VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA - Trends, Drivers and Pathways to Resilience

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the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.

This report has been drafted with the assistance of ChatGpt. Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 30 October 2025 which have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.

January 2026

Rapporteur: Odile Bulten

Editor: Daryl Swanepoel

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

2 THE SCALE AND SPREAD OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA

3 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION: FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO AFRICA

4 VULNERABILITIES AND DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

4.1 Governance collapse and state absence

4.2 Grievances and unmet needs

4.3 Coercion and the search for protection

4.4 Regional spillovers

4.5 Transnational collaboration

5 THE NATURE OF EXTREMIST GOVERNANCE

6 THE LIMITS AND RISKS OF MILITARISED RESPONSES

7 REGIONAL DIFFERENCES AND CASE STUDY: GHANA’S RESILIENCE

8 RECOMMENDATIONS AND ROADMAP

9 ROADMAP

9.1 Short-Term Actions (1-2 years)

9.2 Medium-Term Actions (3-5 years)

9.3 Long-term actions (5+ years)

10 CONCLUSION

Cover image: iStock.com | Stock photo ID:458320297

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups in Africa by theater

Figure 2: Africa’s active militant Islamist groups

Figure 3: Timeline of violent extremism and weak governance

Figure 4: Ghana’s strategy to combat violent extremism

1 INTRODUCTION

Africa’s struggle with violent extremism has reached a level of intensity that now places the continent among the global epicentres of terrorism. Across multiple regions, extremist groups have entrenched themselves in ways that reveal systemic governance failures, structural vulnerabilities and long-standing grievances that remain unaddressed. The evolution of the extremism in the African context is neither linear, nor is it uniform, it is, in fact, shaped by political transitions, external military interventions, institutional fragility and the daily realities that citizens, who often live far from the reach of the state, have to face.

The discussions from a recent expert session on terrorism and extremism in Africa, which was hosted by the Africa Think-tank Dialogue on 30 October 2025, revealed a comprehensive and worrying picture of how terrorism has expanded in Africa, why it persists and what continues to drive its spread. The insights that are drawn from observation, the data and the region-specific examples cited in the discussions, offer a rich basis for understanding extremism, not as an ideological explosion, but instead, as the outgrowth of political and social conditions that have made large parts of the continent vulnerable to violent actors.

What emerges is a multi-layered narrative that frames extremism as an outcome of political neglect, as a reaction to foreign military presence, as an expression of security vacuums, as a competitor to the state and as a movement shaped by transnational networks. This report reconstructs that full picture in a narrative format that does justice to the richness and details presented in the discussions.

2 THE SCALE AND SPREAD OF VIOLENT

EXTREMISM IN AFRICA

In recent years, Africa has become the most affected region in the world in terms of terrorism, and it has now surpassed the traditional hotspots. In so doing, fatalities linked to Islamist militant groups have escalated dramatically and the geography of extremism on the continent has broadened far beyond its original centres.

The data presented in the discussions helps to clearly illustrate the scale of the problem. In 2021, total fatalities from extremist attacks in Africa stood at approximately 16,000, which then rose to 20,000, further surging to 23,000 in 2023, which marked the height of the violence. And although fatalities dipped slightly to 18,100 in 2024, the projection for 2025 shows that they are projected to again rise to 19,500. What is particularly striking in the trendline, is that even in years that the number of fatalities fall, the number of actual attacks do not decline- attacks have shown a consistent upward trajectory from 2021 right through to 2025.

These statistics reveal a structural entrenchment which suggests that the extremist violence is not episodic or cyclical, but that it is deepening, widening, and becoming more persistent over time.

The Sahel region, specifically Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, remains the most severely affected areas, with Burkina Faso, at one point, becoming the most impacted country in the world, with extremist violence overtaking the traditionally affected areas in the Middle East and South Asia. Another major hotspot is Somalia, which continues to experience violent extremist operations, despite decades of international and regional counterterrorism efforts. And yet another flashpoint is the Lake Chad Basin, which has also emerged as a critical zone of insurgency, while northern Mozambique continues to experience sustained extremist violence, and North Africa, in turn, is still part of the broader geography of jihadist activity, due to its links to historical extremist networks across the Maghreb.

Across the continent, attacks take different forms, with data categorising them into violence between government forces and militant groups; remote violence, such as improvised explosive devices, bombing campaigns, and airstrikes; and violence against civilians.

Particularly devastating is the killing of civilians, who are frequently targeted either to intimidate populations, punish non-cooperation or demonstrate territorial control. In some settings, civilians account for most fatalities.

A stark figure from the Africa Defence Forum highlighted the severity. On average, 44 people die every single day on the continent as a result of extremist attacks. Combined with the daily frequency of attacks, this positions Africa not merely as a region affected by terrorism, but as a continent undergoing a profound security crisis.

Figure 1: Fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups in Africa by theater

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project

3 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION: FROM THE MIDDLE

EAST TO AFRICA

One of the most revealing insights from the discussion was the explanation on how Africa became the new centre of extremist activity, when the global attention and focus shifted from the Middle East, which has historically been the hub of violent extremism, particularly during the peak years of conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. Over time, however, a noticeable shift occurred.

Several factors contributed to this migration, such as intensive military campaigns in the Middle East, which significantly weakened the major extremist organisations in that region; the withdrawal of Western forces from key states, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan, which altered the local power balances; and where local governments in the Middle East have reasserted their control, which has created inhospitable environments for violent extremist groups.

As pressure increased in the Middle East, extremist movements reoriented themselves toward new geographies. Africa, with its vast ungoverned spaces, fragile states, and long-standing governance deficits, became an attractive theatre of expansion.

This shift is being facilitated by transnational networks that have been linking Middle Eastern organisations to many African affiliates. As an example, one can point to ISIS, which was initially rooted in Iraq and Syria, having now developed relationships with local extremist groups across Africa. This has resulted in the emergence of formal ISIS affiliates, joint training, funding flows, and ideological alignment that has strengthened the African extremist groups.

In Somalia, the rise of al-Shabaab serves to illustrate the internal dynamics of this shift, in that it has shown then after the Somali government partnered more closely with foreign military forces, particularly the United States, extremist actors became more militant and aggressive. This also led to al-Shabaab expanding its operations beyond the Somali borders. Simultaneously, clan-based politics intensified the conflict, and anti-foreign sentiment became a key part of its narrative, all of which positioned al-Shabaab as a defender of the Somali identity against perceived external domination.

Thus, extremism in Africa cannot be understood without reference to its evolution from a Middle Eastern-centred to a pan-African problem, which has been facilitated by global extremist networks and local vulnerabilities.

Figure 2: Africa’s active militant Islamist groups

Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies

4 VULNERABILITIES AND DRIVERS OF VIOLENT

EXTREMISM

The discussion identified multiple drivers of violent extremism, all of which operate simultaneously and reinforce one another, and they are not primarily ideological in nature. It is in places where government failure, insecurity and social exclusion grows that fertile ground for extremism flourishes.

Key vulnerabilities include:

4.1 Governance collapse and state absence

In areas where the state’s presence is minimal or non-existent, extremist actors have stepped in, which development has left entire regions of Africa outside the effective reach of their national institutions. Schools, courts, hospitals, and administrative services are absent, and it is in such environments that extremist groups fill the void by offering governance in the form of dispute resolution, taxation, protection, and social regulation.

4.2 Grievances and unmet needs

Radicalisation often begins not with ideology, but with grievance, for example when individuals and communities seek solutions to long-standing problems, such as land conflicts, unemployment, corruption or insecurity, because, when the state does not help its citizens, it creates a void that extremist organisations fill by presenting themselves as actors who can.

4.3 Coercion and the search for protection

A poignant insight from the discussions is that many civilians often turn to extremist groups, not because they support them, but because they seek protection from abusive or ineffective governments. Widespread civilian casualties caused by military operations, particularly those carried out “without data” or precision, push populations closer to militants, and in some cases, foreign forces deployed by African governments, notably from Russia, have been implicated in abuses, which has strengthened public sympathy for extremist groups.

4.4 Regional spillovers

When instability in one country intensifies, extremist actors shift into neighbouring states, creating a regional diffusion that continually expands the geographical reach of terrorism, which complicates the counterterrorism efforts.

4.5 Transnational collaboration

Moreover, local extremist groups gain strength when they receive support, affiliation and/or legitimacy from global extremist enterprises, such as ISIS.

These drivers explain why the foothold that extremist organisations have established throughout Africa is deepening.

Figure 3: Timeline of violent extremism and weak governance

Source: Adapted from Africa Centre’s Literature by Dr. Edknowledge Mandikwaza, Post Doctoral Researcher, University of Pretoria

5 THE NATURE OF EXTREMIST GOVERNANCE

Another central theme is the governing role that extremist organisations assume in areas where the state has retreated.

Extremist governance takes several forms:

Resolution of disputes are often resolved through harsh, but swift “justice” systems.

Protection is provided by the extremists, albeit through coercion.

The extremists also install taxation and revenue systems, which systems mirror rudimentary state functions.

Community activities are often regulated by the extremists in order to create a predictable, albeit oppressive, order.

This governance role explains why some communities tolerate the rule by the extremists. It is not ideological alignment, it is survival, because when the state does not provide basic services, people turn to whichever actor fills that space.

The contest between the state and extremists is therefore a contest for legitimacy and not just territory and, even if their rule is violent, extremists gain legitimacy when they are perceived to be more reliable than the state.

6 THE LIMITS AND RISKS OF MILITARISED

RESPONSES

The discussion raised deep concerns about the often over-securitisation of African responses to the extremism, with participants noting that despite African states devoting enormous resources to military solutions, the number of extremist groups continue to expand.

Several risks were identified:

• The overreliance on force ignores the root causes giving rise to the extremism, such as governance deficits, a lack of services and social grievances, amongst others.

• Extremist recruitment is fuelled when military operations cause civilian casualties.

• The situation is sometimes worsened when the forces of foreign security partners, such as Russia, behave abusively.

• The weak national defence capacities have left states dependent on external military actors, who often do not prioritise local civilian protection over military success.

The result is a widening gap between communities and the state, because when people lose trust in government security forces, they may align, willingly or reluctantly, with extremist actors who appear more responsive or less abusive.

Thus, security operations, while necessary, should be part of, but not be the primary strategy.

7 REGIONAL DIFFERENCES AND CASE STUDY:

GHANA’S RESILIENCE

A compelling part of the discussion was when the question was posed as to why Ghana, which is surrounded by countries affected by extremism, has remained relatively unscathed by it.

The explanation was multi-dimensional:

• Ghana’s democratic governance has strengthened citizens’ trust in the state and its institutions.

• The interfaith dialogue mechanisms have help to keep religious tensions from escalating.

• The ethnic and cultural dialogue platforms have promoted and sustained social cohesion.

• Ghana has a strong and vocal civil society, which is integrated into the security-sector governance.

• Proactive security measures create early warning capacity.

• The information environment is more open and it allows for grievances to surface without having to resort to extremist channels.

The resilience displayed by Ghana, demonstrates that violent extremism need not be inevitable, in that where there is strong governance, inclusive civic institutions and coherent social cohesion systems, vulnerability is dramatically reduced. It stands in sharp contrast to regions where civil society is weak, for example in Burkina Faso and Somalia, where early warning systems failed and where populations were left exposed.

Figure 4: Ghana’s strategy to combat violent extremism

Source: Civil Society Alliance Against Violent Extremism (CAAVE Ghana)

8 RECOMMENDATIONS AND ROADMAP

Drawing on the insights from Ghana’s resilience and the broader challenges faced by neighbouring countries, the following recommendations form a living narrative of resilience, where governance, dialogue, civil society, security, information, structural reform are combined to strengthen national and regional responses to violent extremism for sustainable impact.

The Roadmap emphasises that the fight against violent extremism requires a holistic approach - one that unites strong governance, inclusive civic institutions, robust early warning systems and regional collaboration. By learning from Ghana’s experience and by proactively addressing governance deficits, countries across Africa can build the resilience and collective determination needed to withstand and overcome the threat of extremism.

• They need to strengthen democratic governance by Investing in transparent, accountable and participatory governance structures that foster public trust, and governments should prioritise reforms that enhance the legitimacy of state institutions in order to ensure equitable service delivery, particularly in vulnerable communities.

• They need to promote interfaith and intercultural dialogue by establishing and by supporting platforms for sustained dialogue among religious and cultural groups, and these mechanisms should be institutionalised in order to proactively address tensions, to prevent escalation and to foster mutual understanding and respect amongst the various religious groups.

• They need to empower civil society organisations through the integration of  robust civil society actors into security-sector governance and policy-making. So too they should support capacity building for grassroots organisations to serve as early warning systems and effective channels for conveying community grievances.

• They need to enhance early warning and proactive security measures through the development of comprehensive early warning frameworks that combine community intelligence with technological tools, and which strengthen coordination between local, national and regional security agencies so as to ensure rapid responses to emerging threats.

• They need to foster an open information environment by safeguarding media freedom and by creating avenues for open expression of grievances, and by encouraging responsible reporting and information sharing in order to counter the extremist narratives and to provide sufficient space for peaceful dissent.

• These countries also need to address their structural governance deficits by implementing reforms aimed at improving access to justice, basic services and inclusive economic opportunities, particularly in marginalised areas; and this includes prioritising the restoration of state legitimacy and community trust where such has eroded.

• They need to strengthen regional cooperation by enhancing cross-border collaboration through shared intelligence, joint operations and harmonised legal frameworks, and regional bodies should facilitate dialogue and coordinated action against transnational extremist threats.

9 ROADMAP

9.1 Short-Term Actions (1-2 years):

• Countries ought to conduct national and regional assessments in order to identify governance gaps and at-risk communities, which they can begin doing by implementing targeted governance reforms and by focusing on service delivery and justice in vulnerable regions.

• They should establish and/or reinforce interfaith and intercultural dialogue platforms in hotspot areas under their jurisdiction.

• They ought to launch public awareness campaigns on the importance of state legitimacy, social cohesion and peaceful grievance redress; and they should initiate capacity-building programmes for local leaders, civil society and community-based organisations.

• They ought to develop and operationalise early warning and rapid response systems in collaboration with civil society.

9.2 Medium-Term Actions (3-5 years):

• They must institutionalise inclusive governance mechanisms and ensure regular civil society engagement in order to improve security-sector oversight.

• They must expand regional cooperation initiatives, including intelligence sharing and border management, amongst other actions that are aimed at securing stability.

• Monitor and evaluate the impact of interventions by adapting strategies based on lessons learned and evolving threats.

9.3 Long-term actions (5+ years):

• African countries should consolidate reforms by embedding best practices into their national policies and their legal frameworks.

• They should promote regional integration so as to ensure a sustained collective security and resilience against the violent extremism.

• Continue to foster civic education, interfaith harmony and responsive governance in order to address root causes of extremism.

10 CONCLUSION

The African continent is confronting an era of rising extremist violence, which is marked by an expanding geography, increasing frequency of attacks and a deepening of civilian suffering. The available security data reflects an escalation in fatalities, rising daily death tolls and a widening spread of attacks across regions, which, read together, underscores an undeniable fact that the continental security landscape is under immense strain.

But, extremism is not merely a military threat, it is also a symptom of structural governance challenges, in that states are failing to provide basic services, security, justice and inclusion, which is creating a vacuum that extremist groups then exploit. This is so, because when communities feel abandoned or abused, they may shift their loyalties for purposes of self-preservation. Moreover, weak regional coordination allows extremists to move across borders unimpeded. In contrast to this, Ghana’s counter-narrative has shown that strong governance, robust civil society, interfaith harmony and proactive security measures can build resilience and national immunity against violent extremism.

By following the proposed recommendations and roadmap, African states can transform the fight against extremism from a reactive struggle into a proactive strategy of governance renewal, which will strengthen social cohesion and community empowerment, and which will ultimately reclaim legitimacy and achieving sustainable peace.

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