top of page

A critical assessment of Africa-US relations: Lessons from Tanzania



ree

Copyright © 2025


Print ISSN: 2960-1541

Online ISSN: 2960-155X

Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609

Mill Street

Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R

Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of

the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council

members.


JULY 2025


ree

Image credit: istockphoto.com | Stock photo ID:1695883136

 

by Dr Francis A.S.T. Matambalya

 

Abstract

 

The article offers a glimpse of Africa-US relations, with particular reference to Tanzania. It highlights the dynamics of Tanzania’s integration into the international system, evolution and scope of Tanzania-US relations, positive and negative experiences of cooperation between the two countries, and challenges hindering the development of relations to full potential. The findings show that Africa-US relations predate Africa’s formal colonisation by European imperialist powers. Historically, the US has been, inter alia, a key party in transatlantic trade, including the infamous slave trade. Also, Americans came to Africa as colonisers, explorers and missionaries. Hence, the US is perceived as both a benevolent and malevolent power. During the colonial period, the US – itself an offshoot of the European imperialist system – was an ardent perpetrator of imperialism, and a coloniser. In the post-colonial era, Africa-US relations evolved further espousing cultural, economic, political, and social dimensions. Benefits for Africa include some benevolent action through development assistance, and cooperation in peace and security matters. Contrarily, many examples manifest the US’s malevolent hegemony, including sidelining decisions by African institutions, being party to conflicts on the continent, divergent interests in international fora, resource-greediness, etc. The analysis of the aforementioned issues provides inputs for the design of strategic interventions for strengthening and making Africa-US relations mutually beneficial and respectful. This paper recommends that the architecture of Tanzania-US relations should embrace a mapping of gaps in the framework conditions for autonomous and sustainable development in Africa. Consequently, support should focus on building the framework conditions for development, in the areas of governance, diverse non-financial resource capacities, and financial resource capacities. These measures are seen not only as preconditions for meaningful Africa-US relations, but also for achieving strategic autonomy of African countries. This paper is derived from research of the Kamanda Rajabu Diwani Centre on studies of the dynamics of the international system titled Africa’s Past and Present International Positioning.

 

Keywords: colonialism, framework conditions for development, governance institutional frameworks, imperialism, strategic autonomy.


Introduction

 

Arguably several factors shape a state’s foreign policy, and accordingly, foreign relations. Pertinent domestic factors include the country’s culture, history, economic situation, political situation, public opinion, interests and clout of specific power groups, etc. External factors manifest the geo-economics and geo-politics of the day. A blend of these factors determines a country’s hard and soft power, and its ability and method to leverage them in dealing with other actors (state and non-state) in the global system (Dayasanka, 2023; Petrič, 2013).

 

In this connection, a proficient assessment of Tanzania-US relations requires revisiting several annals on pertinent issues. Besides epochal philosophies, other key records relate to Tanzania’s integration in the global system, within the broad context of Africa’s imperial conquest. Empirical literature offers insights into these issues.

 

From this backdrop, this paper portrays Africa-US relations, with particular reference to Tanzania. To understand these relations, not only does this paper dwell on the contemporary situation, but it also delves into the past, in order to connect it to the present, and to instructively project the future. Within the constraints of the paucity of research, this paper highlights the subject, leitmotif, and concrete manifestations and outcomes of the relations.

 

The multidimensional assessment situates the Africa-US relations within its historical context, tracing its dawn to trans-Atlantic slave trade, which preceded the official founding of the US and most African polities.[1]

 

A major risk of modern scholarly writing is to find oneself echoing the ideas of other people and making no or little contribution through one’s own original perceptions and understanding of the subject matter. To avoid this trap, the author first wrote this paper out of personal normative understanding of the world through exposure to various cultures and intercultural relations. These original perceptions and understandings were then blended with data and information gathered through desk and field research of pertinent issues. The paper systematically fuses lessons from literature and field research.

 

Background

 

Tenets of globalisation that created colonial African polities

 

Today’s African polities are by and large the creation of European powers, as per the Berlin Conference. The process destroyed several existing African nation-states, subsuming them in newly created polities.

 

Imperialism[2] is the philosophical foundation, guiding societal interactions between the victor and the vanquished. Thus, it is the doctrinaire basis of the making of African colonial polities and governing them. The victor controls the vanquished through various channels: administrative, cultural, diplomatic, economic, military, political, and legal and regulatory. The victor unilaterally engineers and manages the interactions of these spheres to serve its imperial interests.

 

Moreover, imperialism created and leveraged at least three major instruments to achieve and sustain total control and ‘ripping-off’ of the vanquished. Within this context racial hierarchy served as an instrument for rationalising discrimination, denial of human rights and dignity to Africans. It was missing word(s) deliberate attack on humanness, identity, self-esteem, physical wellbeing, and mental wellbeing of the vanquished, who were designated as creatures of inferior status. Various means were used to enforce the racial hierarchy code. Already during the 7th century, the Arab conquers of North Africa received higher pay than their Berber colleagues who served in the Arab army (Warmington & Brett, 2024). The British created a special rank for Africans, the effendi, to save the ‘superior’ European soldiers from the ‘embarrassment’ of saluting ‘inferior’ Africans.

 

Collective exploitation of Africa and the Africans by imperial conquerors acted as an instrument for underlining racial superiority and ensuring broader support in conqueror societies. This justified the exploitation of the vanquished (inferior creatures) by all individual and institutional members of the conqueror race (superior creatures). Colonial powers as ‘hegemons’ in their colonies curtailed the say of the vanquished in societal affairs. The vanquished became irrelevant in the domestic and global arenas. The victors architectured the polities; exercised sovereignty over both domestic and foreign affairs; disrupted traditional political systems; designed and conditioned the elite system to serve colonisers’ interests; dictated victor-vanquished societies built on alien hegemony, power imbalance, multidimensional oppression, and exploitation; institutionalised inequality and parallel societies; formed cosmopolitan societies; and created African diaspora societies.

  

Primordial globalisation and the making of Tanzania

 

Commensurate with the general process of the making of present-day African polities, the territory that today bears the name Tanzania has a long history of interactions with external actors and integration into the international system. Starting long before the territory existed in its current configuration, the interactions occurred within and across cultural, economic, political, and social dimensions. A blend of domestic and external forces drove the interactions.

 

In this context, the subject territory has gone through a roller-coaster of experiences. Intense foreign exploration of present-day Tanzania began in the 7th century, spearheaded by Arabs and Persians, followed by the Portuguese in the 15th century. Up to the 15th century, the interactions were amongst sovereign entities. Key markers include peaceful interactions with ancient Chinese explorers and traders; and largely peaceful relations with Arabia and Europe, though they were based on mercantilist trade, including forceful establishment of trading posts.

 

The late 15th century presents a turning point. It was the beginning of an extended period of subjugation by slave traders from Arabia, and conquerors from Arabia and Europe. From then onwards subjugation besides mercantilism, conquest, slave trade, landgrab, and colonialism perpetrated by Arabs (through limited territorial conquest and landgrab, colonialism, mercantilism, slave trade) and Europeans (through full territorial conquest and landgrab, colonialism, mercantilism, and limited slave trade) defined the interactions.

 

Zanzibar was taken by the Portuguese in 1503, who ruled until 1756. Elsewhere, by 1525 the Portuguese had subdued the entire coast of East Africa, including the present-day Tanzania mainland. The Sultanate of Oman seized Zanzibar from Portugal in 1756, and the Arabs ruled the island until 12 April 1964, when they were toppled through a popular revolution by the indigenous African population.

 

Moreover, in the implementation of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) resolutions on the control of African resources, the British established control over Zanzibar to protect the Arab colonisers (and knighted the Island’s five imperial rulers). Simultaneously, the German Empire eventually established control over what is now mainland Tanzania – which it named Deutsch Ost-Africa (DOA), i.e., German East Africa. Notably, the formalisation of colonial rule in Tanganyika came some 88 years after Zanzibar had been completely subdued by the Arabs. After the defeat of the German empire in World War I, and as per the Versailles Agreement (1919), DOA became a Trust Territory of the League of Nations, administered by the British. The territory’s name was changed to Tanganyika. Tanganyika became Trust Territory of the United Nations Organization (UNO) after World War II, while the United Kingdom (UK) retained the governance mandate of the same.

 

Outcomes of Tanzania’s primordial integration in the global system

 

Some of the enduring outcomes of centuries of interactions between domestic and external forces are the development of Kiswahili, superimposition of alien culture, formation of cosmopolitan societies, formation of polities, and racialised relations.

 

The key factors that favoured the development of Kiswahili include: colonial governance institutions (administration, army, and police); colonial economic set-up (plantations, mines, labour, and settlements); communication between indigenous people and foreigners (e.g., European-African communication); mass communication (education, literacy campaigns, and mass media); and spread of religions (especially major foreign religions)[3] (Batibo, 1989). The impact of a common lingua franca lies in the fact that not only does it streamline communication, but it also reinforces shared societal (national) values and creates a more cohesive and efficient governance of diverse societal matters.

 

In contrast to Kiswahili, the superimposition of alien culture over more than 100 local African cultures was distinctly detrimental, and is the strategy used to inflict the most damage to African societies. Cultural hegemony sought to erase the African identity, because culture is a society’s software. African traditional systems and values, and their institutions, were designated as ‘inferior’ and ‘outdated’ and systematically destroyed. Thus, Tanzania, became part of culturally mutilated Africa, compartmentalised religiously (between Christianity and Islam) and linguistically (Anglophone, Arab, Francophone, and Lusophone).

 

Obviously, current borders of Tanzania as a polity are also attributed to the Arab, British, and German colonisers, and did not consider cultural, economic, political, and social relations amongst the local people.

 

In Tanzania too, colonialism established a code of relations, built on parallel societies of the victor and the vanquished, and characterised by power imbalance between the two. At the centre of this social construct was multidimensional suppression (in all societal spheres). Organisationally, DOA became an integral part of the imperial master country, Germany.

 

Colonialism inevitably induced the formation of cosmopolitan society in Tanzania – culturally, ethnically, and racially. Over centuries, the territory absorbed people from other African territories, Asia, and Europe. A notable feature of this is the divide between indigenous and non-indigenous factions of society, defined along such lines as economic wellbeing, political participation, etc. In some cases, contradictory interests (cultural and political) manifested the divide (Lindermann, 2023).

 

Demise of colonialism and formation of the United Republic of Tanzania

 

The territory’s indigenous people had to endure prolonged periods of struggle for the liberation of Africa and Africans, for Tanzania to become what it is today.

 

On 9 December 1961, the UK handed independence to the Tanganyika African Union (TANU), which had won the elections.

 

In Zanzibar, the UK decided to bypass the Afro Shiraz Party (ASP), which had won the election. In 1963, it handed over ‘independence’ to the colonial Sultan, who had dominated the isles for more than 200 years. Six weeks after the Zanzibar revolution, Tanganyika (governed by TANU) and Zanzibar (governed by ASP) united to form the United Republic of Tanzania (URT), in an arrangement that reserved substantial autonomy for Zanzibar.

 

On 5 February 1977, TANU and ASP united to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Also, in 1992, a multiparty system was re-introduced in the country, and CCM has continued to dominate the URT’s politics to date.

 

Tanzania international engagement as a post-colonial state

 

The international relations that Tanzania could forge are closely linked to what it became as a post-colonial state (in the cold war era). In this regard, three fundamental positions show how the country sought to position itself globally: it assumed the role of a centre for African liberation, pursued de facto strategic sovereignty in foreign policy, and became a key player in pan-African activism.

 

As a centre for African liberation, it became a leading voice for, and host of African liberation struggles, serving as the headquarters of the OAU’s liberation committee, supporting exiled movements and refugees from across the continent (including severing diplomatic relations with the UK from 1965-1968 over UDI).

 

In pursuance of de facto strategic sovereignty in foreign policy, Tanzanian foreign policy was distinctly ‘value-based’ and non-partisan, as opposed to being ideologically veiled. Through the policy of Ujamaa and self-reliance, Tanzania was in many ways doing things in a totally different way from the rest of the world (CSS, 2024). Achievements included persuading Commonwealth members to reject the readmission of apartheid South Africa, partnering with China (including building the TAZARA from Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia in 1970-1975 and campaigning successfully for China’s 1971 re-admission to the UN), and becoming the first country south of the Sahara where East Germany had a diplomatic mission.

 

As a key player in pan-African activism, which reached fever pitch in the 1960s and 1970s, Tanzania was a prominent hub for Pan-Africanism. The country attracted Pan-Africanist supporters of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Diaspora Africans from the US and the Caribbean, including activists and scholars, made pilgrimages to Tanzania, to learn about and support the nation, and some even to stay.

Obviously, some of the positions that Tanzania took contradicted the choices of the US, especially in relation to working with China and the Eastern Bloc or opposing colonialism and white supremacy. Except for Kennedy, no other US President encouraged African liberation (CSIS, 2024). Also, the US only outlawed racial discrimination in 1964, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of the same year: meaning that prior to that, white supremacy policies were still official.

 

Overview of Tanzania-US relations

 

Basic knowledge on several issues is helpful in grasping the dynamics and patterns of Tanzania-US relations, so as to form a plausible opinion about them. This paper explicates the framework of the relations (i.e., conceptual and theoretical grounding, determinant factors, philosophical foundations), their genesis and epochs, their avenues/tiers of relations, and their outcomes.

 

Conceptual and theoretical grounding

 

Some knowledge of the concepts and theories of foreign policy and foreign relations is helpful in understanding the dynamics and patterns of Tanzania-US relations. These are briefly introduced hereunder.

 

As concepts, foreign policy and foreign relations are portmanteau terms, with no single commonly agreed definitions. Many scholars have attempted to define these two concepts. In this paper, foreign policy is understood to mean a deliberate system of guidelines that guide the dealings between a given state with other states. A state’s foreign relations are shaped by its foreign policy. Foreign relations refer to multidimensional inter-country interactions in cultural, diplomatic, economic, political, and social spheres. Implicitly, a country’s foreign policy guides its foreign relations. Several theories offer a framework for understanding the patterns and dynamics of interactions between and amongst societies – in the context of states – in the global system.

 

The theory of realism emphasises the centrality of ‘power politics’ and ‘national interests’ in the architecture of international relations (Morgenthau, 1949; Waltz, 1979). The theory of liberalism emphasises international cooperation and interdependence, and mutual benefits (Voltaire, Locke, Smith, and German thinker Immanuel Kant). The theory of constructivism argues that states’ identities, and (shared) norms and ideas, shape their foreign policy decisions (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; Finnemore, 1996, 2003).


Factors shaping foreign policy and relations

 

Several factors determine a state’s foreign policy (and by extension, foreign relations). Broadly expressed, foreign policy and foreign relations are determined by the intermingling of domestic factors and external factors.

 

Domestic factors include those within a state’s cultural, economic, political, and social spheres. In this paper, they reflect relations within the society and how these impact the development concerns, interests, opportunities, voice in public opinion, and concrete shaping of and benefits from development actions.

 

External factors emanate from the global system and reflect the power and actions of actors in that system. Accordingly, a country’s position in the global system is determined by affinity or distance (cultural, diplomatic, economic, historical, natural, political, and social) between itself and other actors (both state and non-state) in the global system. They too impact on a country via interactions at various levels: bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral.

 

The interplays between external and internal factors determine the blend and brand of states’ ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’, and the prospects to leverage them in dealing with other actors in the global system (Dayasanka, 2023; Petrič, 2013).

 

Genesis and epochs of the relations

 

The territories that now constitute the US and the African Continent have had interactions, even before their extant configurations. These relations have evolved from the period when Africa was not yet colonised, to the colonial and post-colonial era in Africa.

 

From very early times, US looked to Africa for cheap resource inputs in its economy. From the 1500s to 1865, slave trade and slavery were compelling facts of the US economy, and many individual Americans and institutions enjoyed its ‘fruits’. Key corporate profiteers include banks (e.g., predecessors of Citibank, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, etc.); shipping companies; slave trading firms, and several corporate conglomerates, e.g., the Lehman Brothers.

 

Relations did not favour Africa under colonialism either. Not only was the US part of the Global North, but it was also a key player and determinant of the geo-economical and geopolitical dynamics and patterns. After World War II, it became a key superpower and leader of the Western World, which thrived on imperialism.

 

During the post-colonial era, Tanzania – a relatively early achiever of independence (in 1961) – became the hub for African liberation. The primary focus of its international engagement became African liberation. This stance put the country in a strategic confrontation with the supporters of the global colonial system.

 

Avenues of interactions

 

Tanzania and the US interact bilaterally and in multilateral fora. They established diplomatic ties in 1961 and have since nominally maintained cordial bilateral relations. Moreover, both belong to several multilateral organisations, e.g., the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), United Nations System, and World Trade Organization (WTO). Also, they interact through the US’s cooperation with the African Union (AU); and African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), specifically, East African Community (EAC), and Southern African Development Community (SADC).

 

Additionally, Tanzanian interests are impacted by unilateral decisions of self-proclaimed and non-inclusive institutions of global governance, e.g., the G-7, G-20, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in which the US is a key player. Ideally, any African perspective of the agenda of these institutions must address the colonial and neo-colonial history and the imbalances they institutionalised against Africa. In reality, this can only be a pipe dream, because the foundational purpose of these institutions is not necessarily aligned with African concerns and interests.

 

Since 1961, the US and Tanzania have been, at least nominally, sovereign development partners. The partnership has been relatively broad-based, espousing all societal dimensions, i.e., cultural, economic, political, and social.

 

The US’s support has focused particularly on: economic growth and development, education services, trade development, environmental protection, energy services, healthcare, and democratic governance.

 

Outcomes of the interactions

 

The US has had a cross-dimensional impact on Tanzania. In the cultural sphere, today, 63% of the total population practices Christianity, making it the largest religion in Tanzania (CIA Fact Book, in 2023). The diffusion of Christianity in Tanzania is attributed to, amongst other people, American Christian missionaries, who have been involved in spreading Christianity in the country since the 19th century. The American missionaries worked alongside European missionaries and indigenous teachers to establish churches and schools, and to translate the Bible into Kiswahili.

 

The two countries have maintained bilateral diplomatic relations continuously since 1961. This is significant considering that the country’s diplomatic ties with its former colonisers broke up from February 1965 with West Germany over the East Germany issue, and from 1965-1968 with the UK over the UDI issue. Moreover, both countries belong to a number of international organisations, including the United Nations System, Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), and World Trade Organization. In contrast to relative achievements in bilateral diplomacy, there is little evidence that the two countries have been strategic partners in international fora.

 

In the economic sphere, the two countries maintain some ties. To highlight, 6.3% of the US’s total exports of US$ 15,843,060,000 to Africa in 2018 went to Tanzania. In the same year, 0.3% of the US’s total imports of US$ 25,078,450,000 from Africa in 2018 came from Tanzania. Moreover, the US has supported Tanzania to attract private investments. Overall, the share of Africa in US world trade was about 1.06% (USDC, 2018). In 2022, the top ten countries (Cayman Islands, China, Canada, UK, Mauritius, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, South Africa, and France) accounted for 76.4% of total FDI inflows. The US was not amongst the top ten (NBS, BOT & TIC, 2024: 26).[4]

 

In the political sphere, the US has provided development assistance to Tanzania for capacity-building to encourage democratic governance.

 

The two countries have also maintained strategic relations in the areas of peace and security, a later addition to the Tanzania-US partnership. Since 2000, the two countries have been engaged in military cooperation (embracing counterterrorism, protection of territorial integrity, and engagement in peacekeeping operations; Professional Military Education (PME); military intelligence; maritime security; and countering the trafficking of illicit goods and narcotics. Tanzania’s National Defense College (NDC) routinely invites the US’s diplomats, as guest lectures in its Security and Strategic Studies Course, which aims at equipping policymakers with knowledge and skills on the management of peace, security and stability at national, regional and global levels.

 

Positive experiences

 

The Basis

 

To understand the benefits to Tanzania from its relations with the US, it is useful to begin by introducing the basis of those benefits, i.e., the legal and regulatory frameworks (LRFs) permitting them, and the organisational framework to manage the development assistance.

 

The most relevant of the LRFs is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, a US Public Law 87–195 that was approved on 4 September 1961. It is ‘an Act to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and external security, and for other purposes’.

 

  • Governance institution for US assistance

 

On 3 November 1961, the Kennedy administration established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to implement the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and administer economic foreign assistance programmes USAID’s programmes are broadly defined and embrace: alleviating poverty, improving health, providing economic support (including through supporting economic growth and capacity to participate in world trade). Nominally, the Agency’s work is correctly focused: seeking to build resilience in beneficiary communities so that they can thrive independently (CRS, 2025). US support takes into account the US’s international interests, commercial and otherwise (CRS, 2025).

 

In 2004 the US established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The Agency pursues poverty reduction through economic growth, focusing on countries with good economic policies and the potential for development. The Agency supports country-led projects and offers grants. Tanzania was one of the 32 African countries out of 63 that were eligible to submit proposals for funding under this arrangement (CRS, 2025).

 

Assistance programmes

 

Even before the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Peace Corps was the first development assistance programme, from which Tanzania and other African countries benefitted. Since the enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, there have been several other programmes, as outlined hereunder.

 

  • Peace Corps

 

The Kennedy administration established the Peace Corps as a development assistance programme. To this effect, President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10924 on 1 March 1961, ‘challenging young Americans to serve humanity by working for peace and development in countries around the world’.

 

The Peace Corps’ goals include supporting existing economic assistance programmes, assisting beneficiary countries to meet their needs for skilled workers, and fostering understanding between Americans and people of other nations.

 

Tanganyika became one of the first countries to benefit from the initiative. The first batch of 50 volunteers departed for Tanganyika on 28 August 1961. Since then, over 3,200 volunteers have served in Tanganyika and Tanzania, working in education, agriculture, health, promoting world peace and friendship. In 2024, there were 50 Peace Corps in the country.

 

  • Special and differential treatment

 

Tanzania is eligible, under World Trade Organization (WTO) rule, for special and differential treatment (SDT) concerning market access (MA) to the US. Two of the most important arrangements are the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).

 

The GSP is a unilateral preferential trade policy (PTP) that provides duty-free access (DFA) to the US market for the more than 5,000 products from designated developing countries, currently 169.

 

AGOA is also a PTP, providing DFA to the US market for eligible sub-Saharan African countries, currently 32. It covers over 1,800 products, besides those under GSP. Since its enactment in 2000, it is the core of US economic ties with Africa.

 

  • Prosper Africa

 

‘Prosper Africa’ was established in 2019 by the Trump Administration as a trade and investment promotion initiative. It brings together 17 US Government agencies to connect US and African businesses (i.e., buyers, investors, suppliers). It eases US companies’ access to US Government investment and export support tools. Support to Africa is indirect, i.e., African companies can find export opportunities to the US and attract investment. This market-driven programme is adversarial to the state-backed approaches of China and Russia.

 

President Biden reinvigorated ‘Prosper Africa’ with an additional US$80 million for investments in infrastructure, clean energy, and healthcare.

 

Negative experiences

 

For centuries, Africa’s interests have been hurt by its status as a battleground for superpower conflicts, looking for resources. From this backdrop, the country’s negative experiences emanating from its interactions with the US – which are hinted at in section two – are basically the same as for the rest of Africa. For analytical illumination, these experiences can be broken into three broad categories: experiences expressing the legacy of imperialist world vision, experiences driven by ideological hysteria, and experiences associated with Africa’s stance.5[5]

 

Experiences expressing the legacy of imperialist world vision

 

Since the US is an off-shoot state of European imperial projects, its relations with Africa have been strongly influenced by the imperialistic global vision. The legitimisation of double standards in LRFs permitted a long list of interrelated evils perpetrated on Africa: plundering, depopulating (through slave trade and conquest wars), landgrabbing, colonisation, frustrating liberation efforts, siphoning resources (without evidence of an enduring exhibit of positive engagement), strategically undermining sovereignty, providing ‘below threshold’ (symbolic) assistance, being party to creating and enhancing negative structural legacies (based on racial hierarchy), being party to engineering erratic nation-building, and perpetuating marginalisation in international fora.

 

Most of the issues referred to in the previous paragraph are relatively clear.

 

Nevertheless, here are a few examples to illustrate the facts:

 

  • Between 1501 (global population was 450 million) and 1867 (global population was 1.2 billion), 13 million Africans were trafficked as slaves across the Atlantic Ocean. At least two million of them, ca. 10-15%, died during their passage. By comparison, the two nuclear bombs dropped on Japan by the US killed 70,000 to 135,000 people in Hiroshima; and 60,000 to 80,000 people in Nagasaki.

  • At least 13 US presidents owned slaves. Paradoxically, men who, on the political podiums, advocated for individual freedom also enslaved people (for example, Historian Edmund S. Morgan). Further noteworthy is that by 1900, Africa’s population had shrunk to only 96,000,000 people, ca. 6% of the global population at the time (Manning, 2013: 7).

  • Though a major power of the time, the US was present at the Berlin Conference, alongside the Austria-Hungarian Empire, Belgium, Kingdom of Denmark, British Empire, French Empire, German Empire, Italy, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Kingdom of Portugal, Russian Empire, Kingdom of Spain, Kingdom of Sweden-Norway, and Ottoman Empire (Turkey).

  • In 1822, the US established a colony in Liberia. It named its capital Monrovia (in honour of President James Monroe, who had contributed more US Government money to support the colonisation project). Liberia unilaterally declared independence in 1847 and was recognised by the US on 27 July 1967.

 

These intrusions left behind enduring negative effects, because, to a large extent, they created appendage economies that lacked strategic autonomy, and the framework conditions for autonomous and sustainable development.

 

Experiences driven by ideological hysteria

 

Ideological considerations have been the basis for the US to frustrate positive change, taking sides in conflicts, opposing Africa’s interests in international fora, and targeting African countries with hostile measures.

 

An example of frustrating positive change includes frustrating African liberation efforts (by siding with the coloniser of their reactionary domestic agents). The motive was to position itself against USSR/Russia, other Eastern Bloc States, China, and Cuba, which supported Africa’s liberation. The second example relates to land reforms. The US knows very well that indigenous people did not voluntarily give land to any conqueror, yet it covertly and overtly opposes land reforms, e.g., in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Besides, the US has traditionally been comfortable with revolutionary political leaders like Tanzania’s John Pombe Joseph Magufuli, Patrice Emery Lumumba (Congo), and Sylvanus Olympio (Togo).

 

Also, within the context of the Cold War, the US has historically taken sides in lethal conflicts in Africa, e.g., civil wars, coup d’états, liberation wars, and other forms of standoffs.

 

Another sticky issue is the practice by the US of leveraging its clout to blockade African interests in international fora. An example concerning Tanzania is the vetoing of Salim Ahmed Salim as UN Secretariat General on 27 October 1981. It used its veto three times in one day to deny him the position.

 

On hostile measures, the US repeatedly imposes travel bans for Africans and provides frequent travel advisories against Africa. In 2020, USDA imposed a visa ban on Tanzania (alongside Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan). Also, as recent as 5 September 2024, the USDA issued a travel advisory against Tanzania, ‘due to crime, terrorism, and targeting of LGB persons’.

 

Tanzania’s relations with the US happen in the context of an Africa that lacks a coherent continental policy towards the US. There is no unity of concern, interest, or action in its dealings with the US. In reality, African countries predominantly engage with them individually rather than collectively (IDEG, 2014). Given the limited bargaining power of small countries like Tanzania, this consolidates and prolongs unbalanced Africa-US relations.

 

Moreover, in the manifestation of dependency syndrome, the African elite associate Africa-US relations with ‘the US trying to do well for Africa’ rather than ‘Africa and the US doing something good together’ (IDEG, 2014).

 

Sticky issues eroding the outcomes of Tanzania-US partnership

 

An obvious outcome of Tanzania-US relations is that instead of enabling the country to develop strategic autonomy and resilience, they have contributed towards perpetuating and even worsening dependency. In this regard, the imperialistic foundation of the relations erodes the outcomes by promulgating a mindset of servitude in partner countries, pursuing the US’s self-centric interests and dominance (culturally, economically, politically, and socially).

 

Promulgating a mindset of servitude

 

In realpolitik, imperialism is perhaps the strongest constituency in a country like Tanzania. Its pressure is omnipresent and bears heavily on the elite, whose society is subject to imposition of alien values (cultural, economic, political, and social). In response to this pressure and as a coping mechanism to bear the risks of imperialism, often the elite opt to collaborate with the imperial power. This has, in turn, led to two consequences. First, imperialism is blamed for promulgating a mindset of servitude in peripheral countries, blocking strategies. Second, this conduct exposes Africa-US relations to criticism, because on many occasions, it has appeared to promulgate a mindset of servitude by frightening the elite and eroding their confidence (e.g., putting them on travel ban lists), leading to the elite invariably being branded as aristocratic, despotic, undemocratic, unpatriotic, etc.

 

Self-centric interests and dominance

 

Inter-superpower antagonism – e.g., between the USSR and US – shows that each superpower perceives its societal values to be the best not only for itself, but for everyone else (Ogunbambi, 1982). Moreover, superpowers have been ready to inflict heavy damage challengers, to defend their assumed ‘value supremacy’.

 

On the one hand, the US is perceived to be extremely self-centred, with foreign affairs ‘seldom an issue of concern’ (Taşpınar, 2010). On the other hand, the US has a strong influence in Tanzania, cutting across all societal dimensions. It projects its ‘value supremacy’ through various channels: corporate (i.e., economic) activities, education, film, media, music, political interactions, religion, etc. However, the architecture of Tanzania-US and EAC-US bilateral economic agreements (in the areas of trade and investments) has been criticised by local scholars for being heavily US-centric (Pay & Gitonga-Mutethia, 2021).

 

In the political arena, Tanzania is subject to the bipartisan agreement commitment (of the Democrats and Republicans) to advancing US geopolitical interests in Africa (Gnanguênon, 2024; Lellou, 2024).

 

Overall, the US’s engagement in Tanzania is usually overtly or covertly adversarial to China and Russia. Its architecture is more concerned with containing the influence of these adversaries than assisting the country achieve concrete development objectives related to building strategic autonomy and resilience.

 

To exacerbate the limitations, the depth of support has largely remained under the threshold of required resources and US’s capacity to support: scarce financial resources have been spread thin (i.e., across far too many initiatives); cooperation outcomes have been person-based, hence stronger during certain periods (e.g., in the 1960s during the Kennedy administration) than others; and conditions of access to grants have been used to spy on local institutions.

 

Reflections for building mutually beneficial relations

 

Strategic action to strengthen and make Africa-US relations mutually beneficial and respectful should be guided by at least three basic considerations: the essentiality of resetting the relations, need for US to become a benevolent strategic partner of Africa, and strategic focus on the architecture of the relations.

 

Essentiality of resetting and leveraging Africa-US relations

 

‘Positive’ Africa-US relations are essential for two reasons: lessons from Africa’s legacy as a backwater of the world, and the fitness of the US as a partner. As explained in the previous chapters, at least parts of Africa and the African people, whether within the African continent or in the diaspora, have largely been a backwater of the world since the Middle Ages. Moreover, as delineated in chapter 2, especially in subsection 2.2 to 2.5, the circumstances, in the postcolonial African polities, implied that they would not have much leverage in international affairs. Unsurprisingly, today Tanzania, alongside other African countries, is still a backwater of the world.

 

Also, given its capabilities, the US can be a positive game changer in Africa’s development, in the same way it did for Western Europe after World War II, and with other friendly countries – e.g., South Korea[6], Taiwan, etc. – thereafter. It can assist Africa to set up effective framework conditions for autonomous and sustainable development. A measure of ideal partnership would be the support from the US to bolster strategic autonomy and resilience.

 

Tanzania lags behind in terms of framework conditions for autonomous and sustainable development. Consistent with the fundamental logic of building its own capacities, Tanzania needs to be strategically less reliant by building and enhancing critical capacities for development.

In this context, issues related to peace and security are seen as necessary outcomes of the development achieved.

 

In terms of strategic focus, the new Africa-US relations should break from the traditional North-South relations, driven by imperialistic ideals and fictitious commitments. It should be modelled as a Partnership for Building Strategic Autonomy (PBSA), capable of catalysing transformative development in Africa.

 

Its aims should be to consolidate good governance institutional frameworks; enhance their productive resource capacities; address the development restraints linked to historical injustices (to create a level playing field for all societal groups); strengthen (African) strategic alliances; strengthen the enforcement of governance ethics; and leverage the African diaspora.

 

Measures to build mutually beneficial relations

 

To expedite the process of transforming to a higher level of development, Tanzania needs to build resilience so that it can thrive independently. Most importantly, it needs to embark on a path to strategic autonomy.

 

However, inter-societal interdependencies are not only inexorable but appropriate, and genuine allies should nurture them. Hence, strategic autonomy does not mean binary choice between dependence and independence or between engagement and decoupling. It is more about mutually beneficial and respectful interdependencies (Helwig & Sinkkonen, 2022).

 

Building Tanzania’s strategic autonomy can be achieved through international cooperation with viable partners, in which case a benevolent partner of the calibre of the US can play a strategically vital role.

 

Therefore, the prime concern in assessing Tanzania-US relations was to understand the character and impact of the foreign policy pursued by the US, and, in consequence, to propose the kind of cooperation measures that ought to be adopted by the two partner countries. The key question was: Is the US’s foreign policy imperialistic or not? Invariably, does it contribute to creating the necessary conditions for strategic autonomy in Tanzania, or suppress them?

 

Based on the reflections in the previous sections, this section describes a Partnership for Building Strategic Autonomy (PBSA), defined as a capacity development project focusing on four broad pillars: capacities for good governance, FiR capacities, productive resource capacities, and flanking measures. These capacities are preconditions for achieving both strategic autonomy, and a conducive environment for sustainable peace, security, and stability.

 

Consolidating good governance institutional frameworks

 

Governance is certainly one of the major failings in Tanzania and other African countries.[7] It is innately linked with poor development performances across all spheres of society. The several factors that erode the effectiveness of the governance institutional frameworks (GIFs) are linked to, inter alia, legal and regulatory frameworks (LRFs), governance organisational frameworks (GOFs), professional competency deficiencies of policy and lawmakers (PLMs) and policy and law implementors (PLIs)[8], and leadership deficiencies of the political elite[9].

 

Hence, it is necessary that the US-Tanzania partnership supports a new era and vision of African governance; in which these handicaps are addressed systematically and sustainably.

 

Well-designed LRFs should promote a ‘rule of adhocracy’[10], instead of the prevailing ‘rule of bureaucracy’, using lessons from Tanzania’s tea industry survey 2023 as a case study (TBT, 2024).

 

The governance organisational frameworks (GOFs)[11] determine organisational efficiency. Particular focus should be on countering the proliferation of state actors (e.g., government agencies, authorities, etc.) in general, and ‘weed institutions’, in particular. Given its knowledge, skills capital, and experience, the US could show the way in pursuing the appropriate reforms, ranging from scaling down to eliminating entire organisations, in order to promote governance efficiency.

 

The professional competence of the elite is critical in achieving and safeguarding the strategic autonomy of a given entity. Hence their strategy should involve professionalising technical leadership of policy and lawmakers (PLMs) and policy and law implementors (PLIs) from both the public and private sectors. This requires building institutional capacities for (deepening) good conduct, and professional competency and confidence of the elite on a continuous basis.

 

Political leadership is a vital determinant of a society’s strength. At every epoch, good leadership has been responsible for driving performance through strategic thought, mobilization, and action. Africa too has had its share of brilliant leaders. Thus, PBSA should make Tanzania build a governance system that ensures continuity and safeguards the development dynamics initiated by visionary leaders. Concrete measures can focus on strengthening institutions for nation-building (e.g., establishing non-partisan national endowments for democracy), institutions for democratic development (i.e., strong, independent judiciaries, free and fair electoral systems, media freedom, and a robust civil society).

 

Productive resource capacities

 

Productive resource capacities (PRCs) determine a country's ability to produce goods and services, ultimately driving economic growth and development. This refers to both FiR capacities and NFiR capacities.

 

Although financial development is essential for economic performance (King & Levine, 1993), Tanzania lacks it (ACBF, 2015; Allen et al., 2012; Baltagi et al., 2009; King & Levine, 1993; Rajan & Zingales, 2003). Overall, the capacity concerning challenge is high (the highest category) in 17.8% of African countries, including Tanzania (ACBF, 2015). Boosting the country’s FiR capacities requires addressing corruption, deficient LRFs, fiscal unsustainability, illicit financial flows, and revenue collection anomalies.

 

The PBSA should address the various NFiR capacities to unleash Tanzania’s development potential and make Tanzania-US relations bear mutually beneficial outcomes. This underlines the need for Tanzania to create robust productive capacities targeting at least five dimensions: entrepreneurship, knowledge and skills, organisations (institutions), physical infrastructure, and technology.

 

Flanking measures

 

In addition to consolidating GIFs, and building PRCs, several measures are critical for addressing genuine concerns related to the societal configuration in Tanzania and other African countries, so as to fully unleash and capitalise on the potential for development. Key measures are mitigating development restraints linked to historical injustices, strengthening African strategic alliances, and strengthening the enforcement of governance ethics.

  

  • Addressing development restraints linked to historical injustices

 

The imperialistic racial hierarchy system introduced by colonisers throughout Africa created castes in societies. The system of race-based castes institutionalised cultural, economic, political, and social discrimination. In this arrangement, the people of African descent were marginalised in their own countries and throughout the world.

 

Thus, recognising and supporting corrective action against historical injustices is crucial not only for honouring and upholding the dignity of the people of African descent, but also for broadly unleashing the development potential embedded in the various societal groups in African countries.

 

In this regard, counteracting the societal distortions caused by the system of race-based castes and affirmative action system can help. Key to this is access to opportunities: business and economic, education, health care, and political ones.

 

As the US was quick to come up with the Marshall Plan to reconstruct the European economies after World War II, it should also acknowledge the historical and contemporary adverse effects of slave trade and imperialism on people of African descent and commit itself to addressing the structural legacies attributed to imperialism and colonialism[12].

 

  • Strengthening African strategic alliances

 

The barriers to African strategic autonomy are also compounded by several other factors. One example is what Pay and Gitonga-Mutethia (2021) refer to as the ‘collateral damage' caused by national action that disregards the collective African dimension. An example is Kenya ignoring its legal commitments under regional economic communities (RECs) and bilaterally signing a trade agreement with the EU and US, instead of doing it under the umbrella of the East African Community (EAC) Common Market.

 

Another example is the resistance by African polities to cede power to supra-national institutions (that they have themselves created), which is one of the main reasons for the relative dysfunctionality of African RECs, compared to RECs from other regions of the World.

 

The two factors alluded to in the previous paragraphs imply a lack of African strategic alliances. The US has plenty of experience in effective management of strategic alliances. Hence, a reset of the Africa-US partnership should also focus on strengthening intra-African strategic alliances, as well as strategic alliances between Africa and other regions, beyond the usual rhetoric and symbolism.

 

  • Strengthening the enforcement of governance ethics

                 

Governance ethics is a major concern regarding the conduct of the African elite. In an expression of frustration, critics have designated the African elite as ‘corruptocracies’, ‘chaosocracies’, and ‘terrorocracies’ (Van Wyk, 2007). They blame them for deficiencies in patriotism and commitment to societal interests.

 

The perceptions of corruption illuminate the scope of the challenge. In spite of a stark cross-country contrast, the continent as a whole ranks poorly on the global corruption index. In 2023, only five countries had scores of 50 or above, i.e., Seychelles (71), Cabo Verde (64), Botswana (56), Rwanda (51), and Mauritius (51).[13] Tanzania’s score was 40. The pan-African score of 33 was the lowest of any major region in the world (Statista, 2024).

 

In order to achieve genuine change, with the assistance of their international partners including the US, Africa must build the right institutional frameworks for the development of a cadre of competent, conscious, devoted, and patriotic political stewards at all levels.

 

  • Leveraging the African diaspora

 

The US has what all other imperialist states lack: a huge African diaspora. This is a resource that can serve as an inter-societal bridge for engagement (Lellou, 2024). For what can it be leveraged? For Tanzania’s renewal and transformation towards strategic sovereignty and resilience, in a similar manner to the pan-African movement of the 1960s and 1970s.

 

For example, the large African communities in the US can be involved in creating connections that enhance mutually beneficial and respectable cooperation in all societal spheres: cultural, economic, political, and social.


Conclusions and the way forward

 

Concluding observations

 

This paper set out to examine Africa-US relations, with particular reference to Tanzania. Concerning Africa as a whole, it illuminated the organisation of African societies before colonial conquest, systematic conquest of Africa, and tenets of primordial globalisation that impacted the making of African elites.

 

Referring to Tanzania, the paper revisited several issues, including the chronology of its integration into the international system, lasting outcomes of its integration into the international system, genesis and setting of relations with the US, evolution and scope of those relations, impact (positive and negative) of the relations on the country, and challenges hindering the development of relations to full potential.

 

The overall verdict is that contrary to diplomatic rhetoric, Africa-US relations have not been mutually beneficial and respectful, a challenge enduring to-date. A perennial underdog in the global system, Africa has served the pursuits of imperialistic powers, including the US. The US has dealt with Africa in an antagonistic, lop-sided, and truculent manner, and has not prioritised mutually beneficial relations. The US’s view of the world through the lens of a superpower has determined its African policy, contributing to plunder, depopulation, landgrab, colonisation, conflict perpetration, counter-liberation efforts, economic exploitation and provision of ‘below threshold’ assistance, clashing of interests, blockading, and undermining sovereignty. Its relations are still clearly exploitative.

 

Hence, by most measures, Africa-US interactions have generated overwhelmingly negative experiences, linked to imperialistic excesses, ideological hysteria, and a dependence mindset and syndrome of the African elite.

 

The overall impact of these negative experiences is the marginalisation of Africa, placing it on the periphery of global affairs. The experiences have created scepticism about US’s discourteous involvement in African affairs.

 

Nevertheless, Africa-US interactions have not been a complete zero-sum game for Africa. Several positive outcomes can be attributed to their relations. They include the creation of LRFs to manage development assistance; and establishment of assistance programmes, e.g., Peace Corps, SDT related to trade, and Power Africa, which are outlined in section 4.

 

Therefore, specifically, the paper recommends a reset of Africa-US relations, to ensure that they deliver results based on mutual benefits and respect. The relationship should be built on a new approach that distinguishes the new Africa-US policy from the previous one in vision, content, and action. In these new relations, the US should recognise Africa’s polities as sovereign entities, support them in building strategic autonomy and resilience, and advocate for their genuine interests in fair treatment in the global arena by all bilateral and multilateral partners.

 

Way forward

 

This research paper contends that despite past and contemporary challenges, resetting the US’s engagement in Africa, though not insurmountable, is a tough task. Business as usual will not be able to turn around the trend.

 

Therefore, a new strategy – built on the belief of ‘humanity is one and indivisible’ as propagated by Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere – must emphasise engagement at all levels focused on mutually beneficial and respectful outcomes. Among the specific recommendations, the paper calls for the US’s stance towards Africa to explicitly signal a new approach that distinguishes the new Africa-US policy from the previous one in vision, content, and action; recognise Africa’s polities as sovereign entities; support Africa’s interest in multilateral governance institutions; and support Africa’s interest in international agreements.


References

 

African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). 2015. Africa Capacity Report 2015: Capacity Imperatives for Domestic Resource Mobilization in Africa. Harare: ACBF.

 

Barnett, M. & Finnemore, M. 2004. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. New York: Cornell University Press.

 

Batibo, H. 1989. The Position of Kiswahili Amongst the Lingua Francas of Africa: A Typological Survey, Linguistics and Language in Education, 4(1).

 

Benjamin, J. 2011. Decolonizing Nationalism: Reading Nkrumah and Nyerere’s Pan-African Epistemology, Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, 3.

 

Birhane, A. 2020. Algorithmic Colonisation of Africa. [Online] Available       at: https://www.theelephant.info/analysis/2020/08/21/algorithmic-colonisation-of-africa/ [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Breytenbach, B. 1997. Cuito Cuanvale revisited, 54 Africa Insight, 27(1).

 

Bruner, J. 1996. The Culture of Education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

 

Burns, W. 2019. Assessing the Role of the United States in the World. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. February 2017.

 

Campbell, H. 1990. The Siege of Cuito Cuanavale. [Online] Available at: https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:288776/FULLTEXT01.pdf [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

 

Center, R. 2005. United States Strategy for Mexico. [Online] Available at: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA432735.pdf [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

 

Chitadze, N. 2019. The Global North-Global South Relations and their reflection on the World Politics and International Economy, Journal of Social Sciences, 8(1).

 

CRS. 2025. US Agency for International Development: An Overview. [Online] Available at: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10261 [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

CSIS. 2024. The Twists and Turns of US-Tanzania Bilateral Relations. [Online] Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/twists-and-turns-us-tanzania-bilateral-relations [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

European Parliament. 2022. EU strategic autonomy 2013-2023: From concept to capacity. [Online] Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2022)733589 [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Finnemore, M. 1996. National Interests in International Society. US: Cornell University Press.

 

Finnemore, M. 2003. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. US: Cornell University Press.

 

Fitzpatrick, M. 2025. Ukraine isn’t invited to its own peace talks. [Online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/ukraine-isnt-invited-to-its-own-peace-talks-history-is-full-of-such-examples-and-the-results-are-devastating-250049 [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Gates, H. & Appiah, K. (eds). 2010. Encyclopaedia of Africa. UK: Oxford University Press.

 

Gentry, L. 2023. A History of China-Tanzania Relations: How China Became Donor, Friend,

and Foe. [Online] Available at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/wwu_honors/64 [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Gjersø, J. 2015. The Scramble for East Africa: British Motives Reconsidered, 1884–95, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 43(5).

 

Gnanguênon, A. 2024. US Interests and African Agendas: Africa Policy After the 2024 Elections, America Votes 2024 Series No. X IV. GMF Geostrategy. [Online] Available at: [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Hébié M. 2015. Was There Something Missing in the Decolonization Process in Africa? The Territorial Dimension, Leiden Journal of International Law, 28(3).

 

Helwig, N. & Sinkkonen, V. 2022. Strategic Autonomy and the EU as a Global Actor: The Evolution, Debate and Theory of a Contested Term, European Foreign Affairs Review 27, Special Issue: 1–20.

 

Hoskyns, C. 1968. Africa's Foreign Relations: The Case of Tanzania, International Affairs,

44(3).

 

Kell, F., Masabo, A. & Feltes, T. 2024. Reviving Tanzania’s regional leadership and global engagement: Priorities for an effective foreign policy reset. London: Chatham House.

 

King, R. & Levine, R. 1993. Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3).

 

Lellou, H. 2024. US Relations with Africa and the New Cold War. The US Army College Quarterly: Parameters, 54(4).

 

Liber, R. 2022. Is the United States a Disruptor? In: Lieber, R. (ed), Indispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in a Turbulent World. US: Yale University Press.

 

Linderman, J. 2023. Decoloniality in Germany’s foreign aid? Exploring the case of the ’Marshall Plan with Africa’ and the role of public personnel in official development assistance. [Online] Available at: https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=9142682&fileOId=9151308 [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Manning, P. 2013. African Population, 1650 – 1950: Methods for New Estimates by Region. [Online] Available at: https://www.mortenjerven.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/AfricanPopulation.Methods.pdf [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Mathew, D., Burgess, B., Custer, S., Knight, R., Marshall, K., Katera, L., Mpapalika, J., Simba, C. & Jahari, C. 2024. Investing in Tanzania’s People: Valuing the US Tanzania Partnership for Prosperity. [Online] Available at: https://www.repoa.or.tz/?publication=investing-in-tanzanias-people-valuing-the-u-s-tanzania-partnership-for-prosperity [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

McEachrane, M. 2021. Will European countries ever take meaningful steps to end colonial legacies? [Online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/will-european-countries-ever-take-meaningful-steps-to-end-colonial-legacies-148581 [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Mohamed, A. 2024. The Rise of the Multipolar World Order: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa, Journal of International Relations and Policy, 5(1): 1-10.

 

Morgan, E. 1975. American Slavery, American Freedom. New York: WW Norton & Co.

 

Morgenthau, H. 1949. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred Knopf.

 

Mosquera, C. 2025. US Foreign Aid Was Always About Furthering US Interests. [Online] Available at: https://jacobin.com/2025/01/us-foreign-aid-imperialism-humanitarianism [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

NBS, BOT & TIC, 2024. Tanzania Investment Report 2023: Foreign Private Investment. [Online] Available at: https://www.bot.go.tz/Publications/Other/Tanzania%20Investment/sw/2024112109463635.pdf [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Ogunbambi, R. 1982. The Politics of Multipolar Configuration in Africa: Changes for Today's Society, The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs, 9(1): 85-103.

 

Pay, V. & Gitonga-Mutethia, R. 2021. US-Africa Relations: A Case Study of US-Kenyan Economic Diplomacy, African Studies Quarterly, 20(4).

 

Petric, E. 2013. Foreign Policy: From Conception to Diplomatic Practice. Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff.

 

Rajan, R. & Zingales, L. 2003. The great reversals: The politics of financial development in the twentieth century, Journal of Financial Economics, 69(1).

 

Reinhard, W. 2008. Kleine Geschichte des Kolonialismus. Stuttgart: Kröner.

 

Rodney, W. 1972. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. [Online] Available at: https://arxiujosepserradell.cat/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/How-Europe-Underdeveloped-Africa-by-Recorded-Books-Inc.Rodney-Walter-z-lib.org_.pdf [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Rosenberg, M. 2024. The Berlin Conference to Divide Africa: The Colonization of the Continent by European Powers. [Online] Available at: https://www.thoughtco.com/berlin- conference-1884-1885-divide-africa-1433556 [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Rwashdeh, A. 2008. The Tension of the Social Relations Between the Colonizer and the Colonized Under the Impact of the British Colonialism to India in Forster's A Passage to India, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 4(10).

 

Skurnik, W. 1976. Africa and the Super Powers, Current History, 71(421).

 

Statista. 2024. Corruption Perceptions Index score in Africa in 2024, by country. [Online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/america-remains-self-centered/ [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Taşpınar, Ö. 2010. America Remains Self-Centered. [Online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/america-remains-self-centered/ [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

The Conversation. 2024. US-Africa relations under Biden: a mismatch between talk and action. [Online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/us-africa-relations-under-biden-a-mismatch-between-talk-and-action-242307 [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

USDA. 2023. U.S. Relations with Tanzania: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet. [Online] Available at: https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-tanzania/ [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

USDC. 2020. U.S. Trade with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), January-December 2018. [Online] Available at: https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4780.pdf [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Utin, I. 2018. Political Systems and Underdevelopment in Africa (1957-2010), International Journal of Arts and Humanities (IJAH) Ethiopia, 7(2).

 

Van Wyk, J. 2007. Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons or Profiteers? Occasional Papers, 2(1).

 

Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics. [Online] Available at: https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/486328/mod_resource/content/0/Kenneth%20N.%20Waltz%20Theory%20of%20International%20Politics%20Addison-Wesley%20series%20in%20political%20science%20%20%20%201979.pdf [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Warmington, B. & Brett, M. 2024. From the Arab conquest to 1830 in North Africa. [Online] Available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/North-Africa/From-the-Arab-conquest-to-1830 [accessed: 21 July 2025].

 

Wendt, A. 1999. Social Theory and International Politics. UK: Cambridge University Press.


[1] A polity is ‘a political system or a society considered as a political unit, encompassing the structure of government and its institutions’. A polity is not necessarily a nation-state, and most polities created by colonisers were not nation-states.

[2] Imperialism considers itself to have an absolute moral right and considers it the duty of the nation to exploit other nations. Africa was exploited by a collective European nation that perpetrated imperialism.

[3] Other factors include: demographic imbalance (compelling minorities to learn Kiswahili); historical identity; symbols of national, racial, and cultural identity; immigration and nomadism; social prestige; traditional trade and settlements; and urbanisation.

[4] In 2022, Tanzanian shares of global FDI inflows and Africa FDI inflows were 1% and 2.5% respectively (NBS, BOT % TIC, 2024: 12). Moreover, from 2019 to 2022, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) accounted for 31.9% of FDI inflows. The US was not amongst the top ten (NBS, BOT & TIC, 2024: 26).

[5] The readiness for the US to interact positively and constructively with Tanzania is presumably eroded by a lack of ‘cultural and ideological affinity’.

[6] The US played a crucial role in South Korea's economic transformation, providing comprehensive assistance in embracing grants, loans, technical assistance, investments, and preferential treatment in trade (with the US absorbing most of the country’s exports).

[7] Both GIFs and GOFs aim to establish structures and processes for effective decision-making, accountability, and transparency. GIFs focus on broader societal structures (i.e., LRFs and norms that govern a society or a particular sector); while GOFs focus on specific entities or groups (e.g., government entities, corporate entities, CSOs, etc.).

[8] Due to lack of professional development frameworks (PDFs) capable of producing competent professionals.

[9] Due to lack of institutionalised frameworks for producing competent political stewards.

[10] In an organisational management setting, adhocracy culture describes a model that fosters decentralisation, individual initiative, and organic decision-making. It deviates from a rigid system of authority or procedures, by focusing on consistently adapting methods by giving employees who are closest to the action permission to do their work and solve problems as they see fit.

[11] The GOFs focus on the internal structures and processes within a specific entity.

[12] In 2019, the European Parliament passed a resolution on the fundamental rights of people of African descent. The resolution called for a comprehensive perspective on colonialism and slavery acknowledging their historical and contemporary adverse effects on people of African descent.

However, being largely symbolic, these measures have not translated into practical and effective instruments for addressing the structural legacies attributed to colonialism.

A note on the US: While being able to very quickly come up with the Marshall Plan to reconstruct the European economies after World War II, it has not even acknowledged the historical and contemporary adverse effects of slave trade and imperialism on people of African descent. Therefore, there is no commitment to addressing the structural legacies attributed to colonialism.

[13] Implicitly, in spite of some achievements, there is still widespread corruption because the court system is one of the most corrupt institutions, routinely covering up heinous crimes committed by various branches of the elite.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


ree

This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals.


Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589

Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

 
 
 
bottom of page