Towards a GNU Plus model: Inclusive public policy responses to South Africa’s governance and development crisis

Read as PDF

Copyright © 2026

Print ISSN: 2960-1541

Online ISSN: 2960-155X

Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609

Mill Street

Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R

Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of

the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council

members.

JANUARY 2026

Image credit: AI-generated illustration produced with OpenAI (DALL·E), 2026.

by Prof William Gumede

Abstract

US President Donald Trump’s global tariffs, slashing development aid and funding to global multilateral organisations, combined with major global disrupting forces, such as climate change and artificial intelligence (AI), are ushering in a new global era of uncertainty, triggering a likely global economic downturn and possibly causing economic ruin for many countries.

It is causing a Great Disruption. South Africa’s Government of National Unity (GNU) offers an inclusive governance model to navigate the Great Disruption. The GNU brings together the diversity of SA’s political parties, colours and resources. However, for the GNU to be effective, it must be truly inclusive, including non-ANC partners in decision-making, policymaking and ideas-generation. A government of national unity (GNU) model, which tries to bring together a diversity of parties – therefore different ideologies, ideas and minority groups – is a more inclusive governance approach in societies under crisis, but also societies that face external threats.

GNUs are established when societies face deeply-rooted crises, and one single-party or group alone cannot solve these, or do not have the electoral mandate to do so on their own. Effective coalitions need formal coalition agreements, beyond a handshake between party leaders. Formal coalition agreements also set out how the partners engage with each other, the rules of engagement and the protocols. The success of South Africa's new GNU will heavily depend on whether ANC and participating opposition party leaders can muster the maturity to adhere to consensus decision-making, rather than majority decision-making or brinkmanship.

Although South Africa's African National Congress is in a multiparty Government of National Unity, it makes decisions, policies and behaves as if it is the majority government, solely in power, without any partners, and because of this, perpetually undermines the stability, longevity and cohesion of the country's first post-1994 national coalition government. For the GNU to be successful, there has to be a governance culture change, from majoritarianism to multiparty consensus.

But South Africa’s domestic and international challenges cannot be navigated by politicians or government officials alone. A Government of National Unity Plus governance model, whereby the GNU partners with business, civil society and professionals, will improve South Africa’s capacity to navigate the frightening domestic and global challenges and seize the opportunities.

It is critical that the GNU transforms into a GNU Plus, which would include business, civil society and professionals to co-govern South Africa during the Great Disruption South Africa and the world now face. A key structural reform needed is to bring in the private sector, civil society and professional associations to help with public service delivery and tackle development, state, institutional, infrastructure, and policy failure.

Keywords: Government of National Unity (GNU), GNU Plus, Inclusive governance, Coalition government, Consensus decision‑making, SA Inc approach, Pragmatism in policymaking, State capacity, Public service delivery, Structural reforms

Introduction

US President Donald Trump’s sweeping tariffs, slashing development aid and funding to global multilateral organisations, combined with major global disrupting forces, such as climate change and artificial intelligence (AI), are ushering in a new global era of uncertainty, triggering a likely global economic downturn and possibly causing economic ruin for many countries.

Global trade, economic and political governance rules, institutions, multilateralism have been upended. It is causing internal turmoil in countries outside the US, disrupting economies, companies and potentially causing instability in societies, as their economies are experiencing, or will experience, downturns (Morgan, 2025; Shang-Jin, 2025; Staiger, 2025). It is causing a Great Disruption.

There is the real danger for South Africa and many countries to experience Covid-19-like disruptions of economies, businesses and societies. Many developing country economies will crash, especially those that are poorly governed.

Countries, firms and communities that practice good governance are more likely to thrive in global disruption (Byrne, 2025; Gumede, 2025). Good governance is a buffer to uncertainty. Good country governance is an inoculation against geopolitical, economic, technological and environmental unpredictability. Good governance helps strengthen country, society and company resilience in uncertainty.

Countries that have inclusive models of government will weather global storms better. Countries, companies with poor governance will be left behind.

South Africa’s Government of National Unity (GNU) offers an inclusive governance model to navigate the global disruption (Gumede, 2025). The GNU brings together the diversity of South Africa’s political parties, colours and resources. However, for the GNU to be effective, it must be truly inclusive, including non-ANC partners in decision-making, policymaking and ideas-generation. Diversity offers a buffer to uncertainty (Duchek et al., 2019; Levin, 2020; Ma et al., 2024). South Africa’s growth, poverty reduction and employment creation can only come through its diversity (Gumede, 2025). So, diversity-led growth, poverty reduction and employment creation. 

A Government of National Unity (GNU) model, which tries to bring together a diversity of parties – therefore different ideologies, ideas and minority groups – is a more inclusive governance approach in societies under crisis, but also societies that face external threats.

GNUs are established when societies face deeply-rooted crises, and one single-party or group alone cannot solve these, or do not have the electoral mandate to do so on their own (Kadima, 2006; Gumede, 2024). South Africa is facing multiple domestic crises – ranging from a battling economy, high unemployment, mass homelessness, lawlessness, and rising tribalism (Gumede, 2025). Furthermore, the impact of Trump’s sweeping tariffs have brought an external challenge to the country (Gumede, 2025).

Coalition governance even more appropriate in diverse societies, to recover from economic emergencies and from conflict

Coalition governments can either be established when no party secures a majority, or it can be formed when one party gains a majority but includes the losing parties in a form of Government of National Unity (GNU). Coalitions can also be formed pre-election – before the parties have taken part in an election – or post-election, based on the results of the election (Golder, 2006; Conti, 2014; Gumede, 2024).

Coalition governance allows for the greater participation of minorities in governance, helps cater for the interests of all groups in a country and for the adoption of policies that cater for marginalised constituencies, as dominant governing parties often only deliver to their own constituencies and exclude the interests of non-supporters (Kadima, 2006; Figueiredo, 2007; Evans, 2019; Gumede, 2024). Furthermore, because coalition governance forces participants to regularly engage with each other, get to know the other side, and build relationships, if done effectively, it is a good institution to build trust across political, racial and class divides.

Effective coalition governance demands compromises for the greater good of public service delivery, participation of all partners and parties governing in the interests of all the constituencies of the partnership (Thies, 2001; Müller & Strøm, 2008; Evans, 2019; Gumede, 2024). Successful coalition governance cultures also transplant to the rest of societies – making diverse societies more open to compromise, to look after the interests of all communities and stakeholders and encourage a culture of conflict resolution (Gumede, 2024). This means that coalition governance is likely to lead to more peaceful societies (Evans, 2019; Gumede, 2024). Since the Second World War, coalition governments have produced among the greatest country economic miracles, from Germany and Switzerland to Brazil.

Most African countries are exceptionally diverse – ethnically, religiously and linguistically – because of the way former colonial powers arbitrary created these countries (Mamdani, 2012; Gumede, 2017). However, since the end of the independence from colonialism, white-minority regimes and apartheid, most African countries have been run by dominant liberation and independence movements, military and personal regimes which often had their power bases in one ethnic, religious, language or regional group (Kadima, 2006; Mamdani, 2012; Gumede, 2017).

African governments invariably have governed only for their ‘own’ group, rather than in the widest interests of all communities in their countries (Mamdani, 2012; Gumede, 2017). Furthermore, when most African countries launched multiparty regimes, they adopted ‘winner-takes-all’ electoral systems in which the party or leader that wins governs only for their ‘constituencies’ and excludes everyone else from state, private sector and societal positions (Gumede, 2017). This has been among the main reasons for development, state and democratic economic failures in post-independence Africa. Coalition governments would have been a much more inclusive form of governance for countries in Africa.

Coalitions have been particularly critical in countries rebuilding after war, ethnic conflict and civil war. Following defeat in the Second World War, Germany had long periods of coalition governments, as parties spanning various ideologies and religions worked together to rebuild the country, fostering national unity and boosting industrial recovery (Evans, 2019). In fact, in the post-Second World War, Germany was only governed for one term by a single party (Riker, 1962; Martin, 2017). The great German post-Second World War growth miracle happened under coalition governments.

Following the civil war in 1918, between socialists and those who oppose socialism, Finland had continuous coalitions governments, often between parties with opposite ideological outlooks (Tornudd, 1969). The civil war was conducted between the  Finnish Socialist Workers’ Republic (Red Finland) and the non-socialists (White Finland), during the country’s transition from being part of the Russian Empire, to an independent state. The coalition governments helped the country bind together again after the violent divisions of civil war.

In Brazil, it took coalitions of parties to band together to push out military rulers and restore constitutional rule (Mainwaring et al., 2000). Following a long period of military rule, a coalition government took power following the 1945 elections, with the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático), founded by Getúlio Vargas in alliance with the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) forming the PSD-PTB alliance, which governed Brazil between 1946 and 1964, before the military staged another coup in 1964. The PSD-PTB governing alliance prioritised restoring constitutional order following the military rule.  After another period of military rule in Brazil, a coalition between the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the Liberal Front Party (PFL) took power, under José Sarney, between 1985 and 1990, following the collapse of military rule, and formed the first civilian government since 1965. The PMDB-PFL governing coalition restored democracy again.

Post-Second World War Japan had different mechanisms of coalitions (Evans, 1995; Gumede, 2018). From the late 1950s onwards, Japan’s dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), although even if not in coalition, offered policy concessions in Parliament to the opposition parties, pursuing consensus-style politics, involving opposition parties in policymaking, in return for support for its export-led growth strategy. Unlike, in Africa, where dominant governing parties often steamrolled the opposition parties, the LDP co-opted opposition, and almost co-governed and co-legislated around a core set of national priorities (Gumede, 2017). Japan’s LDP introduced the idea of a social pact, involving organised business and trade unions as part of country policymaking.

Governments of National Unity in Africa

Ordinary governing coalitions are put together when no single party wins an outright majority – mostly in normal times. However, GNUs usually involve including additional parties, not necessarily required to form a governing majority. The focus of a GNU is to try to get the widest representation of political parties into a government, which would serve South Africa well in facing its multiple crises – economic, lawlessness and tribalism (Gumede, 2023).

Former South African President Nelson Mandela presided over a Government of National Unity, a form of coalition government, to promote reconciliation, inclusiveness and participation, when he included all the other major opposition parties into government, including the National Party, the former governing party, despite the fact that the ANC won the 1994 elections (Gumede, 2005).

Zimbabwe had a GNU at independence in 1980. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe at the time offered portfolios to the rival liberation movement, the Patriotic Front, and positions to former members of Ian Smith’s white-minority government. Mugabe’s then Zimbabwe African National Union won 57 out 100 parliamentary seats in the 1980 election but signed a coalition agreement with the opposition Patriotic Front of Joshua Nkomo and with the Rhodesian Front, formerly white governing party led by Ian Smith (Ross, 1980). In February 2009, Mugabe’s Zanu-PF formed a GNU with Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change and Arthur Mutambara’s faction of the MDC (Matyszak, 2010).  

After Kenya’s disputed 2007 presidential elections, the country plunged into conflict between supporters of incumbent president Mwai Kibaki, leading the Party of National Unity, and opposition leader Raila Odinga, leading the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). Kibaki had announced he had retained the presidency, which was disputed by Odinga. Both candidates used ethnicity and the fear of ethnic dominance to mobilise support. More than 1,200 people died, and 350,000 people were displaced in the violence. Kibaki formed the party just before the election. 

To bring an end to the violence, the political opponents Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga formed a GNU, which lasted from 2008 to 2013 (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010; Mapuva, 2010). The Kenyan GNU coalition formulated a new Constitution for the country (Mapuva, 2010). The agreement called for a President and a Prime Minister, the writing of a new Constitution, and referendum to approve it. Each party would have equal ministerial positions (Kagwanja, 2024). Ministers of one party were teamed up with deputies of another country. A mechanism was agreed to adopt policies. Kenya also introduced an “interagency committee system” to get different government departments to collaborate around specific crises, policies and implementation. Performance agreements for ministers were introduced. Ongoing country conflicts would be mediated by external mediators. It was agreed that violence would be monitored by independent monitors. The Kenyan GNU agreement proposed an ethnicity conference to tackle inter-ethnic conflicts.

In 2024, following renewed protests over the Kenyan government’s failures, Kenyan President William Ruto formed a GNU, by including four prominent opposition leaders in his Cabinet, to sooth public unhappiness and to establish a more inclusive national government structure (Wasike, 2024). The weeks-long 2024 violent public protests caused over 50 deaths, destruction of public property and widespread political polarisation. The protests began on June 18 as peaceful rallies against tax hikes but morphed into a wider anti-government campaign calling for President Ruto to resign.

Ruto said in his address following the appointment of his GNU: “The crisis has presented us with a great opportunity as a nation to craft a broad-based and inclusive citizen coalition for national transformation and progress made up of Kenyans from all walks of life. Consequently, I have started the process of forming a new broad-based cabinet to assist in driving the urgently needed and irreversible transformation of our country” (Al Jazeera, 2024). Some opposition groups slammed the GNU as “cosmetic”, arguing it “only maintains a tradition in Kenyan politics of leaders co-opting the opposition with jobs and perks while the population sees no benefits” (Al Jazeera, 2024).

GNU need formal agreements and structures

The key to the success of the GNU is how it will be structured. The size, meaning the number of parties in a GNU, is critical to its effective functioning. While every attempt must be made to be inclusive, too many parties may hinder governing effectiveness (Gumede, 2023). It will be better to include a smaller number of parties in the core GNU and involve other parties in case-by-case co-governing arrangements, whether heading legislative committees or chairing official inquiries. There are 11 parties in the current GNU. The ANC has pushed the idea to include more smaller parties – doing so would make the GNU operation more cumbersome than is currently the case.

National Executive Committee member Mzwandile Masina said the ANC was moving ahead with plans to include more political parties in the GNU, and discussions are ongoing with political parties, including with former ANC and South African President Jacob Zuma’s uMkontho weSizwe (MK) party (Maromo, 2025).

“This GNU is led by ourselves. The DA [Democratic Alliance] will have to accept that we are resetting the button. We are bringing others who will be prepared to subscribe,” said Masina recently (Maromo, 2025). 

Many national coalitions in other African countries fail because partners do not sign formal agreements which set the terms of the coalitions, establishing coalition governance structures, and agreeing on key policies that will underpin the coalitions (Gumede, 2024). Many of South Africa’s municipal coalitions have failed because coalition partners do not come up with formal agreements, set up coalition governance structures and agree on the core policies for the coalition.

Kenya’s 2008 and 2013 GNU had no formal agreement, beyond handshakes (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010; Mapuva, 2010). Effective coalitions need formal coalition agreements, beyond a handshake between party leaders. Often coalition agreements are only based on how appointments will be distributed among parties. Formal coalition agreements also set out how the partners engage with each other, the rules of engagement and the protocols.

Such formal agreements hold parties accountable to themselves, to their partners and to the voters. Such agreements must ideally be made public, so that voters understand these agreements. Making agreements publicly is important to hold parties accountable, as voters can measure parties’ coalition engagements in relation to these agreements. It also helps hold parties accountable, as parties cannot willy-nilly leave coalitions for superficial reasons.

Most of South African municipal coalitions do not sign partnership agreements (Gumede, 2024). Parties often leave coalitions for no substantial reason, unleashing governing instability. Because there are no formal coalition agreements, party supporters and voters cannot assess whether their leaving is credible. The GNU will also have to put together a code of conduct to ensure acceptable behaviour, common decency and rules of engagement for leaders. Such a code of conduct must be equitably policed.

Parties in a coalition also need to come up with a joint coalition policy programme. Coalitions are multiparty governments – and therefore have to come up with policies that reflect the priorities of the members of the coalition, not that of the party with the most votes. Many coalitions at a municipal level in South Africa have failed because the party with the most votes, often wrongly, insists their policies become the government policies (Gumede, 2024). The ANC, South Africa’s former majority governing party, has struggled to change its culture from having the ANC’s party policies becoming the government’s policies, to having multiparty policies, in which the GNU members jointly agree on policies.

The GNU must create a political structure or structures where senior party leaders can meet regularly to discuss issues related to governance, to pre-empt minor differences between members ballooning into big fallouts. Coalitions must be seen as a ‘super-party’. This means GNU or parties in any coalition, must have a parallel political structure where all key party leaders – not the national leaders of the party – for example, their general secretaries, can regularly meet, whether two-weekly or so, to pro-actively look at issues that could potentially be conflictual. Such a mechanism was in agreement between the Multiparty Charter of 15 parties that agreed ahead of South Africa’s May 2025 elections to participate in a national government if they would be able to secure a majority. But the presidents of the participating GNU parties must also meet at appropriate intervals outside the Cabinet and government structures.

Coalitions, and the GNU, need a conflict resolution mechanism. A key factor in the success of many Western European national coalitions is the creation of formal conflict management structures for coalitions (Riker, 1962; Müller & Strøm, 2008; Conti, 2014; Schermann & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014). Many coalitions at South Africa’s municipal level failed because of an absence of conflict resolution mechanisms or an abuse of such mechanisms by dominant parties. The Statement of Intent that provides for the GNU provides for a dispute deadlock breaking mechanism (ANC, 2024). It is called a clearing-house mechanism. It is an issue-specific negotiating committee, chaired by Deputy President Paul Mashatile, to iron out disputes.

During all the policy disputes between the ANC and non-ANC GNU partners, the clearing house had its last meeting in December 2024, where the Basic Education Laws Amendment (BELA) Act, a South African law passed in December 2024 that amends the South African Schools Act and the Employment of Educators Act, was the centre of the deliberations. But the clearing-house subcommittee was ultimately not able to resolve the dispute (O’Regan, 2024). In a letter to Ramaphosa on 24 January 2025, in which John Steenhuisen, the leader of the DA, objected to the Expropriation Act, he claimed the clearing-house “mechanism was abused during the dispute over Bela” (DA, 2025). 

The GNU’s conflict resolution mechanisms must be reformed (Gumede, 2025). The clearing house has yet to adopt terms of reference and is not an ideal conflict resolution mechanism (O’Regan, 2024). For it to be effective, impartial and fair, it cannot be chaired by a leader from the dominant party. It obviously cannot be chaired by the country president. It has to be chaired by one of the smallest parties or by an independent outsider – an Ombudsman – which has buy-in from all GNU partners. South Africa is a constitutional democracy. This means that every policy dispute, including one in the GNU, when agreed conflict resolutions mechanisms are unable to resolve disputes, can be taken to the courts to arbitrate.

Consensus decision-making

Consensus, rather than majority-rule decisions, has been at the heart of countries that have established inclusive democracies, sustainable development and peaceful societies. Many of the great economic miracles in the post-Second World War period, whether in Japan, Germany or in Scandinavian countries, such as Sweden, have been based on consensus decision-making in politics, economics and wider society (Robin, 1982; Lijphart, 1984; Linder, 1994; Evans, 1995; Hofstede & Soeters, 2000). 

The June 2024 agreement that established the GNU provided for consensus decision-making as the basis to arrive at decisions (GNU, 2025). The principle is outlined in clause 19 of the GNU’s Statement of Intent, the charter by which parties to the GNU operate. Broadly, if there is deadlock the principle of ‘sufficient consensus’ will be the basis of decision-making. Parties representing 60% of the seats in the National Assembly must agree. This means that the non-GNU partners will have to mobilise all the non-GNU members and the pro-Constitutional parties outside the GNU, such as ActionSA and Build One SA.

The Statement of Intent also provides that “in instances where sufficient consensus is not reached”, parties should raise disputes within the deadlock-breaking mechanisms created for this purpose. The deadlock mechanism currently is what is called the clearing-house mechanism, an issue-specific negotiating committee, chaired by Deputy President Paul Mashatile, to iron out disputes. However, the clearing house has yet to adopt terms of reference and is not an ideal conflict resolution mechanism. The clearing house had its last meeting in December 2024, where the Bela Act was the centre of the deliberations. But the clearing-house subcommittee was ultimately not able to resolve the dispute.

Up to now, the ANC, which has governed South Africa for the past 30 years, based its decisions on majority rule, which is democracy in its most limited form. In many cases the majority rule decisions of the ANC often favoured the party's, its leadership, or ideological and populist interests, rather than the best interests of South Africa (Gumede, 2005, 2012). The ANC has struggled to transition from its long-standing culture of unilateral majority-based decision-making to inclusive consensus decision-making as outlined in the GNU agreement (Gumede, 2024, 2025).

Consensus decisions – if genuinely taken in the widest public interest – produce better quality policies, wider societal embrace of decisions and policies, and therefore, more successful implementation of them (Robin, 1982; Hofstede & Soeters, 2000). But consensus-seeking is more likely to produce outcomes that are in the widest interests of all of society, rather than dominant groups (Lijphart, 1984; Lewin, 1998). In consensus decision-making, not everyone gets all that they want, but common basic agreements are reached, which does not harm any of the participants interests (Robin, 1982; Lijphart, 1984; Lewin, 1998; Hofstede & Soeters, 2000). In a GNU model, broad consensus is reached which is in the best interests of all of society, not one political party, colour or ethnic group.

The success of South Africa's new GNU will heavily depend on whether ANC and participating opposition party leaders can muster the maturity to adhere to consensus decision-making, rather than majority decision-making or brinkmanship.

Need governance culture change: from majoritarianism to multipartyism

Although South Africa's African National Congress is in a multiparty Government of National Unity, it makes decisions, policies and behaves as if it is the majority government, solely in power, without any partners, and because of this perpetually undermines the stability, longevity and cohesion of the country's first post-1994 national coalition government.

South Africa's post-2024 GNU government is a new multiparty government, not the continuation of the ANC majority government. Yet many ANC leaders, members and supporters misguidedly insist that it is an ANC government, with the GNU partners as add-ons. The ANC, having governed for 30 years as a majority party, has struggled to change from majority party-based decision-making to collaborative decision-making – at the heart of any successful coalition government (Lijphart, 1984).

In this wrong view, ANC policies of the past, for example, foreign policy or the National Budget, automatically become GNU policies. Yet, the GNU is an entirely new government, a new multiparty government, that needs new policies at all levels. Given that it is a new multiparty government, and not an ANC majority government, it must come up with new GNU policies, not continue with the policies and budget the ANC adopted and implemented when it was the majority government. For the GNU to be successful, there has to be a governance culture change, from majoritarianism to multiparty consensus.

South Africa's National Budget presentation was initially cancelled hours before its delivery after the Democratic Alliance, one of the parties in the GNU, refused to support it because the ANC did not consult its GNU partners. Since coming into power in 1994, the ANC has put together Budgets without consulting opposition parties, business or civil society. The ANC put together this year’s national Budget, by itself, solely based on the ANC’s party policies, as if it was the majority government, without consulting, or including, the policies and views of the GNU partners.

Most of South Africa’s coalitions at municipal level have collapsed in the past because parties with the most votes behave like majority parties, forcing through their own party-specific policies, decisions and appointments, rather than governing in partnership, and coming up with consensus policies.

GNU Plus – partnering with business, civil society, professionals

South Africa’s domestic and international challenges cannot be navigated by politicians or government officials alone. A Government of National Unity Plus governance model, whereby the GNU partners with business, civil society and professionals, will improve South Africa’s capacity to navigate the frightening domestic and global challenges and seize the opportunities.

It is critical that the GNU transforms into a GNU Plus, which would include business, civil society and professionals to co-govern South Africa during the Great Disruption South Africa and the world now face. Economic disaster can be averted and new opportunities grasped if South Africa takes a South Africa Inc (SA Inc) approach involving non-ANC GNU members, business, civil society and professionals coming up with new policies, new strategies and improving government execution. 

A key structural reform needed is to bring in the private sector, civil society and professional associations to help with public service delivery and tackle development, state, institutional, infrastructure and policy failure. Key elements of the ANC ideologically oppose working with business, civil society and professionals – unless they are ANC political capitalists, ANC-associated ‘civil society’ or forums; or unless the ANC can ‘discipline’ business and civil society or the partnership is temporary to fix dire state failure.

It is crucial for the turnaround of the economy that the GNU partners with business, civil society and professionals to form a kind of GNU+, to help provide new ideas, capacity and energy to turn around the country’s broken state, broken economy and broken society. Importantly, this partnership should be based on co-delivery, co-implementation and co-ideas generation. It has to be real co-creation partnership, not government only seeking the help of business, civil society and professionals in instances of full state collapse. Nevertheless, partnership is particularly important in mission-critical state, policy and resource failures.

For example, South Africa must establish a GNU Plus task team bringing together the GNU partners, critical government departments and business, civil society and professionals to negotiate South Africa’s impasse with the US and to seek new markets for the country’s products. Business Leadership South Africa, for example, has urged the government to establish a 'Trade Crisis Committee', bringing together key government departments, business, civil society and professionals to drive coordinated action to secure new markets, to tackle US tariffs' damaging impact.

In its critical negotiations over tariffs with the US, South Africa must assemble a special team of negotiators led by the business sectors currently actively exporting to US markets, and heavyweight South Africans in US President Donald Trump’s inner circle. The negotiations are of such critical nature that traditional diplomacy is not to carry muster. South Africa has an advantage in that there are many South Africans within the Trump inner circle that can leverage in these high-stakes negotiations. It is critical that ideological, colour or party affiliations are not criteria for negotiators.

SA Inc approach

The GNU Plus governance model has to be based on an SA Inc approach, whereby South Africa’s policies, challenges and public service failures will have to be solved through involving not only the ANC, the government, but also the ideas, capacity and energy of non-ANC GNU partners, business, civil society and professionals.

An SA Inc approach looks at solutions based on whether it is in the widest interest of South Africa, not whether it is in the interest of one political party, ideology or colour. Pragmatism is critical in such an approach.

The South Africa Inc approach that President Ramaphosa used, involving the non-ANC Government of National Unity partners, business and civil society organisation, and keeping ANC ministers in the background, helped to ensure that the Trump-Ramaphosa meeting did not plunge into a Zelenskyy-like shouting match. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, using an SA Inc approach, taking along non-African National Congress Government of National Unity members, business and trade union leaders, in his tense meeting in the White House with US President Donald Trump, considerably helped to soften Trump, who could have responded with even more outrage than was the case in the meeting.

It is critical that President Ramaphosa govern from now on based on an SA Inc model involving non-ANC GNU partners, organised business, civil society and professionals – in co-governance, rather than as add-ons to be involved only the moment the state has failed in the delivery of a public service, which is in public focus, and where there is clearly no state capacity to deliver it, only for partners to be dispatched immediately once the public service has been delivered.

This will mean an ideological change is needed from many ANC leaders and members, who are often ideologically opposed to business, civil society and professional organisations, because of the mistaken belief that the ANC party is the sole decision-making power, and that only the state can deliver development and public services.

In an SA Inc approach, for example, in South Africa’s negotiations with the US, it will mean the country appointing an SA Inc negotiating team that excludes senior ANC figures but involves South African business figures that are doing business in the US, civil society figures with networks in the US Republican Party, non-ANC GNU members, and South Africans in Trump's inner circle. A new South Africa ambassador to the US, if an SA Inc approach is adopted, would come either from the non-ANC GNU partners, a South African business leader successful in the US, or a credible South African civil society figure, not associated with the ANC, or a South African within the Trump circle.

Pragmatism should be basis of policymaking

It is critical that pragmatism is at the heart of policymaking, decision-making and public appointments. Pragmatism is basing decisions on being practical, in the present, in the current context, rather than based on ideology, or the past or on “Great Truth” ideologies, whether Marxism or ‘Black or White’ thinking. 

The US was always perceived to be the country that has industrialised based on pragmatism, using policies based on whether they work, rather than based on ideology (Thayer, 1970; West, 1989; Morrisey, 1994). US thinkers such as John Dewey emphasised pragmatism as an ideology to guide country decision-making (Westbrook, 1993; Talisse, 2007).  

The East Asian economic miracles after the end of the Second World War was largely because of pragmatic policies, approaches and stances, rather than based on “Great Truth” ideologies (Schmiegelow, 1991; Evans, 1995; Austin, 2001). These countries have adopted orthodox or unorthodox policies not based on dogma or ideology but on practicality (Evans, 1995; Tsai & Liu, 2013). Thus, these countries could combine state-guided policies with market-driven policies, pragmatically based on the context. For example, Japan partnered with the US, who defeated Japan in the Second World War; Vietnam partnered with the US even after the Vietnam war; communist China copied Japanese-style policies. The Israeli’s worked with the Germans after the Second World War. In contrast, failing African countries followed Marxist, African socialism or struggle allegiance policies.

China’s own post-60s economic miracle has been based on pragmatism, choosing policies that have worked across the world, taken from Japan or the US, rather than pursuing dogmatic communist policies (Tsai & Liu, 2013).

ANC leaders and members have often pursued populist, ideologically rigid and past-based policies, rather than adopting pragmatic policies. Populist and left breakaway parties from the ANC also in most cases adopted populist, ideologically outdated and past-based policies. For example, many of the ANC’s foreign policies have prioritised past liberation-era allegiances of the ANC, rather than being based on the present conditions. Such policies have often been against the national interests of South Africa, stunting economic growth, undermining development and industrialisation.

East Asian miracle economy governments pragmatically changed policies, as the domestic and the global environment changed – and because of this, were able to grasp new opportunities (Evans, 1995; Rüland, 2007). Because of the lack of pragmatism, ANC governments have dug in deeper when their policies failed, or when domestic or global conditions or markets changed, compounding failure, rather than pragmatically changing course as conditions change. In South Africa, ANC leaders and members and populist offshoots from the ANC have, for example, refused to work with white business groups, saying they are “white monopoly capital”; or are reluctant to work with white civil society organisations, saying these are “right wing”. Pragmatism means that parties and leaders must partner across ideology, colour and communities.

ANC leaders and members and ANC populist offshoots, for example, support autocratic Russian ideologically as if it is still the Soviet Union, or support autocratic other African liberation movements ideologically based on the past struggle associations, even if it undermines South Africa’s economic interests. Autocratic African liberation movements unleash violence, unemployment and poverty on their citizens, who flee to South Africa, stretching South Africa’s resources. Similarly, ANC leaders and members and ANC populist offshoots support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, even if it raises the ire of the US and Western allies – and so, undermine South Africa’s economic interests.

A GNU that prioritises pragmatism may foster a society-wide movement towards pragmatic approaches to economic development, political partnerships and community collaborations – necessary for higher levels of economic growth.

Opposition and the GNU

Effective coalition governments boost oversight of the management of government, as individual coalition partners hold each other accountable for public service delivery. The coalition GNU may therefore be a governance oversight structure over the management of government affairs under the coalition (Thies, 2001). GNU partners may be keener to be responsive to the criticisms of poor delivery, corruption, and dishonesty by their partners.

Opposition parties that joined the GNU are under pressure to show the voters that they can deliver in their portfolios. Non-ANC GNU partners have a greater urgency to show that they can deliver and outperform ANC ministers, many of whom have been in government for decades with very little to show in terms of delivery. This means they must be able to independently show their voters and the public that they are performing better than the ANC ministers.

This competition between the ANC and non-ANC GNU partners to show they can deliver, increases overall public service delivery. To do so, non-ANC partners will have to regularly publicly showcase their delivery. In the past, when the ANC was the majority party, it had very little incentives to perform, as voters continued to vote for them, even if they did not deliver effective public services. The good thing is, Members of Parliament of non-ANC GNU partners have also exercised their oversight role of the GNU executive, particularly of ANC Cabinet Ministers, state-owned agencies and democratic institutions, as if they are the opposition. This has been good for democratic oversight.

However, the challenge is that competition between non-ANC and ANC ministers over who best deliver can also risk that ANC and non-ANC ministers could operate in silos, could undermine integrated delivery of public services and could create tension between the ANC and non-ANC ministers.

Nevertheless, the quality of the oversight of the opposition outside the GNU is also going to be critical to hold the GNU accountable for its performance. How the opposition outside the GNU will oppose the government, will be critical in determining the quality of delivery of the GNU. Key opposition parties formed the Progressive Caucus to oppose the GNU – although the parties involved are mostly populists, tribalists and anti-Constitutionalists, and can by no definition be taken as progressive. They include the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the United Africans Transformation (UAT), the African Transformation Movement (ATM) and the MK party.

The tone of opposition has changed. When the DA was the opposition, the party pursued a “lawfare” approach, taking unconstitutional, irrational and ideological policies of then majority ANC to court. Of course, South Africa is a constitutional democracy, and the courts are an essential avenue to challenge policies. However, the “lawfare”, although successful, undermined black grassroots’ embrace of the party. The ANC could portray the DA as a “white” party and “using” the courts to oppose “transformation”. The EFF again, when it opposed the majority ANC, used street protest-style opposition in Parliament, rather than scrutinising the details of policies, giving the impression they were a protest movement, rather than a political party in Parliament.

The MK party, with its many MPs who were state entity CEOs and former Cabinet ministers – who understand how the state and its entities work – have brought more scrutiny of the GNU executive, state entities and the public service. The MK’s opposition approach to scrutinise the details of executive and state entity reports, appears to have also pushed the EFF into focusing more on scrutiny policies and decisions, rather than on protesting. Furthermore, it is difficult for the ANC to dismiss the MK, as the new official opposition, as a “white” party, and it is forced to substantially respond to the MK. The ANC is divided between two factions: one faction opposed to the ANC’s GNU partnership with former MPC members such as the DA and the FF Plus, and the other wanting the ANC to partner with the EFF and MK.

President Cyril Ramaphosa appears to see the challenge for the ANC from both anti-MPC groups within the ANC and the populist ANC breakaways, the EFF and MK. This means President Ramaphosa and the ANC leadership appear to take MK and EFF opposition more seriously as an electoral threat, especially the possibility that the EFF and MK could combine with the ANC populist faction opposed to the ANC’s GNU partnership with MPC members, the DA, FF Plus and the IFP. 

Conclusion

Good country governance is an inoculation against global political and economic environments that are increasingly unpredictable. US President Donald Trump's sweeping global trade tariffs, combined with the forces of climate change and artificial intelligence, are causing a great disruption of trade, business and politics. Many developing country economies will crash, especially those that are poorly governed.

South Africa's Government of National Unity (GNU) offers an inclusive governance model, which brings together a wide number of political parties, ideas, energy and resources. However, for the GNU to be effective, it must be truly inclusive. The ANC will have to change from behaving as if it is still the majority party and not part of a multiparty government. Non-ANC GNU partners must be included in decision-making, policymaking and ideas-generation. Consensus-based decision-making must be the basis of GNU decision-making, policies and actions.

In using consensus-style decision-making, South Africa must adopt an SA Inc approach in governing, putting the widest interest of the country ahead of political party, ideological or colour interests when making decisions, policies and actions. The GNU conflict resolution mechanisms must be reformed to make it more functional, more credible and less open to abuse by the ANC.

Furthermore, the GNU must marshal the capacity of business, civil society and professionals in a GNU Plus model, whether to make policies, implement public services where the state fails or negotiating new global trade deals. GNU Plus policymaking must be based on pragmatism, rather than on fundamentalist ideologies, populism and emotions. 

References

African National Congress (ANC). 2024. Statement of intent of the 2024 Government of National Unity. [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/statement-of-intent-of-the-2024-government-of-national-unity-2/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Al Jazeera. 2024. Kenya’s Ruto announces partial cabinet amid mass protests. [Online] Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/19/kenyas-ruto-announces-partial-cabinet-amid-mass-protests [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Austin, I.P. 2001. Pragmatism and public policy in East Asia: origins, adaptation and development. PhD Thesis, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland.

Bosman, I., Rubidge, L. & Gruzd, S. 2024. Coalitions and the GNU in South Africa: Proposals to Embrace, Pitfalls to Avoid. [Online] Available at: https://saiia.org.za/research/coalitions-and-the-gnu-in-south-africa-proposals-to-embrace-pitfalls-to-avoid/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Byrne, D. 2025. How to cope with tariffs: the corporate governance perspective. [Online] Available at: https://www.thecorporategovernanceinstitute.com/insights/news-analysis/how-to-cope-with-tariffs/?srsltid=AfmBOoqGks1EXNsElMozd4XgatsFHx1rf6SiRL81SQ8oQRCvJLg5710d [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Cheeseman, N. & Tendi, B-M. 2010. Power‐sharing in Comparative Perspective: The Dynamics of ‘Unity Government’ in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Journal of Modern African Studies, 48(2).

Conti, N. (Ed.). 2014. The Challenge of Coalition Government: The Italian Case. UK: Routledge.

Dewey, J. 1927. The Public and its Problems. New York: Henry Holt & Company.

Duchek, S., Raetze, S. & Scheuch, I. 2019. The role of diversity in organizational resilience: a theoretical framework. Business Research, 13, 387–423. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40685-019-0084-8

Ennser-Jedenastik, L. & Schermann, K. 2013. The Dynamics of Policy Implementation in Coalition Governments. Paper presented at the 7th ECPR General Conference. Bordeaux, 4–7 September.

Eugster, B. & Strijbis, O. 2011. The Swiss: A Political Nation? Swiss Political Science Review, 17(4), 394–416.

Evans, M. 2019. Coalition Government as a Reflection of a Nation’s Politics and Society. UK: Routledge.

Evans, P. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. US: Princeton University Press.

Falcó-Gimeno, A. 2014. The Use of Control Mechanisms in Coalition Governments: The Role of Preference Tangentiality and Repeated Interactions. Party Politics, 20(3).

Figueiredo, A.C. 2007. Government Coalitions in Brazilian Democracy. Political Science Review, 1(2), 182-216.

Golder, S.N. 2006. Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. British Journal of Political Science, 36(2), 193–212.

Government of National Unity (GNU). 2025. Statement of Intent. Republic of South Africa, July 2025.

Gumede, W. 2005. Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC. US: Penguin Random House.

Gumede, W. 2012. Restless Nation: Making Sense of Troubled Times. South Africa: Tafelberg.

Gumede, W. 2017. The Democracy Deficit of Africa’s Liberation Movements Turned Governments. Politikon, 44(1), 27-48.

Gumede, W. 2021. Building a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa. [Online] Available at: www.dbsa.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/2021-02/Policy%20Brief%20No.%201%20Delivering%20a%20democratic%20developmental%20state%20in%20South%20Africa_0.pdf [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Gumede, W. 2023. Improving Coalition Governance. [Online] Available at: https://www.democracyworks.org.za/policy-brief-improving-coalition-governance/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Gumede, W. 2024. Cast the GNU net wide beyond politicians. [Online] Available at: https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/opinion-and-analysis/opinion/2024-06-09-cast-the-gnu-net-wide-beyond-politicians/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Gumede, W. 2025a. ‘GNU Plus’ offers a pragmatic, inclusive approach that could redefine governance in SA. [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2025-08-25-gnu-plus-offers-a-pragmatic-inclusive-approach-that-could-redefine-governance-in-sa/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Gumede, W. 2025b. Going for growth: Structural reforms needed for South Africa's economic recovery. [Online] Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/going-for-growth-structural-reforms-needed-for-south-africa-s-economic-recovery [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Gumede, W. 2025c. With the GNU comes hope, a sense of fresh energy and new talent. [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2025-01-30-with-the-gnu-comes-hope-a-sense-of-fresh-energy-and-new-talent/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Hartwell, L. 2013. Reflecting on Positive Zimbabwe GNU Moments. The Zimbabwe Independent, 11 July.

Hofstede, G. & Soeters, J. 2000. Consensus Societies with Their Own Character: National Cultures in Japan and the Netherlands, In: J. Benders, N. Noorderhaven, A. Keizer, H. Kumon & J. Stam (Eds.), Mirroring Consensus: Decision-Making in Japanese-Dutch Business, Lemma Publishers, 1-17.

Kadima, D. (Ed.). 2006. The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa. Johannesburg: EISA/KAS.

Kagwanja, P. 2024. Interview: “What Can South Africa Learn from Kenya’s Government of GNU?” Newzroom Afrika, June 8.

Laver, M. & Schofield, N. 1990. Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe. UK: Oxford University Press.

Levin, M. 2020. How to translate diversity strategies into resilient organizations. [Online] Available at: https://www.weforum.org/stories/2020/03/diversity-strategies-resilient-organizations-leadership/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Lewin, L. 1998. Majoritarian and Consensus Democracy: The Swedish Experience. Scandinavian Political Studies, Bind 21, 3.

https://tidsskrift.dk/scandinavian_political_studies/article/view/32929/31307

Lijphart, A. 1984. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. US: Yale University Press.

Linder, W. 1994. Swiss Democracy. Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies. New York: St Martin's Press.

Ma, A., Paek, J.J.W., Liu, F. & Kim, J.Y. 2024. Research: Why Forming Diverse Teams Is Harder in Uncertain Times. [Online] Available at: https://hbr.org/2024/12/research-why-forming-diverse-teams-is-harder-in-uncertain-times [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Mainwaring, S. & Scully, T. (Eds). 1995. Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America. US: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, S., Meneguello, R. & Power, T.J. 2000. Conservative Parties, Democracy and Economic Reform in Brazil, In: Kevin Middlebrook (Ed), Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America. US: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mamdani, M. 2012. Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity. US: Harvard University Press.

Mapuva, J. 2010. Government of National Unity (GNU) as a Conflict Prevention Strategy: Case of Zimbabwe and Kenya. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 12(6), 247–263.

Maromo, J. 2025. ‘Don’t give us ridiculous conditions’: EFF and MK party invited to join GNU. [Online] Available at: https://thestar.co.za/news/politics/2025-08-08-dont-give-us-ridiculous-conditions-eff-and-mk-party-invited-to-join-government-of-national-unity/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Martin, L.W. & Vanberg, G. 2011. Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Matyszak, D. 2010. Law, Politics and Zimbabwe’s Unity Government. The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Morgan, J.P. 2025. US tariffs: What’s the impact on global trade and the economy? [Online] Available at: https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/current-events/us-tariffs [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Morrisey, D.J. 1994. Pragmatism and the Politics of Meaning. Drake Law Review, 43(3), 1993-1994. https://drakelawreview.org/volume-43-no-3-1993-1994/.

Müller, W. & Strøm, K. 2008. Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

O’Regan, V. 2024. Bela Act report is with Ramaphosa, says Mashatile, as consultation deadline arrives. [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2024-12-13-bela-act-clearing-house-process-has-concluded-says-mashatile/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Riker, W.H. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Robin, R.J. 1982. Consensus, the Japanese way — collective energy at work. European Management Journal, 1(2), 10-26.

Rüland, J. 2007. Editorial: The Politics of Pragmatism: Southeast Asia’s New Free Trade Bilateralism. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 26(1), 7-13.

Schermann, K. & Ennser-Jedenastik, L. 2014. Coalition Policy Making Under Constraints: Examining the Role of Preferences and Institutions. West European Politics, 37(3), 564–583.

Schmiegelow, M. 1991. The Asian Newly Industrialized Economies: A Universal Model of Action. Civilizations, 40-1, 133-171.

Schwartz, D. 2010. Coalition government: Precedents from around the world. [Online] Available at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/coalition-government-precedents-from-around-the-world-1.876563 [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Sleeper, R.W. 2001. The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy. US: University of Illinois Press.

South African Government. 2023. Concept discussion document on the Development of a Framework for Coalition Governments. Presidency, Pretoria, August.

Staiger, R. 2025. How Trump threatens the world trading system. [Online] Available at: https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/01/08/how-trump-threatens-the-world-trading-system/ [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Steenhuisen, J. 2025. DA declares formal GNU dispute over Expropriation Bill and NHI. [Online] Available at: https://www.da.org.za/2025/01/da-declares-formal-gnu-dispute-over-expropriation-bill-and-nhi [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Talisse, R.B. 2007. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy. UK: Routledge.

Thayer, H.S. 1970. Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism. US: Hackett Publishing.

Thies, M.F. 2001. Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Governments. American Journal of Political Science, 45(3), 580–598.

Tornudd, K. 1969. Composition of Cabinets in Finland 1917-1968. Scandinavian Political Studies, Bind 4. https://tidsskrift.dk/scandinavian_political_studies/article/download/32048/29545?inline=1

Tsai, T-C. & Liu, T.T-C. 2013. Whither East Asian Regionalism? China's Pragmatism and Community Building Rhetoric. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 14(4), 543–566.

Wang, J. 2007. John Dewey in China: To Teach and to Learn. New York: State University of New York Press.

Wasike, A. 2024. Embattled William Ruto seeks stability with government of national unity. [Online] Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/kenyan-president-expands-cabinet-with-figures-from-opposition/3284268 [accessed: 2 February 2026].

Wei, S-J. 2025. How to Counter Trump’s Tariffs Productively. [Online] Available at: https://business.columbia.edu/insights/columbia-business/productive-strategies-to-counter-trump-tariffs [accessed: 2 February 2026].

West, C. 1989. The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism. US: University of Wisconsin Press.

Westbrook, R.B. 1993. John Dewey and American Democracy. US: Cornell University Press.

Zubek, R. & Klüver, H. 2015. Legislative Pledges and Coalition Government. Party Politics, 21(4), 603–614.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals.

Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za

Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589

Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za