Beyond rhetoric: Africa-US relations and the search for a rapprochement

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JULY 2025

Image credit: OpenAI. Africa-U.S. Relations. 2025. Digital illustration.

by Dr Efem N. Ubi

Abstract

The relationship between the United States (US) and Africa has been the subject of considerable debate, with questions about whether it is driven by genuine strategic interests or merely rhetorical commitments. This analysis examines these dynamics, with a focus on the strategic value of Africa in US global power calculations. As great power competition intensifies across Africa, this paper challenges the persistent gap between the US’s diplomatic rhetoric and its strategic prioritisation of Africa. While US officials often emphasise the importance of Africa, operational policy reflects outdated paradigms that undervalue the continent's pivotal role in global power dynamics. This paper interrogates whether Africa holds genuine strategic value in US global power calculations or remains a shallow concern. The article critically examines US trade, security, and diplomatic engagements, comparing them with Africa’s relationships with other advanced and emerging economies. Analysis reveals how the emerging economies have more concretely recognised Africa's strategic value, translating this recognition into sustained engagement that threatens US influence. The article further highlights gaps between policy pronouncements and actual strategic interests in US-Africa engagements. It argues that the US must move beyond rhetorical commitments to Africa and fundamentally reassess its strategic value through a multidimensional lens that recognises Africa's critical importance in the global system. This repudiation requires abandoning outdated foreign policy paradigms that marginalise Africa and embracing a partnership model that acknowledges Africa's unique position in a multipolar world.

Keywords: US-Africa Relations, Power Calculations, Rhetoric vs. Reality, Multilateralism, Sovereignty, Strategic Value, Rapprochement

Introduction

Despite acknowledging Africa's growing significance, the United States' (US) strategic engagement with Africa reveals a notable discrepancy between diplomatic rhetoric and actual prioritisation. This is more evident along two key fronts. Firstly, there is a decline in this relationship, as demonstrated by diminishing trade, security cooperation, and diplomatic initiatives when compared to those with China and other emerging powers. Secondly, the dynamics of the relationship reflect an imbalanced hierarchy, characterised by a superordinate and subordinate status. Africa remains secondary in US planning, which hinders partnerships and risks strategic losses to rivals. This disconnect necessitates a more profound and nuanced understanding of US-Africa relations within the current global power dynamics. There is no gainsaying that China and the emerging economies’ expanding global presence further complicates the strategic dimensions of the relationship between the US and Africa (Fulford, 2018).

Notably, Africa has become central in several ways after appearing on the periphery of world history for much of the 19th and 20th centuries. While it is essential to acknowledge China's strategic interests in Africa, particularly concerning the substantial volume and quality of resources required to support a continuous development agenda domestically, we cannot ignore its competition with the United States for exclusive spheres of influence in Africa (Yu, 2022). Africa's strategic importance has increased due to global power competition, particularly between the United States, China, Russia, and the emerging economies. The sheer volume of Africa's strategic value, particularly its resource base, shows its importance. Africa boasts a vast array of strategic mineral wealth. Many of the critical resources of modern society either come directly from the continent or can only be extracted with their assistance (UNEP, N.d.).

However, the questions are: Why is Africa so undermined? What is the US's interest in Africa? Does Africa hold genuine strategic value in US global power calculations or remain a shallow concern? What should be the prognosis towards a rapprochement that will reengineer the relations towards mutual benefit? These are critical questions that this article will examine. The article examines the essential elements that will shape a recalibrated US-Africa partnership model, fostering mutual interests and acknowledging Africa's unique place. Using specific metrics in no precise order, such as security, trade, economic development, etc., this article investigates and evaluates the actual strategic value of Africa within US global power calculations, to bridge critical gaps, enhance understanding, inform policy, and promote a more nuanced, equitable, and effective US-Africa relationship in a rapidly evolving global order.

Historicising US-Africa Relations

US-Africa relations, although multifaceted, span historical, economic, and security dimensions. Historically, the United States' relations with Africa date back to the founding days of the US, the Atlantic slave trade, and the Cold War (Magu, 2018; Nyang, 2005). Regardless of the numerous characteristics that define the relationship between the US and Africa, it is evident that a significant portion of the global population predominantly associates both regions with their Black communities, as well as the political and military dynamics that emerged during the Cold War era (Nyang, 2005) when it became a primary objective of US policy to prevent ideological and political penetration of the region by communism (Ohaegbulam, 1992).

Although successive US administrations have often blamed each other for paying insufficient attention to the needs of the African continent, it is argued that US policy towards Africa is an afterthought (Institute for Democratic Governance, 2014). Africa began to gain prominence in US foreign policy in 1958, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower established the Bureau of African Affairs within the Department of State. This initiative took place during the Cold War, a period when Africa was viewed as an ideological battleground, with the US seeking to counter the Soviet Union's influence on the continent (Oyebade, 2018). During the Cold War, the US's approach to Africa, as noted by Daniel and Nagar (2016), primarily focused on countering the spread of communism. While this strategy involved supporting various regimes, including those in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia, it often compromised important democratic principles and hindered socioeconomic development. Following 1945, the US positioned itself as an anti-colonial force, striving to advance its own interests while challenging Soviet influence on the continent. This complex dynamic highlights the need for a deeper understanding of how US policies could have more effectively aligned with fostering democracy and development in Africa (Daniel & Nagar, 2016).

The end of the Cold War led to the US initially reducing its focus on Africa, as it no longer needed to counter Soviet influence on the continent. This shift was characterised by a decrease in diplomatic presence and foreign aid, as well as a diminished focus on economic engagement (Çelik, 2022). According to Hamid, in the post-Cold War era, the US has struggled to establish a coherent African strategy, appearing reactionary compared to China's proactive economic diplomacy. This shift has led to a lack of political resolve and a diminished focus on promoting democratic governance and stability in the region (Lellou, 2024). Despite rhetorical support for democracy and economic development, the policies of Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama remained focused on securitisation. They often supported autocratic regimes, undermining the stated goals of promoting democracy and development. It was not until the early 2000s, following terrorist attacks and the discovery of energy reserves, that US military operations and engagement increased under the Bush administration. Subsequently, interest waned again during the Obama and Trump administrations, with China and the EU surpassing the US as key trade partners (Dagne, 2002). And picked up again under President Biden’s administration. Like every other relationship, the US-Africa relations have seen moments of conflict and moments of reconciliation. The US's oft-shifting rhetoric continues to have a detrimental impact on African nations (Adebajo, 2018).

The fluctuating engagement clearly demonstrates the urgent need to scrutinise the specific policy frameworks that have directed US interactions with Africa, as these frameworks serve as pivotal instruments of influence. The key policy frameworks that have decisively shaped the US-Africa relationship over the years include the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). These initiatives are crucial for understanding and strengthening US-Africa relations.

The Challenges with US-Africa Relations

1.              US-Africa Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Africa

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was enacted in 2000 to increase trade and investment between the US and eligible sub-Saharan African countries by reducing tariffs on exports, thereby boosting African exports to the US (Zenebe et al, 2014). However, due to structural inequities, the Act has had limited success in diversifying trade. Many nations benefiting from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) continue to rely mainly on exporting raw materials, resulting in an overall trade volume that remains relatively low compared to other US trading partners. In 2016, testifying before the United States International Trade Commission on deepening the US-Africa trade and investment relationship, Joshua Meltzer opined that “the United States trade relationship with sub-Saharan Africa remains underdeveloped” and has been declining since 2011 (Meltzer, 2016).  Currently, only approximately 1.5% of US exports are to sub-Saharan Africa. It is worth noting that the US and China remain the primary trading partners of numerous African countries.

Depending on the administration, trade between the US and Africa has fluctuated continuously. US-Africa trade was US$100 billion in 2008 but dropped to US$41 billion in 2018. By 2024, trade had increased to US$71.6 billion; however, the uncertainty of 2025 will determine US-Africa trade under President Trump's second term. Compared to China, recent statistics indicate that Africa is China's fastest-growing trade partner, outpacing the growth of China's trade with Latin America and other Asian regions. China has established approximately 2,000 enterprises in Africa, involving a total investment of US$6 billion. China also accounts for 20% of Africa's trade (up from 10% in 2008). In 2024, trade between China and Africa was US$295.5 billion. With this tremendous trade flow, China has taken an increasingly larger chunk of Africa’s external trade, except in the petroleum sector, where the traditional former colonial powers and the United States still maintain strong monopolies. However, it is essential to note that any economic fluctuations or increases in tariffs in these countries will be felt throughout the global supply chain, with Africa being the most affected.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa came from a diverse array of source countries. Top investors include China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United States, and India, among others. China, India, and the UAE collectively account for at least 34% of FDI and play a crucial role in driving job creation, capital investment, and project count in many African countries (Sita et al, 2024). Regarding the US, it contributes approximately 13% of Africa’s total investment (Trends, 2024).

In 2017, US foreign direct investment in Africa totalled approximately US$50.4 billion. It decreased to US$43.2 billion in 2019 and scaled up again in 2023 to US$56.29 billion (Tierney, 2025). On the contrary, Chinese FDI in Africa as of 2004 was US$135 million. In 2006, it rose to US$37 billion. In 2012, inflows reached an estimated US$46 billion. Thus, between 2014 and 2018, China invested funds of more than US$72 billion in Africa, creating over 137,000 jobs, making it the largest foreign direct investment contributor to Africa in terms of total capital invested (Afrix, 2025). In 2023 alone, China's FDI capital stock in Africa reached approximately US$42.1 billion. From the data presented, it is clear to see the vast disparity in trade between the two most powerful global economies and Africa. It further demonstrates that there is a problem in US-Africa relations.

Figure 1

Source: China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI), 2025.

The year 2025 marks the expiration of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), presenting an opportunity for both Africa and the United States to reassess and potentially renegotiate the terms of their trade relationship with a more technical and pragmatic focus. Although AGOA primarily emphasises economic engagement through trade preferences, the outcomes have varied. Furthermore, the United States' policy toward Africa encompasses a broader spectrum that extends beyond mere commercial interactions to include security considerations as well.

2.              The Complexities of US Foreign Aid to Africa

US aid is administered by the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), typically allocated from global accounts or programme, such as humanitarian aid, or provided through contributions to multilateral organisations like the United Nations. It is observed that Africa receives approximately US$8 billion annually in aid from the United States, making it the largest recipient of US assistance. In 2022, the top ten recipients of non-emergency aid managed by the State Department and USAID were Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa. However, 70% of annual non-humanitarian aid to Africa is directed towards health programmes, with HIV/AIDS assistance taking the most significant portion of US support for the continent. Other funding initiatives aim to boost agricultural productivity and economic development, enhance security, and promote democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG), as well as improve access to quality education and social services (Congressional Research Service, 2023). Nevertheless, the pressing question remains: How effective has US aid truly been for Africa? Have the promises made been fully realised? Aside from the State Department and USAID, the US government has established other agencies, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), for distributing aid to Africa. 

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an independent US foreign aid agency, aims to promote economic development and good governance in developing countries. Established in 2004, it links aid to governance and policy performance to encourage policy improvements. MCC grants are "compacts" to countries that meet specific criteria, providing substantial funding for infrastructure projects and policy reforms. This promotes economic development in Africa, creating a conducive environment for private sector investment and sustainable growth (US Agency of International Development, N.d.). The effectiveness of the MCC is a subject of ongoing debate and evaluation as well. The MCC's eligibility criteria emphasise neoliberal reforms, utilising scorecards with indicators that promote policies such as economic freedom, good governance, investing in people, and combating corruption (Millennium Change Corporation, 2021). However, many African countries are excluded due to the high eligibility standard. Critics have also noted that MCC projects prioritise US corporate contractors over local firms. Additionally, the competitive bidding process favours large US companies, limiting local businesses' capacity for development and potentially leading to projects that are not fully aligned with local needs. Sometimes, these aids undermine a country’s sovereignty, as seen in the case of Tanzania, where MCC was suspended because the country decided to proceed with an election rerun in Zanzibar that MCC disagreed with (Cooke & Hubner, 2016). Nevertheless, MCC can be described as fairly effective. The degree of effectiveness varies according to the experience of different African countries. The initiative represents a shift towards performance-based aid, but its long-term impact on Africa's development remains to be fully assessed.

Since 2001, the United States has significantly increased its development aid to Africa, with a notable rise in financial commitments and strategic initiatives. The US foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, managed by the State Department and USAID, saw a 340% increase, amounting to an additional US$5.5 billion, alongside US$3.8 billion through Millennium Challenge Account compacts. However, while these figures suggest a robust commitment, they often mask a disconnect between stated objectives and actual impact, contributing to the broader rhetoric-reality gap that undermines US strategic engagement in Africa. Programmes like the Prosperous Africa Initiative have targeted economic sectors such as agribusiness, with efforts to improve technological capabilities in agriculture, as seen in Kenya and Nigeria (Mysheta et al, 2022). However, the effectiveness of this agricultural aid remains contested, with limited evidence of achieving the structural economic transformation necessary for sustainable development.

This inconsistency highlights the challenges the US faces in translating its financial commitments into meaningful strategic influence on the continent (Ssozi et al, 2017). Despite the increase in aid, persistent issues such as poor governance, corruption, and dependency on assistance pose significant obstacles to its effectiveness (Momah, 2018). Often, this aid ends up supporting authoritarian regimes, which complicates efforts to promote the very democracy and human rights (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004) that it was intended to safeguard. Furthermore, the extensive flow of aid into Africa does not necessarily lead to tangible outcomes, as evidenced by the varied experiences of different countries (O’Connell & Soludo, 2001). Dr Akinwumi Adesina, President of the African Development Bank, emphasised that “Africa is not going to be developed by aid; it will be developed through investment”. Therefore, it is essential to create opportunities for the private sector to play a role in addressing some of the continent’s most pressing challenges and contribute to Africa’s key development priorities (Schneidman & Signé, 2018).

Thus, a closer examination of US-Africa aid relations reveals a crisis of intention that is primarily influenced by political interests, prioritisation, and strategic objectives. US foreign aid to Africa faces numerous challenges that necessitate careful consideration. In that stead, a nuanced understanding of local contexts is a sine qua non for an effective aid strategy. By prioritising an informed, responsive, and comprehensive approach that emphasises the empowerment and governance challenges faced by African nations, the US can more effectively address the unique issues these nations encounter, while enhancing the overall impact of foreign aid programmes in achieving long-term development goals.

3.              The US Security Cooperation with Africa without Security

In the realm of security, the United States has faced criticism for its reliance on a military-centric strategy, which can destabilise fragile democracies and potentially provoke proxy wars (Kagwanja, 2006). In response, the US has increasingly emphasised the importance of African-led solutions to security challenges, focusing on partnerships with African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This approach aims to enhance regional security and stability through coordinated efforts, thereby reducing the necessity for direct US intervention (Chido, 2013). Counterterrorism initiatives in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa, have become a central component of the US security strategy. While these efforts have advanced peace processes, they have also intensified insecurity due to their military-centric nature. The integration of counterterrorism into Africa's security agenda has been impeded by inadequate funding and poor coordination with international initiatives (Kagwanja, 2006). Furthermore, the state-centric orientation of these initiatives often undermines human security and has inadvertently enabled predation (Solomon, 2013).

The establishment of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007 represents another critical aspect of US-Africa relations that complements and sometimes complicates economic partnerships. AFRICOM is a US military command responsible for military relations with African nations, to promote regional security, stability, and cooperation. Its significance lies in its reflection of Africa's growing strategic importance to the United States, particularly in the areas of counterterrorism, maritime security, and resource protection (Khlopov, 2021). AFRICOM's presence signifies a shift towards a more proactive US military engagement on the continent, underscoring US global power calculations and its desire to maintain influence amidst increasing competition from other global actors, while also generating debate about its impact on African sovereignty and the nature of US-Africa partnerships.

The establishment of AFRICOM has sparked considerable debate over its actual impact, challenging the validity of its claims regarding security enhancement and development support. Critics argue that its militaristic tactics frequently thwart meaningful progress, revealing a stark contrast between its rhetoric and the reality on the ground (Nyiayaana, 2022). Waddington (2013) believes that AFRICOM's benefit to Africa is not mere rhetoric. He states that AFRICOM has conducted joint training exercises that enhance military capabilities, focus on regional security, counter organised crime and maritime piracy, and address militant Islamist extremism, thereby significantly influencing the continent's security architecture (Waddington, 2013). Fah (2010) takes a contrary view, noting that AFRICOM's purported benefits to Africa, such as enhancing peace and security, are seen mainly as rhetoric because local peace-building efforts are undermined (Fah, 2010). Keenan (2008) shared Fah's view, opining that its militarisation has led to increased insecurity, repression, and destabilisation, contradicting the purported humanitarian security-development discourse (Keenan, 2008). Others have argued that it reflects a self-serving US policy focused on terrorism and energy security. Genuine support for African solutions is crucial to overcoming scepticism and aligning US actions with African interests (N’Diaye & Africa, 2009).

The US approach to humanitarian interventions also reveals a gap between rhetoric and action. Following the Cold War, there was a shift from realist principles to more pluralist notions in foreign policy rhetoric, with an emphasis on morality in humanitarian interventions. However, this shift has been inconsistent and case-specific, lacking a comprehensive framework for foreign policy (Prins, 2016). This inconsistency suggests that while rhetoric may emphasise humanitarian concerns, actual interventions are often driven by strategic interests. Presidential rhetoric also plays a crucial role in legislative actions. For example, President Obama's rhetoric in his State of the Union addresses was consistent in credit claiming and symbolic use. Yet, his legislative requests often required congressional cooperation, leading to partial success in policy implementation (Hoffman & Howard, 2012). This suggests that while rhetoric can influence agendas and highlight priorities, actual policy outcomes ultimately depend on legislative processes and cooperation. In the economic domain, presidential rhetoric serves as a tool for economic leadership, influencing public perception and economic behaviour. However, the effectiveness of this rhetoric is constrained by the need for cooperation from other political institutions and the fragmented nature of the American political system (Wood, 2004). This highlights a potential gap between the optimistic economic rhetoric and the practical challenges of policy implementation.

US-Africa Rapprochement: A Desideratum

The relationship between the United States and Africa has been a topic of significant debate lately. These discussions focus on perspectives regarding US relations with Africa. Historically, the United States’ policy towards Africa has vacillated between periods of engagement, indifference, and neglect, often influenced by broader geopolitical considerations. The US-Africa relationship dates back to the Atlantic slave trade and intensified during the Cold War. During the Cold War, the US was primarily concerned with containing communism, which significantly influenced its interactions with African nations. The focus shifted in the post-Cold War era, but the engagement remained sporadic, raising questions about the depth of the US commitment to Africa (Cumbo, 2013). Despite high expectations, particularly during the Obama administration, US-Africa relations have often been characterised by continuity rather than transformative change. For instance, the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit was seen as a pivotal moment, yet it essentially resulted in firmer rhetoric rather than substantial policy shifts. The approach has been described as "smart continuity", focusing on logistics, intelligence, and development rather than revolutionary policy change (Touo, 2021).

The US must acknowledge that as the world undergoes a significant transformation marked by profound geopolitical uncertainty, African nations are actively forging new alliances and redefining their relationships. They are moving decisively beyond traditional aid models to embrace partnerships that do not undermine them but prioritise locally driven development that asserts their strategic autonomy. This shift is characterised by a concerted effort to establish African-defined frameworks. We must acknowledge here that a certain level of estrangement has developed between the US and many countries in Africa, except for those with whom the US has strategic partnerships. There is growing speculation that, by the conclusion of President Trump’s second term, numerous countries in Africa and around the world may experience a strained relationship with the United States if diplomatic efforts are not managed effectively. While not directly tied to US-Africa relations, recent analyses, such as a piece in the Wall Street Journal, suggest that “Trump is Trashing America’s Reputation”. Additionally, a commentary from The Economist has stated that “Trump’s erratic policy is harming the reputation of American assets”. Steve Dunne, writing for The Conversation, noted that “Throughout the first 100 days of his second term, Trump … has devastated—perhaps irreparably—economic confidence in the US” (Poast, 2025).

Irrespective, Africa never ceases to matter in US foreign policy. US-Africa relations still hold great potential, regardless of the impending challenges. For instance, Mr Biden lucidly captured this when he noted that “African voices, African leadership, African innovation all are critical to addressing the most pressing global challenges ... Africa belongs at the table in every room where global challenges are being discussed and, in every institution, where discussions are taking place” and that “the United States is all in on Africa's future". To demonstrate the importance of Africa to the US, the Biden administration organised a US-Africa summit in December 2022, eight years after the first Summit, which took place in 2014.

The summit, which had delegations from 49 African countries and the African Union, alongside members of civil society and the private sector, came at a time when US-Africa relations had deteriorated to an all-time low, during the first term administration of President Donald Trump, who had a condescending attitude towards African countries and their leaders. While the summit is seen from some quarters as a US guarantee to mend its relationship with Africa, for some others, the summit is also seen as an alleged US obsession to contain China and other emerging powers in the continent, predisposing the essence of the summit within the ambit of extant rivalry and competition between the US and China for Africa. Lest we forget, Africa’s recent explosive demographic growth, accelerating urbanisation, natural and human resources endowment, and economic potentials make the African continent a region of interest to many countries – the more reason, one sees the active participation of powers like China, Russia, and other advanced and emerging economies in a robust engagement with the continent, economically and politically, which on the contrary has come to overshadow US influence and its longstanding relationship with Africa.

Notwithstanding, under the President Biden administration, numerous efforts have been made to seek a rapprochement between the US and Africa, especially after Donald Trump's first term, which was established as one of the worst eras in US-Africa relations. For instance, Biden's 2022 US-Africa summit led to several commitments and planned initiatives aimed at further enhancing the US partnership with Africa in addressing challenges such as conservation, climate change, clean energy transition, supply chain security, investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation. At the summit, Biden pledged to invest at least US$55 billion in Africa in areas such as trade, investment, and energy. There was also a proposed support for the African Union's admission as a permanent member of the G20 (Group of 20). The African Union was eventually admitted as a member in 2023 at the G20 meeting held in New Delhi, India. There was also another promise by the US to invest US$500 million in a key West African port in Benin, aimed at reducing transportation costs. Other commitments include US$350 million, which would be spent on boosting the digital economy. The administration launched the next phase of the Young African Leadership Initiative (YALI) with over US$100 million to build the capacity of young African leaders for the continent’s development. The administration further spearheaded the next phase of AGOA through the Washington AGOA Forum, led by the United States Trade Representative, Katherine Tai (Alorh, 2024).

A memorandum of understanding has been established with the African Continental Free Trade Area, which seeks to "unlock new opportunities for trade and investment" between the United States and Africa, valued at US$3.4 trillion. This agreement aims to promote equitable, sustainable, and inclusive trade. Additionally, during President Biden’s visit to Angola in December 2024, he announced the provision of over US$1 billion in humanitarian assistance to address food insecurity and other urgent needs faced by refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and affected communities across 31 African countries. This commitment builds on the pledge made during the 2022 US-Africa Summit to support African partners in addressing food insecurity. It is worth noting that the visit to Angola marked the first visit of a US president to Sub-Saharan Africa since 2015 (FPC Briefing, 2024). President Biden's approach generally aimed to enhance existing US-Africa relations and ongoing programmes. This includes initiatives such as Prosper Africa, launched in 2018, which seeks to increase two-way trade between African nations and the United States. Additionally, the Clinton-era Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) provides African apparel manufacturers with preferential access to the US market, while the Power Africa initiative, started by President Obama, focuses on connecting millions of Africans to the electricity grid, among other efforts.

The whole effort surreptitiously shows how desperate the US was to restore its relationship with the continent. The central question remains: to what end? Was President Biden's initiative to mend US-Africa relations truly sincere? In other words, did these efforts effectively repair the relationship, or were they merely a strategy for the US to reposition itself in the emerging competition for Africa, particularly in light of Europe’s declining influence and the intensifying rivalry among global powers for Africa's strategic resources, both natural and human?

Despite President Biden's commitment to high-level engagement and the strengthening of commercial ties with Africa, significant challenges persist that hinder the establishment of stronger US-Africa relations, which would guarantee mutual benefits. At the same time, US officials have consistently emphasised the importance of Africa and reaffirmed their commitment to supporting democratic institutions on the continent, advancing lasting peace and security, promoting economic growth, trade, and investment, and supporting sustainable development. On the contrary, operational policy undermines and undervalues the continents in the international system; this was no different from the Biden administration. It further undermines the notion that the powerful and industrialised US, with its success, should serve as a source of inspiration and imitation for other African countries.

This situation leads us to consider the prospects for the current administration, often referred to as Trump 2.0, in terms of its approach to US-Africa relations. If the Biden administration has not fulfilled its commitment to resetting US-Africa relations based on an equal partnership, it definitely will not take place under President Donald Trump's second term in office. The reasons are not far-fetched. The US-Africa policy does not change. It remains the same irrespective of the administration in place. Some of the reasons advanced for this are that the US takes unilateral decisions on Africa without consulting Africans. In his first term, the Donald Trump administration launched an Africa policy that seeks both primacy and partnership on the continent. The US consistently undermines African agencies by pressuring African countries constantly to take a position, even if it is anathema to their survival. This disposition is unlikely to change in his second-term administration. The probabilities remain that the US-Africa relationship in the next four years under Trump will be one of superordinate versus subordinate, and this disposition is expected to have significant and enduring implications for both parties involved (Schneidman & Signé, 2018).

And finally, the imminent superpower rivalry is trivialising and undermining Africa. A point which the Biden administration’s US-Africa strategy noted, where he claimed that China views Africa as “an important arena to challenge the rules-based international order, advance its own narrow commercial and geopolitical interests, undermine transparency and openness, and weaken US relations with African peoples and governments” (Global Times, 2022). Recently, Africa has become a hotspot of superpower rivalry and competition. The question is, competition over what? Is it to have access to strategic resources or to control governments in this sphere? Even if it is to control governments, to what end? Indeed, this rivalry is undermining Africa’s development, and it is indisputable to state that the US and other superpowers view Africa as a resource to be divided among themselves.

Conclusion

To successfully navigate the complexities of a multipolar world, the United States should focus on strengthening economic partnerships and ensuring consistent diplomatic engagement. The United States needs to embrace multilateralism and a new global governance that is both effective and efficient. In particular, its foreign policy towards Africa needs to evolve from traditional aid models toward emphasising tangibility like trade, foreign direct investment, infrastructure development, and technology transfer. By concentrating on enhancing local value chains and supporting African nations in developing their manufacturing capabilities, the US can foster sustainable growth. Africa's significance extends beyond its rich natural resources; its potential for innovation and influence on global norms and institutions underscores its strategic importance in the world today.

For instance, during his first term, Donald Trump's foreign policy rhetoric often diverged from the actual strategies implemented, especially regarding counterterrorism efforts. His rhetoric primarily aimed to evoke a sense of crisis to galvanise domestic support rather than accurately reflecting or legitimising his administration’s strategies (Hall, 2020). Therefore, in his second term, we expect Mr Donald Trump to bear the considerable responsibility of actively and proactively re-strategising US foreign policy engagements with Africa. In particular, there is a need for the US to recalibrate its approach, shifting away from its superordinate and subordinate dispositions when dealing with Africa. What Africa needs right now is a mutually beneficial relationship based on mutual respect and shared interests, one that respects African sovereignty. By adopting this new paradigm of partnership, the US can cultivate a more sustainable and mutually beneficial relationship with Africa in an increasingly multipolar world.

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