore, is not whether China’s initiative is justified, but whether the failure of the United Nations and related bodies to reform leaves the world any real alternative.     2. China’s diagnosis of global governance failure   China’s critique of the post-war order is rooted in its perception that global governance remains dominated by Western power and ideology and in this regard president Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated that the architecture of global governance must reflect the realities of the new world balance. Beijing’s diagnosis can be summarised in three main points.   2.1 An unrepresentative institutional order   The United Nations Security Council (UNSC)  still enshrines the geopolitical structure of 1945, with Africa, Latin America and much of Asia still remaining without permanent representation, but on the contrary, however, the permanent five (P5) veto system remains firmly in place, where it continues to entrench inequality between the member states by allowing the powerful ones to block reforms that might dilute their influence (CFR, 2025).     2.2 Economic governance skewed toward the West   Voting shares at the International Monetary Fund (IMF)  and World Bank  continues to remain weighted in favour of the US and Europe, despite decades of growth in emerging economies, such as in China and India, who together now account for nearly 20% of global GDP (nominal 2023) (Worldometer, N.d.); and yet these two countries hold less than 10% of IMF voting power (IMF, N.d.). Moreover, attempts at reforming the quota regime have stalled repeatedly due to the political resistance of Washington and Brussels against it.     2.3 Normative and ideological bias   China also criticises what it considers value monopolies, being the imposition of liberal democratic norms through conditional aid, sanctions or interventionism, which Beijing argues is a Western-led governance structure that equates legitimacy with liberal democracy and human rights, which dictate serves to marginalise alternative governance models (Dams & Van der Putten, 2015).   This diagnosis, whilst it can be argued self-serving in part, resonates widely in the Global South , where many states view the post-1945 order as inequitable and morally inconsistent.     3. The case for reform: Why China has a point   3.1 Reform paralysis and structural inertia   Calls for reform of global institutions are not new. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document committed to making the Security Council more “representative, legitimate and effective” (UN, 2005). Two decades later, little has changed. The G4 proposal  (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) and the African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus,  both languish in procedural limbo. The failure to even agree on criteria for membership expansion demonstrates institutional sclerosis.     3.2 Double standards and the erosion of normative authority   Western states, and in particular the United States, have often undermined their own claims to uphold a rules-based order, for example, the 2003 invasion of Iraq without UN authorisation (MacAskill & Borger, 2004), the 2011 intervention in Libya that exceeded the UN mandate (Miller, 2022), and the selective recognition of international court rulings, and the US rejection of the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment in 1986. This has eroded confidence in Western stewardship of international law.     3.3 A system in crisis   The failures of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions during COVID-19, the climate crisis and global debt distress further expose governance gaps, where, for example, the World Health Organization  was sidelined during the pandemic, while the Paris Agreement  remains underfunded and politically fragile. The West’s dominance in rule-making, combined with its paralysis in collective action, leaves space for alternative leadership.   In this sense, China’s argument that reform is overdue is not revisionist, it is factual. The current system is both unrepresentative and ineffective.     4. The critics’ case: The “parallel system” concern   Despite this, Western and some Asian commentators argue that the GGI is not about reform, but about replacement and they identify several strands of evidence to support the “parallel system” thesis:     4.1 Institutional duplication   China’s creation of new bodies, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) , the New Development Bank  and now GGI-linked forums, they argue, appears to mirror existing Western-led institutions rather than integrate with them (The Diplomat, 2025). Their concern is that these structures will operate under Chinese normative and financial leadership.     4.2 Normative divergence   Whereas the liberal order prioritises individual rights, transparency and intervention for humanitarian purposes, China’s GGI stresses sovereignty , non-interference and developmental pragmatism , which the critics thereof argue, could serve to legitimise authoritarianism and to reduce global accountability (Schuman, Fulton & Gering, 2023).     4.3 Selective multilateralis   China participates vigorously in some global institutions, such as, for example, UN peacekeeping and the World Trade Organization, but it bypasses others through its own platforms such as the Belt and Road Forum  and/or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation . This selective engagement suggests a dual-track strategy.     4.4 Strategic influence   Some fear that the GGI provides a normative shield for Chinese geopolitical expansion, enabling Beijing to align states through debt dependency, technology standards and diplomatic patronage and therefore they argue the GGI’s purpose is not inclusivity, but hegemony under a different banner (Schuman, Fulton & Gering, 2023).   These critiques cannot, one supposes, be dismissed out of hand, even though sound and logical counter-arguments can be readily made by antagonists. But at its core, critics overlook the most fundamental and basic question. If the existing system refuses to reform, is the emergence of alternatives not inevitable?     4.5 Moral double standards and selective legitimacy   Critics of China’s global initiatives often imply that Beijing’s pursuit of its own national interests is somehow illegitimate or destabilising, as though the promotion of national interest were a prerogative reserved for Western powers and yet, if leadership in global governance is deemed acceptable for the United States or Europe, on what ethical or moral grounds is it denied to China? The notion that a multipolar distribution of influence is inherently problematic betrays a deeper attachment to hierarchy rather than principle, because what is being defended is not an objective standard of governance, but a particular configuration of power that privileges one set of actors over others.   Equally striking is the inconsistency in how the West evaluates the political systems of its adversaries, because whereas China’s non-liberal governance model is routinely cast as incompatible with global leadership, Western states have long maintained strategic partnerships with even more authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, where they often overlook grave human rights violations in favour of energy security and regional influence. This selective tolerance undermines the moral authority of the liberal order itself, because, if democracy and human rights are invoked only when geopolitically convenient, then the critique of China’s model becomes less a defence of universal values and more an instrument of strategic containment. These contradictions expose the moral and structural double standards at the heart of Western criticism and therefore the question is not why China seeks to shape global governance, but why others resist change that would make it genuinely representative.     5. Who really blocks reform? The West’s defensive rigidity   The paralysis of global governance is not primarily due to Chinese obstruction, but to Western defensiveness. The evidence lies in three domains:     5.1 Security Council reform   Despite rhetorical support for “African representation” and “greater legitimacy,” the United States, the United Kingdom and France have consistently avoided endorsing concrete reform models that would dilute their veto power (Muruthi, 2024). Europe has also resisted consolidation of its two permanent seats (UK and France) into a single one, preserving overrepresentation.     5.2 IMF and World Bank quotas   The United States Congress has repeatedly delayed or diluted quota realignments that would increase China’s and other emerging economies’ voting shares and as a result, the IMF remains structurally anchored in the 1980s global economy (Truman, 2014). The message to the Global South is clear - reform is promised, never delivered.     5.3 Selective multilateralism by the West   Western actors have increasingly relied on minilateral  clubs, such as the G7, G20, Quad and AUKUS, that privilege likeminded members over universal representation. Critics in the Global South see this as precisely the fragmentation they accuse China of promoting.   Thus, the West condemns China’s parallelism while practicing its own.     6. Understanding China’s strategy: Pragmatic or revisionist?   6.1 Institutional experimentation, not replacement   China’s behaviour often reflects pragmatic experimentation rather than outright revisionism. For example, the AIIB  works in partnership with the World Bank and adheres to many of its safeguards. The New Development Bank  co-finances projects with existing institutions (NDB, 2022). These  are not acts aimed at destroying the existing order, but rather, appear to be strategic diversification.     6.2 Normative innovation   By emphasising sovereignty and “development before democracy,” China offers an alternative development logic that resonates with many non-Western states (Qasem, Van Dongen & De Ridder, 2011) and so whilst this challenges liberal orthodoxy, it also highlights the pluralism of governance models in a post-Western world.   6.3 Self-interest and systemic correction   Of course, Beijing’s motives are not altruistic, they serve to expand its influence and China’s strategic interests. But is it not so that all great powers, including the US, have historically shaped global rules in their image and so the key question should rather focus on whether China’s initiatives remain open to multilateral participation or whether it is bound to evolve into hierarchical patronage systems.     7. The way forward: Towards co-reform, not containment   The choice for policymakers is not between defending a decaying order and submitting to a Chinese one. It is whether to co-reform global governance before fragmentation becomes irreversible.     7.1 Recognising the legitimacy of Chinese concerns   China’s call for reform aligns with long-standing demands from Africa, Latin America and South Asia. Engaging Beijing as a stakeholder, rather than as a rival, could revitalise multilateral institutions.     7.2 Reforming Western leadership   The West must abandon its zero-sum instinct to guard institutional privileges and concede that representation, especially in the Security Council and IMF, is not weakness, but strategic adaptation to reality. A truly rules-based order requires rules that evolve.     7.3 Integrating parallel mechanisms   Instead of treating Chinese initiatives as external threats, Western and other actors could integrate them into a layered system of global governance. For instance, aligning AIIB and World Bank standards or linking the GGI’s development principles with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), could yield complementarity rather than competition.     7.4 Promoting transparency and standards   The key challenge for China is to make its initiatives transparent, inclusive and rules-based. Without institutionalised accountability, the GGI risks becoming another rhetorical framework and therefore constructive engagement from other powers could encourage higher standards rather than isolation.     8. Conclusion   The Global Governance Initiative should be understood as both a critique and a consequence of Western dominance and institutional stagnation. While critics warn of a parallel system, it is the failure of the existing system  that opens the door for and renders such parallelism inevitable.   Critics of “parallelism” would do well to ask whether their own resistance to reform has not, in fact, produced the very conditions that now empower China to lead in shaping alternative multilateral models. The paralysis of UN reform, perpetuated by those who benefit from the status quo, has created both the need and the space for innovation elsewhere. Had the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions evolved to reflect 21st-century realities, there would have been little justification or opportunity for Beijing to advance the Global Governance Initiative as a rival framework and so in that sense, the emergence of parallel structures is not merely a Chinese project, but a by-product of Western obstruction. The failure to democratise global governance has not preserved legitimacy, instead it has forfeited it and in doing so, ceded moral and institutional leadership to those willing to fill the vacuum.   Condemning China’s initiatives without addressing the deeper governance crisis is both hypocritical and self-defeating. Reform is overdue, not because China demands it, or out of fear for Chinese parallelism, but because global legitimacy depends on it.   The challenge for policymakers is to move beyond moral grandstanding and embrace shared reform: to rebuild a multilateral order that reflects not only Western ideals, but global realities. References   Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). 2025. The UN Security Council.  [Online] Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/un-security-council [Accessed 13 October 2025].   Dams, T. & Van der Putten, F. 2015. China and Liberal Values in International Relations. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2016-02/China_and_Liberal_Values_in_International_Relations.pdf [accessed: 14 October 2025]   International Monetary Fund (IMF). N.d.  [Online] Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/About/executive-board/members-quotas [accessed: 14 October 2025]   MacAskill, E. & Borger, J. 2004. Iraq war was illegal and breached UN charter, says Annan. [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq [accessed: 14 October 2025]   Miller P. 2022. Nato bombing of Libya ‘exceeded UN mandate’ . [Online] Available at:  https://www.declassifieduk.org/nato-bombing-of-libya-exceeded-un-mandate/ [accessed: 14 October 2024]   Muruthi, T. 2024. Africa and the US “Non-Proposal” on UN Security Council Reform . [Online] Available at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/africa-and-us-non-proposal-un-security-council-reform?utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 14 October 2024]   New Development Bank (NDB). 2022. New Development Bank General Strategy for 2022–2026 . [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/NDB_StrategyDocument_Eversion-1.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 14 October 2025]   Qasem, I., Van Dongen, T. & De Ridder, M. 2022. World Foresight Forum . [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/WFF02_Issue_Brief_The_Beijing_Consensus02.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 14 October 2025]   Reuters. 2025. China’s Xi Pushes New Global Order Flanked by Leaders from Russia and India. [Online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-pushes-new-global-order-flanked-by-leaders-russia-india-2025-09-01/  [accessed: 13 October 2025   Schuman, M., Fulton, J. & Gering, T. 2023. How Beijing’s newest global initiatives seek to remake the world order . [Online] Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/how-beijings-newest-global-initiatives-seek-to-remake-the-world-order/?utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 14 October 2025]   The Diplomat. 2025. What China Wants with Global Governance.  [Online] Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/what-china-wants-with-global-governance/  [accessed: 13 October 2025]   Truman, M. 2014. IMF reform is Waiting  on the United States. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb14-9.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com [accessed: 14 October 2025]   United Nations (UN). 2005. 2005 World Summit Outcome. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf [accessed: 14 October 2025]   Worldometer. N.d. GDP by country. [Online] Available at: https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/ [accessed: 14 October 2025] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Global South Media and Think Tank Forum China-Africa Partnership conference opened on the Thursday 14 th November 2025. The conference was held to explore ways to strengthen cooperation, to further promote common ways for shared global governance and to impart exchanges of knowledge by amplifying the Global South’s collective voice. The forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists and policymakers from across Africa and China to discuss the evolving partnership and its role in reshaping international institutions under the theme: "Reforming Global Governance: New Roles and Visions for China-Africa Cooperation." The event was attended by key panelists, including Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to South Africa, Wu Peng; the Chairman of Independent Media and co-chair of the BRICS Media Forum, Dr Iqbal Survé; Executive Mayor of the City of Johannesburg, Dada Morero; Consul General of China in Johannesburg, Pan Qingjiang; Lu Yansong, Editor-in-Chief of Xinhua News Agency and African Union Director of Information and Communication, Leslie Richer.The two-day conference, co-hosted by Xinhua News Agency, the African Union (AU) and South Africa's Independent Media, among other partners, gathered more than 200 representatives from over 160 media outlets, think tanks, government organizations and other institutions from China and 41 African countries, as well as the AU. Inclusive Society Institute, Advisory Council Member Ms. Nondumiso Alice Sithole was requested to be a panelist member and represented the Institute at the forum. The institute has become a key strategic partner in the South Africa and is African think-tank community. Ms. Sithole’s speech highlighted aspects on “the core pathways for China and Africa to jointly advance modernization, their global contributions and worldwide impact”. She delivered a speech which commended the intergovernmental relations between the two sides, the initiatives by China in supporting the African countries as a whole, specifically when it comes to the continent progressing towards better development goals. However she also drew attention to the trade deficit and proposed some solutions as to how it can be addressed by both sides, one being commodity beneficiation to occur on the African continent before export. Lastly, she emphasized the importance of the two sides continuing to explore appropriate partnership models that are fit for purpose in so far as it concerns the respective partner-countries individually.