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D I S C L A I M E R

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MAY 2026

by Lerato Tsebe

BA (Political Studies, International Relations & Sociology), BA Hons (Political Studies), University of the Witwatersrand

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the European Union’s (EU) Global Gateway initiative and its implications for Africa’s development, with a particular focus on South Africa. Launched in 2021, the initiative seeks to mobilise substantial investment in key sectors such as clean energy, digital infrastructure, transport, health, and education, positioning Africa as a central partner in a shifting global economic landscape.  It also reflects the EU’s strategic response to increasing competition from global actors, including China and the United States, for influence on the continent.

While the Global Gateway is framed as a modern and sustainable development strategy, this paper questions whether it represents a meaningful departure from historically unequal EU-Africa relations. Concerns persist regarding the accessibility of financing, the rigidity of funding conditions, and the risk that European strategic interests may take precedence over African development priorities.  The initiative’s reliance on private capital and loan-based financing models further raises questions about debt sustainability and the ability to achieve inclusive growth.

South Africa serves as a critical case study due to its status as the EU’s largest trading partner in Africa and a major recipient of Global Gateway funding. Recent investments aimed at supporting renewable energy, infrastructure, and skills development highlight opportunities for advancing green industrialisation and a just energy transition.  However, these opportunities will only be realised if investments align closely with national priorities and contribute to long-term structural transformation.

The paper identifies key challenges, including limited African participation in decision-making, insufficient focus on local capacity-building, and the potential for externally driven projects to reinforce dependency.  To address these issues, it recommends strengthening joint governance, increasing concessional financing, enhancing transparency, and prioritising local value addition.

Ultimately, the paper argues that the success of the Global Gateway will depend on its ability to move beyond traditional donor-recipient dynamics and foster a genuinely equal partnership grounded in mutual benefit, shared responsibility, and sustainable development outcomes.

1. INTRODUCTION

As the global multilateral order continues to evolve, smaller Global South and Western countries are participating more in the world arena, with Africa being seen as the next big destination for foreign investment – it is set to become a global economic powerhouse. Much of the African continent is youthful and resource-rich, making it attractive to foreign countries with an appetite for economic partnerships. This is especially true in the continent’s renewable and fossil fuels energy sector. Africa is undoubtedly one of the world's energy-rich regions – an appealing prospect for those countries eyeing dominance in the energy space. Within a global arena that is politically charged, economically consequential and fraught with division, the African continent remains at the epicentre of global attention.

Russia, China, India and the European Union (EU) are all potential partners for mineral-rich Africa, each having signed agreements with the continent to enhance their mineral and/or economic wealth. However, Europe has maintained a mainstay economic partnership with Africa, one that continues to evolve. The EU remains Africa’s largest trading partner and has recently consolidated its economic prospects on the continent with its novel Global Gateway initiative – a geoeconomic instrument that primarily consolidates the strategic economic areas in which the EU seeks to partner with Africa.

The Global Gateway, launched in 2021, is the EU’s strategic investment framework for the clean energy, digital, transport, health and education sectors, aiming to address the continent’s geopolitical challenges. Questions remain, however, about how the Global Gateway will contend with a China dominant across Africa, a financially rich United States, an aggressive yet inexperienced Middle East, and curious Global South partners such as Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil and Singapore.

This paper will examine how the EU’s Global Gateway will compete with so many competitors in Africa and how it can anchor its position as a partner for the African continent. The paper will specifically look at South Africa, the EU’s largest trading partner in Africa, and examine the primary policy and governance priorities that can be addressed to strengthen overall EU-Africa relations and advance mutually beneficial outcomes.

2. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S GLOBAL GATEWAY:

NOVEL POLICY FRAMEWORK OR OLD WINE IN A

NEW BOTTLE?

In 2021, at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU launched the Global Gateway Framework. It is widely regarded as its counterstrategy to an encroaching China in Africa, traditionally perceived by the EU as its ‘economic landscape’ in perpetuity. Tied to the African continent for centuries, much of the relationship was initiated during the 300-year-long colonial project, which has left deep scars, particularly from European economic imperialism. Over the years, the Euro-African relationship has taken many forms. Most recently, it has struggled to become a fair and equal political and economic partnership. The geopolitical landscape on which this relationship seeks to establish itself is being shaped by new bi-continental initiatives, largely driven by the European Union, as it aims to position itself as the leading partner for Africa’s political, economic and green energy ambitions.

The Global Gateway is “a new European strategy to boost smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors, while also strengthening health, education and research systems across the world ... the Global Gateway is the EU’s contribution to narrowing the global investment gap … the Global Gateway is also fully aligned with the

UN’s Agenda 2030 and its Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the Paris Agreement” (European Commission, N.d.). It is envisioned that a total of €300 billion will be disbursed into Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean by 2027, with Sub-Saharan Africa receiving the lion's share of €150 billion through the Africa-Europe Investment package. This was the EU’s foundational initiative to strengthen ties with the African Continent. The EU announced its initial investment at the 2022 EU-AU Summit in Brussels, Belgium.

The Global Gateway is structured around five pillars of partnership: digital connectivity, climate and energy, transport, health, and education and research (European Commission, 2021). The 2021 Africa-Europe Investment Package, worth €150 billion, focuses on the renewable energy transition, transport corridors, digitalisation, and sustainable agriculture (European Commission, 2022). These projects, announced for implementation across the continent, place a strong emphasis on expanding and strengthening Africa’s renewable energy sector. For the Global Gateway, as of 2023, “ninety key projects were launched worldwide across the digital, energy and transport sectors, while also advancing health, education and research systems globally” (European Commission, N.d.).

For the EU, Africa is front of mind and formed the first phase of implementation under the Global Gateway initiative. Given the tense geopolitical climate, and the African continent’s rich mineral wealth, large youth population and massive natural energy endowments, Africa is a highly attractive partner for Western Europe, which lacks many of these key attributes. Taken together, these factors provide strong motivation for Africa to be on the receiving end of the first disbursement of the €300 billion Global Gateway investment initiative.

A key feature of the Global Gateway has been the inclusion of the EU’s private sector, European financial institutions and development agencies – collectively referred to as ‘Team Europe’. “This 'Team Europe approach' means joining forces so that our joint external action becomes more than the sum of its parts. By working together and pooling our resources and expertise, we deliver more effectiveness and greater impact. Team Europe consists of the European Union, EU Member States – including their implementing agencies and public development banks – as well as the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)” (European Commission, 2025). Other European regional development banks, such as Germany’s KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), the world's largest development bank, are also a part of this broad coalition of development finance institutions that make up this multi-pronged Team Europe. Well-financed and resource-rich, the members of Team Europe and their respective contributions represent longstanding instruments of Europe’s engagement with Africa, suggesting that their role is more conventional than innovative.

Additionally, for Africa and other members of the Global South, the real challenges that remain are the detailed technical terms and conditions governing access to Team Europe’s financing and resources. A longstanding point of political contention between the two continents has been the rigid terms and conditions – another defining feature of EU-Africa relations – which call for further evolution. From the perspective of African economists, academics and analysts, there has been criticism of the enduring relationship between Africa and Europe, particularly regarding new economic development initiatives structured around rigid governance frameworks.

For African academics, the Global Gateway and these contentious terms and conditions, “access to finance, the perceived risks of investing on the continent not only results in a higher cost of borrowing from international markets (which can be up to five times more than other regions) but contributes to high debt burdens. Making more concessional capital available is fundamental, and this puts development banks at the centre of scaling affordable climate finance (unfortunately, development banks are also increasingly lending at market rates)” (esi-africa.com).

In 2025, the relationship between the European Commission and the World Bank Group broadened, with the World Bank identifying 18 high-impact investments across energy, transport, and digital infrastructure in Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America, designed to move projects from pipeline to financing and, ultimately, to jobs and tangible results (World Bank, 2025). This is essentially the same formula that the Global Gateway adopts. The EU-World Bank relationship has in no way quelled African anxieties, as most African Union (AU) member states have long had a tenuous relationship with the World Bank – seen as a prototype of a financial institution that African countries feel is impenetrable and averse to African-led reforms that would make it more relevant to their realities.

Although in its nascent stage, the Global Gateway faces challenges, as critical analysis reveals several structural concerns. Firstly, while the EU emphasises investment in hard infrastructure, there has been insufficient investment in strengthening governance frameworks and fostering local digital innovation (Lunardini et al, 2025). Secondly, the initiative’s geopolitical motivations – particularly competition with China – risk instrumentalising African development for European strategic interests rather than genuinely prioritising African-defined needs (Hackenesch & Bergmann, 2021).

Thirdly, the mobilisation of private capital, central to Global Gateway’s financing model, raises questions about profit-driven priorities that may conflict with development imperatives and social equity. To support this third point, at the EU-AU summit in Luanda, it was noted that “debt relief and reform of the international financial architecture were also highlighted, with calls for more transparent restructuring mechanisms and reduced borrowing costs for African states” (APA News, 2015).

Thus, although the Global Gateway was a response to the number of participants encroaching on the African economic arena and to the need to continue extending the lifeline of the EU-AU partnership, the perception that the Global Gateway is merely ‘old wine in new bottles’ is reinforced by its inability to address the structural issues of adopting terms and conditions and language that speak to the realities of African countries, and by the incongruencies that the continent faces in the international community.

3. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

South Africa is the EU’s largest trading partner in Africa. Equipped with sophisticated transport infrastructure, an advanced financial architecture, and a tech-savvy population, and considered Africa’s most democratically advanced state, South Africa is an appealing partner for the EU. The country has thus far received the largest disbursement of funds from the Global Gateway coffers. In October 2025, following the March 8th EU-South Africa summit, the country received an additional €12 billion in funds. South Africa initially received €4.7 billion in March from the EU. The funds were intended to help Africa’s most advanced country to focus “on the just energy transition, sustainable infrastructure, digital connectivity and pharmaceutical value chains in South Africa. The objective is to drive inclusive growth and shared prosperity” (Bulbulia, 2025).

The second disbursement of funds to South Africa signalled an extension of the EU’s renewable market initiatives in the country and the opportunity to use South Africa’s experience as a prototype to be emulated across Africa. For South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa, the financial endorsement aligned with the country’s development aspirations, “welcome the special focus on skills, small business development, and research and development. This is vital for the development of South Africa’s people, our most valuable resource” (Bulbulia, 2025).

Ramaphosa’s remarks are attributed to the fact that skills development and increasing employment opportunities for its people are central to the South African Renewable Energy Masterplan (SAREM) of 2025.

The plan is anchored on four priorities:

1. Supporting the local demand for renewable energy and storage by unlocking market demand and system readiness, as a large-scale rollout of renewable energy systems is a critical precondition to achieving the core objectives of SAREM.

2. Driving industrial development by building renewable energy and storage value chains, through localisation drives on both the public and private sector markets and supportive trade and industrial policy. 

3. Fostering the inclusive development of renewable energy and battery storage value chains, by driving the transformation of the industry, supporting the development of emerging suppliers, and contributing to a just transition. 

4. Building local capabilities in terms of skills and technological innovation to enable the rollout of renewable energy and storage technologies and associated industrial development” (South African Government, 2025).

Like the rest of Africa, South Africa is grappling with an unemployment crisis, with more than 30% of its population, mostly young people, unemployed. Thus, the President's acknowledgement of the funds allocated to skills development, which can help to alleviate the pressures of the unemployment crisis, is relevant.

South Africa occupies a unique position within the EU-Africa partnership framework. As Africa’s most industrialised economy, a member of the BRICS grouping, and a continental leader in renewable energy development, South Africa is both a critical partner and a bellwether for the success of EU engagement strategies (Alden & Schoeman, 2015).

The EU will undoubtedly use its partnership with South Africa as a template for how it will roll out and structure its Global Gateway framework across the African continent. The EU-South Africa “partnership also sends a message of geopolitical alignment, reinforcing the EU’s role as a development and investment partner of choice amid growing global competition for influence in Africa” (Chilamphuma, 2025). This competition for the African continent emanates from different directions – from BRICS and China’s Belt and Road Initiative to the United States of America. The competition for Africa’s future economic prospects is being played out by a variety of determined global actors.

Thus, the EU’s relationship with Africa is being challenged to shift from being asymmetrical (with issues pertaining to finance and trade in the EU’s favour) to being mutually reciprocal. “With Global Gateway, the EU entered the race for global infrastructure financing with China by building up its own sphere of influence to foster economic relationships through catapulting trade and investment as geostrategic ‘key EU foreign policy tools’ (European Union External Action, 2022: 253) ... EU member states decided to establish Global Gateway as a new geopolitical instrument” (Heldt, 2023).

The engineering of this new foreign policy instrument is “a combination of external and internal factors—the rise of China as a geopolitical power, the shift to private investment to finance development projects, and the transformational leadership of the European Commission— [that] contributed to the adoption of Global Gateway as a new European geopolitical strategy” (Heldt, 2023).

For the EU and countries like South Africa, mutual reciprocity needs to manifest specifically in arenas where Africa has traditionally been on the back foot, such as trade agreements, financing mechanisms, and debt and loan financing terms and conditions. The latter issues have been ongoing areas of contention for the EU-Africa relationship. Thus, “as the partnership unfolds, both Brussels and Pretoria appear determined to show that development cooperation can evolve beyond rhetoric - into real, transformative impact” (Chilamphuma, 2025).

4. THE EU-AFRICA RELATIONSHIP: PERPETUAL

INCONGRUENCY?

Aside from being tasked with evolving, there is also a concern that the EU’s Global Gateway will become the preferred model of development in the African renewable market and that it will serve as a dictation rather than a dialogue, with targeted milestones that could lead to a mutually beneficial partnership between the EU and Africa.

In its initial design phase, the EU should have institutionalised African participation across all stages of project identification, design, implementation, and evaluation. The current model, in which European institutions largely determine priorities before presenting them to African partners, perpetuates asymmetry (Carbone, 2013).

Global Gateway investments should align with and complement African-led frameworks, particularly the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) (African Union, 2015). For South Africa specifically, alignment with the National Development Plan 2030 is essential to ensure investments address nationally defined priorities rather than externally imposed agendas (National Planning Commission, 2012). Had the EU pursued this initial line of thought, it would have given the framework far greater efficacy and enhanced its offering in an arena dominated by China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which invested $39 billion in Africa in 2025 alone.

Although South Africa is the recipient of a substantial financial investment, the relationship between the EU and its largest African economic partner, South Africa, faces challenges. “South Africa’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, reflected in its non-aligned stance on various international issues and deepening ties with China and Russia, complicates EU expectations of alignment on geopolitical matters” (Sidiropoulos, 2021). As in any relationship, there are differences in the way an issue may be addressed. The way the issue is viewed and/or resolved will always be seen through the lens of what is in the best interest of a State. However, differences of opinion on issues such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the current configuration of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in no way constitute an immovable obstacle to their relationship.

Progress requires compromise, and continuing the current relationship dynamic between the EU and Africa will stall development. It will stall political and economic development for both sides. Compromise is necessary to ensure long-term strategic alignment and enable African partners to exercise meaningful oversight and course-correction authority (Lunardini et al, 2025).

Even under the current framing of the Global Gateway principles and values, “guiding the investments, democratic values and high standards, good governance and transparency, equal partnerships, green and clean, security focused, catalysing the private sector” (European Commission, 2025), these should have been part of a dialogue the EU had with its African counterparts at the engineering phase of the Global Gateway, rather than merely consolidated points of instruction packaged as a new investment package.

The Global Gateway project has to move beyond rhetoric to deliver a tangible, transformative impact that is mutually beneficial for Europe and Africa. This evolution is driven by a fast-changing geopolitical climate, where the Global South, Africa in particular, is playing a far more prominent role in global affairs.

5. LOCAL TECHNOLOGY AND LOCAL VALUE

ADDITION

A critical policy priority is to ensure that infrastructure investments catalyse technology transfer, skills development, and local value addition rather than merely creating dependencies on European technology and expertise. Historical development cooperation has often resulted in turnkey projects that leave little local capacity (Moyo, 2009). Global Gateway must differentiate itself through explicit technology transfer provisions, local content requirements, and investment in technical and vocational education and training (TVET) systems.

In South Africa, this is particularly relevant to the renewable energy and digital infrastructure sectors. The country’s renewable energy independent power producer procurement programme demonstrates how local content requirements can stimulate domestic manufacturing and job creation (Eberhard et al., 2014). Global Gateway projects should incorporate similar provisions to ensure that solar panel manufacturing, wind turbine component production, and digital infrastructure equipment are progressively localised.

Moreover, investment in research and development partnerships between European and African institutions can foster innovation ecosystems that generate locally appropriate solutions rather than merely transferring European technologies (Chataway et al., 2007). South Africa’s established research infrastructure provides a foundation for these partnerships.

6. SUSTAINABLE FINANCING MODELS AND DEBT

SUSTAINABILITY

The financing architecture of Global Gateway must prioritise grant financing and concessional loans over commercial lending, which exacerbates debt burdens. African countries collectively face debt distress, with debt-to-GDP ratios rising significantly, thereby constraining fiscal space for development investments (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2022). Whilst the EU emphasises leveraging private capital, this must not result in unsustainable debt accumulation or profit extraction that undermines development objectives.

Questions remain about whether the EU can afford to finance the Global Gateway project at €330 billion, whilst China’s Belt and Road Initiative intends to spend $1.1 trillion, more than triple the envisioned amount for the Global Gateway initiative. “The European Court of Auditors has already questioned whether the EU can mobilize the claimed sums. In other words, Europe claims to support global development without actually committing any new or meaningful financial resources for much-needed infrastructure investments in low-income countries” (Gerasimcikova & Okumu, 2025). In addition, “the so-called billions are to be conjured up through the old toolbox of loans from multilateral development banks and EU member states. Projects from these loans are now rebranded as the Global Gateway” (Gerasimcikova & Okumu, 2025). If the EU wants to compete with other contenders for Africa’s economic partnership, it needs to scrutinise itself internally before it can offer a framework to a debt-ridden continent like Africa.

There is scope for compromise here; innovative financing mechanisms, such as debt-for-climate swaps from African countries, could help redirect debt servicing towards renewable energy investments, aligning with Global Gateway priorities. Transparency in financing terms and conditions is essential.

Global Gateway projects should publicly disclose their interest rates, repayment terms, collateral requirements, and expected returns to private investors, enabling both the lender and recipient countries to scrutinise the offer in their national Parliaments.

7. CLIMATE JUSTICE AND JUST TRANSITION

Global Gateway’s climate and energy pillar must be grounded in climate justice principles that recognise historical responsibility for emissions and differentiated capacities for climate action. For South Africa, which remains heavily dependent on coal-fired electricity generation, a just transition requires substantial investment in renewable energy infrastructure, grid modernisation, and social protection for workers and communities dependent on fossil fuels (Swilling et al, 2016). The EU’s Just Energy Transition Partnership with South Africa, announced in 2021 with an initial commitment of $8.5 billion, provides a model for Global Gateway engagement – but implementation must ensure that financing is genuinely additional, grant-based rather than loan-heavy, and accompanied by technology transfer (Presidential Climate Commission, 2022).

Furthermore, Global Gateway investments in renewable energy must prioritise energy access and affordability for African populations rather than merely facilitating green hydrogen exports to Europe. South Africa’s energy generation challenges, with millions lacking reliable access to electricity, demand that renewable energy investments serve domestic needs first.

8. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY

For South Africa, Global Gateway’s commitment to sustainability must be operationalised through rigorous environmental and social safeguards. Where mining and infrastructure projects have historically caused environmental degradation and social displacement, particularly affecting marginalised communities, safeguards must be robust and enforced (Cock, 2007). Global Gateway transport corridor investments, for instance, must avoid biodiversity-rich areas, incorporate wildlife corridors, and ensure that land acquisition processes respect community land rights and provide fair compensation. For a country with deeply entrenched racial economic discrepancies, such as South Africa, this is imperative, as there are few other economic avenues for most poor communities to pursue to offset what they will lose.

Gender-responsive approaches must also be mainstreamed across all Global Gateway interventions, ensuring that women participate in decision-making, benefit equitably from employment opportunities, and are protected from risks associated with large infrastructure projects (African Development Bank, 2021). For South Africa, gender and youth interventions are envisioned in the Renewable Energy Masterplan, where “a Transformation Fund, aimed at providing capital, but also support guarantees and warrantees (and possibly other support required by beneficiaries, such as skills development), for emerging suppliers into the sector will be established. It will aim to catalyse existing (and additional) funding streams in the sector” (South African Government, 2025).

9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL

OUTCOMES

Proposed recommendations to strengthen EU-Africa relations through Global Gateway in a manner that advances mutually beneficial outcomes, particularly for South Africa:

1. Establish a Joint EU-AU Global Gateway Governance Council with equal representation and decision-making authority, responsible for strategic direction, priority-setting, and oversight. This is to ensure that the Global Gateway framework remains impartial and meets the needs of both Africa and the EU alike. 

2. Reconsider the structure of debt, loans and grants being disbursed to Africa. A more substantive conversation between Europe and Africa needs to take place here. There is room for finance innovation and agility, well outside of the rigid conventional framework. Loosened terms and conditions for Africa could lend the EU a more competitive edge over its peers. 

3. Commit a portion of Global Gateway Africa financing as only grants or highly concessional loans to ensure debt sustainability.

4. Mandate local content requirements of 40- 60% and skills development programmes across all Global Gateway infrastructure projects. This will align with local legislation and alleviate the pressure most African countries face, driven by high unemployment rates.

5. Establish independent grievance mechanisms accessible to project-affected communities, led by local communities that interface most with them, especially women.

6. Invest in strengthening African institutions for infrastructure governance, including regulatory agencies and parliamentary oversight capacities, to ensure sustainable management beyond project completion.

7. CONCLUSION

The European Union’s Global Gateway African framework offers a significant opportunity to transform EU-Africa relations and address Africa’s infrastructure deficit in ways that support sustainable development and mutual prosperity. However, realising this potential requires confronting historical asymmetries, ensuring genuine African ownership, and prioritising development effectiveness over geopolitical competition. For South Africa specifically, Global Gateway can support the renewable energy transition, digital infrastructure development, and regional integration – but only if investments align with nationally defined priorities and contribute to structural economic transformation rather than merely facilitating European access to critical minerals and markets.

The policy and governance priorities identified in this essay provide a framework for strengthening EU-Africa relations in ways that advance mutually beneficial outcomes. Implementing these priorities requires political will from both European and African leaders, sustained engagement with civil society, and a commitment to partnership based on equality, mutual respect, and shared prosperity rather than donor-recipient dynamics.

The coming years will reveal whether the EU can transcend historical patterns and forge a genuinely transformative partnership with Africa – or whether Global Gateway will become another iteration of asymmetrical engagement that privileges European interests whilst constraining African possibilities.

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This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals.

Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za

Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589

Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za