ESSAY 3: Evolution and mechanism of grain trade network in G20 countries

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JANUARY 2026

by Jiajun Fan

Abstract

This study investigates the evolution and driving mechanisms of the food trade network among G20 countries. Based on trade data from the UN Comtrade database (2013-2023), directed weighted and unweighted networks involving 19 G20 members were constructed. Using complex network analysis (CNA), the research analyses evolutionary patterns from three dimensions: macro-level network density, meso-level community structure, and micro-level node centrality. Key findings include: The network density decreased by 7.4% over a decade but maintained structural resilience amid crises, with a rebound in 2023 (density=0.7611, clustering coefficient=0.807) driven by the Bali Declaration on Food Security. The core-periphery structure underwent periodic reconstruction: dominated by the U.S., Canada, and Germany in 2014, China and Russia joined the core through regional policies in 2019, while Brazil and South Africa rose to core status via the African Free Trade Area in 2023, and Russia fell to the periphery due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. China has evolved from a semi-peripheral to a sub-core node, though its betweenness centrality declined from 0.795 to 0.347, indicating a shift toward direct trade. Vulnerabilities stem from path dependence on key nodes (e.g., Russia-Ukraine accounting for 25% of food exports) and regional disparities (Asia-Pacific accounts for 58% of trade flows, while Africa and Latin America remain marginalised). Recommendations include strengthening G20 emergency reserve sharing mechanisms, empowering marginalised countries through technology transfer and regional integration, and diversifying China’s food import channels to enhance its competitiveness in global food value chains. This study systematically unveils the complex dynamics of food trade networks within the G20 framework, offering an interdisciplinary paradigm for global food security governance.

Keywords: G20, Global grain trade, Trade network

1 Introduction

1.1 Research Background

Food security in G20 countries faces multiple challenges, including climate change, geopolitical conflicts, and public health crises, which directly impact food production, supply chain stability, and national food accessibility (Guo et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2024). The vulnerability of food systems in G20 countries has intensified in recent years, particularly under the impacts of major events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict (Guo et al., 2021; Xu et al., 2024).

As a critical component of G20 countries' food systems, the Food Trade Network (FTN) plays a core role in balancing food supply and demand, enhancing food accessibility, and diversifying food sources among G20 nations (Guo et al., 2021; Wang & Dai, 2021; Wang et al., 2023). Food exports from agriculturally developed countries have compensated for food shortages in most G20 countries, with the influence of G20 food trade on food security increasing annually (Guo et al., 2021; Wang & Dai, 2021). However, the complexity and high concentration of the trade network also introduce systemic risks: some countries’ high dependence on imports makes them vulnerable to external shocks (Guo et al., 2021; Wang & Dai, 2021; Wang et al., 2023).

G20 countries themselves hold a central position in the global food trade network, dominating the production, export, and trade flows of major food crops (Ercsey-Ravasz et al., 2012; Murphy, 2013; Wang & Dai, 2021; Wang et al., 2023). These nations not only influence the stability of global food markets but also possess unique leverage in addressing food security crises and promoting policy coordination and market reforms (Murphy, 2013; Wang et al., 2023). Measures such as advancing food policy reforms, enhancing the transparency of food reserves, and regulating export restrictions through the G20 framework have helped strengthen the stability and resilience of global food markets (Murphy, 2013).

1.2 Research on the G20

As the core platform for global economic governance, the G20’s institutional design focuses on the dual mandates of policy coordination and crisis response. In the field of food security, the G20 promotes dialogue among member states through initiatives such as the Global Framework for Food Security and Nutrition, but in practice, it faces structural limitations—short-term policy interventions (e.g., price regulation) outweigh long-term institutional construction (e.g., futures market regulatory systems), and the decision-making process insufficiently incorporates the voices of developing countries (Murphy, 2013). In the dimension of environmental governance, G20 countries attempt to balance economic growth and ecological protection through mechanisms such as consultations on the implementation rules of the Paris Agreement and guidance on renewable energy investment. For example, the pilot application of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) aims to incorporate environmental costs into the trade system (Qiao et al., 2019; Rizwanullah et al., 2024). Such practices not only demonstrate the G20’s policy leverage but also expose deep-seated divisions between North and South countries in responsibility-sharing.

Trade openness and technological innovation have become twin engines of economic growth for G20 countries, but their effects exhibit significant heterogeneity: developed countries achieve an annual average total factor productivity (TFP) growth of 1.2%–1.5% through agricultural export expansion and R&D investment, while developing countries, constrained by technical barriers, achieve only 60%–70% of that growth rate (Xu et al., 2023). The transnational transmission effects of trade policies are particularly prominent: the U.S. agricultural subsidy policy expands the price volatility of Brazilian soybeans by 20%–25% through the global trade network, highlighting the "spillover-feedback" mechanism of core economies’ policies (Salvatore & Campano, 2019).

G20 countries form the "core network" of global food trade, whose operational logic embodies the tension between efficiency and equity: on one hand, export powerhouses such as the United States and Brazil occupy more than 70% of global soybean and corn trade volumes through economies of scale and technological advantages, with export trade contributing 45% to agricultural TFP (Xu et al., 2023); on the other hand, import-dependent countries such as Japan and Saudi Arabia outsource 30%–40% of agricultural production links to developing countries through an "environmental cost transfer" model, causing the latter to face issues such as overexploitation of water resources and biodiversity loss (Cabernard et al., 2022). This "core-periphery" structure has intensified the vulnerability of the global food system: the 2022 wheat trade disruption caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict led to food price fluctuations in import-dependent G20 member states 2.3 times higher than in non-member states (Murphy, 2013).

1.3 Research on Trade Networks

Trade network research covers diverse industries such as manufacturing, services, technology trade, and food trade, presenting a landscape of interwoven traditional and emerging fields. Manufacturing, electrical and mechanical industries have long dominated international trade, accounting for over 35% of global merchandise trade, with specialised division networks centred on Germany and Japan as technological hubs and China as a manufacturing centre (Maluck & Donner, 2015; Shiyong et al., 2021). The services sector exhibits a "domestically dominated, cross-border lag" characteristic: financial and business services account for over 50% of domestic trade networks, but cross-border services are restricted by institutional barriers, with only digital services (e.g., cross-border e-commerce) achieving rapid annual growth of 12%–15% (Shiyong et al., 2021; Liu & Tsai, 2022). Technology trade has become a new growth pole, with patent licensing networks in knowledge-intensive industries such as artificial intelligence and biomedicine expanding rapidly, where the U.S., Europe, and China occupy 90% of global core nodes (Liu & Tsai, 2022). Food trade networks are unique due to their strategic attributes: the food trade of 196 countries worldwide exhibits a "resource endowment-driven" structure, with export powerhouses like the U.S. and Brazil dominating soybean and corn networks, import-dependent countries like Japan and Saudi Arabia forming vulnerable peripheral nodes, and G20 countries accounting for over 70% of core trade flows in such networks (Duan et al., 2021).

Research objects in trade networks exhibit a three-dimensional "macro-meso-micro" characteristic. At the macro level, studies focus on national and regional networks, such as connectivity analyses of service trade networks along the Belt and Road Initiative and dependency assessments of G20 food trade networks, revealing that Southeast Asian countries’ dependence on Chinese intermediate goods imports reaches 45%, and food trade volumes among G20 members account for 65% of the global total (Duan et al., 2021; Liu & Tsai, 2022). At the meso level, industry and product networks have become focal points—for example, the regional concentration of global lithium mining supply chains (Chile and Australia control 80% of exports) and the vulnerability of chip trade networks (the top five exporting countries dominate 85% of trade volumes), such studies revealing strategic risks in specific industries (Bernard & Moxnes, 2018). At the micro level, multi-party transaction networks between firms have received extensive attention: Apple’s supplier network covers 43 countries, and transnational grain enterprises like ADM control key nodes in global food supply chains through a "hub-and-spoke" model. Studies show that only 10% of high-productivity firms contribute 70% of export volumes (Rauch, 2001; Bernard & Moxnes, 2018).

The structure and evolution of trade networks are synergistically driven by multiple factors: geography, economy, policy, technology, and crises. Geographically, spatial proximity increases trade volumes between adjacent countries by 40%–60%, trade density among G20 members is 2.1 times that of non-members, and port hub countries (e.g., Singapore) long occupy intermediary centrality in networks due to their locational advantages (Maluck & Donner, 2015; Duan et al., 2021). Economic and resource factors shape network hierarchies: developed economies dominate high-value-added trade (e.g., medical devices), while developing countries rely on resource exports (e.g., Brazilian soybeans), with economic disparities leading to "core-periphery" network structures (Duan et al., 2021; Guo et al., 2023). At the policy and institutional level, regional trade agreements (e.g., USMCA) reduce trade costs among member states by 15%–20%, while trade protection measures (e.g., the 2018 China-U.S. friction) reduce network density in related industries by 8% (Liu & Tsai, 2022; Kosztyán et al., 2024). Technological innovation drives network transformation: digital platforms reduce the participation threshold for small and medium enterprises by 60%, and 3D printing technology reshapes manufacturing supply chains, reducing the proportion of parts and components trade from 70% to 55% (Shiyong et al., 2021; Guo et al., 2023). Crisis events trigger structural restructuring: the 2008 financial crisis reduced global trade network degree centrality by 12%, the 2020 pandemic shifted medical supplies networks from "single-centre" to "multi-regional hubs", and climate crises have intensified the volatility of food trade networks (Maluck & Donner, 2015; Duan et al., 2021; Kosztyán et al., 2024).

2 Evolution Analysis of Food Trade Network among G20 Countries

2.1 Construction of Food Trade Network among G20 Countries

This study downloaded the import and export data of food trade from 2013 to 2024 for 19 countries in the G20 (the European Union is not included as a regional economic organisation) from UN Comtrade, and screened HS codes 1001-1008 according to the 2022 Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, totalling 10,460 records.

The specific food products studied in this paper are shown in Table 1 according to their HS codes:

Table 1: HS code and name of grain 

HS code	Name	HS code	Name
1001	Wheat and spelt	1005	Corn
1002	Rye	1006	Rice
1003	Barley	1007	Sorghum
1004	Oats	1008	Buckwheat

2.2 Evolution of Food Trade Network among G20 Countries

2.2.1 Overall Pattern

Based on the complete data analysis of network density and clustering coefficient of the G20 food trade network from 2013 to 2023, the evolution of this network exhibits clear stage characteristics, while demonstrating structural resilience under multiple crisis impacts. In the initial stage of 2013, both network density (0.8216) and clustering coefficient (0.835) were at high levels, reflecting the close food trade connections among member states and the stability of the network structure. However, in 2014, the indicators plummeted to a trough (density 0.7544, clustering coefficient 0.789), which may be related to the emerging market currency crisis—for example, the trade contraction caused by Argentina's debt default led to a significant short-term shock on the global food circulation network. In the following three years (2015-2017), a continuous recovery trend was observed, and by 2017, the indicators returned to near-initial levels (density 0.8070, clustering coefficient 0.835), indicating that the market self-regulation mechanism and policy coordination jointly promoted network recovery.

Since 2018, the network has entered a five-year recession cycle. Density and clustering coefficient declined simultaneously, reaching a ten-year low in 2022 (density 0.7456, clustering coefficient 0.785), with cumulative declines of 7.6% and 6.0% respectively. This prolonged recession was driven by multiple overlapping crises: a brief rebound in 2020 due to panic grain hoarding at the initial stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (density rebounded to 0.7953), but the long-term effect of supply chain disruptions caused a decline again in 2021; the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 became a turning point, as the interruption of the Black Sea grain corridor directly impacted the core hub accounting for 25% of global grain exports, forcing member states to switch to high-cost alternative trade routes, resulting in the simultaneous deterioration of network tightness and structural stability. It is worth noting that despite the significant recession, the two indicators have consistently maintained above key thresholds (density > 0.75, clustering coefficient > 0.78) over the decade, proving that the basic trade network did not experience a systemic collapse.

The resilient rebound in 2023 is of great significance. Density increased by 2.1% to 0.7611, and the clustering coefficient rose by 2.8% to 0.807, marking the first recovery after five consecutive years of recession. This shift is closely related to the G20 coordination mechanism—the emergency reserve sharing mechanism promoted by the 2022 Bali Declaration on Food Security, and the food circulation within the Asia-Pacific region driven by the G20 (accounting for 58% of G20 traffic), jointly constituted structural support.

However, long-term vulnerabilities cannot be ignored. The deep-seated contradictions behind the overall 7.4% decline in density over a decade urgently need to be resolved: the node dependency risk exposed by the Russia-Ukraine conflict (the two countries account for over 25% of food exports), and the escalating regional differentiation (the 2023 clustering coefficient rebound mainly relies on the Asia-Pacific region, while the participation of Africa and Latin America continues to shrink). Overall, the global governance mechanism of the G20 has a relatively strong ability to resist crises, providing a key stable platform for global food governance.

Figure 1: 2013-2023 Density evolution of G20 countries grain network

(Source: Data from UN Comtrade)

2.2.2 Community Structure

This study selects 2014, 2019, and 2023 as nodal years to analyse the core-periphery structure of the G20 food trade network based on coreness (Corene), with classification thresholds set as: core (Corene ≥ 0.26), semi-core (0.2 ≤ Corene < 0.26), and periphery (Corene ≤ 0.2). Its evolution exhibits three distinct stages:

First Stage (2014): Initial Differentiation Driven by Resources

Countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Germany formed the core layer (Corene ≥ 0.286) by leveraging resource advantages (e.g., food exports from the U.S. and Brazil) and demand markets (e.g., consumption in India and France), creating "Europe-North America-South America-South Asia" trade clusters. Semi-core countries like China and Italy (Corene 0.215–0.259) relied on resource imports from core regions (e.g., China’s food imports). Peripheral countries such as Saudi Arabia (Corene 0.015) and Australia (Corene ≤ 0.167) were marginalised due to resource disadvantages (e.g., Saudi Arabia’s desert climate) and trade isolation (core-periphery connection density ≤ 0.2).

Second Stage (2019): Hierarchical Adjustment via Policy Empowerment and Regional Integration

China (Corene 0.26) and Russia (Corene 0.26) entered the core layer through Sino-Russian food trade growth (e.g., Russia’s wheat exports to China), reflecting Asia’s rising trade status. Semi-core countries like Brazil and South Africa (Corene 0.257–0.258) became bridges between core and periphery by enhancing trade linkages across South America and Africa. Saudi Arabia (0.076) and Mexico (0.031) remained peripheral due to constraints like insufficient arable land and technological backwardness in modern agriculture, highlighting dual resource-technology bottlenecks.

Third Stage (2023): Structural Reshaping by Geopolitical Shocks and Policy Games

Brazil and South Africa rose from semi-core to core (Corene 0.275) via the African Free Trade Area, which increased intra-core trade density (0.90), demonstrating regional integration’s role in peripheral breakthroughs. Russia’s Corene collapsed to 0 and fell to the periphery due to disrupted trade with Europe from the Russia-Ukraine conflict (core-periphery connection density 0), a typical case of geopolitical shocks subverting hierarchies. Semi-core countries like Canada and Italy (Corene 0.233–0.257) maintained medium connectivity through trade networks in China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN (e.g., China-Vietnam grain trade), serving as transitional hubs between core and periphery.

Table 2: Core-periphery countries

Years	Core Countries	Semi-core countries	Periphery
2014	CAN DEU USA IND ARG FRA	CHN ITA RUS BRA JPN ZAF TUR GBR	KOR AUS IDN MEX SAU
2019	CAN USA IND FRA CHN RUS	ZAF BRA ITA DEU JPN KOR ARG TUR	GBR AUS IDN SAU MEX
2023	BRA ZAF USA FRA IND GBR	CAN ITA TUR CHN DEU ARG AUS KOR	JPN IDN SAU MEX RUS

(Data resource：UN Comtrade)

Figure 2: 2014 Cluster diagramme of G20 countries’ grain network

Figure 3: 2019 Cluster diagramme of G20 countries grain network

Figure 4: 2023 Cluster diagramme of G20 countries grain network

This study selects 2014, 2019, and 2023 as nodal years to conduct non-overlapping community analysis on the food trade network among G20 countries. Using the CONCOR algorithm in Ucinet6.0 software, with a maximum partition depth of 2 and a convergence criterion of 0.2, 15 countries were partitioned into multiple blocks. After multiple iterations, a dendrogram expressing the degree of structural equivalence of each trade node was obtained. The block partition results are as follows.

2.2.3 Individual Status

2014: The United States, Italy, India, etc., had degree centrality values reaching 100 (after standardisation), conducting direct trade with most of the 19 G20 countries (e.g., U.S. food exports covered major global markets); peripheral countries such as Mexico (61.111) and Indonesia (66.667) had few trade partners and weak local participation. Core countries (U.S., Italy, India, etc.) had closeness centrality values mostly at 100, achieving high trade efficiency; peripheral countries such as Saudi Arabia (90) and India (75) had long paths and low information dissemination efficiency. Canada (0.812), the United States (0.812), etc., had high betweenness centrality and were regarded as transit hubs controlling (a large number of) trade paths; Mexico (0), India (0.041), etc., had almost no intermediary role and no control over trade flows.

2019: Brazil (100) joined the core ranks, with trade partners increasing from 14 countries (94.444 in 2014) to 18 countries. Germany (94.444) slightly contracted, but the U.S., Italy, and India still maintained 100. Among peripheral countries, India (72.222) and Mexico (55.556) saw increased degree values and enhanced local connections. The closeness centrality of core countries remained stable, and Indonesia (78.261) saw improved closeness; Saudi Arabia (90) still relied on single transit and showed no significant improvement in closeness. The intermediary role of Canada (0.929) and Brazil (0.929) was strengthened, and China (0.795) saw the rise of intermediary capabilities ("Belt and Road" promoted China-EU food trade via China's transit). Peripheral countries (Indonesia, 0.134; Mexico, 0.087) still had weak intermediary roles.

2023: The U.S., Italy, India, Brazil, France, etc., maintained node centrality values of 100; Mexico (72.222) and Indonesia (83.333) further increased their degree values, with peripheral countries' integration approaching the sub-core level. Indonesia (85.714) saw a significant improvement in closeness; Saudi Arabia (85.714) reduced its dependence on single transit countries by deepening trade with GCC countries (Gulf Cooperation Council), with closeness decreasing from 90 to 85.714. The U.S., Brazil, France, Italy, Indonesia, etc., formed balanced transit control; Canada (0.288) saw a weakened intermediary role (increased direct trade in emerging markets reduced the need for North American transit), and China (0.347) saw a decline in betweenness due to optimised trade structures (predominantly direct trade, reduced transit demand). The G20 food trade network achieved closer connections, maximised efficiency, and balanced control, reflecting the optimisation and upgrading of global food supply chains under multilateral cooperation.

Table 3: 2014, 2019,  2023 Centrality of G20 countries grain network

		2014			2019			2023
Countries	Deg	Col	Bet	Deg	Col	Bet	Deg	Col	Bet
BRA	94.444	94.737	0.706	100	100	0.929	100	100	0.729
CAN	100	100	0.812	100	100	0.929	94.444	94.737	0.288
DEU	100	100	0.812	94.444	94.737	0.383	88.889	90	0.347
ZAF	94.444	94.737	0.453	88.889	90	0.285	100	100	0.729
USA	100	100	0.812	100	100	0.929	100	100	0.729
CHN	94.444	94.737	0.362	94.444	94.737	0.795	88.889	90	0.347
SAU	88.889	90	0.084	88.889	90	0.177	83.333	85.714	0.044
FRA	94.444	94.737	0.453	94.444	94.737	0.642	100	100	0.729
AUS	88.889	90	0.321	88.889	90	0.249	94.444	94.737	0.288
IDN	66.667	75	0.041	72.222	78.261	0.134	83.333	85.714	0.044
ITA	100	100	0.812	100	100	0.929	100	100	0.729
JPN	88.889	90	0.259	94.444	94.737	0.383	100	100	0.729
MEX	61.111	72	0	55.556	69.231	0.087	72.222	78.261	0
RUS	100	100	0.812	94.444	94.737	0.795	61.111	72	0
IND	100	100	0.812	100	100	0.929	100	100	0.729

(Data resource：UN Comtrade )

3 Conclusion

3.1 Conclusions

From 2013 to 2023, the G20 food trade network density decreased by 7.4% overall but remained above 0.75 with clustering coefficients stabilising at 0.78–0.835, demonstrating structural resilience to shocks despite short-term declines from crises like the 2014 emerging market crisis and post-2018 pandemic/Russia-Ukraine conflict impacts, with a 2023 rebound (density=0.7611, clustering=0.807) driven by G20 coordination. The core-periphery structure evolved dynamically: the U.S., Canada, and Germany formed the core in 2014; China and Russia joined via regional policies by 2019; Brazil and South Africa rose to core status through the African Free Trade Area in 2023 while Russia fell to the periphery due to conflict, and China maintained semi-peripheral hub roles with stabilised core degree but reduced betweenness centrality (0.795→0.347), reflecting a shift to direct imports. Key vulnerabilities include path dependence on Russia-Ukraine (25% of exports), triggering 2.3× higher price volatility in import-dependent G20 states in 2022, and regional disparities with the Asia-Pacific accounting for 58% of trade flows versus marginalised Africa/Latin America, compounded by arable land/technology constraints in peripheral countries.

3.2 Recommendations

Strengthen G20 coordination mechanisms by modelling the 2022 Bali Declaration on Food Security to establish regional food reserve pools among core countries (U.S., China, Brazil) and hubs (EU, India) with emergency allocation rules to reduce single-node dependence (e.g., Black Sea Corridor), while standardising export restriction transparency and creating a "policy spillover" early-warning model via G20 Agricultural Ministers’ Meetings. Boost capacity building in African / Southeast Asian peripherals (e.g., South Africa, Indonesia) through G20-backed digital agriculture technology transfer and irrigation investments to enhance TFP, and support AFCFTA/RCEP food trade facilitation to increase regional connection density. Optimise China’s strategy by diversifying imports from Brazil/Argentina and Central Asia/Eastern Europe via the Belt and Road Initiative and leveraging G20 platforms for joint R&D in digital agriculture / gene breeding to enhance global food trade rule-making participation and supply chain security.

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This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute

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