Beyond extraction: Resolving the EU-West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement Deadlock Through Employment Formalisation
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by Ogonna Beauty Ogbologu
Abstract
Preferential trade arrangements are widely regarded as instruments of development. Yet in Nigeria, participation in the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) has failed to produce the structural employment transformation these frameworks promise. With 93% of Nigeria's workforce trapped in informal employment, the gap between trade volumes and labour outcomes has become a structural deadlock. This paper argues that the failure is institutional, not incidental; existing trade frameworks regulate the movement of goods, not the organisation of work. Drawing on the WTO Enabling Clause, the Appellate Body's landmark ruling in EC-Tariff Preferences (2004), and the EU's own practice of conditioning preferences on climate and migration, this paper proposes the Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP). By integrating this framework into the yet-to-be-concluded West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement, trade incentives are linked directly to measurable labour outcomes. This transforms preferential access from a passive gift into a binding social contract and a shared investment in productive employment. This proposal addresses long-standing sovereign concerns regarding de-industrialisation and ensures that the Nigerian worker is no longer invisible to global trade governance.
Keywords: Trade preferences; Informal employment; WA Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA); Value Leakage; Enabling Clause; WTO; Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP).
Introduction
The long-standing deadlock over the West Africa–EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is not merely a diplomatic disagreement; it is a structural rejection of an extractive status quo embedded in the current trade architecture governing Nigeria’s access to the EU market, particularly under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP).
Nigeria is the third-largest economy in Africa (International Monetary Fund, 2025). It is also endowed with some of the most valuable natural resources on earth (Britannica, 2026), yet this abundance has not produced prosperity for the majority of Nigerians. Consider the "boomerang trade" inherent in Nigeria's cocoa sector. Ninety percent of the total cocoa exports are shipped in raw form (NEPC, 2024). Of these raw cocoa bean exports, the European Union (EU) is the largest destination market, accounting for up to 67% of the total exports (Sánchez, 2024, pp. 18, 30). The cocoa farmer receives the fluctuating price of a commodity; Europe captures the stable value of the finished chocolate and the formal employment that attends its production.
In this structure, the formal workforce is found where value is added. Where value is added outside Nigeria, domestic labour markets are left without sufficient industrial jobs, and workers are absorbed into informal activity. In the second quarter of 2024, Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported that approximately 93% of the country's total employment was informal (NBS, 2024, p. 9). This staggering figure indicates that the vast majority of Nigerian workers lack social security, labour protections, and legal standing. They remain invisible to the trade frameworks under which their produce travels. If a trade agreement ignores nine out of ten workers, it merely facilitates the movement of products while bypassing the workers' economic advancement. This reality forces a fundamental question: Market access for whom?
This is not a story about exploitation simpliciter; it is a story about structural design. This paper argues that the current architecture of EU-Africa trade, built on instruments like the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) (European Commission, 2026a) and the yet-to-be-concluded West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), was designed primarily to facilitate the frictionless movement of goods (European Commission, 2026b). While data confirms that Nigerian commodities flow into European markets, this focus on "market access" has failed to catalyse development or formal employment.
To address this, this paper recommends a renegotiation of the EU–West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) to incorporate an Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP), through which access to trade preferences is aligned with the formalisation of labour. In doing so, the paper reconceptualises tariff preferences not as passive grants, but as instruments of structural transformation.
This paper proceeds in four parts. It examines the extractive structure of EU–Africa trade and its implications for industrialisation and labour informality; analyses the legal framework and its institutional limits; demonstrates how employment formalisation aligns the interests of Nigeria and the European Union; and develops the legislative architecture of the Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP) as a shift from passive access to conditional integration.
Why Trade Does Not Equal Transformation
In 2024, mineral fuels comprised 90.3% of Nigerian exports to the EU, while industrial goods made up 82.1% of EU exports to Nigeria (European Commission, 2025). This structural mismatch confirms that Nigeria primarily exports the raw substratum, the basic inputs for European production, while importing finished goods. This system, rooted in colonial-era logic (Ake, 1996), remains largely unchanged. The Observatory of Economic Complexity confirms that raw materials account for up to 90% of Nigeria's total exports, while manufactured goods represent 1% to 5% (OEC, 2024).
This concentration reflects tariff escalation: raw commodities enter the EU at near-zero duties, while value-added goods face rising barriers. The incentive is brutally clear: Nigeria earns the price of raw beans while Europe captures the value of chocolate. This is not a market outcome; it is a policy choice that fuels Nigeria’s refusal to conclude the EPA.
The consequences for employment are profound. While the oil sector generates revenue, it employs few. Similarly, agricultural exports like cocoa are produced by millions of smallholders in fragmented, informal supply chains with no social security or legal protections. A reported $10 billion trade surplus in 2025 (Mom, 2025) is a welcome macroeconomic indicator, but it tells us nothing about employment quality or worker protection.
The second dimension of this problem is the collapse of domestic manufacturing. Net job creation in Nigeria's manufacturing sector declined by 37.83% between 2023 and 2024 (MAN, 2024). The textile backbone of Northern Nigeria collapsed, losing over 500,000 jobs (West African Pilot News, 2025). This was driven by a 42% increase in energy costs and 35.5% lending rates (Awodipe, 2025; NBS, 2024). Firms that could not absorb these costs exited the formal sector, pushing workers into the informal economy.
The EPA’s liberalisation framework tilts the playing field further. European products, benefiting from infrastructure and subsidies, reach Nigerian consumers at prices domestic firms, facing ₦1.11 trillion energy bills, cannot match. Trade liberalisation without an industrial formalisation mechanism is not a partnership; it is a de-industrialisation trap.
Nigeria’s cocoa sector is the definitive case study. As the world's fourth-largest producer (NEPC, 2024), Nigeria exports nearly 90% of its cocoa value as raw beans (NEPC, 2024). The smallholders producing this crop are invisible to trade governance, operating through social networks rather than formal contracts (Meagher, 2010). This invisibility is not abstract. The 2024 displacement of 10,000 farmers in Ondo State (David, 2024) proves that trade statistics ignore the conditions of production. As observed by Orbie et al. (2022), the current regime overlooks the lived experiences of the workers it claims to champion. The Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP) is a legislative instrument required to make these workers visible and to define the terms of a balanced partnership.
The Law Allows It, But the Framework Prevents It
The policy of tariff escalation, imposing zero duties on raw commodities while taxing processed goods, systemically discourages industrialisation (Voora et al., 2019) and the formal labour force. Under the GSP, raw cocoa beans enter the EU at zero duty, while finished chocolate faces a higher rate. This communicates a harsh incentive. The EU prefers value addition and formal employment to remain in Europe, while Nigeria is relegated to exporting raw materials.
This makes the 98% duty-free access under the GSP (European Commission, 2024) a hollow concession because it has not improved either the labour force or industrialisation. This is the very reason why Nigeria has not ratified the West Africa EPA. Nigeria’s concerns regarding the absence of safeguards for value addition are legitimate (Premium Times, 2018). While Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Cameroon have signed, their agreements prioritise liberalisation over labour dignity (Vollmer et al., 2009). As warned by the International Trade Union Confederation and European Trade Union Confederation (2018), this architecture will place Nigeria in a perpetual state of informal labour. At this point, the critical question is not whether trade can accommodate labour considerations, but whether the law provides the tools to do so.
The WTO Enabling Clause and the EC-Tariff Preferences (2004) ruling provide the "Legal Safe Harbour" for a formal employment framework. The Enabling Clause (GATT, 1979) stipulates that preferences must be “designed to respond positively to the development ... and trade needs of developing countries”. This does not merely tolerate preferences; it authorises and conditions them on developmental purpose. Also, the Appellate Body in EC-Tariff Preferences (2004) established that differentiation among developing countries is lawful if based on “objective criteria” (WTO, 2004). Crucially, it ruled that "development needs" are not determined unilaterally by the EU. These needs can be measured against the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Decent Work standards (ILO, 2020). Therefore, the linkage between trade and labour formalisation is not a disruption of the rules, but rather, it is an activation of them.
The EU has already set the precedent by adding conditions for climate protection and migration cooperation to its 2025 GSP regulations (Council of the European Union, 2025). This is a critical turning point. Since the law provides that development needs are not to be determined unilaterally and arbitrarily by the preference-granting country, Nigeria can equally insist that its own development priority, measured against the ILO's objective standards, be recognised as a legitimate basis for shaping trade preferences. By refusing to conclude the EPA in its current form, Nigeria is asserting its right to define these needs. This paper is therefore asking the EU to apply the same legal authority it has already exercised for climate and migration to the most pressing labour market challenge facing Nigeria. Formalising 93% of its workforce is not a request for charity. It is a claim of right under the multilateral trading system.
What follows from this is straightforward. The legal framework already contains the authority, the criteria, and the precedent for conditioning trade preferences. What is missing is not law, but political will and institutional design. The preceding analysis exposes three principles. First, trade preferences may lawfully include conditions tied to development needs. The Enabling Clause permits differentiation, also confirmed by the Appellate Body. Second, development needs are not defined exclusively by preference-granting countries. They must be assessed objectively. International labour standards provide that objective measure. Third, the EU already conditions preferences on its own priorities (such as migration management and climate change). This establishes a critical precedent. If the EU can condition trade on its own demographic security, Nigeria can condition trade on its own industrial and employment security. Together, these principles create a solid legal foundation for a formalised employment framework. The architecture does not need to be rebuilt. It only needs to be activated through a sovereign demand for value addition.
The Mutual Benefits of Employment Formalisation for the EU and Nigeria
Nigeria’s fiscal sovereignty is at stake. A situation where 93% of workers operate informally (Abdullahi, 2026), the tax base collapses, making formalisation a prerequisite for economic self‑determination. In 2025, Nigeria’s exports to the EU totalled $20.2 billion (Trading Economics, 2026). These figures are largely from sectors characterised by high levels of informality. Nigeria has already defined its development priorities through the revised National Employment Policy (2025) (ILO, 2025) and the Nigeria Industrial Policy (2025) (State House, 2026), by placing formalisation, value addition, and industrial employment at the centre of its economic strategy. The domestic commitment is no longer in question. The trade architecture must now align to support that transition.
Demographics make the case mutual. Europe’s workforce could shrink by 20% by 2070 (Szryka, 2025). Nigeria adds 4.5 million young people to the labour market each year (Ngaira, 2026). Europe needs legal, certified labour; Nigeria needs structured pathways. The EU has already established, through its revised GSP framework, that trade preferences can be conditioned on broader policy objectives such as migration cooperation and climate compliance (Council of the European Union, 2025). Extending this conditionality to employment formalisation is therefore not a departure from existing practice, but a logical and legally consistent progression.
EU corporate law provides a further, more immediate incentive. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) requires large European companies to identify and manage human rights risks across their supply chains. Although the omnibus clause has narrowed its scope and delayed implementation, the core obligation remains (European Commission, 2026; Directive (EU) 2026/470). For firms sourcing from countries like Nigeria, where production often occurs within informal systems, this creates ongoing compliance risks. A more formalised labour force, therefore, reduces those risks and supports more reliable supply chains, making formalisation directly aligned with European commercial interests.
Irrespective of the changes in the EU corporate law, the WTO Enabling Clause and the Appellate Body ruling in EC–Tariff Preferences (2004) provide an independent legal foundation for this paper’s proposal (GATT, 1979; World Trade Organisation, 2004). Nigeria is not a discretionary partner; it represents nearly 60% of West Africa’s GDP and remains the dominant economy in the region (European External Action Service, 2026). Within this context, a formal workforce would help to stabilise a bilateral trade relationship that consistently exceeds $20 billion annually (European Commission, 2025; Trading Economics, 2026).
The broader precedent is clear. The EU’s regulatory influence, often described as the “Brussels Effect”, demonstrates how access to its market can transform global standards without formal coercion (Bradford, 2020). By linking market access to formalisation, the EU can set a new global standard for labour governance. South Korea, Vietnam, and Morocco’s rise as the EU’s largest vehicle exporter (€15.1 billion) proves that structured, conditioned trade integration, not passive market access, is what generates formal employment at scale (Fox, 2024; Yoo, 2017).
It is obvious that positive developments already exist. The EU provided technical support to Nigeria’s National Employment Policy, signalling a shared commitment to employment reform. At the same time, sustained trade flows, exceeding $20 billion annually, demonstrate the depth of existing economic ties. These developments reveal the desire for cooperation. Nigeria has already chosen industrialisation; therefore, the trade structure must now align with it. The Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP) proposed herein, therefore, represents a logical next step, not a disruptive departure.
The Legislative Architecture: From Passive Access to Conditional Integration
In response to the EU’s 2024 call for "responsible and inclusive investment" (EU Mission to WTO, 2024), this paper proposes a regulatory departure that treats market preferences as a binding social contract rather than a discretionary gift. The Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP) ensures that trade competitiveness is no longer subsidised by the "invisibility" of unprotected labour. This framework does not ask Nigeria to begin what it has not already started; rather, it provides the External Trade Incentive necessary to make the 2025 National Employment and Industrial Policy commercially viable.
The EFP will be operationalised through a Dual-Track Tariff Architecture, which functions as a "sorting machine" for market access. This architecture proposes that the EU grants 0% or preferential duty-free access exclusively to goods produced through verified formal employment. Verification is no longer an abstract social goal but is anchored on three benchmarks: enterprise registration, mandatory worker social security enrolment, and transparent banking settlements.
This means that exports from unverified, informal networks would face a standard baseline tariff. This "Inverted Preference" model removes the economic incentive for informality, signalling that access to the European market requires a structured and protected workforce. Oversight would rest with the EPA's Joint Committee on Trade and Development. To facilitate this, the committee must leverage the treaty's technical cooperation provisions to build a Unified Labour Market Information System (LMIS), a digital ledger used to verify sectoral progress and trigger preferential tariffs.
The framework will be implemented using a conditional sectoral integration in a phased and verifiable manner, embedding structured inclusion. So, access is earned based on how production is organised. This step is critical for revitalising Nigeria’s industrial hubs, such as the textile corridors of Kano and Kaduna, where formalisation can restore the workforce lost to the informal economy. To ensure this is a Partnership of Equals, the EU must provide critical structural support such as funding for digital traceability systems, transition credits to cover initial SME compliance costs (such as pension registration), and vocational training to ensure formalised workers gain priority access to legal labour mobility pathways.
To prevent this mechanism from becoming a punitive trade penalty, the EFP includes four legal safeguards that shift the operative question from unilateral accountability to shared obligation. First, an Economic Shock Clause allows for automatic timeline extensions during macroeconomic crises, ensuring that external volatility does not derail long-term formalisation. Second, Independent Monitoring ensures that benchmarks are verified by joint technical bodies and not unilaterally imposed by the preference-granting party. Third, a Non-Retroactivity Clause protects preferences already granted from being undermined by new benchmarks. Finally, a Minimum Floor Guarantee ensures that Nigeria retains standard GSP entitlements regardless of sectoral performance.
Together, these safeguards prevent the risk of regulatory capture and ensure that the EPA serves as a sovereign instrument for industrial transformation. The goal is a trade architecture that no longer looks through the Nigerian worker but at them as the primary beneficiary of global exchange. This paper asserts that these formalisation commitments must become a binding condition precedent to Nigeria's signature of the West Africa EPA.
Conclusion
This paper began with the "Cocoa Paradox", a farmer in Ondo State whose labour provides the raw substratum for a global industry that leaves her legally invisible. While she bears the risks of production, the trade architecture linking her farm to the European factory is not built around her interests. It is a system designed to facilitate the frictionless movement of commodities, not the formalisation of the people who produce them. Therefore, the issue is not a lack of cooperation, but the urgent need to re-engineer that cooperation to prioritise productive employment while reinforcing a rules-based international system.
This is a structural choice that requires a structural revision. The legal case for the Employment Formalisation Prerequisite (EFP) is unambiguous: the WTO Enabling Clause and the Appellate Body (2004) confirm that ILO standards provide the objective benchmarks for development needs. The operative question is no longer about legality, but about political symmetry. Will the EU recognise Nigeria's 93% informality rate as a development necessity as legitimate as its own migration and climate priorities?
This paper asserts that the inclusion of the EFP in the West Africa EPA is a legal key to resolving the 2018 deadlock. By focusing on conditional sectoral integration, the agreement can transform trade from a passive exchange into a binding social contract. Trade policy is never neutral; it is a decision about whose interests the system prioritises. By adopting this framework, the EU finally recognises the Nigerian worker as a subject of trade governance, rather than a mere vehicle for commodities.
Nigeria has already unilaterally formalised its commitment through the National Employment and Industrial Policy (2025). The European Union must now decide if it will meet this commitment with a matching trade architecture. This is not a request for a concession; it is the minimum condition for a true partnership. Nigeria should not sign the EPA to fit into an old, extractive system; it must sign to build a new, formalised order.
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