Copyright © 2026

prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute

PO Box 12609

Mill Street

Cape Town, 8010

South Africa

235-515 NPO

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced

or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in

writing from the Global South Perspectives Network

DISCLAIMER

Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of

The coordinating entities or any of their office bearers

Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 19 January 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.

FEBRUARY 2026

Author: Daryl Swanepoel

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

2 THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT: SYMBOLIC ADVANCE AND POLITICAL CONTRACTION

3 MULTILATERALISM UNDER PRESSURE: WHEN RULES DEPEND ON RESTRAINT

4 REINTERPRETING THE AFRICAN G20: AGENDA-SETTING AS INFLUENCE

5 CONTESTATION AND LANGUAGE: NORMS UNDER EXPLICIT CHALLENGE

6 EXCLUSION AND PRECEDENT: PROCEDURAL NORMS AT RISK

7 ARTICLE 109 AND THE LIMITS OF FORMAL RENEWAL

8 FROM UNIPOLARITY TO MULTIPOLARITY: FRAGMENTATION AS STRUCTURAL TRANSITION

9 COALITIONS OF THE WILLING: PRAGMATIC COOPERATION IN A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM

10 AGENDA NARROWING: COHERENCE OR RETRENCHMENT?

11 PRESIDENCY CYCLES, CONTINUITY AND THE RISK OF HIATUS

12 FRAGMENTATION AND THE ILLUSION OF EXIT

13 BUREAUCRATISATION AND THE LOSS OF INFORMALITY

14 CONCLUSION: THE G20 BETWEEN STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINT AND ADAPTIVE AGENCY

Cover photo: Image generated using OpenAI’s DALL·E image generation model (2026). Concept developed for the Inclusive Society Institute / Global South Perspectives Network publication.

1 INTRODUCTION

The Open Consultation Mondays webinar on “What is the future of the G20?” took place at a moment when the international system appears to be quietly, but unmistakably, recalibrating itself. This is not a period marked by dramatic institutional collapse, nor by the sudden abandonment of multilateral frameworks. Rather, it is characterised by something more subtle and more unsettling: the gradual loosening of the political consensus that once gave those frameworks coherence and direction.

Multilateralism continues to exist in form, yet increasingly struggles to operate in substance, since rules remain written, but compliance has become selective. Forums still convene, but authority is uneven, contested and often fragile.

Within this unsettled terrain, the G20 occupies a distinctive and revealing position, because unlike treaty-based institutions, it is neither anchored in international law, nor supported by enforcement mechanisms. Its legitimacy rests almost entirely on political consent, procedural convention and the shared understanding that systemically important economies carry a collective responsibility for managing global risk. Where that understanding weakens, the G20 does not simply underperform. It becomes a site where deeper tensions in global governance are exposed.

For this reason, the consultation approached the G20 not as a discrete institution facing episodic difficulty, but as an indicator of broader transformations in how multilateral cooperation is practiced. The central concern was not whether the G20 has delivered particular outcomes, but whether the conditions that once made it a credible and effective forum still hold.

2 THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT: SYMBOLIC

ADVANCE AND POLITICAL

CONTRACTION

The discussion was framed by the conclusion of the first G20 Summit hosted on the African continent. This G20 in Johannesburg marked an important symbolic expansion of global economic governance, that reflected both the shifting geography of systemic importance and the growing assertiveness of the developing and middle-income economies. Hosting the G20 on African soil carried an implicit challenge to inherited hierarchies within the international system, in that it reinforced the long-standing arguments that global governance must adapt to the contemporary economic realities, rather than remaining tethered to historical precedent.

But the consultation deliberately resisted a purely symbolic reading of the Summit and instead, it situated the African presidency within a longer trajectory in which developing countries have sought to reshape both the content and the normative orientation of global economic governance. The agenda advanced during the presidency foregrounded structural constraints, rather than cyclical fluctuations, directing attention to issues that speak directly to long-term development and systemic vulnerability.

At the same time, the consultation acknowledged that this agenda unfolded within a narrowing political space. Participation by some major economies, most notably the United States, was limited. Contestation over language intensified. And soon after the Summit, developments surrounding the forthcoming presidency introduced new uncertainty regarding the procedural norms of the forum itself. This juxtaposition, between agenda expansion on the one hand and political contraction on the other, framed much of the discussion that followed.

3 MULTILATERALISM UNDER PRESSURE:

WHEN RULES DEPEND ON RESTRAINT

A foundational analytical premise of the consultation was that multilateral institutions derive their effectiveness not from formal rules alone, but from the willingness of participants to accept constraint. Rules do not enforce themselves. They function because actors believe that restraint serves their long-term interests better than unilateral action.

When this belief erodes, institutions rarely collapse outright. More often, they hollow out. Procedures continue, but their binding force weakens. Participation becomes conditional, selective or instrumental. The consultation argued that this pattern is increasingly visible across the multilateral system as a whole.

The G20 is particularly exposed to this dynamic. Its informality was originally its greatest strength, allowing rapid coordination in moments of crisis and enabling dialogue among actors with divergent political and economic systems, but informality also carries vulnerability and so when commitment to consensus fades, flexibility can be repurposed to justify exclusion, agenda narrowing or procedural manipulation.

Current tensions within the G20 were therefore framed not as isolated dysfunctions, but as manifestations of a broader shift in global governance, namely a shifting away from rule-bounded cooperation and toward power-mediated engagement. This shift does not eliminate multilateralism, but it fundamentally alters its character, which renders cooperation more contingent and less predictable.

4 REINTERPRETING THE AFRICAN G20:

AGENDA-SETTING AS INFLUENCE

A substantial portion of the discussion was devoted to reassessing what constitutes “impact” in contemporary global governance. The consultation challenged evaluation frameworks that privilege attendance by heads of state, the specificity of communiqués or the immediacy of deliverables.

Instead, emphasis was placed on agenda-setting as a form of influence, given that the shaping of the terms of debate can, in a fragmented system, be more consequential than securing immediate commitments. The African presidency was therefore understood as exercising policy and norm entrepreneurship, filling discursive space at a moment when the global narrative is unsettled.

Debt sustainability was foregrounded as a structural issue embedded in the architecture of global finance, rather than as a failure of fiscal discipline and the cost of capital was elevated as a central constraint on development. Climate finance was reframed around access, quality and adaptation, rather than aggregate pledges alone, and critical minerals were positioned within a development and beneficiation discourse that challenges extractive models which externalise value.

The consultation noted that many of these issues transcend the G20 itself. Their significance lies in their capacity to migrate across forums, reinforcing debates in development finance, climate negotiations and regional processes and so, in this sense, influence operates cumulatively, through repetition and coalition-building rather than through singular decisions.

5 CONTESTATION AND LANGUAGE:

NORMS UNDER EXPLICIT CHALLENGE

The consultation examined the intensification of contestation within the G20, particularly around language previously regarded as settled, where issues such as climate action, gender, sustainable development and solidarity again became sites of explicit disagreement.

What distinguished this phase of contestation was not its breadth, but its nature; where the use of previously agreed language as a basis for compromise was resisted by some member states and where normative frameworks that had accumulated over time were no longer uniformly treated as common reference points.

The discussion underscored that in consensus-based forums such as the G20, even limited resistance can exert disproportionate influence on the outcomes, because in such fora, even  a small number of dissenting actors can significantly narrow them and recalibrate what is considered to be politically possible. The result is that over time this dynamic reshapes expectations, which weakens the stabilising function of precedent.

This development was interpreted as reflecting a broader environment in which norms themselves are increasingly contested, because as power politics reassert themselves, commitments to shared values become conditional, subject to reinterpretation or outright rejection.

6 EXCLUSION AND PRECEDENT:

PROCEDURAL NORMS AT RISK

A critical analytical focus of the consultation concerned the unilateral exclusion of a founding G20 member, South Africa, under the forthcoming presidency, which, while formally framed as temporary, could set a troubling precedent.

The G20’s legitimacy rests on inclusion and shared participation among its members and therefore selective exclusion, even without formal expulsion, undermines this premise. More consequential, however, was the absence of collective resistance from the other members of the G20.

The consultation interpreted this silence of the other members as indicative of the current fragmented political environment in which institutional principles seem to increasingly yield to bilateral calculation. States may object privately, but publicly, they are reluctant to incur political cost by defending procedural norms.

This pattern was identified as a key mechanism through which consensus-based systems erode. It does not occur through overt rejection, but through submission; and then over time, the exceptions become normalised, thereby altering expectations and embedding procedural uncertainty within the institution itself.

7 ARTICLE 109 AND THE LIMITS OF

FORMAL RENEWAL

Flowing directly from the discussion on exclusion and procedural precedent, the consultation broadened its analytical lens to consider deeper structural constraints affecting institutional reform within the multilateral system. Particular reference was made to the United Nations Charter’s built-in reform mechanisms, notably Article 109, and to the persistent failure to activate them in any meaningful way.

Article 109 was treated as emblematic, rather than exceptional. Its existence demonstrates that the multilateral system is not legally frozen, pathways for comprehensive reform are formally available. Yet its non-use highlights a more fundamental reality: reform is not blocked by legal impossibility, but by political equilibrium. Those actors most empowered to activate reform are frequently those with the least incentive to alter existing arrangements.

This observation underscored a broader point. Institutional stagnation should not be misread as technical failure; instead, it reflects a balance of power in which entrenched advantage is preserved through inaction, where reform becomes conceivable only when shifts in power alter incentive structures and not merely when legal mechanisms exist.

The consultation also cautioned against the activating Article 109, due to the profound political risk thereof. In a deeply fragmented and power-contested international system, the opening of the Charter to wholesale revision may yield an order markedly worse than the one it seeks to reform.

8 FROM UNIPOLARITY TO

MULTIPOLARITY: FRAGMENTATION AS

STRUCTURAL TRANSITION

Building on the discussion of institutional stasis, the consultation situated the current G20 dynamics within the wider historical transition that is underway; a transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order.

The post-Cold War unipolar moment created an enabling environment for consensus-based multilateralism. In such an environment the concentration of power reduced coordination costs, which allowed dominant actors to underwrite the institutions even when the outcomes were imperfect or unevenly distributed. As power diffuses, however, the logic of cooperation changes fundamentally. Consensus becomes harder to sustain, veto power more widely distributed and normative coherence more fragile.

Fragmentation, in this reading, is not synonymous with chaos. It is a structural consequence of multipolarity. The challenge facing institutions such as the G20 is not whether fragmentation exists, but whether it can be governed. Consequently, thinner outcomes, slower consensus and heightened contestation may in fact reflect an adaptation of the system, rather than its failure.

9 COALITIONS OF THE WILLING:

PRAGMATIC COOPERATION IN A

FRAGMENTED SYSTEM

Against this backdrop, the consultation explored the growing role of coalitions of the willing as pragmatic instruments of cooperation, not as substitutes for multilateralism, but as adaptive responses to institutional gridlock.

Coalitions of the willing allow cooperation to proceed where unanimity proves unattainable, and so by enabling a critical mass of states to align around shared objectives, progress can be made without waiting for universal agreement. Their legitimacy of such cooperation will be derived from the coalition’s effectiveness, openness and the capacity to expand.

The discussion acknowledged the potential risks associated with such coalition formation, where poorly designed coalitions can entrench fragmentation or reinforce power asymmetries. Yet in the current environment, paralysis was seen as a greater danger than pluralism and therefore carefully structured coalitions may help sustain cooperation, while preserving institutional continuity.

Within this logic, the G20 itself can be understood as an early coalition of the willing, given that it was created as to address systemic risks informally, when the existing institutions multilateral processes proved insufficient.

10 AGENDA NARROWING: COHERENCE

OR RETRENCHMENT?

The proposal to narrow the G20 agenda to its original macroeconomic and financial focus was examined in detail. While agenda expansion has strained coherence, the consultation rejected a simplistic return to “back-to-basics”.

The global economy today is structurally different from that of earlier periods. Finance, development, inequality and climate risk are deeply intertwined. Treating development as external to economic governance misreads contemporary risk, in that a finance-only G20 risks managing symptoms, while ignoring the underlying causes.

The distinction advanced was therefore between rationalisation and regression. Streamlining may be necessary, retreat is not.

11 PRESIDENCY CYCLES, CONTINUITY

AND THE RISK OF HIATUS

The discussion also noted that the immediate transition following South Africa’s presidency includes a de facto hiatus under the current United States presidency, during which the G20 process is expected to operate with reduced momentum and limited agenda expansion. This interlude was not framed as withdrawal from the forum, but as a period of lowered political investment, with implications for continuity and follow-through on issues elevated during the African presidency. Against this backdrop, cautious hope was expressed by a number of participants in the consultation that the United Kingdom presidency may serve as a point of reactivation, where deferred threads could be picked up and where the G20’s work programme can be re-anchored, even if under a different framing and set of priorities.

The consultation also reflected on the implications of the G20 presidency cycle, particularly the transition from South Africa to the United Kingdom, and thereafter to South Korea. The concern expressed was not one of intent or legitimacy, but of continuity. Presidencies matter because they shape agenda priority and framing, and the risk identified was that issues foregrounded under South Africa’s leadership, notably development constraints, inequality, debt dynamics and the cost of capital, may struggle to retain salience as the forum shifts toward political economies with different strategic reference points. The UK was implicitly associated with a more traditional G7-style orientation, while South Korea was seen as occupying a more ambiguous middle position. The underlying question was whether the momentum created by the African presidency would be carried forward or quietly diluted. Or will it be re-anchored around narrower macroeconomic concerns.

12 FRAGMENTATION AND THE ILLUSION

OF EXIT

The discussion also addressed the proliferation of alternative groupings and parallel institutions, which should not be viewed  as straightforward substitutes for established forums. Fragmentation may very well create tactical openings, but it could also magnify power asymmetries. Negotiations in such fragmented environments could lead to smaller and middle-income states losing their collective leverage.

13 BUREAUCRATISATION AND THE LOSS

OF INFORMALITY

A reflective strand of the consultation focused on the increasing bureaucratisation of the G20, where procedural density has expanded considerably, coupled with extensive negotiation over text that crowds out essential less formal political dialogue.

The G20 was originally conceived as an informal space for candid engagement and in the current environment that is marked by mistrust and fragmentation, such relational spaces may be increasingly important. Dialogue, the consultation argued, is not ornamental. It is infrastructural.

14 CONCLUSION: THE G20 BETWEEN

STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINT AND

ADAPTIVE AGENCY

The consultation underscored that the G20 should no longer be assessed against expectations formed in a different structural era. Its present tensions reflect deeper constraints embedded in the contemporary international order.

Formal reform pathways exist, but remain politically blocked and fragmentation is structural, rather than episodic and therefore, consensus, where it emerges, will be partial and issue-specific.

Within this environment, the G20 remains ambiguous, but consequential. It cannot restore a lost consensus, nor can it substitute for comprehensive institutional reform. Its value lies in functioning as a flexible platform for coordination, agenda-setting and selective alignment.

The future of the G20, like that of multilateralism itself, will be shaped by political choice, by whether states remain willing to accept constraint in pursuit of cooperation that is imperfect, but still necessary.

 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network

Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates.

GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North.

Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi.

GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order.

Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za

Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589

Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za