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Original transcripts of the presentations made during a meeting held on 19 January 2026 have been summarised with the use of the AI tool and then edited and amended where necessary by the rapporteur for correctness and context.

MARCH 2026

Author: Daryl Swanepoel

CONTENTS

1 The middle power concept in a changing international system

2 Geopolitical ruptures and the erosion of global norms

3 Strategic autonomy and the limits of alignment

4 Reaffirming international law and collective norms

5 Domestic politics and the foreign policy of middle powers

6 Perceptions of middle powers in a multipolar world

7 Institutional reform and the limits of structural change

8 The diplomatic role of middle powers

9 Conclusion

Cover photo: Image generated using OpenAI’s DALL·E image generation model (2026). Concept developed for the Inclusive Society Institute / Global South Perspectives Network publication.

1 THE MIDDLE POWER CONCEPT IN A

CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The dialogue began with what might appear to be a simple question: what exactly do we mean when we speak of “middle powers”? It is a term that has circulated in the literature of international relations for decades. Yet the more one reflects on it, the more elusive the definition becomes.

Middle powers clearly do not possess the capacity of great powers to reshape the international system or to impose outcomes unilaterally. At the same time, though, they are far from insignificant actors, in that many possess extensive diplomatic networks, credible economic weight, often also military capabilities, and a meaningful presence within international institutions. And whereas they might not be the architects of the global order, neither are they mere spectators. They occupy an intermediate position somewhere between the dominant global actors and those states whose influence remains largely regional.

What emerged quite quickly during the exchange was just how diverse this category of states really is. Countries commonly described as middle powers differ widely in geography, population size, economic structure and political influence. Some combine large territories and advanced economies with relatively small populations. Others possess vast populations and strong regional influence, but a more limited global reach. What brings together these countries into the “middle power” category, therefore, is not uniform material capability, but a shared capacity to influence international debates/activities through diplomacy, coalition-building and engagement within multilateral frameworks.

Historically, middle powers have often played a quiet but important role in sustaining the multilateral system. At different moments they have acted as intermediaries between larger powers, helping to facilitate compromise and maintain channels of international cooperation. The geopolitical and geo-economic environment in which they now operate, though, appears to be changing, and changing rapidly.

This leads to what might be described as the central challenge for middle powers in our times. They depend on a system of functioning norms for their independence, peace and prosperity. Yet they rarely possess the power to shape or enforce these norms. In a world where major powers appear increasingly willing to operate outside established norms, middle powers find themselves under growing pressure to protect and help adapt the very system on which they depend.

2 GEOPOLITICAL RUPTURES AND THE

EROSION OF GLOBAL NORMS

As the conversation unfolded, attention gradually shifted to the broader international environment, in which middle powers now find themselves operating. There was a growing concern that the international system may be entering a period of deeper disruption, perhaps not collapse, but certainly a moment of unsettling, radical change. Recent developments were frequently mentioned in this regard, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the escalation of violence in Gaza following the Hamas attack on Israel, and the latest confrontation involving Iran. Each of these crises has intensified geopolitical tensions, but more importantly, they have also exposed deep disagreements about how international law should be interpreted and applied.

What seemed to trouble many participants was not simply the occurence of large-scale conflict. The international system has always been marked by crises of one kind or another. Rather, it was the growing perception that some powerful states appear increasingly willing to reinterpret, or bypass, international norms when it suits their interests, while the rest of the states and multilateral institutions stand idly by.

Even if that may not hold fully true, or may be temporary, the perception matters. When the rules of the system appear negotiable, confidence in the system itself begins to erode. Several participants suggested that the cumulative effect of these developments may be creating what could be described as a kind of normative vacuum in international politics. In other words, if those actors with the greatest power to uphold international law appear less committed to doing so, the credibility of the international legal order inevitably comes under strain.

In such circumstances, the responsibility for defending the principles of multilateral cooperation may increasingly fall on a wider group of states. Middle powers, in particular, have a direct interest in preserving a stable and predictable international environment as, unlike great powers, they rely heavily on rules and institutions to manage global politics. Can they rise to the occasion and proactively defend the norms- and rules-based system that they depend on, even if that means that they may have to face off the greater powers that are breaking the rules?

This tension lay at the heart of much of the discussion that followed.

3 STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND THE

LIMITS OF ALIGNMENT

How do middle powers manage their relationships with larger powers and can they achieve strategic autonomy vis-à-vis those larger powers? Strategic autonomy refers to the ability of a state to pursue its national interests without becoming overly dependent on, or constrained by, more powerful actors. Not a simple thing for sure.

Economic (inter)dependence, security alliances and geographic realities often bind middle powers closely to larger partners, thereby forming relationships that can narrow their room for manoeuvre. They shape trade patterns, security arrangements and, in many cases, the assumptions that quietly guide foreign policy thinking.

One example raised during the exchange illustrated this the above point particularly well. Canada’s economic and security relationship with the United States has historically been exceptionally close. For decades that relationship provided both stability and reassurance. It allowed the country to pursue an active multilateral diplomacy while operating within a relatively predictable strategic environment.

More recently, however, political developments have prompted a reassessment of that environment. Questions have begun to emerge about the reliability of long-standing assumptions. And when such questions arise, governments naturally begin to look for ways to diversify their options. Efforts are therefore underway to broaden economic partnerships and to deepen diplomatic engagement with other regions, including Europe and Asia. The objective is not necessarily to abandon existing relationships, instead it is to reduce dependence on any single partner and create a little more strategic space.

This example fed into a broader reflection about alignment in an increasingly polarised international system. Terms such as non-alignment, selective alignment and active non-alignment surfaced repeatedly during the discussion. The terminology differed, but the underlying instinct was often the same. States need flexibility. They need the freedom to cooperate with different partners on different issues without being drawn too deeply into the rivalries of larger powers. In this sense, the language of non-alignment may simply reflect a pragmatic effort to preserve foreign-policy choice.

Yet the discussion also acknowledged a harder truth. Strategic autonomy cannot simply be declared. It must be built. And many middle powers still find themselves operating within structural constraints that make such autonomy difficult to achieve in practice.

4 REAFFIRMING INTERNATIONAL LAW

AND COLLECTIVE NORMS

At a certain point the discussion returned to a question that sits quietly beneath many debates about international politics: what happens when confidence in the rules of the system begins to erode?

Several participants reflected on the growing perception that respect for international law may be weakening. If the rules governing sovereignty, the use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes are no longer widely observed, the international system begins to look very different. It becomes less predictable. And far more unstable.

Against this backdrop, an interesting idea surfaced during the exchange. Some participants suggested that middle powers might consider taking the initiative in convening a global gathering aimed at reaffirming the foundational principles of the international order.

The historical reference point for such an initiative would be the Bandung Conference of 1955. That meeting brought together newly independent states from Asia and Africa to articulate principles of peaceful coexistence, sovereignty and mutual respect. It later helped shape the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War.

Of course, the circumstances today are very different. The world of the twenty-first century is not the world of decolonisation. Yet the underlying impulse behind Bandung, the collective reaffirmation of international norms, still resonates. A contemporary equivalent would therefore serve a somewhat different purpose. Rather than responding to colonial structures or Cold War divisions, such a gathering could reaffirm the legitimacy of the international legal order at a moment when its authority appears increasingly contested. It could provide an opportunity for states to restate their commitment to the principles embedded in the United Nations Charter and the broader framework of international law. Just as importantly, it could open space for dialogue among countries that still share an interest in preserving a cooperative and rules-based international order.

5 DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE

FOREIGN POLICY OF MIDDLE POWERS

At this point the conversation shifted somewhat inward. Up to now much of the discussion had focused on the external environment in which middle powers operate. But foreign policy, as several participants reminded the group, rarely exists in isolation from domestic politics.

In many cases the international behaviour of middle powers is closely shaped by developments at home, where changes in leadership, electoral pressures and shifting political coalitions can all influence how governments position themselves internationally. Thus, foreign policy priorities may change quite quickly when domestic political circumstances change.

Periods of strong engagement with multilateral institutions can therefore be followed by phases in which governments adopt a more cautious or inward-looking posture. This is not unusual; it is, in fact, often part of the natural cycle of democratic politics.

Domestic pressures can also limit the attention governments are able to devote to international initiatives, as electoral cycles, internal controversies and institutional tensions frequently draw political energy inward. When this happens, diplomatic engagement abroad can become more difficult to sustain.

Brazil was mentioned during the dialogue as a useful illustration of this dynamic: The country has long been recognised as an important advocate of multilateral cooperation and South–South partnerships. Its foreign policy trajectory, though, has also reflected changes in domestic political leadership and internal debates.

Recent efforts to reassert Brazil’s global diplomatic profile illustrate how leadership choices can reshape a country’s international engagement. However, ongoing domestic political debates continue to influence both the tone and the direction of Brazil’s foreign policy, leading to major changes depending on whether a Lula or a Bolsonaro is in power

6 PERCEPTIONS OF MIDDLE POWERS IN

A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

At one stage the dialogue turned to a set of findings that provided a useful empirical lens through which to view many of the issues under discussion. Reference was made to the Körber Emerging Middle Powers Initiative, an international research project supported by the Körber Foundation. The project surveys foreign policy experts across several middle powers, in order to understand how policymakers and analysts interpret the changing dynamics of global governance.

The countries included in the survey, among them Brazil, India, South Africa and Germany, represent very different political and geopolitical contexts. Yet taken together, the findings offer an interesting window into how middle powers themselves understand their evolving position within the international system.

One observation in particular stood out: Across several of the surveyed countries there appears to be a clear preference for maintaining strategic autonomy, rather than aligning too closely with any single major power. Put simply, this means that many experts believe that these countries favour the avoidance of rigid geopolitical blocs and instead prefer pursuing partnerships that remain flexible and that can shift depending on the issue at hand. This instinct is perhaps not surprising, given that middle powers often operate in environments where rigid alignments carry real risks. Flexibility allows them to cooperate with different actors while preserving room for manoeuvre.

At the same time, the survey revealed some interesting differences in perception between parts of the Global North and the Global South. Respondents in Northern countries tended to view the global role of the United States more positively. In parts of the Global South, however, attitudes were noticeably more sceptical. The reverse was true regarding China’s role in international affairs.

These differences are important in that they remind us that the category of “middle powers” does not describe a unified geopolitical bloc. Rather, it encompasses a diverse group of states shaped by very different historical experiences, strategic environments and foreign policy priorities.

The survey also revealed a noticeable degree of pessimism regarding the prospects for global institutional reform. Support for multilateralism remains widespread among experts in the surveyed countries. Confidence that major institutions, such as the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, will undergo meaningful reform in the near future, however, appears to be far more limited.

Taken together, these findings point to both the possibilities and the constraints facing middle powers in an increasingly complex, unpredictable and evolving international order.

7 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE

LIMITS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE

The conversation then turned more directly to the question of institutional reform and in particular, participants reflected on the possibility of convening a review conference under Article 109 of the United Nations Charter.

In theory, such a conference could examine the functioning of the UN and propose amendments to the Charter. In practice, however, any amendments would ultimately require ratification by the permanent members of the Security Council, thus giving those states critical influence – in effect a veto - over the outcome of the process.

This reality raises difficult questions about the practicality of pursuing major structural reforms through existing institutional mechanisms of the United Nations. Several participants in fact noted that opening the Charter to revision could even weaken certain protections, if the process were to be dominated by the interests of powerful states. For that reason, the discussion returned repeatedly to the need for caution when considering initiatives aimed at institutional redesign.

8 THE DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF MIDDLE

POWERS

As the conversation moved toward its concluding stages, attention returned to a practical question: how exactly might middle powers exercise influence in an international system that is becoming increasingly fragmented?

There was broad agreement amongst the participants that middle powers still possess the ability to shape international debates, and that the challenge lies less in the existence of that potential and more in how it is exercised.

One idea that surfaced during the discussion was the possibility of closer coordination among middle powers, but this suggestion quickly prompted an important caution, when several participants warned against the temptation to organise middle powers into a formal bloc or alliance structure.

At first glance, such an arrangement might appear attractive. By acting collectively, middle powers could achieve greater leverage in international negotiations. The risk, though, is that a new grouping of middle powers might simply reproduce the same bloc politics that already complicate cooperation within the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. Put plainly, the formation of a middle-powers bloc could deepen the fragmentation it seeks to overcome and so instead, a more subtle approach to diplomacy was needed. Middle powers may need to rely less on formal alliances and more on flexible and pragmatic forms of cooperation.

Issue-based coalitions are one example of pragmatic middle power cooperation, and could help advance issues like climate action or pandemic response. Coordinated diplomatic initiatives within existing multilateral institutions are another example. In some cases, the most important role may simply be convening dialogue among states whose geopolitical positions differ. Historically, middle powers have often played precisely this kind of intermediary role, because whilst they are not themselves dominant powers, they are frequently able to maintain relationships with multiple actors at the same time. They can thus act as bridge-builders between competing geopolitical camps and facilitate conversations that might otherwise prove difficult. This form of influence is not always visible. It does not resemble traditional power politics, but it can be surprisingly important.

Middle powers may prove most effective not when they attempt to compete directly with great powers, but when they help sustain dialogue, reaffirm shared norms and build consensus around practical responses to global challenges; because their influence often operates quietly and sometimes almost invisibly. Seen from this perspective, the strength of middle powers lies less in formal institutional authority and more in what might be described as diplomatic entrepreneurship. Acting as conveners, mediators and agenda-setters, they can help set the tone and direction of international debates, even in periods of heightened geopolitical rivalry.

9 CONCLUSION

What the dialogue ultimately revealed was a picture of middle powers navigating a world that is becoming increasingly uncertain and an international system that is clearly undergoing a period of transformation. Geopolitical rivalry is intensifying, confidence in established institutions is weakening, and rules that once appeared relatively settled are now being questioned more openly.

Middle powers do not stand outside these developments, instead they are deeply affected by them. Domestic political pressures, economic dependencies and differing regional priorities all shape the extent to which these states are able to act collectively on the global stage. In practice, their room for manoeuvre is often narrower than the rhetoric of diplomacy might suggest.

But the discussion also produced a quieter, but important observation, namely that  middle powers should not be underestimated. Their influence rarely lies in the ability to impose outcomes or reshape the balance of power. Rather, it often lies in something less dramatic, but no less valuable: sustaining dialogue, reaffirming international norms and keeping open the channels of cooperation that allow the international system to function.

In this sense, the role of middle powers may be less about power in the traditional sense and more about the stewardship of the UN’s values and the rules-based order. They might not be able to determine the future of the global order on their own, but they can certainly help preserve the principles and institutions that make international cooperation possible.

In a period of geopolitical turbulence, that may prove to be a contribution of considerable significance.

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This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network

Global South Perspectives Network (GSPN) is an international coalition founded in 2022 by HumanizaCom, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). It brings together think tanks and experts from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East to amplify Global South voices in global governance debates.

GSPN works to strengthen Southern representation in decision-making, focusing on United Nations reform and multilateralism. Through research, dialogue, and advocacy, it promotes equitable partnerships between the Global South and North.

Key initiatives include the 2023 report Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform, presented at a UN workshop in New York, and events such as the 2024 UN Civil Society workshop in Nairobi.

GSPN’s mission is to ensure Global South nations are equal partners in shaping global policy, fostering a fair, inclusive, and sustainable international order.

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