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  • Black Professionals Institute Lecture and Panel Discussion

    The Black Professionals Institute (BPI) held its annual lecture and panel discussion on Tuesday evening, 4 February 2025.   The annual lecture was delivered by Prof. Pali Lehohla (former Statistician General, who spoke on the topic “Whither a democratic dividend or demographic disaster: What is to be done?”   The lecture was followed by a panel discussion moderated by Mr Mike Siluma (Deputy Editor Sunday Times). The panellists were Dr Theuns Eloff (Academic and Director of Companies), Mr Daryl Swanepoel (CEO, Inclusive Society Instiute), Dr Kefiloe Matsineng (National Planning Commission and Dr Nthabiseng Moleko (University of Stellenbosch).   Mr Swanepoel core message was that the current  GDP growth was insufficient to accommodate sufficient job growth to deal with the employment backlogs and population growth. No amount of social engineering without concomitant economic growth will alleviate the inequality or deal with the jobs backlog. A all-of-society focus should be on economic growth ‘uber alles’.

  • Inclusive Society Institute releases the 2024 South African Social Cohesion Index

    The ISI released the 2024 South African Social Cohesion Index at a function co-hosted by Telkom and themselves at Villa Calatrava in Cape Town on 5 February 2025. SASCI, a multiyear trends analysis of social cohesion in South Africa was developed on cooperation with Constructor University in Bremen, Germany.   The report was officially handed over to Government at the event. In attendance was, amongst others, the Deputy President of the Republic, HE Paul Mashatile and Ministers Hon. Maropene Ramokgopa MP (Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation) and Hon. Gayton McKenzie MP (Sports, Arts and Culture).   The programme included speeches by the aforementioned dignitaries, the CEO of Telkom and the Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute. It was followed by a panel discussion with panellists Commissioner Dr Pulane Molokwane (National Planning Commission), Mari Harris (director of IPSOS and ISI Polling Consultant), Daryl Swanepoel (ISI CEO) and Dr Georgi Dragolov (constructor University).   REPORT: Click on picture for the report PRESENTATION: Click on picture for the presentation

  • The South Africa Social Cohesion Index: Measuring the well-being of a society - 2024 UPDATE

    This report has been enabled through the generous support of Telkom Copyright © 2025   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   February 2025   Author: Georgi Dragolov and Klaus Boehnke Constructor University, Bremen, Germany Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Table of Contents   Table of Content List of Tables List of Figures Executive Summary 1.   Introduction 2.   Measuring social cohesion 2.1 Data 2.2 Analytical approach 3.   Level and trend of social cohesion 3.1 Social cohesion in South Africa 3.2 Social cohesion in the nine provinces 4.   Structural influences on social cohesion 4.1 Data and method 4.2 Results 5.   Individual experiences of social cohesion 5.1 Data and method 5.2 Four classes of experience 5.3 Socio-demographics of the four classes 6.   Social cohesion and subjective well-being 6.1 Provinces 6.2 Individuals 7.   Discussion and conclusion References               Appendices Appendix A: Indicators of cohesion across time Appendix B: Dimensions of cohesion in the provinces over time Appendix C: Correlations of social cohesion on the province level Appendix D: Latent class analyses               Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:1440750455    List of Tables   Table 2.1 Sample sizes of Khayabus – Waves 1 Table 2.2 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 1, “Social relations” Table 2.3 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 2 “Connectedness” Table 2.4 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 3 “Focus on the common good” Table 3.1 Social cohesion and its dimensions in South Africa across time Table 3.2 The overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time Table 4.1 Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table 5.1 Social cohesion and its dimensions in the four classes  Table 5.2 Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents  Table 6.1 Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces  Table 6.2 Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents   Table A.1 Indicators of Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” across time  Table A.2 Indicators of Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” across time      Table A.3 Indicators of Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” across time    Table A.4 Indicators of Dimension 2.1 “Identification” across time    Table A.5 Indicators of Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” across time    Table A.6 Indicators of Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” across time      Table A.7 Indicators of Dimension 3.2 “Solidarity and helpfulness” across time  Table A.8 Indicators of Dimensions 3.2 “Respect for social rules” across time    Table A.9 Indicators of Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation” across time  Table A.10 Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” in the provinces across time  Table A.11 Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” in the provinces across time  Table A.12 Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” in the provinces across time   Table A.13 Dimension 2.1 “Identification” in the provinces across time  Table A.14 Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” in the provinces across time  Table A.15 Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” in the provinces across time    Table A.16 Dimension 3.1 “Solidarity and helpfulness” in the provinces across time   Table A.17 Dimension 3.2 “Respect for social rules” in the provinces across time    Table A.18 Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation“ in the provinces across time  Table A.19 Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table A.20 Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Table A.21 Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions Table A.22 Relative class sizes for LCA solutions List of Figures   Figure 1.1 Constitutive elements of social cohesion (Leininger et al., 2021) Figure 1.2 Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar Figure 2.1 Provinces of South Africa Figure 3.1 Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces (2023)  Figure 3.2 Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time Figure 5.1 Average scores of dimensions in the four classes  Executive Summary   This study provides a comprehensive assessment of social cohesion in South Africa. It is an updated edition of the study published in November 2024, which focused on the development of social cohesion from 2021 to 2023, extending the period of observation to 2024.   Following the measurement concept developed by the authors and their colleagues for the Social Cohesion Radar of Bertelsmann Stiftung, the study assesses social cohesion in three domains: Social relations, Connectedness, and Focus on the common good. Each of these domains encompasses three dimensions of cohesion, namely: the intactness of Social networks, general Trust in people, and Acceptance of diversity within the domain Social relations; Identification with one’s place of residence, Trust in institutions, and Perception of fairness within the domain Connectedness; and Solidarity and helpfulness, Respect for social rules, and Civic participation within the domain Focus on the common good.   The study uses data from Waves 1 of the Khayabus Survey, a population-representative cross-sectional survey conducted annually by Ipsos South Africa. The Bertelsmann concept of defining a country’s level of social cohesion allows scores between 0 (no cohesion) and 100 (maximal cohesion). Which score can be regarded as sufficiently high is a normative, not to say political decision. It has become customary to designate scores below 20 as very low, from 20 to below 40 as low, from 40 to below 60 as moderate, from 60 to below 80 as high, and from 80 to 100 as very high. A very high level of social cohesion has not been reported for any country or other geopolitical entity yet.   In 2024, the overall level of social cohesion in South Africa as a whole was found moderate at 53.3 points. It went through a steady, though slow, decline from 53.5 points in 2021 to 51.7 points in 2023. By 2023, the downward trend in South Africa’s overall level of social cohesion has halted and reversed in an upward direction. The previously accrued decline has been almost overcome by 2024.   In 2024, the highest scores for a single dimension were found for Identification (72.2), followed by Solidarity and helpfulness (61.3), and Social networks (59.9). These dimensions constitute the glue that holds the South African society together. The lowest scores were found for Respect for social rules (36.6) and Perception of fairness (42.7). Although all nine dimensions improved from 2023 to 2024, only three have achieved an overall increase from 2021 to 2024: Trust in people (+2.0), Solidarity and helpfulness (+2.2), and Civic participation (+3.6). All other dimensions have registered an overall decline in the range from -0.2 for Acceptance of diversity to -3.8 for Respect for social rules.   As for the South African provinces, all exhibit moderate levels of social cohesion in 2024. In a comparison, cohesion was found lowest in KwaZulu-Natal (49.6), second lowest in North West (52.0), and third lowest in Free State (52.1). Cohesion was found highest in Limpopo (56.5). Over the period from 2021 to 2024, cohesion has improved only in North West (+1.2) and Eastern Cape (+2.6). All other provinces have registered an overall decline in the range from -0.1 for Gauteng to -4.2 for Northern Cape.   Correlational analyses on the provinces’ overall level of social cohesion and their structural characteristics offer insights on how to strengthen social cohesion: by enabling inclusive (people-centered) economic progress, reducing unemployment, lowering income inequality, providing adequate jobs for the highly qualified, promoting a family-oriented life-style, and bringing the living conditions in rural and urban areas to an equally adequate level.   The study, further, presents results from Latent Class Analysis (LCA), a grouping procedure that isolates distinct subgroups of South Africans who experience different strengths and deficits in social cohesion in their immediate life context. The preferred LCA solution identifies four classes of South Africans: Class 1 (Critics), which is characterized by high Identification but critically low Acceptance of diversity, a critically low perception of Respect for social rules, and low to moderate scores on the other dimensions; Class 2 (Integrated Sceptics), which is characterized by well-knit Social networks, high levels of Trust in people, Acceptance of diversity, Solidarity, and Civic participation, but low scores on the remaining dimensions; Class 3 (Middle South Africa), which is characterized by a high level of Identification with the country but moderate scores on all other dimensions; and Class 4 (Cohesive Communities), which is an ideal-typical model of strong cohesion in South Africa manifesting itself in exceptionally high Identification and high scores on all other dimensions. A series of chi-square tests of independence suggest that these four classes differ along core socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The insights can help identify social groups at risk of experiencing low social cohesion.   Ultimately, the report examines the relationship between social cohesion and subjective well-being among South Africans. The evidence supports a core finding that has emerged in essentially all previous studies we have performed on social cohesion elsewhere: The quality of society (social cohesion) translates directly into citizens’ quality of life (subjective well-being). The analyses performed on the level of the provinces show that higher levels of social cohesion lead to a more positive evaluation of life, improved life satisfaction, and stronger optimism for the future. The same picture emerges from the analysis focusing on the four classes of respondents: In Class 4, Cohesive communities, families are predominantly seen as better off than a year ago, life satisfaction has improved for the majority, children are predominantly believed to have a bright future ahead.   It is exactly the strong positive relationship between social cohesion and subjective well-being that underscores the necessity of political action to improve South Africa’s level of social cohesion. Whereas conceptual academic work on social cohesion sometimes claims that too high a level of social cohesion can cement the societal status quo and prevent progress, all empirical studies have shown that high levels of cohesion foster peaceful coexistence of various societal groups in respect, dignity, trust, and cooperation. Cohesion translates the social and economic structures (performance and output of the economy, living conditions) into quality of life (happiness, life satisfaction) directly experienced by individual members of society. In case cohesion is neglected, one can expect societal polarization and political instability. 1. Introduction   Since the French Revolution with its famous motto “liberté, égalité, fraternité”, discourse on the cohesion of geopolitical entities (countries, provinces, neighborhoods) has seen waves of greater and lesser intensity, but one thing is clear: A healthy social entity needs fraternité  or, in modern terminol­ogy, social cohesion among its members. Social cohesion stands for the ability of societies to stick together or, as Leininger and colleagues put it, “the glue that holds society together” (Leininger et al., 2021: 2).   In recent years, when social cohesion has been discussed in South Africa, it has been with an increasingly critical undertone. The sentiment that the self-declared Rainbow Nation (Tutu, Mandela) is drifting apart rather than growing together has become stronger. However, research – mainly empirical – on social cohesion in South Africa is scarce. Our search for any available scholarly literature within the past 10 years yielded seven publications, two of which are reviews of a book by Ballantine et al. (2017) included in the count. The book by Ballantine and colleagues is a collection of essays by local academics and public figures about issues related to, amongst others, inequality, xenophobia, safety, gender-based abuse, political leadership, law, education, identity, sport, arts, and South Africa’s position in the world. A paper by Abrahams (2016) tracks the evolution of social cohesion over twenty years in South African politics, criticizing the instrumentalization of cohesion as a social policy concept exclusively towards a form of nation-building that seeks to solidify the hegemony of the ruling party. A brief report by the South African Institute of International Affairs (2021) reviews the status quo and progress in religion, nationality, race and ethnicity, and LGBTQ+ rights. The latter report offers recommendations for improving the situation in these spheres and promotes the role of young people in fostering social cohesion. A paper by Burns and colleagues from the South African Labour and Development Research Unit emphasizes the importance of social cohesion as a social policy concept, also referring to studies conducted by the authors of the present report, critically reviews existing concepts of social cohesion proposed in the academic and policy discourse, and formulates a definition for its assessment in the South African society based on theoretical considerations: “Social Cohesion is the extent to which people are co-operative, within and across group boundaries, without coercion or purely self-interested motivation” (Burns et al., 2018, p. 10). Interestingly, Burns et al. (2018) identify the overlap between social cohesion and ubuntu, arguing that the two have become synonymous regarding nation-building and efforts to close South African society's cultural and racial divides.   To our knowledge, two existing empirical studies have defined and measured social cohesion in South Africa. Langer et al. (2017) define social cohesion in an African context as the interplay of three salient aspects: perceived inequalities, trust (interpersonal and institutional), and identity (national vs ethnic). Their measurement draws on data from 19 countries, including South Africa, from Round 3 (2005 – 2006), Round 4 (2008 – 2009), and Round 5 (2011 – 2013) of the Afrobarometer survey. For each aspect of a country, the authors calculate the proportion of respondents who provide those answers to the selected survey items that point to a stronger expression of cohesion. The resulting proportions for each aspect are then averaged by taking their arithmetic mean into a social cohesion index. According to the findings, overall cohesion in South Africa and its three aspects have recorded only minor ups or downs in the period studied. The level of identification was found to range from 0.612 (2005 – 2006) to 0.700 (2011 – 2013) and can be considered moderately high. The perception of equality was found in the range from 0.328 (2008 – 2009) to 0.469 (2011 – 2013) and can be qualified as low to moderately low. Trust was found in the range from 0.239 (2011 – 2013) to 0.293 (2005 – 2006) and can be qualified as low. From a comparative perspective, South Africa emerged in the middle of the country ranking on the overall level of cohesion and the perceived level of equality, in the lower half of the ranking on trust, and among the top countries on identification.   The second available empirical study (Leininger et al., 2021) similarly compares African countries. According to its authors, “cohesion is characterized by a set of attitudes and behavioural manifestations that includes trust, an inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good” (Leininger et al., 2021, p. 3). These three attributes unfold into two elements, encompassing horizontal or vertical relations among citizens and the state (see Figure 1.1): social trust and institutional trust, group identity and national identity, intergroup cooperation, and state-society cooperation. Leininger and colleagues operationalize their concept with items from the Afrobarometer, covering a varying set of African societies depending on the data availability for the particular element of cohesion: 17 to 18 in Round 3 (2005 – 2006), 20 in Round 4 (2008 – 2009), 28 to 34 in Round 5 (2011 – 2013), 32 to 36 in Round 6 (2014 – 2015). Their methodological approach measures the three attributes on a scale from 0 (low) to 1 (high). South Africa achieved scores in the range from 0.44 (2015) to 0.51 (2011) on trust, 0.3 (2015) to 0.43 (2006) on cooperation, and 0.42 (2015) to 0.74 (2011) on identity. These scores point to a downward trend in cohesion in South Africa for each attribute. In comparing African countries, South Africa ranked in the middle on trust, in the lower half on cooperation, and among the top countries on identity (except for the last year of observation, 2015). The work by Leininger et al. (2021), however, does not produce an overall index of cohesion, does not offer insights for more recent years since 2015, and does not venture into exploring the determinants of the country scores on the cohesion attributes or outcomes of cohesion.   Figure 1.1 Constitutive elements of social cohesion (Leininger)     Source:  Leininger et al. (2021)   The present report attempts to close the gap in the existing research on South Africa. It aims to provide an all-around theoretically founded and methodologically sound empirical assessment of social cohesion in South African society. In particular, our study attempts to:   measure the current degree of social cohesion in South Africa and its nine constituent provinces; track how cohesion has developed in the period from 2021 to 2024; identify structural characteristics from the thematic fields of economic situation, inequality and poverty, demography, diversity, and modernization that promote or hinder social cohesion; explore which social groups experience a high or low level of cohesion; investigate how social cohesion, i.e., the quality of society, relates to citizens’ well-being, i.e., quality of life.   To achieve these aims, we apply the measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar, which was informed by a comprehensive literature review (Schiefer & van der Noll, 2017) and the input of experts on the topic. It defines cohesion as the “quality of social cooperation and togetherness of a collective, defined in geopolitical terms, that is expressed in the attitudes and behaviors of its members. A cohesive society is characterized by resilient social relations, a positive emotional connectedness between its members and the community, and a pronounced focus on the common good” (Dragolov et al., 2016: 6). These three domains unfold into three dimensions. The domain Social relations measures the strength and resilience of individuals’ social ties (Dimension 1.1 – Social networks), the degree to which people trust others (Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people), and the extent to which people accept individuals of different background, lifestyle, and values as equal members of society (Dimension 1.3 – Acceptance of diversity). The domain Connectedness measures the strength of individuals’ identification with the geopolitical entity (Dimension 2.1 – Identification), the degree to which individuals trust the entity’s institutions (Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions), and individuals’ perception that they are treated fairly and that material resources are fairly distributed (Dimension 2.3 – Perception of fairness). The domain Focus on the common good captures the extent to which people feel and demonstrate responsibility for weak others (Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness), people’s willingness to abide by the rules of society (Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules), and their participation in society and political life (Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation). Figure 1.2 depicts the measurement concept of the Social Cohesion Radar (SCR).   Figure 1.2 Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar     Source: Dragolov et al. (2016) A comparison of the SCR to the approaches of Langer et al. (2017) and Leininger et al. (2021) shows that the three concepts overlap in several regards. First, social cohesion is a quantifiable quality of collectives, not individuals. Second, they all cover horizontal and vertical ties. Third, they all suggest that social cohesion should be assessed via a perception-based index, not based on objective socio-demographic indicators. Next, there is a considerable conceptual overlap in the emphasis on specific dimensions (aspects) of social cohesion. As already mentioned above, Langer et al. suggest including the extent of perceived inequalities (SCR: Perception of fairness), the societal level of trust (SCR: Trust in people), and the strength of people’s adherence to their national identity (SCR: Identification). Leininger and colleagues also mention trust and identity, whereas their dimension of cooperation is called Solidarity and helpfulness in the SCR.   The main difference between the three approaches lies in their conceptual scope. Whereas the SCR comprehensively describes the components necessary for a full-fledged assessment of the level of social cohesion in a given society, the two concepts based on the Afrobarometer remain somewhat piecemeal. In addition, one of the main advantages of the SCR approach is its leanness, a necessity also underscored by Leininger et al. (2021). On the one hand, the concept covers the essential components of social cohesion. At the same time, it leaves room for a systematic exploration of determinants (e.g., state of the economy, socio-economic exclusion) and outcomes (e.g., population well-being). For a critical review of the advantages and disadvantages of measurement concepts of cohesion that have been applied in empirical research, we refer readers to Delhey, Dragolov, and Boehnke (2023).   On a final note, the SCR has been utilized to assess social cohesion in 34 Western (EU and OECD) countries (Dragolov et al., 2016), 22 Asian countries (Delhey & Boehnke, 2018), the 16 federal states of Germany (Dragolov et al., 2016), 79 spatial planning regions of Germany (Arant et al., 2017; Boehnke et al., 2024), 78 neighborhoods of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen (Arant et al., 2016), the 32 federal entities of Mexico (Boehnke et al., 2019), and the seven regions of Kyrgyzstan (Larsen & Boehnke, 2016).   2.  Measuring social cohesion   This section details the data and methodological approach employed for measuring social cohesion in South Africa.   2.1  Data   The current report offers empirical evidence from analyses performed on data from the Khayabus Survey. The data were collected by Ipsos South Africa and provided by the Inclusive Society Institute. The Khayabus Survey is a population-representative cross-sectional survey that has been fielded annually in at least two waves among respondents of age 15 and above. The survey covers various topics related to society and politics in South Africa. It initially included the sections Socio-Political Trends (SPT), Government Performance Barometer (GPB), and Party Image (PI). A fourth section, GovDemPol, was added in 2021.   Because the GovDemPol section includes the core set of indicators needed for assessing social cohesion along the concept of the Social Cohesion Radar, our analyses can only start with 2021. Data on three items crucial for the measurement concept, each belonging to the SPT section, had to be taken from the 2020 Khayabus, as they were not included in the 2021 survey. The most recent survey data available to us refer to the year 2024. Our report concentrates on survey respondents aged 18 and above, as several of the needed items were not included in the questionnaire for under-aged South Africans. The analyses performed for this report draw on Waves 1 of the Khayabus survey, typically conducted from late May/early June to mid-July. The overall samples in the employed data encompass 3758 respondents in 2020, 3402 respondents in 2021, 3459 respondents in 2022, 3519 respondents in 2023, and 3172 respondents in 2024.   Table 1.1 Sample sizes of Khayabus – Waves 1     Table 2.1 offers detailed information on sample sizes achieved in Waves 1 of the Khayabus survey from 2020 to 2024. The table provides a breakdown of the samples by province, as the present report also aims to measure social cohesion in the nine constituent provinces of South Africa. We refer readers unfamiliar with the nine provinces' geographic location and administrative borders to Figure 2.1. It is important to note that population sizes vary widely between the mostly urban Gauteng province, where well over a quarter of South Africa's adult population lives, and the mostly desert Northern Cape province, which encompasses less than 3%. The uneven distribution of the South African population across the provinces is reflected in the achieved sample sizes for the provinces, as evident from Table 2.1. The low sample sizes for the least populated provinces, e.g., Northern Cape with typically about 60 respondents per wave, do not necessarily reduce the representativity of the data concerning core socio-demographic characteristics of their population. We address this issue by calibrating the survey data with the population weights provided by Ipsos South Africa. Smaller sample sizes do, however, involve a larger standard error for sample statistics like percentages and means. In practical terms, this means that the precision of the measurements for Gauteng ( NGP,2024  = 1087) is about four times higher than that for Northern Cape ( NNC,2024  = 63) at the same variability in the data. Caution is, therefore, required when interpreting such statistics as estimates of the ‘true’ situation or opinion in the population of provinces for which low sample sizes are available.   Figure 1.3 Provinces of South Africa   Source: Apraku et al. (2018)   In addition to the above-addressed statistical issues, population sizes, and population density are closely related: In the Gauteng province, more than 800 people live per square kilometer, whereas in the Northern Cape province, the density figure is below 4 per square kilometer (Statistics South Africa, 2024a). Considering these stark differences is essential when evaluating our findings on levels and trends of social cohesion in South Africa.   2.2  Analytical approach   Below we elaborate on the methodological approach for assessing social cohesion. We begin with the strategy for selecting Khayabus survey questions, also referred to here as items or indicators, to measure the nine dimensions of social cohesion in line with the Bertelsmann concept. We then turn to the approach for computing scores for the nine dimensions and the overall social cohesion index.   Item selection was conducted using a multi-step procedure. First, members of the research team – independent of each other – identified potential items for measuring the nine cohesion dimensions from the Khayabus questionnaire according to face validity. Members of the research team then jointly prepared a pool of items according to face validity. In the third step, items from the pool were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis for each dimension. Factor analysis is a statistical sorting procedure that analyzes the matrix of item intercorrelations to separate items with a highly similar response pattern from items with a different response pattern and then sort them into distinct subgroups. The various subgroups of items (called factors) allow us to assess whether or not the items were selected appropriately according to their face validity as per the different dimensions of social cohesion. An important selection criterion is the item’s factor loading, which reflects how strongly an item is correlated with the other items sorted into the given factor. Item loadings should typically exceed .40 to be seen as sufficiently high. Items exhibiting sufficiently high factor loadings were retained. In the final step, we assessed the internal consistency of the scales formed by the selected items to measure a pertinent dimension. Cronbach’s α consistency coefficients should reach .90 for an excellent scale, .80 for a very good scale, .70 for a satisfactory scale, and minimally .30, or, in case of short scales, at least .10 times the number of items in the scale.   Several data preparation steps had to be taken before performing factor analyses. Where needed, the response options of the items were reverse coded so that a higher numerical value stands for a more vital expression of the pertinent aspect of cohesion. The response options of all items were rescaled to range from 0 (weakest expression of cohesion) to 100 (strongest expression of cohesion). If present, missing values on an item were substituted with the sample mean as the missingness rate was very low. Tables 2.2 to 2.4 document the selected items' factor loadings and the internal consistencies of the scales these items form for measuring the nine dimensions of social cohesion.   Table 1.2  Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 1 “Social relations”       Table 1.3 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 2 “Connectedness”     Table 1.4 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 3 “Focus on the common good”   Readers will note that not all dimensions of social cohesion were measured equally well. This had several reasons. To begin with, the questionnaire offered a limited choice of indicators for some dimensions. This is why not all dimensions could be measured with at least three items. This pertained to Dimension 2.1 (Identification) and Dimension 3.1 (Solidarity and helpfulness), for which only two items could be included. Moreover, for Dimension 2.1, an item from the 2020 Khayabus had to be included, even with two items, to assess citizens’ identification with South Africa in 2021. Second, not all scales exhibit a high degree of homogeneity (level of intercorrelation) of the included items. This is particularly true for Dimension 2.1 and Dimension 3.3 (Civic participation).   After sorting items via factor analyses, the nine dimension scores were computed by calculating the arithmetic mean of the items determined to belong to a given factor. The overall cohesion index was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the nine dimension scores. Dimension and index scores for the provinces and South Africa were calculated by aggregating the individual-level data to the respective level via the population-weighted arithmetic mean. Scores for the dimensions and the overall index range from 0 (very low cohesion) to 100 (very high cohesion), where scores from 0 to 19.99 can be interpreted as pointing to a very low level of cohesion, 20 to 39.99 – low, 40 to 59.99 – medium, 60 to 79.99 – high, and 80 to 100 – very high.   3.  Level and trend of social cohesion   In this section, we report findings on the level and trend of social cohesion in South Africa and its nine constituent provinces from 2021 to 2024.   3.1    Social cohesion in South Africa   Table 3.1 documents the annual level and trend of social cohesion in South Africa since 2021. We first present the findings for 2024, the most recent year for which data are available, and then proceed to the changes observed over time.   Level in 2024   In 2024, the overall social cohesion index for South Africa was 53.3, slightly above the theoretical midpoint of the measurement scale of 50. As such, the strength of social cohesion in South Africa can be qualified as moderate—neither high nor low. What is behind this result? A look at the single dimensions reveals the strong and weak spots of cohesion in South Africa that jointly produce its moderate overall level.   Table 1.5 Social cohesion and its dimensions in South Africa across time     Dimension 1.1, Social networks, scored 59.9 in 2024. The intactness of citizens’ social networks is currently the third strongest dimension in South Africa. The strength of this dimension can be qualified as moderate to high as it has almost reached the lower bound of the interval of high scores (60). To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: About 52.5 % of the respondents agreed with the statement “I entertain friends from different population groups at home or another place,” 24.8 % disagreed, and 20.7 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.1 of the Appendix). Dimension 1.2, Trust in people, can also be found in 2024 in the upper half of the measurement scale, with a score of 54.4. The level of trust that South Africans place in others qualifies, thereby, as moderate. To exemplify the finding with one indicator for this dimension: 17.7 % of the respondents trust people in their community completely, 64.6 % only somewhat or not very much, and 16.5 % not at all (see Table A.2).   Dimension 1.3, Acceptance of diversity, achieved in 2024 a score of 46.8. The numeric result qualifies the tolerance level in South African society still as moderate. However, it should be noted that it falls within the lower half of the measurement scale, unlike the previous two dimensions from the domain Social relations. To exemplify with one indicator for Acceptance of diversity: 10.8 % of the respondents trust coloured South Africans completely, 58.9 % only somewhat or not very much, and 28.5 % not at all (see Table A.3).   Dimension 2.1, Identification, scored 72.2, the highest among all dimensions in 2024. Identification is the most pronounced aspect of social cohesion in South Africa and the only dimension that can be qualified without any reservations as high. This is manifested, for example, in the responses to the statement “I am proud to be South African”: 75.4 % agreed, 13.9 % disagreed, and 9.2 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.4).   Dimension 2.2, Trust in institutions, achieved in 2024 a score of 47.9. Just like Acceptance of diversity, the extent of trust citizens have in the country's institutions can be considered moderate. However, it falls within the lower half of the measurement scale. To exemplify with one indicator: 48.7 % of the respondents agreed with the statement “Elections are free and fair,” 30.6 % disagreed, and 17.3 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.5).   Dimension 2.3, Perception of fairness, scored in 2024 at 42.7. It is the second weakest aspect of social cohesion in South Africa. The extent to which people perceive the distribution of material resources as fair can be qualified as moderate. However, it should be noted that the result is very close to the upper bound of the interval of low scores (40). To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: 29.9 % of the respondents stated the government is doing very well or fairly well at narrowing the income gap between races, whereas 65.3 % stated the government is handling this issue not very well or not at all well (see Table A.6).   Dimension 3.1, Solidarity and helpfulness, achieved in 2024 a score of 61.3. With this result, it is the second most vital aspect of social cohesion in South Africa. The extent to which people help the weak members of society can be qualified as high. To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: 60 % of the respondents agreed with the statement “I actively look for ways in which I can support people who are less fortunate than I am”, 18 % disagreed, and 20.4 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.7).   Dimension 3.2, Respect for social rules, achieved in 2024 a score of 36.6. This is the weakest aspect of social cohesion in South Africa. The extent to which people perceive that rules are observed is low. To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: 23.5 % of the respondents stated that the government is doing very well or fairly well at reducing the crime rate, whereas 74.9 % stated not very well or not at all well (see Table A.8).   Dimension 3.3, Civic participation, scored at 58.0 in 2024. Citizens’ involvement in society and political life can be qualified as moderate, tending towards high. One indicator for this dimension: 51.4 % of the respondents agreed with “I actively work for the welfare of my community”, 28.5 % disagreed, and 18.2 % were undecided (see Table A.9).   The results for the dimensions form a nuanced profile of cohesion. None of the three domains of social cohesion (Social relations, Connectedness, and Focus on the common good) exhibits either only deficits or only strengths for all its dimensions. Interestingly, the three top-scoring dimensions (Identification, Solidarity and helpfulness, and Social networks) stand out as strong to moderately strong anchors of their respective domains. However, two domains are imbalanced: Connectedness by the moderately low Perception of fairness, and Focus on the common good by the low Respect for social rules. If one should point out the glue that holds South African society together, this would undoubtedly be citizens’ strong identification with the country, their solidarity with their weaker fellow citizens, and the functioning of their social networks. On the other hand, what could destabilize the South African society is the perceived lack of respect for rules and the perceived lack of distributional fairness.   Trend over time   Regarding the trajectory of social cohesion, the results summarized in Table 3.1 present a mix of good and bad developments. To begin with the good, the year 2023 marks an inflection point in the downward trend of the overall index that had been observed since 2021. Following a steady, though slow, decline from its level at 53.5 in 2021 down to 52.4 in 2022 and further down to 51.7 in 2023, the overall index of social cohesion has increased to the current level of 53.5. The overall index has, thereby, recovered by 1.6 points from 2023 to 2024, but not fully yet to the level measured in 2021, as it is still -0.2 points below this benchmark.   The almost full recovery of the overall index of social cohesion should not be overestimated as it masks diverging trajectories among the dimensions. It is indeed the case that all nine dimensions increased from 2023 and 2024. The gains vary considerably from +0.1 points for Acceptance of diversity to +3.6 points for Respect for social rules. For six dimensions, the increase over the past year does not suffice to compensate for the previously accrued decline. The latter issue is most pronounced for Respect for social rules. In 2021, this dimension ranked as moderate with a borderline score of 40.3 but lost -7.3 points over 2022 and 2023 to qualify in the low-level category, where it can still be found despite the halving of the decline from 2023 to 2024. In fact, Respect for social rules in South Africa is approximately back to its level from 2022. A similar trajectory can be observed for Social networks: From an initially high level of 61.3, over 2022 and 2023 it slid down by 2.4 points to the moderate-level category, and is still to be found there in 2024 despite a gain of +1 point up to its current level, which happens to be identical to that from 2022. Other dimensions that are currently still below their starting positions from 2021 are Trust in institutions (-2.8 points), Identification (-1.1 points), Perception of fairness (-0.7 points), and Acceptance of diversity (-0.2 points).   The remaining three dimensions follow the opposite trajectory. By 2024, they have not just made up for declines experienced prior to 2023, but have, moreover, surpassed their starting levels from 2021. The most pronounced increase can be observed for Civic participation (+3.6 points), followed by Solidarity and helpfulness (+2.2 points), and Trust in people (+2.0 points). Further, Solidarity and helpfulness has already made it into the high-level category. We refer readers to Tables A.1 to A.9 of the Appendix for changes over time in the responses to the indicators of the respective dimensions.   3.2  Social cohesion in the nine provinces   Level in 2024   Zooming into the provinces, we find some variation across these administrative units. Figure 3.1 maps the strength of the overall social cohesion index in the nine provinces. Table 3.2 documents the annual level and trend over the four years examined here. In 2024, social cohesion was found relatively lowest in KwaZulu-Natal (49.6), second lowest in North West (52.0), and third lowest in Free State (52.1). Mpumalanga (53.2) comes closest to the country average of 53.3. Cohesion is higher than the result for South Africa as a whole in Gauteng (54.0), Eastern Cape (54.4), Western Cape (54.5), Northern Cape (55.1), and highest in Limpopo (56.5). In fact, all provinces rank in the interval of the measurement scale, referring to a moderate level of cohesion.   Figure 1.4 Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces (2024)     Note : The map applies the colour scheme displayed above to visualize the strength of social cohesion in 2024 across the nine provinces.     Table 1.6  The overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time     Tables A.10 to A.18 of Appendix A document the provinces' performance on the single dimensions of cohesion. Interestingly, none of the provinces exhibits a consistent profile. Each province has a distinctive pattern of strengths and weakness which is evident both in an absolute and in a relative comparison of the provinces’ dimension scores. The only exception would be the strength of identification with the country, which is, in absolute terms, high across all provinces. To exemplify the idiosyncrasies of the provinces, we take Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal, the two extremes in the ranking on the overall index of cohesion. Limpopo, achieves the relatively highest scores on altogether five dimensions from the domains Connectedness and Focus on the common good, but shows deficits on two dimensions from the domain Social relations. In particular, Limpopo occupies the second lowest rank on Trust in people, found highest in Eastern Cape (61.0), with a moderate score of 48.1, and the lowest rank on Acceptance of diversity, found highest in Gauteng (49.6), with a low score of 37.9. On the other hand, KwaZulu-Natal occupies bottom ranks on six dimensions across all three domains but achieves the second highest score on Trust in people (57.2).   Trend over time   As evident from Table 3.2, social cohesion in the provinces has followed five different trajectories from 2021 to 2024. The most common trajectory comprises a larger decline in the beginning followed by a smaller increase, which, taken together, result in an overall decline. Readers may recall that this is the trajectory of South Africa as a whole on the overall index of cohesion and all dimensions but Trust in people. It applies to five provinces: Northern Cape (-4.2 points), KwaZulu-Natal (-1.5 points), Free State (-1.4 points), Mpumalanga (-0.8 points), and Gauteng (-0.1 points). The opposite trajectory – a larger increase in the beginning and a later smaller decline – applies only to Eastern Cape (+2.6 points). Two other provinces, Limpopo and North West, have experienced a zig-zag trajectory similar to that of South Africa as a whole on Trust in people: a decline followed by an increase and then another decline. Due to differences in the magnitudes of these ups and downs, the combined effect is an overall decline in Limpopo (-0.4 points) and an overall increase in North West (+1.2 points). Finally, a steady decline characterizes the trajectory of cohesion in Western Cape, resulting in an overall decline of -1 point. Taken together, the five trajectories bring about an overall decline of social cohesion in seven provinces and an overall increase in only two. Figure 3.2 depicts these developments in the overall cohesion index across the provinces.   Readers may notice in Table 3.2 that the divergence of the provinces observed from 2022 to 2023 has reversed to a convergence from 2023 to 2024. The range of the provinces’ scores on the overall index, i.e. the difference between the top ranked and the bottom ranked province, has decreased from 12.2 points in 2023, when it was the largest across all years analyzed, to only 6.9 points in 2024. In fact, the range in 2024 is the smallest observed in the period from 2021 to 2024. The closing gap in the strength of cohesion among the provinces is, however, misleading. Behind it is not a process of upward convergence, i.e. former ‘losers’ catching up, but one of downward convergence, namely the weakening cohesion in Limpopo and Northern Cape.   Figure 1.5 Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time   Note : The figure shows the scores of the nine provinces on the overall index of social cohesion in 2021, 2022, and 2023.   As to the trend in the single dimensions, Tables A.10 to A.18 reveal that Social networks, Solidarity and helpfulness, and Civic participation are the only dimensions that have improved for almost all provinces. Social networks have weakened only in KwaZulu-Natal (-1.3 points), and more pronouncedly in Gauteng (-5.1 points) and Mpumalanga (-8.8 points). Solidarity and helpfulness has declined only in Western Cape (-3.1 points), Northern Cape (3.2 points) and more dramatically in Mpumalanga (-12.7 points). The only declines observed on Civic participation affect North West (-0.5 points) and Northern Cape (-1.1 points). It is worrying that the picture is reversed for Identification, which holds the South African society together: Whereas citizens’ strength of identification has improved in Limpopo (+6.5 points) and North West (+6.6 points), it has declined in the remaining seven provinces in the range from -0.2 points (Eastern Cape) to -5.9 points (Free State). Perception of fairness and Respect for social rules – the major weaknesses of social cohesion in South Africa – as well as Trust in institutions also register predominantly declines across the provinces. Respect for social rules has returned to its initial level from 2021 in Limpopo, and has increased only in Northern Cape (+1.4 points) and Western Cape (+1.9 points). We observed the largest decline in Respect for social rules in KwaZulu-Natal (-11.6 points), despite an improvement of +2.6 points from 2023 to 2024. Perception of fairness has improved only in Western Cape (+0.2 points), Gauteng (+1.8 points), and Limpopo (+6.2 points). The extent to which citizens place trust in institutions has improved only in Mpumalanga (+1.2 points), Western Cape (+2.1 points), and Northern Cape (+2.3 points). Following a steady downward trend, Trust in institutions has declined by -11.7 points in KwaZulu-Natal. On a final note, Trust in people and Acceptance of diversity are also characterized by more provinces being on a decline, although the ratio here is rather balanced at 5:4. It is noteworthy, though, that Limpopo has experienced a steady decline across all years both on the extent to which citizens trust others (-9.8 points) and the extent to which citizens accept diversity (-12.9 points). Acceptance of diversity has consistently declined also in Western Cape (-6.5 points). In contrast, we observe a steady increase on Trust in people for Eastern Cape (+11.6 points) and North West (+9.5 points), and a steady increase on Acceptance of diversity in Mpumalanga (+12.3 points).   In the subsequent section, we investigate which structural characteristics of the provinces may be at play in promoting or hindering social cohesion.   4.  Structural influences on social cohesion   This section aims to find evidence on structural determinants of social cohesion. For this purpose, we explore the relationship between the overall level of social cohesion in the nine provinces and selected characteristics of the provinces from the following thematic fields: economic situation, inequality and poverty, demography, diversity, and modernization. The focus on these aspects is not arbitrary: Our studies on Western and Asian societies as well as the federal states and spatial planning regions of Germany demonstrated empirically that aspects from these thematic fields act as determinants rather than outcomes of social cohesion (Dragolov et al., 2016; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Arant, Dragolov & Boehnke, 2017; Boehnke, Dragolov, Arant & Unzicker, 2024).   4.1  Data and method   To touch on the economic situation in the provinces, we use data on the gross domestic product per capita [1] in Rand (Statistics South Africa, 2024a), Human Development Index (Global Data Lab, 2024), and unemployment rates – official and expanded (Statistics South Africa, 2023b). We measure poverty using one subjective indicator – the share of households in a province who perceive themselves as poor (Statistics South Africa, 2024c), and objective indicators concerning three definitions of the poverty line [2] – the share of the population below the food poverty line, the lower-bound poverty line, and the upper-bound poverty line (own calculations based on CRA, 2023). We employ the Gini index of income inequality and the P90/P10 ratio (own calculations based on CRA, 2023) to measure inequality [3] . We draw on data from Census 2022 (Statistics South Africa, 2023a) for the remaining thematic fields. In particular, as to demographics, we consider population density, the share of urban and rural population, the share of singles and married citizens, and the population's median age. To tap into diversity, we use the share of Blacks, Whites, Coloured, Indian/Asian, and Other races; the share of immigrants; as well as ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization [4] (own calculations based on Statistics South Africa, 2023a). To touch on modernization, we use the share of citizens with completed primary, secondary, and post-secondary education, the share of citizens owning a computer and a cell phone, and the share of the population without access to the internet.   For reasons of data availability, all structural indicators refer to the years 2021 or 2022. Thereby, they precede the most recent measurement of social cohesion from 2024 by about two to three years. The intentional time lag—earlier measurement of the provinces’ structural characteristics and later measurement of social cohesion—introduces a certain degree of temporal order in the analyses. It cannot prove the existence of a causal relationship, but it can increase the plausibility of attributing causality.   Each of the above-listed structural characteristics of the provinces was subjected to a correlation test with the level of social cohesion. Two variables are correlated when changes in one are (closely) followed by changes in the other. A correlation can be positive (the more of Variable A , the more of Variable B ) or negative (the more of Variable A , the less of Variable B ). The strength of the association is reflected in the correlation coefficient, which can range from 0 (no correlation) to ±1 (perfect correlation). Typically, a correlation of size below |.10| is very weak and not worth interpreting, between |.10| and |.30| – weak, between |.30| and |.50| – moderate, and above |.50| – strong.   A considerable obstacle arises from the sample size for the correlations on the level of provinces. Of course, the overall sample size in each survey wave is large and has sufficient statistical power. Power (in mathematical-statistical theory) means that a given sample is large enough to corroborate a particular effect as likely ‘true’ about the population from which the sample was drawn – South Africa in this case. On the level of provinces, however, showing that a specific correlation is sizable enough to conclude that it is significant (i.e., likely true in the nine provinces) is problematic due to the number of provinces – only nine, unlike the number of surveyed individuals – over three thousand in each year. This may be surprising at first glance because more people have been surveyed in the provinces, with a minimum of 63 in Northern Cape and a maximum of 1087 in Gauteng in 2024. However, social cohesion is not a characteristic of individuals but of geopolitical entities, and the latter – the provinces of South Africa – are only nine.   The low number of cases (provinces) means that only extremely high correlations can reach statistical significance. Mathematically, significance is a function of sample size (the higher, the more likely it is for a particular coefficient to be significant) and data variability (the higher the variance of the included data, the less likely it is that a specific coefficient is significant). Given these constraints, we disregard the significance of the correlation coefficients in our reporting and interpretation, focusing instead on the tendency in the data. Thus, we follow the appeal of a respectable number of scientific community members to ditch p -values (Wasserstein, Schirm & Lazar, 2019). The results from additionally performed bivariate biserial Pearson correlations, for which the province-level characteristics were disaggregated to the individual-level data set for 2024 ( N  = 3172), show that ten of altogether 31 associations may not be considered significant (see Table A.19 of Appendix C). This finding supports our decision to focus on tendencies instead of discarding associations merely for not meeting a criterion for statistical significance.   Besides significance, the number of provinces is critically low for performing Pearson correlations. As a parametric test, the Pearson correlation involves assumptions that cannot be fulfilled with the data on the level of provinces. We, therefore, resort to Spearman correlations as a non-parametric, assumption-free alternative. A Spearman correlation is, in essence, a Pearson correlation performed on ranked data. The distinction between the two approaches is that a Pearson correlation considers the exact distances among the observations on each variable, whereas a Spearman correlation considers only whether there are differences, disregarding their size. For example, in 2022, the wealthiest province in terms of per capita GDP was Gauteng, with 96,252 Rand, and the poorest was Eastern Cape, with 54,805 Rand. The Pearson correlation will be influenced by the numeric difference of 41,447 Rand between the two provinces, whereas the Spearman correlation will only consider which province has the higher value. One implication is that the Spearman method is not sensitive to outliers in the data – observations (provinces) with an extremely large or extremely low value on a characteristic of interest. Given the critically low sample size of nine provinces, the Spearman method is advantageous compared to a Pearson correlation which may be quickly and heavily biased by an outlier. Because in all our previous studies on cohesion, the data allowed us to apply the Pearson correlation method, we performed Pearson correlations for the present report, too. Interested readers can find those in Table A.19 of Appendix C. In a few instances, we observe great discrepancies – mostly in size but also in direction. As discussed at length above, to stay on the safe side, we report and interpret the findings from the Spearman correlation tests.   On a final note, we performed both bivariate correlations and partial correlations for GDP, because both in our study of 34 Western countries (Dragolov et al., 2016) and our study of 22 Asian countries (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018), GDP was highly positively related to social cohesion: The more prosperous a society, the more cohesive it is. Partialling GDP out of a relationship removes the influence of GDP on both variables involved. This makes it possible to speak of associations between a given structural characteristic of the provinces and social cohesion, independent of their economic prosperity. In the section below, we report and interpret the partial correlations.   4.2  Results   Table 4.1 documents the relationships between the structural characteristics of the nine provinces and social cohesion per thematic field. The empirical findings for South Africa present several surprises concerning what has been previously found for Western and Asian societies.   Economic situation   The bivariate correlation between per capita GDP (in a province) and social cohesion (in the same province) was found at ρ =.00. The relationship is non-existent. It informs that social cohesion is independent of how economically affluent the provinces are. This result is striking as it goes against the positive association between GDP and cohesion that was consistently found in all our previous studies on Western and Asian societies.   The correlation between the Human Development Index and cohesion emerged positive and moderate in size (ρ = .39). People-centered economic progress (Gross National Income coupled with mean years of schooling and life expectancy) appears conducive to social cohesion.   Both measures of unemployment – the official and expanded unemployment rates – exhibited moderately negative associations with social cohesion (ρ = -.42 and ρ = -.32, respectively). Provinces in which more unemployed people reside tend to have weaker social cohesion.   Poverty and inequality   The evidence presents mixed findings on poverty. Whereas the subjective indicator exhibited a strongly negative correlation with social cohesion (ρ = -.55), the three objective indicators were found to correlate positively but only very weakly in the range from ρ = .03 for the upper-bound poverty line to ρ = .10 for the food and lower-bound poverty lines. Social cohesion tends to be lower in provinces where more households perceive themselves as poor. Its level, however, appears to be, by and large, unrelated to objective poverty. Though at first glance puzzling, the results on objective poverty can be explained with the efficiency of social welfare programs targeted at supporting poor citizens.   The correlations of the social cohesion index with both measures of income inequality were found to be consistently negative. Social cohesion tends to be lower in provinces with larger inequality in income. Interestingly, the correlation with the Gini index is moderately negative (ρ = -.44) and insignificant, whereas that with the P90/P10 ratio is strongly negative (ρ = -.65) and marginally significant ( p  ≤ .10). The Gini index considers the entire income distribution. In contrast, the P90/P10 ratio contrasts the income at the top of the distribution (90th percentile) to the income at the bottom (10th percentile). The latter focuses on inequality, which is more visible and more accessible for ordinary citizens to perceive. The top-to-bottom income ratio is 38 in the Free State and 11 in the Northern Cape. These values inform that the top earners' income is 38 times higher than that of poor citizens in the Free State; in Northern Cape – ‘only’ 11 times higher. Vast discrepancies in income emerge as detrimental to social cohesion. Table 1.7 Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces     Demography   Population density exhibited a weak negative relationship with social cohesion (ρ = -.22). Social cohesion tends to be lower in more densely populated provinces. This finding corresponds with the associations of the cohesion index with the shares of urban (ρ = -.30) and rural population (ρ = .30). Though the relationships are weak in size, they indicate that social cohesion tends to be lower in more urbanized provinces and, in contrast, higher in provinces with a larger share of rural population.   Marital status was found to correlate strongly with social cohesion. Social cohesion appears to be significantly lower in provinces with a large share of singles (ρ = -.69, p  ≤ .10) and tends to be higher in provinces with a larger share of married citizens (ρ = .47). This finding suggests that families contribute strongly to cohesion in the South African society.   We found a moderately negative association (ρ = -.44) with median age. Social cohesion tends to be lower where the population’s median age is higher. The association was reversed in Asia: Social cohesion was found higher in Asian countries with a higher median age.   Diversity   The composition of the provinces’ population regarding race, migration background, language, and religion seems to be weakly to moderately related to social cohesion. Provinces with larger shares of Blacks (ρ = -.16) tend to have a somewhat weaker level of social cohesion. In contrast, cohesion tends to be somewhat higher in provinces with larger shares of Whites (ρ = .13), Coloured (ρ = .32), and other races (ρ = .12). A negligibly positive association was found between the provinces’ level of social cohesion and their share of Indian/Asian residents (ρ = .09). As to immigration, provinces with more immigrants were found to have a slightly stronger level of cohesion (ρ = .21).   The fractionalization measures offer findings that generally follow the tendencies mentioned above. Ethnic (racial) fractionalization exhibited a positive, though only weak, correlation with social cohesion (ρ = .16). The relationship with linguistic fractionalization emerged as positive and moderate (ρ = .43), whereas that with religious fractionalization was found to be weak and negative (ρ = -.12). Racial and linguistic diversity in the provinces seem to contribute to social cohesion, whereas religious diversity appears to harm it.   Modernization   The evidence is puzzling concerning educational attainment. Whereas the share of citizens with completed primary education exhibited a weakly positive correlation with social cohesion (ρ = .20), the shares of citizens with completed secondary education exhibited a negative, very strong and marginally significant correlation (ρ = -.67, p ≤ .10). Its size is comparable to the correlations of the social cohesion index with income inequality (P90/P10 ratio) and the share of singles. The correlation with the share of citizens with completed post-school education also emerged negative, though only weak (ρ = -.16). Provinces with better and more highly educated citizens seem to have lower levels of cohesion. A possible explanation for these surprising results could be the economy of the country which does not deliver jobs up to the expectations of the better educated citizens.   Access to modern information and communication technology (computers, cell phones, and the internet) poses yet another puzzle. The correlation of the social cohesion index is weakly to negligibly negative with the share of computer owners (ρ = -.10) and cell phone owners (ρ = -.10), but strongly positive with the share of the population without access to the internet (ρ = .62).   What brings social cohesion in the South African provinces forward is people-centered economic progress, rural population, marriages, racial and linguistic diversity, and immigration. As potential hazards to social cohesion emerged: unemployment, felt poverty, income inequality, high population density and urbanization, single life, older population, religious diversity, and access to the internet. [1]      In line with the customary practice in economic research and our previous studies, we transform the raw values by taking their natural logarithm ( ln ). [2]      Individuals below the food poverty line cannot afford enough food to obtain the minimum daily energy requirement for adequate health. Individuals below the lower-bound poverty line are unable to afford both adequate food and non-food items and have to sacrifice food for essential non-food items. Individuals below the upper-bound poverty line can afford adequate food and essential non-food items. In 2022, the food poverty line was at 663 Rand, the lower-bound poverty line at 945 Rand, and the upper-bound poverty line at 1417 Rand, according to the report of the Center for Risk Analysis (CRA, 2023). [3]      The Gini index measures income inequality in the population as a whole. It ranges from 0 (perfect equality among all individuals) to 1 (perfect inequality, where one individual has all income). The P90/P10 ratio contrasts the income at the 90th percentile of the income distribution to the income at its 10th percentile (OECD, 2021). [4]      Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected individuals are not from the same group (ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc.; Alesina et al., 2003). The corresponding indices for ethnic/linguistic/religious fractionalization range from 0 (all individuals are from the same ethnic group/speak the same language/are from the same religious group) to 1 (each individual belongs to a separate ethnic/linguistic/religious group).   5.  Individual experiences of social cohesion   The previous sections of the report examined the levels and trends of social cohesion in South Africa and its provinces. Correlational analyses on the level of the provinces offered insights into potential structural characteristics that determine the local level of cohesion. In this section, we go down to the individual level to explore which population groups might be at risk of experiencing low cohesion in South Africa.   5.1  Data and method   There are several methodological approaches for identifying groups at risk of experiencing low cohesion, each involving different assumptions. One possibility is to perform separate analyses relating the individual scores on the overall cohesion index and its nine dimensions to the respondents' relevant socio-demographic and economic characteristics. This approach will likely lead to a plethora of results that are difficult to systematize. In order to reduce the complexity without a substantial loss of information, we prefer to identify classes (distinct groups) of respondents based on the pattern of their scores on the nine dimensions of social cohesion. The resulting classes are characterized by similarities within and dissimilarities across the classes concerning the experience of the nine aspects of cohesion by the respondents who belong to them. In a second step, we relate class membership to socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. In simpler terms, we investigate how the experience of social cohesion is related to individual characteristics. An example could be rich and poor citizens experiencing different levels of social cohesion.   To classify respondents into groups with distinct experiences of cohesion, we employ Latent Class Analysis. To cite from the abstract of a recent overview paper (Weller et al., 2020): “Latent class analysis (LCA) is a statistical procedure used to identify qualitatively different subgroups within populations who often share certain outward characteristics. The assumption underlying LCA is that membership in unobserved groups (or classes) can be explained by patterns of scores across survey questions, assessment indicators, or scales.” We take respondents’ scores on the nine dimensions of social cohesion in 2024 as the basis for the LCAs performed here.   LCAs are typically undertaken sequentially. The statistical procedure is programmed to come up with different numbers of groups, usually starting with two distinct groups (classes) and continuing until several groups (classes) are distinguished that offer plausible pathways of interpretation: Who are the people grouped into Class 1, Class 2, …, Class k ? It is customary to summarize interpretations by labeling the different classes in a way that best characterizes their response patterns. Next to interpretability, specific indices of goodness-of-fit aid the decision of how many groups are most plausible to extract from the available data (Weller et al., 2020). These include the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the (sample-size-adjusted) Bayesian Information Criterion ( BIC , saBIC ), which do not have pre-defined thresholds but inform comparisons of solutions: The solution with the lower AIC  and ( sa ) BIC would be deemed better. Goodness-of-fit indices with pre-defined thresholds include the Entropy coefficient H  and the Average Probability of Class Membership ( APCM ): Each should be greater than .90 for excellent fit or .80 for acceptable fit. Table A.21 of Appendix D documents the goodness-of-fit indices of five different LCA solutions. Table A.22 of Appendix D shows the population-weighted relative sizes of the classes in the total sample ( N  = 3172) from the various LCA solutions.   Based on the resulting goodness-of-fit indices of the LCA models we specified and considering the classes' interpretability, we selected the LCA model producing four classes.   5.2  Four classes of experience   Table 5.1 provides an overview of respondents’ average scores on the nine dimensions of cohesion, which served as the basis for the LCA, and the overall index of social cohesion within each class. Class 1 encompasses 18.6 % of the respondents. It is characterized by low cohesion with an average score of 37.5 out of 100 points. Classes 2 and 3 encompass 29.1 % and 41.8 % of the respondents, respectively. Both exhibit a moderate overall level of social cohesion with an average score of 54.6 in Class 2 and 54.4 in Class 3. Class 4, encompassing only 10.5 % of the respondents, exhibits a high level of social cohesion with an average score on the overall index of 73.3 points.   Table 1.8 Social cohesion and its dimensions in the four classes     A closer look at the average scores of the classes on the nine dimensions reveals the aspects of cohesion along which the classes differ from each other (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). Likely due to the large sample sizes of most classes, a series of Scheffe pairwise comparisons from one-way analyses of variance for each of the dimensions informs of significant differences ( p  ≤ 0.01) among all classes on all dimensions except for Identification between Class 2 ( M  = 72.4) and Class 3 ( M = 72.1).   Respondents within Class 1 (low cohesion) exhibit a high level of identification (67.4). The strength of their social networks (49.6), their solidarity with weak others (54.6), and their involvement in civic life (48.5) is moderate. Members of Class 1 place low trust in others (25.1) and in institutions (30.7), and have a low perception of fairness (27.0). Their tolerance for diversity is very low (15.4). These respondents also have a very low perception that social rules are respected (18.8). Class 1 can be described as Critics.   Members of Class 2 (moderate cohesion) exhibit a mixed profile. They are well-networked socially (67.3), place high trust in others (71.6), and have high levels of tolerance for diversity (63.6), strong identification (72.4) as well as strong solidarity with weak others (66.3). Their involvement in civic life is also high (61.5). However, the trust they place in institutions is low (37.2), and they perceive low levels of fairness (29.9) and respect for rules (22.1). Class 2 can be described as Integrated sceptics. Figure 1.6 Average scores of dimensions in the four classes   Note : The figure visualizes the average scores of the social cohesion dimensions in each of the four classes of respondents.   Members of Class 3 (moderate cohesion) rate most social cohesion aspects on the middle level. The strength of their solidarity with others (58.0) is moderate to high. Moderate are the level of trust they place in institutions (56.5), their involvement in civic life (56.1), the strength of their social networks (56.0), their level of perceived fairness (51.5), and the trust they place in other people (50.2). Further, these respondents have a moderate perception that rules are observed (46.4). Their tolerance for diversity, however, is moderate to low (42.9). Identification with the country (72.1) is the only strong aspect of cohesion in this class of respondents. If these were findings on the US society, we would label this class Middle America, with strong loyalty to the country and below-average acceptance of otherness. Class 3 can be described as Middle South Africa.   Members of Class 4 express a very strong identification with the country (80.3) and high levels of social cohesion in all aspects. Class 4 appears to be South Africa’s ideal-typical model of strong cohesion. It can be described as Cohesive communities.   Across all four classes, Identification with the country was found to be consistently high. In contrast, the deficits in Respect for social rules, particularly in Class 1 and Class 2, emerge yet again as an antithesis to citizens’ loyalty to the country.   5.3  Socio-demographics of the four classes   In this section, we explore which individual characteristics are typical for the four classes with distinct experiences of social cohesion. We do so using the following socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics: biological sex (male, female), age group (18 to 24, 25 to 44, 45 to 64, 65 years and above), race (White, Black, Indian/Asian, Other), primary language (English, Afrikaans, Indigenous), marital status (single, married or living as married, windowed or divorced), community size (rural or village, town or city, metropolitan area), education (post-secondary, secondary, lower or none), employment status (employed, not in workforce, unemployed), and income class [1] (low, lower-middle, upper-middle, high, missing). Data on these characteristics stem from Wave 1 of Khayabus 2024.   The four classes were characterized in the framework of separate chi-square tests of independence between respondents’ class membership and the respective individual characteristics of interest. Table 5.2 documents the population-weighted relative frequencies (%) of the socio-demographic and socio-economic categories in the total sample and in each of the four classes as well as the respective result from the chi-square test of independence and Cramer’s V  coefficient of effect size. Due to the large sample sizes in three of the classes, six out of nine tests emerged as statistically significant, but all effect sizes are small. Insignificant are the relationships between class membership and biological sex, marital status, and level of education. We, therefore, focus rather on the tendencies in the data.   Class 1, the Critics, is characterized by an overproportional representation of women (54.9 %), respondents from the age group 25-44 years (53.1 %), persons of other race (11.4 %), speakers of Afrikaans (17.0 %), singles (60.5 %), dwellers in towns or cities (30.0 %), unemployed (39.3 %), members of the low-income class (23.2 %) and persons who refused to report their household income (43.6 %). Class 1 is further characterized by an underrepresentation of men (45.1 %), respondents from the age group 45-64 years (24.1 %), Blacks (81.3 %), speakers of English (7.6 %), married or living together as married (29.9 %), dwellers in villages or rural areas (28.9 %), employed (40.2 %), and members of the lower-middle (9.4 %), upper-middle (13.2 %), and high-income class (10.6 %).   Class 2, the Integrated sceptics, is characterized by an overproportional representation of Whites (10.4 %) and Indian/Asian (4.1 %), speakers of English (14 %) and Afrikaans (16.7 %), respondents who have completed secondary (50.6 %) and post-secondary education (17.3 %), employed (47.7 %), and members of the high-income class (19.1 %). Conversely, Class 2 is characterized by an underproportional representation of respondents from the age group 18-24 years (13 %), Blacks (76.8 %), speakers of indigenous languages (69.3 %), respondents who have low or no completed education (32.1 %), respondents who are not in the workforce (15.8 %), and members of the low-income class (18.2 %).   Class 3, Middle South Africa, is characterized by an overproportional representation of respondents from the age group 18-24 years (17.2 %), Blacks (87.7 %), speakers of indigenous languages (79.7 %), dwellers in towns and cities (29.0 %), respondents with low or no completed education (38.4 %), respondents who are not in the workforce (21.9 %), and members of the low (25.0 %) and lower-middle income class (12.9 %). In contrast, Class 3 is characterized by an underproportional representation of respondents from the age group 25-44 years (48.7 %), non-Blacks (Whites – 4.3 %, Indian/Asian – 1.4 %, Other – 6.6 %), speakers of Afrikaans (10.3 %), dwellers in metropolitan areas (40.0 %), respondents who have completed secondary education (47.5 %), employed (41.7 %), and respondents who have refused to report their household income (33.4 %).    Table 1.9 Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents     Class 4, the Cohesive Communities, is characterized by an overproportional representation of men (53.1 %), respondents from the age group 45-64 years (28.6 %), Blacks (85.6 %) and Indian/Asian (4.0 %), speakers of indigenous languages (78.9 %), married or living together as married (35.8 %), divorced or widowed (10.7 %), dwellers in metropolitan areas (48.8 %), employed (52.1 %), and respondents who have refused to report their household income (39.7 %). Conversely, Class 4 is characterized by an underrepresentation of women (46.9 %), respondents from the age group 18-24 years (14.0 %), Whites (1.7 %), speakers of Afrikaans (10.7 %), singles (53.5 %), dwellers in towns or cities (20.2 %), respondents who are not in the workforce (18.4 %), unemployed (29.5 %), and members of the low-income class (17.3 %). [1]      Income classes were derived from the reported total household income. The latter was equivalized concerning household size using the modified OECD equivalence scale. Respondents with equivalized household income lower than 60 % of the median belong to the low-income class, from 60 % to 100 % - to the lower-middle income class, from 100 % to 200 % - to the upper-middle income class, greater than 200 % - to the high-income class. Respondents with a missing value on household income are treated as a separate group due to the large share of non-response (41.5 %).   6.  Social cohesion and subjective well-being   In the present section, we inspect the data to determine whether they support the consistent finding from our previous studies on the topic that high levels of social cohesion are related to greater (subjective) well-being. We employ the following five items from the Khayabus survey as proxies of well-being:   Think of the way your family lives, would you say that your family is… better off than a year ago / about the same / worse off than a year ago? And how do you think your family’s lives will be in a year’s time? Do you think your family will be… better off than today / about the same / worse off than today? Please think about your children or the children of family or friends. What do you think the future holds for these children? Do you think that… they have a bright future ahead of them / they have a bleak future ahead of them? And your satisfaction with life? Has it… improved/staying the same/worse compared to a few months ago? On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate whether you (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) agree or (5) strongly agree with the following statement: I am seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so.   We perform analyses both on the level of provinces and of individuals.   6.1  Provinces   We aggregate the individual responses to the five items to measure well-being on the level of provinces. For each province, we take the respective share of the positive response option to each of the four items with categorically scaled answers (better off, bright future, improved) and the arithmetic mean of the individual responses to the Likert-scale item tapping on emigration.   We apply the same methodological approach as in Section 4, which explored associations between several structural characteristics of the provinces and the index of social cohesion. Table A.20 of Appendix C documents the biserial bivariate correlations on the individual level and the bivariate and partial Pearson correlations on the level of provinces. As in Section 4, we report and interpret the results from the Spearman correlations partialled for GDP (see Table 6.1).   Table 1.10 Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces     The share of respondents evaluating their family’s life as better off today than a year ago exhibits a very strong positive correlation with the level of social cohesion in respondents’ province (ρ = .79). The same was found for the share of respondents evaluating their life satisfaction as improved in comparison to a few months ago (ρ = .77). Further, in more cohesive provinces, there are larger shares of respondents believing that their family’s lives will be better off than today in a year (ρ = .68) and that their children will have a bright future ahead (ρ = .79). The share of respondents who consider emigrating to another country tends to be negligibly lower in the more cohesive provinces (ρ = -.10).   The provinces' results indicate that social cohesion is conducive to a positive life evaluation, higher life satisfaction, and greater optimism. They are entirely in line with our findings from other continents: The higher the level of social cohesion in a geopolitical entity, the more positive people’s outlook on life (see Dragolov et al., 2016; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Arant et al., 2017; Boehnke et al., 2024).   6.2  Individuals   To investigate the association between social cohesion and subjective well-being on the individual level, we relate the individual responses to the well-being items to respondents’ membership in the four distinct classes of experiencing social cohesion. As most of the items on well-being are of categorical measurement quality, we apply the approach from Section 5 to describe the four classes based on respondents’ socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Table 6.2 documents the results. Unlike the very weak relationships found in Section 5, the individual experience of social cohesion exhibits somewhat stronger associations with four of the indicators of subjective well-being.   Table 1.11 Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents     The evidence presents a clear picture. The greatest share of respondents who evaluate their family’s life as better off than a year ago was found in Class 4, Cohesive Communities (46.3 %). The second largest share was found in Class 3, Middle South Africa (22 %). The lowest shares were found in Class 2, Integrated sceptics (18.2 %), and Class 1, Critics (19.6 %). The largest shares of respondents evaluating their family’s life as worse off than a year ago were found in Class 1 (35.5 %) and Class 2 (34 %).   Moving on to the two indicators of optimism, we find similar evidence. The largest share of respondents believing their family’s life would be better off than today in a year was found again in Class 4 (59.1 %). Class 3 appears somewhat reserved, given that most believed life would be about the same (45.3 %). Again, in Class 1 (29.7 %) and Class 2 (27 %), we find the largest shares of respondents who believe their family’s life would be worse off than today. It should be mentioned, though, that within Class 1 and Class 2, the share of pessimists is counterbalanced by an approximately similarly sized share of optimists. Optimism regarding children’s future was found highest in Class 4, followed by Class 3: 71.8 % and 53.6 %, respectively, believe children would have a bright future ahead of them. Pessimism prevails in the other two classes, where about 64 % of the respondents believe children would have a bleak future ahead of them.   The above-described pattern holds for life satisfaction, too. The largest share of respondents evaluating their life satisfaction as improved was found in Class 4 (50.3 %), followed by Class 3 (30.4 %). Life satisfaction has worsened for the majority in Class 1 (41.4 %). Most of the respondents in Class 2 (48.4 %) and Class 3 (46.8 %) reported that their life satisfaction has stayed the same. And yet, in Class 3, the share of respondents for whom life satisfaction has increased (30.4 %) is larger than the share of those for whom it has worsened (22.8 %); this pattern is reversed in Class 2.   Finally, the association between the experience of social cohesion and emigration is rather blurred. An overwhelming majority in each class (65.4% in Class 2 and over 70 % in the other classes) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, “I am seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so.” The disagreement rate is highest in Class 4 (75.5 %). Class 2 has the relatively highest rate of agreement with the statement (17.8 %), followed by Class 1 (14.9 %) and Class 4 (12.8 %), whereas only 11.7 % of Class 3 consider emigrating. High social cohesion appears insufficient to discourage people from emigrating. The relationship is, however, very weak in terms of effect size.   7.  Discussion and conclusion   South Africa has debated social cohesion ever since the end of the apartheid regime, especially in light of the Rainbow Nation concept. However, only two empirical studies have assessed South Africa's social cohesion during all these years. The insights that this past research provided are, by and large, piecemeal and outdated by now.   The present study aimed to assess social cohesion in South Africa, tracking its development from 2021 to 2024; to identify structural factors that promote or impede it; to explore social groups at risk of experiencing low cohesion, and to examine the relationship between social cohesion and citizens' well-being. Cohesion was conceptualized and operationalized along the measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar which has been used as a model to quantify societal cohesiveness in altogether over 60 countries across the world. The study drew on the data from Waves 1 of the Khayabus survey, a population-representative cross-sectional survey fielded annually by IPSOS South Africa. Below, we summarize and discuss the results in light of previous evidence but mostly leave the conclusions to the political bodies engaging with the study results.   In 2024, the overall level of social cohesion in South Africa as a whole was found moderate at 53.3 points (of maximum 100). It went through a steady, though slow, decline from 53.5 points in 2021, the starting point of our analysis, to 51.7 points in 2023. In 2023, the downward trend in South Africa’s overall level of social cohesion halted and reversed in an upward direction. The previously accrued decline has been almost overcome. Yet, one needs to consider that our study offers insights on the recent four years only of altogether three decades since apartheid – a new chapter in South Africa’s history whose onset was marked by hope, reconciliation and the vision to create a Rainbow Nation. The current – only moderate – level of cohesion suggests that the South African society is perhaps still far from its ambitious founding goal. The glue that holds the South African society together consists mostly of the high level of identification with the country (72.2) but also of high solidarity with weaker fellow citizens (61.3) and relatively well functioning social networks (59.9). Political attention must, however, be paid to the widely perceived lack of respect for social rules (36.6), as it can spark turmoil. Policy makers may also consider overcoming the perceived lack of distributional fairness (42.7), strengthening acceptance of diversity (46.8) and trust in institutions (47.9).   To put the findings on South Africa in a comparative perspective, we refer to the case of Germany (see Boehnke et al., 2024). Interestingly, Germany’s level of social cohesion in 2023 (52 points) was almost identical to South Africa’s in the same year. Germany also experienced a downward, though much steeper, trend, losing nine points on the overall index between 2020 and 2023. The COVID pandemic is often seen as one of the reasons for dwindling social cohesion. In the authors’ view, which for reasons of data availability is not backed by empirical data, a reversal in the downward trend in Germany is not in sight yet, considering the intensifying societal and political polarization on pressing issues such as the inflation, the Ukraine-Russia military conflict, migration and violent crime, to name a few. A comparison of the results from 2023 further reveals that the two countries do not have identical profiles of cohesion. What they have in common are a similar strength of Social networks, practically the same level of Trust in institutions, and a lacking Perception of fairness. Germany’s profile is much stronger with respect to Acceptance of diversity and, quite stereotypically, Respect for social rules, but weaker with respect to Trust in people, Identification, Civic participation, and particularly Solidarity and helpfulness (34 points). Extending the scope to the comparison of 34 EU and OECD member states (Dragolov et al., 2016), we find considerable similarities in the pattern of strengths and weakness between South Africa and Israel. The society of Israel exhibits similarly strong Identification, moderate Solidarity, Social networks, and Trust in people, as well as pronounced deficits in the Perception of fairness and Respect for social rules. No country among the 22 Asian studied (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018) exhibits this profile. Nevertheless, in light of South Africa’s membership in BRICS, we briefly outline the cohesion profiles of India and China for comparison purposes. India’s profile is characterized by very weak Social networks, low Trust in people, very low Acceptance of diversity, very low Identification, moderate Trust in institutions, very low Perception of fairness, low Solidarity and helpfulness, moderate Respect for social rules, and moderate Civic participation. In contrast, China’s profile is characterized by strong Social networks, very high Trust in people, moderate Acceptance of diversity, moderate Identification, very high Trust in institutions, moderate Perception of fairness, very low Solidarity and helpfulness, high Respect for social rules, and very low Civic participation.   The survey data further allowed us to examine cohesion in the nine South African provinces. In 2024 as well as in all previous years analyzed, all provinces achieved scores on the overall index in the interval designating a moderate level of cohesion. Yet, despite an improvement of +3.5 points from 2023 to 2024, KwaZulu-Natal had (again) the relatively lowest level of social cohesion (49.6). Below the South African average are currently also the provinces of North West (52.0), Free State (52.1), and Mpumalanga (53.2). Limpopo (56.5) had (again) the relatively highest level of social cohesion than the rest of the country, despite a decline of -1.8 points from 2023 to 2024.   The look into people’s subjective experience of social cohesion yielded four groups (classes) with distinctive patterns of strengths and weakness. Class 4, Cohesive communities, emerged in 2024 as an ideal-typical model of strong cohesion but represents only some 10 % of the South African society. In contrast, Class 1, the Critics, did emerge also in 2024 as the segment of the population (18.6 %) that experiences worrying deficits in five of altogether nine aspects of cohesion, most alarming of which are the critically low levels of acceptance of diversity (15.4 points) and respect for social rules (18.8 points). This at-risk population segment encompasses overproportionally more women, respondents from the age group 25-44 years, persons of other race, speakers of Afrikaans, singles, dwellers in towns or cities, unemployed, and members of the low-income class. It would be an overstatement and, moreover, methodologically inappropriate, to conclude that, i.e., all women or all low-income earners are at risk of experiencing low social cohesion. However, some of the above listed social groups and, in particular, combinations thereof, certainly deserve policy makers’ attention.   Next, several surprising results on the associations between the structural characteristics of the provinces and their level of social cohesion need to be highlighted. Previous studies elsewhere have always yielded that geopolitical entities enjoying higher levels of per capita GDP also exhibit higher social cohesion, Scandinavia being the most prominent example. Findings for Asian countries corroborate that result (Delhey et al., 2018). In South Africa, the wealth of the provinces is unrelated to their level of cohesion. Our study, furthermore, finds conflicting results on poverty and inequality. On the one hand, social cohesion is lower in provinces where more households view themselves as poor but not lower in provinces where more people objectively live in poverty. That poverty harms cohesion has been a consistent finding in our studies on Western societies (Dragolov et al., 2016), Asian societies (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018) as well as Germany’s federal states and regions (Arant et al., 2017; Boehnke at al., 2024). On the other hand, though, social cohesion is lower in provinces with larger discrepancies in the income distribution, which is in line with the results on Western countries. Further, a negative link with median age (the younger the people in an area, the higher the level of social cohesion) was discovered, which appears counterintuitive at first glance. Another somewhat puzzling result is the positive correlation with ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. However, evidence on Asian societies shows that ethnic and linguistic diversity are conducive to social cohesion up to a certain extent and harmful beyond it. Another counterintuitive result is the positive association between the level of social cohesion in the provinces and the share of citizens without access to the internet. By no means should the latter finding be interpreted such that wider provision of access to the internet per se harms social cohesion. The internet is merely a tool. It empowers people by facilitating, e.g., economic activity, access to knowledge, and social interactions, but also has its dark sides promoting criminal activity, the spread of fake news and misinformation as well as discursive polarization. Further research is needed to shed more light on the mechanism operating behind the finding at stake, but one thing is for sure: One should not throw the baby out with the dirty bathwater.   Beside the counterintuitive and surprising results discussed above, the analyses of the provinces’ structural characteristics offer insights on how to strengthen social cohesion. To begin with, the provinces’ level of social cohesion was found to correlate positively with the Human Development Index, and negatively with subjective poverty, unemployment, and income inequality. These findings suggest that social cohesion can be enhanced by enabling inclusive (people-centered) economic progress, reducing unemployment, and lowering income inequality. In addition, we found negative associations between the provinces’ level of social cohesion and the shares of citizens with completed secondary and post-secondary degrees. We assume that this is due to an underperformance of the South African economy in providing adequate jobs for the highly qualified. Next, cohesion in the provinces was found to correlate positively with the share of married citizens – conversely, negatively with the share of singles. The latter finding suggests that social cohesion can be fostered by promoting a family-oriented life-style. Finally, we found a positive relationship between the provinces’ level of social cohesion and the share of rural population – conversely, a negative relationship with the share of urban population. It is likely that dwellers in rural areas feel forced to leave their otherwise supportive rural communities in a pursuit of better living conditions and greater economic opportunities in the urban centers, where social cohesion tends to be lower. This could be avoided by efforts to bring the living conditions in rural and urban areas to an equally adequate level.   And yet, what is social cohesion good for? The present study on South Africa corroborates a core finding of essentially all other studies we have performed to measure social cohesion elsewhere: The quality of society (social cohesion) translates directly into citizens’ quality of life (subjective well-being). 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Social cohesion: A new definition and a proposal for its measurement in Africa  (Discussion Paper 31/2021). Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). https://doi.org/10.23661/dp31.2021.v1.1   OECD (2021). Old-age income inequality. In Pensions at a Glance 2021: OECD and G20 Indicators . OECD Publishing, Paris. doi: https://doi.org/10.1787/d1a5a309-en   Schiefer, D. & van der Noll, J. (2017). The essentials of social cohesion: A literature review. Social Indicators Research, 132 (2), 579-603. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1314-5   Statistics South Africa (2023a). Census 2022. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa (2023b). Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Quarter 4: 2022. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa (2024a). Estimation of regional gross domestic product for South Africa: Experimental estimates. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa (2024b). Population Estimates. Pretoria: Stats SA   Statistics South Africa (2024c). Subjective poverty in South Africa. Findings from the General Household Surveys 2019 and 2022. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Wasserstein, R. L., Schirm, A. L., & Lazar, N. A. (2019). Moving to a World Beyond “ p  < 0.05.”  The American Statistician, 73 (sup1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2019.1583913   Weller, B. E., Bowen, N. K., & Faubert, S. J. (2020). Latent Class Analysis: A guide to best practice. Journal of Black Psychology, 46 (4), 287-311. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095798420930932 Appendices   Appendix A: Indicators of cohesion across time   This Appendix documents the population-weighted relative frequencies of the response categories of the indicators used to calculate the social cohesion scores in the report. The reported values pertain to the respective percentage distributions in the total sample for each year of data collection.   Table A.12 Indicators of Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” across time Table A.13 Indicators of Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” across time Table A.14 Indicators of Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” across time Table A.15 Indicators of Dimension 2.1 “Identification” across time Table A.16 Indicators of Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” across time Table A.17 Indicators of Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” across time Table A.18 Indicators of Dimension 3.1 “Solidarity and helpfulness” across time Table A.19 Indicators of Dimensions 3.2 “Respect for social rules” across time Table A.20 Indicators of Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation” across time Appendix B: Dimensions of cohesion in the provinces over time   This Appendix contains results on the level and change over time in the nine single dimensions of social cohesion across the provinces of South Africa.   Domain “Social Relations”   Table A.21 Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” in the provinces across time Table A.22 Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” in the provinces across time Table A.23 Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” in the provinces across time Domain “Connectedness”   Table A.24 Dimension 2.1 “Identification” in the provinces across time Table A.25 Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” in the provinces across time Table A.26 Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” in the provinces across time Domain “Focus on the Common Good”   Table A.27 Dimension 3.1 “Solidarity and helpfulness” in the provinces across time Table A.28 Dimension 3.2 “Respect for social rules” in the provinces across time Table A.29 Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation“ in the provinces across time Appendix C: Correlations of social cohesion on the province level   Table A.30 Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table A.31 Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Appendix D: Latent class analyses   This Appendix documents goodness-of-fit indices for the various LCA models specified.   Table A.32 Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions Table A.33 Relative class sizes for LCA solutions   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

  • How China can accelerate an African and South African green economy and technology expansion, and low-carbon development

    Occasional Paper 2/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. J A N U A R Y 2 0 2 5 This paper has been prepared for presentation at the International Conference on “Resource and Environmental Technology Innovation Boosts China-Africa Green and Low-Carbon Development” in Shanghai and Jinhua from 1 – 5 November 2024 Daryl Swanepoel MPA, BPAHons, ND: Co. Admin Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University       Abstract   Green energy, low-carbon development and green technology offer economic opportunities for South Africa and African countries, which have abundant potential for renewable energy generation. However, the scale and pace of investment in green energy in Africa is sorely inadequate. Inconsistent policies, inefficient public services, corruption and lack of rule of law all undermine domestic private and international development finance involvement in green projects. Limited access to finance, inadequate infrastructure, and insufficient government incentives for the private sector, households and foreign investors, also deter new investors. Thirty of the world’s 40 most climate vulnerable countries are in Africa, yet Africa emits only 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Unless Africa responds effectively to climate change, up to 118 million people will live in abject poverty by 2030.   South Africa and Africa should look to China for lessons on the way forward. China is the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions by volume but now produces most of the world’s renewable energy. China expanded its renewable energy capacity with astonishing speed and scale. The country’s industrial policy – based on a pillar of world-class infrastructure suitable for shipping goods anywhere in the world – turned China into a global giant manufacturer of electric vehicles. Partnering with China would open up many opportunities for both parties to boost their green economies and technologies, and low-carbon development – together preparing for what will surely be more stormy weather ahead.   Introduction   Green energy, low-carbon development and green technology offer economic opportunities for South Africa and African countries.   They can drive economic growth, create jobs and reduce poverty through the creation of new manufacturing industries, the development of new technologies, the development of a green economy, and the expansion of infrastructure, agriculture and ecotourism (Biswas & Yila, 2022). South Africa and Africa have abundant potential for renewable energy generation, and not only for their own consumption.   However, the scale and pace of investment in green energy in Africa is inadequate. South Africa and Africa’s transition to a green economy must be secured in such a way that it lifts inclusive economic growth, increases development and expands industrialisation.   Developed countries such as Denmark – which generates 57% of its power from wind energy – have energy mixes that are dominated by renewable energy, but still rely on fossil fuels, either for baseload power, the transport industry or for heavy export industries.   African countries are also struggling to source funding to address losses and damages linked to climate change. It is estimated that developing countries, including those in Africa, need at least US$100 billion a year to adequately finance a Loss and Damage Fund aimed at compensating them for such losses and damages (Kabukuru, 2023).   Regional power pools, whether through renewable energy or gas, are critical to boost individual country power grids. This will require power to be traded between countries, and so avoid energy shortages or surpluses sitting idle.   But there are many obstacles getting in the way of progress. Inconsistent policies and regulations in South Africa and other African countries, inefficient public services, high levels of corruption and lack of rule of law undermine domestic private and international development finance involvement in green projects.   Limited access to finance and insufficient government incentives for the private sector, households and foreign investors, deter green investments. South Africa and African countries also have inadequate infrastructure for green projects, which hinders delivery and puts off new investors. South Africa and almost all African countries need to upgrade and expand their existing grid infrastructure, while building new renewable energy generation capacity.   Foreign businesses in Africa often do not implement green practices, as there is largely a lack of enforcement in these countries. Whereas local African businesses are often simply not aware of the benefits of green practices, nor do they have the capacity to implement them, nor are there, in many instances, government incentives to do so (UNDP, 2024).   South Africa and Africa could become world leaders in motoring the green economy, if they set appropriate policies and regulations, muster up the political will to push for green energy and secure the requisite investments.   However, South Africa and African countries lack public funds to finance the green economy and low-carbon development. There is also a lack of funding for countries to mitigate against and adapt to climate change. Grant funding is critical for this. Development finance, private finance, and public-private finance is critical to achieve the green economy goals.   James Murombedzi, head of the Addis Ababa-based African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC), says that Africa will have to explore innovative private sector financing structures such as debt-for-nature and debt-for-climate swaps to overcome the climate financial gap. At the African Climate Summit, African leaders expressed their frustrations with the industrialised countries’ inability to honour their commitments to provide adequate climate finance.    The route to climate change mitigation is clear. The International Energy Authority’s (IEA) Roadmap to Net Zero by 2050 , first published in May 2021, outlined how the world can reduce global warming to 1.5°C. It says the world must reduce use of fossil fuels, double energy efficiency, and increase and expand the range of clean energy technologies. The IEA says tripling global installed renewable power capacity, such as solar and wind, by the end of the current decade is the most important lever to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.    Africa disproportionately impacted by climate change   The Paris Agreement’s goal is to curb global warming to 1.5˚C. However, these targets are far off. Africa emits only 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions, and yet, the continent is disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of climate change – with temperature rises higher than the global average (Climate Adaptation Platform, 2024).   A 2024 report by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) shows that 2023 was the warmest year globally on record. The report shows that the three major greenhouse gases – carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide – reached a new record in 2022. It says ocean warming continues to increase, with the ocean heat content at a historic high in 2023.   The report notes that as the ocean absorbs a quarter of annual human-caused emissions, increasing emissions also decreases pH, a process known as “ocean acidification”. This affects organisms and ecosystem services, including food security, by reducing biodiversity, degrading habitats, and endangering fisheries and aquaculture.   As a result, the WMO report reveals that African countries are losing 2-5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to climate change. Many of these countries set aside 9% of their budget to respond to climate extremes. The cost of climate adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa is very high, estimated to be between US$30-50 billion annually over the next decade, representing 2-3% of their GDP.   Unless Africa responds effectively to climate change, up to 118 million people will live in abject poverty – living on less than US$1.90 per day by 2030 – and will be exposed to drought, floods, and other extreme weather conditions, the report says. In fact, “between 1970 and 2021, Africa accounted for 35% of weather, climate, and water-related fatalities” (WMO, 2024).   In 2023, droughts cut North Africa’s cereal production to 10% below a five-year average. In Sudan, sorghum and millet production in 2023 decreased by about 25% and 50%, respectively, compared to 2022 (WMO, 2024).   Thirty of the world’s 40 most climate vulnerable countries are in Africa. A 2022 Mo Ibrahim Foundation report, The Road to COP27: Making Africa’s Case in the Global Climate Debate , emphasised that Africa’s small contribution to CO2 emissions, and the continent’s disproportionate vulnerability to the negative impact of climate change, should necessitate the continent getting climate financing from industrial countries responsible for emissions.   Crucial to consider is that Africa holds 65% of the uncultivated arable land left in the world, and therefore holds the key for the future of food globally. The rising global population makes optimising the productivity of available land even more urgent, since climate change reduces water availability and reduces crop productivity.   “Extreme weather – including droughts, cyclones and heatwaves – is increasing in frequency and intensity, alongside trends of urbanisation, population growth and weak conservation enforcement. Ecosystem damage and biodiversity loss is now having major negative impacts on livelihoods, causing US$7-15 billion in yearly losses (projected to reach US$40 billion by 2030)” (UNDP, 2023: 19).   Research by the ACPC showed “the increasing frequency and severity of climate change impacts resulting in disproportionate effects on African economies and societies, with countries estimated to be losing on average 2-5% of GDP and many countries diverting up to 9% of their budgets into unplanned expenditures on responses to extreme weather events.”   At the same time, over 600 million people in Africa lack electricity. Affordable clean energy sources is therefore critical to plug the power gap. Africa’s collective approach to combat climate change   African countries, at an Africa Climate Summit in September 2023, adopted the “Nairobi Declaration” as a broad approach to combat climate change and facilitate a green transition in the region (African Union, 2023). The Nairobi Declaration called for climate-positive growth, renewable energy expansion, the protection and enhancement of biodiversity and nature; green industrialisation; sustainable agriculture; standards, metrics and market mechanisms to value nature, biodiversity and co-benefits; and African countries to adopt policy and enabling environments to support the development of the green economy.   The Nairobi Declaration outlined some of the opportunities for the African region, including the opportunity emerging from its youthful demographics. They could become new markets for innovative solutions and business models. But there are also formidable challenges such as rapidly urbanising populations; lack of skills, resources, capital and political will; and old economy thinking among African governments, political and business elites.   African countries as a group demand that developed countries provide between US$200-400 billion a year by 2030 for loss and damage because of climate change; and US$400 billion a year for adapting to climate change. This is, on top of funding required to reduce emissions.    In December 2023, the Conference of the Parties 28 (COP28) pledged record funding to climate change transition, including to Africa. However, the pledges to Africa at COP28 deferred major financial decisions to COP29, only contributing US$134 million and US$792 million to the Adaptation Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund respectively (Mbungu, Ogallo & Rudic, 2024).   Also in 2023, an Arab-African initiative was launched to improve agriculture and food systems in both regions. The “Africa and Middle East SAFE Initiative”, a public-private partnership, aims to mobilise US$10 billion in funding to support green agriculture. The idea is that Africa can provide food solutions to the Middle East, “where water stress poses immense challenges for food production, and where the cost of water desalinisation is prohibitive for competitive food production to assure food security” (Adesina, 2023).   The project aims to unlock green investments and promote climate-smart agriculture. The focus will be on irrigating two million hectares of African farmland, enhancing climate resilience for 10 million smallholder farmers, with a focus on women and young people, creating two million green jobs, and exporting two million metric tons of food crops from Africa to the Middle East.   In January 2023, African countries organised the Feed Africa Summit in Dakar – convened by the African Development Bank and the Government of Senegal, under the chairmanship of President Macky Sall – where 34 African Heads of State and Government signed the Dakar Declaration.   They agreed to establish food and agriculture delivery compacts, which are clear roadmaps for fully unlocking the potentials of their food and agriculture sector. The African Development Bank mobilised US$72 billion to implement these food and agriculture delivery compacts. This will allow Africa to take proper advantage of the size of its food and agriculture market, which, if cultivated effectively, could reach US$1 trillion by 2030 (Adesina, 2023).   Back in 2016, the African Development Bank launched its Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT) – a continent-wide initiative designed to boost agricultural productivity by using new technologies. TAAT brings productivity-increasing technologies to crop, livestock and fish smallholder farmers. The TAAT programme transfers resilient agricultural technologies to smallholder farmers.    Africa’s green energy, low-carbon funding needs   Investing in green growth alternatives is expensive. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa calculates that US$2 trillion is needed in the power sector alone by 2050 to drive green economic growth in Africa. And yet, the IEA says less than 2% of global investments in clean energy flows into Africa, with the current annual flow of climate finance to Africa standing at US$29.5 billion.   Africa requires an annual capital commitment of US$277 billion to implement Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and achieve agreed-on climate objectives by 2030. The private sector’s involvement in Africa’s climate finance stands at 14%, equivalent to US$4.2 billion in 2021.    Central and East African countries have the largest climate investment shortage as a percentage of GDP, averaging 26% and 23%, respectively. North African countries have lower climate investment gaps, averaging 3% of GDP – they still require up to six times more green capital than current levels. Southern Africa has the largest financial gap in absolute terms, because of South Africa’s massive green capital requirements, around US$107 billion annually, according to the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP).     The UN Economic Commission for Africa’s Deputy Executive Secretary, Antonio Pedro, said African countries could marshal US$82 billion annually through accessing carbon markets. The United Nations (UN) estimated that combined developing and emerging countries, including Africa, need US$2 trillion annually by 2030 to deal with climate change.   Industrial countries have not delivered on their climate finance promises. African countries have called on industrialised countries to “scale up climate finance to make up for the shortfall caused by [their] failure to deliver US$100 billion per year by 2020 and through 2025” (Kabukuru, 2023). African countries are also asking for between US$200-400 billion a year by 2030 for climate losses and damage; and US$400 billion a year for climate change adaptation.   Industrial countries and emerging powers collectively paid out US$7 trillion in 2022, for producing coal, oil and natural gas, in the form of subsidies such as tax breaks or price caps (Parry, Black & Vernon-Li, 2021). China is the biggest subsidiser of fossil fuels, followed by the US, Russia, India and the European Union (EU) (Parry, Black & Vernon-Li, 2021).   Fossil-fuel subsidies rose during the global increase in energy prices caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the country’s economic reboots following the Covid-19 pandemic. The subsidies were the equivalent of 7.1% of global gross domestic product. The subsidies have risen by US$2 trillion over the past two years.   Following energy shortages because of the Russia-Ukraine war, many industrial countries have returned to the use of coal for power. In October 2023, Germany’s Cabinet approved putting on-reserve lignite-fired power plants back online until the end of March 2024, as a step to replace scarce natural gas this winter and avoid shortages. This happened in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a sudden drop in Russian gas imports to Germany – Berlin reactivated coal-fired power plants and extended their lifespans (Pole, 2022).   Austria, the Netherlands and Italy also, in 2023, started up their coal power stations (Pole, 2022). Previously the Netherlands had limited coal power to just over a third of the country’s power output.   In 2022, in its bid to cut planet-warming  emissions by 55% by 2030  from 1990 levels, the European Commission (EU) proposed a 100% reduction in CO2 emissions from new cars by 2035 (Pole, 2022). That means it would not be possible to sell combustion engine cars from then on. However, the German government refused to accept this ban.    Harnessing Africa’s own resources   African countries could also generate income from the value chains of non-renewable resources – for example, critical minerals – mainly found in Africa and essential for battery production.    African governments have made commitments to contribute US$26.4 billion from domestic public resources for green energy annually. However, given rising government debt, mismanagement and corruption, combined with competing developmental priorities, it is highly unlikely that they will reach these targets. Public-private partnerships to finance climate change and drive green business will be crucial.   The continent has abundant renewable energy resources. It accounts for 40% of global solar irradiation. It has a 20,000MW geothermal power potential; a 30,000MW hydropower potential and a 110,000MW wind power potential. The challenge is to secure a smart transition, growing renewable energy, increase decarbonisation by using gas and gradually easing out coal – or finding clean coal technology.   As for “green recovery”, pledges by industrial countries and multilateral organisations have not only been insufficient, but also not forthcoming. According to the UNDP, for every US dollar spent addressing the climate crisis, four dollars fund fossil-fuel subsidies, perpetuating the crisis (UNDP, 2024: 17).   The UNDP argues an urgent transition into green business is a necessity for Africa to overcome the “dual challenges posed by the increasingly extreme impacts of climate change and the imperatives of continued economic growth”. It argues a green business transition “represents the opportunity to pursue alternative growth models, leapfrog generations of technology and build a more sustainable future” (UNDP, 2024:17).   Many industrial companies have become guilty of “greenwashing” in Africa. They mislead the public by claiming their products, policies and Environment, Sustainability and Governance (ESG) are environmentally friendly. Banks, mining and fossil fuel companies are among the key culprits in greenwashing. United Nations Secretary General António Guterres at COP27 in November 2022, criticised the practice as dishonest and undermining the fight against climate change.   In August 2024, TotalEnergies, the world’s 19th-biggest greenhouse gas emitter, was found guilty of misleading sustainability advertising in South Africa. TotalEnergies was found guilty of greenwashing by the South African Advertising Regulatory Board (ARB). The complaint was filed by campaign group Fossil Free South Africa.   The lawsuit centred on a partnership between TotalEnergies and South Africa National Parks (SANParks), in which the two organisations partnered in a #FuelYourExperience competition, encouraging people to visit South Africa’s parks. In an advertisement, TotalEnergies said: “We’re committed to sustainable development and environmental protection”, which Fossil Ad Ban highlighted as being “false and misleading” and was “greenwashing”.   Fossil Ad Ban cited the energy company’s “response to the 2015 Paris Climate Treaty has been not to cut, but to continue to expand its emissions, by another 14 million tonnes, to 400 million tonnes of carbon dioxide by 2022” (Doris, 2024). The ARB also ruled that there was “no doubt that the core business of the Advertiser is directly opposed to the issue of sustainable development, as the ongoing exploitation of fossil fuels is contra-indicated in this context” (Doris, 2024).   But developed countries also often misrepresent their policies, initiatives and projects in Africa as “green”, while it is totally the opposite. Unfortunately, African countries do not have laws against greenwashing. Some EU and Southeast Asian nations have introduced guidelines of financial practices to prevent greenwashing.   The UNDP has proposed several key recommendations for how Africa could leverage the green economy. The organisation has proposed the establishment of dedicated green investment banks, facilities and funds, with a specific mandate to support the development of green business in the region via green financing products.   The international organisation proposed that Africa create an urban green business and finance platform to help support Africa’s rapidly growing cities to meet the dual challenges of rapid urbanisation and climate change. The UNDP calls on multi-lateral development banks to do more to reduce investment risk in Africa through the creation of new and innovative instruments, funds and facilities.   The UNDP also called for African countries to establish nature as an asset class, leveraging the lessons from carbon markets elsewhere as well as Africa’s nature-rich status, to build robust carbon and biodiversity markets. The UNDP proposes that African countries enhance green value chains and capacity, leveraging Africa’s natural abundance of minerals needed in the green transition, along with the region’s sustainable energy, to ensure greater value addition remains within the communities and areas involved in mineral extraction.     South Africa: energy mix   South Africa’s energy mix in 2023/2024 consists of 82.8% coal, with renewable energy providing 8.8%, amounting to 42 000 MW. Nuclear power makes up 6% of electricity output and gas only contributes 3% of South Africa’s power generation. Upgrades to South Africa’s only nuclear plant, at Koeberg, have seen its two reactors having lifetimes extended to 2045 and 2047.   Coal will remain the main source of energy for the immediate future (ITA, 2024). However, around 8.7GW of non-hydro renewable energy capacity is planned to be installed between 2023 and 2032. Solar energy will be the primary source of expansion.   South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnerships plans to repurpose and decommission coal-fired power plants to decrease emissions – the government is planning to close down seven coal-fired power stations by 2032.   The government has eased restrictions for local content in solar. Renewable energy expansion is slowed by opposition to it by interest groups in the ANC-SACP-Cosatu tripartite alliance, and opposition from populist groups and coal-based trade unions to renewable energy.   It is expected that South Africa’s total power capacity will expand by 4GW (ITA, 2024). The expansion will come from non-hydro renewable energy – increasing from 9.3% to 17% in 2032. The South African government’s revised Integrated Resource Plan makes provision for gas to provide 8% of energy capacity.   South Africa’s Renewable Independent Power Producer Programme is expected to increase the non-hydro renewal, because of the lessening of licence restrictions, allowing more private sector involvement in the sector. The developers of renewable energy are mostly foreign companies that have signed power purchase agreements with Eskom for the electricity they produce.   However, South Africa’s aging, poorly maintained and vandalised network infrastructure undermines the energy distribution network. According to Eskom, the utility needs 8 000km of transmission infrastructure by 2030 to absorb new renewable energy capacity (ITA, 2024). But Eskom’s long-term financial viability is in question, considering its R400 billion debt. Renewable energy companies have already signed purchase agreements with Eskom, agreements which would be compromised should Eskom collapse.   South Africa’s automotive industry contributes 5.3% to South Africa’s GDP and is its biggest manufacturing sector, and supported R270 billion worth of exports in 2023. South Africa’s auto industry was facing headwinds because of the rise in the sales of electric powered vehicles globally, the increased use of fuels with cleaner emissions, and use of new technologies such as autonomous driving vehicles.   In response, South Africa has created the South African Automotive Masterplan, SAAM 2035. It aims to increase the country’s motor vehicle production to 1% of global output. And to increase the yearly exports value of the industry from R200 billion in 2019 to R400 billion in 2035 (IOL, 2024).   Domestically, the country’s declining economy, high fuel prices and high interest rates have compounded the declines in vehicle sales. In 2023 vehicle sales were down 5.8%, exports were down 16.9%, and vehicle production dropped 20%. South Africa’s automotive industry is lagging, and will continue to lag, behind turning its production to new electric vehicles (NEVs), its global competitors.   In fact, Trade and Industry Minister Parks Tau said that South Africa may take 15 to 20 years longer to transition to mass NEVs. To mitigate this, the government is preparing a White Paper on NEVs, which is being put together by the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, the National Treasury, and the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy.   In October 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced that the government will introduce tax incentives to make new energy vehicles cheaper for South Africans. The incentives will also cover hybrid vehicles – which use traditional fuels and electricity batteries, and other renewable energy, including hydrogen.   The Government announced NEVs incentives in the Budget in February 2024, providing for a 150% investment allowance for expenses in the initial year of investment, effective from 1 March 2026. Depreciation allowances for new and used machinery and inputs to make NEVs was increased to 40% in the first year and 20% in each of the following three years. “Consideration must be given to incentives for manufacturers as well as tax rebates or subsidies for consumers to accelerate the uptake of electric vehicles,” said Ramaphosa (National Treasury, 2024).    South Africa: green energy and low-carbon development funding   South Africa’s Just Transition Framework focuses on public-private partnerships, foreign investment, and blended finance (PCC, 2022). On 4 November 2021, South Africa announced the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) at COP26.   The JETP is a US$8.5 billion funding package from the European Union, Germany, France, the US, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark, to support South Africa securing a just energy transition. The final amount, following additional pledges, is now more than US$11 billion. Only 4% of the amount was grant financing; the rest is concessional loans.   South Africa introduced the Just Energy Transition Implementation Plan at COP28, the annual climate change conference, held in Dubai in 2023. This is a roadmap for achieving decarbonisation of the economy in a just manner. The Implementation Plan was aimed at outlining how the funding would be structured, the priorities, projects and implementation partners. It covers six portfolios: Electricity; Mpumalanga Just Transition; New Energy Vehicles (NEVs); Green Hydrogen; Skills; and Municipalities.    Reports showed that before the JET Implementation Plan was released in 2023, more than R10 billion of the funds had already been allocated or assigned to projects or spent on projects (Davies, 2024). The pre-plan released spending allocations were outlined in the JET Implementation Plan Grant Mapping Register. The register outlines the priority areas for spending.   “By the time the JET Investment Plan was unveiled by President Cyril Ramaphosa on 4 November 2022, 89 of the 145 projects, worth more than R5.3 billion, had already commenced (before November 2022 when the JET IP was publicly announced). The end dates for 26 of them were before Cabinet formally approved the JET IP in November 2023” (Davies, 2024). Furthermore, more than R8.5 billion had been used for projects that had already finished at the time of funding.   Only two projects, out of 145, had not started by the time the funding became available. This means no public discussion on the kinds of projects that needed funding, the organisations to whom the projects should go, and who the beneficiaries should be that receive help.   It is unclear what the criteria for funding are or whether the projects were growth catalytic ones – for example, whether it is for projects developing new manufacturing or fit within a wider industrialisation plan. The application process, funding oversight and selection governance structures appear unclear. The JET IP framework said a JET Funding Platform would be established in 2024 as a “matchmaking mechanism” between implementing entities and beneficiaries.   On the JET IP register of projects only 24% of the funds went to South African implementing organisations. Most of the funding went to donor country companies. Donor agencies take large proportions of the funding to cover their costs. More than R222 million went to consulting and financial advisory firms. A third of the distributed funding went to German entities: among these, R1.7 billion went to GIZ, the German development agency, R2 billion went to KfW, the German development bank. Essentially, all the financing given by Germany has gone to German entities.   Of the funding from the United States (US) government, R145 million went to consultancy firm Deloitte and R58 million went to the US Department of Energy’s National Labs. The Dutch government funding, among others, went to the Dutch Water Authorities, and the Danish government’s funding, among others, went to the Danish Energy Agency.   Researchers Katrina Lehmann-Grube, Imraan Valodia, Julia Taylor and Sonia Phalatse analysed how the JET IP money was spent. The bulk of the money was directed to green hydrogen, Mpumalanga Just Transition, electricity infrastructure, municipalities, skills development, electricity just transition, and new energy vehicles. However, Lehmann-Grube and her colleagues revealed that most of the funding did not go directly to the assigned priorities.   They report that for funds allocated to electricity infrastructure, none was allocated for building electricity infrastructure, whether to expand the grid or for renewable energy generation. The funds for electricity infrastructure has been spent on technical assistance, project feasibility studies and scenario planning. Around R1.2 billion was spent on technical assistance. Lehmann-Grube et al described the technical assistance as “ long been criticised as a form of aid  for being ineffective, extremely expensive since much of these funds go to foreign ‘experts’, and an outdated form of development”.   Another portion of the funds, around R1.5 billion was spent on green finance, which included refinancing community trust projects, green bods, blended finance to attract the private sector, which is “arguably not where the grants portion of the finance should be focused”. Funds are allocated for stakeholder engagement and capacity building. However, civil society and community organisations are rarely involved. Only 0.4% of the funding was allocated to civil society – around R41 million.   Approximately R1.1 billion was allocated to skills training. However, the researchers show only R453 million went to actual skills training. Astonishingly, none of the allocation went to employees that will lose their jobs, livelihoods and income in the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy.   There are other significant South African public funds established for climate change. The state-owned Development Bank of Southern Africa established the Green Fund in 2011. The fund is a complementary fund, aimed to augment existing fiscal allocations. It particularly focuses on existing projects that require bridging financial gaps. The Green Fund says it has collective investments of R679.8 million.   There are also private funds in South Africa dedicated to climate change. In 2018, Growthpoint Properties, a real estate investment trust, issued a (10-year) corporate green bond. The proceeds from this bond are earmarked for the financing of new and existing environmentally friendly properties.    China: world leader in renewable energy economy manufacturing   China is the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gas emissions by volume, burning as much coal as all of the world combined. At the same time, the country now produces most of the world’s renewable energy.   In the 2000s, China changed its development model, based on coal dependence, as it was causing environmental crises and had begun to undermine economic growth. With GDP growth slowing in the mid-2000s, labour costs rising and a housing crisis, China, as part of changing its developmental model, also moved towards renewable energy. The country invested heavily in green energy technology, prioritising becoming the world’s largest supplier of renewable energy technologies, manufacturing products and infrastructure to tap into the world’s need for clean energy.   China now dominates the manufacturing of renewable technologies. “China had largely achieved its goal of dominating not only the production of solar and wind technologies, but it had developed a near monopoly on every aspect of the supply chains, including the mining and processing of the rare-earths and strategic minerals essential for the clean energy revolution” (Hilton, 2024).   China controls 80% of the globe’s solar manufacturing. It dominates wind and battery technology and manufacturing. Its manufacturing of electric vehicles is rising. Its domination of renewable energy technologies, manufacturing and supply chains has brought global prices down.   China expanded its renewable energy capacity with astonishing speed and scale. Fossil fuels now make up under 50% of the country’s power generation capacity, whereas a decade ago, fossil fuels made up two-thirds of its power generation. The International Energy Authority said that the 50% increase in the installation of renewable energy capacity in 2023 was largely attributed to China.   In 2023 China doubled its new solar installations, increased new wind capacity installations by 66%, and quadrupled energy storage capacity. In 2022, its solar photovoltaic capacity installation for that year, was as large as the rest of the world combined.    China has transformed its economic growth model to make high-tech export products to spur growth. The country’s changed industrial policies are outlined in its “Made in China 2025” (MIC 2025) industrial strategy, a multidecade national strategy for the manufacturing sector, which was published in 2015. The strategy sets out its goal to dominate global market share of high-tech manufacturing, prioritising higher valued goods.   China is now also a dominant global manufacturer of plug-in electric vehicles and its associated supply chains. Electric vehicles is a disruptive technology, because it replaces internal combustion engine vehicles, which have dominated vehicle manufacturing (Graham, Belton & Xia, 2021).   China’s industrial policy followed the example of Japan’s Toyota, Germany’s Volkswagen and the US’ General Motors, who dominated global combustion engine vehicles supply chains. China’s industrial policy to turn it into a global giant manufacturer of electric vehicles – and their supply chains – is a lesson for developing countries in cobbling together successful industrial policies.   The country’s electric vehicle global rise has unleashed a trade conflict between China, the EU and the US over electric vehicles. The EU is the largest overseas market for China’s electric car industry.   The EU is planning to impose huge taxes on imports of electric vehicles from China to Europe. It says introducing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles imports aims to protect the European car industry from being undermined by what EU governments say are unfair Chinese-state subsidies on its own cars. Tariffs on electric cars made in China are set to rise from 10% to up to 45% over the next five years (Race, 2024).   The European Commission set individual duties on three large Chinese electric vehicle brands: SAIC, BYD and Geely. The EU fears that European car manufacturers will not be able to compete with Chinese cars. It calculated the charges based on estimates of how much Chinese state aid each manufacturer has received following an EU investigation. Chinese-made electric vehicles account for 19% of Europe’s market, estimated to rise to 25% by the end of 2024.   The US in May 2024 announced that it was quadrupling customs duties on imported Chinese electric vehicles. China has not penetrated the US market as it has the European market. In response, China has lodged a complaint against the US over the tariff penalties at the World Trade Organisation in March 2024, charging that the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) “formulates discriminatory subsidy policies for new energy vehicles”, referencing a classification that includes electric cars and hybrids.   China says the US IRA “distorts fair competition, seriously disrupts global new energy vehicle industrial and supply chains and violates WTO rules”. China has denied that its own industrial policies are unfair and has repeatedly threatened retaliation to safeguard its companies. The US has rejected China’s WTO challenge, saying “China's challenge is particularly hypocritical in light of China's targeting of clean energy sectors for global dominance” (AFP, 2024).   In 2022, the United States announced a giant aid and subsidy programme to support US-based companies operating in the energy transition sector and electric cars manufactured in the US. The US government said the subsidies were to address the climate crisis and “invest in US economic competitiveness”. The US also said its electric vehicle subsidy programme was meant to counter China’s subsidies for electric vehicles and China’s green industry, which has seen China investing vast state funds into domestic firms as well as research and development.    How China can help boost a South African manufacturing boom based on the green economy and technology   South Africa needs a dynamic manufacturing sector that can soak up low skills. A manufacturing sector in the energy sector based on renewable energy and gas, can soak up an army of low and unskilled. It can also reverse the decline of manufacturing in other sectors – which could create desperately needed new jobs, especially for those with low skills.   The inputs, technology and production processes underpinning renewable energy and gas production must be manufactured within South Africa as far as possible. Local communities can set up local cooperatives to generate and sell their own energy. If local renewable energy initiatives are established by local communities in every town; and gas is piped to every household, it would not only stabilise energy supply, but it will also create a much-needed manufacturing explosion.   China is in a tariff dispute with the European Union and the US over electric vehicle imports. The Chinese government has asked its manufacturers to halt expansion plans in Europe over this trade conflict, including stopping active searches for production sites in the region and signing of new deals (Zhang, Lepido & Torsoli, 2024).   This creates an opportunity for South Africa to become a hub for Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers – and serve as a springboard to the rest of Africa, the developing world, and even Europe. China could set up manufacturing plants in South Africa; and co-manufacture with South African companies. However, in such co-manufacturing, there must be an awareness of “political capitalists” – politically connected individuals with no industry experience, but who set up “black economic empowerment” companies to partner with established firms.   Chinese research, technology and development organisations could partner with South African ones to exchange green economy technologies for development purposes. Industrial policy-learning between China and South Africa is critical to help South Africa boost its industrial policy capacity.   China should match Western countries’ financial commitments for climate change to South Africa. However, China’s financial commitments should be different: rather than loans, it should be grant funding, manufacturing, technology, supply chain, and research and innovation exchange partnerships.    How China can partner with Africa to boost green economies and low-carbon development on the continent   African countries lack public funds to finance the green economy and low-carbon development. Grant funding is critical for this. Development finance, private finance, and public-private finance is critical to achieve the green economy goals.   African leaders expressed their frustrations with the industrialised countries’ inability to honour their commitments to providing adequate climate finance. China can partner with Africa in international climate change negotiations to secure better climate change funds for Africa – and to ensure that industrial countries honour their climate change financial commitments. But China could also be a source of grant funding for African countries’ green economy and low-carbon development initiatives.   African countries have inadequate infrastructure for green projects, which undermines delivery and deters new investors. Almost all African countries need to upgrade and expand their existing grid infrastructure, while building new renewable energy generation capacity.   Over 600 million people in Africa lack electricity. Affordable clean energy sources is critical to plug the power gap. China could partner in expanding Africa’s infrastructure, which underpins any green economy and low-carbon development strategy.   Foreign businesses in Africa often do not implement green practices – as there is largely a lack of enforcement in these countries. It is critical that the Chinese government compel Chinese state and private companies to implement genuine green practices in their operations in African countries.   Africa and China can also collaborate on food solutions for China – for example, by helping Africa to boost climate-smart agriculture. In 2016, the African Development Bank in 2016 launched its Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT) – a continent-wide initiative designed to boost agricultural productivity by using new technologies. TAAT brings productivity-increasing technologies to crop, livestock and fish smallholder farmers. China could partner with African countries to boost new agricultural technologies to increase African agricultural productivity.   Moreover, China could establish manufacturing hubs for electric vehicles in African countries, and link African economies into their global manufacturing value chains.    South Africa: policy and regulator reforms needed   South Africa does not have a coherent industrial policy that places the green economy as one of the pillars of economic transformation, industrialisation and economic development. Truth be told, the county’s green economy and low-carbon development initiatives appear to be ad hoc – not part of an overall industrial strategy. South Africa can learn from China’s green economy industrial policy, both in its scope and execution.   For 20 years, China’s government has pursued clear, well-thought-out industrial policies to make it the world’s biggest producer of electric vehicles. China also pursued a focused industrial policy to build renewable energy manufacturing capacity.   In South Africa, whereas the apartheid government had industrial policies that produced disruptive technology, the post-1994 government has lost the ability to pursue industrial policies that can foster disruptive technology. The current South African government can learn from how the Chinese have pursued industrial policies that usher in disruptive technologies.   South Africa can learn from China how to quickly push through renewable energy, which is currently being slowed down by pro-coal proponents and opponents of renewable energy within and outside the ANC tripartite alliance. The Chinese government pushed through renewable energy with steely determination; similar determination is lacking in the South African government.   South Africa should introduce tax incentives to large corporates, SMMEs and households for renewable power generation. Tax systems must offer incentives to low-income households and businesses for deploying renewable energy.   Banks should be compelled to provide affordable finance to households and SMMEs to secure renewable energy generation. Customers should also be allowed to sell excess power back to the grid.   South Africa needs regulations to prevent “greenwashing” by countries and businesses who claim their policies, initiatives and investments are green – when they are not. There are currently no laws in South Africa combating green and sustainability claims. There are only voluntary standards. These standards need to be incorporated into legislation. There are increasing civil society efforts to litigate against companies using greenwashing tactics (Parker, 2023).   South Africa’s collapsing infrastructure undermines any industrial policies – it is critical to reboot these systems. 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[Online] Available at: https://sdgfinance.undp.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/UNDP_Thematic%20Bonds%20101.pdf [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2024. Africa Green Business and Financing Report . [Online] Available at: https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/africa-green-business-and-financing-report  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2016. The State of Biodiversity in Africa: A Mid-term Review of Progress Towards the Aichi Biodiversity Targets . [Online] Available at: https://www.unep.org/resources/report/state-biodiversity-africa-mid-term-review-progress-towards-aichi-biodiversity [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2023. Africa’s green business opportunities are abundant, UNEP study shows . [Online] Available at: https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/africas-green-business-opportunities-are-abundant-unep-study-shows#:~:text=Addis%20Ababa%2C%2017%20August%202023,today%20by%20the%20UN%20Environment [accessed: 28 October 2024]   United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). 2023. How a new wave of tech startups is driving development in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://iap.unido.org/articles/how-new-wave-tech-startups-driving-development-africa#:~:text=5%20Taking%20a%20mobile%2Dfirst,e.g%20Opay%20and%20Kuda%20Bank)%2C [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Bank. 2023a. Scaling agriculture science and innovation for a climate-resilient future in Africa . [Online] Available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/agfood/scaling-agriculture-science-and-innovation-climate-resilient-future-africa#:~:text=Science%20and%20innovation%20in%20agriculture,the%20evolving%20needs%20of%20farmers . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Bank. 2023b. Lessons from 25 Policies Advancing a Low-Carbon.  [Online] Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/3770b59a-617f-4636-8aa1-adbe6db7db34#:~:text=protects%20the%20poor.-,'Reality%20Check%3A%20Lessons%20from%2025%20Policies%20Advancing%20a%20Low%2D,studies%20across%20sectors%20and%20geographies . [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Meteorological Organization. 2023. State of the Climate in Africa. [Online] Available at: https://library.wmo.int/viewer/69000/download?file=1360_State-of-the-Climate-in-Africa-2023_en.pdf&type=pdf&navigator=1  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Meteorological Organization. 2024. Africa Suffers Disproportionately from Climate Change . [Online] Available at: https://wmo.int/news/media-centre/africa-faces-disproportionate-burden-from-climate-change-and-adaptation-costs  [accessed: 28 October 2024]   World Resources Institute. 2023. Key COP28 Takeaways for Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.wri.org/africa/key-cop28-takeaways-africa [accessed: 28 October 2024]   Zhang, C., Lepido, D. and Torsoli, A. 2024. China asks carmakers to halt Europe expansion over tariff spat . [Online] Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-24/china-asks-carmakers-to-halt-europe-expansion-over-tariff-spat  [accessed: 28 October 2024]          - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

  • Fostering a common South Africaness based on democracy, diversity and social justice

    Occasional Paper 1/2025 Copyright © 2025 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. J A N U A R Y 2 0 2 5 Prof William Gumede Former Programme Director, Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London; former Senior Associate Member and Oppenheimer Fellow,   St Antony’s College, Oxford University; and author of South Africa in BRICS (Tafelberg). Abstract One of the main reasons for post-apartheid South Africa’s low growth, development and peace has been the continued polarisation along ethnic, colour and political affiliation. Colonial and apartheid governments insisted that South Africa is a country with vastly different ethnic communities always on the verge of communal conflict, unless they are separated and run by one group or by a strong central state. Yet, after 350 years of this approach, South African communities are not ‘gated communities’ with fixed borders; often, they overlap meaningfully, with ‘interconnected differences’.  The fact that the country is so ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse should be the central element of a unique South African identity.  The starting point must be the premise that there cannot be one single definition of who is a South African or one sole defining culture that indicates South Africanness.   The best way forward then is not Afrikaner or African nationalism, but rather “civic nationalism”, building a shared citizenship around a common civic identity, trumping individual or group ethnic-based identities. The glue that holds diverse societies together is equal rights and shared democratic cultures, values and institutions, rather than ethnic nationalism. However, this necessitates political leaders who govern and deliver at all times for every South African, not just for one political party, faction or ethnic group. And citizens who support leaders, whether in government, politics, business or traditional affairs, on the basis of democratic values, not colour, ethnicity and culture. Herein lies the challenge of building a common South Africanness and a successful nation.   Introduction   South Africa’s bitter history of more than 350 years of colonialism and apartheid – with its accompanied ethnic division, conflict and state-sponsored economic inequalities – makes the challenge of cobbling together a new South Africanness, from our divided past, so much harder, yet so much more urgent.   Almost three decades after apartheid, it appears that the ethnicisation and Balkanisation of South Africa along ethnic lines set by apartheid continues. Although, this time not by official state policy, but because of the failure of the state to deliver public services equitably; the failure of the democracy to deliver economic dividends. However, some governing party leaders, populist opposition leaders, parties, groups, public figures and online influencers, blame state, economic and democracy failures on ethnic groups different to them (Malema, 2018; Tandwa, 2019; Gumede, 2021).    Former President Jacob Zuma’s mobilisation of specifically isiZulu-speakers in order to become leader of the African National Congress (ANC) in 2007 and South Africa in 2009, the perception, in the period before the 29 May 2024 general elections of rising exclusion of minorities within the then governing ANC and, as a direct result of this, new ethnic-based opposition political parties forming, have contributed to undermining a common South Africanness (Gumede, 2009, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2013).   There has been a rise in incidents where one ethnic, colour or regional group has often been scapegoated for the lack of advancement of another community. A typical example is Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) leader Julius Malema attacking South Africans of Indian ancestry for allegedly dominating affirmative action leadership and management positions in the private sector (Malema, 2018).   Persistent institutional racism, “the systematic distribution of resources, power and opportunity in our society to the benefit of people who are white and the exclusion of people of colour”,  undermines a common South Africa that cuts across race, ethnicity and colour (Dyer, 2002). Racial solidarity, where black and white South Africans support others solely on the basis of their ethnicity or colour, not only undermines a common South Africa, but also undermines common nationhood (West, 1993).   South Africa has no choice but to build a common South Africanness. If the country does not, there will be no future for any single community – or for the country’s collective communities – as South Africa will be plunged into ethnic strife, which will make economic growth, development and prosperity impossible, whether at the individual, community or collective community level (Réaume, 1988; Mason, 2000; Appiah, 2005). Diverse countries with divided pasts need a “civil religion” as an alternative model for common nationhood   Diverse developing countries with a politically divided past, such as South Africa, obviously cannot find a solution in a nationalism based on shared culture or common citizenship or living in a shared space, alone – often assumed in Western models of nationhood (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991; Miller, 1995).   One of the great African scholars of ethnicity, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) observed how the Achilles heel of many African post-independence and liberation movements has been their difficulty in constructing citizenship as an inclusive concept.   Like India, both colonial and apartheid governments have insisted that South Africa is a “society of self-enforced communities, always potentially – and in the absence of the (colonial or apartheid) state, actually – in gruesome conflict with one another” (Khilnani, 2003).   Yet, more than 350 years of colonialism and apartheid has meant that South African identities are not ‘gated communities’ with fixed borders; often, they overlap meaningfully, beyond the occasional shared word or value (Khilnani, 2003; Gumede, 2012) . Our modern South Africanness therefore cannot be but a ‘layered’, plural and inclusive one, and one based on acceptance of our ‘interconnected differences’ ( Khilnani, 2003; Gumede, 2010, 2012).   The fact that South Africa has a multiple identity should be the basis of its shared South Africanness. The country is a melting pot of people with their roots in Africa, the East and the West (Gumede, 2018) . On the face of it, in many cases, at the end of colonialism and apartheid there may have remained distinctly different communities, despite centuries of intermixture.   The challenge for any South African leader or governing party is how to build a common sense of South Africanness and “shared responsibility for a common destiny”, on the basis of our ‘interconnected differences’ (Khilnani, 2003). The fact that we are so ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse should then be the central building block of a unique South African identity. The country’s democracy is based on a compromise between the diverse political groups and acceptance of our differences (Gumede, 2005). A common South African identity and the future will have to be built as a mosaic of the best elements of our diverse pasts and present, histories and cultures.   The best way forward for South Africa is not Afrikaner or African nationalism, but what Michael Ignatieff (1993) described as “civic nationalism”, which aims to build a shared citizenship around a common civic identity (Stilz, 2009), where such a civic identity trumps individual or group ethnic-based identities.    In “civic nationalism” the glue that holds communities together is equal rights and shared democratic cultures, values and institutions, rather than ethnic nationalism, whether Zulu, Indian, Afrikaner or coloured group identities (Gumede, 2012a). In civic nationalism, a nation “ need not be unified by commonalities of language or culture [where ‘culture’ refers to the traditions and customs of a particular national group]” (Stilz, 2009: 257). Citizens of all ethnic, race and religious groups must embrace democracy, democratic institutions, and democratic values and behaviour.   This means the state does not favour one ethnic group, culture or language, but instead, embraces the multiple ethnic groups, cultures and languages within the borders of the country (Habermas, 1998: 228). Jürgen Habermas argues that the different political cultures and identities within a country must be superseded by a shared national democratic political culture (Habermas, 1998: 118). The political culture that becomes the national political culture is not that of one political party or tradition, but is a shared political culture built on democracy, values and an inclusive state.   To do so, a country with South Africa’s diversity has no other alternative but to build what the US sociologist Robert N. Bellah (1967) described – when referring to the US common democratic values, institutions and rituals – as a “civil religion”, which he argues has been crucial to that country’s national identity. Bellah built his case for a “civil religion” – and expands on it beautifully – based on Rousseau’s original description of it, being “the existence of God, the life to come, the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of religious intolerance” (Rousseau, 2003: Chapter 8, Book 4).   Clearly, in the South African case, the central tenet of a common South Africanness must be a “civil religion” – based on inclusive democracy, ethnic, colour and political diversity, core shared values, and empathy for the vulnerable – that cut across the racial, colour and political divide (Gumede, 2005, 2012a, 2012b).   Crisis of South Africa’s inclusive non-racial nation-building project   South Africa’s nation-building project has hit a crisis, with many seeming to believe that the country’s diversity is an obstacle to development, growth and peace. Some wrongly say that the country can prosper if led by only one group, excluding others, whether based on ethnic, colour or political lines, while others say that some communities are not African enough (Malema, 2018; Shivambu, 2018; PTI, 2021).    Increasingly there have been public criticisms of a rise in ethnic-based appointments at national, provincial and local government level, and in state-owned entities (Gumede, 2021). Until the establishment of the Government of National Unity, which includes representatives of 11 parties, after the 29 May 2024 general elections, appointments to leadership in the ANC, government departments and state-owned entities (SOEs) have increasingly been criticised for lacking racial diversity.   Furthermore, many Cabinet ministers have often been accused of appearing to only appoint members from their ethnic community to senior positions in their departments and SOEs reporting to them – making some government departments appear to be Bantustans (Gumede, 2021).   Higher Education Minister Blade Nzimande is just one senior government leader who has been accused of favouring individuals from KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) in appointments to his department and its entities – an accusation which he has denied (Head, 2021). There are many SOEs and agencies where there are boards and executives made up of individuals of only one colour, or one ethnic group, making a mockery of South Africa’s diversity, and constitutional obligations to ensure diversity and representation in public appointments (Gumede, 2021).    The appearance of the ethnicisation of the ANC at some levels has led to many of the excluded communities not feeling psychologically safe, meaning they do not believe their interests will be looked after by the party (Delizonna, 2017; Van der Loo and Beks, 2020; Gumede, 2021). Many who feel excluded by the ANC because of ethnicity or colour, find the new ethnic-based and minority parties that have mushroomed appealing – these parties have done well in the 1 November 2021 local government elections (Gumede, 2021) and the 29 May 2024 national and provincial elections, with parties such as the Patriotic Alliance and Cape Coloured Congress gaining significant footholds.   The lack of diversity in national, provincial and municipal governments, and state entities robs the country of ideas, skills and capacity – because the full spectrum of the country’s talents is not used to foster growth, development and public services. It is therefore one of the main reasons for lack of equitable development, poor public services delivery, and failure of the state.   There has been rising scapegoating of minorities by new Africanist and populist parties such as the EFF, and online populists, blaming minorities for all South Africa’s complex problems. Although many of the country’s problems stem from its apartheid past, many have also been created or exacerbated by current government incompetence, corruption and irrational policies.   For example, as mentioned above, EFF leader Julius Malema in a press conference verging on hate speech, attacked South Africans of Indian ancestry for supposedly dominating affirmative action leadership and management positions in the private and public sectors (Malema, 2018). In 2002, playwright Mbongeni Ngema wrote a song in isiZulu that incited South Africans of Indian ancestry (PTI, 2021). Former President Nelson Mandela had to step in to calm tensions between the communities following the song (PTI, 2021).   One of the standouts of the 1 November 2021 local elections has been the dramatic rise and success of ethnic-based parties at the municipal level. Many communities, feeling excluded by the ANC and the state, and frightened by the anti-diversity politics of the EFF, find parties promoting their excluded ethnic group or who defend the cause of minorities in general, appealing (Gumede, 2021).   The ANC’s increasing exclusion of minorities within the party, the rising attacks on minorities by new Africanist and populist parties such as the EFF and the Patriotic Alliance, and the failure of the state to provide public services, benefits and jobs to South Africans of all ethnic communities, have resulted in many communities retreating into ethnic laagers, seeking comfort in clan, tribe and colour kinship ( Gumede, 2021).     New parties such as the Cape Coloured Congress, the Patriotic Alliance repositioning itself to appeal to disillusioned coloured voters, the Al Jama-ah party targeting Muslims, and the Freedom Front Plus refashioning itself as a party not only for whites, but also for other minorities, have made significant electoral inroads (Gumede, 2021). Many politicians have increasingly opportunistically used the race or ethnic card for self-enrichment or to cover up wrongdoing, which undermines the building of a common South African identity (Molefe, 2016; Mantashe, 2016). Others, again, support individuals who are corrupt, do wrong or are incompetent, solely on their colour ( Gumede, 2018) . On occasions when there are incidents of blind racial solidarity, where groups support individuals solely on the basis of their colour, even these individuals undermine the democratic constitution, institutions and values, or behave violently (Gumede, 2018).   In 2021 the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) found that Western Cape Judge President Hlophe was guilty of gross misconduct and should be impeached by Parliament (JSC, 2021). The JSC found that Judge Hlophe tried to influence Justice Bess Nkabinde and Justice Chris Jafta in the case they presided over, in which former President Jacob Zuma was accused of corruption with French armaments company Thint. In 2021, the Black Lawyers Association nominated Judge Hlophe to become Chief Justice, based partially on his blackness, while ignoring the impropriety he was found guilty of by the JSC (Thamm, 2021).   When former President Jacob Zuma was arrested for contempt of court for refusing to answer questions about corruption under his presidency at the Zondo Commission, many of his supporters called on isiZulu-speakers to rally behind him, to defend him in Zulu solidarity, ignoring the poverty, unemployment and public service failures caused by Zuma’s corruption, incompetence and unresponsiveness to all South Africans, including Zulus (Gumede, 2012b).   Zuma explicitly mobilised voters in KZN to support him on the basis of his Zuluness during past elections for the ANC and the country’s presidency (Gumede, 2018). In fact, d uring the Zuma presidency, the ANC transformed into a party made up of something almost akin to ethnic provincial blocs. In ANC provincial branches, the ethnic community that dominated the province often also dominated the leaders and government of the province, to the exclusion of other communities (Gumede, 2021).   Some South Africans doggedly support leaders, views and positions of their “own” ethnic group, colour and political affiliation, no matter if these leaders are corrupt, wrong and violent; and even if supporting their “own” goes against their personal, financial and future interests (Gumede, 2018).  This includes black individuals, political organisations that are predominantly black, and civil society organisations established to focus on issues affecting black communities often supporting leaders, viewpoints and leadership just because they are black, even if they are corrupt, incumbent and dishonest (Gumede, 2021).   Some white South Africans think that competence is reserved for whites, and thus also undermine a common South African identity (Gumede, 2018). Instances of white incompetence cannot be ignored, either. When blacks do well, it should not be dismissed as being because of their ‘political connections’, and so on.   In March 2021, during a session of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Higher Education, Science and Technology, ANC MP Jane Mananiso said that black vice chancellors of universities appear to be less competent than their white peers (Mananiso, 2021). Such blanket statements attributing competence or incompetence based on colour are wrong. Afterwards, Ahmed Bawa, chief executive officer of Universities South Africa, rightly said it is unfair to “lump all black vice chancellors together and simply say that they are all incompetent” (Naidu, 2021).   The American scholar of race, Cornel West (1993), warns against the pitfalls of what he calls a resort to black ‘authenticity’ politics, whereby every issue is reduced to ‘racial reasoning’. He argues rightly that we must “replace racial reasoning with moral reasoning, to understand the black-freedom struggle not as an affair of skin pigmentation and racial phenotype but rather as a matter of ethical principles and wise politics” (West, 1993).   South Africa’s Covid-19 economic downturn has and will continue to increase racial tensions (World Bank, 2021). Some white South Africans who fall into economic difficulties will be tempted to blame a black-dominated ANC government for being ‘against’ them. Poorer black South Africans may also be seduced to turn their anger solely on whites in general, rather than seeing it as a combination of the legacy of apartheid inequities and misguided policies by black-dominated democratic governments.   The ethnicisation of South Africa’s politics undermines social inclusion, common nationhood, and integration of all ethnic communities in the life of the country. It leads to the Bantustanisation of the country. The truth is, no single ethnic community, colour or political group in South Africa can develop by excluding others.   No one single definition of who is African or South African    The starting point for fostering a common South Africanness must be the premise that there cannot be one single definition of who is a South African. The obvious basic building block is identifying oneself as South African. The definition of being South African can never be narrow, it must be inclusive, embracing and democratic (Gumede, 2005, 2012a, 2012b).   The ethnic, language and regional diversity bequeathed by both colonialism and apartheid must mean that modern South Africanness cannot be but a ‘layered’, interwoven mosaic (Gumede, 2021). Former President Nelson Mandela’s 1962 statement in the dock during his political trial for inciting resistance against the apartheid government neatly put it, saying South Africanness cannot be defined in relation to a majority community (Mandela, 2013). At the same token there cannot be one sole defining culture that indicates South Africanness.   Being African, within South Africa’s plural South Africanness, cannot ever take only one form, but should be, because of the country’s unique history, more nuanced, multiple and diverse. Retreating into “nativism”, wanting to seek an exclusive definition of South Africanness or who is an African – which over-rides the Constitution’s core definition arguing for multiple identities, diversity and inclusivity as the pillars of South Africanness – undermines the idea of an inclusive South African identity.   Alarmingly, increasingly, but wrongly, many perceive who or what is African in South Africa very narrowly, either only based on one type of pigmentation, ethnicity of forbearers or level of suffering ( Quintal, 2006; SAPA, 2011; Malema, 2018; Shivambu, 2018). This leads to the misguided phenomenon that some people are perceived as supposedly not African or black enough, because of their skin colour, language or historical ethnic background. This for many South Africans leads to unnecessary trauma and questioning of their sense of identity and sense of belonging.    Africanness or an African identity in the South African context cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be the same as in, say, a Nigerian, Zimbabwean or Ghanian context.   South Africa was not colonised in the same way that many other African countries were colonised. South Africa was colonised in the 1600s by European powers as part of what became known in mainstream history as the “New World”, in a similar way to countries like Brazil, the US and Cuba (Lloyd and Metzer, 2013).   In this New World type of colonialism, indigenous people inhabited these countries prior to colonialism, which brought settlers from colonial countries. In many cases colonialism also brought subjected peoples from other parts of the world, whether as slaves or subjects. These societies over time became ethnically, culturally and pigmentationally mixed.   Even the indigenous communities who were present before colonialism often had mixed to one degree or another. The apartheid project was largely based on preventing any further intermixing of colours, languages and communities.   An African identity in the South African context is therefore more diverse than in most other African countries – and that is also the overwhelming character, uniqueness and strength of Africanness in the South African context. It is the basis of the country’s national identity, its mirror unto itself, and its face to the world.   An African identity in the context of South Africa’s African identity is its diversity – and that is also the individual, collective and the country’s identity.   Accepting diversity also crucial for growth, inclusive developmental and societal peace   Embracing, building on and leveraging South Africa’s diversity is crucial to lifting economic growth, inclusive development and maintaining societal peace (Raz, 1986; Gradstein and Justman, 2018; Rodriguez‑Pose and von Berlepsch, 2019).  In fact, o ne of the reasons for post-apartheid South Africa’s low growth, development and societal peace trajectory has been the rejection of diversity – the continued polarisation along ethnic, colour and political affiliation (Barry, 1993; Laitin and Fearon, 2003; Goodin, 2007).   Many South Africans, whether in the ANC, EFF or among black political parties on the populist left, appear to believe that the country’s diversity is an obstacle and that one ethnic, colour or political group could successfully drive the country’s development, lift economic growth levels and bring societal peace on their own (Malema, 2018; Shivambu, 2018).   But growth, development and peace will not come from one group controlling South Africa at all levels, at the exclusion of others who are different from the dominant group (Goodin, 2007; PTI, 2021).   More recently, appointments to leadership in the ANC, government departments and state-owned entities increasingly have low levels of diversity, which is one reason for the persistent poor performance of these entities. Some South Africans will doggedly support leaders, views and positions of their “own” ethnic group, colour and political affiliation, no matter if these are corrupt, wrong and violent; and even if supporting their “own” goes against personal, financial and future interests (Malema, 2018).   Of course, the reality is that extreme poverty among many of South Africa’s previously disadvantaged communities often prevents them from seeking closer relations with communities from different ethnic, colour or even political affiliations. Having lost political power, fearing black resentment of their apartheid accrued social capital, and black populists often blaming white South Africans for sometimes self-inflicted government failure, have also driven many white South Africans into white laagers.   More importantly, the stunning failure by the ANC government to govern honestly, make decisions in the best interests of the largest number of South Africans, and provide quality public services to all has driven many communities into tribal laagers, seeking safety among those with whom they share ethnicity, language or colour.     Many South African ethnic, language and colour communities wrongly fear that embracing those communities who appear different from them will erode their own ethnic, cultural and language identity. Moreover, some leaders regularly exhort their supporters to marginalise others based on ethnicity, colour and political affiliation; claiming that only if “their” group is in charge, will South Africa see development, growth and societal peace. They are sorely mistaken (Shivambu, 2018).   Former President Jacob Zuma, in 2012, reflected the wrongheaded notion that some South African ethnic communities have more rights than others. “Sorry, we have more rights here because we are a majority. You have fewer rights because you are a minority. Absolutely, that’s how democracy works. So, it is a question of accepting the rules within democracy and you must operate in them” (Zuma, 2012).    The apartheid government tried to have one colour group control South Africa, but that racist experiment failed, because it was not sustainable; the economic growth, development and societal peace was temporary. The inevitable explosion was only postponed. The more ethnically, colour and politically polarised a society, the worse its economic, development and peace performance.   A country is fortunate to be able to draw on the vast networks, social capital, and knowledge of diverse communities ( Gradstein and Justman, 2018; Rodriguez‑Pose and von Berlepsch, 2019). In fact, a prerequisite for South Africa to foster a common nationhood is for the vast talents of all South Africans, not only those of the same colour, party or faction, to be used. If the opposite case prevails, it will undermine nation-building, as it leaves those deliberately marginalised or excluded, whether black or white, shut out.   South Africa has, up to now, not been able to reap the growth, development and peace benefits of its diversity. Its diversity should be South Africa’s competitive advantage, not its curse ( Gradstein and Justman, 2018; Rodriguez‑Pose and von Berlepsch, 2019).   However, this does not mean a national identity based on a singular shared culture, language or ethnicity.   As   Nelson Mandela stated from court docks in 1962, it also should not be defined solely in relation to one majority community (Mandela, 2012).   In times of crisis, whether based on economic collapse, corruption or state failure, in the post-colonial or post-apartheid period, citizens, in countries with diverse roots such as South Africa, may fall back on historical self-identities, groups and divisions of the past – making the forging of a shared new identity much harder, yet so much more urgent. Crucially, building a shared South African common identity must therefore involve economic redress, tackling racism, and a rebalance of apartheid-inherited power relations.   South African common identity based on democracy    Because the nation, termed the ‘imagined political community’ by the scholar of nationalism, Benedict Anderson (1991), is so diverse, creating a new South Africanness will have to be based on politics. What then is the basis of our common political identity? A common South Africanness will have to be weaved around the idea of an inclusive democracy.    South Africa’s founding myth – based on politics – is the fact that the country managed to rise out of the ashes of a civil war, peacefully construct a democratic dispensation based on a new democratic constitution, anchored in South Africa’s ethnic diversity, and a new set of democratic values, rules and political culture. The founding document of our political settlement that ended apartheid and ushered in non-racial democracy is our constitution.   South Africans will have to transform their individual self-identity away from the narrow white, Zulu, Afrikaner, coloured or Indian – or narrow colour or political identities – to a broader South Africanness, which is vested in democracy, democratic values, and ethnic and racial inclusivity. Altogether these would be the basis for common interests and a ‘national consensus’ across the ethnic, political and colour divide. Our common ambition should be to mould a new democratic identity for South Africa.   Because South Africanness is a political construct, there are some obvious pitfalls.  Since democracy and the new Constitution are at the heart of South Africa’s new identity, undermining both cannot but undermine the formation of a new South Africanness. Yet, increasingly, the Constitution has often not been treated as a founding document by some political leaders.   As Larry Diamond, the American democracy scholar, argues, once a departure from the democratic rules and behaviour becomes a ‘recurring and defining feature’ (it does happen to some degree in all democracies), it will remain a hollow democracy. And for our purposes, if the democracy is of low quality, it will be impossible to foster a ‘new national democratic identity’ (Diamond, 1997).  A new democratic South African identity necessitates widespread public trust in the Constitution, democratic institutions and democratic system overall. A prerequisite for developing a common South Africanness is absolute loyalty – not to a party, leader or tribe, but to the country’s Constitution.   The South African Constitution has often not been treated as a founding document by many ANC leaders and members. In many cases, the ANC’s constitution is seen as above the country’s Constitution. But “to survive, a constitution must have more than philosophical or logical appeal; it must be viewed by most citizens as worth defending” (Weingast, 1997).   Because South Africa’s common identity is built on politics, its constitution will have to be continuously motivated for. It is not one that will be enacted by decree or good intentions alone, but rather, it will rely on constantly having a quality democracy, inclusive democratic institutions, and a capable state delivering services equitably (Dahl, 1989, 1990).   South Africa cannot have competing governance systems to the democratic Constitution   There cannot be competing governance systems to the Constitution, either. The organisational culture of the ANC has increasingly also become the national political culture of the country, upstaging the democratic Constitution (Gumede, 2018). The ANC’s seminal March 2007 discussion document on organisational renewal acknowledged there is tension between the “imperatives of the ANC as a national liberation movement with a distinct culture and revolutionary traditions”, and the “demands and obligations” of the government overseeing a democracy (ANC, 2007).   Since it took power in 1994, the more secretive, intolerant and centralised decision-making aspects of its exile, underground military wings, appear to have come to dominate the party’s culture. There is a wrong belief among many ANC leaders and members that the party laws are above those of the country’s Constitution, laws and individual conscience (Mthembu, 2018).   For example, former President Jacob Zuma some time ago warned that ANC MPs should serve the ANC first, before the Constitution, which of course devalues the Constitution (Makinana, Stone and Nhlabathi, 2016). For another, many ANC leaders and members reckon that the ANC and its leadership are above democratic institutions, such as parliament; and that the rules of the party have preference over the Constitution, democratic laws or democratic institutions such as parliament. An ANC leader or member of parliament may do something illegal – but it only becomes illegal if the party says so.   Former President Zuma said: “ ANC leaders in government should not regard South Africa’s Constitution as being ‘more important’ than the ANC because this would land them in trouble.” The leader of the Congress of the People, Patrick Lekota, responding to Zuma’s anti-Constitution statement said that elevating the ANC above the country’s Constitution “is an absolute disaster” for democracy and will “reduce to nil whatever gains of democracy we have cherished and continue to hope will become” (Van Onselen, 2008).   South Africa has other parallel governance systems competing with the Constitution. The governance system of traditional chiefs, leaders and structures, with its guiding ideology of patriarchy, directly challenges and competes with South Africa’s democratic Constitution, laws and values. Pockets of many rural areas have turned into parallel states, where either traditional kings, chiefs or leaders have turned these areas into their quasi-states, which run parallel to South Africa’s constitutional state (Mnisi Weeks, 2015).   South Africa’s former homelands, in particular, have been entrenched, as they were during the apartheid era, with unelected kings, chiefs and traditional leaders and their councils ruling without democracy, controlling communal land and mining rights, with citizens having little rights and where gender equality is a foreign concept.   The system of African traditional chiefs, leaders and structures should be abolished or, if retained, reformed to be in line with constitutional democratic norms, to ensure social, gender and age equality and promote individuals’ freedom of choice.   Former President Jacob Zuma shored up the power of traditional kings, chiefs and leaders, just like many leaders of other African independence and liberation movements, in return for these individuals to compel their “subjects” to vote for the ANC (Gumede, 2012; Mnisi Weeks, 2015; Stoddard, 2017). Although customary law is recognised in democratic South Africa, it is meant to be subject to the Constitution, democratic institutions and laws, not above these.   Organised criminal groups are in some cases also operating as parallel states, handing out their own justice, providing “services” and employment. In many townships, gangs form parallel states, controlling resources, setting “laws” and forcing ordinary citizens to pay “taxes” to them in their “jurisdictions” (Kinnes, 2017; Imray, 2020; Cruywagen, 2021). In these areas the Constitutional rules, values and laws do not apply.     An accountable democratic state crucial for a common democratic South African identity    Because a democratic state is so central in building a new common South Africanness, the legitimacy of the state will hinge on whether it delivers. Herein lies the danger for nation-building, which is premised on an effective, inclusive and caring state.   The nature of South Africa’s transition to a democracy meant that it was always going to be difficult for any democratic government in South Africa to build a national consensus centred on a new democratic state – unless the state delivers.   Because of South Africa’s negotiated compromise, the apartheid state that many black South Africans saw and fought against as illegitimate, was taken over by the new democratic government. The failure of the democratic state to deliver services to black South Africans has undermined many black South Africans’ confidence in the democratic state, just as they lacked confidence in the apartheid state, which did not deliver to them.   A combination of lack of public service delivery, a seemingly indifferent democratic state, and the perceptions that only a few blacks connected to the top ANC leadership and whites, who by virtue of education and pre-1994 policies benefit economically from the democracy, undermine any nation-building efforts.   Trust in the state, public leadership and democratic institutions, and in democracy itself, depends on these institutions being accountable, honest and effective.   Public corruption that appears to go unpunished or only with selective punishment (the perception is that if the person is closely connected to the right faction of the ANC, then wrongdoing is often not punished or the person is just given a slap on the wrist), undermines the democratic legitimacy, credibility and trust of the state.     Leadership that strengthens a common South Africanness   Leadership style matters very much. There is going to be a premium on South Africa’s political leaders to govern at all times for every South African, not just for one political party, faction or ethnic group.   Good public leadership is a pillar of good democratic governance, the way the values of the country, as encompassed within the Constitution, are embedded. Leaders can either foster the underlying values – inclusive nationhood and peaceful co-existence – set out in democratic constitutions, or undermine these.   A case in point is the fact that former President Nelson Mandela, like India’s Mohandas Gandhi, purposefully tried to evoke through his own personality a symbol of all-South African patriotism around which all South Africans could rally, no matter their colour, ethnicity or political allegiance.    People often say South Africa lacks leadership. What they mean is that we need leaders that would govern in the best interests of all. Leadership that is in the widest public interest, aligned with the values of the Constitution and which is compassionate, promotes democratic governance. Leaders must follow the rules applicable to everyone else. Flagrant ignorance of the new democratic laws by post-apartheid leaders won’t do.   Leadership is at a higher premium in societies that are ethnically diverse, have high levels of inequality, and where democratic rules, institutions and governance are not fully embraced by all. Poor leadership prevents the institutionalisation of democratic constitutions, laws and racial inclusivity. It will mean ordinary citizens supporting leaders, whether in government, politics, business or traditional affairs, on the basis of democratic values, not colour, ethnicity and culture.     Solidarity, social justice and caring for the vulnerable    Building commonality on the basis of difference presents a unique challenge. In the South African type of colonial and apartheid history, w hite skins were bestowed with more social, political and economic power. Power was further dispersed based on skin pigmentation.   Race, and the continued legacy of apartheid inequalities, where most blacks are poor and whites better off, is one of the fault lines in the country’s efforts to build a common South Africanness. Therefore, building a shared South African common identity must involve economic redress, tackling racism, and a rebalance of apartheid-inherited power relations.   A common South Africanness must be built on solidarity for the vulnerable across ethnicity, colour and political affiliation. T his means that social justice must underpin governing.    It will be critical that economic development policies focus on genuinely uplifting not only the poor, but the widest number of people at the same time, whatever their race, colour or political affiliation – rather than a small elite, whether white or black or both. If the poor black majority is left out of prosperity, a common South Africanness will remain a fading dream.     Conclusion    The lack of grown-up elected and public leadership, lack of rational thinking in public discourse and lack of knowledge of the diversity, complexity and varied history by many of their own country beyond their immediate village, social and political setting, has contributed to the often-despairing limited view of South Africanness (Gumede, 2012). We need deeper, better-quality discussions, debates and information on what constitutes a new post-apartheid South African identity at the individual, communal and national level.   Nevertheless, a common South African identity cannot ever take only one form, but should be, because of the country’s unique history, more nuanced, multiple and diverse.   The post-apartheid collective identity-building project has to be building a ‘layered’, plural one based on acceptance of our ‘interconnected differences’. A common South African  identity in the context of South Africa is the country’s diversity – and that is also the individual, collective and the country’s identity.   This means that S outh Africans will have to transform their individual self-identity away from the narrow white, Zulu, coloured or Indian, to a more inclusive South Africanness. Being born into the Zulu, white, coloured or Indian “community” should be only one aspect of Africanness or South Africanness, and not the only one – as it alarmingly is, in many instances, the case now.     A South African identity would be taking parts of all communities, adding to those ones born into, and discarding aspects that are discriminatory, impinging on human rights and dignity of others. A common South African identity is partially based on politics. And because of this, South Africanness will have to be continuously motivated for. It is not one that will be enacted by decree or good intentions alone.   South Africanness must be based on self-identities that are vested in the common constitution, democracy, democratic institutions and democratic values. These together with an inclusive state and acceptance of diversity must be the central pillars of a common South Africanness.      References Anderson, B. 1991. 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Black Lawyers Association comes out to bat for John Hlophe as SA’s Chief Justice . [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-10-03-black-lawyers-association-comes-out-to-bat-for-john-hlophe-as-sas-chief-justice/ [accessed: 9 December]. Van der Loo, H. and Beks, J. 2020. Psychological Safety: Signpost to fearless performance . Independently Published. Van Onselen, G. 2008. Jacob Zuma, Terror Lekota, and the constitution . [Online] Available at: https://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/jacob-zuma-terror-lekota-and-the-constitutio [accessed: 9 December]. Watson, M. 2019. The Damned Neighbours Problem: Rousseau’s Civil Religion Revisited, Religions , 10: 349. Weingast, B. 1997. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, American Political Science Review , 91(2): 245-263. West, C. 1993. Race Matters . New York: Vintage Books. World Bank. 2021. South Africa Economic Update: South Africa’s Labour Market Benefit from Young Entrepreneurs, Self-Employment?   [Online] Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/publication/south-africa-economic-update-south-africa-s-labor-market-can-benefit-from-young-entrepreneurs-self-employment [accessed: 9 December]. Zuma, J. 2012. President’s Question Time , National Assembly, Cape Town, 13 September.        - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

  • How South Africa can leverage the Artificial Intelligence Revolution

    Occasional Paper 10/2024 Copyright © 2024 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. D E C E M B E R 2 0 2 4 Lars Gumede BCom (Actuarial Science) Picture: istockphoto.com , Stock photo ID: 1483013789 Abstract   At its core the Artificial Intelligence (AI) revolution represents a period of exponentially increasing technological advancement. However, the future of AI is a human question more than a technological one – of how we deal with its rapid transformation of society. Companies are rushing to integrate AI into their systems to capitalize on its potential for greater efficiency, accuracy and cost-effectiveness. But there is also potentially a dark side to AI. For low- and middle-income countries, it will either mean economic salvation or continued stagnation. Large corporations will be forced to follow global corporate trends – automating as many jobs as possible and investing in reskilling the remaining workforce. Other companies may give up competing globally, compensated by government to artificially keep job numbers up.   Of course, the AI revolution also represents the opportunity to solve pressing issues: climate change, world hunger, the fight for resources. Global trends indicate a net loss to jobs in the short term, but long term, new industries will create more jobs and grow the world economy. For South Africa, the opportunity exists for radical growth. If proper investment is made in digital infrastructure, AI hubs and innovation, education and reskilling and in using AI to boost its strategic opportunities, there is no limit to the success we may see. If, on the other hand, we neglect our responsibility to build, learn and ensure that the country thrives, South Africa will see increased strife in the form of unemployment, crime, economic stagnation and inequality. Introduction   The Artificial Intelligence (AI) revolution will have more significant consequences than the Industrial Revolution and Internet Age. The potential of this revolution is unquantifiable even for the best experts and researchers in the field. Artificial Intelligence and the hunt for Digital Superintelligence will spark exponential technological development culminating in the ‘technological singularity’ – the point at which technology is advancing at such a fast rate that the human mind can no longer comprehend.   Before that though, there will be wide-ranging effects on the world economy, social cohesion and our systems of organizing ourselves. As new breakthroughs occur every day, it becomes increasingly essential to understand AI and its potential for upheaval, as it creates the potential for salvation or damnation for companies, countries, individuals and organizations alike.   It is no surprise then that companies are rushing to integrate AI into their systems to capitalize on the power of AI to increasingly accomplish human tasks with much greater efficiency, accuracy and cost-effectiveness. These integrations are projected to automate 43% of all job tasks by 2027, according to the World Economic Forum’s Future of Jobs Report  (2023). Corresponding to 83 million jobs eliminated in easily automated areas such as data entry, bookkeeping and other repetitive administrative roles (WEF, 2023).   Governments are rushing to put together regulations to deal with potential societal upheaval as well as implement AI systems into their own organizations to increase efficiency. Civil society organizations and think-tanks are contemplating social safety nets such as Universal Basic Income to compensate for lost jobs.   Jobs that are not lost can expect to be radically transformed as integrations with AI transform every job into a management role overseeing an AI tool that automates mundane, repetitive and programmable tasks.   There also exists the potential for entirely new jobs in entirely new industries. These opportunities require adaptive and informed citizens in order to smoothly move into this new world. Sixty-nine million jobs are expected to be created due to new technologies by 2027 – below the number of jobs lost. Resulting in a net loss to jobs of 2% globally by 2027 (WEF, 2023).   This will have impacts on social cohesion and necessitates countries establishing comprehensive social safety nets, warns Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2024). Of course, such governmental measures are tall asks, particularly for developing nations. This will generally worsen global inequality between countries and within countries as the benefits of technological development most often go to capital owners and highly skilled labour (Moll, Rachel & Restrepo, 2022).   In South Africa, a country already dealing with high inequality, unemployment and social tensions, the effects will be even more extreme. Large companies will be forced to take harsh decisions – implementing AI systems and replacing human jobs. Only then will they be able to compete globally against companies operating in highly efficient markets who will act with great haste and ruthlessness.   Government will find itself under increased pressure from the resulting social unrest and may be forced to guarantee jobs – which if implemented well could see incredible innovation and growth. It could also spell total disaster, if government measures to protect jobs clash with the requirements of businesses in order to compete globally.   Of course, the AI revolution also represents opportunities unlike any humanity has seen in its history. The potential exists for a world in which increased productivity and technological advancement allows humanity to solve such pressing issues as climate change, world hunger and the fight for resources.   There exists a huge opportunity to supercharge the economy and create new jobs in new industries. To capitalize on this opportunity, the country must do certain basic things such as invest in digital infrastructure, AI innovation and entrepreneurship, reskilling and education as well as specific strategies to boost national assets and opportunities.   There is also a need for unconventional local-focused strategies such as a national online AI education platform, a national public data repository to allow all to create AI systems targeting South African issues and challenges, and lastly, a national AI venture fund is needed to support South African entrepreneurs and promote AI-based economic growth.   These opportunities will be grasped by forward thinking countries, companies, individuals and organizations. In order to compete, a full understanding of the future of AI and its potential is needed. What is AI – and what is its current state?   Artificial Intelligence (AI) refers to computer systems and related machinery that are able to perform tasks typically associated with human intelligence such as classification, natural language generation and interpretation of text and speech.   The field of study of AI has been around for nearly a century. British scientist Alan Turing, in 1950, developed the ‘Turing Test’ as a way of evaluating whether a machine could think. The latest breakthroughs that have taken the world by storm are in the form of Large Language Models (LLMs), the most well-known being the GPT models of OpenAI (Goldstein & Kirk-Giannini, 2023).   The ‘ChatGPT’ interface by OpenAI provides a user-friendly way to interact with the world’s most advanced AI. The latest models can analyze text, images and video; write working code as well as pass professional tests and exams with flying colours – scoring in the 90th percentile on the SAT (OpenAI, 2024).   LLMs are neural networks that can understand and generate human (natural) language. These models are trained on large quantities of text on the internet such as books, articles and scientific papers. By processing this data, the models are able to produce coherent text relevant to the input it receives (IBM, 2024).   When one puts a question to an LLM, it uses the patterns and knowledge from its training data to generate responses. By analyzing patterns in the language used in its training data, one can converse with it as one would with any real person. These systems are referred to as Generative AI (GenAI) systems as they generate text from some input.   While OpenAI led the charge with its GenAI offerings, today there exists proprietary models from most large technology companies as well as a large ecosystem of open-source models which are just as advanced and available for anybody to use in their own projects.   Developments in AI will continue as models get larger, more powerful processors are developed and more money enters the space. The stated goal of the AI heavyweights such as OpenAI and Meta is to build Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). AGI being a level of AI that surpasses human capabilities, and that could in theory take over all strenuous and arduous tasks.   Of course, there is much debate as to whether the achievement of AGI will bring about utopia or dystopia. As with all things it will likely be somewhere in the middle, as better technology has solved many human problems – conversely, we are still saddled with many problems that we have the technology to fix. The future of the world of AI depends on how we adopt this new technology.    Global Adoption of AI – Its Effect on Employment Private Sector The breakthroughs in AI are rapidly transforming various sectors of society. The availability of custom models, abundance of data and global connectivity mean companies are racing to integrate AI into their systems. According to a McKinsey Global Survey, 65% of respondents say their organization is regularly using AI (Chui et al., 2024).   Automation of Jobs by AI   In Finance, JP Morgan Chase is using AI for fraud detection, risk management and the reviewing of legal documents with their Contract Intelligence (COiN) platform (JP Morgan Chase, 2024).   German giant Siemens is using its AI platform MindSphere to analyze the data from its connected machinery in order to reduce downtime and optimize manufacturing processes (Siemens, 2024). Tesla’s Autopilot system uses AI to control its self-driving cars. Google’s AI optimization tools have reduced the tech giant’s energy consumption by 40% across its data centres by predicting cooling needs.   Mining conglomerate Rio Tinto has been working on AI-driven automation for more than a decade. The company’s Iron Ore business unit operates AutoHaul, a long-distance railway system that is fully autonomous – a world first. The company operates 200 autonomous locomotives on 1700km of railway. By eliminating the need for drivers and the associated costs, the company has significantly improved safety and efficiency. New productivity schemes across its $50 billion portfolio generated $5 billion of additional free cash flow in 2021 (Rio Tinto, 2021).   Swedish fintech company Klarna has introduced an AI customer service agent that handles two-thirds of its customer service chats. The system is “designed to enhance the shopping and payments experience for Klarna’s 150 million consumers worldwide” (Klarna, 2024).   Its system handles the equivalent of 700 full-time customer service agents. The system is more accurate than human agents – with a 25% drop in repeat inquiries and has reduced the average query resolution time from 11 minutes to 2 minutes. It has capabilities that cannot be matched by human agents. It is available 24 hours a day, in 23 markets and can communicate in 35 languages. This AI system brought a $40 million USD profit improvement to the group in 2024 (Klarna, 2024).   This system, which was a result of a joint experiment by Klarna and OpenAI, will likely become the industry standard globally in the coming years. This is significant as the global customer service market is valued at roughly $9 billion and is predicted to reach $82 billion in revenue by 2025 (Forbes, 2024). Moreover, bad customer service is estimated to cost global markets $3.7 trillion annually. The millions employed in the customer service industry will increasingly see themselves being replaced by much cheaper, effective and secure AI systems.   While Klarna is an early adopter of these technologies and it may seem natural for a technology company to be heavily automated, these changes will soon be seen worldwide. The Future of Jobs Report  compiled by the World Economic Forum in 2023 found that by 2027, 43% of all work tasks will be automated – an increase from 34% in 2022. Faster than expected automation is estimated to displace 83 million jobs in the next five years. The jobs most at risk are highly repetitive administrative tasks such as bookkeeping, data entry, accounting and other administrative and secretarial work (WEF, 2023).   More generally, job losses will primarily be low-skilled jobs as a study of Taiwan’s electronics industry found that AI innovations favour high-skilled labour – reducing the share of the workforce who hold college level educational qualifications and lower (Yang, 2022).   A survey of 2000 corporate executives, conducted by Swiss staffing firm Adecco Group, found that 41% of executives polled expect to employ fewer people due to AI. Furthermore, 80% of business executives are actively accelerating their plans to integrate AI systems and deploy new technologies (WEF, 2020).   Globally, AI systems are being tested with great success in performing human tasks. These successful tests will prompt full-scale replacements in the years to come. It is not only blue-collar jobs and highly repetitive tasks that are at risk of replacement. Rapid technological development means that “AI is coming for the jobs that were supposed to be automation-proof”, according to Sarah T. Roberts, associate professor at the University of California in Los Angeles (Verma & De Vynck, 2023).   The IMF estimates that 40% of all jobs are exposed due to AI – meaning the jobs will either be lost or radically transformed, requiring reskilling or repurposing (Georgieva, 2024).   Scientists are increasingly finding that Large Language Models are capable of surprising levels of creative production and could target even the most intellectually demanding jobs. So complex are the largest models that scientists and researchers are studying them like they would strange natural phenomena – experimenting and trying to explain the results (Heaven, 2024). There is thus no way of knowing to what extent AI will replace jobs or even which jobs are safe.   Opportunities for Reskilling   While job losses are inevitable, there are huge opportunities for reskilling workers to be productive in conjunction with advanced AI systems. Where jobs are not lost, they will certainly be transformed and will look quite different than they do now. A study by the Harvard Business Review  found that the average half-life of skills is now less than five years and in the technology industry it is less than three years (Harvard Business Review, 2023).   The figure below, illustrated the extent to which the labour market will be impacted by the AI revolution. Together, 61% of jobs will require reskilling or redeployment by 2027, according to the Future of Jobs Report  of the World Economic Forum (2023).    Upskilling and Reskilling Outlook, 2023-2027, by workforce fraction Figure 1:  Upskilling and reskilling outlook, 2023-2027. Graph adapted from WEF Future of Jobs Report  2023 (WEF, 2023).   Companies are therefore investing more than ever before in internal training and retraining – roughly 1.5% of the total budget among large companies, according to a Boston Consulting Group study (Goel & Kovács-Ondrejkovic, 2023). Investment in reskilling workers for this new world is essential, as the World Economic Forum estimates that over half of the global population requires new skills to stay ahead of technology-driven change. That figure could climb to 90% by 2030 as current skills become increasingly obsolete.   Telecommunications giant AT&T, released in their 2022 ESG summary the fruits of the company’s new Real Time Training Program created to upskill its employees. During the year 2021, almost 2 000 employees received real-time tutorial recommendations, resulting in 4 300 new customers and nearly a $5 million increase in annual revenue. In the program the company “identifies who needs training and when, as well as which training solution is most likely to drive the greatest performance improvement”.   In 2023, pharmaceutical giant Moderna undertook a massive reskilling and modernization program affecting all aspects of its business. Partnering with OpenAI, it has deployed ChatGPT Enterprise to thousands of its employees (OpenAI, 2024).   “We’re looking at every business process—from legal, to research, to manufacturing, to commercial—and thinking about how to redesign them with AI,” said Stephane Bancel, Moderna’s CEO. The company is seeking to bring 15 new mRNA medicines to market in the next five years by supercharging its development cycle. Moderna set out to achieve a “100% adoption and proficiency” of generative AI by all its employees. To do this, the company assembled a dedicated team of experts who created personalized AI learning companions augmented by group research and training exercises.   The company’s internal AI chatbot, mChat, has been adopted by 80% of the company’s workforce and has 2 000 active weekly participants in its AI forum. After months of usage, the average user has 120 conversations with AI per week – boosting knowledge and productivity at all levels.   “If we had to do it the old biopharmaceutical ways, we might need 100 000 people today,” explained Bancel. Utilizing advanced AI systems, a few thousand people can perform like a team of 100 000 (Moderna, 2024). This corporate architecture supercharged by AI allowed Moderna to ready its COVID-19 vaccine for human trials in just 42 days (Pomeroy, 2023).   Projected job creation and displacement, 2023-2027 Figure 2:  Projected job creation and displacement, 2023-2027. Graph adapted from WEF Future of Jobs Report  2023 (WEF, 2023).   In the near future (next five years), there will be job losses of around 83 million. Near-term job creation is expected to total 69 million – created by new technologies and industries, according to a World Economic Forum report (2023). This estimate gives a net loss of 14 million jobs worldwide by 2027 – which corresponds to a global workforce cut of 2% (WEF, 2023). In the long term, by orders of magnitude more jobs are likely to be created by entirely new industries (JP Morgan, 2024). However, long-term estimates are difficult due to the rapid nature of technological advancements and their effects.   The private sector has obviously been faster to adopt new AI systems but worldwide, public sector organizations are also adopting these systems to boost their productivity and efficiency.   Public Sector   Just as companies are racing to integrate AI into their systems, so too are proactive governments and public sector entities. In the public sector, AI is being used on four primary issues (OECD, 2023):   Effectiveness of Policymaking Efficiency of Operations Improved Accountability Responsiveness Public Sector AI Opportunities Figure 3:  Public Sector AI Opportunities – generated by author.   Policymaking   AI enables effective and objective policymaking. Sophisticated systems are able to ingest large volumes of data and produce policy recommendations at great scale, efficiency and at low cost. However, only 30% of countries have adopted AI for policymaking, according to the 2023 OECD Digital Government Index (OECD, 2023).   Use cases include budget management to analyze spending and income data, fraud and corruption prevention, anticipating budget deviations and emergencies and many more.   The largest use case for AI in guiding policymaking is in analyzing large quantities of data to better understand the needs of the population and identify patterns to make more effective decisions. In the Netherlands, an AI system was introduced in Nijmegen municipality to monitor the number of and activities of people in the city centre. Analyzing the traffic, movement and economic data of the city allows policymakers and officials to make better decisions involving city planning, road safety, municipal services as well as entrepreneurial and business support.   “We can now also predict how busy it is in places where there are no sensors,” says Paul Geurts, strategic information adviser at the municipality of Nijmegen. This system boosts economic development by creating better decision-making at the municipal level (Geurts, 2024).   In South Korea, the Disease Control and Prevention Agency developed an AI system to address crises involving emerging infectious diseases. The system analyzes medical, quarantine, spatial and population data to develop strategies and protocols for responses to infectious diseases (Ubaldi & Zapata, 2024).   AI can be used to analyze and predict the environmental effects of current or prospective public projects. In France, AI was used to build a digital simulation of the Paris-Saclay municipality which is used to simulate the management of large projects. Officials are able to predict energy needs, environmental and financial impacts as well as ordinarily unexpected challenges and setbacks (Paris-Saclay, 2023).    Operational Efficiency   Most deployments of AI by the public sector are done in order to improve efficiency of operations and service delivery. This has been done by nearly 70% of countries analyzed by the OECD’s 2023 Digital Government Report  (OECD, 2024).   In Sweden, an AI system was developed by the Companies Registration Office that automatically sorts 60% of its incoming emails. This system reads the emails, understands the content and then forwards it to the appropriate department in the office. Every day the authority receives approximately 500 emails that would ordinarily require multiple dedicated employees to handle. To modernize the authority’s operations, a dedicated AI hub was set up, which birthed this AI email sorter. The team leading this AI initiative is currently working to expand the system, with the final goal of automatically resolving all queries without the involvement of any staff members (Bolagsverket, 2023).   France has developed and deployed a much larger model in its national government. The Interministerial Directorate for Digital Affairs launched an AI system named Albert that helps public service agents better respond to online queries. French Prime Minster Gabriel Attal declared the system will “de-bureaucratize the administration and simplify everyday life” (Attal, 2024).   ‘Albert’ has been deployed in various areas of the French administration. The system manages court hearings, detects forest fires, manages human resources and automates medical reports, to name but a few of its use cases (Cirou, 2024). Another of Albert’s jobs is to answer questions posed to all government departments. For example, French tax agents receive around 16 million queries per year. Albert, with its database, knowledgebase and ability to understand and respond to questions, will automatically satisfy these queries or forward them to the relevant departments (RFI, 2024). The system is even able to ‘pre-instruct’ regional environmental directorates on the 4 000 environmental project proposals they receive each year and has detected nearly 150 000 cases of fraud for local tax authorities.   Additionally, a new AI system called ‘Aristotle’, which focuses on education, will soon be deployed nationally to modernize the French education system. ‘Aristotle’ will be a digital tutor, provide quizzes and assessments as well as convert lecture videos and materials into disability-friendly format (Cirou, 2024).   As illustrated, the potential for AI to improve the efficiency of government operations whilst radically cutting costs is immense.   Public Accountability   Another important use case of AI is in promoting public accountability and transparency of government. AI has been successfully tested by tax and procurement authorities in order to detect fraud, limit corruption and manage risk (OECD, 2024).   In Brazil, the General Controllership of the Union developed an AI system to curb procurement fraud and corruption. The system called the Analyzer of Biddings, Contracts and Notices (ALICE) automatically analyzes data and recommends action related to public procurement. ALICE collects data related to ongoing and past procurement contracts on the various federal Government procurement platforms. The system will analyze a potential contract and its facts and alert auditors and officials to suspicious and unusual cases (Oliveira at al., 2022).   ALICE scrutinized nearly 200 000 purchasing processes in 2023. Investigations based on the alerts of the ALICE system saw the cancellation of purchases worth more than $2.08 billion (R6.7 billion (ZAR)). This advanced system is capable of such sophisticated tasks as identifying the overpricing of products and services, unnecessary contracting and conflicts of interests ( Gov.br , 2024).   Advanced AI systems can play a crucial role in enhancing oversight and accountability in the public sector – providing objective and transparent analysis that can be used to monitor all areas of government spending.   Responsiveness   The final major use case of AI in the public sector relates to responsiveness – specifically improving service delivery by responding to the feedback of the population. Responsiveness to feedback has been found to be directly related to quality of services provided (OECD, 2013).   In Finland, the government created the AuroraAI program to analyze which public services are well-received and well-administered and which are poorly received. The project forms part of the Finnish drive to digitalize all public services. AuroraAI functions as a network connecting citizens to the most relevant services, with the aim of “making everyday life and business easier”, according to (now former) Prime Minister Sanna Marin (European Parliament, 2024).   Around the world governments are utilizing AI to improve the lives of their people. The potential for huge improvements in efficiency, accountability, responsiveness and decision-making exists and is being explored by forward-thinking government entities.    Regulatory Challenges & Development Consequences   The most important impact of the AI revolution will be on the rate of change of technological development. The acceleration of innovation across all fields of science will bring about massive changes to all aspects of our lives and the world.   New systems will boost productivity globally and may herald a new era in which humanity can focus on issues greater than wars and strife. Of course, today there already exists the tools to solve most practical problems, yet problems abound.   It is thus a human question; one of human organization. Many will prosper, namely large asset owners, forward facing companies and countries. Many will no doubt be left behind just as today 700 million people globally live in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2024).   The IMF projects 40% of the world’s jobs are at risk due to AI, some to replacement and others to augmentation (Georgieva, 2024). This will necessitate well-thought-out and put-together social safety nets to support acceptable standards of living. However, there will be entirely new industries created – giving rise to countless jobs.   Personal AI systems will become commonplace, which will cause inequality that goes far beyond socio-economic inequality. Persons who have access to these tools will be able to supercharge their intellect and productivity and those without access will be left behind – creating a wider and wider gap.   In developed economies, the wealthiest asset owners will continue to see the bulk of benefits. While the bottom majority will find themselves increasingly out of work or forced to reskill themselves for AI-related tasks. Globalization saw millions of jobs offshored from developed nations to developing nations; now those developed economies will lose even more jobs to AI (European Parliament, 2023). Jobs in advanced, highly efficient economies are much more exposed to AI than those in developing nations – as they are forced to adopt the latest market and productivity trends (Georgieva, 2024).   In developing nations, which rely heavily on foreign investment, jobs are not safe either. Just as companies moved their operations to the third world for cheaper labour, they will find even cheaper labour in the form of advanced AI systems. This will have serious consequences for development, as it will reduce foreign investment in these developing nations (Fan & Qiang, 2024).   This leads to the devaluing of their comparative advantages, less access to capital, worse terms of trade and will eventually further widen the gap between rich and poor countries (Boy et al., 2023). This will also have serious consequences geopolitically, as developing nations will have even less of a say in world affairs.   Lack of social cohesion and unrest will be a global phenomenon, which will come as more of a surprise to developed nations whose standards of living may see more abrupt changes. This process (which has begun already) will precipitate the rise of populist political movements, as is happening across Europe today.   In developing nations whose standards of living are low even without AI’s effects, the trends are more predictable. These nations who feel increasingly excluded from the family of developed nations will attempt to form their own trading, diplomatic and support blocks (Gumede, 2023). Groups like BRICS have expanded to 10 member nations (BRICS+) and tensions will continue to rise between the West and the rest.   Without global cooperation, meaningful AI regulation will be near impossible. Like with taxes, corporations will shop around the world for the best regulatory environment rendering any good or bad faith regulations toothless (Wheeler, 2023).   Democracy and democratic values may be perceived as being of diminishing value and utility as one relies more and more on transnational corporations and global social initiatives than one does on one’s own government.   Success in the future of AI depends primarily on:   ·                Digital Infrastructure: An essential foundation for an AI-powered economy. ·                Skills Development & Retraining: Equipping people with the skills of the Future. ·                Local AI Investment: Developing local AI industries, hubs and innovators. ·                Strategic Boosters: Using AI to boost strategic opportunities and assets. ·                AI Safety: Regulation to ensure safe development in national/global interest.   Development Requirements in the World of AI  Figure 4:  Development Requirements (generated by author).    Continental Developments & Outlook   In May 2024, the African Union Commission released its Draft Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy pursuant to the African Union Agenda 2063. The continental strategy aims to guide member states in achieving ‘people-centric’ and ‘development-oriented’ AI implementation.   The strategy’s focus areas are:   Maximizing AI benefits: Improving people’s livelihoods, focus on AI in agriculture, healthcare, education, public service delivery and defense. Minimizing risks: Addressing risks involving inclusion, human rights and dignity. Building capabilities: In infrastructure, AI talent, R&D and innovation. Regional and international cooperation: Developing strategic partnerships. Private/public sector investment: Encouraging massive regional investment.   Underlying the strategy is an adherence to African culture and values (African Union, 2024). The strategy goes further in stating 15 “action areas”, including but not limited to:   Establishment of appropriate regulation and governance systems. Creating an enabling environment for AI startups. Ensuring the availability of high-quality and diverse datasets. Promoting AI skills and talent in schools, colleges, workspaces and among the populus.   The continental AI pioneer Mauritius published its national AI strategy in 2018 – which included countrywide research and a detailed action plan. Included in this plan was the creation of the Mauritius Artificial Intelligence Council (MAIC) – a 10-member panel tasked with facilitating the implementation of various AI projects (MAIS, 2024). This is overseen by the larger Mauritius Emerging Technologies Council (METC), whose goal is to make Mauritius a thriving tech hub.   Among the projects are:   Digital Youth Engagement Program: Partnership with Microsoft to equip 25 000 Mauritians with digital skills. Venture Investing and Funding: the National Resilience Fund as well as various grant programs are providing investment and low-interest working capital loans with flexible payment terms. Development Sandboxes:  The country’s Regulatory Sand Box License lets startups ‘test-drive’ their systems and products in a controlled environment.   Due to these initiatives, Mauritius is set to nearly double tech’s contribution to GDP by 2025, according to a PwC report (Balloun, 2024).   Today, 13 out of Africa’s 54 countries have begun putting together national AI strategies, as the continent recognizes the importance of AI for development and growth. These strategies are essential to confront the challenges facing the continent such as limitations in infrastructure, lack of access to quality data and incohesive regulatory frameworks. As well as capitalize on the potential $1.2 trillion AI contribution to Africa’s GDP (Jaldi, 2024). Proper AI development in Africa could see Africa’s stature rise in the global geopolitical landscape, with Africa becoming less reliant on the Global North and lead to a more balanced power dynamic (Brookings, 2024). On the other hand, failure to become leaders in AI will spell continued lack of influence in global matters.   South Africa Outlook: Risks & Opportunities   The World Bank described AI as being either a blessing or a curse for low- and middle- income countries (Fan et al., 2024). In South Africa, AI will certainly be either a blessing or a curse; economic salvation or continued stagnation.   Large South African corporations who wish to compete globally will be forced to follow global corporate trends – automating as many jobs as possible as well as investing in reskilling the remaining workforce to work in conjunction with AI. Other companies may give up competing globally, compensated in some way by government who wishes to artificially keep job numbers up.   This may be done in business-friendly ways by reviving South African industry and supercharging businesses with AI tools; thus, creating jobs, or it may be done by bloating the government – stretching an already stretched national budget.   The informal economy will be less affected than the formal economy as it is less linked to global markets. With job losses in the formal economy and the reskilling of workers to equip them with modern skills, many will find the technological skills requirements too foreign or cumbersome. There will be a larger split between the formal economy, which aims to compete globally, and an increasingly large informal economy utilizing outdated and inefficient means as it does today.   As economic inequality grows ever larger, social cohesion becomes more difficult and the rule of law may continue to degrade. The gap between the rich and the poor will continue to grow. Increased productivity and wealth will put the top end of the formal economy out of reach of the government as the country becomes increasingly reliant on the private sector for survival. Government operations may at some point abandon economic goals and profit motives completely as on one side the masses of people reliant on the state demand what the state cannot provide and on the other side, slow thinking and anti-market policies will see the state being less competitive.   The welfare state will expand – with a greater percentage of the population depending on grants and jobs that are artificially protected (to the detriment of productivity and efficiency). The current grant program by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) may be expanded into a countrywide Universal Basic Income (UBI) style program.   Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a cash transfer unconditionally given to all citizens at regular intervals (Banerjee et al., 2019). South Africa, as a developing country with a large formal economy, faces unique financial challenges in dealing with an expanding welfare state.   Since 2012, South Africa’s Personal Income Tax (PIT) base has shrunk by roughly 2% (Scott, 2022). Given South Africa’s shrinking tax base, funding an expanded grant program will become increasingly untenable. A World Bank Blog (2023) study found that in developing nations with large informal sectors, funding a UBI grant through income taxes is unfeasible. Such a program would likely be funded by increased consumption taxes – taxes on the purchases of goods and services (Singh, 2023).   Global innovations in technology will make the world less reliant on South African exports and labour. Moreover, poor governance will make it less and less possible for South African companies to export goods competitively. Decreased reliance on South Africa means less investment interest and the economy begins to stagnate.   A large portion of the country will feel disenfranchised and wronged as their standard of living continues to drop. This fuels anti-free market sentiments and prompts a rise in populist anti-establishment and anti-constitutionalist political movements (Gumede, 2024b).   Development Requirements   Conventional Requirements for AI Prosperity   In order for South Africa to thrive in the world of AI, the country must do certain basic things. The four requirements that are common across most national AI strategies are:   Invest in Digital Infrastructure:  Behind every amazing AI system is a vast infrastructure making it all possible. This includes datacenters, large-scale energy generation and specialized hardware. For example, expanding internet and smartphone access as well as supporting the technology industry.   Skills Development & Digital Education:  Large-scale investment is needed in education involving science, technology and specifically AI. This is essential in giving citizens the tools to build the AI systems that can create jobs, growth and technological progress. For example, introducing school and post-school programs that expose people to the latest developments in AI and promote AI participation.   Local AI Industry:  Investment is needed to turn the country into an AI hub that can attract investment, talent and interest in the country. This requires support of entrepreneurs, research laboratories, national educational programs and competitions – anything that promotes engagement in the field of AI. For example, the establishment and support of dedicated AI research institutes.   Strategic Boosters:  AI must be used to boost strategic assets. Public-private sector cooperation is needed to unlock the potential of the country’s resource and human wealth. For example, public-private sector AI research units in every major corporation and state-owned enterprise that deals specifically with AI tools for its area of expertise.   South Africa’s Current AI Strategy   There are two existing government AI initiatives in South Africa. In 2011, the Centre for Artificial Intelligence Research (CAIR) was established by the Department of Science and Innovation (DSI) and is primarily engaged in supporting AI research at South African Universities. In 2022, the AI Institute of South Africa (AIISA) was established by the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies (DCDT) – which is focused on creating applications of AI for the private and public sector.   In 2024, a new discussion document was released at the DCDT’s AI National Government Summit, listing four core priorities for the government regarding AI:   Smart Approach to AI: An AI agenda that benefits all citizens. AI Skills Generation: Invest in education geared towards developing AI skills. Policy Research: Identify ways to mitigate negative impacts of AI. Economic Growth: Promote investment in local AI economy.   The document further describes the country’s 2030 goals, most notably to have 5 000 AI experts, 30% of the country’s workforce trained with basic AI skills, 100 to 300 AI startups and R70 billion in direct investment in AI (DCDTa, 2024).   The four core priorities are more or less shared by most countries developing their own national strategies.   Birthed by the dialogue of the National AI Summit was South Africa’s AI Policy Framework. Released by the DCDT, it is a “first step in developing the National AI Policy” and aims to address national challenges and exploit opportunities across the economy (DCDTb, 2024).   The framework suggests a ‘Futures Triangle’ approach to developing the national AI policy – considering the “Push of the Present”: technological advancement, the “Pull of the Future”: the National Development Plan (NDP), as well as the “Weight of the Past”: the historic inequities in South African society.   The AI policy framework lays out the following strategic pillars for the national AI policy.   Talent Development, Digital Infrastructure, Research & Development Public Sector Implementation, Ethical AI, Data Protection, Security & Transparency Fairness, Human Control & Promotion of Cultural Values   The National AI Policy Framework outlines the key considerations and values that should be foundational to a future national plan or future AI initiatives.   However, there exists a large gap between the country’s goals and its core priorities – namely specific initiatives designed to achieve the goals. These represent significant unaddressed opportunities for the country.   Unaddressed Opportunities & Specific Plans for South Africa   Artificial Intelligence (AI) is being designated a national priority by the world’s largest economies, who are all investing heavily and conventionally in their AI industries. South Africa, with an already stretched budget and existing social-economic and development challenges must embrace unconventional strategies in an attempt to leap-frog up and compete on the world stage. Importantly too, these strategies must be economically feasible and easily implementable.   While the DCDT’s AI National Government Summit discussion document and AI Policy Framework list the country’s core priorities for upcoming national AI policy, there are many opportunities unaddressed by the national dialogue and policy framework that could deliver cost-effective economic growth.   In order to create cost-effective and efficient growth in regard to AI, the country must:   Create shared public datasets and environments for AI development, training and testing. Problem Addressed: Too many problems for government to address Make government data publicly available so that the public can create solutions to the country’s problems. In the National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan 2023 prepared by the National Science and Technology Council in the United States, one strategy that is proposed is the creation of publicly available datasets for AI research and development (NAIRDSP, 2023).   Availability and access to large volumes of relevant data is crucial for AI development. A well-designed public data repository would promote cost-effective AI development by allowing anybody to train and test models as well as build advanced systems that solve unique local challenges. All data collected and stored by government departments should be made publicly available with private/sensitive data being anonymized for privacy and security considerations. Additionally, cloud hardware and computing resources could be made available for the public to train and test the systems on the available data or at the very least point to free, online publicly available tools.   This would allow citizens to build systems to solve problems facing the country from anywhere without cost to the government. For example, by making school performance and resource data (e.g. results, attendance, socio-economic breakdowns, resource availability, location, teacher certifications, etc.) available publicly, AI systems could be built to optimize resource allocation, professional development, policy recommendations and customized learning tools.   This is a cost-effective way to allow the country’s best minds to confront the challenges this country faces and develop solutions tailored to local challenges.   National Public AI Learning Platform Problem Addressed: Lack of skills and literacy in the field of AI As described above in ‘Global Adoption of AI: Public Sector’, the average half-life of skills is less than five years and 61% of all jobs will require reskilling by 2027. It is therefore essential to equip citizens with the skills of the future or make available the tools for citizens to equip themselves.   The most cost-effective way of doing this is by creating a zero-rated (free to access) online AI learning portal with resources created by partnerships with companies and universities. Under Singapore’s 2019 National Artificial Intelligence Strategy, the government is on course to provide AI literacy courses to 100 000 adults and students by 2025 (SNDGO, 2019).   This is an efficient way to skill and reskill citizens for the world of AI and drastically improve AI literacy and understanding of the opportunities that exist as a result of advancements in the field of AI.   National AI Venture Investment Fund   Problem Addressed: Missed Economic Opportunities South Africans have produced innovations that have shaped the world in the fields of medicine, technology, electric vehicles and more. There currently exists the next generation of large SA-born companies. The government – whether under the Public Investment Corporation, Department of Communications and Digital Technologies, or any other branch – must establish a vehicle to invest in South Africa’s burgeoning AI startups.   This will boost the number of AI startups by offering capital, promoting the local AI ecosystem and allowing future spending on future AI-related projects. The countries on the forefront globally in technological development are large-scale investors in startups in their home countries and abroad. Examples include the China Investment Corporation (CIC) supporting Chinese entrepreneurs, Fonds Souverain d'Investissements Stratégiques (FSIS) in France, which is partnered with tech incubator ‘Station F’ to fund French startups, and the Saudi Public Investment Fund involved in venture investing across the world (WIPO, 2020).   The stakes are higher than ever before for South Africa. The country may have the world’s greatest potential but the potential for total disaster exists if the country does not move swiftly, proactively and strategically into the new world. Given South Africa’s unique challenges, the country needs unconventional strategies that can have maximum impact whilst remaining economically feasible.   Conclusion   Fears of dystopia and hopes of utopia are equally unrealistic in regard to AI. We already have the tools of our destruction and salvation, AI is yet another. The future of AI is a human question more than it is a technological question – a question of how we deal with increasingly advanced technologies.   At its core the AI revolution represents a period of exponentially increasing technological advancement. Each stage of human development has brought significant change but overall, the human standard of living has increased, human civilization has expanded, and new worlds and industries have been created.   The automobile revolution created millions of jobs and displaced countless, too. The Ford Model T must certainly have been devastating to the last horse trader in Detroit, but today a world without automobiles is impossible to imagine.   Global trends indicate that there will be a net loss to jobs in the short term as a result of AI but that in the longer term, new industries will create more jobs than are lost and grow the world economy.   Companies, countries, organizations and individuals who are proactive and adaptive in this changing world will see their fortunes thrive and others who are not, will see their fortunes wither. Countries around the world are making great gains in efficiency, transparency and service delivery by utilizing AI. Companies too, are increasing the efficiency of their operations by experimenting with automated AI systems.   For developing nations like South Africa, the opportunity exists for radical growth. If proper investment is made in educating and reskilling people for the world of AI, the country’s enormous potential could be unleashed. If the people of South Africa actively participate in the task of finding the right path and the government endeavors to create the conditions for people to thrive, there is no limit to the success we may see.   If, on the other hand, we neglect our responsibility to build, learn and ensure that the country thrives, South Africa could easily be left behind. The country must invest in digital infrastructure, support AI hubs and innovation, invest in education and reskilling for the future and use AI to boost its strategic opportunities.   In addition to the conventional strategies, there is also a need for unconventional local-focused strategies. These include a national online AI education platform, a national public data repository to allow all to create AI systems targeting South African issues and challenges, and lastly, a national AI venture fund is needed to support South African entrepreneurs and promote AI-based economic growth.   The right choices could see the country become a world superpower with an economy supercharged by AI and related advanced technologies. The wrong choices will bring about increased strife in the form of unemployment, crime, economic stagnation, inequality, etc.   In understanding what the future of humanity’s relationship with technology is, one should consider this: a century ago the idea of being able to instantaneously see and speak to somebody across the world was beyond comprehension. Today, if one forgets one’s phone at home, it feels as if one is missing a limb. If the internet is down, one might as well be in Antarctica. Not only is technology advancing at an increasing rate, but we are also becoming technology. We are merging with machines – in so doing, creating a new type of human. With advancements in the way we interact with technology it will soon become difficult to determine where machines begin and humans end. Humanity is being supercharged by machines.   Imagine now if one does not participate in this societal shift. The gap between those who embrace AI and those who do not will grow exponentially until the differences in capabilities within our species are greater than the difference between us and our closest relatives: Chimpanzees and Bonobos.   The AI revolution represents a shift too significant to ignore or sleep-walk into. Failure to adapt and develop will have severe consequences regarding development, social-economic inequality, social cohesion, human rights and democratic ideals. Fortunately, the future is in our hands. It will neither be utopia nor dystopia; it will be what we make it.   References   African Union. 2024. Draft Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy . [Online] Available at: https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/44004-doc-EN-_Continental_AI_Strategy_July_2024.pdf   Attal, G. 2024. Use of AI to Serve French Citizens. Office of Prime Minister, France. [Online] Available at:   https://www.uspa24.com/bericht-24391/pm-g-attal-s-speech-amid-states-reform-over-de-bureaucratizing.html   Balloun, C. 2024. Inside Mauritius’s Thriving Tech Hub: Startups and Success Stories . NuCamp. [Online] Available at: https://www.nucamp.co/blog/coding-bootcamp-mauritius-mus-inside-mauritiuss-thriving-tech-hub-startups-and-success-stories   Banerjee, A. et al. 2019. Universal Basic Income in the Developing World . National Bureau of Economic Research. [Online] Available at: https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25598/w25598.pdf   Bolagsverket. 2023. AI model sorts the agency's inbox. 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Alice - Bidding, Contracts and Notices Analyzer.  [Online] Available at:   https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/assuntos/auditoria-e-fiscalizacao/alice   Gumede, W. 2023. BRICS: Rising de-dollarisation of the world. [Online] Available at: https://www.inclusivesociety.org.za/post/brics-rising-de-dollarisation-of-the-world   Gumede, W. 2024. Unless Africans elect better leaders, developing continent remains a dream. [Online] Available at: https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2024-04-18-william-gumede-unless-africans-elect-better-leaders-developing-continent-remains-a-dream/   Harvard Business Review. 2023. Reskilling in the Age of AI.  [Online] Available at: https://hbr.org/2023/09/reskilling-in-the-age-of-ai Heaven, W. 2024 . Large language models can do jaw-dropping things. But nobody knows exactly why . [Online] Available at: https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/03/04/1089403/large-language-models-amazing-but-nobody-knows-why/   IBM. 2024. What are large language models (LLMs)?  [Online] Available at: https://www.ibm.com/topics/large-language-models   Jaldi, A. 2024. Artificial Intelligence Revolution in Africa: Economic Opportunities and Legal Challenges. [Online] Available at: https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2023-07/PP_13-23%20(Jaldi%20).pdf   JP Morgan. 2024. How AI can boost productivity and jump start growth. [Online] Available at: https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/nam/en/insights/markets-and-investing/ideas-and-insights/how-ai-can-boost-productivity-and-jump-start-growth   JP Morgan Chase. 2024. Artificial Intelligence Research . [Online] Available at: https://www.jpmorgan.com/technology/artificial-intelligence   Klarna. 2024. Klarna AI assistant handles two-thirds of customer service chats in its first month . [Online] Available at: https://www.klarna.com/international/press/klarna-ai-assistant-handles-two-thirds-of-customer-service-chats-in-its-first-month/   MAIS. 2024. Mauritius Artificial Intelligence Strategy . Government of Mauritius. [Online] Available at: https://ncb.govmu.org/ncb/strategicplans/MauritiusAIStrategy2018.pdf   Moll, B., Lukasz, R., & Pascual, R. 2022. Uneven Growth: Automation’s Impact on Income and Wealth Inequality . [Online] Available at: https://benjaminmoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/UG.pdf   NAIRDSP. 2023. National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan . National Science and Technology Council. [Online] Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/National-Artificial-Intelligence-Research-and-Development-Strategic-Plan-2023-Update.pdf   OECD. 2013. Responsiveness of public services: Timeliness . Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Publishing. [Online] Available at:  https://doi.org/10.1787/gov_glance-2013-54-en   OECD. 2023. 2023 Digital Government Index . Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Publishing. [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/1a89ed5e-en   Oliveira, T. et al. 2022.  Alice: Desafios, resultados e perspectivas da ferramenta de auditoria contínua de compras públicas governamentais com uso de inteligência artificial . [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.36428/revistadacgu.v14i26.530   OpenAI. 2024a. GPT-4 Technical Report . [Online] Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.08774   OpenAI. 2024b . Moderna and OpenAI partner to accelerate the development of life-saving treatments.  [Online] Available at: https://openai.com/index/moderna/ Ormond, E. 2023. Emergence of Artificial Intelligence in South Africa . [Online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W4W5d6iYuLc   Paris-Saclay. 2023. Paris-Saclay dévoile TWIN 2030 un jumeau numérique territorial à large échelle pour une politique publique de nouvelle generation . [Online] Available at: https://www.paris-saclay.com/fileadmin/documents/1._L_agglo/Espace_Presse/Paris-Saclay_Twin_2030.pdf   Pomeroy, R. 2023. How AI played an instrumental role in making mRNA vaccines . [Online] Available at: https://bigthink.com/health/ai-mrna-vaccines-moderna/   RFI. 2024. French government will use AI to modernise public services .  [Online] Available at: https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20240423-french-government-will-use-ai-to-modernise-public-services   Rio Tinto. 2016. Rio Tinto outlines new $5 billion productivity push under long-term strategy focused on cash generation. [Online] Available at: https://www.riotinto.com/en/news/releases/2016/5bn-productivity-push-outlined   Scott, M. 2022. SA Budget Review 2022: The Shrinking PIT tax base . [Online] Available at: https://www.ey.com/en_za/insights/tax/the-shrinking-pit-tax-base-what-s-next   Siemens. 2023. AI for Everyone.  [Online] Available at: https://webinars.sw.siemens.com/en-US/mindsphere-analytic-tools-how-does-ai-work-with-iot/   Singh, K. 2023. UBI Financing and Its Long-Term Impacts in Economies with a Large Informal Sector.  [Online] Available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/impactevaluations/ubi-financing-and-its-long-term-impacts-economies-large-informal-sector-guest   SNDGO. 2019. Singapore National Artificial Intelligence Strategy . Smart Nation and Digital Government Office. [Online] Available at: https://www.smartnation.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/national-aistrategy.pdf?sfvrsn=2c3bd8e9_4   Social Income. 2024. World Poverty Statistics 2024 . [Online] Available at: https://socialincome.org/en/int/world-poverty-statistics-2024   Ubaldi, B. & Zapata, R. 2024. Government with Artificial Intelligence: Are Government Ready? Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Publishing. [Online] Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/26324bc2-en.pdf?expires=1722873693&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=6DAA28EDC7DB05B28D3531F98746C1AB   Verma, P. & De Vynck, G. 2023. ChatGPT took their jobs. Now they walk dogs and fix air conditioners.  [Online] Available at:   https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/06/02/ai-taking-jobs/   WEF. 2020. Future of Jobs Report 2020 . World Economic Forum. [Online] Available at: https://www.weforum.org/publications/the-future-of-jobs-report-2020/   WEF. 2023. Future of Jobs Report 2023 . World Economic Forum. [Online] Available at: https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs_2023.pdf   Wheeler, T. 2023. The three challenges of AI regulation . [Online] Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-three-challenges-of-ai-regulation/     WIPO. 2020. Sovereign Wealth Funds and Innovation Investing in an Era of Mounting Uncertainty. World Intellectual Property Organization . [Online] Available at: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2020-chapter5.pdf   Yang, C. 2022. How Artificial Intelligence Technology Affects Productivity and Employment: Firm-Level Evidence from Taiwan . [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j .respol.2022.104536        - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

  • Report: Proposed National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council

    Report into the Feasibility, Structure, and Functioning of the Proposed National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council: Striving for a Corruption-Free South Africa Copyright © 2022 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members, the Stellenbosch University, or the Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership. JULY 2022 Contents LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS ABSTRACT ABOUT THE INCLUSIVE SOCIETY INSTITUTE (ISI) ABOUT THE STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY AND THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC LEADERSHIP (SPL) STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY (SU) SCHOOL OF PUBLIC LEADERSHIP (SPL) THEME 1: PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW AND INSIGHTS INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXTUAL OVERVIEW: SETTING THE SCENE CONCEPTUALISING CORRUPTION IN CONTEXT: TYPOLOGIES, FORMS, AND ACTS OF CORRUPTION AFRICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION ADVISORY BODIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE RWANDA SEYCHELLES BOTSWANA CONCLUSION THEME 2: RESEARCH METHOD, FINDINGS, AND ANALYSES BRIEF OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH, STRATEGY, AND SAMPLING SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSES CONCLUSION THEME 3: NACAC IN PRACTICE NACAC COMPOSITION AND STAFF SELECTION CRITERIA NACAC’S AUTHORITY, MANDATE, AND RESPONSIBILITIES DESIGN AND FUNCTION OF A COORDINATING BODY RESOURCES AND CAPACITY NEEDS CONCLUSION EXPERTS’ RESPONSES ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCLUSION REFERENCE LIST List of Abbreviations ACCERUS - Anti-corruption Centre for Education and Research of Stellenbosch University ACCS - Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles ACTT - Anti-Corruption Task Team APRM - African Peer Review Mechanism CECA - Corruption and Economic Crime Act 29, 2018 CPI - Corruption Perceptions Index DCEC - Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime GSCID - Governance, State Capacity and Institutional Development Cluster IACAB - International Anti-Corruption Advisory Board ICC - Inter-Agency Coordinating Council ISI - Inclusive Society Institute ICTS - International Cooperation, Trade and Security Cluster JCPS - Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster MFMA - Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 NACF - National Anti-Corruption Forum NACS - National Anti-Corruption Strategy NDPP - National Director of Public Prosecutions NEDLAC - National Economic Development and Labour Council NPA - National Prosecuting Authority NRF - National Research Foundation PDE - Procuring and Disposing Entities PFMA - Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 PPE - Personal Protective Equipment SADC - Southern African Development Community SARS - South African Revenue Service SDGs - Sustainable Development Goals SONA - State of the Nation Address SPL - School of Public Leadership SIU - Special Investigating Unit SU - Stellenbosch University UN - United Nations UNCAC - United Nations Convention against Corruption UNDP - United Nations Development Programme List of Contributors The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) in partnership with the Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership (SPL) hosted a High-Level Dialogue on the Establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa, on 19 October 2021. This dialogue aimed to give direction to the research to be undertaken by the ISI and the Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership. The following experts contributed to the main aim of the dialogue and, in a larger sense, the direction of the feasibility research report: ​ ​ ​ ​Mr Daryl Swanepoel Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) ​Prof Zwelinzima Ndevu Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership (SPL) ​Prof Evangelos Mantzaris Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership (SPL) ​ ​ ​ ​Prof Geo Quinot Stellenbosch University African Procurement Law Unit ​Prof Hanns Bossert Academica University of Applied Sciences – Netherlands ​Mr Johnny Douglas Stellenbosch University School of Public Leadership (SPL) ​ ​ KEY WORDS: Corruption South Africa National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council for South Africa; South African Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030 Abstract In his State of the Nation Address on 11 February 2021, the President of the Republic of South Africa announced the establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council (NACAC) for South Africa. The establishment of NACAC confirms South Africa’s commitment to the implementation of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Goal 16, which aims for peace, justice and strong institutions. This report attempts to investigate the feasibility and possible structures of the proposed National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council for South Africa. The first section of the report compares and draws lessons from three African countries internationally recognised to be amongst the least corrupt in the world. It considers the structure and operation of their anti-corruption institutions and includes an assessment of their effectiveness in combating corruption. In the second section, the findings of the qualitative research conducted, which considered South Africa’s unique socio-political context, are presented. Eight expert leaders based in the public sector, business community, and civil society were purposely sampled to participate in open-ended interviews based on key issues related to the structures, processes, realities, and expectations of the proposed new body. Finally, section three presents an informed attempt to chart what NACAC could look like after considering the research findings and best practices from the case studies found on the African continent. It unpacks the practical steps that need to be taken to implement a fully functioning and successful anti-corruption institution that is fit-for-purpose for the South African context. About the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and self-standing institution that functions independently from any other entity. It was founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever-transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. About the Stellenbosch University and the School of Public Leadership (SPL) Stellenbosch University (SU) Stellenbosch University (SU) is home to an academic community of 29 000 students (including 4 000 foreign students from 100 countries) as well as 3 000 permanent staff members (including 1 000 academics) on five campuses. The historical oak-lined university town, which lies amongst the Boland Mountains in the Winelands of the Western Cape, creates a unique campus atmosphere, attracting local and foreign students alike. On the main campus, paved walkways wind between campus buildings – some dating from previous centuries; others just a few years old. Architecture from various eras attests to the sound academic foundation and establishment of an institution of excellence. This, together with the scenic beauty of the area and state-of-the-art, environmentally friendly facilities and technology, as well as visionary thinking about the creation of a sustainable 21st-century institution, makes for the unique character of Stellenbosch University. School of Public Leadership (SPL) The Stellenbosch University, through the School of Public Leadership (SPL), is a leader in learning for sustainable African and global futures. The SPL is unique in the South African context with its combination of Public Governance, Environment and Sustainability as strategic focal points. These three foci also provide the rationale for the three postgraduate programmes in Public Policy and Management, Environmental Management, and Sustainable Development. SPL’s business vision and mission, with “Learning for sustainable African futures” as its slogan, can best be understood and summarised as serving public value in an African context. THEME 1: Preliminary literature review and insights Introduction and Contextual Overview: Setting the Scene In his delivery of the 2021 State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Cyril Ramaphosa identified the government’s focus as concentrating on four pillars decisively dealing with Covid-19, job creation and inclusive financial growth, acceleration of the country’s economic recovery, and the fight against corruption. It became evident in the speech that the fight against corruption is instrumental in achieving the success of the other fundamentals and its realisation at all levels is the key to government’s efforts to revive hope to the people for a better future. His brave acceptance of the fact that the government’s reputation has been dented for years because of widespread corruption at all government and societal levels, led to the announcement of what has been described as a new feasible step forward in the fight against extensive corruption within the public sector ranks. As the Honourable President Mr Cyril Ramaphosa stated: “We will shortly be appointing the members of the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council, which is a multi-sectoral body that will oversee the initial implementation of the strategy and the establishment of an independent statutory anti-corruption body that reports to Parliament.” The indication and belief that such a fight against corruption could only be successful when the whole of society becomes an integral, collective part of the effort leading to a strengthened rule of law, was at the heart of the President’s speech. It was stated that the processes of increasing accountability amongst senior government leaders would be rubber-stamped immediately through the signing of a performance agreement with all ministers before the end of February, a measure that would reach the country’s public. In the announcement of the new National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council, it was characterised as a multi-sectoral body that will oversee the initial implementation of the strategy and establishment of an independent statutory anti-corruption body that reports to Parliament. This was followed by the promise that well planned and decisive investigative action would be undertaken against corruption in the procurement processes and outcomes of Covid-19-based goods and services. The beginning of such an anti-corruption journey was initiated by the authorisation of the SIU (Special Investigating Unit) to commence with and complete the investigations of all allegations and evidence of unlawful conduct that took place at all levels of Covid-19 supply chain and procurement structures and processes – by all government spheres and state bodies – during the national state of disaster. It was officially stated at the time, during SONA, that the SIU had finalised investigations into 164 contracts with a total value of R3.5-billion (Ramaphosa, 2021). These initiatives were supported by the creation of a fusion centre, where representatives of all key law enforcement agencies gather, debate, and share information and resources. It was shown that the establishment has been successful in the fight against corruption, as it has delivered a large number of court cases and achieved the preservation and recovery of millions of Rands in public funds. Beyond this, South Africa as a signatory to intercontinental treaties and conventions on societal aspirations – such as Goal #16 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN), and continental conventions such as the African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration – is bound to continually improve its anti-corruption efforts to achieve the planning, designing, and implementation of an honest, transparent, and good governance ethos in running its state affairs. Conceptualising Corruption in Context: Typologies, Forms, and Acts of Corruption Though the phenomenon of corruption is as old as human history, it only received attention after a few years into the democratic dispensation – understandably so, as South Africa was managing the bigger political project of democratic transition and the change of power. The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA, 2002) was the first government department to initiate an anti-corruption strategy. Within it, a number of corrupt acts were identified as types and manifestations of illegal actions (abuse of power and privileged information/insider trading; bribery, conflict of interest; embezzlement; extortion; favouritism; fraud and nepotism). Since then, numerous efforts have been coordinated to rid the country of corruption. Amongst others, a series of reports from the empirical research conducted by the Public Service Commission (PSC, 2008; 2011a) entitled The Most Common Manifestations of Corruption were published. The findings included: Abuse of government resources Appointment irregularities Criminal conduct Fraud and bribery Identity document fraud Mismanagement of government funds Procurement irregularities Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing irregularities Gross negligence Misappropriation, theft, and financial mismanagement; and Social grant fraud. The foregoing list is a stark reminder that corruption is multifaceted in nature. It therefore needs to be dissected if it is to be understood to its core. In the process of continuous empirical research on the subject matter for over a decade, the Anti-Corruption Centre for Education and Research at Stellenbosch University (ACCERUS) has developed a wide range of both specific and ‘general/collective’ types of ‘common’ and ‘sophisticated’ corrupt acts as listed below: Asset misappropriation is associated with theft that comprises a variety of actions such as extraction from cash deposits; asset purchases; theft of tangible assets; cash on hand, from cash deposits received; transactions in foreign currencies; unrecorded cash transactions; inventory and other assets (e.g., stocks); use of organisation’s equipment (or staff); asset transfers; inventory schemes and movement of assets for private purposes. Bribery is one of the world’s most common and serious forms of corruption and is pervasive – in both big and small acts – in the public sector. While it is probably most prevalent in the supply chain and procurement process transactions, it is in fact also found in many other areas of corruption in the public sector (MBPC, 2016) . It entails an act or attempt, by way of a gift of money or other inducements, to dishonestly persuade someone (or a group of persons) to act in one’s favour. Bureaucratic corruption is an act associated with public servants who operate at various organisational and professional levels and abuse their positions for their own personal benefit (Gans-Morse et al., 2018:173-174) , or that of their associates, without overt gifting. Computer/IT fraud/corruption (cyber-crime) is a generic concept used to describe criminal activities carried out by means of computers or the Internet. Creditors’ corruption is consisted of, amongst others, double billing; fraudulent disbursements/payments; overpayments; shell companies; fraudulent credit notes; mispricing; and false refunds (Leuthner, 2016) . Debtors’ corruption acts are related to discounts; false invoices; payment diversions; sales schemes; unrecorded or under-recorded sales; invoice kickbacks; refunds and credit notes; a variety of bribes and short deliveries (Gilander & Neselevska, 2017) . Economic and financial corruption cover a wide spectrum of offenses, inter alia, financial crimes committed by banks, insurance companies, tax evasion, illicit capital havens, money laundering, as well crimes committed by public officials (such as bribery, embezzlement, traffic of influences, etc.) either to benefit unduly personally, or benefit organisations. Employee-related fraud/corruption is characterised by a wide variety of acts such as irregular loans; fake educational qualifications; payroll/remuneration schemes; irregular bonuses; falsified curriculum vitae; irregular promotions and bonuses; duplicated reimbursements; department credit cards for personal use; falsified wages; nepotism; fictitious expenses; patronage use; fraudulent travel and subsidy claims; backdating salary increases; a variety of misrepresentations of relevant personal information; illegal gratuities and expense reimbursement schemes (Woods & Mantzaris, 2012) . Grand corruption occurs at the highest levels of political and administrative leadership and management as well as groups who, in most, if not all cases, use the privileged information at their disposal to take advantage of the laws, rules, and regulations gaps and anti-corruption agencies’ lack of capacity, weaknesses, and structural and functional inadequacies (Bauhr & Charron, 2017:416-417) . Management fraud is perpetrated by a wide range of managers who become directly and indirectly involved with most, if not all, acts of corruption mentioned above purely by having both access to information and power to act and influence the course of events to their favour. Such fraud is also synonymous with “fraudulent financial statements” (Mbaku, 2007) . Petty corruption is generally associated with corrupt practices by lower- and middle-grade public servants who, in most instances, deal with the public on a daily basis (also described as ‘survival corruption’) (Stahl et al., 2017(a)) . Political corruption , inevitably the most debated corruption reality in South Africa, Africa and globally, is associated with politicians’ greed, avarice, irregular and illegal actions at various levels of position and authority, from the president to a municipal councillor. Principal-agent-type corruption is the idea, planning and implementation of actions which provide an opportunity for ‘middlemen’/‘agents’ to facilitate deals/transactions in the public service terrain. The employed agent can either be an internal or external party to the entity but will naturally have the power to sway influence (GAB | the Global Anticorruption Blog, 2015) . Procurement fraud is related to a very wide range of manipulated, inter alia, “preferred and ghost service providers” to direct the procurement processes toward a pre-emptive conclusion; many forms of bribery through mediators; violation of “preferential procurement” and falsified “broad-based black economic empowerment” arrangements; fictitious quotes and invoices; ghost suppliers and purchasing schemes (Mantzaris, 2014(a); Mantzaris, 2014(b)) . “Quiet” service has been described as a low-level form of corruption under circumstances where public servants fail to deliver the service they are paid to deliver, such as medical doctors’ or nurses’ absenteeism or drugs embezzlement from public hospitals (U4, 2017) . Systemic corruption is rooted in inadequacies, weaknesses, and state institutions’ incapacity of organisational systems, structures, and processes. In most instances, it is encouraged by the lack of transparency, integrity, accountability, and acts of impunity as well as authoritarian and/or monopolistic power relations (Laver, 2014) . It is synonymous with state capture. African Anti-Corruption Advisory Bodies: Comparative Perspective In an effort to learn from existing bodies of research and work done in the anti-corruption domain, three African countries that are internationally recognised to be amongst the least corrupt in the world and on the African continent, have been purposively selected as case studies from which to compare and draw lessons that could inform the proposed NACAC. These countries are Rwanda, Seychelles, and Botswana. RWANDA The Rwanda Anti-Corruption Advisory Council was established in 2014 and has played an important role in the fight against corruption in the country. The Council comprises the Chief Ombudsman (the Chairperson), Director General of National Intelligence and Security Service, Minister of Local Government and Justice, two Ombudsman Deputies, the Inspector General of Rwanda National Police, Vice President of the Supreme Court, Prosecutor General, State Finance Auditor General, Executive Secretary of Rwanda Public Procurement Authority, representatives of the Civil Society Platform, and the Chief Executive of the Private Sector Federation. The Rwanda Anti-Corruption Advisory Council was initially based on a continuous initiative communication campaign led by senior ministers, the country’s ombudsman, and highly placed officials. The campaign covered the entire country and was reported daily on radio, television, and social media. Furthermore, all the Council members communicated daily with the media, private sector, and civil society, convincing them to become active against corruption and mobilise their communities and constituencies to grow to be an integral part of the effort. The Council operates at National level but is also decentralised at District, Sector, and Cell levels (Government of Rwanda, N.d.) . These significant initiatives took place in the country at a time when it was already considered amongst the least corrupt globally. In the 2014 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Rwanda was one of Africa’s five least corrupt nations. Consequently, 97.3 per cent of the population expressed confidence in the government’s efforts to fight corruption, according to the 2014 Rwanda Bribery Index, which was conducted by Transparency International Rwanda chapter (Transparency International Rwanda, 2014) . In the Transparency International CPI, Rwanda had a score of 54, ranking as the third-least corrupt country in Africa. The country’s prosecutor general at the time revealed that the prosecution office had filed 155 cases of corruption in courts, of the 225 cases reported in the fiscal year 2013-2014. The Transparency International 2020 results showed that the country’s score increased from 53 to 54 percent, which placed it at 49th on the global ranking (from 51st in 2019), retaining the lead in the East-African region as the least corrupt (Transparency International, 2020) . The country’s civil society leadership was encouraged to cooperate with the Council in an effort to sensitise the general public towards the consequences of corruption, and research and reports of corruption to the police, National Public Prosecution Authority, and the Office of the Ombudsman. The Council’s key responsibilities at the national level include: research and reports/opinions on strategies against corruption; thorough study and research of all reports that emanate from anti-corruption institutions and recommendations to advance the fight against corruption; maintain continuous channels of information exchange on corruption between institutions; research, assess, and evaluate all reports that emanate from organisations regarding corruption in Rwanda and recommendations that are based on their positions, planning, and implementation of all processes resulting in the approval and publication of an annual report of the achievements in the fight against corruption in Rwanda (Sebudubudu, Khatib & Bozzini, 2017) . Members of the National Advisory Council meet on a quarterly basis and report directly to the President of the Republic, and present copies of all meetings, discussions, and decisions to Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the Cabinet. The Council’s Technical Committee comprises technicians from institutions led by members of the Advisory Council at the national level. The Office of the Ombudsman is responsible for the Advisory Council Secretariat at the national level. Thus, in its structure, the Secretary of the National Advisory Council fights corruption and injustice. International comparative research has conclusively revealed that the success of Rwanda’s government against corruption cannot be underestimated and the key reasons for such a reality lies in the government’s anti-corruption initiatives, plans, and action at all levels (Baez-Camargo et al., 2017; Sebudubudu, Khatib & Bozzini, 2017) . Baez-Camargo and Tharcisse (2018:26) recently postulated that empirical research and evidence overwhelmingly suggests that petty corruption as a normalised practice has been eliminated in Rwanda. Such observations highlight the fact that Rwanda’s trajectory is being widely and globally recognised. Moreover, the country is on par with a very small number which have achieved a substantial reduction in levels of corruption in the last 30-40 years (Mungiu-Pippidi & Hartmann, 2019) . In fact, empirical research has further conclusively shown that in less than 20 years of high levels of corruption, Rwanda has achieved successes and brought the country on par with ‘middle income’ countries. During this 20-year period, the anti-corruption efforts concentrated on the reduction of administrative corruption – the primary terrain of the scourge in a society struggling to overcome a destructive genocide and civil war of major proportions. The success achieved under a seriously coordinated effort has been instrumental in increasing the developmental levels of the economy and the country’s fiscal stability. Such a success against a grave economic and social pandemic does not imply that administrative corruption does not exist at all. However, the relentless advancements at all levels (careful investigations, persistent public servants training, community communication and support structures, committed alliances with civil society, highly skilled anti-corruption methods, and punishment of the guilty) has moved the country’s public sector forward. Rwanda’s law-abiding public sector, which is rooted in solid and diversified legislation, is the reward of a journey along an arduous road. Internationally, it is recognised as a significant developmental achievement which can be utilised as a guide going forward for countries facing substantial struggles in their efforts to defeat corruption. For this aspiration to be realisable for many countries, the fight against corruption can only succeed through honesty, accountability, transparency, education, effectiveness and efficiency, strong public sector authority and competency, and cooperation, synergy and a persuasive understanding between public and private sectors, civil society, and all sectors of the country’s population (World Bank, 2020) . SEYCHELLES The Advisory Council of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles was established in 2016 and comprises four members. Its primary aim is to oversee the Commission’s administrative policy and review provisions of laws contributing to the prevention of corruption. The Council has the authority to investigate, detect, and inhibit corrupt practices and, according to its founding law, it is a neutral, independent, and self-governing entity, which is not subject to the direction or control of any person or authority. The body also makes recommendations to the President for effective implementation of existing and new legislation. The founding four members of the Council were appointed following a thorough and detailed interview process. The new group members of the Council were announced in September 2021 (Sedrick, 2021) . The Advisory Council derives its work from its independent ability to investigate, detect, and inhibit corrupt practices. The work encompasses a wide variety of multi-dimensional research initiatives and direct assistance at all levels of operations undertaken by the primary anti-corruption body; the Anti-Corruption Commission of Seychelles (ACCS), which was also established under the Anti-Corruption Act in 2016. In this process, the Council is responsible to provide research, analysis, and recommendations which facilitate the Commission’s functions, processes, and operations in terms of: Filing cases on the basis of enquiry or investigation Conducting investigation of offences Conducting cases Performing functions assigned to the Commission by the existing Acts Holding enquiry into allegations of corruption Reviewing and recognising laws for the prevention of corruption and submitting recommendations to the Commission Raising awareness and promoting the values of honesty and integrity amongst all communities, with a view to prevent corruption Organising seminars, symposiums, and workshops on the subjects falling within the Commission’s functions and duties Identifying causes of corruption in the context of the country’s socio-economic conditions Determining the procedures of enquiry, investigation, and filing of cases Investigating a public officer’s conduct that the Commission has reasonable grounds to believe is connected with corrupt practices Coordinating and cooperating with other institutions authorised to investigate, prosecute, prevent, and combat corrupt practices Guiding implementation of an integrated approach leading to the eradication of corruption Consulting, cooperating, and exchanging information with appropriate bodies internationally that are authorised to conduct inquiries or investigations in relation to corruption Adopting and strengthening mechanisms for educating the public to respect the public good and public interest Developing educational and other programmes in collaboration with the media Promoting an environment for upholding ethics in governance; and Disseminating information and sensitising the public about the negative effects of corruption. Members of the Advisory Council travel regularly to attend international conferences that address anti-corruption state issues, to network, draw insights, and share knowledge. Furthermore, their strategy and tactics, in terms of examination of complaints and evidence in their duties, have been described as slow, complex, and meticulous, leading to an appropriate assessment for submission to the main body. Though it has been mentioned that such a process has been successful, on occasion, external pressures exert a strong influence, resulting in fear of failure. By ensuring appropriate procedures are adhered to despite pressures, at the end of the process the evidence is often much stronger. This goes beyond the national context. Following the correct international protocols has been described as the best guarantor of being on the correct path towards the next stage of an investigation. One of the body’s acknowledged achievements has been the launching and development of a comprehensive educational and awareness campaign to rally society behind the efforts. Such initiatives have a direct multidimensional impact on all sectors of the country, including the youth, civil society, private sector, and the public sector. Utilisation of all media to strengthen public relations in order to educate the public about corruption has been considered successful. One of the leading factors that contributed to this success is the active cooperation, coordination, and synergy of the Advisory Council with all the government departments, entities, independent bodies as well as civil society and the private sector. It is believed that the country’s existing legislation provides sufficient opportunities and access to authority for members of the Council when the need arises, to scrutinise confidential agreements as well as records, books, reports, returns, and other documents that relate to the work of any public or private body (U4, 2020) . Seychelles has a score of 66 and is in position 27 on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2021 – and is recorded as the number one least corrupt African country. BOTSWANA The Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), the most important anti-corruption body in Botswana, bears similarities with the future South African National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council, as it also initially begun as an advisory state entity before a fully-fledged body with necessary institutional authority. It was established in 1994 to combat corruption through thoroughly researched investigations, prevention, and education. The entity operates under the President's Office and is not formally independent; though its staff are subject to public service regulations and independent of citizen oversight committees (Isbell, 2017) . Its founding was based on a government decision to turn the tide, described as a very decisive moment by observers, following a well-publicised series of high-level corruption events in the country, which had a reputation for solid governance. The events created a public outcry amongst Botswana’s citizenry to the point where it was impossible not to act. The outcries coincided with the outcomes of the 1994 Corruption and Economic Crime Act (CECA), which re-categorised new forms of corruption, and passed most of the anti-corruption responsibility to the new DCEC from the hands of the country’s police force (Isbell, 2017) . An analysis of the Directorate’s anti-corruption philosophy has revealed that the unit, since its establishment and inauguration, has morphed into a highly efficient institution with mixed results. The educational programmes have reached the country’s population, including those in the far-flung corners of the rural lands, while its investigative efforts are widely criticised for a number of reasons after high-profile corruption cases were unsuccessfully prosecuted in court – as opposed to the successes involving petty corruption. This is attributed to the fact that prosecution evidence presented was purely based on advice without rigorous legal analysis, and that the entity was, in its ‘first level’ phase, seriously understaffed. The subsequent legislative reforms – transformation of the entity’s role which began in 2010 and beyond – changed the institution’s path to anti-corruption success (Kuris, 2013) . At first the key responsibilities of the DCEC were related to the promotion of ethical behaviour in public service organisations based on codes of conduct, maintenance of transparency, rule of law, and good governance at all levels of corruption prevention interventions. They were later expanded to encompass wide-ranging responsibilities, duties, powers, and operational independence. These were concentrated on three key strategies: investigation, prevention, and public education. Its members had the power to search, extradite suspects, seize, and freeze assets, arrest, confiscate travel documents, and recommend prosecutions to the Directorate of Public Prosecutions, which controlled all prosecutions (Nwokorie & Viinamäki, 2017) . As time passed, these initiatives proved instrumental and decisive in the fight against corruption because of the close relations of the body with a wide variety of stakeholders won through the activities of the DCEC leadership. This fact of a societal united front proved to be a key element as NGOs, community watchdog bodies, whistle-blowers in both the public and the private sectors, and citizens became allies of the state institution; assisted by a number of specialist anti-corruption units set up in all ministries involved with preliminary investigations of possible offences in their domains (Sebudubudu, 2003:126-127) . In the latter years of the 21st century, international organisations considered DCEC to be the best anti-corruption agency in Africa. It was successful in both the prevention, education as well as positive outcome in the alliance with all anti-corruption state institutions to strengthen accountability and transparency in the country. One of the differences between the Botswana anti-corruption public leaders and those in many African countries has been the open and transparent connection and collaboration with intellectual and research-based think tanks such as BIDPA (Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis), instrumental in the designing and development of a national anti-corruption policy framework (Kuris, 2013) . The planning and implementation of its three-pronged strategy starts with the prevention of corruption, which is preceded by a process of thorough investigation of existing loopholes and their detection; investigation of suspicious transactions and economic crimes at all levels; and finally, the file/s submission to the DPP when sufficient and irrefutable evidence has been collected. Public education is a complementary strategy but is as vital as the others. To achieve these, the DCEC has been well-resourced and works meticulously with all judicial institutions (Jones, 2017:213-214) . The organisation’s new staff develops extra skills and expertise through highly recognised training courses, and performance management training through highly qualified "performance improvement coordinators”, including the Basel Institute of Governance. The latter institute developed an internal training framework and new investigative manual, as well as regular classes for all investigators. Its performance indicators included several investigations; launched a number of completed investigations; ratio of number of investigations to numbers of staff; as well as conviction rate and levels of implementation of recommendations derived from preventive work and public opinion surveys (Sebudubudu, 2003:130) . Much significance is given to assignment studies that deal with existing systems and procedures and their weaknesses in terms of systems and processes. The DCEC has been instrumental in promoting an anti-corruption culture in all state agencies – due to many of its officers having been seconded to other ministries in their effort to establish “corruption prevention committees” – as well as all oversight bodies operating in the President’s Office, including the Procurement Department and the State Auditor, Customs, Ombudsman, Immigration Department, Police Service, and international organisations such as Interpol (Anti-Corruption Authorities, 2020). Conclusion The above case studies provide an opportunity for comparative analysis and learning. However, South Africa, like any people, is unique in some respects and therefore differences are bound to exist that have a bearing on how anti-corruption in South Africa works, and the realities informing it. As a result, while drawing lessons about best practices from the above is essential, it will be short-sighted not to consider the socio-political context that characterises South Africa. The following research findings and discussion accounts for this complementary element to ensure that the formation and functioning of NACAC is based on a solid structural and operational foundation. That is fit-for-purpose for the South African context. THEME 2: Research method, findings and analyses Brief Overview of Methodological Approach, Strategy, and Sampling A total of ten (10) expert leaders based in the public sector, business community, and civil society were purposely sampled to participate in the qualitative interviews. Two (2) declined the offer due to prior commitments that were unworkable with the interview scheduling irrespective of the researcher’s attempts to reschedule. Therefore, eight (8) leaders responded to the set standard open-ended questions that were based on key issues related to the structures, processes, realities, and expectations of the new body: NACAC. To ensure anonymity, as agreed upon by the researcher and the expert leaders, no names are used to attribute views expressed, to any of the leaders. Instead, numbers (1 to 8) have been assigned to each interview participant as follows: Expert Leader 1: Retired Senior Member of Chapter 9 Institution, Cape Town. Expert Leader 2: Senior Researcher, NGO, Durban. Expert Leader 3: Senior Researcher, NGO, Cape Town. Expert Leader 4: Senior Public Servant, Provincial Government, KwaZulu-Natal. Expert Leader 5: Senior Public Servant, Chapter 9 Institution, Gauteng. Expert Leader 6: Businessperson, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. Expert Leader 7: Senior Academic Researcher, Gauteng. Expert Leader 8: Senior Administrator, Provincial Government, Gauteng. Summary of Research Findings and Analyses A preliminary briefing took place as a means to confirm that the expert leaders are sensitised to the envisioned NACAC and recent developments in the subject matter, in addition to their existing in-depth knowledge. As it would later emerge, while there is consensus on a few issues, equally, questions and opinions are divergent on other issues of interest. For example, while it is debatable that some anti-corruption agencies and bodies are riddled with corrupt elements that undermine the fight against corruption, there is consensus on “Scorpions’ days when corruption was certain to have repercussions.” Four of the leaders (number 2, 4, 5, and 8) highlighted the complete lack of effort to put in place and use scientific integrity pre-screening processes to maximise prospects of ensuring that the top leadership of anti-corruption bodies comprises competent and ethical leaders, especially in the supply-chain and procurement management, investigations and prosecution services, internal audits, and risk management offices. These offices are integral to the integrity of the anti-corruption bodies’ ability to function effectively and efficiently and to build public trust – without which it will be virtually impossible to mobilise stakeholders in anti-corruption efforts. Interestingly, leader 3 suggested that NACAC could face the same fate as the Scorpions, as it may neither enjoy sufficient legal status nor guarantee security of tenure of office. He further opined: “It is consistent with the ANC’s NEC decision in 2020 to establish a single, permanent, and independent agency with the capacity to deal with corruption decisively. When one considers the Glenister litigation cases, it suggests that poor political advice was rendered without significant acknowledgement of the thrust of the findings.” Amongst other factors, incapacity and illegality could see the agency dissipating, unless duly addressed from inception. This means that, for the new body to exist and operate, it is inescapable that a new law will have to be enacted and passed – a process that is unpredictable. He points to the strong belief that, with support from civil society and the business community, the Democratic Alliance is prepared to present a ‘Private Members Bill’ that could compete with the plans, and the growing ‘look to private prosecution’ view expressed by some – including Eskom’s leadership recently – when there are delays and failures in the state’s anti-corruption agencies. Legitimacy, representability, and trust are intricately linked and crucial to the success of NACAC. This is according to expert leader 5, who emphasised that the structure could assume the representative character of NEDLAC (the National Economic Development and Labour Council) to ensure that it mobilises all stakeholders of society against corruption. However, as she cautioned, members of the public need to feel a sense of institutional trust so that they can report, collaborate, and support it. Ideally, she elaborated, the proposed NACAC must have a witness protection programme that falls under the control of retired Constitutional Court judges who are no longer interested in political power. Besides, retired judges, especially of an apex court such as the Constitutional Court, command moral and ethical respect. It would, all matters considered, be likely that they will be trusted by many, if not all, stakeholders. It is common cause that experience triumphs anything, in many fields. This is a reminder by leader 1, who noted the importance of ensuring that the selection of the NACAC body is more informed by meritocracy than anything else. In particular, according to him, “… the selected members [must] have a developed understanding of the subject matter [that] they will be dealing with. Their knowledge and experience, beyond the technical, should include knowledge on internal workings and systems of public sector organisations, and how corruption manifests itself within the sector.” In addition to the technical know-how and sectoral knowledge, there is consensus on a number of considerations that will ensure that NACAC succeeds in its mandate as per the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) 2020-2030: NACAC is authorised to issue relevant directives and oversee their implementation. Without such a drastic step forward, any hope for NACAC’s success would easily be inhibited by pedantic bureaucratic layers put down by those who do not want to account (leaders 1, 5, 7, and 8) . That these instructions are considered mandatory by the entire security cluster (leaders 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7) . That all Cabinet Ministers actively support NACAC and its mandate (leaders 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7) . That the Accounting Officers and Accounting Authorities (as per PFMA/MFMA) actively support and oversee NACAC directives – and account for the effective implementation and ongoing application (leaders 1, 4, and 7) . That NACAC directives are incorporated within the internal control regime of each, and every public sector organisation stipulated – including the PFMA/MFMA – internal audit function, the risk management function, and prescribed procurement practices (leaders 1, 4, 5, and 7) . That every public official involved in the running of the entity must undergo serious essential training, covering the nature of public sector corruption and NACAC prescribed anti-corruption practices (leaders 1, 4, and 7) . That various members possessing different expertise and industry knowledge will add respective value to the body. This implies, for example, that NACAC senior representatives would need to establish and lead different subcommittees or working groups based on their skill sets and knowledge. It cannot be expected for each member to be conversant in all aspects of corruption. Two of the expert leaders (4 and 6) highlighted the indisputable fact that the forthcoming report emanating from the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture would open additional avenues of challenges at all levels of the State and, possibly, result in new relations and actions undertaken by anti-corruption agencies. Such new decisions and outcomes were already described as opening novel paths in the relationship between the new body with organisations such as the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and Special Investigating Unit (SIU), as seen by the collaboration between the entities on a number of high-profile cases. Therefore, it is important for NACAC to not be rigidly formed in the beginning but rather to allow the structure to emerge and mature with time in the first two to three years of its operation (added leaders 2 and 5) . It was widely acknowledged by some of the leaders (3 and 6) that the challenges associated with NACAC’s planning and operations as described in the NACS will be extremely difficult, due to the vast expansion and complex composition and dimensions of a public sector characterised by structures and functions of separate autonomous institutions across the three spheres. Considering that NACAC has the responsibility to deal with each one of these equally and comprehensively, it is a foregone conclusion that the establishment of a supportive Secretariat is crucial for it to fulfil its mandate (leaders 1, 5, and 8) . While the NACAC leadership should be the “brains trust” of the body, members of the Secretariat should be attuned to the subject matter and goals of the NACAC to constructively execute the instructions of the body and manage the daily operations. This would require the Secretariat members to possess a sound understanding of the internal workings and legal frameworks of all state institutions as well as report writing, events and meetings management, and other administrative abilities that would be necessary for the comprehensive and successful operational duties and responsibilities needed. For instance, one expert leader (3) referred to their knowledge of how the interplay between the National Prosecuting Authority and Department of Justice’s leadership limits resources to restrict meaningful prosecution in certain cases. South African government and state machinery is characterised by fragments. Leaders 1, 4, and 6 warned that the configuration of NACAC should not carry the same fragmented character, because there is great potential for conflicting responsibilities and duplication of areas of competencies. This could stifle the effectiveness of the overall anti-corruption intentions of the government at many levels, as observed from some of the challenges encountered by the Anti-Corruption Task Team. This implies that clear formalised areas of responsibility and authority that exist within a single coherent anti-corruption strategy and action plan are crucial to its success. There were reservations regarding the proposed term of office for the interim body, which is two years, by some of the participants. Leaders 1, 5, and 6 were concerned that with a change of leadership soon after its establishment, NACAC could lose momentum and the necessary sense of urgency. Furthermore, as expert leader 7 added, corruption is a multifaceted phenomenon to be unravelled within a short space of time. The intricate details of grand corruption, as revealed, for example, at the Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, and complex vast networks to disentangle take a great deal of time and resources. Resourcing, staffing, and financing of NACAC was also a common theme. Given the shrinking tax base due to unemployment and a stagnant economic growth rate amidst expanding service delivery mandates, leader 7 recommends that, to supplement operational budget, the body could use additional funds from the Criminal Asset Recovery Accounts to ensure that it has enough funds to meet its financial needs, including hiring of competent staff and the ability to retain them, especially in the investigating unit and the Secretariat. Conclusion The above findings bring a few salient factors to light that must be taken into consideration when formalising NACAC. While it is generally accepted that it is impossible to attend to all issues raised by the expert leaders at once, it is worth sieving through them and deciding on the critical ones, those which have the potential to direct the structure, operation, and mandate of the body to ensure that it is fit-for-purpose at inception stage. The following section gives a detailed overview of how the researcher, in consultation with the reference group from the School of Public Leadership and Inclusive Society Institute, understands NACAC as conceived by the NACS document. THEME 3: NACAC in practice This section represents an informed attempt to chart what NACAC could look like after considering the research findings (theme 2) and best practices from the case studies found on the African continent (theme 1). The establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council is the beginning of a two-year process, leading to the creation of a permanent entity that will lead the fight against corruption in South Africa. This process concentrates on, particularly, the management of the initial transitional matters of the new permanent organisation that will later emerge. The key mandate of NACAC is strategy implementation of research and conceptual development, culminating in a draft proposal for Cabinet that will ultimately inform the establishment of the overarching body. The foundation upon which the new body is built should be informed by a sound legal basis governing the institution, which should elaborate especially on financial, personnel, procedural, and operational issues related to the agency. Preparation of internal organisational structures and regulations including the internal code of conduct; initiating the process of recruitment of staff; working out internal administrative, operational, and reporting procedures, and establishing manageable work plans and benchmarks to assess progress should form part of the initial stage. NACAC Composition and Staff Selection Criteria During the first transitional period, between 7 and 10 senior representatives from government, the private sector, and civil society appointed by the President will comprise the body, and they will be supported by a full-time dedicated Secretariat. Government Minister/s who have participated in the Clusters of Directors General and Clusters of Ministers established by the Presidency in line with Section 85 of the Constitution of the Republic are considered to be the appropriate government representatives to be prioritised to represent government. This is because they have sufficient experience and knowledge of issues associated with coordination and integration of government priorities and programmes, the study and processing of Cabinet memoranda, draft bills, policies, documents, and strategic decisions for consideration and approval by Cabinet. The incumbents of the Governance, State Capacity, and Institutional Development Cluster (GSCID); Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS); or the International Cooperation, Trade and Security Cluster (ICTS) could be candidates to represent the government. The National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF) – a coalition formed by the government, business, and civil society sectors – could potentially serve as a ready-forum from which to choose non-governmental representatives, as it already serves as a forum to discuss corruption challenges. It could be considered along with NEDLAC. Other civil society and organised interest bodies such as Business Unity South Africa offer third-level options. In terms of civil society organisations, the existence of a wide variety and diversified anti-corruption entities makes the choice challenging on a number of levels, but inevitably a critical, open, and democratically undertaken debate can lead to an appropriate decision. If the government needs to tap into existing structures, the National Development Commission, and National Governing Council on APRM (African Peer Review Mechanism), for example, offers access to a wide range of civil society bodies at an apex level. In terms of the Secretariat, the key elements for selection should prioritise the knowledge and understanding that exists within all relationships NACAC has with other anti-corruption bodies. The Secretariat members employed after a successful transparent and participatory interview will be well educated, skilful, and capable employees executing daily administrative tasks for the organisation. The existence of soft and hard skills is to be supplemented with important professional aspects such as technological knowledge, systems design, and database management, South Africa’s anti-corruption legislation, rules and regulations, and agreements with African and international bodies. The importance of NACAC means that members of the Secretariat should be attuned to the subject matter and goals of the body so as to constructively carry out the instructions of the organisation – especially as it will be the main daily conduit of communications between NACAC and government departments, anti-corruption bodies, public enterprises, etc. This would require that the Secretariat has a good understanding of the internal workings and the legal frameworks of all these organisations – as well as all the report writing, meeting organising, and other administrative abilities that would be necessary to achieve day-to-day operational goals. NACAC’s Authority, Mandate, and Responsibilities NACAC derives its key primary mandate from the fact that it is the entity that oversees the processes, structures, plans, and implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and all anti-corruption programmes as envisioned by NACS. In this process, NACAC could then become an organisation that periodically reviews the NACS; and could call for public hearings and/or submissions and recommend changes to Parliament if and when deemed necessary. That is, the body will have the power, authority, influence, and responsibility to ensure cooperation, coordination, synergy, monitoring, and evaluation of all anti-corruption projects and programmes in all societal sectors, including compliance with all international and multilateral institutions and conventions. The research, policy formulation, and advisory roles are integral to the existence of the entity. Research activities on anti-corruption led to the creation and development of new knowledge that is instrumental to the processes of analysing and dissecting operational, regulatory, and legislative inadequacies and devising proposals of relevant interventions. Such initiatives and outcomes give rise to the formulation of new initiatives, measures, and policies aimed at preventing corruption. While in the process of researching the necessity and/or suitability of a single anti-corruption agency, the management of stakeholder relations and partnerships – their engagement and development – ultimately generates a deeper understanding of sectoral and industry forum coordination. Within such a functional and structural reality, hosting regular anti-corruption summits amongst representatives of all anti-corruption bodies becomes inevitable, as such undertakings could prompt further development of relevant interfaces or engagement mechanisms. Therefore, one of the key responsibilities of NACAC is the continuous liaison and collaboration with other anti-corruption agencies and bodies, including but not limited to constitutional institutions such as Chapter Nine institutions and the Public Service Commission, law enforcement agencies, the NPA, the SIU, the intelligence services, specialised units in departments, and any coordinating mechanism for reactive and law-enforcement activities (currently the ACTT). Within the same operational terrain, the importance of highlighting failure or any undue, unconstitutional, political, and/or other interference in the operation of these bodies and bringing it to the attention of Parliament, cannot be overstated. In fact, calling attention to deficiencies related to capacitation, impediments, funding, and resources for anti-corruption bodies is a significant functional objective. It is necessary for NACAC to prioritise raising the alarm on any unethical or integrity-deficient conduct of the head or senior management of any anti-corruption body, as an early warning system for attempts at state capture or any action that could result in state capture. Design and function of a coordinating body Anti-corruption agencies in South Africa are poorly coordinated due to overlapping mandates, diversity, and institutional lack of clarity. NACAC can achieve effective inter-agency cooperation as a coordinating body through sufficient capacity, resources, authority, and political will. A number of well-defined measures could create effective cross-agency cooperation, which might lead to proactive information and communication, joint training initiatives, and evaluating and monitoring the planning processes and implementation of anti-corruption efforts by the existing bodies. In many countries, the effective coordination of anti-corruption work is greatly undermined by the failure to consider cooperation issues from the design stage of the anti-corruption institutional arrangements. This results in inadequate or non-existent coordination mechanisms that lack resources, capacity, and political backing. Empirical research has shown that on many occasions coordination of anti-corruption bodies is weak and inconsistent, even non-existent. Although the mandates of such bodies are defined by laws, rules, and regulations, these entities exist more on paper than in practice and therefore lack a pro-active approach, powers, and political leverage to act in a way that enables them to fulfil their mandates efficiently. Political and legal support across the board is a necessity if NACAC is to succeed in effectively implementing inter-agency cooperation (U4, 2005) . Immediate and continuous planning, together with operational and political attention, is required from the onset. Coordination issues need to be debated and planned from the design stage of the anti-corruption policy making. In addition, integration in the overall anti-corruption architecture is important. A coordinating body’s success is based on a strong understanding of how and where the various mandates and responsibilities meet and interact. A new anti-corruption architecture enables the reallocation of responsibilities and roles whereby institutional hierarchies, mandates are clarified, and competencies are readjusted. This means that respective institutions are given clear lines of responsibility, as clear rules of engagement guide the collaboration and interaction of the existing bodies (Meagher, 2005) . Coordination can be the solution to the primary concern in the anti-corruption fight in South Africa, as research has shown inadequate networking between different entities with different tasks. At present, South Africa has fourteen anti-corruption bodies struggling to do their work. The poor state of the economy, in part due to the continuing impact of COVID-19, and the reality of a continuous fiscal austerity calls for a prudent approach to the reform of the country’s regulatory landscape. Any reforms should be considered and decided upon based on maximum value on expenditure. A suitable point of departure could be the adoption of a well-coordinated and networked approach that brings together the heads of all the existing entities. These include the Chapter Nine institutions mandated with anti-corruption work, including the Public Service Commission, all the law enforcement agencies in all their various forms and guises, and the intelligence sector. Cross-cutting reforms – especially those associated with corruption and the anti-corruption fight – depend on valuable information and communication-sharing between the public and the implementing agencies in addition to access and dissemination of supporting anti-corruption documents and policies. The developments in information technology have opened increasing opportunities in this field and are instrumental in providing innovative tools to promote information and data-sharing across agencies. The design and implementation of a systematic and proactive strategy of information-sharing amongst all agencies will be crucial to help build and sustain trusting relationships which will ultimately bring about longer-term cooperation. This means that NACAC is designed to take the lead in crucial information exchange as a strategy to gain the confidence of all other agencies (De Sousa, 2010). Resources and Capacity Needs The existing official National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030 states that, in terms of budget and resourcing, and given the fact that the NACAC will exist for a maximum of two years, this structure can explore the use of funds from the Criminal Asset Recovery Accounts. This is a separate account within the National Revenue Fund (NRF) into which property and monies are deposited after a judicial confiscation, forfeiture, or order – a process rooted in the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998 (Act No. 121 of 1998) . The hypothesis behind asset forfeiture legislation is that, by forfeiting or confiscating the proceeds or profits of crime, the incentive for committing specific crimes is reduced, while the state uses the proceeds to strengthen its anti-corruption efforts. It is important that a legal opinion should be sought as to the authority of the National Treasury to redirect the distribution of these funds. It is a natural cause that, if found to be legally permissible, funding of NACAC (and its Secretariat) could produce a considerable politico-societal return by way of reduced corruption – reduced loss of public funds in public sector institutions – which in turn further justifies its funding and increases the pool of resources government needs to deliver services. Beyond resources, institutional capacities needed include: A Research and Policy Unit that is responsible for researching anti-corruption initiatives. Its key responsibility is to facilitate and conduct research and analytical studies on issues pertaining to the development of anti-corruption initiatives locally, regionally, and internationally. While researchers employed in the unit can be directly involved in staff training throughout the anti-corruption institutional terrain, contacts, meetings, and digital conferences can connect the staff with colleagues and academic researchers on the African continent to exchange ideas, research, and insights. Potential staff members of such a unit should be university graduates with at least a master’s degree in the social, law or economic sciences, preferably with knowledge and/or exposure to anti-corruption realities. The unit might be strengthened by the success of the innovative model currently being developed by the University of Pretoria together with the Presidency, which aspires to create a highly networked governance method that will link up existing researchers in a very lean organisational sense. Such thinking could influence the future development of the notion of applying higher levels of coordination and focus to the fight against corruption. Important to note is that the unit does not make recommendations. It presents its final reports to its leadership, its sister organisations, and finally to the anti-corruption bodies and the National Parliament. A Project Management Office that will operationalise the existing policies, strategies, and procedures together with the existing multilateral initiatives on governance and anti-corruption; identify the dynamics and realities for risk analysis and institutional assessments; governance and anti-corruption project design measures; supervision monitoring and evaluation, and similar operational matters. An Education Office that will operate at two levels: the institutional and the public. The institutional level will focus on training all members of NACAC as well as those in all anti-corruption agencies. This will involve an ‘induction training programme’ providing basic training to new employees, all of whom spend the first few months of their service in the Research and Policy Unit in order to improve their knowledge on corruption and anti-corruption realities, investigations, successes, processes, structures, and challenges, before being considered for the final posting. The new recruits’ training could last at least a year, while the trainees work and learn at the Research and Policy Unit. During the process the courses include corruption prevention, communication skills, rules of evidence, law, computer forensics, financial investigation skills, and cognitive interview techniques, amongst others. Throughout the period of employment, the training continues at higher levels. The public pillar is for awareness campaigns and educational programmes in order to mobilise society in the fight against corruption. A Whistle-blower Protection Unit that is responsible for considering the circumstances under which suspicions of wrongdoing can be reported inside and outside the organisation; has the knowledge and means to provide legal and physical protection to the whistle-blowers; ensures that the existing reporting channels, such as information hotlines, also exist for individuals working in the private sector, who are involved in the provision of local and regional public services; encourages positive attitudes towards whistle-blowing amongst citizens by promoting whistle-blowing policies and publicising post-reporting follow-ups, to ensure that individuals considering reporting suspected cases of wrongdoing have access to advice that is confidential and free of charge; forms part of external bodies such as NGOs and national associations; and introduces periodic assessments of the effectiveness of rules and regulations on the protection of whistle-blowers. The treatment of whistle-blowers in South Africa has led to proposals for a reform of the Protected Disclosure Act (PDA) after representative organisations of those who speak up voiced their frustrations. According to the organisations, the PDA does not protect whistle-blowers since whistle-blowing still leads to job losses. The value of whistle-blowing for the public good has increased worldwide over the last 40 years. In many countries, both state and federal statutes have been put in place to protect whistle-blowers from employers and institutions. This is a direct result of the fear public employees face when exposing corruption. New strict laws, rules, and regulations have been introduced worldwide to protect whistle-blowers, and so doing help the fight against corruption by encouraging more people to expose misconduct or illegal and dishonest activity (Lee & Kleiner, 2011:342) . A recommended amendment to the PDA is to afford the complete protection of all government employees and especially the whistle-blowers. The amendment should prohibit the government from taking any personnel action against an employee after they have disclosed information that they believe exposes gross mismanagement, corruption, waste of funds, or the abuse of authority. Conclusion To gain protection from the amendment, a public employee needs to show that a protected disclosure was made, the nature of which the accused official was aware of, and that a connection exists between the retaliation from the official and the actions of the employee which induced the retaliation (US Department of Labour, N.d.). Click here to continue to Part 2 of this report

  • Report: Proposed National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council

    Click here to go back to Part 1 of this report Expert’s responses analysis There were mostly similar as well as a number of diversified opinions in the responses to questions structured in order to receive, assess, and absorb expert opinions of interviewees belonging to all three categories of the first leadership group of the new body in its ‘first stage’ of two years. The questions dealt with key issues of structures, processes, realities, and expectations associated with the body. There were mostly agreements in respect of key issues but also queries and additions based primarily on the deep knowledge of the interviewees as well as their viewpoints and beliefs guided by it. In the preliminary introduction of the topic and the explanation of the structure of the open-ended questions to be answered the researcher had the opportunity to ask the prospective interviewees’ opinions on the conditions and realities of the anti-corruption agencies and the existing law enforcements in the country at present. The general response was rooted on the belief that such agencies and anti-corruption bodies were an integral part of a corruption-ridden public system, a small part of which still ‘remember with nostalgia the Scorpions,’ possibly the only such system in the world that has faced the reality that every single Commissioner of police has been removed from his/her position facing charges for corruption. Such an undisputed fact points to the vital significance of senior appointments of well trained, highly educated, and ethical leadership. Four of the interviewees (No 2, 4, 5 and 8) pinpointed to what they described as ‘complete lack of efforts to corrupt prevention’ in terms of what was described lack of clear cut scientific examination of anti-corruption personnel integrity tests through instruments such as lie-detectors and newly established testing tools, especially in key corruption-ridden or corruption- creating public sector functions such as supply chain management and procurement, risk management and internal audits amongst others. Interestingly, similar positions have been expressed by a highly experienced and knowledgeable former head of the NPA (National Prosecuting Authority) who has publicly mentioned that ‘the focus in the country’s law enforcement entities had been on violent crimes and sexual offences’ due to the public outrage. ’Such a position, it was stated, points to the significance of the support of an anti-corruption agency that only focuses on anti-corruption, not rape or murder. The proposed anti-corruption agency on his part should have the “vital power” to allow answers to self-incriminating questions “like the Scorpions.” Such important positions on the part of the retired anti-corruption leader were demystified as follows: “If there is no cost to them changing their version when evidence comes up, it drags on and on. The Investigating Directorate does this, but its 30 or 40 people will not make a difference. Self-incriminating questions cannot be used against the confessor in his own trial but can be used against others.” He also favoured a “proper whistle-blower mechanism” that fell under the control of retired Constitutional Court judges, as he believed that such a step would make whistle-blowers feel safe (Hofmeyr, 2021). The gist of responses to the questions set appears below: Question 1: The National Anti-Corruption Strategy has indicated that the number of persons in NACAC should be senior representatives from government, civil society and business, consisting of between seven (7) and ten (10) members. Do you consider the composition of the body appropriate and according to NACAC’s principles, duties and responsibilities? If NOT please state your reasons. There was one interviewee who was from the beginning against the very existence of the proposed new body (Interviewee No 3). The interviewee begun the describing the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030 as a ‘detailed document rooted on good sense’ and an agreement with the ANC’s NEC urgent resolution in 2020 that ‘instructed’ the Cabinet to establish a single, permanent, and independent agency with the capacity to deal with corruption decisively. This ‘instruction’ was ‘echoed’ in the President’s announcement on February the 21st of the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council. The interviewee’s belief that ‘the President has been ‘poorly advised’ by politicians who have no understanding or knowledge of the crucial significance in law of the thrust of the findings in the Glenister litigation case (Glenister 2 and 3) that are binding. It was stated that the findings of the case that was centred on the inadequacy of the Hawks were based on the fact that a statutory body as described in the Presidential State of the Nation Address cannot enjoy the legally required security of tenure of office. This means that the body is illegal and will face the fate of the Scorpions, an organisation that disbanded after the ex-President Jacob Zuma replaced then President Thabo Mbeki. The interviewee’s position was clearly based on the belief that the new body described by the President in SONA will be immediately very vulnerable and will face the same ending as the Scorpions. This is, because it is not legally a Chapter 9 institution, an entity that is structurally and operationally independent, one that cannot be legally terminated by a simple majority. On the other hand, it was believed that a ‘real new Chapter 9 institution’ that has the mandate to investigate, prosecutor and answer to Parliament is needed. There was a strong belief that the new independent anti-corruption body described the President was ‘unconstitutional’ and such a position was in fact a negation of the ANC’s National Executive Committee’s resolution in August 2020 as it was mostly in accordance with the Glenister 2 and 3 binding findings. It was felt that the fact that the advisory body’s initial composition has not been announced by the President yet points to the reality of deep misunderstanding of the complexities of laws, corruption realities, as well as the Zondo Commission outcomes. Following SONA there was the expectation that the appointment of the members of the new body would be the first priority. The delay of such an appointment was described by the interviewee as a lack of planning and implementation of key decisions announced publicly which aim at ‘filling the gaps in the fight against corruption’ in South Africa. Such gaps can be only filled by a lawful anti-corruption advisory body that will enable a new successful path for the government. This could only be a body rooted on the clear findings of the Glenister 2 and 3 cases. The introduction of such a body would be the beginning of a road leading the country far away from corruption and ‘state capture’ through carefully executed efficient steps against the corrupt elements throughout the public service and beyond. There was a strong belief that the Democratic Alliance, through an alliance with non- governmental organisations was prepared to present private members’ bills supporting a new anti-corruption investigative body, while non-governmental organisations had already prepared in legally based plans for a ‘one-stop shop’ Chapter Nine organisation that when established would be able and capable to investigate and prosecute all forms of serious corruption at all societal levels. Finally, it was stated that for the new body to exist and operate ‘a new law needs to be passed’’. This meant that given the ‘procrastination of the President’ to establish the new body a court case was prepared to have such a ‘plan’ nullified (Interviewee 3). There was a general acceptance on the number of members elected by the President as the first leading group of the body (between seven and ten) and despite the almost general acceptance of the suggested sectoral representation there was a somewhat diversified opinion. Interviewee No 5 believed that a ‘community member’ should be included in the group and such a position was justified by the example of NEDLAC (the National Economic Development and Labour Council), where there is a community and a worker/labour union contingent. While the equal representation of the groups was generally agreed upon by the interviewees there was a belief that the diversification of the groups, especially those from the ranks of labour and civil society was important (Interviewees No 2, 4, 5 and 6, 7, and 8). A critical issue raised by I nterviewee No 1 initially and agreed upon by the majority of the rest was that the most essential element instrumental in the success of the body is that the chosen members have a developed understanding of the subject matter they will be dealing with. It was felt that knowledge that includes the internal workings and systems of public sector organisation, how corruption manifests itself within such organisations, as well as what is to be learnt from the international literature on corruption in the public sectors and the established best practices towards combating is essential. It was strongly felt that without such understanding and experience the NACAC would be ineffective - as previous anti-corruption initiatives have shown conclusively . A number of interviewees indicated that given the existing realities evident within the political and organisational structures of the ruling party, the President’s selection of the body’s members from government should be based on clear criteria of credibility, honesty, existing historical background and serious knowledge of the realities, laws, rules, and regulations regarding corruption (Interviewees No 1,2, 4, 6 ,7) . An interviewee emphasised the importance of the proposed number of the initial leadership core, especially in terms of the importance of labour representation. It was felt that more people in the leadership of NACAC ‘would spoil the broth as the saying goes’ (Interviewee No 8) . Question 2: It is stated in the Anti-Corruption Strategy Document that ‘ This body will be responsible for the managing of the initial transitional matters of strategy implementation, including research, conceptual development and drafting of a proposal to Cabinet for the establishment of the overarching body’. Is it viable that all these matters of strategy implementation can be undertaken by the NACAC senior representatives? If not, what do you feel are the alternatives and the reasons for your response? Given the knowledge of all interviewees, especially in relation to the SOUTH AFRICAN ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY 2020-2030, it was not a surprise that the possibility that an appropriately staffed NACAC would be able to manage the necessary and successful implementation of the responsibilities stated in the Anti-Corruption Strategy Document was very viable at all levels. Despite the general acceptance that the proposed planned and implemented new body could be capable in managing the necessary and successful implementation of the responsibilities as outlined in the Anti-Corruption Strategy Document it was strongly felt that there were a number of ‘particularly important’ prerequisites for such a success to become a reality: The NACAC is given the necessary authority to issue relevant directives and oversee their implementation. Without such a step forward any hope for success is lost (Interviewees No 1, 5, and 7, 8). That these instructions are regarded as mandatory (Interviewees No 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7). That all Cabinet Ministers actively support the NACAC and its mandate (Interviewees No 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7). That the Accounting Officers and Accounting Authorities (as per PFMA/MFMA) actively support and oversee NACAC directives – and must account for their effective implementation and ongoing application (Interviewees No 1, 4 and 7). That the NACAC directives are incorporated within the internal control regime of each and every public sector organisation – including the PFMA/MFMA stipulated internal audit function, the risk management function and the laid down procurement practices (Interviewees No 1, 4, 5, and 7) . That every public official involved in the requirement as the above necessities outlined above must undergo serious essential education covering the nature of public sector corruption and the NACAC prescribed anti-corruption practices (Interviewees No 1, 4, and 7) . That the various members could introduce various strengths to the table and would not all, for example, have to be researchers although research is an inevitable element of the body . This means that NACAC senior representatives could need to have subcommittees for some of the work as not all elements or decisions are research orientated and might be strong on a particular strategy element but not all of it. It was felt that there could not be expectations for each member to be conversant in all aspects of the corruption realities, meaning that such undertakings would be outsourced to specialised, ad hoc committees (Interviewee No 8). A number of such statements were seen as important in the context of future challenges facing the key operations of the new body and its members as two interviewees (No 4 and 6) pinpointed the undoubted fact that the forthcoming report emanating from the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture would open new avenues of challenges at all levels leading to new relations and actions undertaken by anti-corruption agencies. Such new decisions and outcomes were also described as opening new paths in the relations between the new body with organisations such as the South African Revenue Services (SARS) and the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) that have been decisive in their road to new, forward-looking, and positive directions ( Interviewees No 2, 5 and 8). There could be the possibilities of difficulties in future relations leading to the necessity of fresh paths of collaboration between the new body’s leadership with group/s of politicians as well the leaderships of central, provincial and district municipal leaderships associated with corruption still under investigation as well as state-owned companies such as the Airports Company South Africa, Transnet, Denel, and ESCOM. These realities demand unity of purpose, common understanding of existing realities and openness as vital ingredients of success (Interviewees No 3 and 6). Question 3: It is stated that ‘The NACAC must be supported by a full-time dedicated secretariat to facilitate any practical arrangements, to consolidate and record its work and reports, and to ensure that it can deliver on its mandate’. How important is the composition of such a body and what skills, knowledge, and experience and sector background (public or private) the potential secretariat members should possess. Provide reasons. It was widely acknowledged by the interviewees that the challenges associated with NACAC’s planning and operations as described in the Anti-Corruption Strategy document will be extremely difficult because of the vast expansion and complex composition and dimensions of a public sector that is characterised by the existence, structures and functions of separate institutions and entities. Bearing in mind the reality that NACAC has the responsibility to deal with each one of them equally and comprehensively, it is inevitable that the establishment of a supportive secretariat is crucial to the fulfilment of its mandate (Interviewees No 1, 5, and 8). While the NACAC leadership should be the “brains trust” of the body, members of the secretariat should be attuned to the subject matter and goals of the NACAC to constructively carry out the instructions of the body – especially as it will be the main daily conduit of communications between the NACAC, anti-corruption bodies, Government Departments, Public Enterprises etc. This would require the secretariat members to possess a good understanding of the internal workings and the legal frameworks of all these organisations – as well as all the report writing, meeting organising and other administrative abilities that would be necessary for the comprehensive and successful operational duties and responsibilities. While it has been widely accepted that strong organisational skills and meticulous treatment of existing technical and other existing challenges and problems within the entity, it was felt that that research capacity and skills experience would be beneficial at this this level especially when dealing with confidential information (Interviewees No 2,4,6 and 7). These realities mean that from the beginning the NACAC leadership should recruit highly qualified staff, with skills that are the foundation of future success. It needs to be noted that the commitment to effectiveness of the leadership functions in the process of fighting corruption should be integrated into the duties and responsibilities of the secretariat that could be diversified in terms of operations as follows: The key duties and responsibilities of a secretariat involve a good number of individuals executing daily administrative tasks for an organization, mainly but not exclusively the handling human resources and personnel issues; the organisational finances; practical arrangements for the meetings; planning, implementing, and maintaining a forward plan of agenda items and liaising with the Chair to prepare agendas, and preparing, checking, and issuing accurate minutes. Such a group of professionals needs to be practitioners with a wide variety of qualities associated with the individual’s positions, duties and responsibilities. The combination of hard and soft skills in terms of qualities include deep knowledge of the incumbents’ duties, responsibilities as well as the subject/s associated with the operational roles, such as high technological skills, and deep understanding of the issues related to the communication channels of all anti-corruption agencies, authorities, and state institutions at all levels (Interviewees No 1, 3, 6 and 8). It was felt that the members of the Secretariat could become important in the effort to upgrade existing realities both within government departments and entities as well as upgrading the knowledge of anti-corruption agencies staff in issues as important as an advanced understanding of the Treasury rules and regulations in regard of public procurement, through a careful dissection of first operational stages of the processes involved in supply chain management. Such a process could be based on setting standards and regulations in regard to the procurement and disposal activities of Procuring and Disposing Entities (PDEs) such as Government ministries, District Municipalities, Local Municipalities, and all other public bodies engaged in the procurement and disposal activities. Such processes and mechanisms comprise of compliance inspections of PDEs in terms of establishing whether the legally based structures of all relevant contract and procurement committees and their composition are functional, and that the disposal units are in place and functional and according to the rules, laws and regulations. Such a process compliance inspection could lead to the identification of structural and/or functional weaknesses, challenges and problems that could ultimately lead to further investigation. Such initiatives will make a real positive difference in performance at many organizational levels (Interviewee No 5). In order to dissect the real significance of the secretariat’s understanding of the realities and dynamics facing anti-corruption agencies, an interviewee set up the example of the relationships of ministers associated with such institutions. This was done through the utilisation of the position and attitudes of the Department of Justice leadership, the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) and the financial independence of the NPA. It was stated that existing relations between these state institutions in regard to NPA’s financial position are in need to be solved, as the existing situation does not allow the entity to pursue meaningful prosecutions. This means that the secretariat employees need to understand the administrative and financial condition of anti-corruption agencies as well all state institutions in general in order to be able to fulfil their duties and responsibilities. It was felt strongly that as the communication with all anti-corruption bodies is considered of paramount importance, both the leadership and the secretariat should plan, design, and implement strategies and tactics as the first key priority (Interviewee No 3). Question 4: It is stated that in terms of accountability and reporting that is recommended NACAC should report to the President and its reports tabled in Parliament. According to your own understanding, experience and knowledge does such a reality mean that possible debates and majority decisions can become instrumental in changing or/and modifying existing decisions of NACAC? Can you provide the reasons and your own ideas on such a possibility? The difficulty of this question that can be justified as legally and politically challenging attracted only two responses from the interviewees. The fact that both interviewees who tackled the issue have experiences both in government institutions, academia and research at a number of levels, indicate both the significance and dilemmas associated with the challenges associated with such decisions. The first position based on the interviewee’s experience both within government institutions, legislative roles, academic research and teaching and political oversight is rooted on the belief that it would be important for NACAC to be given scope within its prescribed mandate to make changes to its decisions should this be seen as necessary to further improve the effectiveness of its anti-corruption efforts. It was felt strongly that such changes should always be made within existing administrative laws and not in conflict with executive directives. It was felt strongly that it would be advisable that the stance of the Cabinet, Parliament, the Accounting Officers, the Accountant General and the Auditor General should be invited and taken into account prior to any significant changes being proposed. Depending on the legal mandate of the NACAC and the degree of independence it is given, it could be subjected to Executive and Parliamentary prescribed changes. However, it was strongly felt that such impositions are not likely (Interviewee No 1). On the other hand, Interviewee No 8 felt that given the importance of NACAC as evident in both the Presidential announcement as well as the content of the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030, it was felt that new and innovative rules and/or regulations should be structured from the relevant bodies so that the possibility of confusion, misunderstandings that could lead to political and/or legalistic dilemmas could be avoided. The interviewee felt that the final decision would depend on the level of the debates and their constructive nature. Decisions, it was said, should be commonly agreed upon rooted on the common belief that the best interests of the country are of paramount importance (Interviewee No 8). Question 5: It is stated that ‘a transitional interactive strategic relationship will have to be maintained with the Anti-Corruption Task Team (ACTT) and all law enforcement agencies. Similarly, the work of the NACACS steering committee and NACS reference group should be incorporated into the interim advisory body’. Which section of the Advisory Council do you feel will maintain such relationships, the 7 to 10 of senior representatives from government, civil society and business or by the full-time dedicated secretariat to facilitate any practical arrangements, to consolidate and record its work and reports, and to ensure that it can deliver on its mandate. Provide the reasons for your answer. The responses can be characterised as similar in most cases, but with a small number of diversions that need to be explored for comments. The general agreement was related to the common belief that any relationship of NAPAC with anti-corruption bodies and other state institutions should be well defined. It is believed that in such relationships the significance of the ‘detailed realities’ is of paramount importance, a fact that will lead to the avoidance of repetitions of past experiences. There was an agreement amongst most interviewees that it was the responsibility of the 7 to 10-member Advisory Council body to communicate with other bodies its policy and action, which will also be presented to the President and Parliament. The member of the Secretariat facilitates such communications at the administrative level. There were also a small number of different positions on the issue. It was mentioned, however, that experiences of conflicting responsibilities and authorities between various bodies have been instrumental in undermining the effectiveness of the overall anti-corruption intentions of the Government at many levels. This means that the best way forward depends clearly on formalised areas of responsibility and authority which all work within a single coherent anti-corruption/strategy and action plan. It was felt that such a need does not exist at present (Interviewees No 1, 4, and 6). The role of the Secretariat and its knowledgeable staff was said to be a key in creating an environment leading to success. Hence the body needs to be enabled to play a key role in providing the functions and processes of an ‘educational enforcement mechanism’ that could prove instrumental in the fight against corruption in terms of dissecting procurement audits within both government entities as well as the anti-corruption agencies. This is because audit reports throughout the years have been very important sources in analysing the functionalities and dysfunctionalities of procurement and risk management structures and functions as well the relationships between politicians, administrators, and business operators. This means that in the final analysis the comprehensive examination of specified disposal or procurement cases that have given wide negative publicity to the people, a fact leading to public controversy, lack of trust, suspicion of corruption or malpractice leads to well planned, investigation of the relevant anti-corruption agencies. Such an understanding and analysis within this context leads to a belief that at a time when suspicion of a corrupt act in public supply chain and procurement areas are reported to the appropriate anti-corruption authorities, the rule of law demands criminal investigation and prosecution with integrity. In such cases the investigative powers leading to prosecution are in need of capability and excellence on the part of the state employees responsible to deal with such issues and challenges (Interviewee No 5). Such a position by the one interviewee was supported by a business person whose opinion was based on the fact that the realities of corruption and anti-corruption have not slowed down, especially during the period of the Covid-19 pandemic and the continuous Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) corruption had devastating effects on the lives of millions of the poorest of the poor throughout South Africans. This reality was perpetrated for months despite the fact that the Special Investigating Unit was seriously activated, and a large number of such cases were investigated, and culprits were discovered and punished. Such anti-corruption initiatives were also active through the Fusion Centre (Interviewee No 6). On the other hand, there was a belief that the ACT has not proven much success in matters relating to their core activities, while the same applies to the division and duplication among the law enforcement agencies. This was said, to leads to the conclusion that in the end, there is the need for a process leading to substantial transformation within the parameters of the Criminal Justice Cluster. Once such an effort succeeds there is an open opportunity for all stakeholders and role players to begin a constructive and useful debate in respect of all important matters in the fight against corruption at all levels. In the end, it was believed, the responsibility lies with the leadership of the NACAC Advisory Council while the Secretariat will mostly provide professional and support services. The NACS Reference group at least represents all sectors involved in the fight against corruption (Interviewee No 7). Interviewee No 8 believed that the Secretariat in collaboration and direct communication with the main body would provide the ‘guidance of how issues would be resolved after following the administrative processes’ that include direct communications with all government clusters, the DPSA and the National Treasury. The final decision, it was believed, rested with the President and the Department of Justice. Question 6: It is proposed in the National Strategy document that their term of office should be two years’ maximum or until the overarching body is established and operational. Do you feel that the term is well thought given the existing circumstances? Please justify the answer. There were two basic positions regarding this question with 3 interviewees stating that given the existing circumstances it was extremely difficult for them to comment on the issue. Three interviewees ( No 1, No 5 and No 6) believed that those two years should be an adequate period for the overarching body to establish the necessary functionality and to go through the learning curve in order for it to establish an adequate modus operandi for the permanent body (i.e., phase 2). For the interim body to extend beyond two years would lead to the loss of necessary urgency and impetus of the NACAC initiative. Two interviewees, however, who based their opinion on what they called ‘a clear understanding of the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030’ (Interviewees No 2 and No 4) , believed that the realities facing South Africa, Africa and the world during the Covid 19 pandemic have led to devastating human, social and health challenges. Such realities, it was believed, have led them to the conclusion that the present and future decisive battles against corruption can only be led and guided by groups of political leaders, politicians, administrators and future leaders and employees of NACAC who themselves are honest, committed, transparent, independent-minded, well - educated and trained specialists in a number of scientific disciplines associated with corruption in all its sides and angles. Their belief was even if the leadership and the Secretariat of the new body were widely accepted because of their own credentials, history and background, the dynamics, realities, challenges, complications, and existing circumstances are so diverse and multi- dimensional that this period is not enough for the completion of the target. It was felt that the term is most likely too short given the fact of all the existence of the technicalities involved and especially the realities of the existing bureaucratic system in which this body will function. It can also be seen with Councillors in local government-they barely have their internal aspects sorted, started with work (especially when taking over from another political party) and then their time has expired (Interviewee No 7) . Interviewee No 8 believed that the success or failure of such a plan could depend on the reality of setting up the appropriate aims and objectives as well a ‘business plan’ consisting of the realities of the mandate, the roles, structures and membership of the body, the existing and future resources, the priorities, the performance measures and annual targets,the functionalities of the systems, audit realities, risk assessment and mitigation, policy and priorities agendas. Question 7: It is stated that in terms of budget and resourcing and given the fact that the NACAC will exist for a maximum of two years, this structure can explore the use of funds from the Criminal Asset Recovery Accounts. Do you think that such a possibility exists? Provide the reasons for your answer. A proposed alternative is welcome. It was stated that this proposed source of funding for the NACAC is certainly worth exploring.It was felt that a legal opinion should be sought as to the authority of National Treasury to redirect the distribution of these funds.Failing this, it should be possible to convince the Minister of Finance that funding of the NACAC (and its Secretariat) should produce a considerable return by way of reduced corruption i.e., reduced loss of public funds in Public Sector institutions – which in turn justifies its funding (Interviewee No 1) . It was felt that such a decision that could lead to a reality in the end of the process will literally depend on all of the costs that the Council will incur.While the allocation of a budget during the period of the operations could be considered a ‘done deal’, additional funds could come from the Criminal Asset Recovery Accounts. However, it was believed, one should keep in mind what the Criminal Asset Recovery Accounts are actually supposed to do with for example the recovered funds. If the Advisory Council should find their own financial means it will not work (Interviewee 7). Question 8: What do you consider the best ways and channels used by the various anti-corruption agencies to coordinate and interact? This was basically a ‘general question’ set with the hope that the knowledge of the interviewees even from a variety of different angles would or could provide new knowledge or original ideas and alternatives suited to the new entity. The majority of interviewees (Interviewees No 1, 2, 4, 5,6 and 8) mentioned that this was a ‘very difficult question’ for a number of reasons, the most important been the multiplicity of anti-corruption laws, rules, regulations and anti-corruption bodies as well as what was described as the difficulty of South African people, including members of Parliament and senior public servants at all government levels to really know and understand of specific duties and responsibilities of each of these bodies. The name of the Scorpions that do not really exist anymore cropped up a number of times as an almost ‘generic’ belief emerged that ‘perhaps a new body can be the only carefully selected conclusion.’ The new body NACAC was mentioned by four of the respondents as a possibility, although it was stated that knowing the problems and challenges facing the political realities associated with such decisions, a final answer was difficult (No 4, 5,6 and 7). Interestingly a similar position to a point, albeit with an addition, was provided by one of the most distinguished international corruption and anti-corruption researcher Professor Drago Kos, who is the Chairperson of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, as well as the co-chair of Mena – the OECD Business Integrity Network, and a member of International Anti-Corruption Advisory Board (IACAB), among others. He questioned whether South Africa has an anti-corruption fatigue because of the fact that the country has 14 anti-corruption agencies. He pointed out that although political will and the right personnel are key to success, any new proposed entity would also need clearly defined powers and resources. Because of these realities, it was stated, ‘South Africa does not need an agency number 15’ (Kos 2021). An almost similar position was proposed by Interviewee No. 7 as follows: “I have always thought that, considering the least corrupt countries in the world, that the South African system has too many pieces of legislation and various bodies. My first suggestion would be to streamline these and then, basically on a similar basis to the intergovernmental relations framework, coordinate, and work together. It would be best to have ONE central reporting point (where there would not be any undue influence) and where information can be compared, verified, and acted on.” One interviewee with attention to detail indicated that a ‘new, fairly radical approach’ might be needed based on the successes of both international, but also African governments. His point was based on all countries’ choice, including South Africa, what is more important in the fight against corruption, punishment or prevention? He provided the examples of South Africa and Botswana. The point was that the South African people and government have been facing the fight against corruption been only successful when the corrupt are arrested and punished in accordance with the corrupt acts, while the prevention initiatives were considered weak or non- existent. The examples of the Hawks, the National Prosecutor and the SIU were mentioned, and the question arose how their successes, their functions and the reasons of successes or failures were communicated to the people who could learn. The conclusion emanating from such realities pointed to the possibility or probability of a new trend that has been now considered as ‘the foundation’ of anti-corruption success, diagnosis, thorough investigation, widespread education, effectiveness. New operational dynamics planned, structured and implemented through a deep study of the best practices across the world (Interviewee No 8). Conclusions and recommendations The key question marks in the minds of anti-corruption leaders, activists, researchers, throughout the public and the private sectors, civil society and the country’s people at large has been revolving since the evening of the 21st of February 2021 around the proposed development of a new anti-corruption entity, the National Anti-Corruption Advisory Council. This is due to the fact that South Africa has 14 fully operational anti-corruption agencies and bodies it was inevitable that serious research was needed in order to assess whether the existing realities were in need of a ‘a gap analysis’ able to assess the necessity of an additional entity /entity, its nature, structures, functions and future responsibilities, planning and implementation imperatives and above it its benefit. This meant that the benefits and/or challenges of a new agency and its leading/guiding/ organising /supervising role, in short its ‘operational mode’ should be clearly identified and detailed as most cases at such new entities tend to be multi-layered and complex. Key questions are developing while the processes, realities, future structures, leaderships, relationships, co-operations, planning for efficiency and effectiveness and possible challenges and problems are unfolding. Debates and decisions have continued or will continue on the issue even during a period when even the real need for such an initiative is urgent, mainly because of the fact that there is a multiplicity of anti-corruption bodies and a widely acknowledged solid anti-corruption legislation, rules, and regulations. Those who have questioned and debated the need of a new institution have used legalistic, legal, financial, functional/structural, personal/professional knowledge and experience and comparisons associated with the effectiveness, successes, or failures of the country’s existing anti-corruption institutions. Such debates can only be based on comparisons, empirical evidence, analysis and dissection of existing realities, relationships, planning, leadership, functions, structures, success, and failures as well as their foundations. It is such a thoughtful analysis that can lead the government and society at large to trust or not such entities and identify the existing gaps that can move the anti-corruption struggles to the future. The research upon which the present document is based utilised primary and secondary sources in South Africa and internationally and included the analysis of the fundamental structures and functions of three successful anti-corruption bodies in African states that incorporate education at all societal levels as integral components of societies based on ethics. The key findings pinpointed the fact that the two basic foundations of a successful anti-corruption agency or council, are strong political will and well trained, highly educated and ethical personnel. It was agreed that there could be no successful fight against corruption without the strong support of society, communities and the government and all its institutions. This means that the combination of a political will and the appropriate and careful selection of new people in the proposed agency who undergo regular integrity testing and lifestyle audits can lead to success. Within this context a careful analysis of the structures, functions, processes, relationships, mechanisms, leadership, political will, independence, priorities, challenges, and problems at all operational and institutional levels can be described as an important lesson for the future. The ethical culture through education to public service personnel at all levels as well as wider society is included in this effort. Such a team with the characteristics as described above, comprising of a variety of committed members can be instrumental in creating the foundations of a common group understanding, cohesion, commitment and dedication based on ethics that can play an important role not only exposing, but also through planning, designing, preparing, and opening the appropriate path forward. Such a path is the way forward in the process of defeating the culture, planning and actions related to corruption in the public and private sectors and society at large. This is a process leading to the destruction of grand and petty corruption, tackled by a team that can become the key ingredient leading to the transformation, reformation, and re-shaping of an already advanced and multiple administration of justice against corruption, a multi-faced crime against South Africa and its people. Corruption is not only a national threat, but also the root of a daily refutation of the country’s Constitutional aspirations and the vision of the National Development Plan. We need to have a second legal opinion included to either validate this or venture an alternative position. Should there be an alternative position, then we make the point thatthe issue be workshopped by the legal fraternity before finalising legislation because it needs to stay out of the courts. A highly interesting position regarding the functions of the new council in terms of the ‘non-trial resolutions’ (NTRs) has appeared recently, a reality that has been described by international research of anti-corruption as a ‘possibility of been critical to the country’s proposed anti-corruption council’, despite the indisputable fact that there would be resistance, mainly because of the harsh reality that South Africa has been stripped of an estimated trillion rand as a result of graft. Within this context an expert researcher on the issue Dr Abiola Makinwa, MICA, a Principal Lecturer in Commercial Law/Anti-Corruption Law, and Policy at the Law Department in The Hague University of Applied Sciences, has indicated that ‘traditional criminal prosecutions are time-consuming and susceptible to lack of political will and the influence of elites. The sentence was completed with the belief that ‘even when in a traditional court prosecution is successful, it may fail to take the money out of the crime, so the poverty trap continues.’ Inevitably such statements could sound and/or considered as both ‘generic’ and ‘ideological’ in nature but they are founded on scientific analysis and dissection of a multiplicity of legal and court reports internationally and in Africa. It has been shown empirically that throughout the world in the case of global powerful companies, out-of-court settlements would often take place. As official reports have shown leniency has been granted ‘upon the extent to which the company self-reports on acts of corruption and foreign bribery that an anti-corruption agency would not have discovered on its own. It was thought that as ‘non-trial resolutions’ could be thought to be and escribed as the ‘new kids on the block’, and were being used successfully globally, an analysis of their processes could be useful for the new entity to study (Makinwa, A., 2021a; Makinwa, A., 2021b) . The success of NACAC can only become a reality under seriously and meticulously planned and implemented strategic, tactical and action steps that enable the creation of transparency and accountability. These attitudes and behaviour can guarantee the prevention of corruption risks in the public and the private sectors beginning with the careful and well-researched improvements in public finance, including serious attendance to supply chain and procurement realities at all government levels, political and private sector corruption, attention to corruption risks in all parastatals, as well as the police, intelligence, defences, and the health sectors. One of the key steps leading to the success of NACAC is the creation and actions of an Inter-Agency Coordinating Council (IACC) organising the inter-agency sharing of strategic intelligence with the active participation of the police and national intelligence, and all anti-corruption agencies themselves. The effective cross-agency cooperation should be based on sufficient authority and resources, capacity and political backing to perform its mandates. (Koranteng, 2020) . Two Progress Reports per financial year will be instrumental in streamlining the monitoring process with the main aim to assess the appropriate planning, designing and implementation process of all 14 anti-corruption entities and the priority areas identified in the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020-2030 the existing Action Plans. Such a report will be the basis of identifying the achieved outcomes, the existing and future as well as existing challenges and gaps (Quah, 2015) . The relationship between the Monitoring Tool and the Progress Report will include the following realities: The Monitoring Tool identifies the targets, activities, the responsible agency, specific timeframes, partner/s and budget. It should be filled twice a year by the responsible agencies, including the non-governmental organisations who could be participants. The ratings take two stages of assessments of the activities undertaken: 1. ​Stage 1: Assessment Rating: 1.1. activity is implemented to completion 1.2. activity implemented to a large extend 1.3. activity implemented only partially and activity not implemented at all. ​2. Stage 2: Status Assessment Rating: 2.1. no finalisation in the implementation process 2.2. implementation is ongoing till completion 2.3. partial or complete suspension of implementation 2.4. termination or finalisation of implementation. Closure of the two stages . ​ 3. Stage 3: Report and Process 3.1. Stage 3.1: Progress report and Monitoring Tool: 3.2. Final assessment is made by Secretariat and Progress Report is prepared 3.3. Progress Report is submitted to the ACC and adopted ​ 4. Stage 4: Monitoring Report 4.1. The Report will be prepared annually by the ACC Secretariat so that the assessment of the implementation processes of the Action Plan activities and achieved results can be prepared 4.2. The Report will be based on the Progress Reports and Monitoring Tool submitted by the agencies that have the key responsibility biannually; consideration to the ratings will be paid attention to and studied thoroughly 4.3. Monitoring Report will be submitted to the ACC for adoption, to the President and Parliament. (Recanatini, 2011) ​ 5. Stage 5. Evaluation Report 5.1. The Evaluation Report’s most important objective is the assessment of the achieved results prioritising the levels of efficiency, effectiveness, as well as the thorough analysis of the existing situation, the identification of problems, gaps, and challenges in the Action Plan implementation process. 5.2. The Evaluation Report will be prepared once in two years. 5.3. The Assessment of local and international organisation, international ratings, assessment of international and local organisations, research-based, official documents and relevant publications, in-depth interviews, meetings, and debates with representatives from responsible agencies, NGOs or experts will be used in this process. 5.4. The Evaluation Report will be submitted to the ACC, NACAC, the South African Parliament and the President (UNDP United Nations Development Programme 2011) . ​ The planning, development and implementation of the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework is the foundation upon which NACAC will be enabled will to integrate effectiveness in the overall management framework, a positive way forward to success. In the process of seeking continuous success in the fight against corruption, NACAC’s leadership and Secretariat should see as one of the key priorities from the beginning the creation, development, and continuation of a set of objectives, well-thought, comprehensive and reliable indicators enabling the assessment and measurement levels as the most important guide to the fulfilment pf the entity’s aims and objectives. Given the existing Pan-African guidelines, laws, rules, regulations, and memoranda of anti-corruption agreements the participation of all organisations and entities the direct and continuous communication with key anti-corruption agencies and organisations is compulsory including the African Development Bank, the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption, the anti-corruption bodies of Sub-Saharan and Southern African countries and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Common meetings, debates, exchange of ideas, conferences, and regular communication are or could be serious contributors in the development of effectiveness indicator/s. The key institution in such processes is the African Development Bank whose leadership is considered vital in the development and continuation of an African common effectiveness agenda (OECD 2017; NCPA 2019) . NACAC in collaboration with all key anti-corruption agencies are the foundations of the developmental path leading to strategies and tactics opening the paths of improved collaboration and coordination among all law enforcement agencies at country level and at regional level through multilateral cooperation. Such initiatives can be achieved through the introduction of regular meetings and follow-ups that are instrumental in ensuring one of the most important tools in understanding the dynamics of corruption and its types through the sharing of experiences and best practices against them. Contact with regional organisations and networks including civil society entities lead to expanded and useful relations and exchanges of research, ideas, realities, and knowledge and are instrumental in enriching new planning developments and ways forward to increasing innovation and effectiveness at all levels (World Economic Forum 2018; UNODC 2019). In fact, one of the interviewees who considered himself very lucky to be a participant in regional conference and an integral part of the processes leading to formal resolutions after crucial debates, indicated that as NACAC will be an integral part of the African Union Summit, the SADC (Southern African Development Community) Summit and the Conference of States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the possibilities for success and effectiveness multiply. The creation of a new establishment like NACAC will inevitably create the hopes and aspirations for a new entity enabled to achieve results where others have failed and to meet all expectations raised by the country’s senior political and administrative leadership. It is within this context that it is the sheer responsibility of the leadership and Secretariat of the agency not only to achieve the effectiveness expected through its functions, but also the processes of evaluation that is the assessment of the processes and outcomes at all levels of institutional operations. The outcomes of such an exercise are rooted on the comprehensive pre-execution method of the measurements of achievements leading to excellence against goals, aims, objectives, milestones, and objectives. The processes leading to unsuccessful outcomes to be thoroughly researched in the effort to analyse and dissect the reasons which determine the causes and effects of the failure of operations, as well the policy implementation and tactics in terms of effective outcomes. Thus, eradicating corruption remains a very difficult and complicated challenge despite all sophisticated means provided by the state finance but can nevertheless be brought under control (Barrett, et.al 2020:75-76; Camperle, 2018:158-159) . The existing realities associated with countries throughout the world that are not as corrupt as the vast majority such as Singapore, New Zealand, Sweden, or Finland that are on the top of the widely acknowledged Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), a reality pointing to the truth that despite the success against corruption at least a minimal percentage of it will exist always. To be ‘thoroughly effective’ in the fight against corruption is always considered a very important achievement because everything in life relies on existing comparisons. This is due to the fact that the lack of objectivity in comparisons has its own boundaries when it comes to functional, organisational, and institutional effectiveness in the fight against corruption (Schütte, 2017). This means that it is relatively easy to compare countries in relation to their own economic and financial development, because such analyses and dissection are directly related with issues that can be scientifically calculated such as a country’s Gross National Product, growth rate realities or per capita income. ‘Successes within the parameters and the purpose of this study related directly and indirectly with NAPAC can be considered as ‘synonymous with effectiveness,’ a reality of the present and the future destined to be a new struggle for those involved (Kuris, 2015:127). 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[Online] Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup4/2019-September-4-6/V1902764e.pdf [Accessed November 4, 2021]. United States Department of Labour. N.d. OSHA Whistleblower Protection Programme . [Online] Available at: www.whistleblowers.gov [Accessed November 4, 2021]. W Wong, J.Y. 2008. Theory of ground vehicles . John Wiley & Sons: New Jersey. Woods, G. & Mantzaris, E.A. 2012. Anti-Corruption Reader . ACCERUS, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. World Economic Forum. 2018. The Future of Trust and Integrity, White Paper by the Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI). [Online] Available at: www.psc.gov.za/documents/2011/PSC%20Report%212,www.psc.gov.za/documents/2011/PSC%20Report-%20 [Accessed November 7, 2021]. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deep ening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

  • Inclusive Society Institute presents its electoral reform proposals to the Electoral Reform Consultation Panel

    The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) attended and presented its electoral reform proposals to the Electoral Reform Consultation Panel (ERCP) on Wednesday, 4 December 2024. The ERCP public consultations was held at the Imbizo Centre in Parliament.   In short, the ISI is proposing a Multi-Member Constituency system, where between 3 and 7 MPs are elected in 69 Constituencies, using the District municipality borders as the basis for the constituencies. In metro areas the sub-council borders will be the basis therefor. The proportional system will remain a feature under the ISI proposal, with 300 members elected from the MMCs, and 100 members from a compensatory list used to establish overall proportionality. To simplify the electoral process, only two ballots (one for national, and one for provincial) will be required.   The ISI cautioned against retaining the current pure PR system and a single-seat constituency system. The current system has proved that MPs are not accountable to the electorate – hardly anyone knows who their local MPs are – and under a single-seat constituency system there is a real danger of diversity being undermined.   Click here for the full ISI electoral reform proposal.

  • The South Africa Social Cohesion Index: Measuring the well-being of a society

    This report has been enabled through the generous support of Telkom Copyright © 2024   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   November 2024   Author: Georgi Dragolov and Klaus Boehnke Constructor University, Bremen, Germany Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Table of Contents   Table of Contents List of Tables List of Figures Executive Summary 1. Introduction 2. Measuring social cohesion 2.1 Data 2.2 Analytical approach 3. Level and trend of social cohesion 3.1 Social cohesion in South Africa 3.2 Social cohesion in the nine provinces 4. Structural influences on social cohesion 4.1 Data and method 4.2 Results 5. Individual experiences of social cohesion 5.1 Data and method 5.2 Four classes of experience 5.3 Socio-demographics of the four classes 6. Social cohesion and subjective well-being 6.1 Provinces 6.2 Individuals 7. Discussion and conclusion References                                 Appendices Appendix A: Indicators of cohesion across time Appendix B: Dimensions of cohesion in the provinces over time Appendix C: Correlations of social cohesion on the province level Appendix D: Latent class analyses                                 Cover photo: istock.com - Stock photo ID:1440750455             List of Tables   Table 2.1 Sample sizes of Khayabus – Waves 1 Table 2.2 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 1, “Social relations” Table 2.3 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 2 “Connectedness” Table 2.4 Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 3 “Focus on the common good” Table 3.1 Social cohesion and its dimensions in South Africa across time Table 3.2 The overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time Table 4.1 Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table 5.1 Social cohesion and its dimensions in the four classes Table 5.2 Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents Table 6.1 Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Table 6.2 Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents Table 0.1 Indicators of Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” across time Table 0.2 Indicators of Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” across time Table 0.3 Indicators of Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” across time Table 0.4 Indicators of Dimension 2.1 “Identification” across time Table 0.5 Indicators of Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” across time Table 0.6 Indicators of Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” across time Table 0.7 Indicators of Dimension 3.2 “Solidarity and helpfulness” across time Table 0.8 Indicators of Dimensions 3.2 “Respect for social rules” across time Table 0.9 Indicators of Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation” across time Table 0.10 Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” in the provinces across time Table 0.11 Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” in the provinces across time Table 0.12 Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” in the provinces across time Table 0.13 Dimension 2.1 “Identification” in the provinces across time Table 0.14 Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” in the provinces across time Table 0.15 Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” in the provinces across time Table 0.16 Dimension 3.1 “Solidarity and helpfulness” in the provinces across time Table 0.17 Dimension 3.2 “Respect for social rules” in the provinces across time Table 0.18 Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation“ in the provinces across time Table 0.19 Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces Table 0.20 Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces Table 0.21 Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions Table 0.22 Relative class sizes for LCA solutions   List of Figures   Figure 1.1 Constitutive elements of social cohesion (Leininger et al., 2021) Figure 1.2 Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar Figure 2.1 Provinces of South Africa Figure 3.1 Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces (2023) Figure 3.2 Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time Figure 5.1 Average scores of dimensions in the four classes Executive Summary   This report provides a comprehensive assessment of social cohesion in South Africa, focusing on its development over the past three years. The study uses data from the Khayabus Survey conducted by Ipsos South Africa. Following the conceptualization developed by the authors and their colleagues for Bertelsmann Stiftung, the study assesses social cohesion in three domains: social relations, connectedness, and focus on the common good. Each of these domains encompasses three dimensions of cohesiveness, namely the intactness of social networks , general trust in people , and acceptance of diversity  for the domain ‘social relations,’ identification with one’s place of residence , trust in institutions , and perception of fairness  for the ‘connectedness’ domain, and solidarity and helpfulness , respect for social rules , and civic participation  for the domain ‘focus on the common good.’   The Bertelsmann concept of defining a country’s social cohesion level allows scores between 0 (no cohesion) and 100 (maximal social cohesion). Which score to evaluate as a sufficiently high score of social cohesion is a normative, not to say political decision. It has become customary to designate scores above 60 as speaking for a high level of social cohesion. Scores between 40 and 60 are designated as moderate, below 40 as low and below 20 as very low. Scores above 80 speak for a very high level of social cohesion, which has, however, not been reported for any country or other type of geopolitical entity yet.   The overall social cohesion index in South Africa is moderately high , neither specifically high nor low, but has seen a stable decline  in the past three years. The highest scores for a single dimension were found for identification, followed by solidarity and helpfulness and social networks. The lowest scores were found for 'Perception of Fairness' and 'Respect for Social Rules.'   The study reveals that the most significant decline  occurred in the cohesion dimension,  respect for social rules . Other weakened dimensions include trust in institutions and perception of fairness. The level of solidarity and helpfulness remained stable, whereas civic participation and general trust in people have become slightly stronger.   The current level of cohesion in South Africa, 51.7 , is almost identical to that found in Germany  in 2023, where the index score was 52. As for the South African Provinces, social cohesion was found lowest in KwaZulu Natal (46.1), second lowest in Free State (49.4), and third lowest in Gauteng (50.5) in 2023.   Focusing on the relationship between the level of social cohesion in nine provinces and the characteristics of the provinces reveals surprising facts. The study shows that social cohesion in the South African provinces is negatively correlated with GDP and assets, i.e., higher assets resulting in lower social cohesion. This is mirrored by the finding that poverty positively correlates with social cohesion, with more poor people living in areas with higher social cohesion. The percentage of people living in rural areas is a good predictor of social cohesion, whereas city dwellers report lower levels of subjectively experienced social cohesion. High levels of language fractionalization correlate positively  with social cohesion, and social cohesion tends to be lower when the median age is higher. In contrast, social cohesion elsewhere in the world is higher in countries with a high median age. Language and religious fractionalization results for South Africa also deviate from what had been reported for, e.g., Asia.   The study also found that social cohesion is perceived as lower  among intense Internet   users . These findings contradict the findings of the Bremen Social Cohesion Radar, which suggested that Internet use fosters social cohesion. Cohesion is high where many Whites and Coloureds live and low where many Indians and Blacks live. As one would expect, low percentages of singles in a geopolitical entity and high numbers of married people are related to high social cohesion.   Finally, the study also presents the results of a grouping procedure called latent class analysis (LCA), which isolates subgroups of South Africans who experience different deficits in social cohesion in their immediate life context. The results show that identification with the country of South Africa is not a variable that differentiates the classes: All South Africans are highly identified with their country.   LCAs identify four classes of South Africans: Class 1 (Critics), which is characterized by low tolerance levels and little respect for social rules; Class 2 (Integrated Sceptics), which is characterized by well-knit social networks, high levels of general trust and tolerance; Class 3 (Middle South Africa), which is characterized by an exceptionally high level of loyalty to the country and below-average acceptance of otherness, and Class 4 (Cohesive Communities), which is characterized by a strongly felt social cohesion in their typically rural life context .   Ultimately, the report examines the relationship between social cohesion and subjective well-being among South Africans. The data support the OECD countries' finding that high levels of social cohesion are related to well-being. Results show that higher levels of social cohesion in a geopolitical entity lead to a more pos itive outlook on life , with optimism and subjective well-being being considerably higher in provinces with high levels of social cohesion.   The study also examines subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents. The results show that in Class 4, the Cohesive Communities, families are seen as better off than a year ago, children have a bright future ahead, and life satisfaction has improved. Furthermore, the study found that the higher the social cohesion in a geopolitical entity, the more positive people's outlook on life is. Findings suggest that higher levels of social cohesion in a geopolitical entity will likely lead to increased life satisfaction  and overall well-being. Exactly that finding underscores the necessity of political action to improve South Africa’s level of social cohesion. Whereas conceptual academic work on social cohesion sometimes claims that too high a level of social cohesion can cement the societal status quo and prevent progress, all empirical studies  have shown that high levels of cohesion foster peaceful coexistence of various societal groups in respect, dignity, trust, and cooperation. Cohesion translates the social and economic structures (performance and output of the economy, living conditions) into quality of life (happiness, life satisfaction) directly experienced by individual members of society. In case, cohesion is neglected, one can expect societal polarization and political instability.   1. Introduction   Since the French Revolution with its famous motto ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité,’ discourse on the cohesion of geopolitical entities (countries/provinces/neighbourhoods) has seen waves of greater and lesser intensity, but one thing is clear: A healthy social entity needs fraternité or, in modern terminol­ogy, ‘social cohesion’ among its members. Social cohesion stands for the ability of societies to stick together or, as Leininger and colleagues put it, “the glue that holds society together” (Leininger et al., 2021: 2).   In recent years, when social cohesion has been discussed in South Africa, it has been with an increasingly critical undertone. The sentiment that the self-declared Rainbow Nation (Tutu, Mandela) is drifting apart rather than growing together has become stronger. However, research – mainly empirical – on social cohesion in South Africa is scarce. Our search for any available scholarly literature within the past 10 years yielded seven publications, two of which are reviews of a book by Ballantine et al. (2017) included in the count. The book by Ballantine and colleagues is a collection of essays by local academics and public figures about issues related to, amongst others, inequality, xenophobia, safety, gender-based abuse, political leadership, law, education, identity, sport, arts, and South Africa’s position in the world. A paper by Abrahams (2016) tracks the evolution of social cohesion over twenty years in South African politics, criticizing the instrumentalization of cohesion as a social policy concept exclusively towards a form of nation-building that seeks to solidify the hegemony of the ruling party.   A brief report by the South African Institute of International Affairs (2021) reviews the status quo and progress in religion, nationality, race and ethnicity, and LGBTQ+ rights. The report offers recommendations for improving the situation in these spheres and promotes the role of young people in fostering social cohesion. A paper by Burns and colleagues from the South African Labour and Development Research Unit emphasizes the importance of social cohesion as a social policy concept, also referring to studies conducted by the authors of the present report, critically reviews existing concepts of social cohesion proposed in the academic and policy discourse, and formulates a definition for its assessment in the South African society based on theoretical considerations: “Social Cohesion is the extent to which people are co-operative, within and across group boundaries, without coercion or purely self-interested motivation” (Burns et al., 2018, p. 10). Interestingly, Burns et al. (2018) identify the overlap between social cohesion and ubuntu, arguing that the two have become synonymous regarding nation-building and efforts to close South African society's cultural and racial divides.   To our knowledge, two existing empirical studies have defined and measured social cohesion in South Africa. Langer et al. (2017) define social cohesion in an African context as the interplay of three salient aspects: perceived inequalities, trust (interpersonal and institutional), and identity (national vs ethnic). Their measurement draws on data from 19 countries, including South Africa, from Round 3 (2005 – 2006), Round 4 (2008 – 2009), and Round 5 (2011 – 2013) of the Afrobarometer survey. For each aspect of a country, the authors calculate the proportion of respondents who provide those answers to the selected survey items that point to a stronger expression of cohesion. The resulting proportions for each aspect are then averaged by taking their arithmetic mean into a social cohesion index. According to the findings, overall cohesion in South Africa and its three aspects have recorded only minor ups or downs in the period studied. The level of identification was found to range from 0.612 (2005 – 2006) to 0.700 (2011 – 2013) and can be considered moderately high. The perception of equality was found in the range from 0.328 (2008 – 2009) to 0.469 (2011 – 2013) and can be qualified as low to moderately low. Trust was found in the range from 0.239 (2011 – 2013) to 0.293 (2005 – 2006) can be qualified as low.   From a comparative perspective, South Africa emerged in the middle of the country ranking on the overall level of cohesion and the perceived level of equality, in the lower half of the ranking on trust, and among the top countries on identification.   The second available empirical study (Leininger et al., 2021) similarly compares African countries. According to its authors, “cohesion is characterised by a set of attitudes and behavioural manifestations that includes trust, an inclusive identity and cooperation for the common good” (Leininger et al., 2021, p. 3). These three attributes unfold into two elements, encompassing horizontal or vertical relations among citizens and the state (see Figure 1.1): social trust and institutional trust, group identity and national identity, intergroup cooperation, and state-society cooperation. Leininger and colleagues operationalize their concept with items from the Afrobarometer, covering a varying set of African societies depending on the data availability for the particular element of cohesion: 17 to 18 in Round 3 (2005 – 2006), 20 in Round 4 (2008 – 2009), 28 to 34 in Round 5 (2011 – 2013), 32 to 36 in Round 6 (2014 – 2015). Their methodological approach measures the three attributes on a scale from 0 (low) to 1 (high). South Africa achieved scores in the range from 0.44 (2015) to 0.51 (2011) on trust, 0.3 (2015) to 0.43 (2006) on cooperation, and 0.42 (2015) to 0.74 (2011) on identity. These scores point to a downward trend in cohesion in South Africa for each attribute. In comparing African countries, South Africa ranked in the middle on trust, in the lower half on cooperation, and among the top countries on identity (except for the last year of observation, 2015). The work by Leininger et al. (2021), however, does not produce an overall index of cohesion, does not offer insights for more recent years since 2015, and does not venture into exploring the determinants of the country scores on the cohesion attributes or outcomes of cohesion.   Figure 1.1  Constitutive elements of social cohesion (Leininger et al., 2021)     The present report attempts to close the gap in the existing research on South Africa. It aims to provide an all-around theoretically founded and methodologically sound empirical assessment of social cohesion in South African society. In particular, our study attempts to:   measure the current degree of social cohesion in South Africa and its nine constituent provinces; track how cohesion has developed in the period from 2021 to 2023; identify structural characteristics from the thematic fields of economic situation, inequality and poverty, demography, diversity, and modernization that promote or hinder social cohesion; explore which social groups experience a high or low level of cohesion; investigate how social cohesion, i.e., the quality of society, relates to citizens’ well-being, i.e., quality of life.   To achieve these aims, we apply the measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar, which was informed by a comprehensive literature review (Schiefer & van der Noll, 2017) and the input of experts on the topic. It defines cohesion as the “quality of social cooperation and togetherness of a collective, defined in geopolitical terms, which is expressed in the attitudes and behaviours of its members. A cohesive society is characterized by resilient social relations, a positive emotional connectedness between its members and the community, and a pronounced focus on the common good” (Dragolov et al., 2016: 6). These three domains unfold into three dimensions. The domain ‘Social relations’ measures the strength and resilience of individuals’ social ties (Dimension 1.1 – Social networks), the degree to which people trust others (Dimension 1.2 – Trust in people), and the extent to which people accept individuals of different background, lifestyle, and values as equal members of society  (Dimension 1.3 – Acceptance of diversity). The domain ‘Connectedness’ measures the strength of individuals’ identification with the geopolitical entity (Dimension 2.1 – Identification), the degree to which individuals trust the entity’s institutions (Dimension 2.2 – Trust in institutions), and individuals’ perception that they are treated fairly and that material resources are fairly distributed (Dimension 2.3 – Perception of fairness). The domain ‘Focus on the common good’ captures the extent to which people feel and demonstrate responsibility for weak others (Dimension 3.1 – Solidarity and helpfulness), people’s willingness to abide by the rules of society (Dimension 3.2 – Respect for social rules), and their participation in society and political life (Dimension 3.3 – Civic participation). Figure 1.2 depicts the measurement concept.   Figure 1.2  Measurement concept of the Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar    Source: Dragolov et al. (2016) A comparison of the Social Cohesion Radar to the approaches of Langer et al. (2017) and Leininger et al. (2021) shows that the three concepts overlap in several regards. First, social cohesion is a quantifiable quality of collectives, not individuals. Second, they all cover horizontal and vertical ties. Third, they all suggest that social cohesion should be assessed via a perception-based index, not based on objective socio-demographic indicators. Next, there is a considerable conceptual overlap in the emphasis on specific dimensions (aspects) of social cohesion. As already mentioned above, Langer et al. suggest including the extent of perceived inequalities (‘Perception of fairness’ in the SCR), the societal level of trust (‘Trust in people’ in the SCR), and the strength of people’s adherence to their national identity (‘Identification’ in the SCR). Leininger and colleagues also mention trust and identity, whereas their dimension of cooperation is called ‘Solidarity and helpfulness’ in the SCR.   The main difference between the three approaches lies in their conceptual scope. Whereas the SCR comprehensively describes the components necessary for a full-fledged assessment of the level of social cohesion in a given society, the two concepts based on the Afrobarometer remain somewhat piecemeal. In addition, one of the main advantages of the SCR approach is its leanness, a necessity also underscored by Leininger et al. (2021). On the one hand, the concept covers the essential components of social cohesion. At the same time, it leaves room for a systematic exploration of determinants (e.g., state of the economy, socio-economic exclusion) and outcomes (e.g., population well-being). For a critical review of the advantages and disadvantages of measurement concepts of cohesion that have been applied in empirical research, we refer readers to Delhey, Dragolov, and Boehnke (2023).   On a final note, the SCR has been utilized to assess social cohesion in 34 Western (EU and OECD) countries (Dragolov et al., 2016), 22 Asian countries (Delhey & Boehnke, 2018), the 16 federal states of Germany (Dragolov et al., 2016), 79 spatial planning regions of Germany (Arant et al., 2017; Boehnke et al., 2024), 78 neighbourhoods of the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen (Arant et al., 2016), the 32 federal entities of Mexico (Boehnke et al., 2019), and the seven regions of Kyrgyzstan (Larsen & Boehnke, 2016). 2. Measuring social cohesion   This section details the data and methodological approach employed for measuring social cohesion in South Africa.   2.1 Data   The current report offers empirical evidence from analyses performed on data from the Khayabus Survey. The data were collected by Ipsos South Africa and provided by the Inclusive Society Institute. The Khayabus Survey is a population-representative survey on various topics related to society and politics in South Africa. The survey initially included the sections Socio-Political Trends (SPT), Government Performance Barometer (GPB), and Party Image (PI). A fourth section, GovDemPol, was added in 2021. It has been fielded annually in at least two waves since 2019 among respondents aged 15 and above.   The analyses performed for this report draw on Waves 1 of the Khayabus survey, typically conducted from late May/early June to mid-July. Because the core set of indicators needed for assessing social cohesion along the Bertelsmann concept is part of the GovDemPol section, our analyses can only start with 2021. Data on three items crucial for the measurement concept, each belonging to the SPT section, had to be taken from the 2020 Khayabus, as they were not included in the 2021 survey. The most recent survey data available to us refer to the year 2023. Our report concentrates on survey respondents aged 18 and above, as several of the needed items were not included in the questionnaire for under-aged South Africans. The overall samples in the employed data encompass 3758 respondents in 2020, 3402 respondents in 2021, 3459 respondents in 2022, and 3519 respondents in 2023.   Table 2.1.1  Sample sizes of Khayabus – Waves 1     Table 2.1 offers detailed information on sample sizes achieved in Waves 1 of the Khayabus surveys from 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023. The table provides a breakdown of the samples by province, as the present report also aims to measure social cohesion in the nine constituent provinces of South Africa. We refer readers unfamiliar with the nine provinces' geographic location and administrative borders to Figure 2.1. It is important to note that population sizes vary widely between the mostly urban Gauteng province, where well over a quarter of South Africa's adult population lives, and the mostly desert Northern Cape province, which encompasses less than 3%. The uneven distribution of the South African population across the provinces is reflected in the achieved sample sizes for the provinces, as evident from Table 2.1. The low sample sizes for the least populated provinces, e.g., Northern Cape, with only 64 respondents in 2023, do not necessarily reduce the representativity of the data concerning core socio-demographic characteristics of their population. We address this issue by calibrating the survey data with the population weights provided by Ipsos South Africa. Smaller sample sizes do, however, involve a larger standard error for sample statistics like percentages and means. In practical terms, this means that the precision of the measurements for Gauteng ( NGP,2023  = 1168) is about four times higher than that for Northern Cape ( NNC,2023  = 64) at the same variability in the data. Caution is, therefore, required when interpreting such statistics as estimates of the ‘true’ situation or opinion in the population of provinces for which low sample sizes are available.   Figure 2.1.1  Provinces of South Africa Source: Apraku et al. (2018)   In addition to the above-addressed statistical issues, population sizes, and population density are closely related: In the Gauteng province, more than 800 people live per square kilometer, whereas in the Northern Cape province, the density figure is below 4 per square kilometer (Statistics South Africa, 2024a). Considering these stark differences is essential when evaluating our findings on levels and trends of social cohesion in South Africa.   2.2 Analytical approach   Below, we elaborate on the methodological approach for assessing social cohesion. We begin with the strategy for selecting Khayabus survey questions, also referred to here as items or indicators, to measure the nine dimensions of social cohesion in line with the Bertelsmann concept. We then turn to the approach for computing scores for the nine dimensions and the overall social cohesion index.   Item selection was conducted using a multi-step procedure. First, members of the research team – independent of each other – identified potential items for measuring the nine cohesion dimensions from the Khayabus questionnaire according to face validity. Members of the research team then jointly prepared a pool of items according to face validity. In the third step, items from the pool were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis for each dimension. Factor analysis is a statistical sorting procedure that analyses the matrix of item intercorrelations to separate items with a highly similar response pattern from items with a different response pattern and then sort them into distinct subgroups. The various subgroups of items (called factors) allow us to assess whether or not the items were selected appropriately according to their face validity as per the different dimensions of social cohesion. An important selection criterion is factor loading, which reflects how strongly an item is correlated with the other items sorted into the given factor. Item loadings should typically exceed .40 to be seen as sufficiently high. Items exhibiting sufficiently high factor loadings were retained. In the final step, we assessed the internal consistency of the scales formed by the selected items to measure a pertinent dimension. Cronbach’s α consistency coefficients should reach .90 for an excellent scale, .80 for a very good scale, .70 for a satisfactory scale, and minimally .30, or, in case of short scales, at least .10 times the number of items in the scale.   Several data preparation steps had to be taken before performing factor analyses. Where needed, the response options of the items were reverse coded so that a higher numerical value stands for a more vital expression of the pertinent aspect of cohesion. The response options of all items were rescaled to range from 0 (weakest expression of cohesion) to 100 (strongest expression of cohesion). If present, missing values on an item were substituted with the sample mean as the missingness rate was very low. Tables 2.2 to 2.4 document the selected items' factor loadings and the internal consistencies of the scales these items form for measuring the nine dimensions of social cohesion.   Table 2.2.1  Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 1, “Social relations”   Table 2.2.2  Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 2 “Connectedness”       Table 2.2.3  Factor loadings of items for dimensions within Domain 3 “Focus on the common good”   Readers will note that not all dimensions of social cohesion were measured equally well. This had several reasons. To begin with, the questionnaire offered a limited choice of indicators for some dimensions. This is why not all dimensions could be measured with at least three items. This pertained to Dimension 2.1 (Identification) and Dimension 3.1 (Solidarity and helpfulness), for which only two items could be included. Moreover, for Dimension 2.1, an item from the 2020 Khayabus had to be included, even with two items, to assess citizens’ identification with South Africa in 2021. Second, not all scales exhibit a high degree of homogeneity (level of intercorrelation) of the included items. This is particularly true for Dimension 2.1 and Dimension 3.3 (Civic participation).   After sorting items via factor analyses, the nine dimension scores were computed by calculating the arithmetic mean of the items determined to belong to a given factor. The overall cohesion index was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the nine dimension scores. Dimension and index scores for the provinces and South Africa were calculated by aggregating the individual-level data to the respective level via the population-weighted arithmetic mean. Scores for the dimensions and the overall index range from 0 (very low cohesion) to 100 (very high cohesion), where scores from 0 to 19.99 can be interpreted as pointing to a very low level of cohesion, 20 to 39.99 – low, 40 to 59.99 – medium, 60 to 79.99 – high, and 80 to 100 – very high.    3.      Level and trend of social cohesion   In this section, we report findings on the level and trend of social cohesion in South Africa and its nine constituent provinces from 2021 to 2023.   3.1 Social cohesion in South Africa   Table 3.1 documents the annual level and trend of social cohesion in South Africa since 2021. We first present the findings for 2023, the most recent year for which data are available, and then proceed to the changes observed over time.   Level in 2023   In 2023, the overall social cohesion index for South Africa was 51.7, slightly above the theoretical midpoint of the measurement scale of 50. As such, the strength of social cohesion in South Africa can be qualified as moderate—neither high nor low. What is behind this result? A look at the single dimensions reveals the strong and weak spots of cohesion in South Africa that jointly produce its moderate overall level.   Table 3.1.1  Social cohesion and its dimensions in South Africa across time     Dimension 1.1, ‘Social networks,’ scored 58.8 in 2023. The intactness of citizens’ social networks is currently the third strongest dimension in South Africa. The strength of this dimension can be qualified as moderate, but it should be noted that the result is very close to the lower bound of the interval of high scores (60). To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: About 52 % of the respondents agreed with the statement “I entertain friends from different population groups at home or another place,” 25 % disagreed, and 20 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.1 of the Appendix).   Dimension 1.2, ‘Trust in people,’ can also be found in 2023 in the upper half of the measurement scale, with a score of 54.1. The level of trust that South Africans place in others qualifies, thereby, as moderate. To exemplify the finding with one indicator for this dimension: 19 % of the respondents trust people in their community completely, 62 % only somewhat or not very much, and 18 % not at all (see Table A.2).   Dimension 1.3, ‘Acceptance of diversity,’ achieved 2023 a score of 46.8. The numeric result qualifies the tolerance level in South African society still as moderate. However, it should be noted that it falls within the lower half of the measurement scale, unlike the previous two dimensions from the Domain ‘Social relations.’ To exemplify with one indicator for ‘Acceptance of diversity’: 14 % of the respondents trust coloured South Africans completely, 58 % only somewhat or not very much, and 26 % not at all (see Table A.3).   Dimension 2.1, ‘Identification,’ scored 71.2, the highest among all dimensions in 2023. Identification is the most pronounced aspect of social cohesion in South Africa and the only dimension that can be qualified as high. This is manifested, for example, in the responses to the statement “I am proud to be South African”: 70 % agreed, 17 % disagreed, and 11 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.4).   Dimension 2.2, ‘Trust in institutions,’ achieved in 2023 a score of 46.6. Just like ‘Acceptance of diversity’, the extent of trust citizens have in the country's institutions can be considered moderate. However, it falls within the lower half of the measurement scale. To exemplify with one indicator: 46 % of the respondents agreed with the statement “Elections are free and fair,” 33 % disagreed, and 17 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.5).   Dimension 2.3, ‘Perception of fairness,’ scored in 2023 at 40.5. It is the second weakest aspect of social cohesion in South Africa. The extent to which people perceive the distribution of material resources as fair can be qualified as moderate. However, it should be noted that the result is very close to the upper bound of the interval of low scores (40). To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: 27 % of the respondents stated the government is doing very well or fairly well at narrowing the income gap between races, whereas 68 % stated the government is handling this issue not very well or not at all well (see Table A.6).   Dimension 3.1, ‘Solidarity and helpfulness,’ achieved in 2023 a score of 59.1. With this result, it is the second most vital aspect of social cohesion in South Africa. The extent to which people help the weak members of society can be qualified as moderate, but it should be noted that it is very close to the lower bound of the interval of high scores (60). To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: 58 % of the respondents agreed with the statement “I actively look for ways in which I can support people who are less fortunate than I am”, 21 % disagreed, and 20 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.7).   Dimension 3.2, ‘Respect for social rules,’ achieved in 2023 a score of 33. This is the weakest aspect of social cohesion in South Africa. The extent to which people perceive that rules are observed is low. To exemplify with one indicator for this dimension: 21 % of the respondents stated that the government is doing very well or fairly well at reducing the crime rate, whereas 78 % stated not very well or not at all well (see Table A.8). Dimension 3.3, ‘Civic participation,’ scored at 55.5 in 2023. Just like ‘Trust in people’, the involvement of citizens in society and political life can be qualified as moderate. One indicator for this dimension: 47 % of the respondents agreed with “I actively work for the welfare of my community”, 31 % disagreed, and 20 % positioned themselves in between (see Table A.9).   The results for the dimensions form a nuanced profile of cohesion. None of the three domains of social cohesion (‘Social relations,’ ‘Connectedness,’ and ‘Focus on the common good’) exhibits only deficits or strengths for all dimensions. Interestingly, the three top-scoring dimensions (‘Identification,’ ‘Solidarity and helpfulness,’ and ‘Social networks’) stand out as strong to moderately strong anchors of their respective domains. However, two domains are imbalanced: ‘Connectedness’ by the moderately low ‘Perception of fairness’ and ‘Focus on the common good’ by the low ‘Respect for social rules.’ If one should point out the glue that holds South African society together, this would undoubtedly be citizens’ strong identification with the country, their solidarity with their weaker fellow citizens, and the functioning of their social networks. On the other hand, what could destabilize South African society is the perceived lack of respect for rules and the perceived lack of distributional fairness.   Is the level and profile of cohesion in South Africa unique? A comparison to Germany (Boehnke, Dragolov, Arant & Unzicker, 2024) reveals that the current level of cohesion in South Africa is almost identical to that found for Germany in 2023, where the index score was 52. Nevertheless, despite the similar overall levels, the two countries have distinct patterns of strengths and weaknesses in the single dimensions. In 2023, the strongest dimension in Germany was ‘Acceptance of Diversity’ (69), followed by ‘Respect for Social Rules’ (67), whereas the weakest dimensions were ‘Solidarity and helpfulness’ (34) and ‘Perception of Fairness’ (35). Extending the scope to the comparison of social cohesion in 34 EU and OECD member states (Dragolov et al., 2016), we find considerable similarities in the pattern of strengths and weakness between South Africa and Israel. The society of Israel exhibits similarly strong identification, moderate solidarity, social networks, and trust in people, as well as pronounced deficits in the perception of fairness and respect for social rules. No country among the 22 Asian studied (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018) exhibits this profile.   Trend over time   Although the overall social cohesion index in South Africa emerges as moderate, with scores in the upper half of the measurement scale, it has been on a stable decline (see Table 3.1). Over the past three years, it declined from 53.5 in 2021 to 52.4 in 2022 and 51.7 in 2023, thereby losing 1.8 points.   The downward trend is evident for most of the dimensions. The steepest decline was observed for ‘Respect for social rules.’ In 2021, this dimension still ranked as moderate with a borderline score of 40.3 but lost 7.3 points over time to qualify in 2023 as low. Other dimensions of cohesion that have weakened from 2021 to 2023 are, in this order, ‘Trust in institutions’ (-4.1 points), ‘Perception of fairness’ (-2.9 points), ‘Social networks’ (-2.4 points), ‘Identification (-2.1 points), and ‘Acceptance of diversity’ (-0.3 points). Besides ‘Respect for social rules,’ social networks are the only dimension that has experienced a downgrade from a previously higher to a lower category. In 2021, ‘Identification’ was not the sole dimension that ranked as high, but also ‘Social networks’ with a score of 61.3. In contrast, ‘Solidarity and helpfulness’ has remained strikingly stable, whereas ‘Civic participation’ (+1.0 points) and ‘Trust in people’ (+1.6 points) have become slightly stronger. We refer readers to Tables A.1 to A.9 of the Appendix for changes over time in the responses to the indicators of the respective dimensions.   Is the trend of cohesion in South Africa unique? In this regard, we can only compare to Germany (Boehnke et al., 2024). Despite their identical overall levels of social cohesion in 2023, South Africa and Germany do not have the same starting positions. While the decline in the overall index for South Africa amounts to only 1.8 points, the one observed for Germany within the same three-year period is alerting: The strength of social cohesion declined from a stable value of 61 in 2017 and 2020 by 10 points in 2023. Cohesion in Germany slid from a high down to a moderate level. Moreover, between 2020 and 2023, every dimension of cohesion in Germany weakened considerably. The steepest declines were observed for ‘Solidarity and helpfulness’ (-14 points), ‘Acceptance of diversity’ (-13 points), ‘Identification’ (-11 points), and ‘Social networks’ (-10 points).   3.2 Social cohesion in the nine provinces   Level in 2023   Zooming into the provinces, we find some variation across these administrative units. Figure 3.1 maps the strength of the overall social cohesion index in the nine provinces. Table 3.2 documents the annual level and trend over the three years examined here. In 2023, social cohesion was found lowest in KwaZulu Natal (46.1), second lowest in Free State (49.4), and third lowest in Gauteng (50.5). Social cohesion was slightly above the country average of 51.7 in all other provinces. Limpopo (58.3) emerged as a province with a level of social cohesion considerably above the country average. However, it should be noted that all provinces rank in the interval of the measurement scale, referring to a moderate level of cohesion.   Tables A.10 to A.18 of Appendix A document the provinces' performance on the single dimensions of cohesion. Interestingly, the leader Limpopo achieved only middle positions on the dimensions ‘Social networks’, ‘Trust in people’, and ‘Acceptance of diversity’ but consistently ranked highest or second highest on all other dimensions of cohesion. In contrast, KwaZulu-Natal ranked consistently lowest or second lowest on all nine dimensions.   Figure 3.2.1  Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces (2023)   Note : The map applies the colour scheme displayed above to visualize the strength of social cohesion in 2023 across the nine provinces.    Table 3.2.1  The overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time     Trend over time   As evident from Table 3.2, social cohesion has declined from 2021 to 2023 in six of the provinces, most noticeably in Gauteng (-3.6 points), Free State (-4.2), and KwaZulu-Natal (-5.1 points). These three provinces ranked last in social cohesion in 2023. Cohesion has remained, by and large, stable only in the Western Cape (-0.8 points). In contrast, social cohesion has improved in the Eastern Cape (+3.8 points), Limpopo (+1.5 points), and North West (+1.4 points). Figure 3.2 depicts these developments in the overall cohesion index across the provinces.   Figure 3.2.2  Overall index of social cohesion in South African provinces across time   Note : The figure shows the scores of the nine provinces on the overall index of social cohesion in 2021, 2022, and 2023. As to the trend in the single dimensions, Tables A.10 to A.18 reveal that ‘Trust in people’ and ‘Civic participation’ are the only dimensions that improvements for almost all provinces can characterize. ‘Trust in people’ has weakened only in Limpopo (-4.4 points) and more pronouncedly in Northern Cape (-11.6 points). ‘Civic participation’ has declined only in KwaZulu-Natal (-5.9 points) and Northern Cape (-10.4 points). The picture is reversed for the dimensions of ‘Trust in institutions’, ‘Perception of fairness,’ and ‘Respect for social rules,’ in which almost all provinces experienced declines. ‘Trust in institutions’ has increased only in Western Cape (+3.3 points), ‘Perception of fairness’ – only in Western Cape (+3.2 points) and Limpopo (+6.0 points), and ‘Respect for social rules’ – only in Western Cape (+3.4 points). Interestingly, although ‘Identification’ emerged as the glue that holds the South African society together, all provinces but three experienced declines in identification from -3.0 points (Gauteng) to -10.3 points (Mpumalanga). Identification has improved only Limpopo (+6.3 points), Eastern Cape (+8.2 points), and North West (+8.5 points).   In the subsequent section, we investigate which structural characteristics of the provinces may be at play in promoting or hindering social cohesion.   4. Structural influences on social cohesion   This section aims to find evidence on structural determinants of social cohesion. For this purpose, we explore the relationship between the level of social cohesion in the nine provinces and selected characteristics of the provinces from the following thematic fields: economic situation, inequality and poverty, demography, diversity, and modernization. The focus on these aspects is not arbitrary: Our studies on Western and Asian societies as well as the federal states and spatial planning regions of Germany demonstrated empirically that aspects from these thematic fields act as determinants rather than outcomes of social cohesion (Dragolov et al., 2016; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Arant, Dragolov & Boehnke, 2017; Boehnke, Dragolov, Arant & Unzicker, 2024).   4.1 Data and method   To touch on the economic situation in the provinces, we use data on the gross domestic product per capita [1]  in Rand (Statistics South Africa, 2024a), Human Development Index (Global Data Lab, 2024), and unemployment rates – official and expanded (Statistics South Africa, 2023b). We measure poverty using one subjective indicator – the share of households in a province who perceive themselves as poor (Statistics South Africa, 2024c), and objective indicators concerning three definitions of the poverty line [2]  – the share of the population below the food poverty line, the lower-bound poverty line, and the upper-bound poverty line (own calculations based on CRA, 2023). We employ the Gini index of income inequality and the P90/P10 ratio (own calculations based on CRA, 2023) to measure inequality [3] . We draw on data from Census 2022 (Statistics South Africa, 2023a) for the remaining thematic fields. In particular, as to demographics, we consider population density, the share of urban and rural population, the share of singles and married citizens, and the population's median age. To tap into diversity, we use the share of Blacks, Whites, Coloured, Indian/Asian, and Other races; the share of immigrants; as well as ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization [4]  (own calculations based on Statistics South Africa, 2023a). To touch on modernization, we use the share of citizens with completed primary, secondary, and post-secondary education, the share of citizens owning a computer and a cell phone, and the share of the population without access to the internet.   All indicators refer to 2021 or 2022, preceding the most recent measurement of social cohesion from 2023. The intentional time lag—earlier measurement of the structural characteristics of the provinces and later measurement of social cohesion—introduces a certain degree of temporal order in the analyses. It cannot prove the existence of a causal relationship, but it can increase the plausibility of attributing causality.   Each of the above-listed structural characteristics of the provinces was subjected to a correlation test with the level of social cohesion. Two variables are correlated when changes in one are (closely) followed by changes in the other. A correlation can be positive (the more of Variable A , the more of Variable B ) or negative (the more of Variable A , the less of Variable B ). The strength of the association is reflected in the correlation coefficient, which can range from 0 (no correlation) to ±1 (perfect correlation). Typically, a correlation of size below |.10| is very weak and not worth interpreting, between |.10| and |.30| – weak, between |.30| and |.50| – moderate, and above |.50| – strong.   A considerable obstacle arises from the sample size for the correlations on the level of provinces. Of course, the overall sample size in each survey wave is large and has sufficient statistical power. Power (in mathematical-statistical theory) means that a given sample is large enough to corroborate a particular effect as likely ‘true’ about the population from which the sample was drawn – South Africa in this case. On the level of provinces, however, showing that a specific correlation is sizable enough to conclude that it is significant (i.e., likely true in the nine provinces) is problematic due to the number of provinces – only nine, unlike the number of surveyed individuals – over three thousand in each year. This may be surprising at first glance because more people have been surveyed in the provinces, with a minimum of 64 in Northern Cape and a maximum of 1168 in Gauteng in 2023. However, social cohesion is not a characteristic of individuals but of geopolitical entities, and the latter, we only have nine—the provinces—in South Africa.   The low number of cases (provinces) means that only extremely high correlations can reach statistical significance. Mathematically, significance is a function of sample size (the higher, the more likely it is for a particular coefficient to be significant) and data variability (the higher the variance of the included data, the less likely it is that a specific coefficient is significant). Given these constraints, we disregard the significance of the correlation coefficients in our reporting and interpretation, focusing instead on the tendency in the data. Thus, we follow the appeal of a respectable number of scientific community members to ditch p -values (Wasserstein, Schirm & Lazar, 2019). The results from additionally performed bivariate biserial Pearson correlations, for which the province-level characteristics were disaggregated to the individual-level data set for 2023 ( N  = 3519), show that only 6 of altogether 31 associations may not be considered significant (see Table A.19 of Appendix C). This finding supports our decision to focus on tendencies instead of discarding associations because they do not meet a criterion for statistical significance.   Besides significance, the number of provinces is critically low for performing Pearson correlations. As a parametric test, the Pearson correlation involves assumptions that cannot be fulfilled with the data on the level of provinces. We, therefore, resort to Spearman correlations as a non-parametric, assumption-free alternative. A Spearman correlation is, in essence, a Pearson correlation performed on ranked data. The significant distinction between the two approaches is that a Pearson correlation considers the exact distances among the observations on each variable. In contrast, a Spearman correlation considers only whether there are differences, disregarding their size. For example, in 2022, the wealthiest province per capita GDP was Gauteng, with 96,252 Rand, and the poorest was Eastern Cape, with 54,805 Rand. The Pearson correlation will be influenced by the numeric difference of 41,447 Rand between the two provinces, whereas the Spearman correlation will only consider which province has the higher value.   One implication is that the Spearman method is not sensitive to outliers in the data – observations (provinces) with an extremely large or extremely low value on a characteristic of interest. Given the critically low sample size of nine provinces, the Spearman method is advantageous compared to a Pearson correlation which may be quickly and heavily biased by an outlier. Because in all our previous studies on cohesion, the data allowed us to apply the Pearson correlation method, we performed Pearson correlations for the present report. Interested readers can find those in Table A.19 of Appendix C. In a few instances, we observe great discrepancies – mostly in size but also in direction. As discussed at length above, to stay on the safe side, we report and interpret the findings from the Spearman correlation tests.   On a final note, we performed both bivariate correlations and partial correlations for GDP, because both in our 34-country OECD study (Dragolov et al., 2016) and our study of 22 Asian countries (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018), GDP was highly positively related to social cohesion: The more prosperous a society, the more cohesive it is. Partialing GDP out of a relationship removes the influence of GDP on both variables involved. This makes it possible to speak of associations between a given structural characteristic of the provinces and social cohesion, independent of their economic prosperity. In the section below, we report and interpret the partial correlations.   4.2 Results   Table 4.1 documents the relationships between the structural characteristics of the nine provinces and social cohesion per thematic field. The empirical findings for South Africa present several surprises concerning what has been previously found for Western and Asian societies.   Economic situation   The bivariate correlation between per capita GDP (in a province) and social cohesion (in the same province) was found at ρ = -.38. The relationship is negative and moderate in size. It informs that social cohesion tends to be lower in more economically affluent provinces. This result is striking as it goes against the positive association between GDP and cohesion that was consistently found in all our previous studies on Western and Asian societies.   The correlation between the Human Development Index and cohesion emerged positive and weak in size (ρ = .25). People-centered economic progress (Gross National Income coupled with mean years of schooling and life expectancy) appears conducive to social cohesion.   Both measures of unemployment – the official and expanded unemployment rates – exhibited negative, though only weak, associations with social cohesion (ρ = -.15 and ρ = -.21, respectively). Provinces in which more unemployed people reside tend to have weaker social cohesion.   Poverty and inequality   The evidence presents mixed findings on poverty. Whereas the subjective indicator exhibited a moderately negative correlation with social cohesion (ρ = -.40), the three objective indicators were found to correlate positively and moderately in the range from ρ = .37 to ρ = .40. Social cohesion tends to be lower in provinces where more households perceive themselves as poor. However, it tends to be higher in provinces where more people objectively fall below the poverty lines. Though at first glance puzzling, the results for objective poverty can be explained with the social welfare programs targeted at supporting poor citizens.   The correlations of the social cohesion index with both measures of income inequality were found to be consistently negative. Social cohesion tends to be lower in provinces with larger inequality in income. Interestingly, the correlation with the Gini index is much weaker (ρ = -.19) than that with the P90/P10 ratio (ρ = -.52). The Gini index considers the entire income distribution. In contrast, the P90/P10 ratio contrasts the income at the top of the distribution (90th percentile) to the income at the bottom (10th percentile). The latter focuses on inequality, which is more visible and more accessible for ordinary citizens to perceive. The top-to-bottom income ratio is 38 in the Free State and 11 in the Northern Cape. These values inform that the top earners' income is 38 times higher than that of poor citizens in the Free State; in Northern Cape – ‘only’ 11 times higher. Vast discrepancies in income tend to be detrimental to social cohesion.   Table 4.2.1  Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces     Demography   Population density exhibited a weak negative relationship with social cohesion (ρ = -.27). Social cohesion tends to be lower in more densely populated provinces. This finding corresponds with the associations of the cohesion index with the shares of urban (ρ = -.26) and rural population (ρ = .26). Though the relationships are only weak in size, they indicate that social cohesion tends to be lower in more urbanized provinces and, in contrast, higher in provinces with a larger share of rural population.   Marital status was found to correlate strongly with social cohesion. Social cohesion tends to be lower in provinces with a large share of singles (ρ = -.69) and higher in provinces with a larger share of married citizens (ρ = .55). This finding suggests that families contribute strongly to cohesion in the South African society.   We found a moderately negative association (ρ = -.36) with median age. Social cohesion tends to be lower where the population’s median age is higher. The association was reversed in Asia: Social cohesion was higher in Asian countries with a higher median age.   Diversity   The composition of the provinces’ population regarding race, migration background, language, and religion seems to be weekly to moderately related to social cohesion. Provinces with larger shares of Blacks (ρ = -.12) and Indians/Asians (ρ = -.15) tend to have weaker social cohesion. In contrast, cohesion tends to be higher in provinces with larger shares of Whites (ρ = .27), Coloured (ρ = .42), and other races (ρ = .19). Provinces with more immigrants were also found to have stronger levels of cohesion (ρ = .50).   The fractionalization measures offer findings that generally follow the tendencies mentioned above. Ethnic (racial) fractionalization exhibited a positive, though only weak, correlation with social cohesion (ρ = .12). The relationship with linguistic fractionalization emerged as positive and moderate (ρ = .41), whereas that with religious fractionalization was found to be weak and negative (ρ = -.14). Racial and linguistic diversity in the provinces seem to contribute to social cohesion, whereas religious diversity appears to harm it.   Modernization   The evidence is puzzling concerning educational attainment. Whereas the share of citizens with completed primary education exhibited a positive and moderate correlation with social cohesion (ρ = .34), the shares of citizens with completed secondary education exhibited a negative and very strong correlation (ρ = -.76) – in fact, the strongest of all associations explored. The correlation with the share of citizens with completed post-school education also emerged negative, though at the border of being negligible (ρ = -.10). Provinces with better and more highly educated citizens tend to have lower levels of cohesion. A possible explanation for these surprising results could be the economy of the country which does not deliver jobs up to the expectations of the better educated citizens.   Access to modern information and communication technology (computers, cell phones, and the internet) weakens social cohesion. The social cohesion index correlation is weakly negative with the share of computer owners (ρ = -.22) and cell phone owners (ρ = -.20) and strongly positive with the share of the population without access to the internet (ρ = .61).   What brings social cohesion in the South African provinces forward is people-centered economic progress, rural population, marriages, racial and linguistic diversity, and immigration. As hazards to social cohesion emerged: unemployment, felt poverty, income inequality, high population density and urbanization, single life, older population, religious diversity, and the penetration of modern information and communication technology.   5. Individual experiences of social cohesion   The previous sections of this report examined the levels and trends of social cohesion in South Africa and its provinces. Correlational analyses on the level of the provinces offered insights into potential structural characteristics that determine the local level of cohesion. In this section, we go down to the level of individual respondents to explore which population groups are at risk of experiencing low cohesion in South Africa.   5.1 Data and method   There are several methodological approaches for identifying groups at risk of experiencing low cohesion, each involving different assumptions. One possibility is to perform separate analyses relating the individual scores on the overall cohesion index and its nine dimensions to the respondents' relevant socio-demographic and economic characteristics. This approach will likely lead to many difficult results to systematize. In order to reduce the complexity without a significant loss of information, we prefer to identify classes (distinct groups) of respondents based on the pattern of their scores on the nine dimensions of social cohesion. The resulting classes are characterized by similarities within and dissimilarities across the classes concerning the experience of the nine aspects of cohesion by the respondents who belong to them. In a second step, we relate class membership to socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. In simpler terms, we investigate how the experience of social cohesion is related to individual characteristics. An example could be rich and poor citizens experiencing different levels of social cohesion.   To classify respondents into groups with distinct experiences of cohesion, we employ the Latent Class Analysis statistical procedure. To cite from the abstract of a recent overview paper (Weller et al., 2020): “Latent class analysis (LCA) is a statistical procedure used to identify qualitatively different subgroups within populations who often share certain outward characteristics. The assumption underlying LCA is that membership in unobserved groups (or classes) can be explained by patterns of scores across survey questions, assessment indicators, or scales.” We take respondents’ scores on the nine dimensions of social cohesion in 2023 as the basis for the LCAs performed here.   LCAs are typically undertaken sequentially. The statistical procedure is programmed so to come up with different numbers of groups, usually starting with two distinct groups (classes) and continuing until several groups (classes) are distinguished that offer plausible pathways of interpretation: Who are the people grouped into Class 1, Class 2, …, Class k ? It is customary to summarize interpretations by labelling the different classes in a way that best characterizes their response patterns. Next to interpretability, specific indices of goodness-of-fit aid the decision of how many groups are most plausible to extract from the available data (Weller et al., 2020). These include the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the (sample-size-adjusted) Bayesian Information Criterion ( BIC , saBIC ), which do not have pre-defined thresholds but inform comparisons of solutions: The solution with the lower AIC  and ( sa ) BIC  would be deemed better. Goodness-of-fit indices with pre-defined thresholds include the Entropy coefficient H  and the Average Probability of Class Membership ( APCM ): Each should be greater than .90 for excellent fit or .80 for acceptable fit. Table A.21 of Appendix D documents the goodness-of-fit indices of six different LCA solutions. Table A.22 of Appendix D shows the population-weighted relative sizes of the classes in the total sample ( N  = 3519) from the various LCA solutions.   Based on the resulting goodness-of-fit indices of the LCA models we specified and considering the classes' interpretability, we selected the LCA model producing four classes.   5.2 Four classes of experience   Table 5.1 provides an overview of respondents’ average scores on the nine dimensions of cohesion, which served as the basis for the LCA and the overall index of social cohesion within each class. Class 1 encompasses 16.7 % of the respondents. It is characterized by low cohesion with an average score of 32.9 out of 100 points. Classes 2 and 3 encompass 32.8 % and 29.8 % of the respondents, respectively. Both exhibit moderate social cohesion with an average score of 51.0 in Class 2 and 51.6 in Class 3. Class 4, encompassing 20.7 % of the respondents, exhibits a high level of social cohesion with an average score on the overall index of 68.3 points.   Table 5.2.1  Social cohesion and its dimensions in the four classes     A closer look at the average scores on the nine dimensions reveals the class differences (see Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). Likely due to the large sample sizes of the four classes, a series of Scheffe pairwise comparisons from one-way analyses of variance for each of the dimensions informs of significant differences (p ≤ 0.05) among all classes on all dimensions except for: Dimension 1.2 ‘Trust in people’ for Class 2 (M = 69.3) vs Class 4 (M = 71.1), Dimension 3.1 ‘Solidarity and helpfulness’ for Class 2 (M =60.4) vs Class 3 (M = 59.7), and Dimension 3.3 ‘Civic participation’ for Class 2 (M = 54.8) vs Class 3 (M = 54.5).   Respondents within Class 1 (low cohesion) exhibit only a high level of identification (62.4). The strength of their social networks (43.8), their solidarity with weak others (41.5), and their involvement in civic life (42.8) are moderate, yet tending toward weak. Members of Class 1 place low trust in others (25.4) and in institutions (27.2) and have a low perception of fairness (21.9). Their tolerance for diversity is very low (16.5). These respondents also have a very low perception that social rules are respected (14.4). Class 1 can be described as ‘Critics’.    Figure 5.2.1  Average scores of dimensions in the four classes   Note : The figure visualizes the average scores of the social cohesion dimensions in each of the four classes of respondents.   Members of Class 2 (moderate cohesion) exhibit a mixed pattern. They are well-networked socially (61), place high trust in others (69.3), and have high levels of tolerance for diversity (63.0), identification (67.4), and solidarity with weak others (60.4). However, the trust they place in institutions is low (35.6), and they perceive low levels of fairness (27.4) and respect for rules (20.1). Their involvement in civic life is moderate (54.8). Class 2 can be described as ‘Integrated sceptics.’   Members of Class 3 (moderate cohesion) rate most social cohesion aspects on the middle level. The strength of their social networks (57) and solidarity with others (59.7) are moderate to high. Moderate are the levels of trust they place in institutions (54.9), perceived fairness (49.3), and civic participation (54.5). These respondents place moderate to low trust in others (41.5) and have a moderate to low perception that rules are observed (40.1). Their tolerance for diversity is, however, low (33.0). Their identification with the country is the second highest (74.3) among all four classes. If these were findings on the US society, we would label this class ‘Middle America,’ with strong loyalty to the country and below-average acceptance of otherness. Class 3 can be described as ‘Middle South Africa.’   Members of Class 4 express high levels (60 to 80 points) of social cohesion in all aspects, but ‘Respect for social rules’ has a moderate expression, though tending towards a high one (58.3). It should be noted that the strength of identification with the country tends to be very high (79.8). Class 4 can be described as ‘cohesive communities’.   Across all four classes, Dimension 2.1, ‘Identification,’ was found to be consistently high. In contrast, the deficits in Dimension 3.2, ‘Respect for social rules,’ emerged yet again as an antithesis to citizens’ loyalty to the country.   5.3 Socio-demographics of the four classes   In this section, we explore which individual characteristics are typical for the four classes with distinct experiences of social cohesion. We do so using the following socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics: biological sex (male, female), age group (18 to 24, 25 to 44, 45 to 64, 65 years and above), race (White, Black, Indian/Asian, Other), primary language (English, Afrikaans, Indigenous), marital status (single, married or living as married, widowed or divorced), community size (rural or village, town or city, metropolitan area), education (post-secondary, secondary, lower or none), employment status (employed, not in workforce, unemployed), and income class [5]  (low, lower-middle, upper-middle, high, missing). Data on these characteristics stem from Wave 1 of Khayabus 2023.   The four classes were characterized in the framework of separate chi-square tests of independence between respondents’ class membership and the respective individual characteristics of interest. Table 5.2 documents the population-weighted relative frequencies (%) of the socio-demographic and socio-economic categories in the total sample and each of the four classes and the respective result from the chi-square test of independence and Cramer’s V coefficient of effect size. Due to the large sample size, all tests but one emerged as statistically significant, whereas effect sizes were consistently small. We, therefore, focus on the tendencies in the data.   Class 1, the Critics, is characterized by an overproportional representation of men (51.9 %), speakers of indigenous languages (76.5 %), dwellers in metropolitan areas (54.9 %), persons with completed secondary education (58.4 %), unemployed (38.3 %), and persons who have refused to report their household income (46.1 %). In addition, the shares of respondents from the age group 18-24 years (21.2 %), Blacks (80.1 %), singles (62.7 %), and members of the high-income class (14.9 %) tend to be slightly larger than in the total population.   Class 2, the Integrated skeptics, is characterized by an overproportional representation of respondents from the age groups 25-44 years (54.1 %) and 65+ years (4.7 %), non-Black races (Whites – 13.6 %, Indian/Asian – 3.6 %, Other – 9.7 %), speakers of English (13 %) and Afrikaans (18.1 %), widowed or divorced (10.6 %), respondents who have completed post-secondary education (18.4 %), respondents who are not in the workforce (19.8 %), and members of the high-income class (15.2 %). In addition, the shares of women (53.6 %) and members of the upper-middle income class (15.2 %) tend to be slightly larger than in the total population.   Class 3, Middle South Africa, is characterized by an overproportional representation of women (55.1 %), Blacks (81.8 %), singles (63.6 %), dwellers in towns or cities (26 %), and members of the lower-middle income class (14.3 %). In addition, the shares of respondents from the age group 18-24 years (21.6 %), speakers of indigenous languages (75.4 %), dwellers in rural areas or villages (30.5 %), respondents with lower than secondary or no formal education (33.4 %), unemployed (37 %), but also members of the upper-middle income class (16.8 %) tend to be somewhat larger than in the total population.    Table 5.3.1  Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the four classes of respondents     Class 4, the Cohesive Communities, is characterized by an overproportional representation of respondents from the age group 45-64 years (28 %), married or living together as married (32.9 %), dwellers in rural areas or villages (33.2 %), respondents with lower than secondary or no formal education (34.4 %), employed (47.8 %), and members of the low-income class (19.2 %) but also of the upper-middle income class (17.8 %). In addition, the shares of respondents from the age group 18-24 years (21.6 %), Blacks (79.8 %), and respondents not in the workforce (20.6 %) tend to be larger than in the total population. 6.      Social cohesion and subjective well-being   In the present section, we inspect the data to determine whether they support the consistent finding from our previous studies on the topic that high levels of social cohesion are related to greater (subjective) well-being. We employ the following five items from the Khayabus survey as proxies of well-being:   Think of the way your family lives, would you say that your family is… better off than a year ago / about the same / worse off than a year ago? And how do you think your family’s lives will be in a year’s time? Do you think your family will be… better off than today / about the same / worse off than today? Please think about your children or the children of family or friends. What do you think the future holds for these children? Do you think that… they have a bright future ahead of them / they have a bleak future ahead of them? And your satisfaction with life? Has it… improved/staying the same/worse compared to a few months ago? On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate whether you (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) agree or (5) strongly agree with the following statement: I am seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so.   We perform analyses both on the level of provinces and of individuals.   6.1 Provinces   We aggregate the individual responses to the five items to measure well-being on the level of provinces. For each province, we take the respective share of the positive response option to each of the four items with categorically scaled answers (better off, bright future, improved) and the arithmetic mean of the individual responses to the Likert-scale item tapping on emigration.   We apply the same methodological approach as in Section 4, which explored associations between several structural characteristics of the provinces and the index of social cohesion. Table A.20 of Appendix C documents the biserial bivariate correlations on the individual level and the bivariate and partial Pearson correlations on the level of provinces. As in Section 4, we report and interpret the results from the Spearman correlations partialled for GDP (see Table 6.1).   Table 6.1.1  Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces     The share of respondents evaluating their family’s life as better off today than a year ago correlated strongly and positively with the level of social cohesion in respondents’ province (ρ = .60). The same was found for the share of respondents evaluating their life satisfaction as improved in comparison to a few months ago (ρ = .59). Further, in more cohesive provinces, there are larger shares of respondents believing that their family’s lives will be better off than today in a year (ρ = .67) and that their children will have a bright future ahead (ρ = .68). The share of respondents who consider emigrating to another country was found lower in the more cohesive provinces (ρ = -.43).   The provinces' results indicate that social cohesion is conducive to a positive life evaluation, higher life satisfaction, and greater optimism. They are entirely in line with our findings from other continents: The higher the level of social cohesion in a geopolitical entity, the more positive people’s outlook on life (see Dragolov et al., 2016; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018; Arant et al., 2017; Boehnke et al., 2024).   6.2 Individuals   To investigate the association between social cohesion and subjective well-being on the individual level, we relate the individual responses to the well-being items to respondents’ membership in the four distinct classes of experiencing social cohesion. As most of the items on well-being are of categorical measurement quality, we apply the approach from Section 5 to describe the four classes based on respondents’ socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Table 6.2 documents the results. Unlike the very weak relationships found in Section 5, the individual experience of social cohesion exhibits somewhat stronger, though still weak, associations with four of the indicators of subjective well-being.    Table 6.2.1  Subjective well-being in the four classes of respondents     The evidence presents a clear picture. The greatest share of respondents who evaluate their family’s life as better off than a year ago was found in Class 4, Cohesive Communities (29.5 %). The second largest share was found in Class 3, Middle South Africa (22.3 %). The lowest shares were found in Class 2, Integrated skeptics (13.3 %), and Class 1, Critics (12.7 %). The largest shares of respondents evaluating their family’s life as worse off than a year ago were found in Class 1 (43.8 %) and Class 2 (43 %).   Moving on to the two indicators of optimism, we find similar evidence. The largest share of respondents believed their family’s life would be better off than today in a year was found again in Class 4 (44 %). Class 3 appears somewhat reserved, given that most believed life would be about the same (43.2 %). Again, in Class 1 (43.6 %) and Class 2 (39.8 %), we find the largest shares of respondents believe their family’s life will be worse off than today. Optimism regarding children’s future was found highest in Class 4: 62.3 % believe children would have a bright future ahead of them. Pessimism prevails in the other classes, even in Class 3 (53.8 %), but yet again, we find the largest shares of respondents believe children would have a bleak future ahead of them in Class 1 (77 %) and Class 2 (69.2 %).   The above-described pattern holds for life satisfaction, too. The largest share of respondents evaluating their life satisfaction as improved was found in Class 4 (35.7 %), followed by Class 3 (20.8 %). The majority in both classes, though, report no change in life satisfaction: 50.8 % in Class 3 and 44.9 % in Class 4. Life satisfaction has worsened for the majority in Class 1 (50.4 %) and Class 2 (45.8 %). Finally, the association between the experience of social cohesion and emigration is unclear or instead reversed. An overwhelming majority in each class (over 70 %) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, “I am seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so.” Interestingly, the disagreement rate is highest in Class 1 (81.6 %). Class 2 has the relatively highest rate of agreement with the statement (10.5 %), followed by Class 3 (9 %) and Class 4 (8.1 %), whereas only 7.4 % of Class 1 consider emigrating. High social cohesion does not suffice to discourage people from emigrating. The relationship is, however, very weak in terms of effect size.    7. Discussion and conclusion   We deliberately keep the discussion of our results relatively brief and mostly leave the conclusions to the political bodies working with the study results. South Africa has debated social cohesion ever since the end of the apartheid regime, especially in light of the Rainbow Nation concept. However, only two empirical studies have assessed South Africa's social cohesion during all these years. According to that research, South Africa scores middle on overall cohesion, lower on trust, and high on identification with the country .   The current study assesses social cohesion in South Africa, tracks its development, identifies structural factors that promote or impede it, explores social groups with high or low subjectively perceived cohesion, and examines its relationship to citizens' well-being. The Bertelsmann Social Cohesion Radar  has been used as a model to quantify societal cohesiveness in many countries, including now South Africa. South Africa's social cohesion in 2023 (51.7 of 100 possible points) is similar to Germany's (52), although with different strengths and shortcomings in specific aspects.   The 2020–2023 Khayabus surveys provided by IPSOS South Africa also allowed us to examine cohesiveness in the nine South African provinces. Results demonstrated that social cohesion was predominantly determined by intact social networks, trust in institutions, perceived fairness, and respect for social rules fostering the common good. KwaZulu Natal  had the lowest social cohesion  (46.1), followed by Free State (49.4) and Gauteng (50.5). Limpopo (58.3) had greater social cohesion than the rest of the country.   As for trends across the 2020s, one can clearly state that South Africa's social cohesion is decreasing . However, the downward trend’s 'speed' is not devastating. A similar downward trend was also found for Germany between 2020 and 2022. The COVID pandemic is often seen as one of the reasons for dwindling social cohesion. In South Africa, high levels of identification with the country seem to be the decisive glue of society. Political attention must, however, be paid to the perception of fairness and respect for social rules , as those can spark turmoil. Trust in institutions and acceptance of diversity also need to be strengthened.   When one looks at people’s subjective experience with social cohesion, our study points to the core driver of deteriorating social cohesion: the urban-rural split . Cohesion is considerably higher in rurally dominated South Africa, while metropolitan areas are hotbeds of an intra-societal split.   Finally, several surprising results must be highlighted again. Previous studies elsewhere have always yielded that geopolitical entities that enjoy higher levels of per capita GDP also exhibit higher social cohesion, Scandinavia being the most prominent example. Findings for Asian countries corroborate that result. In South Africa, poorer regions of the country exhibit higher levels of cohesion. The study furthermore found conflicting results on South African poverty and inequality. Social cohesion is lower in provinces where more households view themselves as poor but higher in those where more people objectively live in poverty. A negative link with median age (the younger people are in an area, the higher social cohesion) and a positive correlation with ethnic and linguistic fractionalization were also discovered, which appear counterintuitive at first glance.   However, what emerges from the South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI) study as it did for essentially all other studies that set out to measure the effects of social cohesion on people’s well-being? Social cohesion is ‘good’ for people, or in more technical terms, the higher people perceive social cohesion to be, the more positive their subjective well-being .   There are certainly also shortcomings to the study presented here—as there probably are to all empirical studies: The assessment of the level of social cohesion had to be based on very few questions from the Khayabus studies. Before the SASCI can be fielded as a regular endeavour in providing data for the further development of South Africa’s social cohesion, it may, after all, be advisable to conduct one more extensive representative study devoted exclusively to the topic of social cohesion and its economic (pre-)conditions  as has been the case in Germany with the series of Bertelsmann studies. References   Abrahams, C. (2016). Twenty years of social cohesion and nation-building in South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 42 (1), 95–107. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43900558   Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8 , 155–194. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024471506938   Apraku, A., Moyo, P., & Akpan, W. (2018). Coping with climate change in Africa: an analysis of local interpretations in Eastern Cape, SA. 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Acta de Investigación, 9 (2). http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fpsi.20074719e.2019.2.262   Boehnke, K., Dragolov, G., Arant, R., & Unzicker, K. (2024). Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt in Deutschland 2023. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.   Burns, J., Hull, G., Lefko-Everett K., & Njozela, L. (2018). Defining social cohesion  (SALDRU Working Paper 216). Cape Town: SALDRU, UCT.   Center for Risk Analysis. (2023). Assets and Incomes. November 2023. Johannesburg: Center for Risk Analysis.   Delhey, J. & Boehnke, K. (2018). Conceptualizing social cohesion in Asia, In Bertelsmann Stiftung (Ed.), What holds Asian societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar  (pp. 29-48). Gütersloh: Bertelsmann-Stiftung.   Delhey, J., Dragolov, G. & Boehnke, K. (2023). Social Cohesion in International Comparison: A Review of Key Measures and Findings. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 75 , 95-120. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-023-00891-6   Dragolov, G., Ignácz, Z. S., Lorenz, J., Delhey, J., Boehnke, K., & Unzicker, K. (2016). Social cohesion in the Western world. What holds societies together: Insights from the Social Cohesion Radar . Springer International. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32464-7   Global Data Lab (2024). Subnational HDI (v8.0) . Retrieved on September 24, 2024 from https://globaldatalab.org/shdi/table/shdi/ZAF/   Langer, A., Stewart, F., Smedts, K., & Demarest, L. (2017). Conceptualising and measuring social cohe-sion in Africa: Towards a perceptions-based index. Social Indicators Research, 131 , 321-343. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1250-4   Larsen, M. M., & Boehnke, K. (2016). Measuring Social Cohesion in the Kyrgyz Republic. Social Cohesion Index . University of Central Asia's Institute of Public Policy and Administration Working Paper No. 36, Bishkek.   Leininger, J., Burchi, F., Fiedler, C., Mross, K., Nowack, D., von Schiller, A., Sommer, C., Strupat, C., & Ziaja, S. (2021). Social cohesion: A new definition and a proposal for its measurement in Africa (Discussion Paper 31/2021). Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). https://doi.org/10.23661/dp31.2021.v1.1   OECD (2021). Old-age income inequality. In Pensions at a Glance 2021: OECD and G20 Indicators . OECD Publishing, Paris. doi: https://doi.org/10.1787/d1a5a309-en   Schiefer, D. & van der Noll, J. (2017). The essentials of social cohesion: A literature review. Social Indicators Research, 132 (2), 579-603. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1314-5   Statistics South Africa (2023a). Census 2022. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa (2023b). Quarterly Labour Force Survey. Quarter 4: 2022. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa (2024a). Estimation of regional gross domestic product for South Africa: Experimental estimates. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Statistics South Africa (2024b). Population Estimates. Pretoria: Stats SA   Statistics South Africa (2024c). Subjective poverty in South Africa. Findings from the General Household Surveys 2019 and 2022. Pretoria: Stats SA.   Wasserstein, R. L., Schirm, A. L., & Lazar, N. A. (2019). Moving to a World Beyond “ p  < 0.05.”  The American Statistician, 73 (sup1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2019.1583913   Weller, B. E., Bowen, N. K., & Faubert, S. J. (2020). Latent Class Analysis: A guide to best practice. Journal of Black Psychology, 46 (4), 287-311. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095798420930932   [1]     In line with the customary practice in economic research and our previous studies, we transform the raw values by taking their natural logarithm ( ln ). [2]     Individuals below the food poverty line cannot afford enough food to obtain the minimum daily energy requirement for adequate health. Individuals below the lower-bound poverty line are unable to afford both adequate food and non-food items and have to sacrifice food for essential non-food items. Individuals below the upper-bound poverty line can afford adequate food and essential non-food items. In 2022, the food poverty line was at 663 Rand, the lower-bound poverty line at 945 Rand, and the upper-bound poverty line at 1417 Rand, according to the report of the Center for Risk Analysis (CRA, 2023). [3]     The Gini index measures income inequality in the population as a whole. It ranges from 0 (perfect equality among all individuals) to 1 (perfect inequality, where one individual has all income). The P90/P10 ratio contrasts the income at the 90th percentile of the income distribution to the income at its 10th percentile (OECD, 2021). [4]     Fractionalization is the probability that two randomly selected individuals are not from the same group (ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc.; Alesina et al., 2003). The corresponding indices for ethnic/linguistic/religious fractionalization range from 0 (all individuals are from the same ethnic group/speak the same language/are from the same religious group) to 1 (each individual belongs to a separate ethnic/linguistic/religious group). [5]     Income classes were derived from the reported total household income. The latter was equivalized concerning household size using the modified OECD equivalence scale. Respondents with equivalized household income lower than 60 % of the median belong to the low-income class, from 60 % to 100 % - to the lower-middle income class, from 100 % to 200 % - to the upper-middle income class, greater than 200 % - to the high-income class. Respondents with a missing value on household income are treated as a separate group due to the large share of non-response (41.5 %).   Appendices   Appendix A: Indicators of cohesion across time   This Appendix documents the population-weighted relative frequencies of the response categories of the indicators used to calculate the social cohesion scores in this report. The reported values pertain to the respective percentage distributions in the total sample for each year of data collection.   Table 0.1  Indicators of Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” across time      Table 0.2  Indicators of Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” across time     Table 0.3  Indicators of Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” across time     Table 0.4  Indicators of Dimension 2.1 “Identification” across time     Table 0.5  Indicators of Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” across time     Table 0.6  Indicators of Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” across time      Table 0.7  Indicators of Dimension 3.2 “Solidarity and helpfulness” across time     Table 0.8  Indicators of Dimensions 3.2 “Respect for social rules” across time      Table 0.9  Indicators of Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation” across time     Appendix B: Dimensions of cohesion in the provinces over time   This Appendix contains results on the level and change over time in the nine single dimensions of social cohesion across the provinces of South Africa.   Tables A.10 to A.18 reveal that Gauteng is the province with the weakest level of social cohesion in Domain 1, “Social Relations.” Gauteng ranks last on Dimensions 1.1, ‘Social Networks,’ 1.2, ‘Trust in People,’ and 1.3, ‘Acceptance of Diversity.’ KwaZulu Natal ranks last on five of the remaining six dimensions. Only for Dimension 3.3, ‘Civic Participation,’ Northern Cape ranks last, likely because of lacking infrastructure in this least densely populated province.   Domain “Social Relations”   Table 0.10  Dimension 1.1 “Social networks” in the provinces across time      Table 0.11  Dimension 1.2 “Trust in people” in the provinces across time   Table 0.12 Dimension 1.3 “Acceptance of diversity” in the provinces across time      Domain “Connectedness”   Table 0.13  Dimension 2.1 “Identification” in the provinces across time     Table 0.14 Dimension 2.2 “Trust in institutions” in the provinces across time     Table 0.15  Dimension 2.3 “Perception of fairness” in the provinces across time Domain “Focus on the Common Good”   Table 0.16  Dimension 3.1 “Solidarity and helpfulness” in the provinces across time     Table 0.17  Dimension 3.2 “Respect for social rules” in the provinces across time     Table 0.18  Dimension 3.3 “Civic participation“ in the provinces across time Appendix C: Correlations of social cohesion on the province level   Table 0.19  Structural characteristics and social cohesion in South African provinces     Table 0.20  Social cohesion and subjective well-being in the provinces     Appendix D: Latent class analyses   This Appendix documents goodness-of-fit indices for the various LCA models specified.   Table 0.21  Goodness-of-fit indices of LCA solutions      Table 0.22  Relative class sizes for LCA solutions       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

  • COMPARATIVE STUDY: Enforcement mechanisms of the New York City Commission on Human Rights and South African Human Rights Commission

    Occasional Paper 9/2024 Copyright © 2024 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. N O V E M B E R 2 0 2 4 The Inclusive Society Institute would like to thank JoAnn Kamuf Ward , who is the Deputy Commissioner, Policy & External Affairs at the New York City Commission on Human Rights, for reviewing this paper.  AH Gaum  (Advocate of the High Court) & M du Plessis  (Attorney of the High Court) Abstract   The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) plays a pivotal role in South Africa’s human rights framework, and its current approach reflects the country’s historical and social context. The Commission's use of ‘soft powers’ – which allow for a less adversarial process, encouraging cooperation, transparency, and voluntary compliance – aligns with the country’s justice reconciliation and restoration mechanisms. However, while the SAHRC has a constitutional mandate to promote and protect human rights, its findings and recommendations are not binding and require judicial endorsement to be enforceable.   In contrast, the New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR), which operates under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), provides more robust enforcement powers. This study examined the differences in legal frameworks and jurisdictional powers between the SAHRC and NYCCHR in order to consider how enforcement of human rights in South Africa can be strengthened. It highlighted their capacities, limitations, and the effectiveness of their enforcement actions.   The study found that their approaches and effectiveness differ significantly due to their distinct mandates and enforcement powers. The NYCCHR’s focus on discrimination and its ability to issue binding orders that can be enforced through judicial support makes it a robust enforcer of anti-discrimination laws. The SAHRC’s broader mandate to address all human rights issues, coupled with its non-binding recommendations and reliance on separate legal proceedings, potentially dilutes its effectiveness as an immediate enforcer of rights. Establishing a tribunal, clarifying and expanding legal powers, enhancing collaboration with judicial bodies, and increasing resources and capacity could be the answer to ensuring the SAHRC remains effective and relevant in the current climate.    1. Introduction   1.1. Background   Human rights commissions are instrumental in promoting and protecting human rights. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) and the New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR) are two such bodies operating under different legal frameworks and jurisdictional powers. This study seeks to compare the enforcement mechanisms of the SAHRC and the NYCCHR, highlighting their capacities, limitations, and the effectiveness of their enforcement actions.   1.2. Problem Statement   While the SAHRC has a constitutional mandate to promote and protect human rights in South Africa, its ability to enforce its findings is limited. Recent court cases, such as the Agro Data judgment, have demonstrated that the SAHRC’s recommendations are not binding and require judicial endorsement to be enforceable. In contrast, the NYCCHR operates under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), which provides more robust enforcement powers. This study aims to examine these differences and consider how enforcement of human rights can be strengthened.   1.3. Objectives   The primary objectives of this study are to:   Analyse the enforcement mechanisms employed by the SAHRC and NYCCHR. Compare the legal frameworks and enforcement capabilities of both institutions. Identify the limitations of the NYCCHR and SAHRC’s current enforcement powers.    2. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC)   2.1. Constitutional and Legislative Framework   The SAHRC is established under Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution (South African Government, 1996), which outlines its role in promoting and protecting human rights. As a Chapter 9 institution, the SAHRC is mandated to function independently and impartially to support constitutional democracy in South Africa.   The powers, functions, and responsibilities of the SAHRC are defined in the South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013 (South African Government, 2013). This Act grants the SAHRC authority to investigate human rights violations, issue subpoenas, and make recommendations in cases of human rights violations. The specific powers include:   a)  Monitoring and Investigating:  The SAHRC is authorised to monitor human rights compliance and investigate alleged violations. This includes conducting research, requesting information, and inspecting places such as prisons to ensure adherence to human rights standards.   b)  Issuing Subpoenas:  One of the critical powers of the SAHRC is the ability to issue subpoenas to compel individuals or entities to provide testimony or documents necessary for investigations. Although the word “subpoena” is not used in the SAHRC Act to describe this power, section 15(2)c of the Act in effect creates subpoena powers. Section 15(2)c describes how, in pursuance of an investigation, the SAHRC may “ require any person by notice in writing under the hand of a commissioner addressed and delivered by a member of staff or a sheriff in relation to an investigation to appear before it at a time and place specified in such notice and to produce to it all articles or documents in the possession or custody or under the control of any such person and which may be necessary in connection with that investigation ”.   This power is crucial for gathering evidence and ensuring thorough investigations into human rights abuses. However, the exercise of this power has faced challenges, as will be discussed in light of legal interpretations and judicial guidance.   c)  Making Recommendations:  Following investigations, the SAHRC can make findings and issue recommendations to address human rights violations. These recommendations can be directed at individuals, organisations, or government bodies and may suggest policy changes, restitution, or other remedial actions. However, these recommendations are not binding, which limits their enforceability.   d)  Public Awareness and Advocacy:  The SAHRC has a vital role in educating the public about human rights. It runs awareness campaigns, provides training, and collaborates with civil society organisations to promote a culture of human rights in South Africa.   e)  Reporting:  The SAHRC is obliged to report annually to Parliament on the state of human rights in the country and on the measures taken to address violations. These reports are critical for informing legislative and policy interventions. istockphoto.com: 499739446     2.2. Limitations of the SAHRC's Powers   Non-Binding Nature of Recommendations   One of the most significant limitations of the SAHRC is that its findings and recommendations do not have binding legal force, as established in cases such as South African Human Rights Commission v Agro Data CC  (2022) and AfriForum v South African Human Rights Commission  (2023).   In the Agro Data judgment, the High Court explicitly stated that the SAHRC’s recommendations are advisory in nature and that any enforceable relief for parties seeking redress from the SAHRC would necessitate a separate court application to issue binding orders. This requirement diminishes the immediacy and impact of the SAHRC’s role in enforcing human rights. Shortly prior to the completion of this study, the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court in the Agro Data matter (Supreme Court of Appeal, 2024).   In the AfriForum judgment, the High Court ruled that the SAHRC does not have the power to make definitive determinations on whether hate speech has occurred under section 10 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA). Instead, the SAHRC can only form an opinion about whether there is sufficient merit to bring proceedings in a competent court, such as the Equality Court. This opinion merely informs whether the SAHRC should support a complainant in pursuing a legal case; it does not serve as a binding or final judgment on the matter. This ruling reinforces the view that the SAHRC’s role is primarily investigative and advisory rather than judicial or determinative.   Reliance on Judicial Processes   To obtain binding legal relief to address human rights violations, the SAHRC cannot rely on its recommendations and must initiate litigation, effectively presenting the case de novo  (whether it has already investigated and issued recommendations or not). This sees the SAHRC stepping out of the role of an independent arbiter of human rights and into that of a party to litigation, entering the court room with its own predetermined views of the matter and handing over the role of independent arbiter to the court. In matters where the Commission has already investigated and potentially made findings and recommendations, this process involves re-arguing the facts and legal issues in court, which can lead to delays and increase the cost of securing compliance with its findings. This reliance on judicial processes was highlighted in both the AfriForum (2023) and Agro Data (2022) cases.   Subpoena Power Limitations   The SAHRC’s use of its authority to compel individuals to provide evidence has been overly cautious, as its consistent practice has been to seek consultation or permission from the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) before issuing these legal orders. According to the interpretation of the relevant sections of the South African Human Rights Commission Act, such consultation is only necessary in cases where the testimony or documents could lead to self-incrimination, which might affect ongoing or potential criminal proceedings (South African Government, 2014).   This requirement is designed to safeguard the rights of individuals who may be under criminal investigation, ensuring that any compelled testimony does not unintentionally lead to self-incrimination. Additionally, it preserves the integrity of ongoing or future investigations conducted by the NPA that might overlap with those of the SAHRC. By requiring consultation in these specific cases, both institutions can coordinate their actions and maintain awareness of each other's investigative activities, thereby avoiding conflicts and ensuring that justice processes are not compromised.   The SAHRC has interpreted “self-incrimination” broadly to include statements that could show that a person has violated a human right, whether such violation would be truly criminal in nature or not, and has thus sought the permission of the NPA to proceed with subpoenas in numerous matters where doing so was not required.   By misapplying this provision and seeking approval even in situations where there is no risk of self-incrimination, the SAHRC has unnecessarily limited its investigative powers, reducing its efficiency and effectiveness in enforcing human rights protections. A correct understanding and application of these legal provisions are essential for the SAHRC to maximise its authority and impact in its human rights investigations.   Resource Constraints   Resource limitations further restrict the SAHRC’s ability to fulfil its mandate effectively. Inadequate funding and staffing can hamper the Commission’s capacity to conduct in-depth investigations, run educational programmes, and monitor compliance across the country.   2.3. Recommendations for Strengthening the SAHRC’s Powers   Establishing a Tribunal   The creation of a tribunal within the SAHRC could provide a mechanism for issuing binding orders, reducing the reliance on the judicial system to enforce recommendations. This tribunal could operate similarly to the NYCCHR’s Law Enforcement Bureau (NYC Human Rights, N.d.), issuing enforceable orders that parties must comply with or challenge through appeal rather than de novo court proceedings. Establishing such a tribunal would not only require amendments to the SAHRC Act but also a careful consideration of how to balance these binding powers with the SAHRC's existing approach focused on reconciliation and dialogue. By clearly delineating the tribunal's role, the Commission can avoid undermining its soft powers, ensuring that the tribunal handles only cases where legal enforcement is essential.   Clarifying and Expanding Legal Powers   To enhance its investigative capabilities, legislative amendments are needed to clarify the scope of the SAHRC’s subpoena powers and remove unnecessary limitations. This would prevent the SAHRC from being overly cautious and enable it to utilise its full investigative potential. Empowering the SAHRC to issue binding orders directly could be another area for legislative development. However, introducing such powers must be approached cautiously to avoid diminishing the Commission’s role in fostering open dialogue and voluntary compliance. This could be achieved by making these binding powers an option rather than a standard response, reserved for cases where serious violations occur, and where reconciliation efforts have failed.   Enhancing Collaboration with Judicial Bodies     Developing protocols for better collaboration between the SAHRC and the judiciary could streamline the enforcement process. Establishing procedures for expedited judicial review of SAHRC recommendations would ensure more timely enforcement of human rights protections. This would enable the SAHRC to focus on its core functions of advocacy and education while having the support of the judiciary to enforce compliance when necessary. Such collaboration could also involve shared training initiatives to ensure that both the SAHRC and the judiciary have a common understanding of human rights issues and the best practices for addressing them.    Increasing Resources and Capacity    To fulfil its mandate effectively, the SAHRC requires adequate funding and resources. Enhanced financial support would enable the Commission to conduct more comprehensive investigations, expand public education efforts, and develop specialised units to address complex human rights issues. By increasing its capacity, the SAHRC can not only improve its investigative capabilities but also its role in public education and advocacy, further embedding a culture of human rights in South Africa.   Conclusion   The SAHRC plays a pivotal role in South Africa’s human rights framework, and its current approach, characterised by non-binding recommendations and a focus on dialogue, reflects the country’s historical and social context. South Africa's emphasis on reconciliation and restorative justice as mechanisms for addressing both past and present injustices aligns with the Commission's use of ‘soft powers’. These powers allow for a less adversarial process, encouraging cooperation, transparency, and voluntary compliance. This approach can make parties feel more comfortable engaging openly without the immediate threat of legal consequences, which might otherwise cause defensiveness or reluctance to participate. The SAHRC's role in shining a light on human rights issues, raising public awareness, and fostering societal change through dialogue and education is integral to South Africa's unique journey towards reconciliation and social cohesion.   However, there is an argument to be made for expanding the SAHRC’s enforcement capabilities to include more binding powers, especially in cases where voluntary compliance is insufficient to address serious human rights violations. Enhancing the Commission’s legal framework by establishing a tribunal could provide a means of issuing binding orders while preserving the Commission's existing soft powers. The tribunal could function separately, handling cases where legal enforcement is necessary, thereby allowing the SAHRC to maintain its advisory and reconciliatory role in other situations.   This dual approach, similar to the model used by the Ontario Human Rights Commission and Tribunal (OHRC, N.d.), could prevent undermining the SAHRC’s soft powers. Without a clear separation, there is a risk that stakeholders may default to seeking binding resolutions, thereby diminishing the Commission’s ability to use its conciliatory approach effectively. A specialised tribunal within the SAHRC would enable the Commission to leverage the benefits of both soft and hard powers, providing a comprehensive toolkit for addressing human rights violations in South Africa. Such a balanced approach would ensure that the SAHRC can continue to foster a culture of human rights through dialogue and education while having the capability to enforce compliance where necessary, thus remaining a relevant and effective institution in promoting and protecting human rights.   3. The New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR)   3.1. Introduction   The NYCCHR operates under the authority of the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), which is codified in Title 8 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York (NYC Human Rights, 2003). The NYCHRL was established to address and prevent discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations within New York City. The law provides a comprehensive set of protections against discrimination based on characteristics such as race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and other protected classes.   One of the NYCCHR's primary roles is to enforce the NYCHRL, which specifically addresses discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, and other areas. Protected characteristics under the law include race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, and more. The NYCCHR's authority is outlined in the New York City Administrative Code, Title 8, which empowers the Commission to investigate complaints, conduct hearings, issue fines, and enforce compliance with the law.   A critical component of the NYCCHR's enforcement mechanism is its Law Enforcement Bureau (LEB), which plays a central role in investigating allegations of discrimination. When a complaint is filed, the LEB conducts a thorough investigation to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that discrimination occurred. If such a determination is made, the case is then referred to the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH), an independent city agency that conducts administrative hearings. OATH's involvement is mandatory for cases where probable cause is established, ensuring that the hearings are conducted impartially and separately from the NYCCHR's investigative and prosecutorial arms. The NYCHRL enforces the law, and courts are also a forum where complaints can be filed alleging violations of the Human Rights Law.  istockphoto.com: 1248523239     3.2. Administrative Hearings and the Role of OATH   The NYCCHR relies on OATH to conduct formal hearings. OATH functions independently of the NYCCHR, handling cases not only from the NYCCHR but also from other city agencies. When the LEB finds probable cause of a human rights violation within the NYCCHR, the case is automatically referred to OATH for trial, where an administrative law judge presides over the proceedings. The judge's role is to issue a report and recommendation based on the evidence presented. This recommendation is then reviewed by the NYCCHR’s Office of the Chairperson (OC), which makes the final decision. This process allows for a comprehensive and fair hearing, with the OC having the authority to accept, modify, or reject the judge's recommendations.   OATH's role in the NYCCHR's enforcement framework underscores the separation of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions within the Commission's operations. This separation helps maintain the impartiality and fairness of the hearing process. While the NYCCHR is not required to use OATH for every type of complaint, its use is mandated for cases proceeding to formal hearings following a probable cause finding by the LEB. This reliance on OATH for formal hearings ensures that the Commission's actions are legally sound, and that due process is respected.   However, many cases settle and do not go to a hearing. The Commission resolved 40% of cases in FY24 through settlement. In such cases, the parties and the Commission enter into a conciliation agreement, which is an enforceable Commission order. Some cases are also resolved through a private settlement agreement, with a notice of withdrawal filed at the Commission. Finally, cases resolved through the Commission’s Office of Mediation and Conflict Resolution are also included in these totals.   3.3. Specific Enforcement Actions and Powers   The NYCCHR has the power and authority to enforce its order without a final decision from the office of the Chairperson. These include imposing fines, mandating policy changes, requiring training, and taking corrective actions to address discrimination.   Issuing Binding Orders   The NYCCHR has the ability to issue binding orders following investigations. These orders can mandate policy changes, compulsory training, payment of damages to victims, and the imposition of civil penalties. These orders are considered to have immediate legal effect, and respondents are required to comply without needing additional judicial endorsement, even though such endorsement is necessary at times, as discussed hereunder.   The Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Estelle Stamm v E & E Bagels, Inc.  (2016) case exemplifies how the NYCCHR enforces its powers under the NYCHRL. In this case, Estelle Stamm, who has disabilities that require her to use a service dog, was denied service at Empire City Bagels. She filed a complaint with the NYCCHR's Law Enforcement Bureau, which, after investigating the claim and issuing a Probable Cause Determination, referred the matter to OATH for adjudication.   When the respondent failed to participate in the proceedings, the administrative law judge conducted a damages inquest, leading to a finding of discrimination. The judge recommended $7,000 in compensatory damages to Ms. Stamm for emotional distress and an additional $7,000 civil penalty against the respondent, along with mandatory anti-discrimination training for the employees. The NYCCHR adopted these recommendations, and further increased the compensatory damages and civil penalty to $15,000 each, demonstrating its ability to enforce compliance with its findings effectively.   This case displays the NYCCHR's enforcement capabilities, allowing it to not only make determinations but also impose binding penalties and corrective actions directly.   Issuing Fines and Penalties   As displayed above, the NYCCHR is empowered to impose civil penalties for violations of the NYCHRL. These fines can be substantial, with the Commission authorised to impose penalties of up to $125,000 per discriminatory act. For violations deemed wilful, wanton, or malicious, fines can reach up to $250,000 per act (NYC Human Rights, 2003). These penalties serve both punitive and deterrent purposes, underscoring the importance of compliance with human rights standards.   Corrective Actions and Remedies   Beyond imposing fines, the NYCCHR can require respondents to take corrective actions, such as adopting anti-discrimination policies, undergoing training, and ensuring public accommodations are accessible. The Commission can also mandate restorative justice processes to address and repair harm caused by discriminatory practices. These remedies aim to address the root causes of discrimination and foster a more inclusive environment.   Public Education and Outreach   The NYCCHR is also engaged in public education and outreach initiatives to raise awareness of human rights issues and ensure compliance with the NYCHRL. The Commission organises training sessions, workshops, and public campaigns to educate the community about their rights and responsibilities under the law. These efforts are designed to prevent discrimination by promoting a culture of respect and understanding throughout New York City.   Proactive Investigations and Testing   In addition to responding to complaints, the NYCCHR conducts proactive investigations and testing to identify and address discriminatory practices. These efforts are particularly directed at areas such as housing and employment, where discrimination may be less apparent. Through testing, the NYCCHR can gather evidence of discriminatory practices that might otherwise go unnoticed.    Enforcement through Courts   While the NYCCHR's orders are binding, the Commission may still need to seek court enforcement if a respondent fails to comply. Likewise, respondents have the right and have seen fit to apply to courts to have orders of the NYCCHR overturned or varied.   The NYCCHR can petition the New York State Supreme Court to confirm and enforce its orders. This judicial enforcement mechanism ensures that the NYCCHR’s decisions are respected, with non-compliance potentially leading to court-mandated penalties, including contempt charges. For example, in Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Desir v Walter and Empire State Realty Management, Inc. (2020), the NYCCHR successfully sought court intervention to enforce its orders and ensure compliance​.   An important aspect of judicial enforcement of decisions of the NYCCHR through the New York State Supreme Court is that the express purpose of such cases is not to try the matter de novo  in the court, but rather for the court to consider the decision of the NYCCHR as though the latter were a court itself, whose judgment was now on appeal or review. This allows for the appeal court to more expeditiously dispose of such matters and improve access to justice.   In the case of Automatic Meter Reading Corp. v New York City  (2019), the New York State Supreme Court upheld the decision of the New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR), which had found the employer liable for sexual harassment leading to constructive discharge.   The NYCCHR initially ruled that the complainant was subjected to a hostile work environment and was effectively forced to resign due to ongoing harassment. The administrative law judge at OATH found that the employer's actions were severe enough to constitute constructive discharge. When the employer appealed this decision, the Supreme Court supported the NYCCHR’s findings, including the award of $200,000 for emotional distress damages. The court's affirmation highlights the enforceability and judicial support for NYCCHR decisions.   Of course, individuals are also free to go directly to the courts, they are not required to file with the NYCCHR. However, anyone who contacts the NYCCHR and alleges a violation, must be responded to, as the Commission is a "file as of right agency".   3.4. Limitations and Challenges   Jurisdictional Scope   The NYCCHR’s jurisdiction is confined to addressing human rights violations arising from discrimination within the boundaries of New York City. While the Commission has extensive authority within the city, it cannot address general human rights violations that do not involve discrimination, nor can it address issues outside New York City. This contrasts with bodies like the South African Human Rights Commission, which can address a broader range of human rights issues beyond discrimination​.    Resource Constraints   The NYCCHR, like many governmental agencies, faces resource constraints that can affect its ability to manage a high volume of cases. Limited budgets may impact staffing, investigative capabilities, and the scale of public education and outreach efforts. These constraints necessitate prioritising cases, which can limit the Commission’s responsiveness to all complaints.   Dependence on Judicial Enforcement   Despite the binding nature of its orders, the NYCCHR may still need judicial support to enforce compliance. This results in its orders not being binding in exactly the same way a court’s orders would be, in that a person cannot be held in contempt and thus criminally liable simply for not complying with the order of the NYCCHR – the order would first need to be upheld by the New York State Supreme Court for this to happen. While judicial recourse reinforces the legal standing of the Commission's decisions, it can also lead to delays and complicate enforcement when respondents challenge orders in court. Nevertheless, the matter is not tried de novo  when it is brought for judicial enforcement, and this approach still brings the decisions of the NYCCHR very close to a court’s in respect of enforceability.   3.5. Strengths of the NYCCHR’s Enforcement Model   Robust Legal Framework   The NYCCHR’s authority under the NYCHRL provides a strong legal foundation for its enforcement actions. The power to issue binding orders, conduct thorough investigations, and impose significant penalties makes the NYCCHR a formidable force in protecting human rights within New York City.   Integrated Enforcement Mechanism   The combination of the Law Enforcement Bureau and the administrative hearing process through OATH ensures that the NYCCHR’s enforcement actions are both comprehensive and procedurally sound. This integrated approach allows the Commission to handle cases effectively from investigation through to final order, with mechanisms in place to ensure compliance.   Flexibility and Adaptability   The NYCCHR's proactive stance, including its ability to conduct testing and engage in public education, demonstrates its adaptability in addressing emerging human rights issues. This flexibility allows the Commission to respond to both individual complaints and broader patterns of discrimination, making it a comprehensive enforcer of human rights.    Conclusion   The NYCCHR is an important and effective institution equipped with significant powers to enforce the New York City Human Rights Law. Its ability to issue binding orders, conduct comprehensive investigations, and seek judicial enforcement, when necessary, makes the NYCCHR an effective guardian of human rights in New York City. Despite jurisdictional and resource limitations, the Commission’s integrated enforcement model, supported by a strong legal framework, ensures that it can effectively address discrimination and uphold the rights of all New Yorkers. By leveraging its powers and collaborating with other legal entities, the NYCCHR continues to play a vital role in promoting and protecting human rights.    4. Comparative Analysis of Enforcement Mechanisms and Recommendations: NYCCHR vs SAHRC   4.1. Jurisdiction and Scope of Mandate   A key difference between the New York City Commission on Human Rights (NYCCHR) and the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) lies in the scope and nature of their mandates. The NYCCHR operates under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), which exclusively addresses human rights violations that stem from discriminatory practices. The NYCCHR focuses on issues like employment, housing, and public accommodations but intervenes only when discrimination based on protected characteristics, such as race, gender, or sexual orientation, is involved. This focused mandate restricts the NYCCHR from addressing broader human rights issues that do not involve discrimination​.   In contrast, the SAHRC’s mandate is far broader. The SAHRC is tasked with promoting, protecting, and monitoring all human rights, not just those related to discrimination or those that were violated as a result of discrimination. This allows the SAHRC to address a wide range of human rights issues, including socio-economic rights such as access to healthcare, water, education, and housing, irrespective of whether discrimination is involved. This broader jurisdiction reflects the SAHRC's constitutional role in supporting democracy by upholding the full spectrum of human rights​.   4.2. Enforcement Mechanisms and the Binding Nature of Orders   The enforcement powers of the NYCCHR and SAHRC differ significantly in terms of immediacy and binding authority. The NYCCHR has the power to issue binding orders following its investigations into discrimination complaints. These orders can compel policy changes, require training, award damages, and impose civil penalties. While respondents have the right to challenge these orders, they are generally expected to comply, and the NYCCHR can seek enforcement through the New York State Supreme Court. The court’s role is to confirm these orders, treating the NYCCHR’s findings with the same weight as a lower court decision, thus reinforcing their binding nature​.   The SAHRC, on the other hand, faces more limitations. Although it can issue recommendations after investigations, these recommendations are not binding. The SAHRC does not seek court approval to "convert" its recommendations into enforceable orders. Instead, its recommendations are considered advisory, with no inherent legal force. If the SAHRC seeks to address human rights violations through legal avenues, it must initiate separate legal proceedings, effectively treating the matter as a new case. This separation of the investigative and judicial processes dilutes the impact of the SAHRC's investigations and recommendations, as they do not directly lead to enforceable outcomes​. If the Commission seeks enforceable outcomes, it is required to follow an entirely different legal path within its mandate – in other words, to litigate, regardless of whether it has made recommendations or not.   4.3. Use of Subpoena Powers and Compelling Evidence   Both the NYCCHR and the SAHRC have the authority to compel the production of evidence, but their approaches and the practical application of these powers differ.   NYCCHR   The NYCCHR’s Law Enforcement Bureau (LEB) actively uses its power to issue subpoenas, which compels individuals and entities to provide testimony or documents necessary for investigations into discrimination. This authority is crucial for the NYCCHR to conduct thorough investigations and support its enforcement actions, ensuring that it can gather all relevant evidence to substantiate claims of discrimination​.   SAHRC   The SAHRC is similarly empowered to compel evidence, but its use of this power has been overly cautious. The SAHRC has often sought permission or consultation from the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) before issuing subpoenas, based on a broad interpretation of the need to avoid self-incrimination conflicts with criminal investigations. The SAHRC’s practice has been to apply this cautious approach broadly, rather than reserving it for rare cases where there is a clear risk of self-incrimination, thereby reducing the efficiency and impact of its investigations​.   4.4. Judicial Interaction and Legal Proceedings   The interaction with the judicial system is another area where the NYCCHR and SAHRC differ notably.   NYCCHR   Where the complainant has not gone directly to the Courts, the NYCCHR’s need for judicial involvement typically arises when a respondent challenges an order or when enforcement is necessary. The New York State Supreme Court reviews NYCCHR’s decisions to ensure compliance but does not retry cases. This appellate-like review process supports the NYCCHR’s authority by treating its findings as legally significant and reinforcing the binding nature of its orders. This approach reduces delays and enhances the credibility of the NYCCHR’s enforcement actions​.   SAHRC   For the SAHRC, the judicial process is more distinct and detached from its investigative functions. When the SAHRC identifies a human rights violation that requires legal intervention, it must choose whether to utilise mediation, investigation (with findings and recommendations) or litigation to address the matter. If the SAHRC decides to investigate and makes recommendations that are then not complied with, there are a number of options open to it, including the use of political pressure by approaching relevant government authorities or even Parliament for assistance. However, the only way to truly bring binding relief would be to approach the court, not for an order confirming the recommendations of the Commission necessarily, but rather to argue the case de novo  and ask the court for relief based on the law and facts, essentially restarting the process. This separate legal proceeding treats the matter independently of the SAHRC's investigative findings, undermining the direct impact of its recommendations.   The NYCCHR’s ability to issue binding orders and enforce them through a streamlined judicial review process makes it a potent enforcer of anti-discrimination laws. This direct enforcement mechanism offers immediate legal consequences for non-compliance, which can deter discriminatory practices effectively. However, the SAHRC's approach, characterised by its reliance on issuing advisory recommendations and pursuing separate legal action, if necessary, should not simply be seen as a weakness or a lack of authority.   The SAHRC's softer approach, which relies on persuasion, influence, and public awareness, aligns with South Africa's broader historical context of reconciliation and restorative justice. This model allows the SAHRC to engage with parties in a less adversarial manner, encouraging dialogue and voluntary compliance. The non-binding nature of its recommendations can foster an environment where individuals and organisations feel more comfortable participating in the process without the immediate fear of legal repercussions. This openness can lead to greater transparency, a willingness to acknowledge issues, and cooperative efforts to rectify human rights violations. By shining a light on issues and raising public awareness, the SAHRC plays a crucial role in shaping societal attitudes and behaviours, which can lead to long-term cultural and policy changes. The above also fits neatly into South Africa’s constitutional system, which provides numerous avenues through which to enforce human rights, including specialised courts and tribunals such as the Equality Court, Children’s Court and Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, and numerous ombudsman services at national, provincial and local level.   While the SAHRC’s current model prioritises these softer, reconciliatory methods and has a place in the South African legal system, practical experience has demonstrated that this approach has not been very effective – for example, individuals and government departments often simply ignore the findings and recommendations of the SAHRC. And although the aforementioned challenge may speak more to the overall constitutional and human rights landscape in South Africa, than to specific weaknesses in the SAHRC’s strategical and operational model, there is still room to consider complementing its toolkit with additional enforcement options. Introducing mechanisms such as a specialised tribunal within the SAHRC, which could issue binding orders in specific cases, would provide a balance between soft power and more robust enforcement. This would allow the Commission to maintain its emphasis on reconciliation and education while having the capacity to ensure compliance when voluntary measures fail.   4.5. Structural and Resource Challenges   Both the NYCCHR and SAHRC face structural and resource constraints, but these challenges are framed by their differing mandates.   NYCCHR   Operating within the boundaries of New York City and focusing exclusively on discrimination cases allows the NYCCHR to channel its resources more effectively. However, the high demand for its services in a densely populated city poses challenges. Despite these challenges, the NYCCHR's focused mandate and structured use of its Law Enforcement Bureau enable it to respond effectively to discrimination complaints​.   SAHRC   The SAHRC’s broader mandate covers all human rights across South Africa, which presents a more significant, or at least, a very different kind of challenge. The SAHRC’s ability to conduct comprehensive investigations, monitor compliance, and engage in public education is often hampered by limited funding and staffing. These constraints necessitate collaboration with other institutions and reliance on civil society to extend its reach. The breadth of its mandate, while necessary for addressing the full spectrum of human rights, strains the SAHRC’s capacity to enforce these rights effectively​.   In addition to the above, from a broader human rights perspective, South Africa arguably has a harsher human rights landscape than the USA, both at national and more localised levels. While the USA has significant human rights challenges of its own, one must accept that the levels of poverty, unemployment, lack of state resources, and inequality in South Africa far outweigh those in the USA. This fact alone has a significant influence on the effectiveness of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) in South Africa to address human rights challenges as compared to nations like the USA.    5. Conclusion   The NYCCHR and SAHRC play crucial roles in protecting human rights within their jurisdictions, but their approaches and effectiveness differ significantly due to their distinct mandates and enforcement powers. The NYCCHR’s focus on discrimination and its ability to issue binding orders that can be enforced through judicial support makes it a robust enforcer of anti-discrimination laws. The SAHRC’s broader mandate to address all human rights issues, coupled with its non-binding recommendations and reliance on separate legal proceedings, potentially dilutes its effectiveness as an immediate enforcer of rights, while nevertheless not denying the SAHRC the ability to work for change and, as suggested in this paper, to find additional ways to enforce its mandate.    References   AfriForum v South African Human Rights Commission (14370/2019; 31328/2019), ZAGPJHC 807; 2023 (6) SA 188 (GJ). 2023. [Online] Available at: https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2023/807.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Automatic Meter Reading Corp. v New York City, No. 162211/2015, 63 Misc. 3d 1211(A), 2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 50464(U), 2019 WL 1475080. 2019. [Online] Available at: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/ny-supreme-court/1989750.html [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Desir v Walter and Empire State Realty Management, Inc., Complaint No. M-H-S-17-11067, OATH Index No. 1253/19. 2020. [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/decisions-and-orders/Desir_D&O_SIGNED_Redacted.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Commission on Human Rights ex rel. Estelle Stamm v. E & E Bagels, Inc., Complaint No. M-P-D-12-1026467, OATH Index No. 803/14. 2016. [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/decisions-and-orders/Commission%20on%20Human%20Rights%20ex%20rel%20%20Stamm%20v%20%20EE%20Bagels%20--%20Decision%20and%20Order.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   NYC Human Rights. N.d. Enforcement . [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/site/cchr/enforcement/enforcement.page [accessed: 25 August 2024]   NYC Human Rights. N.d. Rules of Practice. [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/site/cchr/law/title-47-index.page [accessed: 25 August 2024]   NYC Human Rights. 2003. New York City Administrative Code, Title 8: Civil Rights . [Online] Available at: https://www.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/Title-8-Text-of-the-Law.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC). N.d. Litigation and inquiry strategy . [Online] Available at: https://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/about-commission/litigation-and-inquiry-strategy [accessed: 25 August 2024]   South African Government. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996 [accessed 25 August 2024]   South African Government. 2013. South African Human Rights Commission Act, Act No.40 of 2013, Government Gazette , 583(37)   South African Human Rights Commission v Agro Data CC (1448/2021), ZAMPMBHC 58. 2022. [Online] Available at: https://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAMPMBHC/2022/58.pdf [accessed: 25 August 2024]   Supreme Court of Appeal. 2024. South African Human Rights Commission v Agro Data CC & Another (Afriforum, Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Commission for Gender Equality intervening as Amici Curiae) (39/2023) ZASCA 121 . [Online] Available at: https://www.supremecourtofappeal.org.za/index.php/component/jdownloads/summary/94-judgements-2024/4300-south-african-human-rights-commission-v-agro-data-cc-another-afriforum-centre-for-applied-legal-studies-and-commission-for-gender-equality-intervening-as-amici-curiae-39-2023-2024-zasca-121-15-august-2024 [accessed: 25 August 2024]        - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

  • Inclusive Society Institute launches its "South Africa Social Cohesion Index" at the Social Cohesion Dialogue

    The National Planning Commission (NPC), under the office of the Presidency of the Republic of South Africa hosted a dialogue on social cohesion in South Africa. The workshop was hosted at the Union Buildings on the 26th of November 2024, wherein various organizations were invited. The dialogue was chaired by NPV Commissioner, Dr Abba Omar. Several other NPC Commissioners were also present.   Inclusive Society Institute, CEO Mr Daryl Swanepoel, and Advisory Council Member Ms Nondumiso Sithole were present to represent the Institute. The institute has been collaborating with Prof. Klaus Boehnke and Dr Georgi Dragolov from Constructor University in Bremen, Germany, in developing a South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI). This Index was officially launched at the dialogue. Click here to view the SASCI report   Various organizations such as, amongst many others, SALGA, Brand SA, The Center for Human Rights, and PanSALB, attended the event. The message from the dialogue was clear: There must be coordinated efforts and synergy in working collectively with the government, civil society and labour to address the challenges that may have weakened “Ubuntu” and social cohesion in South Africa, since it is crucially important for ensuring economic growth and social stability.  The current state of affairs is less than optimal, and therefore, if it is left to degenerate it will pose a serious risk to the country’s future development.

  • Dialogue on the substance and implementation of a decolonised education

    On 20 November, the Inclusive Society Institute hosted its first in a series of dialogues that seek to examine the cardinal underpinnings of South African society, and to pave the way to a transformed and just nation. The dialogue took place under the theme: Dialogue on the substance and implementation of a decolonised education. Several experts and practitioners on the topic of decolonisation were invited to present their views in the hybrid, in-person and digital seminar. Panelists present represented some of South Africa’s premier universities, including the University of Cape Town, Stellenbosch University, the University of KwaZulu-Natal and the Cape Peninsula University of Technology. Civil society was also represented at the event. Panelists were asked to prepare remarks on the following questions: What kind of pedagogy and education is needed to pursue our Constitutional project? What is the meaning and purpose of decolonisation? Does South Africa need to this?    What does decolonised pedagogy and education entail? And, how does it compare with the current form and content of our education?   Following the prepared remarks, a lively and dynamic conversation ensued that delved deep into the meaning and nature of education and pedagogy in South Africa. While speakers spoke from different disciplines and presented different views, it was clear that South African education must undergo a necessary process that will not only deliver on contemporary requirements, but will imbue the future generation with the true spirit of South Africa. A holistic spirit of personal and societal responsibility; giving expression to ubuntu and the Constitutional principles.  Vast challenges remain before the appropriate reformation of the education system is ensured, but by working together, recognising the past and working together, a system fit for purpose and one that serving the national goals must be pursued. An event report will now be compiled and will in time be circulated by the Institute.

  • Taking the Constitution to the People - Mapenane High School, Zone 16 Ga - Rankuwa, Tshwane West District

    On Friday, 1 November 2024, the Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated a thought-provoking workshop for the Grade 11 learners of Mapenane High School, delving deep into the history, structure, and practical applications of South Africa's foundational legal document - the Constitution. This timely workshop was perfectly aligned with the learners' Life Orientation and History curriculum, providing a valuable opportunity to move beyond the textbook and explore the real-world relevance of this seminal document. Throughout the workshop, Morathi skillfully guided the learners through a comprehensive examination of the Constitution's Preamble, as well as the nation's revered symbols, such as the National Anthem and Flag. By fostering an engaging and interactive environment, Morathi empowered the learners to actively participate, asking insightful questions and sharing their own perspectives on the issues at hand. This dynamic exchange not only deepened the learners' understanding of the Constitution but also instilled in them a heightened sense of their rights and responsibilities as young citizens of South Africa. The workshops, which are currently being rolled out in schools across Gauteng's Tshwane West District, aim to teach, motivate, inspire, and encourage learners, while also building and supporting them in the areas of Values in Education and Social Cohesion. Morathi's facilitation was marked by his ability to navigate these sensitive discussions with care and sensitivity, ensuring that each learner felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns without fear of judgment or repercussion. The Inclusive Society Institute extends its heartfelt gratitude to the district officials, teachers, and learners of the various high schools visited so far, for their invaluable cooperation and support. As the learners prepare for their upcoming exams, the institute wishes them the very best in their academic endeavors, confident that the insights gained from this transformative workshop will serve as a solid foundation for their continued growth and success as engaged and informed citizens of South Africa.

  • Taking the Constitution to the People - Setlalentoa High School, Zone 5 Ga - Rankuwa, Tshwane West District

    The Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated an impactful and engaging workshop for 168 Grade 11 learners at Setlalentoa High School on Monday, 4 November 2024. This workshop was specifically designed to empower these young students with a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of South Africa's foundational legal document – the Constitution. Going beyond the textbook, the workshop provided valuable real-world context and relevance, delving into the Preamble, National Symbols like the Anthem and Flag, and the importance of key civic values and social cohesion. As the session progressed, the learners grew increasingly captivated, actively participating by asking thoughtful questions and sharing their own perspectives on the issues highlighted. The facilitator skillfully navigated these discussions, ensuring each student felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns. By the end, the learners left with a heightened sense of awareness regarding their rights and responsibilities as young citizens of South Africa. This workshop is part of a broader initiative by the Inclusive Society Institute to roll out similar sessions across the Tshwane West District of Gauteng, with the ultimate goal of instilling a profound appreciation for the Constitution and fostering proud, engaged citizens. The institute has observed that many schools no longer regularly hold assemblies that include the singing of the National Anthem, the raising of the National Flag, and the recitation of the Constitution's Preamble. They are therefore encouraging all schools to reinstate these practices, as they believe these simple yet powerful acts can go a long way in cultivating a deep sense of national pride and civic responsibility among the learners. As the Inclusive Society Institute looks ahead to the new academic year of 2025, they remain committed to building on the success of this workshop and continuing to empower South Africa's youth to become active, informed, and engaged citizens who uphold the values enshrined in the country's foundational document.

  • Inclusive Society Institute Chief Executive Officer attends the 22nd Conference on International Exchange of Professionals

    The Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute, Daryl Swanepoel, was invited to participate and speak at the 22nd Conference on International Exchange of Professionals, which was held in Shanghai from 1 to 3 November 2024.   The CEO spoke during the session on ‘Promoting Green and Low-Carbon Development in China and Africa through Scientific and Technological Innovation in Resource and Environment’. The title of his contribution was ‘How China can Accelerate Africa’s Green economy’ [Click here to view the PowerPoint presentation] .   Included in the conference itinerary was an academic exchange hosted by the Zheijiang Normal University’s Institute of African Studies (ZJNU IAS) and attendance of the 5th meeting of the Abuja Forum, a co-organised event between the ZJNU IAS and the Gusau Institute, Nigeria. The CEO participated in the panel discussion on the role of security cooperation in prioritizing devlopment.   The third element of the visit was the attendance of the forum themed ‘Exchanges and Mutual Learning, People-to-people Bond, Win-win Cooperation’, which was hosted by The People’s Government of Zheijiang Province.   And lastly, he attended the Forum on 2024 China-Africa Industrial Cooperation and Cross-borderr E-commerce Development’, which was organised by the College of Economics and Management, ZJNU.   At an appointment ceremony on 6 November 2024, Swanepoel was appointed as a Distinguished Visiting Professor of the IAS for a five year term

  • Taking the Constitution to the People - Kgatoentle Secondary School, Zone 5 Ga - Rankuwa, Tshwane West District

    The Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated a dynamic and engaging workshop for the Grade 11 learners of Kgatoentle Secondary School on Thursday, 17 October 2024. The workshop was designed to empower these young students with a deeper, more nuanced understanding of South Africa's foundational legal document - the Constitution. Aligning perfectly with the learners' Life Orientation and History curriculum, the workshop went beyond the textbook, exploring the real-world relevance and practical applications of this seminal document. The facilitator, Patrick Morathi, skillfully guided the learners through key aspects of the Constitution, including an in-depth look at the Preamble and the nation's official symbols, such as the national anthem and flag. This interactive exploration not only enhanced the students' knowledge but also inspired them to think critically about the Constitution's role in shaping their identities as young South African citizens. As the workshop progressed, the learners grew increasingly engaged, asking thoughtful questions and sharing their own perspectives on the issues highlighted by the facilitator. Morathi navigated these lively discussions with aplomb, ensuring that each learner felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns. By the end of the workshop, the students left with a heightened sense of their rights and responsibilities, better equipped to navigate the complexities of civic engagement and social cohesion. The Inclusive Society Institute is currently rolling out these transformative workshops across the Gauteng province, with a particular focus on the Tshwane West District of the Department of Education. One key observation from these workshops is that many schools no longer hold or conduct regular school assemblies, where the singing of the national anthem and the hoisting of the national flag, coupled with the recitation of the Constitution's Preamble, would typically take place. The Inclusive Society Institute strongly encourages schools to reinstate these important rituals, as they play a vital role in instilling a sense of national pride and fostering a deeper understanding of South Africa's democratic foundations among the learners. By ensuring that students regularly engage with these symbolic representations of their country, the institute aims to cultivate a new generation of proud, engaged, and socially conscious citizens, who will shape the future of their beloved nation.

  • The National Dialogue: Pathway to a People's Plan for South Africa

    Occasional Paper 8/2024 Copyright © 2024 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. O C T O B E R 2 0 2 4 THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE Pathway to a People’s Plan for South Africa     Dr Klaus Kotzé BA Social Dynamics, BSocSci Honours Political Communication, Master in Global Studies, PhD Rhetoric Studies     Abstract   South African society remains unjust and unsustainably unequal. For many years, voices from all corners have suggested that processes be undertaken to give rightful expression to the transformational aspirations captured in the South African constitution. With the formation of the Government of National Unity signifying a recalibration in South Africa’s political order, the time may just be right to initiate a new process towards greater peoples’ power. A process that will structurally and comprehensively address the enduring societal hardships and bring about a more just and equitable society for all. This paper discusses the potential that a comprehensive consultative national dialogue has in critically addressing South Africa’s persistent problems. It proposes that such a dialogue holds enormous potential to convene a common South African vision, and suggests the pathways and processes needed for it to bring about socio-economic transformation.   The members of the 7th administration in the Government of National Unity (GNU)         Picture: X / South African Government   Introduction   A comprehensive national consultative dialogue (national dialogue) is being advanced as a suitable pathway to equitably and justly transform South African society. The calls for such a process have grown louder following the electoral shift from single-party rule, with the Government of National Unity being an expression of where the country finds itself. In the way that negotiation and consensus brought about the Government of National Unity, so too a national dialogue can give rise to a people of national unity.   In his inauguration speech following the recent national elections, President Ramaphosa invited “all parties, civil society, labour, business and other formations to a national dialogue on the critical challenges facing the nation”. Whereas the President’s leadership should be appreciated; the national dialogue should not be led by government alone, nor should it be steered by any one sector. Instead, it must entail an extensive negotiation between all sectors of society. For the process of a national dialogue to be authoritative and for its goals and programmes actionable, it must entail the expressed will of the majority of South Africans. For it to be an effective common vision, the active participation and assent of all of society is required. It is from its democratic participation and accord that a national dialogue receives its legitimacy, and it is its legitimacy that affords it power.   To ensure its legitimacy, the processes and structures of the national dialogue are extremely significant. As with the consultative process that gave expression to the democratic state, so too will it require the consultation and consensus by comprehensive stakeholders, to recognise and understand each other, and to cohere what is needed to realise development and transformation. In appreciating that its process will be protracted and complicated, this paper nevertheless recognises the urgent need to commence the process. It thus seeks to contribute to a broader discussion about the merits, processes and structures required to make the dialogue effective.   Towards a legitimate national dialogue   A national dialogue is an inclusive and transparent negotiating mechanism that is used to influence and give shape to a new socio-political consensus. National dialogues have typically taken place in countries undergoing significant political transition (e.g. Benin, Togo, Yemen)  (Papagianni, 2016). These dialogues involve a broad range of stakeholders collectively discussing issues and proposing pathways to find common ground and resolution. National dialogues are therefore protracted social negotiations between parties with clear positions and interests.   The intention that goes into its formation and the way a national dialogue is put together is of utmost importance. In a give-and-take manner they engage the diverse views and interests of participants. The goal is then to deliver a constructive settlement. A consensual programme of action that the different parties can accept and implement. A national dialogue, therefore, offers passage through transition. Through recognising others and being recognised. Through the process of finding consensus through compromise, it embodies and directs the new (transitioned) political order. Such a new political order is often captured in a new national constitution – a basic set of laws and principles to guide the nation. Where legitimate constitutions are in place, a people’s plan of action is commensurate.   National dialogues offer a comprehensive path for all citizens to be part of the political process. This process of claiming political agency, mobilising towards a cause, is not new in South Africa. In fact, South Africa’s culture of political mobilisation is a national asset which, if rekindled can substantially advance the national project. In the manner that the Freedom Charter claimed that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, and that the people shall govern (African National Congress, 2024), so too the myriad of formations of the 1980s rallied around and then realised the concepts of people’s power and a people’s government (South African History Online, 2024). It was through claiming political agency that political agency was attained. So too it must be through inclusive measures that collectively address inequality, that a more inclusive and equal society will be engendered.   While the negotiations and consultations of the 1990s established a value-based South African national order, bringing about the settlement of disorder and separateness, no supplementary people’s driven programme of societal action was established so to ensure equitable and just transformation. Instead of an additional engagement whereby the various sectors and stakeholders convened to set out and pursue such a programme, the new government, as the authoritative representatives of the people, was singularly charged to give expression to development through the realm of governmental policy.    Today, whereas South Africa has an established and legitimate political order, much of the inequities and inequalities that were present at the turn to democracy, remain unresolved. The government’s centralised, top-heavy approach to development has neglected participative democracy, the very claim of the ‘people’s power’. The receding of the public’s political involvement in the democratic era has left the application of constitutional values and aspirations to the centralised government, supplemented by non-governmental entities and philanthropy. Instead, to give true expression to the constitution, a bottom-up, people’s programme of action is needed.    By bringing together the interests, the needs and the proposed solutions of citizens, the national dialogue will consolidate society-wide development structures. Citizens must take ownership of South Africa’s strategic transformation, giving expression to the human-centred and progressive values and principles of the constitution.   It is therefore the process of South African Constitutionalism, the responsibility of every citizen to the nation, that must be inspected and debated. To effectively bring about the resolution of the national challenges, the national dialogue must have broadly endorsed structures with inclusive programmes that are manageable and well communicated. These structures and the issues they address must find comprehensive support. Such support ensures that discussions move beyond elite-level decision-making and allows for the constructive resolution of national issues. Public participation: The bedrock of a national dialogue   It is from extensive public participation that national dialogues gain their legitimacy, giving rise to a people of national unity. The national dialogue process can take from the constitutional negotiations and the public participation programme run by the Constitutional Assembly. The South African constitution did not derive its authority from imposition, but from being the result of a participative process of constitution-making. The extensive consultation and rationalisation by a broad cross-section of South Africans over a period of two years, collectively afforded the constitution its undisputed legitimacy. The final constitution was the endpoint of a consensus. A product of the rationalisation and then legitimation of the perceptions of a diverse people (Salazar, 2008).   The same holds for the national dialogue, which seeks not only to build consensus, but through consultation to channel the society’s demands, assign responsibility and deliver on its needs. To be an expression of the people’s will, the process and undertakings must initiate a public meeting space where different stakeholders, many of whom have never met, encounter each other so to establish new meaning and a new national narrative.   The proceedings of the national dialogue must be nationally structured and clearly communicated, so to ensure broad participation. The national dialogue must therefore entail a whole-of-society undertaking. Box-ticking exercises, such as those facilitated by the Presidency at the Social Cohesion Summit and Presidential Social Sector Summit, have been insufficient (Ramaphosa, 2022). In the case of the latter, civil society was invited for a two-day event, only to be spoken to and finally rounded into groups, afforded two hours to produce suggestions to impact government. Very little can be expected to follow. Indeed, these approaches may only facilitate a further break in trust between the citizens and the elite.   The national dialogue must rekindle and restore public participation as the expression of people’s power. By engaging in the process, citizens position themselves at the centre of power. The constitution makes it clear: in a representative democracy the public shall be given the space to influence policy outcomes that give expression to the will of the people (Legislative Sector South Africa, 2013). Not only did the government capture and overly centralise political power during the last 30 years, thereby not fulfilling its constitutional mandate to facilitate and incorporate public participation, but the public has also failed to move beyond simple electoral representation. The citizenry has reneged to sufficiently give expression to the very process of democracy.   Whereas during the Constitutional Assembly where a communication strategy ensured public participation and therefore ensured the authority of its outcomes, government and the legislature have resorted to box-ticking exercises. It is imperative that the national dialogue draw from the Constitutional Assembly. That it informs while it stimulates public participation – that listening is as central as speaking. In building new mechanisms that connect to the people (much easier in today’s digital realm), the national dialogue will give meaning and direction to public participation in the contemporary age.   Establishing the structure for South Africa’s national dialogue   For years, progressives have said that to realise effective transformation, South Africans must engage in a process that ensures justice and therefore the very survival of the state. Thus far, the public discussion on a national dialogue has mostly reflected the need for it. Very little has been proposed in terms of what types of processes and structures would ensure its legitimacy and effectiveness.   This paper does not attempt to address the substantive nature of the national dialogue. This will be debated and established by its participants. It is therefore imperative that it is structured so as to allow for a protracted, open and engaging space of talking and listening. But the national dialogue cannot only be a talk-shop. Its structure must be goals- and outcomes oriented. In doing so, the very process of the dialogue will see to it that new perceptions emerge. When different actors from different cultures navigate in good faith to find each other, they will craft new meanings and, in the process, quite tangibly build the nation. They will give expression to the present moment and its’ predicaments. Much like Desmond Tutu’s claim that South Africans are the rainbow people of God (Tutu, 1996), thereby uniting black and white during the transition, so too new understandings, new rhetorical mechanisms will emerge when the different sectors deliberate about the present moment.   Thorough preparation will be central to its success. Before its commencement, the national dialogue must establish its independent relationship to the existing state institutions. It must be clear about its mandate and where it fits into the legal and political system. Its powers, decision-making ability and dispute resolution mechanisms, along with other technical aspects must be clarified before it can start its proceedings. So too, it must be determined where the process will be allocated. Which government department will fund and oversee the proceedings.   The first step would be to convene a preparatory committee to assemble all aspects required for the dialogue. Where countries are in transition, the preparatory committees are typically steered by a collective comprising a variety of factions. In the case of South Africa, a constitutional democracy, the Constitutional Court is the legitimate authority. The Constitutional Court could thus assist in the process by assembling a preparatory committee. In the way that CODESA was opened by Chief Justice Corbett, so too the court could assist in initial proceedings (South African History Online, 2024a). By doing so, it lends it legitimacy. This committee must be broadly representative, thereby averting the criticism lodged against CODESA, that it was dominated by the political elite. Once the committee is elected the court should withdraw from the proceedings.   Once established, a strategic communication team could be brought in to assist. Together they could draw up a compelling case for the national dialogue, ensuring that potential participants and the public at large comprehend the nature of the dialogue, the urgency of the proceedings and how it will be in their interest to participate.   The preparatory committee would be responsible for amongst others:    Determining the pool size of dialogue participants. Establishing the method, criteria and process whereby dialogue participants are selected. A step-by-step process should establish how to determine which groupings or constituencies (political parties, religious bodies, civil society groupings, professional bodies, interest and business groups etc.) be included. The committee would then have to agree on sub-categories and the sub-division of categories (e.g. which and how many participants from each constituency are invited). In determining the pool of participants, space should be allowed both for participants that are appointed or nominated and for self-selection. This will allow for representivity while ensuring no group has too much influence. The committee will also have to determine the basis for participation and which principles determine participation. Drafting the parameters that all constituencies must undertake to respect. Determining the time frame and the different stages of the proceedings. Establish a mechanism through which to assist the different constituencies in the process of the dialogue. Determining the logistics, including the details of the venues, support for participants to travel to the venues, use of technology, security and other considerations.  Drafting the agenda for and setting the dates for the initial series of meetings. It is from this series of meetings, whereby all participants will be included and where each will have equal representation, that the final structure and substance of the national dialogue will be established.   Sourcing, managing and allocation of funding    Whereas a preparatory committee would conceive of the broader framework of the national dialogue, the totality of participants would convene to design its structure and assign its substance. The first series of discussions must deliberate and set out the following:   Steering committee:   A representative steering committee could be democratically elected from the broad range of participants in the first sitting. The steering committee could then take over from the preparatory committee and would consist of a broad collection of parties, thereby ensuring inclusivity. It would confirm or amend the decisions of the preparatory committee. It would lead the establishment of the structure and manage the process of the national dialogue. The steering committee would oversee: The facilitation of the national dialogue Setting the agenda Where meetings are to take place, how and when Establish the decision-making process, including decision-making responsibility and how decisions are made (e.g. simple majority). How participants are to be regulated and if need be, disciplined How to keep participants accountable How funding is to be sourced and disbursed The role of outside players, such as regional bodies and international non-government entities The establishment of a secretariat, and detailing its resourcing and duties of the secretariate How the final resolution will be drawn up and implemented   It could be that when the steering committee is democratically elected from the floor, the floor then deliberates and agrees on the number of working groups. Discussing and agreeing on the topics or themes of the different working groups. Themes could be drawn from the values and aspirations set out in the Constitution.   Working groups:   How many working groups are to be established and how each will be composed so to ensure representativity. The election of working group chairs and secretaries. How much time will be afforded to deliberate before agreement or sufficient consensus is required. What sufficient consensus entails and how each group will reach sufficient consensus. Each group, due to their varied composition will establish their own understanding of sufficient consensus.    Declaration of intent   A proposed final task of the initial meetings would be to establish a declaration of intent for the national dialogue. It is critical that all parties to the dialogue collectively commit to such a shared basic programme of action.    In its Declaration of Intent, CODESA sought to establish a democratic, non-discriminatory constitution; a unitary state composed of a diversity of cultures, religions and linguistic groups; constitutional supremacy; multi-party democracy; separation of powers; and universal human rights and civil liberties. It also agreed that all proposals should be consistent with democracy, and that a mechanism would be established, in co-operation with government, to draft the texts of legislation required to give effect to its agreements (African National Congress, 2024a).   Codesa: Declaration of Intent     Picture: https://ourconstitution.wethepeoplesa.org/the-convention-for-a-democratic-south-africa/    Similarly, the current Government of National Unity is undergirded by the foundational principles, basic minimum programme and modalities that are set out in its Statement of Intent (African National Congress, 2024b). Both pledges sought to offer a guiding document that set out the policy direction and agenda. Establishing how the parties would work together, and how a common goal would bind them together. By detailing and agreeing to these details, the diverse participants were able to collectively pursue the same end from their different means and ways. The establishment of a declaration of intent, to guide its processes, will be invaluable to the successful implementation of the national dialogue.     A People’s Plan   The discussions at the working groups, whether about crime, justice, inequality etc., will inform the national comprehension of each topic. After sufficient consensus is attained, each working group would draw up their findings and proposals.   The steering committee, with the assistance of an appointed communications team, would then undertake a protracted, nation-wide consultative process. It is imperative that South African citizens not only be informed about the dialogue but that they actively take part therein. People should be able to contribute to the substantive nature of the themes, so to take ownership of the process and its outcomes. The public participation programme would be most effective when it is widely mediatised, so to ensure accessibility and transparency. Like the communication roll-out during the Constitutional Assembly process, publications, now primarily through digital media, would provide detailed insight.   After an extensive public participation programme, the accumulated views and inputs would be synchronised and brought to the final phase of the national dialogue. The plenary constituting the entire pool of national dialogue participants would meet to discuss the outputs of the working groups, in conjunction with the additional contributions of the public. In this manner, the outcomes will be a truly South African product of its people. During the final plenaries, a final People’s Plan for South Africa will be debated and then assembled.   Whereas the National Development Plan, released in 2012, involved many experts and non-governmental constituencies, it remained a product of government. A prescribed vision. As a democracy with a consultative political culture, a Plan that is visibly and audibly a product of the people, one that gives expression to their lived realities and that arose from their experiences will have the potential to be truly transformative. It will be a democratic product, one that everyone can feel that they have a say in and can take ownership over. The National Development Plan should not be discarded, but as government’s plan it should be consulted and aligned so to underpin the People’s Plan.   A People’s Pledge, undersigned by citizens, businesses, civil society organisations etc. can be developed as a summarised version of the Plan. In so doing, it will allow citizens to expressly commit to a just and transformed South Africa.   Conclusion   A comprehensive national dialogue offers a pathway to establishing a common vision and People’s Plan. A Plan that will give expression to the values and aspirations of the South African Constitution. For too long, South Africans have possessed over an extraordinarily progressive Constitution without experiencing what it is truly capable of.   For too long, economic and social inequalities have delayed the justice that was promised