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The Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated a dynamic and engaging workshop for the Grade 11 learners of Kgatoentle Secondary School on Thursday, 17 October 2024. The workshop was designed to empower these young students with a deeper, more nuanced understanding of South Africa's foundational legal document - the Constitution. Aligning perfectly with the learners' Life Orientation and History curriculum, the workshop went beyond the textbook, exploring the real-world relevance and practical applications of this seminal document. The facilitator, Patrick Morathi, skillfully guided the learners through key aspects of the Constitution, including an in-depth look at the Preamble and the nation's official symbols, such as the national anthem and flag. This interactive exploration not only enhanced the students' knowledge but also inspired them to think critically about the Constitution's role in shaping their identities as young South African citizens. As the workshop progressed, the learners grew increasingly engaged, asking thoughtful questions and sharing their own perspectives on the issues highlighted by the facilitator. Morathi navigated these lively discussions with aplomb, ensuring that each learner felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns. By the end of the workshop, the students left with a heightened sense of their rights and responsibilities, better equipped to navigate the complexities of civic engagement and social cohesion. The Inclusive Society Institute is currently rolling out these transformative workshops across the Gauteng province, with a particular focus on the Tshwane West District of the Department of Education. One key observation from these workshops is that many schools no longer hold or conduct regular school assemblies, where the singing of the national anthem and the hoisting of the national flag, coupled with the recitation of the Constitution's Preamble, would typically take place. The Inclusive Society Institute strongly encourages schools to reinstate these important rituals, as they play a vital role in instilling a sense of national pride and fostering a deeper understanding of South Africa's democratic foundations among the learners. By ensuring that students regularly engage with these symbolic representations of their country, the institute aims to cultivate a new generation of proud, engaged, and socially conscious citizens, who will shape the future of their beloved nation.

Occasional Paper 8/2024 Copyright © 2024 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. O C T O B E R 2 0 2 4 THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE Pathway to a People’s Plan for South Africa     Dr Klaus Kotzé BA Social Dynamics, BSocSci Honours Political Communication, Master in Global Studies, PhD Rhetoric Studies     Abstract   South African society remains unjust and unsustainably unequal. For many years, voices from all corners have suggested that processes be undertaken to give rightful expression to the transformational aspirations captured in the South African constitution. With the formation of the Government of National Unity signifying a recalibration in South Africa’s political order, the time may just be right to initiate a new process towards greater peoples’ power. A process that will structurally and comprehensively address the enduring societal hardships and bring about a more just and equitable society for all. This paper discusses the potential that a comprehensive consultative national dialogue has in critically addressing South Africa’s persistent problems. It proposes that such a dialogue holds enormous potential to convene a common South African vision, and suggests the pathways and processes needed for it to bring about socio-economic transformation.   The members of the 7th administration in the Government of National Unity (GNU)         Picture: X / South African Government   Introduction   A comprehensive national consultative dialogue (national dialogue) is being advanced as a suitable pathway to equitably and justly transform South African society. The calls for such a process have grown louder following the electoral shift from single-party rule, with the Government of National Unity being an expression of where the country finds itself. In the way that negotiation and consensus brought about the Government of National Unity, so too a national dialogue can give rise to a people of national unity.   In his inauguration speech following the recent national elections, President Ramaphosa invited “all parties, civil society, labour, business and other formations to a national dialogue on the critical challenges facing the nation”. Whereas the President’s leadership should be appreciated; the national dialogue should not be led by government alone, nor should it be steered by any one sector. Instead, it must entail an extensive negotiation between all sectors of society. For the process of a national dialogue to be authoritative and for its goals and programmes actionable, it must entail the expressed will of the majority of South Africans. For it to be an effective common vision, the active participation and assent of all of society is required. It is from its democratic participation and accord that a national dialogue receives its legitimacy, and it is its legitimacy that affords it power.   To ensure its legitimacy, the processes and structures of the national dialogue are extremely significant. As with the consultative process that gave expression to the democratic state, so too will it require the consultation and consensus by comprehensive stakeholders, to recognise and understand each other, and to cohere what is needed to realise development and transformation. In appreciating that its process will be protracted and complicated, this paper nevertheless recognises the urgent need to commence the process. It thus seeks to contribute to a broader discussion about the merits, processes and structures required to make the dialogue effective.   Towards a legitimate national dialogue   A national dialogue is an inclusive and transparent negotiating mechanism that is used to influence and give shape to a new socio-political consensus. National dialogues have typically taken place in countries undergoing significant political transition (e.g. Benin, Togo, Yemen)  (Papagianni, 2016). These dialogues involve a broad range of stakeholders collectively discussing issues and proposing pathways to find common ground and resolution. National dialogues are therefore protracted social negotiations between parties with clear positions and interests.   The intention that goes into its formation and the way a national dialogue is put together is of utmost importance. In a give-and-take manner they engage the diverse views and interests of participants. The goal is then to deliver a constructive settlement. A consensual programme of action that the different parties can accept and implement. A national dialogue, therefore, offers passage through transition. Through recognising others and being recognised. Through the process of finding consensus through compromise, it embodies and directs the new (transitioned) political order. Such a new political order is often captured in a new national constitution – a basic set of laws and principles to guide the nation. Where legitimate constitutions are in place, a people’s plan of action is commensurate.   National dialogues offer a comprehensive path for all citizens to be part of the political process. This process of claiming political agency, mobilising towards a cause, is not new in South Africa. In fact, South Africa’s culture of political mobilisation is a national asset which, if rekindled can substantially advance the national project. In the manner that the Freedom Charter claimed that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, and that the people shall govern (African National Congress, 2024), so too the myriad of formations of the 1980s rallied around and then realised the concepts of people’s power and a people’s government (South African History Online, 2024). It was through claiming political agency that political agency was attained. So too it must be through inclusive measures that collectively address inequality, that a more inclusive and equal society will be engendered.   While the negotiations and consultations of the 1990s established a value-based South African national order, bringing about the settlement of disorder and separateness, no supplementary people’s driven programme of societal action was established so to ensure equitable and just transformation. Instead of an additional engagement whereby the various sectors and stakeholders convened to set out and pursue such a programme, the new government, as the authoritative representatives of the people, was singularly charged to give expression to development through the realm of governmental policy.    Today, whereas South Africa has an established and legitimate political order, much of the inequities and inequalities that were present at the turn to democracy, remain unresolved. The government’s centralised, top-heavy approach to development has neglected participative democracy, the very claim of the ‘people’s power’. The receding of the public’s political involvement in the democratic era has left the application of constitutional values and aspirations to the centralised government, supplemented by non-governmental entities and philanthropy. Instead, to give true expression to the constitution, a bottom-up, people’s programme of action is needed.    By bringing together the interests, the needs and the proposed solutions of citizens, the national dialogue will consolidate society-wide development structures. Citizens must take ownership of South Africa’s strategic transformation, giving expression to the human-centred and progressive values and principles of the constitution.   It is therefore the process of South African Constitutionalism, the responsibility of every citizen to the nation, that must be inspected and debated. To effectively bring about the resolution of the national challenges, the national dialogue must have broadly endorsed structures with inclusive programmes that are manageable and well communicated. These structures and the issues they address must find comprehensive support. Such support ensures that discussions move beyond elite-level decision-making and allows for the constructive resolution of national issues. Public participation: The bedrock of a national dialogue   It is from extensive public participation that national dialogues gain their legitimacy, giving rise to a people of national unity. The national dialogue process can take from the constitutional negotiations and the public participation programme run by the Constitutional Assembly. The South African constitution did not derive its authority from imposition, but from being the result of a participative process of constitution-making. The extensive consultation and rationalisation by a broad cross-section of South Africans over a period of two years, collectively afforded the constitution its undisputed legitimacy. The final constitution was the endpoint of a consensus. A product of the rationalisation and then legitimation of the perceptions of a diverse people (Salazar, 2008).   The same holds for the national dialogue, which seeks not only to build consensus, but through consultation to channel the society’s demands, assign responsibility and deliver on its needs. To be an expression of the people’s will, the process and undertakings must initiate a public meeting space where different stakeholders, many of whom have never met, encounter each other so to establish new meaning and a new national narrative.   The proceedings of the national dialogue must be nationally structured and clearly communicated, so to ensure broad participation. The national dialogue must therefore entail a whole-of-society undertaking. Box-ticking exercises, such as those facilitated by the Presidency at the Social Cohesion Summit and Presidential Social Sector Summit, have been insufficient (Ramaphosa, 2022). In the case of the latter, civil society was invited for a two-day event, only to be spoken to and finally rounded into groups, afforded two hours to produce suggestions to impact government. Very little can be expected to follow. Indeed, these approaches may only facilitate a further break in trust between the citizens and the elite.   The national dialogue must rekindle and restore public participation as the expression of people’s power. By engaging in the process, citizens position themselves at the centre of power. The constitution makes it clear: in a representative democracy the public shall be given the space to influence policy outcomes that give expression to the will of the people (Legislative Sector South Africa, 2013). Not only did the government capture and overly centralise political power during the last 30 years, thereby not fulfilling its constitutional mandate to facilitate and incorporate public participation, but the public has also failed to move beyond simple electoral representation. The citizenry has reneged to sufficiently give expression to the very process of democracy.   Whereas during the Constitutional Assembly where a communication strategy ensured public participation and therefore ensured the authority of its outcomes, government and the legislature have resorted to box-ticking exercises. It is imperative that the national dialogue draw from the Constitutional Assembly. That it informs while it stimulates public participation – that listening is as central as speaking. In building new mechanisms that connect to the people (much easier in today’s digital realm), the national dialogue will give meaning and direction to public participation in the contemporary age.   Establishing the structure for South Africa’s national dialogue   For years, progressives have said that to realise effective transformation, South Africans must engage in a process that ensures justice and therefore the very survival of the state. Thus far, the public discussion on a national dialogue has mostly reflected the need for it. Very little has been proposed in terms of what types of processes and structures would ensure its legitimacy and effectiveness.   This paper does not attempt to address the substantive nature of the national dialogue. This will be debated and established by its participants. It is therefore imperative that it is structured so as to allow for a protracted, open and engaging space of talking and listening. But the national dialogue cannot only be a talk-shop. Its structure must be goals- and outcomes oriented. In doing so, the very process of the dialogue will see to it that new perceptions emerge. When different actors from different cultures navigate in good faith to find each other, they will craft new meanings and, in the process, quite tangibly build the nation. They will give expression to the present moment and its’ predicaments. Much like Desmond Tutu’s claim that South Africans are the rainbow people of God (Tutu, 1996), thereby uniting black and white during the transition, so too new understandings, new rhetorical mechanisms will emerge when the different sectors deliberate about the present moment.   Thorough preparation will be central to its success. Before its commencement, the national dialogue must establish its independent relationship to the existing state institutions. It must be clear about its mandate and where it fits into the legal and political system. Its powers, decision-making ability and dispute resolution mechanisms, along with other technical aspects must be clarified before it can start its proceedings. So too, it must be determined where the process will be allocated. Which government department will fund and oversee the proceedings.   The first step would be to convene a preparatory committee to assemble all aspects required for the dialogue. Where countries are in transition, the preparatory committees are typically steered by a collective comprising a variety of factions. In the case of South Africa, a constitutional democracy, the Constitutional Court is the legitimate authority. The Constitutional Court could thus assist in the process by assembling a preparatory committee. In the way that CODESA was opened by Chief Justice Corbett, so too the court could assist in initial proceedings (South African History Online, 2024a). By doing so, it lends it legitimacy. This committee must be broadly representative, thereby averting the criticism lodged against CODESA, that it was dominated by the political elite. Once the committee is elected the court should withdraw from the proceedings.   Once established, a strategic communication team could be brought in to assist. Together they could draw up a compelling case for the national dialogue, ensuring that potential participants and the public at large comprehend the nature of the dialogue, the urgency of the proceedings and how it will be in their interest to participate.   The preparatory committee would be responsible for amongst others:    Determining the pool size of dialogue participants. Establishing the method, criteria and process whereby dialogue participants are selected. A step-by-step process should establish how to determine which groupings or constituencies (political parties, religious bodies, civil society groupings, professional bodies, interest and business groups etc.) be included. The committee would then have to agree on sub-categories and the sub-division of categories (e.g. which and how many participants from each constituency are invited). In determining the pool of participants, space should be allowed both for participants that are appointed or nominated and for self-selection. This will allow for representivity while ensuring no group has too much influence. The committee will also have to determine the basis for participation and which principles determine participation. Drafting the parameters that all constituencies must undertake to respect. Determining the time frame and the different stages of the proceedings. Establish a mechanism through which to assist the different constituencies in the process of the dialogue. Determining the logistics, including the details of the venues, support for participants to travel to the venues, use of technology, security and other considerations.  Drafting the agenda for and setting the dates for the initial series of meetings. It is from this series of meetings, whereby all participants will be included and where each will have equal representation, that the final structure and substance of the national dialogue will be established.   Sourcing, managing and allocation of funding    Whereas a preparatory committee would conceive of the broader framework of the national dialogue, the totality of participants would convene to design its structure and assign its substance. The first series of discussions must deliberate and set out the following:   Steering committee:   A representative steering committee could be democratically elected from the broad range of participants in the first sitting. The steering committee could then take over from the preparatory committee and would consist of a broad collection of parties, thereby ensuring inclusivity. It would confirm or amend the decisions of the preparatory committee. It would lead the establishment of the structure and manage the process of the national dialogue. The steering committee would oversee: The facilitation of the national dialogue Setting the agenda Where meetings are to take place, how and when Establish the decision-making process, including decision-making responsibility and how decisions are made (e.g. simple majority). How participants are to be regulated and if need be, disciplined How to keep participants accountable How funding is to be sourced and disbursed The role of outside players, such as regional bodies and international non-government entities The establishment of a secretariat, and detailing its resourcing and duties of the secretariate How the final resolution will be drawn up and implemented   It could be that when the steering committee is democratically elected from the floor, the floor then deliberates and agrees on the number of working groups. Discussing and agreeing on the topics or themes of the different working groups. Themes could be drawn from the values and aspirations set out in the Constitution.   Working groups:   How many working groups are to be established and how each will be composed so to ensure representativity. The election of working group chairs and secretaries. How much time will be afforded to deliberate before agreement or sufficient consensus is required. What sufficient consensus entails and how each group will reach sufficient consensus. Each group, due to their varied composition will establish their own understanding of sufficient consensus.    Declaration of intent   A proposed final task of the initial meetings would be to establish a declaration of intent for the national dialogue. It is critical that all parties to the dialogue collectively commit to such a shared basic programme of action.    In its Declaration of Intent, CODESA sought to establish a democratic, non-discriminatory constitution; a unitary state composed of a diversity of cultures, religions and linguistic groups; constitutional supremacy; multi-party democracy; separation of powers; and universal human rights and civil liberties. It also agreed that all proposals should be consistent with democracy, and that a mechanism would be established, in co-operation with government, to draft the texts of legislation required to give effect to its agreements (African National Congress, 2024a).   Codesa: Declaration of Intent     Picture: https://ourconstitution.wethepeoplesa.org/the-convention-for-a-democratic-south-africa/    Similarly, the current Government of National Unity is undergirded by the foundational principles, basic minimum programme and modalities that are set out in its Statement of Intent (African National Congress, 2024b). Both pledges sought to offer a guiding document that set out the policy direction and agenda. Establishing how the parties would work together, and how a common goal would bind them together. By detailing and agreeing to these details, the diverse participants were able to collectively pursue the same end from their different means and ways. The establishment of a declaration of intent, to guide its processes, will be invaluable to the successful implementation of the national dialogue.     A People’s Plan   The discussions at the working groups, whether about crime, justice, inequality etc., will inform the national comprehension of each topic. After sufficient consensus is attained, each working group would draw up their findings and proposals.   The steering committee, with the assistance of an appointed communications team, would then undertake a protracted, nation-wide consultative process. It is imperative that South African citizens not only be informed about the dialogue but that they actively take part therein. People should be able to contribute to the substantive nature of the themes, so to take ownership of the process and its outcomes. The public participation programme would be most effective when it is widely mediatised, so to ensure accessibility and transparency. Like the communication roll-out during the Constitutional Assembly process, publications, now primarily through digital media, would provide detailed insight.   After an extensive public participation programme, the accumulated views and inputs would be synchronised and brought to the final phase of the national dialogue. The plenary constituting the entire pool of national dialogue participants would meet to discuss the outputs of the working groups, in conjunction with the additional contributions of the public. In this manner, the outcomes will be a truly South African product of its people. During the final plenaries, a final People’s Plan for South Africa will be debated and then assembled.   Whereas the National Development Plan, released in 2012, involved many experts and non-governmental constituencies, it remained a product of government. A prescribed vision. As a democracy with a consultative political culture, a Plan that is visibly and audibly a product of the people, one that gives expression to their lived realities and that arose from their experiences will have the potential to be truly transformative. It will be a democratic product, one that everyone can feel that they have a say in and can take ownership over. The National Development Plan should not be discarded, but as government’s plan it should be consulted and aligned so to underpin the People’s Plan.   A People’s Pledge, undersigned by citizens, businesses, civil society organisations etc. can be developed as a summarised version of the Plan. In so doing, it will allow citizens to expressly commit to a just and transformed South Africa.   Conclusion   A comprehensive national dialogue offers a pathway to establishing a common vision and People’s Plan. A Plan that will give expression to the values and aspirations of the South African Constitution. For too long, South Africans have possessed over an extraordinarily progressive Constitution without experiencing what it is truly capable of.   For too long, economic and social inequalities have delayed the justice that was promised with the transition to democracy.   For too long effective transformation and development have been bungled or deferred.   It is time that the people’s power that was fought for is given its true expression. The national dialogue and a People’s Plan offer the opportunity to remake the nation. To move South Africa away from its unsustainable path as an utterly unequal society. To bring about Constitutional transformation that is real and felt. And to instil meaning and purpose, so as to truly give expression to a united national identity.   References   African National Congress, 2024. The Freedom Charter. [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/the-freedom-charter-2/  [accessed: 5 September 2024].   African National Congress, 2024a. CODESA: Declaration of Intent. [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/declarations-1991-codesa-declaration-of-intent/  [accessed: 5 September 2024].   African National Congress, 2024b. Statement of Intent of the 2024 Government of National Unity. [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/statement-of-intent-of-the-2024-government-of-national-unity-2/  [accessed 6 September 2024].   Legislative Sector South Africa, 2016. Public Participation Framework for the South African Legislative Sector. [Online] Available at: https://sals.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/simple-file-list/ppf.pdf  [accessed: 5 September 2024].   Papagianni, K. 2016. Civil Society Dialogue Network Discussion Paper No. 3: National Dialogue Processes in Political Transitions. Civil Society Dialogue Network . [Online] Available at: https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/National-Dialogue-Processes-in-Political-Transitions-January-2014.pdf  [accessed: 12 September 2024].   Ramaphosa, C. 2022. President to address presidential social sector summit. [Online] Available at: https://thepresidency.gov.za/president-address-presidential-social-sector-summit  [accessed: 8 September 2024].   Salazar, P-J. 2008. An African Athens: Rhetoric and the Shaping of Democracy in South Africa . Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Cape Town.   South African History Online, 2024. People’s Power, 1986. [Online] Available at: https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/peoples-power-1986  [accessed: 5 September 2024].   South African History Online, 2024a. Convention for a Democratic South Africa. [Online] Available at: https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/convention-democratic-south-africa-codesa  [accessed: 5 September 2024].   Tutu, D. 1996. The Rainbow People of God: The Making of a Peaceful Revolution . Random House Publishing Group, Cape Town.        - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

On Tuesday, 15 October 2024, the Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated an engaging and enlightening workshop for the Grade 11 learners of Modiri Secondary School. The workshop was designed to empower these young students with a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of South Africa's foundational legal document - the Constitution. Going beyond the textbook, this interactive session explored the real-world relevance and practical applications of this pivotal document, delving into its history, structure, and core components such as the Preamble and the country's National Symbols, including the National Anthem and Flag.   The workshop was perfectly aligned with the learners' Life Orientation and History curricula, providing a valuable opportunity to enrich their knowledge and critical thinking. As the session progressed, the students grew increasingly captivated, actively participating by asking thought-provoking questions and sharing their own insightful perspectives on the issues highlighted by the skilled facilitator. Morathi skillfully navigated these engaging discussions, ensuring that each learner felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns, ultimately leaving the workshop with a heightened sense of their rights and responsibilities as young citizens.   This transformative workshop is part of a broader initiative being rolled out in Gauteng schools, with a specific focus on the Tshwane West District of the Department of Education. As schools across the province approach and prepare for their final exams, the Inclusive Society Institute has planned a series of additional engagements to continue this important work.   On 17 October 2024, the team will visit Kgantoentle Secondary School in Zone 2, Ga-Rankuwa, followed by sessions at Setlalentoa High School in Zone 5, Ga-Rankuwa on 4 November 2024, and finally, Mapenane High School in Zone 16, Ga-Rankuwa on 6 November 2024. Through these impactful workshops, the institute aims to inspire and empower learners, fostering a deeper understanding of the Constitution and its role in shaping a more just, equitable, and socially cohesive South Africa.

The Inclusive Society Institute together with Koinonia and the Athlone Parliamentary Constituency Office hosted its yearly Youth Leadership Camp, from 4 – 6 October. Under the theme Active Citizens Serving South Africa , the camp brought together more than 50 youths from across the Cape Metro and the Cape Winelands.   Over two, busy and exciting days, the youngsters were not only taught about the Constitution, leadership skills, critical thinking and effective communication, but they were also given the opportunity to share their thoughts, their passions and their concerns for South Africa.   The camp started with former Parliamentarian Faiez Jacobs, who set the scene in South Africa. He shared how South Africa is on a path of transformative change. How the government and the citizens must together build a more equal and just future for everyone. After dinner, Klaus Kotzé from the Institute introduced the participants to critical thinking and effective communication. This workshop asked participants to think about and to construct arguments for a better South Africa. It advanced the idea of active and participative democracy, assisting the youth to activate their agency constructively, through debate.   Saturday morning started with the entire camp taking part in a mental health awareness walk in the beautiful Paarl Arboretum. The outing was followed by the Institute’s flagship Constitutional training programme: Taking the Constitution to the People . Here the participants were introduced to the meaning of the Constitution, its values and aspirations. The participants were asked to critically engage with the substance of the Constitution, and to find ways where they can activate its transformational intentions in their daily lives. After an engaging session, the youngsters had a well-deserved break at the pool.   The afternoon’s workshop was hosted by Amanda Rinquest and Thandi Henkeman from Black Sash who graciously gave up their Saturday afternoon to talk about how the Constitution guides leadership and active citizenry in South Africa. The participants were taken through practical examples and thoroughly enjoyed the engaging session. After some more fun, team-building activities, Eddie Williams from Koinonia hosted the very popular Potjie-kos competition. Each group was given the same ingredients, and around a massive fire, laughter and new-born friendship welcomed in the night. The last activity of the evening saw the local filmmaker Nadine Cloete showcase some of her documentaries, shot on location in the Cape. It was a great opportunity for the youngsters to engage with films that they could relate to.   Sunday morning was spent re-capping the substance and intentions of the camp. Participants were asked to reflect on their experiences and develop strategic plans detailing how they will apply their new skills in their community as active citizens. Each group was asked to compile a list of commitments that they could pledge to and with their paint-covered hands everyone involved at the camp pledged their intentions on large papers, provided.   The very successful second Youth Leadership Camp was concluded with a certificate ceremony and a boisterous rendition of the national anthem which left this writer not only with goosebumps but with unmitigated hope for the future of South Africa.

The Shaanxi (China) - Western Cape (South Africa) Economic and Trade Cooperation Negotiation Conference, held on 19 September 2024, at the Rockefeller Hotel in Cape Town, brought together key stakeholders to foster economic collaboration. Organized by the CCPIT Shaanxi Sub-Council and the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), with support from the China-Africa Silk Road Industry Cooperation Promotion Center, the event was a platform for discussions and the signing of agreements.   The conference began with opening remarks by Mr Li Jun, Vice Governor of Shaanxi Province, and Alderman James Vos, City of Cape Town’s Mayoral Committee Member for Economic Growth. This was followed by the signing of trade agreements between New Airline Group and VALUE Group, as well as between Shaanxi Tourism Group and Ridgemorvilla Estate, showcasing the potential for tourism and transportation sector growth.   Mr Tang Changan from the Chinese Consulate-General and Ms Erica Joubert from Wesgro, delivered speeches emphasizing the mutual benefits of China-South Africa trade partnerships. Deputy Chairperson of the ISI, Ms Buyelwa Sonjica also shared her insights. The event concluded with a business matching and negotiation session, paving the way for future investments and strengthened economic ties between the Shaanxi Province and the Western Cape.

Occasional Paper 6/2024 Copyright © 2024 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. SEPTEMBER 2024 SOUTH AFRICA’S INTEREST: PEOPLE-CENTERED AND PRAGMATIC Pursuing a progressive policy with realist considerations   Dr Klaus Kotzé BA Social Dynamics, BSocSci Honours Political Communication, Master in Global Studies, PhD Rhetoric Studies (Source: istockphoto.com – iStock-2113233015) “Foreign policy and national interests should be debated much more vigorously. The sad fact is that in practice there is no debate on the issues” (Le Pere and Vickers, 2004).   Abstract   The national interest is a useful concept that does not receive sufficient critical engagement in South Africa. Considered as its ambition or reason, states must perceive, articulate and pursue their national interests. Its turn to a multiparty Government of National Unity, together with the ongoing changes in international relations, present opportunities to recast South Africa’s national policy and governance.   This paper explores the meaning and purpose of the national interest, conceptually. It then assesses how it has been perceived and used in post-Apartheid South Africa. Lastly, the paper suggests that South Africa’s national interest approach be drawn from its national identity and aspirational, value-based Constitution. It should balance between a realist and idealist approach, while strategically considering domestic and international concerns. Ultimately, the national interest is more than a government concept. Its true value and power is discharged when society at large grasps its potential and participates in its actualisation.    Introduction   In a fracturing and evolving world, states must perceive, articulate and pursue their national interests. In 1994 South Africa turned from its securocrat system of maintaining control over a population, to embrace a human-centred approach guided by the value-based Constitution. This turn to non-racial democracy ushered in a new political reality and with it a new national interest.   Thirty years later, South Africa is again pivoting. For the first time in its democratic history, the African National Congress did not garner an outright majority. The formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) compromising several parties demonstrates a reboot in the national political environment. It ushers in a seminal moment to recast policy and governance. The turn from the ideological dominance of a single party to the GNU’s broadly representative pursuit of the national project, as guided by its Statement of Intent , demonstrates a reorientation of the state. The changed internal dynamics, as well as the increasingly fluid landscape between states, necessitates a revision of South Africa’s national interest.   This paper undertakes a critical assessment so to guide South Africa’s thinking about its national interest. It does so by first exploring the meaning and purpose of the concept. It then discerns how the national interest has been interpreted in democratic South Africa. This is done by analysing official documentation. Lastly, the paper looks at how the national interest should be interpreted and applied, so as to best give expression to the strategic vision and goals of the South African state. In so doing, it will show how the national interest is a useful concept for drawing in diverse stakeholders and bolstering participatory politics during the seventh administration. A way to popularise the ideals of the state. Giving personal and collective expression to both domestic and international policy and ultimately advancing the state.    Delineating the national interest   In 1949, the German American jurist and political scientist Hans Morgenthau infused the words national interest  with contemporary meaning. At a time when the world was entering a new macro political arrangement, Morgenthau spoke of the primacy of the national interest (Morgenthau, 1949). That in the grand arrangement of states, power is the goal. States, according to Morgenthau (writing particularly of the United States), must act so to maintain, enable and advance their power. His was a realist approach to politics. An approach which, while recognising that the world has no central authority and thus anarchic, political interactions are contests between self-interested states.   Power in this realist gaze is the ability to pursue one’s own ends without hindrance. It is also the ability to determine the actions and decisions of others. The pursuit of power, in this realist view, is the reason for the state. This perception is rooted in the deeply sceptical Machiavellian instincts of warring between European states over the centuries. It is, ultimately, a strategic response to the conditions on the ground. Or, what is known as the political environment. Here power entails a zero-sum game; power over, vis a vis other iterations, such as power with. The primacy of this form of power in a state’s affairs ensures a race to the top, and thus the concomitant race from the bottom. According to Morgenthau, “moral principles and the national interest have contented for dominance over the minds and actions of men throughout the history of the modern state system” (Ibid, 208).    This well-known perception of the national interest is countervailing. To maximise the significance of a state’s national interest, its conceptual approach must be recognised. The realist determination also offers meaning to its counterparts which sees the reason of the state through an idealist or moralist gaze. Here the state is guided by principles to pursue value-based ends.   A state’s national interest will differ both in meaning and substance from one state to the next. It can thus be seen as a realist, idealist or a qualified composite. It all depends on the strategic lens through which the state chooses to perceive its national interest. How a situation is interpreted will depend on the approach undertaken.   Morgenthau’s definition assists in guiding how a state should perceive its national interest. The path, or strategic approach, of any state, should be determined by what he called the political reality: “the choice is not between moral principles and the national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles divorced from political reality, and another set of moral principles derived from political reality” (Morgenthau, 1951: 33).    Real governance   The distinction between real (direct) and ideal (indirect or soft) power is important within the (contemporary) exercise of international power. Foucault reminds us that “the exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcomes” (Foucault, 1982). The system that has steered the global power arrangement since prevailing in the Cold War, the last contest for global power, has done exactly that. The West and particularly the United States has guided the realm of possibilities of the global governance system by providing a series of possible outcomes.   In the absence of a guiding alternative, the period since the Cold War has seen states behave more like federated provinces in a global arrangement than truly sovereign and thus independent entities. The dominance of ascendent Western power has seen to it that nations forego their strategic autonomy so as to benefit from global markets and other privileges of the international order. They have also been kept safe, whether it be direct protection or by being spared incursion. The result is thus that real and soft power has been waged by a determinist apex power which in turn has charged the global environment with a specific set of ideals. Most other states, so as not to encroach upon the superpower, have been determined by (and mostly adopted) an accorded realm of ideas: democracy, human rights, etc.   The world’s states, including South Africa, were shaped by this normative framework of global power. States followed international prescripts. Both assuming a normative framework in their interaction between other states, but tellingly also in the ways that they perceived and enacted their domestic affairs. In so doing, states such as South Africa exercised partial sovereignty.   This short period where national alignment afforded access and benevolence has come to an end. The pressure on European and Asian states away from Russia and China, respectively, and towards the interests of the United States, signals pressure and co-optation as opposed to accommodation. This is not a cold, irrational reaction but partly in response to an outward campaign of attraction (and co-optation) by these very states. Including Russia, China and Iran, states pursuing independent and increasingly active foreign policies.   In toto, these movements signal the end of the singular hegemonic moment. The United States no longer has the means nor the strategic will to charge such an international realm of ideals. This closure clarifies that instead of a period of multilateralism, the recent period has been one of privileged inclusion. Compositely, the world is returning to an unfolding period of (great) power politics.   For states to pursue their national interests, they must autonomously make sense of and articulate these perceptions. They cannot understand their ideas through external concepts or approaches. A perceptive clarity of self – a national identity - is needed. The realist vision of Machiavelli is useful here. He stressed that states and their statesmen should interpret the world as is, rather than how it should be. For a state to, therefore, have a discernible national interest. For it to put its own ideas into action, it must have a discernible identity.   Notwithstanding the dominance of a superpower or multiple vying superpowers, states are the legitimate units of power. The United Nations as the primary arrangement of international power provides states with the exercise of self-interest. Article two of the United Nations Charter clearly sets out that members of the organisation are sovereign equal members. It is thus incumbent upon states to formulate and express their sovereignty, while asserting the mandate of the charter and respecting the sovereignty of others.   While it appears contradictory to contemporary globalist perceptions, multilateralism is not when all states agree or pursue the same approach. Instead, it is when states give expression to their national interests in concert with others. Such a concert of voices has not matured beyond the ritual of the yearly United Nations General Assembly, where most states use a portion of their allotted time to recognise the primacy of the United Nations. It is incumbent on each state to claim its authority and express its own views. The formulation and articulation of its interests are important components of a successful state. It sets out meaning, purpose, orientation and direction. It defines and claims a state’s place among other states. It presents a consolidated expression of self, from which a foreign policy can be built. A state’s national interest thus emerges from its context, both domestic and international.    Towards a working definition of South Africa’s national interest   The realist / idealist axis   From the paragraphs above it emerges that a nation cannot perceive its interests using external logics or paradigms. It must consider the (comprehensive) political reality while giving expression to domestic identity and policy. Van Nieuwkerk, in his 2004 essay South Africa’s National Interest , suggests that the national interest is not sufficiently debated in South Africa. “Adeptness at identifying the national interest and pursuing it in a creative way is part of the challenge of governance and state leadership in the current global arena” (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004: 99). For his part, the author continues the predominant realist approach, suggesting that a state’s national goals should be formulated following thorough consideration of the global strategic environment. To this consideration, one should add the local environment to which we return later.   Context matters to national interests. It is determined by an array of forces and agents. It is therefore not only insufficient but can at times also be detrimental for a state to determine its national interest only based on ideals. Ideals for their ambition seek to shape and not contend with context. In the case of early democratic South Africa, it was fortuitous that its principled Constitutionalism coincided with a world embracing a collective, idealist moment – pursuing liberal democracy guided and protected by the Western order. The end of this moment is a reason to reflect and pivot. Van Nieuwkerk warns against a purely value-based national interest. Such an ideologically driven approach is said to be insufficient and would manifest in “misperception, or an absence of means-ends calculations, that could lead to costly policy and strategy failures (Ibid: 91) …and that an “overtly pursuing a human rights-based foreign policy is a delicate balancing act at the most of times” (Ibid. 93).   The White Paper on South Africa’s Participation in International Peace Missions , 1998, is one of the first democratic-era documents to offer clarity on how South Africa views its national interest. The document states that “South Africa’s emerging national interest is underpinned by the values enshrined in the Constitution…a commitment to the promotion of human rights; a commitment to the promotion of democracy…” (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998). This sentimental concept is developed and gives expression to an idealist national interest in a broader domestic and international context of democratisation.   The 2012 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy presents a national interest that has matured, somewhat. The White Paper foregrounds common humanity, relationship-building and interdependence when it describes South Africa’s foreign policy as a “diplomacy of ubuntu” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012). Ubuntu is the Southern African maxim of a shared humanity. That one derives one’s existence and place in the world together with others. Or as per the Zulu ubuntu ngumuntu ngabantu : I am because you are. The South African approach to its national interest is collaborative and inclusive. It is pursued cooperatively and through an interdependent arrangement of states. Such an approach does not pursue a (narrow) national interest but a regional, continental and global interest.   The White Paper claims that “it is in our national interest to promote and support the positive development of others” (Ibid: 4). Throughout its democratic era, South Africa has maintained its “national interest as being intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity…(and) accords central importance to our immediate African neighbourhood and continent” (Ibid: 3). Regional or continental anchoring does a few things. First, as Africa’s most industrialised and developed country, South Africa’s continentalism seeks to propel itself through propelling the continent. It does this to recognise the historical debt to African states who supported the liberation movement in the anti-apartheid struggle. It also does this not to isolate, nor to elevate itself and thus assumes continental leadership without enforcing authority.   The ubuntu diplomacy, an expression of internationalism, has seen South Africa steadfastly campaign for the continent on the global stage, whether at multilateral fora such as the United Nations General Assembly or during bilateral engagements with global powers. This diplomatic entrepreneurialism has seen South Africa punch above its weight on the international stage. It has secured some significant victories. It is widely considered that South Africa was brought into the BRICS arrangement of states as a continental representative.   South Africa’s humanist, ubuntu diplomacy has given expression to the predominant global idealism. Its outward focus – promoting global ideals – has contributed to the substantiation of modern internationalism. The 2012 White Paper suggests that “since 1994, the international community has looked to South Africa to play a leading role in championing values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment. South Africa has risen to the challenge and plays a meaningful role in the region, on the continent and globally” (Ibid: 4). South Africa’s idealist foreign policy has actively sought to sustain and strengthen the multilateral system; by aligning and building this arrangement it advances itself.   While there may be secondary value in integrating its interests to that of a broader arrangement that supports the same ideals, a state must first be able to hold its own when the global arrangement breaks down. Recently, the increasing discord among great powers has exposed significant weaknesses in the global governance arrangement. This is best seen with the failures of the United Nations Security Council seize or prevent blatant atrocities, whether in Ukraine, Palestine and elsewhere. Power leveraging is here to stay, it will only become more recalcitrant. States with an idealist approach and no realist reinforcement will remain circumscribed going forward.   The strategic approach of the new British government proposes the use of real means to advance progressive ends. This presents a compelling path to advance national interests in the contemporary setting. “Instead of realism for transactional purposes”, the thinking goes, “we want to use it in the service of progressive goals…it is the pursuit of ideals without delusions about what is achievable…Progressive realism is not only defined by the policies we espouse, but by the approach we take to diplomacy” (Lammy, 2024). South Africa’s new government should take heed of this strategic calculation: pursuing a progressive policy with realist considerations. We return to this later.   The domestic / international axis   The 2012 White Paper makes a poignant observation. It states that foreign policy should take “into account the ever-evolving global environment in which we operate in order to respond effectively to our domestic imperatives. Effective policy development is essential for the survival and prosperity of any country in the global system” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012: 7). Though recognising the strategic importance of the domestic reality, the White Paper submits that South Africa will persist in its pursuit of a global order. Here it says that South Africa will push “towards the transformation of the global system of governance from power-based to a rules-based system in a just and equitable global order” (Ibid).   At the time of writing such an approach might have appeared as self-evident. This narrow view, held since democratic inception, responded to a singular global reality with a similarly singular approach. But by entrenching itself in a definite gauge, it neglected the strategic necessity of first attending to the domestic political environment: a state cannot only pursue its domestic ends through foreign policy.   When articulating a state’s national interest, it is unwise to rest on moral authority (soft power) to make environmental assumptions. Accordingly, it is unwise to pursue a steadfast approach in a changing global arrangement. The same holds for the domestic strategic environment. It is foolhardy to suppose that South African state will pursue people-centred development simply because the Constitution says so. The seismic decay and rampant corruption that enveloped the state in the years since 2012 proves that any policy orientation needs critical and constant consideration. The latest expression of the national interest is found in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation’s Framework Document on South Africa’s National Interest and its advancement in a Global Environment, 2022 . This document, which has its orientation established in its name, goes some way to offer a more nuanced, subjective approach in a vastly changed global and domestic environment.   The Framework Document which is a departmental and not a government-wide guide proposes the South African national interest be “premised on the values and ideals as enshrined in its Constitution and informed by the needs of the people” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2022: 1). It integrated ideals and needs when it recognises the three principles of inclusiveness, exclusiveness and external relevance.   “The inclusiveness principle suggests that the claim should concern the nation as a whole, or at least a substantial enough subset of its membership to transcend the specific interests of groups and factions. The exclusiveness principle refers to a state seeking the National Interest when it is not concerned with the interests of any groups outside its jurisdiction, except to the extent that it may affect “domestic interests”. This implies that the interests being pursued should at all times be related to the interests at home and not those of any group outside its jurisdiction or territorial control. According to the external relevance principle , the needs in question should significantly be affected by the international environment and, consequently, by the conduct of foreign affairs” (Ibid: 4).   The Framework goes some way reconcile the national and international through pragmatic, not only ideological, considerations. It does this when it says that “national interest is a sub-set of the public interest that is affected by external politics” (Ibid). The domestic should guide the foreign. The Framework presents an evolved perception beyond aligning to international norms to advance domestic interests. Tellingly, it extends beyond the idealist view when it refers to the views of George Kennan, the arch American realist, who proposed that states should not pursue moral considerations but tangible interests. While the Framework is more comprehensive, what is needed is a guideline where strengths are activated to give pragmatic expression to the national interest. South Africa’s ‘soft power’ execution, what the Framework calls ‘principled diplomacy’, is often limited to the policy practitioners charged with “restoring and maintaining South Africa’s image, stature, moral high ground and standing in the region, the continent and in global affairs” (Ibid: 8). Towards the end of the Framework, it makes a compelling point without developing it. It says that the “presence of civil society organisations in international affairs has become increasingly relevant. They have played a role in agenda-setting, international law-making and diplomacy and can be important voices in support of South Africa’s development agenda. Civil society, particularly its large grassroots coverage, plays an importance role in the implementation and monitoring of a number of crucial global issues” (Ibid: 19). For South Africa to connect its four axes and comprehensively pursue its national interests, it should pragmatically leverage its true potential: its human capital.    Recommendations for a South African national interest that is both people-centred and pragmatic   South Africa’s seventh administration represents a new political era which requires a concomitant new approach to national interests. The 2022 Framework advocates for as much when it says: “a review of the National Interest is therefore usually linked to the ending of a particular historical era and the beginning of another” (Ibid 5). As the new administration charts its path, it is crucial that an appropriate and strategic national interest path is charted.   The new South African government must strategically charge the orientation and pursuit of the national interest with the same cooperative and pragmatic intent as shown in the Statement of Intent  which guided the establishment of the Government of National Unity. As the British are doing with their interpretation of progressive realism , South Africa should develop its own. Giving expression to both realism and idealism, in both domestic and international considerations. South Africa’s national interest should follow the spirit of the national Constitution. It should both protect (rights) and command (responsibilities) public officials and citizens to give expression to ideals it pursues.   This position has already gained initial conceptual meaning. The new minister of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Ronald Lamola, has indicated that South Africa will pursue its own version of active idealism. In a speech to the South African Institute of International Affairs, Lamola said: “the evolving international world order necessitates the strengthening of the Non-Aligned Movement. South Africa, with its unique policy of active non-alignment, is not reactive but proactive in its pursuit of peace. This approach is not about being neutral or abstaining from world affairs, but about leading a unifying agenda through dialogue to achieve peace for developing countries that do not wish to take sides in great power rivalry” (South African Institute of International Affairs, 2024).   Whereas active non-alignment presents a real and ideal response to a fraught global political environment, it does not yet give expression to South Africa’s domestic concerns. To do so, the anarchic global reality and the lawed local reality should be read together so to give appropriate responses.   South Africa’s principled diplomacy of ubuntu and non-alignment does not represent the coercive assertion of power over, but rather that of a cooperative power with others. Such a formulation of power is not imposed but exalted, claimed. While the state should formulate and guide this pursuit, it is strategically expedient to extend responsibility to as a diverse and inclusive a constituency as possible. The people, the citizens of South Africa, and those committed to its ethos, have a central role in fulfilling the Constitutional ambitions. They are the means of South African power. The means of pursuing the ends of the state. To build a transformed and developmental state. Such an inclusive perception of power is not only progressive and pragmatic, but also fundamentally human-centred. It brings the pursuit of the national interest into the home of the individual citizen. With the national interest emerging from context, there is no more immediate context than the home of the citizen.   The 2012 White Paper alludes to the central and participatory role of the diversity of South Africa’s people (and its ethical allies). It remarks that: “The business of national interest cannot be the purview of the state alone, but it can encourage an enabling environment of dialogue and discourse among all stakeholders to interrogate policies and strategies, and their application in the best interests of the people” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012). Greater effort needs to be made to bring the national interest into the daily lives of the people. For South Africa to expediently pursue its strategic ambitions of ‘power with’, it must be clarified how citizens can best give expression to ideals and thus pursue interests. For this, the state requires representatives who are skilled in drafting, communicating and executing people-centred strategic frameworks. Such a process should not be ad hoc or issue specific. Instead, a national interest strategic framework should be initiated, and a national interest framework document should be formulated at the beginning of each new administration, so to facilitate expedient expression.   A national interest framework document can take inspiration from the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States. The NSS has since 1987 been a regular report. Prepared by the executive and mandated by an act of Congress. The NSS communicates the executive’s national view of and approach to power to the legislative branch. The report “is obligated to include a discussion of the United States’ international interests, commitments, and policies, along with defence capabilities necessary to deter threats and implement U.S. security plans” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States of America, nd.). Whereas South Africa is not the United States and does not have a similar a focus on defence matters, it should develop its own framework document to discern the strategic environment and give political effect to the nation’s interests.   Like the NSS, the South Africa’s strategic framework document should: “communicate the executive’s strategic vision”; “create internal consensus on foreign and defense policy”; and “contribute to the overall agenda of the President” (Snider, 1995).   In the South African case, a national interest framework document would give expression not to defence (hard power or power over), but to ubuntu (soft power or power with). The nation’s goals will be served by a pragmatic, human-centred approach, guided by values. Here it should be pointed out that these goals may be served in various ways and means, and that those serving the domestic, may be different and pursued differently to those serving international interests. It is the political environment that determines the ways and means; a value-based approach will not always suffice, may even be exclusionary, especially in the anarchic and increasingly fraught international arena where self-interest may be expedient.   It is important, in the South African spirit of discursive democracy, that the framework documents be debated and enacted by a wide cross-section of society. They need to be people-centred, forward looking and pragmatic. In the spirit of the Statement of Intent, the national interest framework document should respond to the current political juncture and thus the present needs of the state. The Statement which convenes the divergent parties in government recognises and commits to specific causes. Thus, giving it direction; to “ensure accountability and foster trust between the electorate and the political parties that form part of the GNU”. By listing a “basic minimum programme of priorities” and by defining “the modalities of government of national unity” (African National Congress, 2024) it defines the collective understanding and thus the strategic pursuit of government.   A national interest framework document would afford similar clarity. At its most profound and yet at its most foundational, such a framework document would marshal resources and offer direction by describing an example. The 2012 White Paper points in this direction in its prescient conclusion: “South Africa’s greatest asset lies in the power of its example. In an uncertain world, characterised by a competition of values, South Africa’s diplomacy of Ubuntu, focusing on our common humanity, provides an inclusive and constructive world view to shape the evolving global order” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012). The ultimate task of a strategic framework document would be to lead the state and its citizens in their discharge of their Constitutional charges. To reveal to them, as the assets (means) of the state, how to enact principled (ubuntu) diplomacy and active non-alignment. This expression of power is not only expedient in the context of South Africa’s assets but will increasingly be valuable in an evolving world defined by asymmetry, fluidity and relationships.     Conclusion   A regular strategic framework document would take stock of the domestic and international political realities at the commencement of each administration. In doing so it will give persuasive expression to the ideas of the state.   The 2022 National Interest Framework Document already provides some direction when it says that national interest can be “articulated as people-centred, including promoting the well-being, development and upliftment of people” (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2022: 8). By describing the domestic and international situation through the eyes of the Constitutional state, it will contextualise and demystify a complex global and local environment. It will give needed expression of the South African identity and by doing so it would collaboratively charge the state and its citizenry with purpose and direction.    References   African National Congress, 2024. Statement of intent of the 2024 Government of National Unity . [Online] Available at: https://www.anc1912.org.za/statement-of-intent-of-the-2024-government-of-national-unity-2/ [accessed: 22 July 2024].   Department of Foreign Affairs, 1998. White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions . [Online] Available at: www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/peacemissions1.pdf [accessed: 5 July 2024]   Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012. White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy - Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu . [Online] Available at: https://www.gov.za/documents/white-papers/white-paper-south-african-foreign-policy-building-better-world-diplomacy [accessed: 5 July 2024].   Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2022. Framework Document on South Africa’s National Interest and its advancement a global environment . [Online] Available at: https://dirco.gov.za/national-interest-framework-doc/  [accessed: 4 July 2024.   Foucault, M. 1982. The Subject and Power.  Critical Inquiry,  8(4): 777-795.   Lammy, D. 2024. Labour’s foreign policy will be realistic about us as a nation, not nostalgic about what we used to be . [Online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/apr/17/labours-foreign-policy-realistic-not-nostalgic-progressive-realism [accessed: 22 July 2024].   Le Pere, G. and Vickers, B. 2004. “Civil society and foreign policy”, in Nel, P. and Van der Westhuizen, J. (eds), Democratizing foreign policy? Lessons from South Africa . Lexington Books, Lanham.   Morgenthau, H. 1949. The Primacy of the National Interest, The American Scholar , 18(2): 207 – 2012.   Morgenthau, H. 1951. In Defense of the National Interest . New York: Knopf.   Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States of America, nd. National Security Strategy . [Online] Available at: https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/National-Security-Strategy/ [accessed: 22 July 2024].   Snider, D. 1995. The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision . [Online] Available at: https://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Snider.pdf [accessed: 25 July 2024].    South African Institute of International Affairs, 2024. Address by DIRCO Minister Ronald Lamola on SA’s Foreign Policy . [Online] Available at: https://saiia.org.za/research/address-by-dirco-minister-ronald-lamola-on-sas-foreign-policy/ [accessed: 25 July 2024].   Van Nieuwkerk, A. 2004. South Africa’s National Interest. African Security Review , 13(2): 89 – 101.       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute is making good on its promise to bring the Constitution to the people, conducting impactful workshops at high schools across Gauteng Province. Leading these sessions is facilitator Mr Patrick Morathi, who is working tirelessly to fulfill one of the Institute's core mandates. On 17 September 2024, learners at Theresa Park High School had the opportunity to participate in one of these transformative workshops, designed to empower young people with a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of South Africa's foundational legal framework. The workshop content aligns perfectly with the Life Orientation curriculum, addressing critical topics like Values in Education and Social Cohesion. By delving into these areas, the sessions aim to have a lasting impact on how the learners perceive and appreciate the Constitution - the very document that underpins the country's democratic principles and national identity. Beyond just the Constitution, the workshops also explore South Africa's rich national symbols, including the flag and anthem, fostering a heightened sense of pride and connection to the nation's heritage. This particular workshop could not have come at a more opportune time, as South Africa celebrates 30 years of hard-won democracy. Moreover, the timing coincides with Heritage Month, which this year carries the theme "Celebrating the lives of our heroes and heroines who laid down their lives for our freedom." The Inclusive Society Institute is committed to educating the youth on these pivotal aspects of South African history and civic life, and more such workshops are expected to be rolled out to additional high schools in the Gauteng region in the coming months.

On Monday, 9 September 2024, the Inclusive Society Institute's facilitator, Patrick Morathi, led a workshop for the Grade 11 learners of Akasia High School. This impactful session was designed to empower the students with a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of South Africa's foundational legal document - the Constitution. Perfectly aligned with the learners' Life Orientation curriculum, the workshop went beyond the textbook, exploring the real-world relevance and practical applications of this essential document. Morathi skillfully guided the learners through the Preamble of the Constitution, bringing to life the core principles and values that underpin South African democracy. The session also delved into the country's National Symbols, including the National Anthem and Flag, fostering a heightened appreciation for the rich heritage and identity that shapes the nation. Throughout the workshop, Morathi's engaging facilitation style encouraged the learners to actively participate, asking thought-provoking questions and sharing their own perspectives on the issues at hand. As the session progressed, the learners became increasingly invested, eager to voice their opinions and concerns. Morathi navigated these engaging conversations with finesse, ensuring that each student felt empowered to express themselves freely. By the end of the workshop, the learners left with a deepened sense of their rights and responsibilities as young citizens, inspired to become active, informed, and socially conscious members of their community. This transformative experience, aligned with the Values in Education and Social Cohesion objectives, will undoubtedly have a lasting impact on the learners' understanding and appreciation of South Africa's foundational legal framework.

Occasional Paper 5/2024 Copyright © 2024 Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. AUGUST 2024 Dr Roelof Botha Economic Advisor to the Optimum Investment Group Abstract   South Africa’s first Cabinet under the government of national unity (GNU) has been met with an overwhelmingly positive response from business leaders and global capital markets alike. But, as the dust settles on these promising appointments, focus shifts to the real work: economic growth and employment creation. A most pressing obstacle is the restrictive monetary policy stance by the South African Reserve Bank. The gains made post-Covid have been wiped out by the highest interest rates in 15 years – putting the financial resilience of households, and other key indicators of economic activity, under pressure.   This paper closely examines this obstacle to growth and then finds a number of positive developments in the macroeconomy and the economic policy environment, likely due to the transition to a GNU that is committed to preserving South Africa’s democratic constitution. The private sector is prepared to become more involved in repairing infrastructure, and fundamental fiscal policy is in place. A resilient rand, combined with an imminent sharp drop in interest rates and consumer inflation, heralds higher growth. And plans are afoot to clean up the state capture mess, especially the mismanagement of state-owned enterprises and municipalities. The time is ripe for a sea change, from ideological objectives to creating employment opportunities at pace. Introduction   Now that the dust has settled on South Africa’s transition to a government of national unity (GNU) and the appointment of a new, expanded cabinet, much of the focus of public debate will shift to progress with the stated intention of prioritising economic growth and employment creation. Based on government’s track record ever since the state capture era, it would require substantial assistance by the private sector in facilitating new investment in the repair, maintenance and expansion of the country’s infrastructure.   This paper examines one of the most pressing obstacles to the expansion of capital formation and household consumption expenditure, namely an overly restrictive monetary policy stance by the South African Reserve Bank and then proceeds with a discussion of a number of positive developments in the macroeconomy and the economic policy environment.   The timing for a new era where emphasis shifts from ideological objectives to creating employment opportunities at pace is good. The world economy is expected to grow at more than 3% over the next couple of years and most of South Africa’s key trading partners are likely to experience macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, due to a much larger degree of price stability, interest rates are bound to start declining during the third quarter of the year – providing much-needed debt-servicing relief to consumers and businesses alike.   The cost of restrictive monetary policy   Ever since the onset at the end of 2021 of restrictive monetary policy in South Africa, the financial resilience of households has been under pressure, with a strong (and predictable) inverse correlation between higher interest rates and the Altron Fintech Household Resilience Index (AFHRI) trend. This inverse correlation is also evident with a variety of other key indicators of economic activity, including the gross domestic product (GDP), real household consumption expenditure and retail trade sales.   The gains that were made with the post-Covid recovery have now been wiped out by the highest interest rates in 15 years, with the current real prime overdraft rate (prime minus the consumer price index – CPI) at a level of 6.7%, which is more than double the average rate that existed during the tenure of the previous Governor of the SA Reserve Bank, Gill Marcus.   Of particular concern is the fact that inflation, as measured by the CPI, has been comfortably within the Reserve Bank’s target range (3% to 6%) for the past twelve months. In a deviation from the erstwhile monetary policy approach of target range flexibility, it seems that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has now opted for the approach of the Federal Reserve in the United States, namely a target point, which the MPC has apparently set at 4.5%. Due to the permanent volatility of emerging market currencies and the strong influence on price levels of temporary currency weakness, such an approach is decidedly unwarranted for an emerging market economy that is battling with an extremely high unemployment rate and low economic growth.   The damage that has been inflicted on the economy due to the intransigent and restrictive stance of the MPC includes the following:   Since the end of 2021, the cost of credit (and of capital) has increased by 68% (measured against the nominal prime overdraft rate) Unnecessarily high interest rates have a profound negative impact on the ability of households to maintain their standard of living and on the ability of businesses to invest in new productive capacity. On the national average mortgage bond level administered by BetterBond of R1.1 million, home-owners are now paying around R4,000 per month more on the instalments. In real terms, total household credit extension, which is valued at more than R2 trillion, has declined by 5.5% since 2013, which means that there has not been any growth in this key enabling macroeconomic indicator over the past decade. It is simply not possible for the South African economy to grow at meaningful and sustained rates in the absence of real growth in household credit extension. Over the past four years, the average monthly real salary in the formal private sector has declined by 8% to a level of R18,500. Excessively high interest rates have further exacerbated the plight of South African households by a sharp increase in debt servicing costs, which, as a percentage of household disposable income, has now risen to 9.2% - the highest level in 15 years, and significantly higher than before the Covid pandemic     Inflation under control   Households and businesses with debt would have been disappointed at the decision by the MPC to maintain the official bank rate at 8.25% (and the prime rate at 11.75%) during their July policy meeting.   Fortunately, some good news filtered through less than a week later with the publication by Statistics SA of the latest inflation rate, as measured by the CPI. This rate declined marginally to 5.1% in June (from 5.2% in May). Importantly, the CPI has now been within the Reserve Bank’s target range for inflation for a full year, with two leading indicators of future expectations for inflation also pointing in the right direction.     Firstly, the food price component slowed to 4,1% in June 2024, from 4,3% in the previous month, due to moderation in price increases across most products in the food basket, except for bread and cereal products, as well as meat. According to the Agriculture Business Chamber (Agbiz), potential future price increases of wheat and rice are expected to be moderate, due to early forecasts by the International Grains Council of global wheat and rice production in the current season that are well above long-term production levels.   The sub-index for food & beverages has dropped to below the mid-point of the MPC’s inflation target range (3% to 6%). In combination, food (including non-alcoholic beverages) and alcoholic beverages comprise more than 21% of the weighting of the CPI basket and any further downward movement will almost certainly serve to lower the CPI further.   Secondly, after some nervousness with an uptick in producer prices in April, the producer price index (PPI) has declined again, with the June reading of 4.6% virtually on the nose of the mid-point of the Reserve Bank’s target range for inflation.   Price increases at the factory gate are currently lower than consumer inflation. As a rule, producer prices act as a leading indicator for consumer prices, which bodes well for a further drop in the CPI in the months ahead.  Consumer price index groups with year-on-year increases well above the CPI (in June 2024) CPI group Weight y-o-y %   %  change Electricity 3.7 15.3 Insurance 9.89 8.1 Water 3.46 7.9 Fuel 4.82 7.6 Restaurants & hotels 3.25 7.5 Note: Groups with a weighting of more than 3% Sources: Stats SA; Own calculations Scrutiny of the June CPI data reveals the negative impact of several consumption expenditure groups that are directly influenced by the public sector (usually referred to as administered prices), especially electricity, water and fuel.   With a bit of luck, the recent strength of the rand exchange rate could eventually lead to a moderation of fuel price increases. Overall, a further moderation of inflationary trends should continue in 2024, with a good chance of an interest rate cut in September.   Forward PMI at 28-month high   In June, the Absa/BER purchasing managers’ index (PMI) for business expectations in manufacturing in 6 months’ time reached its highest level since February 2022. The June reading of 68.1 represents a significant improvement on the average index value of merely 53.2 during the preceding 24 months and promises to further boost the exceptionally strong recovery of manufacturing sales since the middle of last year. Ever since the relentless rise in interest rates, confidence in the country’s key manufacturing sector has been under pressure, with the quarterly average 6-month forward PMI dropping to below the neutral 50-mark on two occasions.   Several other key economic indicators are also reflecting an improved outlook for higher growth, most likely because of the historic transition to a government of national unity that is committed to preserving South Africa’s democratic constitution and the principle of private property rights.   Manufacturing sector shines   South Africa’s manufacturing sector sales performance continues to reach new record high levels, with a cumulative figure of R1.1 trillion having been achieved between January and April. It is the second successive year that manufacturing sales breached the R1 trillion level within merely four months.   When adjusted for inflation by the CPI, total manufacturing sales between January and April increased by more than 9% year-on-year. In the aftermath of the debilitating effects of the Covid pandemic, South Africa’s factories have outperformed most other key sectors of the economy, with average monthly sales values well above those that existed before 2020.   Further good news on the manufacturing front is the announcement by steel producer ArcelorMittal South Africa (AMSA) that it will continue to operate its longs business, the closure of which was deferred earlier this year (in steel industry terminology longs business refers to the manufacturing of steel products such as wire, rod, rail, and bars as well as certain types of structural sections and girders, mainly for use in construction).   Any closure of AMSA’s longs business would have been devastating for the 3,500 workers employed at the plant, as well as the town of Newcastle, in KwaZulu-Natal, where AMSA’s factory is located. It  would also have impacted negatively on the whole of the country’s manufacturing and construction industries.   Reasons for the decision to keep the plant fully operational include the securing of a working-capital facility of R1-billion for a 12-month period, some improvements in Transnet’s performance, and a provisional safeguard duty of 9% on certain hot-rolled steel products.   Any progress with the work being done by the National Logistics Crisis Committee will serve to enhance the efficiency of roads, railways and harbours, which, in turn, should also serve to ultimately stimulate manufacturing sector exports.   Mineral prices start to recover   The recent recovery of mineral prices is a most welcome development for the South African economy, which remains reliant on commodity exports for the bulk of its foreign exchange earnings.   Since the recent lows recorded between March and April, the prices of the top-six minerals produced by South Africa (in value terms) have all edged upwards. Manganese has been the top performer with a price increase of 36%, followed by gold, which remains in record-breaking mode. Since the beginning of the second quarter of 2024, platinum, iron ore and coal have all experienced price increases above 5%, with chromium ore also moving up slightly.   Several research agencies, including BMI, share an overall positive view on metal and mineral price forecasts for 2024, with some key commodities starting to gain on last year’s price levels, whilst remaining above pre-2020 levels. Iron ore is expected to lead gains in ferrous metals, mainly due to positive sentiment over China’s recently announced economic stimulus measures. Despite the Chinese economy being hamstrung by over-supply in its property sector, China remains the world’s largest consumer of metals.   Even a marginal uptick in the demand for minerals from the world’s second largest economy is bound to exert a positive impact on prices. The sectors for energy and construction will also continue to drive demand for a variety of metals and minerals, with a robust US economy likely to boost prices in 2024 and beyond.   Precious metal prices have already responded to the return to price stability in most key economies, with lower interest rates on the cards in the US and Europe. Gold is a shining example of the recovery of precious metal prices and has reached new record highs for several months in succession.   Rising mineral prices have a multi-faceted positive impact on the South African economy. Firstly, despite the problems still being experienced with the efficiency of transport logistics, higher prices will boost the country’s trade balance, which has been in surplus for eight successive years and is now likely to retain this feat.   A stronger balance of payments will impact positively on the rand exchange rate, which has been the strongest global currency against the US dollar since the beginning of March. Currency strength, in turn, should do its bit in easing inflation via the easing of import cost pressures. Welcome reprieve from loadshedding   During April, May and June, South Africa enjoyed three full months of uninterrupted electricity for the first time in several years, due mainly to the expansion of solar power installations. Eskom has announced that its energy availability factor has reached 65.5 percent for the first time since 2021.   According to Isabel Fick, the head of Eskom’s systems operations, the contributions of solar power plants and rooftop solar installations were allowing Eskom to replenish its pumped storage capacity during the day rather than at night. During 2023, about 2 500 MW of rooftop solar capacity was added, much of which was coupled to battery storage, increasing the overall installed base to above 5 400 MW.   An estimated 2,800 MW of photovoltaic solar is already connected to the Eskom grid. The next stage of harnessing more solar power will focus on two crucial issues, namely an expansion of grid capacity and designing a model that allows surplus solar capacity from independent power producers to also become available. Business chambers around the country have welcomed the renewed stability of electricity supply, which has raised productivity and lowered input costs.   Apart from the relentless rise in solar power generated by households and businesses, Eskom has reviewed the performance of plant managers and other senior employees at its power stations., resulting in extensive changes to the leadership at some of the utility’s worst-performing power stations.   Furthermore, a comprehensive maintenance plan was developed, targeting the worst-performing power stations, whilst also partnering with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) with extensive knowledge of the equipment used at power plants.   New cabinet announced by the GNU   The appointment of South Africa’s first Cabinet under the new government of national unity (GNU) has been met with overwhelming positive response by business leaders, whilst also receiving a thumbs-up from global capital markets.   For the first time since the transition to democracy, the country’s second largest political party, the Democratic Alliance (DA) has the opportunity to introduce its track record of sound governance at provincial and municipal level, zero tolerance for corruption, and pragmatic policy making at the highest level of government in South Africa. The cabinet has been expanded again, as a result of the forming of a coalition after the May election results saw an end to the ANC’s sway over the national political executive.   In the economic cluster of the Cabinet, the reappointment of Enoch Godongwana as finance minister and David Masondo as his deputy was most welcome, especially due to the steadfast way in which National Treasury has been managing the country’s public finances, which have been under pressure ever since the occurrence of state capture and the lockdowns implemented during the Covid pandemic. Commenting on the reappointment of Minister Godongwana, Business Unity South said that it demonstrates an ongoing commitment by the government to responsible fiscal policies aimed at reducing debt and freeing up spending for productive social and economic development.   The decision to establish a separate energy portfolio headed by the previous Minister of Electricity Dr Kgosientsho Ramokgopa and the DA’s Samantha Graham as Deputy Minister has been welcomed by key stakeholders and energy sector experts. Prof. Anton Eberhard from the University of Cape Town described the restructuring as a sound development, which means that all the provisions of the Electricity Regulation Act (ERA), including electricity planning and procurement, will now fall under Dr Ramokgopa.   This move is expected to facilitate more effective implementation of energy policies than was the case under a combined portfolio for mineral resources and energy. It has also received support from James Mackay, CEO of the Energy Council of South Africa, who commented that it bodes well for dealing with the country’s broader energy challenges and delivering a national energy transition.   Proof of the urgency with which the new cabinet is approaching the crucially important challenge to lower unemployment via higher economic growth has already surfaced at the Department of Transport and the Department of Home Affairs. On 15 July, Barabara Creecy, new Minister of Transport, announced the imminent formation of a specialised unit in her department, called the Private Sector Participation Unit (PSPU). This unit will be staffed by appropriately qualified and experienced experts and will aim, inter alia,  to harness private sector support for repairing and expanding the country’s transport infrastructure.   The new Minister of Home Affairs, Dr Leon Schreiber, has announced plans to resolve the visa backlog for skilled workers. This will entail a simplification of the application process and the introduction of measures like a points system for skilled workers. Research by the Reserve Bank estimates that four local jobs are created per skilled migrant.   Sterling performance by National Treasury   Over the past two years, National Treasury had made considerable progress in stabilising the country’s fiscal affairs by a conservative approach towards government spending and weaning state-owned enterprises such as Eskom and Transnet off fiscal bailouts.   The effect of improved fiscal management has resulted in South Africa achieving its first primary budget surplus in 15 years. During the year to end March 2024, state revenue exceeded non-interest expenditure by more than R31 billion (0.4% of GDP). The decline in non‐interest expenditure was driven by lower voted expenditure, largely owing to the sharp decline in payments for financial assets, reflecting government’s limited recapitalisation of State-owned companies.   National Treasury has also pressed ahead with structural economic reforms initiated by Pres Ramaphosa, aimed at implementing pro-growth and investment policies with the cooperation & participation of the private sector, especially in key sectors of the economy such as energy and logistics.   The 2024/25 national budget will mainly be remembered for its novel utilisation of a portion of South Africa’s gold and foreign exchange contingency reserve account (GFECRA), commonly known simply as the forex reserves. Most countries have foreign exchange reserves, held by their central banks, which can be used for purposes of maintaining macro-economic stability.   Specific examples include interest payments and principal repayments on external government debt denominated in foreign currencies and beefing up the public finances during times when fiscal revenue has not met budget expectations. The latter is exactly what has been implemented by National Treasury in the wake of the tax revenue shortfall experienced during the 2023/24 fiscal year.   Over the past two years, many companies in the resources sector and its supply chain were faced by weak export commodity prices, whilst sluggish world growth and weak domestic demand (due to the record high domestic interest rates) have also served to curtail turnover and profit growth.   For anyone that is concerned over the practice of resorting to foreign exchange reserves as part of fiscal stabilisation policy, it is interesting to note that the origin of the more than R1.1 trillion in gross gold & foreign exchange reserves currently held by the SA Reserve Bank (SARB) was a fiscal transfer to the SARB of (merely) R28 billion made by then finance minister Trevor Manual in 2003.   At the time, South Africa’s foreign exchange reserves were only slowly starting to recover from the disastrous attempt by the Reserve Bank to protect the rand against the fallout from an emerging market currency crisis caused initially by Thailand’s decision to decouple from the US dollar.    Global capital market approval of GNU   The decline of more than 140 basis points in South Africa’s ten-year bond yield in the aftermath of the recent elections holds the promise of hastening the imminent lowering of the Reserve Bank’s repo rate.   A positive medium to long-term relationship exists between money market rates and long-term interest rates. Should the declining trend in the long-term bond yield continue, it would serve as a clear signal that the repo rate and commercial lending rates are falling significantly behind the curve.   The chances for an easing of lending rates happening sooner rather than later have also improved for other reasons, mainly because of further declines in the producer price index and the food price index, both of which act as leading indicators of the consumer price index.     Both the PPI and the CPI have been within the inflation target range for a year and millions of indebted South Africans are eagerly awaiting a departure from a restrictive monetary policy approach, which started at the end of 2021.   Apart from the larger appetite amongst global fund managers for South Africa’s government bonds, the domestic equity market and the rand have also benefited from the historic transition to a coalition government that is committed to preserving South Africa’s democratic constitution and the principle of private property rights. Between mid-April and 16 July, the JSE all share index (Alsi) rose by more than 11%.   The recent performance of the rand has also been impressive. Between the first of March and the end of June, none of the sixteen key currencies monitored by Currencies Direct  outperformed the rand against the US dollar, with even the Euro, the Chinese yuan and the Japanese yen taking a hit against the world’s dominant currency.   This time around, rand strength was not based on any relative weakness in the US dollar’s value, as the dollar index (DXY) strengthened by almost 2% to 105.9 over the past four months, leaving most of the world’s key currencies floundering.   Although the rand is likely to remain volatile against the dollar, several leading financial institutions are predicting a value of below R18 by the end of the year. A stronger and less volatile rand exchange rate will place further downward pressure on inflation, which could eventually lead to a series of interest rate cuts in 2024.   Policy priorities announced by the GNU   Speaking shortly after the first Cabinet lekgotla of the new government of national unity (GNU) to determine key priorities, Pres. Ramaphosa announced that inclusive economic growth had been identified as the most important item on the national agenda. He promised that the GNU would pursue every action that contributes to sustainable, rapid economic growth and remove every obstacle that stands in the way of growth.   Reducing red tape was another priority area, with departments and public entities having been directed to reduce the undue regulatory burdens that stifle the ability of businesses to expand their operations, especially small firms.   As expected, emphasis was also placed on the just transition towards renewable energy, with the objective of South Africa creating a green manufacturing sector centred on the export of green hydrogen and associated products, including electric vehicles and renewable energy components.   The intention was expressed to turn the country into a “construction site”, as roads, bridges, houses, schools, hospitals and clinics are built, and as broadband fibre and new power lines are installed. Other sector-specific priority areas include the release of public land for social housing and redirecting housing policy to enable people to find affordable homes in areas of their choice.   Part of the plan to ensure that municipalities are financially and operationally sustainable include systems to ensure that capable and qualified people are appointed to senior positions at local government level and to ensure independent regulation and oversight of the appointment process.   The initiation of a second phase of Operation Vulindlela was also announced, which would consolidate reforms already under way in the electricity, freight logistics and water sectors, as well as to facilitate an injection of skills and tourists through visa reforms. Closer cooperation between the public and private sectors lies at the heart of these reforms. If successful, it would be a very welcome development.   A challenging task lies ahead   It is important to note that the new-found urgency in attempting to raise the country’s economic growth rate will be faced with an initial obstacle in the form of officials in the public sector that are not necessarily aligned to the non-ANC parties in the GNU. Cabinet ministers from other parties than the ANC may face some resistance from their bureaucracies and will face a huge task in fostering a spirit of cooperation with existing technocrats and policy advisors. New ministers will also face a steep learning curve in terms of the plethora of regulations that underpin public sector activity. An element of resistance towards the broad policy direction that was outlined on 18 July during the opening of Parliament can also be expected from some trade unions, who have enjoyed a long-standing alliance with the ANC, despite favouring labour market regulations that are not necessarily conducive to employment creation at scale.   It should nevertheless be comforting to the new coalition government that 2019 was the only time a trade union has de facto participated in a national election and the relevant party (the Socialist Revolutionary Workers’ Party) could not attract enough votes for a single seat in Parliament. It seems clear that trade unions with strong socialist leanings do not enjoy meaningful popular support in South Africa beyond the occasional drumming up of some members for a protest march.   In order to allay fears over the effectiveness of the GNU, it would be necessary to identify a selection of the new policy initiatives that could produce visible results in a relatively short time frame. These could include the fast-tracking of low-cost housing construction, repairs to municipal infrastructure (especially roads and sewerage and improved water provision to informal settlements) and the involvement of the private sector in new public works projects (e.g. the transformation of large illegal waste dumping sites into revenue-generating establishments).   Concluding remarks   Judging by comments from business leaders and the reaction of capital markets, South Africa’s transition to a coalition government promises to up the ante for fixing the mess of the state capture era, especially with regard to the mismanagement of several key state-owned enterprises and dozens of municipalities around the country.   One of the prerequisites for a successful infrastructure drive is the return to financial and operational stability of public sector entities that have become dysfunctional (Western Cape excluded). To this end, the proven experience in sound corporate governance at most of the local governments in the Western Cape provides the GNU with handy case studies. There is no need to reinvent the wheel – just ensure that municipalities are staffed by appropriately qualified and experienced personnel.   Fortunately, the chances of success are good – business leaders in the private sector are prepared to become even more involved in assisting the repair to the country’s infrastructure and fundamental fiscal policy is in place. A resilient rand, combined with a sharp drop in long-term interest rates and consumer inflation, have laid the table for higher growth, but this will be delayed until such time as lending rates decline to significantly lower levels. Against the background of high and rising unemployment, there is no justification for clinging to an overly restrictive monetary policy. It is perhaps time to consider a broadening of the membership of the MPC to also allow for inputs from economists in the private sector who are not political appointments.       - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Inclusive Society Institute has been making significant strides in Gauteng schools, actively engaging students and promoting democratic values. On Monday, 2 September 2024, a total of 104 learners from Amandasig Secondary School participated in the "Taking the Constitution to the People" workshop, which was facilitated by Mr Patrick Morathi, the Institute's representative in the Gauteng Province. This workshop aimed to deepen the students' understanding and appreciation of South Africa's democratic constitution, its history, structure, and the fundamental rights and responsibilities outlined in the Bill of Rights.   Through this interactive session, the learners were taken on a comprehensive journey, exploring the intricate process by which the current constitution was crafted, the guiding principles that shaped its development, and the pivotal role it plays in shaping the nation's governance and social fabric. The workshop delved into the Founding Provisions, which establish the foundational values and aspirations of the democratic state, as well as the Bill of Rights, which enshrines the fundamental human rights and freedoms that all citizens are entitled to. Importantly, the session also emphasized the concept of responsible citizenry, empowering the young participants to recognize their active role in upholding the constitution and contributing to the realization of a truly inclusive, equitable, and just society.   The Inclusive Society Institute's commitment to this initiative extends beyond a single event, as Gauteng Province, through its various Districts, will continue to roll out similar workshops in secondary schools across the region. By fostering a deeper understanding and engagement with the constitution, the Institute aims to cultivate a generation of informed, engaged, and civic-minded citizens who will shape the future of South Africa and uphold the democratic ideals that the country was founded upon.

On 29 August 2024, the Inclusive Society Institute, a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting civic engagement and constitutional awareness, visited Walmansthal Secondary School in the bustling township of Soshanguve. Their mission that day was to roll out an enlightening constitutional awareness program titled "Taking the Constitution to the People", with the goal of empowering the learners with a deeper understanding of the history, structure, and practical applications of South Africa's foundational legal document. This workshop was perfectly aligned with their Life Orientation curriculum, providing a valuable opportunity to go beyond the textbooks and explore the Constitution's real-world relevance.   The Inclusive Society Institute's Patrick Morathi facilitated the workshop, armed with a wealth of knowledge and interactive teaching methods. He began by guiding the learners on a captivating journey through the tumultuous history that led to the creation of South Africa's democratic Constitution, highlighting the hard-fought struggles and sacrifices that paved the way for the inclusive, rights-based system the country enjoys today. With vivid descriptions and thought-provoking questions, the facilitator encouraged the learners to connect the constitutional principles to their own daily lives, sparking lively discussions on topics such as equality, freedom of expression, and access to education.   As the workshop progressed, the learners grew increasingly engaged, eagerly raising their hands to share personal anecdotes and pose insightful queries. The facilitator skillfully navigated these conversations, ensuring that each learner felt empowered to voice their opinions and concerns, and left with a heightened sense of their rights and responsibilities as young citizens. By the end of the session, the once-passive audience had transformed into an energized group of constitutional advocates, eager to apply their newfound knowledge and become active participants in shaping their country's future.

Copyright © 2024   Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8010 South Africa   235-515 NPO   All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute                                                                                                                                     DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or its Board or Council members.   August 2024   Author: Klaus Kotzé Editor: Daryl Swanepoel Introduction and Background   The Global South Perspectives Network is a collective of universities, think tanks, non-profit organisations, and government institutions, brought together over three regions: Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa. The Network was co-convened in 2023 by the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS) and the research group Humanitarian Journalism and Media Interventions (HumanizaCom), of the Postgraduate Program in Social Communication at the Methodist University of São  Paulo.   The Network aims to constructively contribute to ensuring greater influence and equitable partnership of the states in the Global South on matters relating to effective, reformed and resilient multilateralism. Multilateralism that ensures adequate representation of the interests of the Global South.   As a whole, the Network seeks to produce research and insights mainly into the non-military threats and human security, with a particular focus on the Global South. These include environmental, economic and social issues, as well as the effects of pandemics and novel problems.   The Network offers an opportunity for amplified voices from the Global South. For broader contribution of these actors in the decision-making process relating to reforms and other actions affecting multilateralism, anchored in the United Nations system.    In light of the complex challenges facing the global governance architecture, considerations are being developed by various stakeholders to provide adequate and timely responses to contemporary, global threats.   The United Nations has recognised the need for such responses and is accordingly planning to host the Summit of the Future, in September 2024. This Summit presents a critical opportunity to chart a path for sustainable development and reformed multilateralism. Leading up to the Summit of the Future, stakeholders are introducing new or recalibrated approaches to address the world’s most pressing challenges. In so doing, they are constructively contributing to the much-needed global governance reform process.   Among the various groups, civil society groups have a central role in discussing and developing new processes that are aimed at addressing global concerns. In its preparation documents, the Summit of the Future recognises that:   “Keeping with the vision of a more networked and inclusive multilateralism enshrined in Our Common Agenda, the Secretary-General has underscored the importance of engaging diverse stakeholders from across the full spectrum of society. Their voices are essential to the preparation and success of the Summit of the Future. By tapping into their wealth of expertise and leveraging their platforms, we can support more informed policy decisions, amplify the impact of the Summit, and better tackle the challenges of today and tomorrow” (United Nations Summit of the Future, 2024: https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future/stakeholders).   The United Nations’ recognition of and appeal to civil society organisations, to make representations and to propose inclusive and critical approaches to addressing global concerns, offers an opportunity for the Global South Perspectives Network to develop and present its views and policy proposals towards a better future.   Global South Perspectives Network: Towards a systemic response    In 2023 the Network produced its first collaborative report: Global South Perspectives on Global Governance Reform . The report seeks to amplify the voices of the Global South in their conceptualisation and direction of reformed multilateralism. It notes the need for global governance innovation not only to exist in pockets of the Global North. But that the states from the Global South have a decided and critical role to play by sharing their experiences and putting forward solutions that advance their interests.   In its inaugural report, the Network looked at ways to ensure rapid and effective response by the United Nations to the crises around the world. It placed particular attention on the multitude of non-military threats. One of the central initiatives that are discussed and advanced in the report, is the proposal of a Global Resilience Council, as introduced and actively developed by the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability.   The ideation of a Global Resilience Council takes into consideration that the systemic crises the world faces have an impact on the social, economic and planetary systems that humanity and the environment depend on. To respond to systemic crises is thus more extensive and on a broader scale than the efforts to develop international cooperation and sectoral solutions. The Global Resilience Council is proposed to operate at the highest level of global governance, pursuant to non-military challenges faced by humanity. Such a Council is envisioned to function with similar authority to that of the United Nations Security Council, but without the impediments that hinder the Security Council’s effectiveness. It would be an inclusive council actively engaging assemblies representing various constituencies of state and non-state actors globally, with its central purpose being to provide these actors with a dedicated and robust platform to pursue effective global governance.   The report assessed the appetite for and thoughts on such a Council. It found that among the contributors and participants of the surveys undertaken, there was broad agreement on the need for a structure such as the Global Resilience Council. Participants also broadly agreed that such a council promises to hold a number of opportunities, and that its potential benefits generally outweigh the possible drawbacks.   The report found that further work was needed to develop the concept of a Global Resilience Council, expanding it in detail and defining its various aspects. The report concluded that the concept should be taken to scholars and practitioners, to think tanks and conferences for interrogation.   ACUNS: A platform to introduce and discuss the GRC   The Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) is a significant organisation that seeks to bring together those studying and working on the practices and performance of the United Nations system. It does so to better understand the international body, and its various approaches to global issues and to provide insight and input into making it more effective. ACUNS recognises that:   “In the 21st century, it is not only war, but also climate change, pandemic disease, new weapons, displacement, inequality, bigotry and extremism that threatens global well-being. Because these challenges disregard borders, no sovereign nation will succeed in countering them alone. Solutions to improve the human condition will most likely advance with evidence-based analysis, international legal agreement, and multilateral action. As the only institution with worldwide membership, an effective United Nations is an existential imperative for the global good. ACUNS serves to foster well-studied action in the UN system” (Academic Council on the United Nations System, 2024:  https://acuns.org/purpose/ ).   With its broader, incisive view of the various global crises, with human security at its centre, and with it bringing together United Nations practitioners from across the world to find collective effective approaches, ACUNS offers an opportune platform for the Network to present its thinking and proposal of a Global Resilience Council.   ACUNS’ flagship event is its annual meeting where practitioners and scholars consider, debate and analyse the work and direction of the United Nations. Between 20 and 22 June 2024, ACUNS’ annual meeting was held in Tokyo under the theme: Global Governance and Sustainable Development: Revitalizing Research to Support Multilateral Solutions . The meeting offered the Global South Perspectives Network the opportunity to introduce its thinking on the ways that global governance can be reformed, so as to make it more equitable and effective at addressing global concerns.   A panel was accordingly held under the title: Effectively addressing Human Security Challenges: What would a Global Resilience Council bring?     The following participants took part in the panel:   Buyelwa Sonjica (Chair), Former Government Minister (South Africa) and current chair of the Advisory Council of the Inclusive Society Institute Georgios Kostakos, Executive Director: Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability Harris Gleckman, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Governance and Sustainability, and Executive Board Member at the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability Shabnam Delfan, associated to the Buckingham University and the Open University    Chairperson’s opening remarks   Buyelwa Sonjica   The world faces significant challenges. Historian Adam Tooze has described the state of global affairs as one resembling a polycrisis. The name describes how there exists an interplay between various crises and that due to the pervasive reality of global connection, the effects are more immediate on everyone. Emerging and critical approaches are required to effectively address this polycrisis.   When the world came together almost 80 years ago to form the United Nations, it was as a response to the immediate threat that nations inflicted upon each other during the second world war.  The response was to collectively form a body that would effectively and legitimately address the world’s most immediate crisis – war.   Today, while the United Nations stands proud, it is increasingly challenged as not being fit for purpose. Its power structures are out of date. They do not reflect the social and political realities of today’s world. Neither is the United Nations able to adequately address these realities nor is it set up to attend to the emergence of new global challenges, whether related to climate change, or what we have recently seen during the COVID-19 pandemic.   In sum, the dominant peace and security approach of the United Nations, steered by the Security Council, cannot address the increasing human security challenges as captured by the polycrisis. In fact, there is currently no coherent and effective way of dealing with global human security challenges. The predominance of the veto bearing permanent members of the Security Council (P5) compromises the United Nations’ broader power, as it does the equality of nations. Currently, the P5 involve themselves in everything, but not everything is related to peace and conflict. The ineffectiveness of the current system plays itself out as a violation of basic human rights. Civilians from around the world are suffering from a system that is unable to effectively discharge its mandate and attend to emergent issues.   What the world needs is a stronger, more representative global system. A move towards inclusive multilateralism will not only highlight but also attend to broader matters affecting the world’s population. The questions, therefore, remain: where are these changes to be brought?  How does the United Nations become fit for purpose? In other words, how does it go about changing its policy, structure and process?   This panel offered the opportunity to explore these matters. Recognising that major structural, global crises go unanswered, the panel discussed the proposal of a Global Resilience Council. An institution that will speak to systemic crises, from a human security approach.   This panel allowed for the thinking of the Council to be expanded, to look at human security aspects such as poverty, migration, climate change and the effect of pandemics. Since the thought about such a Council is still at its development stage, this panel and the discussion that followed among participants and the audience allowed for critical engagement and further development. A case for the Global Resilience Council   Georgios Kostakos The thinking behind a Global Resilience Council commenced from one main observation. It recognises that the reforms required for the United Nations system cannot be accomplished by one centralised and specialised agency. Instead, it asks: how could the whole system be brought together as a whole to address prevailing human security issues? Such an approach recognises that singular mandates, or departments only addressing internal matters, do not address the prevailing systemic problems. To address that, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability came up with the idea of the Global Resilience Council.   The reason for the focus on resilience is simply because that is what is most needed in the world today. It recognises that while there will always be crises that affect humanity, it is important that there should be effective and adequate responses. Ways for the people of the world to get back on their feet, and in a better position than before. Put in another way: get back better.   The idea is that the Council will be analogous to the United Nations Security Council for non-military threats. A Council for systemic crises that have many dimensions. Such an approach should leverage learning from the past so as to better address future events. For example, it should not get stuck in a situation akin to the Security Council, which empowers some powerful states with the veto power to stop decisions from being carried out. This results in the United Nations not being able to address big problems.   A Global Resilience Council will be more representative than the Security Council. With 15 members, the Security Council is not representative of the world’s 193 member states with different interests and concerns. The new body will supplement the Security Council. Whereas the Secretary-General has proposed something similar in his Our Common Agenda report, these suggestions have shortcomings, as he suggests the creation of emergency platforms for each shock that emerges. In such a situation, authorisation from member states would be required for each event. This would mean that the Secretary-General will decide which countries, which civil society organisations, and which private sector players to invite to best address each crisis. It is also proposed not to be permanent, but should be run on an ad hoc basis, so as to allow flexibility. Each structure will then end when that concomitant crisis ends.   Such an approach is short-sighted and will prove to be ineffective. The crises of today, such as climate change, are not ad hoc crises. They are deeply ingrained in the way the world functions, affecting how people produce and consume. How the economy and politics work. In other words, it is not possible to get rid of these systemic crises with an ad hoc structure. Such suggestions also face transparency and legitimacy concerns.   A Global Resilience Council will be an intergovernmental body; governments carry final responsibility for their citizens, and collectively for the whole of humanity. A mix of various (external) actors cannot be expected to deal with existential questions facing countries. As evidenced by the COVAX facility during the COVID-19 pandemic. This facility proved to only work for the wealthy countries that could pay the high costs. These states were the first to receive their vaccines and often other, poorer states were denied their share until the richer states had more than enough. New structures, when set up, must be more representative. This will further ensure their legitimacy.   The Global Resilience Council starts from the basis that climate change, for example, has an impact on the core planetary, social and economic systems. Its solution must therefore also bring all these components together. The world must respond to systemic crises by looking at the big picture – in terms of systems.   Such a council must be able to impose some sanctions when various actors, states or non-state actors, do not follow the rules that have been agreed to. Platforms such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change would be able to bring their grievances to the Council, so as to pressure actors for their compliance. The World Health Organization could do the same for pandemics. Furthermore, the Secretary-General, or individual countries could bring issues to the Council, which will then see to it that separate organisations deal with the separate issues. The differentiated agencies are supplemented by this high-level body, which has an intergovernmental core. Governments are at the centre. They are the ones who are making decisions. But around them, they are supported by an advisory assembly of constituencies. The scientific community will be central, so too the indigenous communities and local authorities. All bringing in their wisdom and advice. And once the decision is taken by the central body, these supplementary bodies also help with implementation.     What a Global Resilience Council would look like   Harris Gleckman At the time that the current global governance system was initiated, largely following World War Two, the organisations to emerge were given discreet tasks. These tasks were economic and social. It did not attend to matters that are today topical and important, such as matters regarding the environment and gender. The significant change in the landscape suggests that a new array of tasks requires a new array of organisations. Or that a new platform is required. This is what is being suggested here with the introduction of a Global Resilience Council.   It is now imperative to rethink the fundamentals that the world has become so accustomed to. The ongoing approach, which sees specific concerns addressed by separate organisational structures, such as development and habitat, is clearly proving to be lacking. The people of the world should step back and ask: in what way could the world best address these emergent concerns through a multilateral body, given the nature of the crises? This is where the suggestion for the new Council comes in. It should be noted that additional thoughts about the structure and composition of the Council should be greatly welcomed. At its core, the idea of a Council is a challenging one. One that is open to discussion and revision where needed and deemed appropriate by the differing people who will be affected by the consequences of ongoing human insecurity.   On an institutional basis, such a Council would need a formal treaty or a change in the United Nations Charter. To get it going, it could be established as a subcommittee of the General Assembly that all other United Nations system organisations would recognise as a co-facilitated committee. In this way, it would provide a platform for all parts of the United Nations at the intergovernmental level to start to meet the diversity of its challenges. While the United Nations has an existing chief executive office, that is on the administrative side. The tough part would be to get the political side aligned with the nature of contemporary issues that they are trying to address. In time, it should be turned, in the fashion of the International Criminal Court, into a self-standing treaty organisation.   When looking at the proposed composition, the agents should be states. But perhaps it would be best for states to be represented on a regional basis. This will be an innovative way to have regional bodies such as the African Union, the European Commission and other regional bodies be part of the coordination structure of the arrangement.   Unlike the voluntary Economic and Social Council, or the voluntary Paris Agreement, the Global Resilience Council is proposed to have some obligatory powers. The suggestion is that in the startup period, it could make direct proposals to governments, international finance institutions and judicial authorities. These organisations and institutions would act under their own authority. Leveraging or addressing the blocking of issues under their own auspices. It could, in a court-like way, insist upon accessing public data from the key actors in the field.  As such it would be able to hold actors accountable.   It could further propose to international banks and financial institutions that certain actors be removed as they are undermining international financial stability. It could advise and counsel other agencies. To advise on their business and where they should take up a certain issue as a serious matter.   An outcome of such an approach will be to attend to the existing fragmented system. It will ensure that for the first time, organisations such as the World Food Council or any of the governing bodies that in practice have no authority to send a formal request to another intergovernmental body, would now be able to do so. It will assist in the partnership and collaboration between organisations, where one will be able to initiate ideas about concomitant concerns and allow different departments and organisations to make requests and to elevate issues onto the agenda of partner organisations.    The thinking behind a Global Resilience Council is thus envisioning a multilateral body that has a starting structure, a set of ways that it can exert some degree of power. Some new ways that the multiple and diverse civil society actors can be a part of and advise upon. And some structure of a platform to allow the existing organisations to have intergovernmental discussions with one another about how to address structural crises.   In conclusion, the concept of a Global Resilience Council offers to be a body that will be central to reformed multilateralism. Through its collective response capabilities to major systemic crises, it would escalate concerns from the level of individual specialised agencies to the global community at large. This would contribute to a concerted effort across various issue areas. It would function in the spirit of a ‘whole of government’ approach, but on a planetary level. Such a body bodes well for the much-needed innovations that would bring about adequate and representative global governance reform.    Building resilience against climate threats   Shabnam Delfan   Climate change has a direct impact on human security around the world. The failure to meet the maximum 1.5 degrees rise in global temperature stemming from the landmark 2015 Paris Agreement shows the imminent risk. Its concomitant disruptions pose an enormous challenge to global society. The interlinked nature of climate, disease, economic and other factors have a direct impact on human security.   Demographic trends, including migration and rapid urbanisation, are raising the threats to the most vulnerable. Climate change is also a threat multiplier. This means that food insecurity, persistent poverty, displacement and other insecurities can trigger a competition for scarce natural resources and fuel social tension and increase crime and insecurity in societies around the world. It, therefore, emerges that the imminent threat of climate change is the increase in poverty and other persisting inequalities. People with lower incomes are the most likely to depend on resources provided by nature. By disrupting natural systems and the resources they provide, dependent people and animals are directly affected.   By hitting the poorest the hardest, climate change increases existing inequalities and causes more people to fall into poverty. It is therefore critical to respond to the climate change crisis comprehensively. Human security takes this approach and United Nations member states have overwhelmingly highlighted the importance of acting on climate change. But what is happening is not enough, nor have these measures been implemented sufficiently.   There are four ways in which climate change affects human security when human security is understood as safety from chronic threats, such as hunger, disease and poverty, but also the protection from sudden and harmful destruction of the patterns of daily life.   Climate change is increasingly impacting human security when changes (such as in rainfall) trigger competition for food and water. This takes place especially in the Middle East and North Africa regions and the Global South more broadly. Declining agricultural output can lead to a loss of income for a broad segment of the population. These changes have already led to more than 20 million people being either internally or externally displaced from their places of stay. Climate change functions as a threat multiplier. It worsens the existing social and economic conditions. Climate change is thus an aggravating factor for instability, conflict and terrorism. It disrupts social relations where it pits groups against one another, such as farmers against communities. In Somalia, for instance, years of conflict have degraded the resilience of the state and have severely affected the stability of local communities. The ongoing drought has simply worsened this tension. In Iraq, the water crisis is a serious and aggravating factor that is bringing the country to a point of existential crisis. Climate change affects food production and drives up hunger. When climate disaster threatens coastal fisheries and agricultural land, food production suffers. Food crises and hunger combine with existing inequalities. Political and social exclusion can also lead to unrest. In Africa, decimated food crops have driven food prices sky-high. In some Pacific islands, increased sea levels have threatened fisheries and thereby threatened the food supply. As many as 800 million people are facing hunger and concomitant displacement due to these disruptions. Each year more than 20 million people are forced to leave their homes and move to other areas due to floods, droughts and other extreme weather events. By and large, most of the displacement of peoples takes place in developing countries, which are already overburdened by conflicts, food shortages and broader instability. All indicators point to migration becoming one of the major policy challenges of the century. This is not only the case in the Global North, where political lines are being drawn and migrants are increasingly finding passage to safety and security difficult. Migration is equally, if not more of, a policy challenge to the states of the Global South, which does not have the registry and security mechanisms of the North. And where social tensions are reaching fever pitch as groups are pitted against each other for resources and employment. Adequate planning and management is going to be critical for human security. The degradation of the ecosystems and the demand for resources can also lead to chronic poverty and hunger and a high level of communicable diseases and broader conflict. Climate change is increasing poverty and inequality. The United Nations Secretary-General has called for stimulation packages of at least 500 billion dollars per year to address the unfair global financial system, and thereby tackling the high cost of debt and exorbitant impacts of long-term financial obligations. Since 2015 there has not been adequate implementation of financial measures to tackle the crisis. The final way that climate change affects human security is the impact it has on women and girls, on gender-related inequalities. Unequal access to resources can leave women and girls disproportionately vulnerable. Women and girls face significant risks from climate change and the disruptions it causes. In Somalia, for instance, shifting rain patterns due to climate change are leading to water quality worsening and leading to higher rates of violence, particularly towards women and girls. Forced displacement due to climate change has seen rates of sexual violence increase. Women are often responsible for providing water and fuel for households, especially in the developing countries. When women and girls have to venture further from their homes in search for water and fuel, they are at an increased risk of sexual harassment and violence. It also decreases their ability to pursue paid work and negatively impacts the opportunities for girls to stay enrolled in schools and become educated. By including women in local initiatives, it reduces the tension and contributes to greater social stability.   It is seen that in relation to climate change and its key priorities, proactivity and intervention are now essential. The international community has so far acted in an essentially reactive manner. By responding to the humanitarian crisis, to assist developing countries tackle urban growth and expansion of slums, the development community and international organisations have a central role to play. The combination of widespread land degradation, food insecurity and large-scale migration are contributing to an extensive and even existential crisis. While more work is needed to be done in these areas, to identify and prioritise the hotspots for intervention, forecasts and existing information provide some indicators for particularly vulnerable areas including small and developing states.   Both humanitarian and development assistance is clearly needed. While most of the burden falls to the least developed countries, it is essential that states take ownership of their own national prerogatives. The key priorities are identified here as, first, gaining a better understanding and recognition of the main issues at hand. Second, the mitigation of the main causes. Especially through environmental management and climate change adaptations, mitigation and ensuring that the migration prospect is not emitted when strategies are developed. The third priority is better managing the environmental migration process, especially improving the carrying capacity of these areas. A fourth priority is the incorporation of these strategies and approaches into existing social structures and policy practices, guidelines and forecasts. As a last priority, it is critical to recognise that early action, planning and intervention on critical issues is needed.   Addressing all these environmentally induced matters is important. A multibillion-dollar process is needed. Yet, there exists a lack of current information and so a more accurate costing is necessary.    Finally, it is imperative for all of humanity to unite to push for practicable support for the most vulnerable countries and populations. This must be done by strengthening the capacity of the governments and all stakeholders to respond effectively to existing climate challenges.     Conclusion   The thinking towards a Global Resilience Council has both identified several failures of the existing global governance infrastructure as well as identified issues with those efforts that have been suggested to attend to these failures. These include the suggestion that ameliorative efforts be permanent, not ad hoc. That approaches must be inclusive and obligatory. Such an approach recognises the long-term and comprehensive nature of the complex polycrisis that the world faces, together.   Whereas this panel at this conference offered a wonderful opportunity to transmit the idea of the Council among decision-makers and scholars, it was concluded that much still needs to be done. The details and workings of the Council must be evolved, so as to ensure that it best addresses its targets. It is also important that its suggestions must be lobbied among influential stakeholders, so as to ensure appropriate buy-in and prominence.   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The Chief Executive Officers of the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), the Institute for Global Governance (IGD) and Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) met at the offices of the ISI in Cape Town on Wednesday, 7 August 2024 to finalise their joint action to promote a Global Resilience Council to deal with would be focused on human security matters and the management of systemic crises of developmental sustainability and resilience such as climate change, pandemics, economic development, and systemic issues giving rise to migration. It forms part of their proposals for the reform of the United Nations and the multilateral order. Click below to few the agreed concept note: Georgios Kostakos Chief Executive Officer Foundation for Global Governance Philani Mthembu Chief Executive Officer Institute for Global Governance Daryl Swanepoel Chief Executive Officer Inclusive Society Institute

The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) received an invitation from the China Center for Contemporary World Studies and Secretary General of the Silk Road Think Tank Association (SRTA) Secretariat to form part of a high-level delegation of Think-Tank Scholars from the African continent, to visit China. The visit commenced on 23 July 2024 and ended on 1 August 2024. The purpose of the African Think-Tank Scholars’ visit was not purely for the delegates to enjoy China’s magnificent landscape and experience its friendly culture and mouth-watering cuisine. The visit’s main objective was to further cement the China-Africa friendship, and to deepen and facilitate the China-Africa and People-to-People bond by contributing to building a high-level China-Africa community with a shared future, through dialogue. On 24 July 2024, the delegation attended the 7th Africa-China People’s Forum in Changsha, Hunan Province (in central China). The event was attended by over 200 guests from over 50 African countries. Ms Nondumiso Sithole, advisory council member at the ISI, represented the Institute and attended as a delegate. Ms Sithole formed part of a panel that led discussions on theme 2, “High-end Think Tanks Boost High-Quality Development of China-Africa Cooperation”.  She further submitted contributions at a media briefing session held at the 7th Africa-China Peoples Forum and Young Leaders Forum on Sino-African cooperation. The delegation also attended various field visits to Hunan Province in several locations and different cities, namely Chenzhou, Luoyang and Beijing (in North China), where the China Center for Contemporary World Studies (CCCWS) is based. A high-level thematic seminar was held with CCCWS researchers, Dr Wang Liyong as well as Honourable Lu Kang and Honourable Hong Dayong. The focus of this intensive session was Sino-African cooperation, Belt and Road development in Africa, and the field visits between the African Think-Tank Scholars as well as the researchers from CCCWS. It is worth mentioning that most of the input from the African Think-Tank Scholars had a common thread: that the relationship between China and Africa had evolved into one in which there is respect, and common objectives in terms of empowering the African continent by transforming its economies through various methods. It was also noted that there is a negative global narrative when it comes to Africa-China relations, wherein Chinese policies in Africa are viewed by some as “debt traps”. But that it was up to the African continent as well as the People's Republic of China to not let this detract from their positive, long-standing relationship, as there is a consensus as well as evidence that the relations built thus far have been mutually beneficial and that both parties will continue to work together on the challenges raised.

The Inclusive Society Institute is truly on course with its civic education programme. This programme is aimed at promoting democratic participation, and good responsible citizenry and the values espoused by the Institute. In its quest to broaden Civic Education, the Institute is engaged in “ Taking the Constitution to the People”, with a view to bringing awareness among the learners about their rights and responsibilities, also to inspire perception about where they can become involved in the civic and public affairs. How they can apply the constitution in their daily lives and why it is important that are responsible for their environment, community and the country at large. On 30 July 2024, Patrick Morathi conducted a “Taking the constitution to the people” workshop at Elizabeth Matsemela Secondary School in Soshanguve. The Grade 11 learners were the target group, they enjoyed and openly welcomed the workshop with its relevant workshop contents and materials that were distributed to the learners. This programme will be rolled out across the Gauteng Province Secondary Schools to foster an appreciation for the Constitution and everything that it entails.

Copyright © 2024 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2024 by Prof Assi J.C. Kimou   Abstract   The Sino-African relationship is driven by China's political will to meet its economic growth needs through access to raw materials and expanding markets. This cooperation is mutually beneficial, offering African countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, opportunities to address infrastructure deficits and boost economic exchanges. Since 1983, Côte d'Ivoire has strengthened ties with China, focusing on development through South-South cooperation. Various agreements have been signed since 1984, and Côte d'Ivoire actively participates in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). China supports Côte d'Ivoire’s economic growth through grants, interest-free loans, and preferential loans via institutions like the China Eximbank. This support has financed significant projects, including infrastructure developments and the expansion of the Abidjan Seaport. China's foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Côte d'Ivoire have grown, with a focus on sectors like construction, mining, and manufacturing. Despite this growth, Chinese FDI remains lower compared to other foreign investors, such as France. Trade between China and Côte d'Ivoire has increased significantly since 2000, although Côte d'Ivoire maintains a trade deficit. Cultural and educational cooperation is also significant, with initiatives such as the Confucius Institute promoting Chinese language and culture in Côte d'Ivoire. Challenges in the Sino-Ivorian relationship include China's economic slowdown, potential debt risks from Chinese loans, and limited job creation due to imported skilled labour. To maximise benefits and mitigate risks, Côte d'Ivoire must diversify its economy, deepen regional exchanges, and stimulate domestic activity. This paper explores these dynamics, providing a comprehensive analysis of the opportunities and challenges in Sino-Ivorian relations.   Keywords : China-Africa Cooperation; Côte d'Ivoire Development; Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); Infrastructure Projects; Trade Balance   Introduction   The Sino-African relationship is primarily driven by a political will of the Chinese government to serve its own economic growth needs, promote restructuring, and improve its economy. In other words, China's interest lies in ensuring access to raw materials at competitive prices, given the abundance of these resources in Africa, as well as expanding markets for its exports and realising profitable investments. In return, China commits to meeting the financing needs of countries in difficulty and addressing their urgent infrastructure needs such as highways, buildings, airports, and others.   This cooperation thus becomes an opportunity for African countries to address their infrastructure deficit and boost their exchanges. In this regard, Côte d'Ivoire has directed its development efforts and strengthened its relations with China since 1983, after several years of privileged relations with the West, particularly with France. Indeed, Côte d'Ivoire aims to establish the foundations of its development through South-South cooperation focused on sharing experiences and knowledge, technology transfer, and market opening .   To concretise this cooperation, various agreements and conventions have been signed between the two states since December 1984. At the multilateral level, Côte d'Ivoire has participated in all meetings organised within the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), since its establishment in October 2000 in Beijing, serves as a dialogue platform allowing China and Africa to diversify exchange frameworks and enrich bilateral and multilateral cooperation, with the aim of institutionalising and strengthening the Sino-African partnership.   Despite the advantages of this cooperation for both Côte d'Ivoire and China, the Chinese presence seems to raise concerns for the Ivorian economy, as it does in other African countries. The recommendations of the African Union (AU) summit in Banjul in 2006 on the need for research institutions to conduct studies on the challenges and opportunities represented by China for Africa are a perfect illustration of this.   This paper will explore several crucial aspects of the relationship between China and Côte d'Ivoire. First, it will examine the development support that China provides to Côte d'Ivoire, highlighting assistance projects and economic cooperation between the two countries. Next, the paper will analyse China's foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Côte d'Ivoire, studying the key sectors affected by these investments. It will also look at the trade exchanges between China and Côte d'Ivoire, examining trade flows, exchanged products, and trade trends between the two nations. Additionally, the paper will address Sino-Ivorian cultural and educational cooperation, highlighting initiatives aimed at promoting cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries. Finally, it will discuss the current challenges and future prospects of the Sino-Ivorian relationship, examining potential obstacles as well as opportunities for growth and development ahead.   Support for China's development of Côte d'Ivoire   The economic relations between China and Africa are often approached through two main channels: aid and investment, in addition to trade exchanges. Chinese foreign aid, as described in the 2011 White Paper, currently consists of two components: altruistic actions such as grants, and interest-bearing loans. These Chinese loans are granted within the framework of bilateral economic cooperation agreements, often through the China Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank), established in 1994 to modernise China's foreign aid modalities. It plays a crucial role in financing companies operating abroad, facilitating imports and exports, and promoting international economic relations.   In Africa, China cooperates through various development projects, particularly in the fields of infrastructure, agriculture, and culture. According to several studies, China has significantly increased its assistance to African countries since the 2000s, benefiting from vast currency reserves that enable it to offer loans on favourable terms. Unlike international donors, China can quickly implement projects, signing agreements in as little as one year. By primarily using national institutions such as the China Eximbank and the China Development Bank, it has become Africa's main creditor.   Regarding Côte d'Ivoire, China has supported its path to economic growth since 1985 through loans and grants for various development projects. Three types of aid can be distinguished: long-term interest-free Chinese government loans, preferential loans at low-interest rates granted by the China Eximbank, and grants from the Chinese government, which do not require repayment (Ma & Zhou, 2021). Graphic 1 illustrates the dynamics of gross loans granted at concessional rates by the People's Republic of China, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and France as a historical partner of Côte d'Ivoire. Our analysis of the dynamics is thus based on Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the form of loans.   Graphic 1:  Concessional gross loans from the People’s Republic of China, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and France (US Dollar) Source: Author’s From OCDE and China Africa Research Initiatives Database   The total gross loans granted at concessional rates by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, including France, amounted to US$1,775 million between 2010 and 2021. During the same period, China provided Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the form of loans totalling US$4,227.84 million, representing 70% of the total ODA mobilised by Côte d'Ivoire over the period. This amount is four times the value of ODA provided by France as a historical partner (excluding 2012, 2013, 2014). In terms of dynamics, China represents on average 61% of the concessional loans Côte d'Ivoire receives annually between 2010 and 2022.   The sectors benefitting from China's financing are a mix of traditional and non-traditional sectors according to estimates from the Global Development Policy Center at Boston University. These sectors include, in order of importance: transportation, environment, information and communication technologies (ICT), education, defense and military, water/sanitation/waste, trade, and services.   In Côte d'Ivoire, China has supported the realisation of several projects, including the construction of the Soubré hydroelectric dam, the construction of the Abidjan-Grand Bassam highway, the provision of drinking water to the city of Abidjan, the expansion of the Abidjan Seaport, and the rehabilitation of the national electricity network, with financing ranging from US$100 million to US$1 billion.   Figure 1:  The Architecture of Chinese Aid Source: Aurégan (2014) Foreign Direct Investment from China to Côte d'Ivoire   Chinese foreign direct investments in West Africa have significantly increased in recent years, reflecting China's growing interest in this resource-rich region offering economic growth opportunities (see graphic 2). China has become one of the leading investors in many West African countries.   Graphic 2:  Evolution of FDI from China to West Africa Source: China Africa Research Initiatives Database   In Côte d'Ivoire, although state-owned enterprises with official representation are few, Chinese investments have a particular pattern. According to studies, these investments are a combination of public investments led by state-owned enterprises and private investments originating from Ivorian legal entities with Chinese capital.   Foreign direct investment inflows into Côte d'Ivoire have increased on average by 15.57% per year between 2012 and 2021. Compared to 2012, these FDI flows have quadrupled to reach US$1,392.44 million in 2021. FDI from China has experienced significant growth of 33.33%, rising from US$3.61 million in 2012 to US$64.17 million in 2021. However, compared to FDI from France, Chinese FDI is significantly lower in terms of level. These FDIs represent only 9% of the cumulative annual foreign direct investments over the period, compared to 24% for France.   Graphic 3:  Evolution of FDI from China to Côte d'Ivoire (US Dollar) Source: Author’s From OCDE and China Africa Research Initiatives Database   Chinese foreign direct investments primarily focus on five priority sectors. In order of importance, these sectors are construction, mining, manufacturing industry, scientific research, and technological services. It is interesting to note that the share of FDI allocated to the latter three sectors has remained relatively stable over time. With a diaspora estimated at over 2 500 individuals, Chinese investments in Côte d'Ivoire cover various economic sectors. Specifically, they are present in healthcare, construction, telecommunications, finance, advertising, tourism, import-export, trade, agriculture (including agricultural equipment and rubber), the fishing industry, the garment industry (especially shoes and textiles), as well as in dietary supplements.   Among the most significant investors is Huawei, a privately held company that has established its sub-regional headquarters in Abidjan, the Ivorian economic and financial centre. According to Aurégan (2014), Côte d'Ivoire hosts 92 Chinese-capital companies, with an estimated amount of €25 million over the period 2005-2011, as reported by the Center  for the Promotion of Investment in Côte d'Ivoire ( CEPICI ) . Abidjan, the economic capital of Côte d'Ivoire, hosts 95% of companies with Chinese capital, thus contributing to the economic polarisation of the southern region of the country and the geographical concentration of aid and public investment. These private enterprises are generally registered as limited liability companies (LLC or SARLU), although a few are joint-stock companies (SA). Approximately 69 companies have the status of LLC or SARLU, while 10 are SAs. The average share capital of these companies is around €34 000, although half of them have invested only the minimum required amount, which is €1524 (Aurégan, 2014).   Graphic 4:  Chinese end of the year FDI Stock to Africa, top 5 sectors (US Dollar) Source: China Africa Research Initiatives Database   The weight of China in foreign direct investments remained marginal compared to other foreign investors in 2022 [estimates from the Center  for the Promotion of Investment in Côte d'Ivoire  (CEPICI)]. Among the main partners of Côte d'Ivoire in terms of incoming FDI, Mauritius occupies the first place with an investment of XAF67 billion, followed by Singapore in second position with XAF63 billion. Lebanon, with an investment of XAF46 billion, ranks third, while France occupies the fourth place with an investment of XAF43 billion. China ranks only 13th with an investment of XAF14 billion.   China-Côte d'Ivoire trade   China has emerged as one of Africa's major trading partners, solidifying its position as an importer and exporter of African products (Nguena & Tsafack Nanfosso, 2014). It provides African countries with cheap manufactured goods, thereby reducing their reliance on traditional trading partners. By becoming a major importer of primary products, China has contributed to improving the terms of trade, which has been beneficial for sub-Saharan African countries that export raw materials. The strong demand for energy and minerals from China has boosted international commodity prices, thereby increasing the volume and value of African exports (Goldstein et al, 2006).   The observation is similar in West Africa. Indeed, graphic 5 highlights an increase in trade between China and West African countries. Consequently, these trade exchanges have strengthened economic ties between China and West African countries, offering an opportunity for countries to diversify their trading partners and develop their local production capacity. This is essential for promoting sustainable economic development.   Graphic 5:  Evolution of trade patterns between Côte d'Ivoire and West Africa Source: China Africa Research Initiatives   Trade between Côte d'Ivoire and the People's Republic of China was modest between 1992 and 1999. However, starting in the 2000s, these exchanges gained momentum. Ivorian exports to China increased from US$7.25 million in 2000 to US$970.22 million in 2022, representing an average annual growth of 25% over the period 2000-2022. At the same time, imports also recorded an average growth of 13.32% over the same period, rising from US$222.76 million in 2000 to US$3,490.90 million. This significant growth in imports and exports is indicative of a robust trade relationship between the two countries.   Graphic 6:  Evolution of the structure of trade between Côte d'Ivoire and China (US Dollar) Source: China Africa Research Initiatives   From 2000 to 2022, Côte d'Ivoire maintained a trade deficit. Although the coverage rate increased from 3.25% in 2000 to 28% in 2022, it remained well below 100%, indicating that the deficit remained significant throughout this period. This imbalance in the trade balance suggests that China enjoys greater competitive advantages than Côte d'Ivoire in their exchanges.   It should be noted that starting in 2016, China became Côte d'Ivoire's main supplier, with offers amounting to XAF1695.20 billion in 2023, compared to XAF1055.84 billion in 2019. Nigeria and France respectively occupy the second and third positions in 2023, with XAF1602.2 billion and XAF638.1 billion. However, China is not among Côte d'Ivoire's main customers during this period. Considering these observations, it is evident that China benefits from its exchanges with Côte d'Ivoire.   Graphic 7:  Côte d'Ivoire’s Main Suppliers (in Billions of CFA francs) Source: DGD/DSEE (General Directorate of Customs of Côte d'Ivoire) Sino-Ivorian Cultural and Educational Cooperation   China deploys the concept of cooperation to promote its worldview in Africa, notably by establishing Confucius Institutes tasked with disseminating the language, culture, and political vision of the country worldwide. In this context, the Confucius Institute within Félix Houphouët-Boigny University in Abidjan plays a pivotal role by conducting various activities aimed at promoting the Chinese language, Chinese culture, and cultural exchanges between China and Côte d'Ivoire. These activities include Chinese language instruction, the promotion of Chinese culture through courses, workshops, lectures, artistic performances, cultural exchanges, and community events. These initiatives aim to strengthen cultural and educational ties between China and Côte d'Ivoire, thereby fostering better understanding and increased international cooperation.   In the context of the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Côte d'Ivoire and China, the Confucius Institute, in collaboration with Félix Houphouët-Boigny University, is redefining its educational mission. This reform aims to enhance the quality of education and transform the Confucius Institute into a major platform for dynamic cultural exchanges between China and Côte d'Ivoire. Objectives include improving the HSK programme, providing a solid foundation for students to study and work in China, as well as supporting a greater number of students from Félix Houphouët-Boigny University in obtaining scholarships from the Chinese government to pursue their studies in China. It is worth noting that China awards about ten scholarships annually to Ivorian students wishing to pursue higher education in China. More than 600 Ivorian students have thus been able to benefit from quality training in various academic fields, such as international finance, science and technology, commerce, accounting expertise, geoscience, journalism, business, and management, among others. These scholarships cover tuition fees, accommodation, necessary books and supplies, as well as a monthly allowance to meet their daily needs.   Challenges and opportunities   Since the early 2010s, China's economic growth has slowed, affected by several factors: a slowdown in the real estate sector, demographic changes related to its aging population, as well as trade tensions, geo-economic fragmentation, and the Covid-19 pandemic on the international stage. While it had an average annual growth rate of about 10% in the 2000s, China saw this rate drop to less than 8% in the 2010s. This trend has been exacerbated since the pandemic, with International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections announcing an average annual growth rate of about 4% over the next five years, marked by reduced investments and a transition to more environmentally friendly technologies (IMF, 2023). These developments could have negative repercussions, particularly on trade links, leading to both a decrease in export volumes and a decline in commodity prices. Consequently, Côte d'Ivoire, which exports relatively more to China, risks being more severely affected by this economic slowdown in the country.   The loans granted by China to sub-Saharan Africa have received considerable attention and criticism due to the relatively strict terms imposed on beneficiary countries, as well as the use of natural resources as collateral (Acker, Brautigam & Huang, 2020). These loans have also raised concerns about the normalisation and transparency of public debt, as Chinese lenders do not systematically document loans to each borrowing country, resulting in significant data gaps. Moreover, according to Pinaud and Reisen (2006), China's financial practices promote corruption, undermine democracy, and increase debt tolerance. China's growing presence in many African countries, as highlighted by Chaponnière (2006), leads to fierce competition that can lead to the disappearance of local businesses. Additionally, the quality of products imported from China is not always trustworthy, as traceability standards are not always adhered to during export to developing countries, often resulting in the importation of inferior quality products. This leads to considerable harm for consumers, who may not fully benefit from the purchased products in the long term despite their competitiveness.   Regarding Chinese investment in Côte d'Ivoire, it is important to note that it is not necessarily associated with significant job creation, as skilled labour is often directly imported from China (Seka & Kouakou, 2012). Consequently, the long-awaited technology transfer by African countries remains a challenge, as Chinese investments are often made with Chinese skilled labour, thereby limiting opportunities for local learning and development. The only jobs created are often unskilled jobs.   Conclusion   The relations between China and Côte d'Ivoire, which began in 1983, have significantly progressed in recent years through the signing of several partnership agreements in economic, cultural, and scientific fields. China has provided significant support to the development of Côte d'Ivoire, manifested through grants and interest-free loans. During the period 2010-2021, China granted official development assistance (ODA) in the form of loans totalling US$4,227.84 million.   Foreign direct investment in Côte d'Ivoire has seen an average annual increase of 15.57% between 2012 and 2021. Although trade exports and imports have significantly increased, the trade balance remains negative for Côte d'Ivoire. This situation could potentially lead to increased dependence on China, raising concerns about possible dominance resulting from this cooperation.   The economic relations between Côte d'Ivoire and China present considerable opportunities, particularly in terms of financing for the country's development. However, they also entail risks, such as increased dependence on raw material exports and heightened debt risks, as well as potential consequences for small and medium-sized enterprises and the informal sector.   To maximise the benefits of this cooperation while mitigating its negative effects, Côte d'Ivoire will need to strengthen its economic resilience and implement structural reforms aimed at diversifying its economy, deepening regional exchanges, improving competitiveness, and stimulating domestic activity.   References   Acker, K., Brautigam, D. & Huang, Y. 2020. Debt Relief with Chinese Characteristics . Working Paper No. 2020/39. China Africa Research Initiative, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC   Aurégan, X. 2014. Géopolitique de la Chine en Côte d’Ivoire: La puissance chinoise à l’école ivoirienne et africaine , Carnets de géographes  [En ligne], 7   Aurégan, X. 2015. Les interventions chinoises en Côte d’Ivoire: aide, investissements et migrants-investisseurs,  Autrepart , 76(4): 89-108   Chaponnière, J-R. 2006. Les échanges entre la Chine et l’Afrique Situation actuelle, perspectives et sources pour l’analyse . Agence Française de Développement (AFD)   Goldstein, A., Pinaud, N., Reisen, H. & Chen, X. 2006.  The Rise of China and India: What's in it for Africa?  Paris: Development Centre Studies, OECD Publishing   International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2023. At a Crossroads: Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Relations with China, in Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa—Light on the Horizon?  Washington, DC, October   Ma, X. & Zhou, R. 2021. China’s overseas development finance: review of flows and definitions, and potential support for SDG attainment in partner countries.  [Online] Available at: https://www.undp.org/china/publications/chinas-overseas-development-finance-review-flows-and-definitions-and-potential-support-sdg-attainment-partner-countries [accessed: 10 July 2024]   Nguena, C.L. & Tsafack Nanfosso, R. 2014. Banking Activity Sensitivity to Macroeconomic Shocks and Financial Policies Implications: The Case of CEMAC Sub-region,  African Development Review , African Development Bank, 26(1): 102-117   Seka, P.R. & Kouakou, K.C. 2008. Economic Relations between China and Africa: The Case of Cote d’ Ivoire.  Nairobi: AERC (mimeo) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Articles Click on the article title below to read: Accountability and oversight over municipal finances: Council oversight as a missing link in service delivery Mmamagang Geoffrey Modisha FOCUS ON AFRICA-CHINA RELATIONS Lessons for South Africa: China during the era of 'reform and opening up' Douglas Ian Scott Overview of the cooperation between China and the West African Region: The Ivorian Case Prof Assi J.C. Kimou Listen and build trust among social, economic and environmental actors in Africa Dr Ndiakhat Ngom A case of the United Republic of Tanzania Prof Omar Mjenga Policy priorities to strengthen the Sino Algerian relations in a way that will advance mutually beneficial outcomes Zine Barka

Copyright © 2024 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2024 by Mmamagang Geoffrey Modisha   Abstract   The local government audit outcomes of the 2021/22 financial year showed a continuing deterioration of the financial health of South African municipalities. According to the Auditor-General South Africa (AGSA), this can partly be attributed to lack of accountability and oversight at the local government level. This paper aims to assess the state of accountability and oversight at local government level in South Africa and to establish whether enhancing the scrutiny and oversight role of municipal councils could contribute to improving the financial management and service delivery mandate of municipalities. Using documentary analysis – particularly the municipal accountability legislative framework and AGSA’s local government audit outcomes – and literature reviews on the topic, the paper shows that the current conceptualisation and practise of accountability and oversight in South Africa has taken an elitist approach that marginally involves councils. As a readily available army of accountability and oversight at local government level, councils and non-executive councillors could help in closing the principal-agent gap between the municipalities, the provincial and national government, and the public. The paper shows that the practice of accountability and oversight must go beyond availability of oversight committees and tools to include a deliberate stimulation of its potential and capability. To this effect, it is recommended that councils be empowered through the development of a local government oversight model that combines all the guidelines and frameworks developed by various state organs so far, considers the variations in municipalities, and involves the public in the oversight process. It is argued that the rise of coalition politics in South African local government is providing an opportunity to empower councils and non-executive councillors to efficiently and effectively play their scrutiny and oversight role.   Keywords: Accountability; Audit Outcomes; Coalition Politics; Local Government; Municipal Finances   Introduction   In her last consolidated audit report of the 4th political term of local government (2016-2021) in 2022, the Auditor-General South Africa (AGSA) decried the lack of accountability and oversight at the local government level. This, according to AGSA, is one of the contributing factors to the unfavourable audit outcomes of the municipalities in South Africa (AGSA, 2022). Without accountability and oversight, communities are not able to determine whether municipalities used the budget as intended, achieved their service delivery objectives, and are in a good financial position. AGSA argues that this leads to erosion of public trust in local government. Through oversight, municipal councils can investigate and deal with unauthorised, irregular, fruitless and wasteful (UIFW) expenditure, fraud and corruption, non-performance, and any legislation transgression. This will ensure that public funds are used for what they are intended, namely, service delivery.   The aim of this paper is to assess the current state of the local government accountability system and provide recommendations for the municipalities to improve on this front. It asks the question as to whether the role of municipal councils in South Africa could contribute to overseeing the financial management and service delivery of the municipalities. The paper analyses the legislative framework of municipal accountability and oversight, assesses AGSA’s audit findings and recommendations, and draws from conducted research, both in South Africa and internationally, to achieve this objective. It argues that the current conceptualisation and practise of accountability and oversight seems to render councils, as the legislative bodies of local government, irrelevant.   It is shown that as the source of horizontal accountability, councils might be the missing link to close the principal-agent gap that exists between the municipalities and provincial and national governments in the accountability cycle. It is further illustrated that the failure of the interventions experimented with over the years might be attributed to misdiagnosis of the actual problems besetting municipalities, which non-executive councillors may help with if empowered to do so. The paper calls for more attention to be given to councillors as an army of accountability, scrutiny and oversight, and suggests that coalition politics at local government level provides an opportunity to do that.   The following section defines municipal accountability and oversight, outlines different accountability tools, as well as different dimensions of accountability and what it must achieve. This is followed by a discussion of the legislative framework governing accountability and oversight at the local government level, as well as how the accountability system is understood by providing a sketch of the local government accountability system.   The next section delves into AGSA’s latest local government audit outcomes and the state of municipal accountability in the country. It is shown that most interventions have so far excluded the role of councils as the centre of oversight at the local government level and concludes that it is perhaps time the government focusses on this to complete the accountability and oversight architecture of local government.   After this, the paper turns to coalition politics at local government level, as this seems to be the future of local government in South Africa. It is shown in that section that, although there is no sufficient empirical research on the impact of coalition governance on service delivery, governance and council functionality, coalition governments present an opportunity to strengthen the oversight function of council. The last section makes recommendations on how to bring councils into the accountability chain of local government in South Africa.   Understanding Municipal Accountability and Oversight   Accountability in the context of public institutions can be defined as a process whereby public authority or the state responds to citizens on its past, present and future actions in implementing its constitutional mandate of service delivery to the society (Schedler, 1999; Buttler, 2011). It is characterised by one person (the principal) appointing the other (the agent) to do work on their behalf, either because it is impractical or too complex for the principal to do so (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2012; 2014). Unfortunately, this relationship tends to give rise to principal-agent problems, where the agent – because of their information, expertise and technical superiority – avoids being accountable to the principal (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2012).   Accountability can further be seen in terms of answerability and enforcement, it can be spatial (horizontal and/or vertical), it can be internal and external, and can be studied by looking at the degree of control imposed by the principal on the agent (Schedler, 1999; Lindberg, 2009; Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2014). Vertical accountability can be both upward – such as local government’s accountability to the provincial and national governments – and downward, which denotes citizens’ attempts to hold the government accountable for its actions, conduct and performance (Lindberg, 2009). Meanwhile, horizontal accountability, also called intra-state accountability or ‘accountability amongst peers’, refers to the processes of checks and balances as espoused by the principle of separation of powers and/or between institutions of the same state machinery (ibid.). When the actors of horizontal and vertical accountability collaborate in their oversight efforts it is called diagonal accountability [1] . The degree of control denotes the level at which the overseer is doing his/her job in enforcing accountability, which can range from interrogation of the minute details of the department’s day-to-day activities, such as financial auditing, to the socio-economic impact of its policies, as is the case with elections (ibid.).   Accountability and oversight are two sides of the same coin (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2012; Pelizzo & Kinyondo, 2015; Malapane, 2019) because both the accountable and accounting or oversight actors must speak and engage on how the allocated/delegated power was utilised (Schedler, 1999). In other words, there is no accountability without oversight, which is a mechanism to ensure transparency and openness of the executive, financial accountability, uphold the rule of law, and hold the executive accountable for its actions and general performance (Madue, 2012). In its Public Sector Oversight Model (PSOM), the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (2012) defines oversight as:   “The proactive interaction initiated by a legislature with the executive and administrative organs that encourages compliance with the constitutional obligation on the executive and administration to ensure delivery on agreed-to objectives for the achievement of government priorities”.   Although this definition of oversight encompasses both answerability and enforceability, it is biased towards oversight as a retrospective exercise, i.e., it happens after implementation of government policies, programmes and actions (Malapane, 2019; Kolisang, 2019). The most comprehensive definition of oversight must include both ex ante  and post ex  aspects (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2012; Madue, 2012; Malapane, 2019; Verhelst & Peters, 2024).   Political accountability and oversight presupposes an exploration of separation of powers within different arms of the state. Also called trias politica , separation of powers doctrine is one of the political philosophical ideas that originated from the enlightenment scholarship of the 17th and 18th centuries, as a vehicle to keep government power in check  (Chikwema & Wotela, 2016). In this arrangement, argued Montesquieu, the parliament is responsible for law-making, judiciary to interpret the laws, and the executive is tasked with implementing the laws for the good of the populace (ibid). In South Africa, the real trias politica  is at the national level, and not the provincial and local spheres of government, because the judiciary is an exclusive national mandate in the country. Therefore, accountability and oversight is mainly between the executive and legislature at provincial and local government levels.   For legislatures to have an impact on policy and the decision-making of the executive, they must have oversight tools that include committees, motions of no confidence, an oversight and scrutiny model, and a relationship with key internal and external accountability institutions such the Internal Audit and Audit Committees, as well as the Auditor-General (A-G) and Public Protector (Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2014). Availability of these oversight tools, however, only signifies the legislature’s oversight capacity and potential and should not be equated to its effectiveness, as this still needs to be activated. Rockvic and Ivanis (2013) posits that the activation of oversight potential requires at least three conditions, namely, authority, ability, and attitude or political will. The latter is underpinned by such factors as party politics, executive-legislature interface, opposition parties, society’s political consciousness and the nature of civil society activism.   According to Koppel (2005), there are five dimensions of accountability, each seeking to address a different area and question as follows:   Transparency – did the organisation reveal all the facts of its performance? Liability – did the organisation or people involved in wrongdoing face consequences for these? Controllability – did the organisation do what the principal desires? Responsibility – did the officials follow the law or policies in performing their duties? Responsiveness – did the organisation fulfil the substantive expectations of the public  or deliver on the public good?   Koppel (2005) highlighted that it is important for organisations to be specific and clear in defining their accountability as uncertainties can lead to ‘multiple accountabilities disorder’. This means a situation where the organisation is confused about the sense in which it is accountable. Because of lack of clarity, argues Koppel (2005: 95), organisations find themselves “accountable in the wrong sense, or accountable in every sense…[thus]... pleasing no one while trying to please everyone”. Clarifying accountability is particularly important in South African local government because of different types of municipalities, their structures and service delivery models [2] .   The following section locates municipal accountability and oversight in the legislative framework of South Africa. It also uses the above discussion to provide a conceptualisation of the accountability system at local government level as understood in this paper.   Legislative Framework of Municipal Accountability and Oversight System in South Africa   While separation of powers at the local sphere of government is not provided for in the Constitution in South Africa, local government legislation – such as the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) “Structures Act”, Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) “Systems Act”, and Municipal Finance Management Act “the MFMA” (56 of 2003) – provides mechanisms through which the municipalities can separate the executive and legislative powers held by council. Section 151(3) of the Constitution provides that a municipality has the right to govern the local government affairs of its own community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the Constitution (RSA, 2015a). In terms of section 160(1) of the Constitution, a municipal council can make decisions concerning the exercise of its powers and the performance of its functions. Section 160 (6) of the Constitution empowers municipal councils to pass by-laws prescribing rules and orders for its internal arrangements, business and proceedings, and the establishment, composition, procedures, powers and functions of its committees (RSA, 2015a).   Section 59 of the Systems Act makes provision for a municipal council to develop a system of delegation to maximise its administrative and operational efficiency and provide for adequate checks and balances in the utilisation of power in the municipality (RSA, 2015b). Sub-section 59(2) of the Systems Act provides that delegation of powers to the executive “does not disinvest the council of the responsibility concerning the exercise of the powers or the performance of the duty” (RSA, 2015b).   The MFMA provides for a clear separation of roles of various role players in the financial management of the municipalities (RSA, 2015d). For instance, the mayor must provide political guidance over the fiscal and financial affairs of the municipality, become a conduit between the executive and council on budgetary matters; and the municipal manager is accountable for the financial management of the municipality. Meanwhile, the council must approve the budget and ensure that the budget is utilised as intended for the benefit of the communities. It must play an oversight role over the utilisation of the budget (RSA, 2015d).    In order to assist councils with their oversight function, sections 33 and 79 of the Structures Act provide for the establishment of committees (RSA, 2015c). Section 79 of the Structures Act further provides for the council to establish necessary committees to assist in efficiently and effectively performing any of its functions or exercising any of its powers. In 2001, the Structures Act was amended to strengthen the accountability and oversight function of council by giving the Speaker of Council a responsibility to ensure efficient and effective oversight committees, enabling the Whip of Council to assume responsibility for facilitating relations between the executive and the legislature, and making municipal public accounts committees (MPACs) statutory committees of council to be established by all 257 municipal councils (RSA, 2021).    To appreciate the nuances of municipal accountability and oversight, it must be put within the context of the broader accountability regime of a country (Verhelst & Peters, 2024). Figure 1 is a schematic representation of how accountability and oversight at local government level can be contextualised in South Africa.   Figure 1: Accountability and Oversight System [3]   It shows that municipal councils are central to the accountability and oversight processes of local government, as vested by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 2015a). Through a delegation of powers system, a municipal council must establish the mayoral or executive committees – together with the bureaucracy or administration – to execute its policies and by-laws and deliver services to the communities (horizontal accountability). The municipality, including councils, the executive and the administration, is also accountable to the national and provincial governments, as well as directly to the citizens through public participation [4] . This can be regarded as vertical accountability, both upward (to provincial and national governments) and downward (citizens) [5] . The diagramme also shows other key role players, namely, the internal audit departments and audit committees, as well as chapter 9 institutions, particularly the Auditor-General and Public Protector and law enforcement agencies such as the South African Police Service (SAPS) or Special Investigating Unit (SIU). Together with council, the relationship with these structures constitutes horizontal accountability, because of their statutory support role. While the council, internal audit and audit committee are internal structures, chapter 9 institutions are external structures.   Financial Management in the South African Local Government – State of Accountability and Oversight   The 2021/22 local government audit outcomes have shown a continued deterioration of the financial health of the municipalities, as they are not reporting as required, there is an increase in supply chain management (SCM) contraventions, and information and communication technology (ICT) systems are not utilised efficiently (AGSA, 2023). In addition, very little consequence management has been imposed on those involved in wrongdoing (AGSA, 2023). Only 14,8% of South African municipalities achieved clean audit outcomes, with two out of the eight metropolitan municipalities, i.e., the City of Cape Town and the City of Ekurhuleni, being able to achieve clean audit outcomes. While it can be noted that 33 municipalities improved their audit outcomes in the 2021/22 financial year, there was a decline in 29 municipalities in comparison with the 2020/21 financial year.   At the end of the 2021/22 financial year, the A-G identified R25,47 billion in unauthorised expenditure, R30,34 billion in irregular expenditure, and R4,74 billion in fruitless and wasteful expenditure. The total outstanding balance of unauthorised expenditure stood at R107,38 billion, irregular expenditure at R136 billion, and fruitless and wasteful expenditure totalled R14,65 billion (AGSA, 2023). This means that some of the R539,13 billion budget of the municipalities was spent on things not budgeted for, unlawfully and/or without a benefit to the South African communities. This state of affairs is attributed to lack of accountability by the municipalities, weak institutional capacity, political and leadership instability, and ineffective interventions from the provincial and national governments (AGSA, 2023; Khaile, 2023). As it is always the case in the first year of the local government political term, stated the A-G, political instability in the transition to a new political term worsened the failures seen over the years (AGSA, 2023).    Generally speaking, there have been three intervention thrusts tried in order to deal with this situation throughout the years. First, the provincial and national government have used section 139 of the Constitution to put municipalities under administration. According to Khaile (2023), 33 municipalities were under section 139 intervention in February 2022. However, this has not been helpful in improving the financial management of the municipalities (ibid.). In a study conducted to assess effectiveness of section 139 interventions in 14 municipalities in the Limpopo, North West and Free State provinces, it was found that only one municipality, i.e., Mangaung Metro, has recorded notable improvement in audit outcomes after the intervention, although it did not achieve a clean audit (Khaile, 2023).   Second, according to the A-G, the audit findings are being thoroughly discussed with the leadership at the national, provincial and local government levels, including the ministers, provincial premiers, mayors, mayoral committees, the speakers of councils, accounting officers and senior management. Thus, the national and provincial departments responsible for local government are given elaborate recommendations by the A-G on how to improve their support to the municipalities and commitments are made to enhance oversight and implement consequence management every year. To this effect, considerable financial and human resources – from national and provincial treasuries, Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), including deployment of experts and consultants (who do not come cheap) – are being pumped in a desperate attempt to ensure that the municipalities produce quality reports for audit purposes. For instance, the municipalities spent a total of R1.2 billion on consultants in the 2021/22 financial year without any tangible results on financial reporting (AGSA, 2023).   Finally, the Public Audit Act (24 of 2004) was amended in 2019 to give the A-G consequence management powers. The amendments empower the A-G to report non-compliance with legislation, fraud, theft or breaches of fiduciary duties to relevant law enforcement bodies like the Public Protector, recommend action, take binding remedial action and/or issue a certificate of debt in cases where the accounting officers and authorities do not resolve them appropriately. It remains to be seen whether the implementation of this act will make any difference to the situation. Nonetheless, the above interventions seem not to help as the audit outcome results have remained the same over the years. According to Hamza (2021:11) this may be because the provided interventions “do not match the actual needs of the municipalities”, resulting from the fact that the higher levels of government do not have a comprehensive understanding of the problems besetting the municipalities. The failure of the interventions to have an impact on audit outcomes of the municipalities may be an indication of a wide principal-agent gap between the municipalities, other spheres of government and the public. Because of this, the municipalities are able to utilise their expertise and specialised information to avoid accountability and ostensibly resist interventions from the provincial and national governments.   Indeed, an assessment of the above interventions indicates an incomplete accountability and oversight function. It only involves (1) chapter 9 institutions, particularly AGSA; (2) the national and provincial government – through section 139 interventions and recommendations on what is to be done; and (3) the leadership of the municipality. The latter includes the executive committees and administration in the form of the mayors, accounting officers or municipal managers, and chief financial officers (CFOs). Councils, which are supposed to be central to the accountability and oversight processes at local government level, seem to matter very little in the municipal accountability and oversight discourse as outlined above. There seems to be a tacit assumption that the national and provincial governments are more qualified to deal with local government issues than councils. This is clearly an elitist approach to accountability and oversight at local government level.    Section 79 of the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) provides for the establishment of the municipal public accounts committees (MPACs), and other committees, manned by non-executive councillors, to assist in efficiently and effectively performing any council functions or exercising any of its powers tasked specifically with overseeing municipalities’ financial management (RSA, 2015b). Particularly, section 79(A) gives MPACs a duty to study the A-G’s recommendations with the view to establish whether they have been implemented. This involves initiating investigations especially on UIFW expenditure, as well as fraud and corruption. Unfortunately, these committees are close to non-existent in many municipalities. Where they exist, they are not sufficiently empowered and capacitated to do their jobs (AGSA, 2023). In comparison to the support drummed up to be provided to the national and provincial departments responsible for local government, the municipalities’ financial departments, as well as provincial legislatures, there is little, if any, advice on processes and procedures to empower such oversight committees.   Perhaps, more attention should be given to strengthen the oversight function of the council to complement the existing accountability and oversight mechanisms. There is a need to look into stimulating horizontal accountability to augment the vertical accountability which, hitherto, seems to have been the major focus of the above-mentioned attempts. Using Koppel’s (2005) framework of accountability dimensions discussed above, one can argue that the local government accountability practice in South Africa deals with transparency, liability and responsibility. It answers the questions as to whether the municipality revealed all the facts pertaining to its performance, followed the law and supply chain management policy in expenditure, and whether those who committed wrongdoing faced consequences.   While the A-G provides information in answering these questions, it is through the above-mentioned interventions that the dire situation of municipalities is left to be dealt with. It is the municipal leadership, provincial and national government that are entrusted with ensuring that service delivery occurs, in exclusion of non-executive councillors who might be more motivated to ensure that municipalities spend the budget as required and that they fulfil the expectations of their communities. Therefore, this constitutes an accountability disorder because, while the budget is approved by council, the bulk of accountability is done only through the municipalities’ leadership, provincial and national government. Secondly, the direct representatives of the communities who must benefit from the budget, both ward and proportional representation (PR) councillors, play a minimal role in scrutiny and oversight.   According to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), 9 473 councillors were elected as ward and proportionate representative (PR) councillors on the 1st of November 2021 (IEC, 2021). Assuming that the local government leadership referred to above makes up approximately 15% of these councillors, if section 43 of the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) [6] is anything to go by, over 8 000 councillors could be additional eyes and ears on the ground to complement the good job done by the A-G in an attempt to improve accountability and oversight over financial management and service delivery in local government.   In relation to accountability, the fact that they are closer to the executive, live in communities, and meant to serve communities on a daily basis, suggest that they might have more incentives to genuinely play a role in improving accountability and service delivery in local government. That these councillors are at the coalface of service delivery – and most likely to become the first victims of violent community protests – could spur them to action if given an opportunity to ensure that their communities are given basic services. This observation was also made by Verhelst and Peters (2024: 137) who observed that “although it was assumed that small but efficient elite suffices [to run municipalities], modern accounts stress the importance of involving every councillor in the process, as they all bring personal history, values, and political perspective to the role”. Perhaps, non-executive councillors are the missing link in overseeing the financial and non-financial performance in the municipalities.   Involving ordinary councillors in scrutiny and oversight processes can serve other purposes (Verhelst & Peters, 2024). First, it can enhance councillors’ political consciousness and elevate the status of the ward office. Through scrutiny and oversight, councillors would have a deeper understanding of council policies and decisions and, in return, improve their performance on constituency work. Second, such an involvement could assist councillors in developing their political careers. As both their scrutiny and community representation work improves, councillors’ reputation in their communities would increase, which would augment their political stature (Verhelst & Peters, 2024).     In a seminal work discussing different modes of legislature-executive interface in parliament, Anthony King (1976) shows that scrutiny and oversight is triggered when parliament is in a non-party or private mode. This happens in various parliamentary committees, which bring together backbenchers from both the ruling party and the opposition. In these committees, public representatives are forced to work together for the benefit of the community, far from intra-political party and factional issues and opposition politics dominating the plenary. In this mode, public representatives become ‘professional’ backbenchers. In an attempt to theorise the role of council in governance, Verhelst and Peters (2024: 143) hold that “the feeling of scrutiny being directly around the corner compels executives to act properly and professionally”. According to King (1976), though, the committee system generally has little influence on policy and decision-making, even less than opposition parties, in majoritarian political systems.   Nonetheless, argued King (1976), it is in coalition governments that the impact of oversight can be seen, in what is called cross-party mode. Coalitions force interaction between dominant and subordinate parties in the executive and their respective backbenchers in the legislature, as well as agreement in voting based on issues on the table (Verhelst & Peters, 2024). The marriage, however, does not eclipse the fact that the parties are ordinarily in opposition to each other. This creates an environment of robust and genuine engagement unfettered by frivolous political considerations. For instance, in cases where administrators were only accessible to the majority party, they are now accessible to both the dominant and subordinate parties in coalitions. Where only a few were consulted, even the minority parties must be consulted in decision-making. The next section discusses how coalition politics can facilitate this scenario in South Africa.   Enter Coalition Politics at Local Government Level   Coalition politics in South African local government is not a new phenomenon, as this has been in motion since the first local government elections in 2000 (Booysen, 2021). The 2000 local government elections resulted in 29 hung councils, 30 in 2006, 33 in 2011, and 27 in 2016 (Booysen, 2021). While the number of hung councils was the smallest in 2016, the coalition politics stimulated scholarly interest in how these affect governance and service delivery at local government, because three major cities in Gauteng, i.e., Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni, became hung councils (Booysen, 2021; Kariuki et al, 2022). The 2021 elections produced 66 hung councils out of the contested 213, with only four out of eight metropolitan municipalities achieving an outright majority (Kariuki et al, 2022; Sithole, 2023). The Cities of Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Nelson Mandela Bay and Tshwane were hung councils after the 2021 elections.   At the most basic, coalition government means two or more parties work together to produce the majority and form a government (Booysen, 2001; Kariuki et al, 2021; Sithole, 2023). Coalitions can be crafted through a formal agreement or informal consensus of the parties in council voting together to form a government (ibid.). One can identify different types of coalitions such as a grand coalition, a bare majority, a minority coalition, and a governance of national or local unity. The common thread on these, though, is that there is always a dominant and subordinate party or parties in the relationship, which makes the relationship a rocky one (Brooks, in Booysen, 2021). This is because the dominant parties seek coalition partners to consolidate power and small parties enter coalitions to have influence in government (ibid.).   Since 2021, South Africans have been treated to a spectacle of council fistfights and flying chairs, political horse-trading and contestations in such cities as Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela Bay, because of the political instability that accompanied these coalitions. In some councils, such as the City of Johannesburg and the City of Ekurhuleni, the mayors and the mayoral committees have changed more than twice by the mid-term of the sixth political term between November 2021 and June 2024.    In response to this, the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) developed a framework on how to handle coalitions in local government (Beukes & de Visser, 2021). This is because, in the view of SALGA:   “Instability in a local coalition can have a severe impact as it may compromise the municipality’s ability to adopt policies and by-laws, make senior management appointments, or even adopt a budget. Coalition instability ultimately compromises the municipal administration’s ability to deliver services to local communities. It puts strain on the planning of the administration because it is difficult to predict whether items would pass in the council. Ultimately, local communities will continue to bear the brunt of unstable coalition politics.” (Beukes & de Visser, 2021: 4)   While the above observation is welcome to kickstart the discussion about the future of local government coalitions in the country, Mutereko (2022) cautions that the spectacle seen on coalition councils should not be equated to the reality of the functionality of municipalities in fulfilling their mandate of service delivery. Of course, there is huge media interest in the drama unfolding around the formation of coalition governments, the disagreements and conflicts during their course, and – particularly – their termination or collapse, which is usually accompanied by a frenzy of political activity. However, this should not make us hasten to castigate coalition governments without empirical research on how they negatively impact the municipalities. One can identify three research areas that would illuminate the impact of coalition governments on the municipalities, namely, financial management and delivery of services, politics-administration/bureaucracy interface, and council functionality.   With regard to financial management and service delivery, there is little evidence, if any, to support that indeed coalition governance has negative effects on service delivery. According to de Visser and Chigwata (2023), the local government administration is not able to function because if council does not approve policies such as the integrated development plan (IDP), credit control policy, zoning schemes, indigent policy, supply chain management, etc., service delivery will stall. This assertion is also based on an incredulous claim by one municipal manager that “When my council fails to meet, the next day, the trucks don’t leave the depot” (de Visser & Chigwata, 2023: 3). All the policies stated above are approved by councils once a year and some, such as the IDP and supply chain management policies, can be dealt with in an interval of five years. It is not clear how trucks can fail to leave a depot due to a failure of council meeting, because such functions are delegated to the administration and do not require a daily approval by council.   Another attempt to explain the impact of coalition on financial management and service delivery is made by Masiya (2022), who relates audit opinion outcomes of the municipalities and unauthorised, irregular, and fruitless and wasteful (UIFW) expenditure to coalition governments. Masiya (2022) claims that, for example, the fact that the cities of Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni had “material misstatements” in 2017/18 can be attributed to coalition governments. However, there is no evidence that such are a result of coalitions.   For instance, the cities of Tshwane and Johannesburg had achieved unqualified audit opinions with findings and material misstatements from 2010/11 and 2012/13 financial years, respectively, and this did not change over the period of the coalitions from 2016 to 2021. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of the cities’ financial performance shows that there had been a steady increase in UIFW expenditure and incidents or transactions in those cities since the late 2000s, making it difficult to see how coalition governments contributed to the trend. For example, the City of Johannesburg recorded approximately 95 UIFW transactions in the 2017/18 financial year – which is the anchor of Masiya’s (2022) argument – and the highest of 217 in the 2012/13 financial year, when there were no coalitions. Similarly, the City of Tshwane recorded 16 UIFW transactions in 2017/18 and the highest of 59 in 2015/16, when there were no coalitions.      The research conducted on the political-administrative interface is not conclusive on whether coalition governments have a negative impact. Reporting on the research conducted on hung metropolitan municipalities in the 2016-2021 political term of local government, Olver (in Booysen, 2021: 269) observes:   “The coalitions in local government have tended to accentuate problems in the political-administrative interface, even though there have been some remarkably stable coalitions, which have been able to insulate administration from political fighting and build performing administrations”.   On the one hand, the research narrates stories told by senior managers of how political tensions of coalitions spill to the administration, prolong decision-making processes, plunge municipalities into policy uncertainties, and create a conducive environment for corruption. In such a context, city managers bemoan being caught up between the warring coalition partners, having to navigate contradicting policy positions, and being isolated by both their subordinates and political principals. In the latter case, the members of the mayoral committees (MMCs) tend to give instructions – most of which are for the benefit of both the concerned MMCs and directors – directly to the directors or heads of departments (HODs) without consulting the city managers, which creates accountability confusions.   On the other hand, Olver (in Booysen, 2021) shows that some coalitions yielded very well-governed administrations. Quoting a study done by Good Governance Africa, Olver (2021) shows that out of 20 best-performing municipalities, five were under coalition governments and this could be attributed to the heightened levels of accountability and oversight. In some cases, such as Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, there is a good working relationship between the mayor and the city manager. In other cases, such as the GladAfrica scandal in the City of Tshwane, corrupt activities were stopped [7] .   Olver (2021) further shows that there is a continuation of the corrupt practices seen under the majority party government, but with a different hue under coalition governments. Where conflicts were between different party factions, they are now between and amongst coalition partners. Senior managers are not angels either in this situation, as they also have a fair share of the political play, which may have a negative influence on the direction a coalition government can take. By virtue of being trusted lieutenants in the relationship, some senior managers tend to attempt to manipulate the situation for their own benefit and individual survival. But, argues Olver (in Booysen, 2021: 292), “Regardless of whether municipalities are run by coalitions or majority parties, the interface between municipal administrations and council politics are vexed”.   Some of the most rigorous research on this topic was conducted by Miller and McTavish (2012) on Scottish local government after the 2000 local government reforms, which saw the rise of coalitions not only in the municipal councils, but also at the ward level called multi-member wards or constituencies. They found that because of multiple – and sometimes contradictory – views and demands from coalition partners, policymaking and political decision-making become a tedious and painstaking process, which increases the complexity of the roles of senior managers in the municipalities. Just as it was also found in South Africa, senior managers find themselves playing the role of intermediaries between the coalition partners, which make them highly active political managers. However, this leads to a greater scrutiny of policy and decisions made in council and induces senior managers to consider the views of the majority of political parties in council, as opposed to one political party in a majority council (ibid.).   In terms of council functionality, one can argue that the political instability of coalition governments leads to the disruption of the council mandate of by-law making, oversight and public participation. Indeed, the contests make it difficult to pass by-laws, policies and scrutinise the items from the executive. In some cases, a council can go for days or weeks without a mayor or the mayoral committee or changes can happen in such rapid succession that the mayoral committees do not have sufficient time to familiarise themselves with the work of the administration to function properly (Olver, 2021). This means that during these times of leadership vacuum, there would be no one to account to council, or oversight committees such as MPAC, on the performance of the municipality. According to Brooks (in Booysen, 2021), political stability is a precondition of accountability in coalitions.      Nonetheless,  Mutereko (2022), argues that below the drama of fights and disruptions is a world of informal negotiations, consideration of others’ points of view, compromises and balancing of tensions, and efforts to satisfy multiple stakeholders with competing values and interests. According to Masiya (2022: 111-112):   “Governance authority [in coalition government] is diffused across institutions controlled by parties responsive to different societal interests in municipalities led by coalitions. This encourages sincere commitments to long-term people-centred policy stability in South Africa … With growing coalitions, it is apparent that various forms of coalition-led municipalities could influence the future of control and accountability in local government”.   This is exactly what King (1976) meant by cross-party mode. It allows for sincere and rigorous decision-making as various interests must be taken into account and this runs through the legislature-executive setting, including the executive committees and council committees. As also argued by Verhelst and Peters (2024), Masiya (2022) further holds that coalition governance creates an anticipation of scrutiny from coalition partners, which promotes good governance, financial prudence, transparency and accountability. It is this situation that could be leveraged to strengthen the scrutiny and oversight function of councils, particularly as this is now legislated through the 2021 Structures Act amendments. For instance, coalitions in most metropolitan municipalities, such as the City of Johannesburg and the City of Ekurhuleni, saw, for the first time, MPAC chairpersons being appointed from the opposition parties (Mutereko, 2022).   According to Brooks (in Booysen, 2021), legislatures can also play an important role in the oversight of coalition agreements. By scrutinising the policies of coalition governments, legislatures can serve to close the wedge created by opposition forces existing between different parties in coalition. Through accountability to both the legislature and the public, coalition governments will be amplifying their chances of success in government (Brooks, 2021; Sithole, 2023). What is to be done? Following from the above discussion, one can make a few recommendations to be considered in order to strengthen the councils’ scrutiny and oversight function in completion of the country’s local government accountability architecture. First, there is a need to empower councils for them to play a meaningful role in the accountability system of local government. This requires us to go beyond the assumption that establishment of MPACs automatically translates to effective municipal accountability and oversight and start looking at councils’ oversight potential and capacity. We need to ask ourselves about the structure of MPACs, its oversight tools, and how the oversight capacity can be stimulated to hold the executive accountable. Simply reiterating that accountability is the responsibility of council, expressing disappointment that it is not happening, and getting commitment from the councils and premiers that it will be strengthened, is not enough.   Second, just as it is the case at the national and provincial government level, there is a need for a local government oversight model at the local government level. Various guidelines produced by the National Treasury (NT), Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) and South African Local Government Association (SALGA) need to be synthesised to provide an oversight cycle, section 79 committee (including MPAC) template, and a picture of what effective section 79 committees look like. In doing this, we need to consider differences in municipalities and modalities through which oversight could be done in different municipalities. For example, oversight in executive committees-type municipalities should not be the same as in the mayoral-type municipalities. Also, the organisational makeup of cities such as the City of Johannesburg, which delivers almost all of its services through municipal entities, should be taken into consideration when thinking about accountability and oversight. Such a service delivery model adds another accountability layer, which makes it difficult for the council to play its oversight role.   Furthermore, the local oversight model must make provision for the involvement of the public in the oversight process. By doing so, it will be encouraging diagonal accountability, where the oversight committees of council, as horizontal oversight actors, and the citizens, civil society organisations and the media (vertical accountability actors) would be working together to hold the executive and administration accountable. This will heighten the accountability and oversight sensibilities of the executive and administration and act as a further deterrence for wrongdoing.  As also argued by Verhelst and Peters (2024) above, the awareness of being watched by the principals makes the agents think twice before doing wrong things.     Third, coalition governments seem to be presenting an opportunity for the government to leverage on scrutiny expectation or anticipation in order to strengthen the scrutiny and oversight role of councils. This comes after the amendment of the Structures Act in an attempt to improve the scrutiny and oversight roles of councils. Therefore, the government could leverage on this to ensure that accountability and oversight is strengthened at local government level for the benefit of the communities.   At the national and provincial government level, the oversight model expressly seeks to insulate accountability and oversight from parliamentary politics by, firstly, ensuring that a certain level of service delivery to the communities occurs, even under political contestations amongst different political actors in government (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2012). Secondly, the model aims to remove Parliament’s work from confrontational opposition-based oversight, famous in Westminster parliamentary style, by setting conditions for collaboration between the legislature and the executive in service delivery, thus making the former partly liable for service delivery failures of the latter arm of the state. Perhaps, the availability of a unified oversight model will serve to conscientise coalition partners, both in the executive and the legislature, of the fact that service delivery failures as a result of coalition politics make them liable. In addition to MPACs, councils should be encouraged to establish more oversight committees, manned by non-executive councillors under the stewardship of the Speaker of Council and the Whip of Council, to assist in carrying out their by-law making, oversight and public participation mandate. Depending on the size and the nature of municipalities, these committees may not be more than two in some municipalities and there might be more than 10 in others. In small municipalities, for instance, MPACs should be able and empowered to play an all-encompassing oversight role.   The committees may include standing committees and portfolio oversight committees. Just as it is the case in parliament (Republic of South Africa, 2012), the former should be permanent committees of council, comprising internal political management committees such as the programming committees, committees of chairpersons, and ethics committees; and transversal committees such as gender, youth and persons with disabilities (GEYODI) and MPAC. The latter, i.e., portfolio oversight committees, should correspond with the available portfolios in the executive or mayoral committee. For example, the Finance Department must account to the Finance Oversight Committee, and the Energy Department to account to the Energy Oversight Committee.    The powers, functions and duties of the committees must be codified in the standing orders of council, terms of reference of the committees, and the local government oversight model. The model should outline the process to be followed by the committees in scrutinising and interrogating the department’s policies, plans, budgets and their financial and non-financial performance, as well as evaluation of the impact of the municipalities in communities. Some of these documents and reports are already provided in various legislative provisions, such as section 129 of the MFMA and circular 63 released by the National Treasury in 2013, providing guidelines on how councils should handle various accountability reports such as integrated development plans (IDPs) / medium-term revenue and expenditure frameworks (MTREFs), annual reports, and in-year service delivery and budget implementation plan (SDBIP) reports, by the mayor.   Since most of these are standard throughout a year, such as the fact that the mayor must table an annual report in council by the end of January every year, the oversight model must also provide for an accountability and oversight cycle designed in accordance with these reporting requirements and expected timeframes for the committees to deal with these. It must also outline oversight tools at the disposal of committees – such as powers to call the members of the mayoral committees (MMCs) to appear before the committees, research and investigation powers, and public participation strategy –  to ensure an effective oversight process. The model must also provide guidelines on the relationship between the internal and external stakeholders such as the HoDs, audit committees, AGSA, Public Protector, media and civil society organisations.   Furthermore, the committees must be provided with enough powers to determine their own agendas, provided with sufficient resources, and provided meeting dates in the council calendar to execute their mandate. This should include enough budget to do their own investigations and benchmark their work with other committees in the country or internationally. Also, they must be given sufficient support staff including committee officers, researchers, legal advisors, and public participation officers to assist them in their daily work. With these, councils will be able to oversee not only the performance of the departments, but also coalition agreements in cases of coalition governments. Non-executive councillors would also be empowered to play their oversight roles and learn more about the operations of the municipality. The other accountability and oversight actors – such as the A-G, provincial and national governments – would be able to get timeous and first-hand information about both the financial and non-financial performance of the municipalities, as well as enriched suggestions about what can be done to improve the situation in the municipalities.      Conclusion   This article sought to assess the accountability and oversight architecture of local government and its functionality in relation to financial management in South Africa. It shows that while there are legislative provisions of accountability and oversight in the mould of separation of powers principles at local government level, these provisions have not been utilised to the fullest, as the role of councils have been excluded to a large extent. Bringing in councils may assist in improving the municipalities’ financial management and service delivery to the communities.   It is shown that the failure of the elitist interventions experimented with over the years seems to be an indication of a wide principal-agent gap between the municipalities, other spheres of government and the citizens. Locating these within the municipal accountability and oversight system, it is shown that oversight is done with little involvement of councils, which are supposed to be central to that process. The fact that the accountability and oversight practices at local government level focus only on transparency, liability and responsibility aspects of accountability suggests that there is an accountability disorder in South African local government. It is thus argued that involving councils as legislatures, and non-executive councillors, can play a role in completing this accountability and oversight architecture by bringing much-needed scrutiny of control and responsiveness as other aspects of accountability. Since they are closer to the financial management and service delivery action and live in communities, councillors can be regarded as a ready army to assist in the accountability and oversight processes of local government, if given an opportunity to do so in oversight committees. This can also serve to create better councillors and politicians to serve in other capacities after their lives as councillors.   Using Anthony King’s (1979) seminal work on different modes of legislature-executive interface, the article argues that the local government structures provide for the required non-party mode for effective oversight. Nonetheless, coalition politics in local government might be providing an opportunity to improve the situation. In coalition governments, the cross-party mode spreads scrutiny not only within the executive, but also on the political-administrative interface, legislature-executive interface, as well as within parliamentary committees. As the dominant parties need partners to hold onto power, and the minority political actors seek to have an influence in government, it becomes harder to ignore these different views and issues in running the government. This is the basis of effective scrutiny and oversight and gives rise to inclusive policymaking and decision-making, which argues well for service delivery and democracy.   Therefore, there is a need for a heightened focus on councils as the source of horizontal accountability. This requires the government to go beyond the establishment of municipal public accounts committees (MPACs) and stimulate councils’ oversight potential and capacity. As argued by Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014), not only do we need to ensure that MPACs and other oversight committees have appropriate oversight tools, but these need to be used for the efficacy of the oversight capacity of councils. Furthermore, there is a need for the establishment of an oversight model at the local government level. So as to avoid multiple accountability disorders, the oversight model must be specific and clear on its definition of accountability, as well as the roles of different stakeholders in the accountability system of local government. Also, the model must consider differences in municipalities, as accountability and oversight in a small municipality of 20 councillors cannot work similarly to a 200-councillors strong metropolitan city delivering 80% of its services through municipal-owned entities. It must also encourage community involvement in the oversight processes of the council.   The article further highlights some of the important characteristics of a functional accountability and oversight strategy, such as the types of committees required and the fact that the committees’ powers, functions and duties must be formalised through standing orders of council, committees’ terms of reference, and the local government oversight model. The committees must further be autonomous and independent enough to exert their influence on the affairs of the municipalities. The oversight model should provide for the modalities through which oversight must happen, oversight tools at the disposal of the committees, as well as guidelines in management of the relationship between the legislature and various stakeholders. Through these and learning from those who have done it before, it is possible to strengthen accountability and oversight at local government for the benefit of the communities.        References   Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA). 2022. Consolidated General Report on Local Government Audit Outcomes, MFMA 2020/21 . [Online] Available at: https://mfma-2022.agsareports.co.za/ [accessed: 18 July 2024]   Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA). 2023. Consolidated General Report on Local Government Audit Outcomes, MFMA 2021/22 . [Online] Available at: https://mfma-2022.agsareports.co.za/ [accessed: 18 July 2024]   Beukes, J. & de Visser, J. 2021. A Framework for Coalitions in Local Government Prepared for the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) . [Online] Available at: https://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/ [accessed: 18 July 2024]   Booysen, S. 2021. Marriages of Inconvenience: The Politics of Coalitions in South Africa . Johannesburg: Maphungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflections   Buttler. 2011. The Politics of the Public Sector: Political Accountability in Post-apartheid South Africa , paper presented at PARI (Public Affairs Research Institute) Symposium on Public Sector Reform, Wits University, 19 January 2011   De Visser, J. & Chigwata, T. 2023. Coalition governments: What are the options for law reform at municipal level?  [Online] Available at: https://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/multilevel-govt/publications/coalitions-background-document-03112023.pdf [accessed: 18 July 2024]   Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC). 2021. Municipal Election Results . [Online] Available at: https://results.elections.org.za/home/downloads/me-results [accessed: 18 July 2024]   Goba, N. 2019. Tshwane and GladAfrica agree to Cancel Contract . [Online] Available at: https://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-02-26-tshwane-and-gladafrica-agree-to-cancel-contract/  [accessed: 3 June 2024]   Hamza, L. 2021. Local Government Accountability and Oversight, and Intervention Mechanisms in South Africa . [Online] Available at: www.ipsa.org.za  [accessed: 18 July 2024]   Kariuki, P., Reddy, P. & Wissink, H. 2022. Coalition Building and Municipal Governance in South Africa: Implications for Municipal Leadership and Service Delivery . Johannesburg: UJ Press   Khaile, T. 2023. The Effectiveness of Section 139 Interventions in Strengthening the Municipal Accountability Architecture in South Africa, The Journal of Local Government Research and Innovation , 4(0): a146   King, A. 1976. Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany, Legislative Studies Quarterly , 1(1): 11-36   Kolisang, L. 2019. The Impact of Oversight Mechanisms on Service Delivery in the Midvaal Local Municipality . Unpublished MA Dissertation: North-West University   Koppel, J. 2005. Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder”, Public Administration Review , 65(1)   Lindberg, S.I. 2009. Accountability: The Core Concept and Its Subtypes . African Power and Politics Programme: UK Department for International Development (DFID). [Online] Available at: www.assets.publishing.service.gov.uk  [accessed: 18 July 2024]   Madue, S. 2012. Complexities of the Oversight Role of Legislatures, Journal of Public Administration , 47(2)   Malapane, A. 2019. The Effects of the Oversight Role of Legislatures in Promoting Good Governance in South Africa with Specific Reference to the Gauteng Legislature . Unpublished PhD Thesis: University of Limpopo   Masiya, T. 2022. Financial Control and Accountability in Coalition-Led Municipal Councils in South Africa, in Kariuki, P., Reddy, P. & Wissink, H. 2022. Coalition Building and Municipal Governance in South Africa: Implications for Municipal Leadership and Service Delivery . Johannesburg: UJ Press   Miller, K. & McTavish, D. 2012. Electoral and Political Changes: The Impact of Political Bureaucratic Relationships in Scottish Local Government, Local Government Studies , 38(1): 113-129   Mutereko, S. 2022. Coalition Governance in Local Government: A Theoretical Analysis of Multi-Party Administration of Hung Municipalities in South Africa, in Kariuki, P., Reddy, P. & Wissink, H. 2022. Coalition Building and Municipal Governance in South Africa: Implications for Municipal Leadership and Service Delivery . Johannesburg: UJ Press   O’Donnell, G. 1999. Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, in Schedler, A., Diamond, L. & Plattner, M. (eds). The Self-Restraining State . Lynne Rienner Publishers: Colorado   Olver, C. 2021. The Impact of Coalition on South Africa’s Metropolitan Administrations, in Booysen, S. (ed). Marriages of Inconvenience: The Politics of Coalitions in South Africa . Johannesburg: Maphungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflections   Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 2012. Oversight Model of the South African Legislature Sector . [Online] Available at: www.parliament.gov.za [accessed: 18 July 2024]   Pelizzo, R. & Kinyondo, A. 2015. Nigerian Journal of Legislative Affairs , 7(1): January-June 201. [Online] Available at: www.researchgate.net/publication/292227902  [accessed: 18 July 2024]   Pelizzo, R. & Stapenhurst, F. 2012. Parliamentary Oversight Tools: A Comparative Analysis . Routledge: New York   Pelizzo, R. & Stapenhurst, F. 2014. Government Accountability and Legislative Oversight . Routledge: New York   Rockvic, V. & Ivanis, Z. 2013. Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Serbia: Perceived Effects, Problems of Post-Communism , 60(1): 55-61   RSA. 2015a. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996), 14th edition . Juta and Company: Johannesburg   RSA. 2015b. Local Government: Municipal Systems Act and Regulations (No. 32 of 2000).  Juta and Company: Johannesburg   RSA. 2015c. Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (No. 117 of 1998) . Juta and Company: Johannesburg   RSA. 2015d. Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act (No. 56 of 2003) . Juta and Company: Johannesburg   RSA. 2021. Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) Amendments . Juta and Company: Johannesburg   Schedler, A. 1999. Conceptualizing Accountability, in Schedler, A., Diamond, L. & Plattner, M. (eds). The Self-Restraining State . Lynne Rienner Publishers: Colorado   Sithole, N. 2023. Coalitions in South African Local Municipalities: Is the Constitution Enabling Democracy or Not? Journal For Inclusive Public Policy , 3(2)   Verhelst, T. & Peters, K. 2024. Scrutinizing Council Scrutiny: From Theoretical Black Box to Analytical Toolbox, Local Government Studies , 50(1): 128-149 [1]  However, there is no consensus on this conceptualisation, as some scholars expand horizontal accountability to include external accountability actors. In this view, civil society organisations  and media are categorised within horizontal accountability (Schedler, 1999; Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2013). O’Donnell (1999) argues that categorising civil society as horizontal accountability is disingenuous because, first, they are in no way equal to other state actors in holding the government accountable. Second, state institutions such as the executive, legislature and the judiciary have clear powers to mete out sanctions amongst each other. [2]  There are three types of municipalities in South Africa, namely categories A, B, and C. Category A includes metropolitan municipalities, B are the local municipalities, and C are district municipalities established to govern several category B municipalities (RSA, 2015a). Also, there are different governance structures such as the mayoral committees, executive committees or collective executive municipalities (RSA, 2015b). Furthermore, there are different service delivery models such as the corporation  model practised  in the City of Johannesburg, where the bulk of services are delivered through municipal-owned entities, those who deliver services through departments, and those who are a mixture of the two models. [3]  Source: Figure created by author. [4]  The reason for the dotted lines from the local government executive to the national and provincial governments and active citizenry is that as a structure of council, the executive is technically accountable through councils, which does not stop them from being individually accountable to these. [5]  While some scholars regard active citizenry as horizontal accountability, this study follows O'Donnell's  assertion that, by virtue of relative powerlessness in relation to the state, and because of the decision-making powers of state institutions, civil society or active citizenry falls within the category of downward vertical accountability (O’Donnell, 1999). [6]  Section 43 of the Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) provides that the executive committee of a municipality should not exceed 20% or 10 councillors, whichever is the least.  [7]  In 2017, the City of Tshwane awarded a three-year contract valued at approximately R1.2 billion for project management consultancy to a company called GladAfrica. It was alleged that the appointment of the company was done irregularly, which prompted an investigation and mutual termination of the contract in 2019 before its expiry in 2020. By the time of its termination, the municipality had already spent over R498 million in payment of GladAfrica’s services (Goba, 2019). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2024 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2024 by Douglas Ian Scott   as published in the New Agenda South African Journal of Social and Economic Policy, Volume 2024, Issue 92, April 2024.   Introduction   China’s economic rise may now be slowing down, but the lessons for South Africa, grappling with its own stubborn development challenges, remain important. While Beijing currently navigates potential stagnation after four decades of breakneck speed economic development, its “reform and opening up” era offers valuable insights for Pretoria. This article argues that South Africa should re-orientate its relationship with China so as to better learn from, and recreate, the successes of China’s development experience. To do this requires appreciating what those successes are and where, as well as which lessons are not worth repeating on South Africa’s own development path.   Currently South Africa seems to be learning many of the wrong lessons from China. Political training missions from South Africa to Beijing are intended by China to normalise China’s one-party-dominant political system in the rest of the world, rather than meet South Africa’s primary needs (Sun, 2016). This spreads the ideologically rigid message of Xi Jinping (and formerly Maoist) China, not the lessons of the “reform and opening up” period (1979-2017) [1]  that propelled China forward. South Africa already has a well-developed, vibrant and dynamic democratic system; we don’t need to be taught things that run counter to those hard-won gains.   It is worth noting that the current South African focus on centralising power in national government contrasts with the reality of the decentralised and semi-autonomous provincial power structures that have long existed in China; a decentralised system of government, born of historical and geographic necessity, that has allowed for local innovation and local accountability. Focusing on setting up Special Economic Zones, whilst a powerful tool of development, ignores the broader reforms that were implemented and the unique situation of Hong Kong as a gateway to the rest of the world. No South African equivalent to Hong Kong exists. Finally, the creation of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to drive development policy ignores the reality that the SOEs have always been a significant drag on China’s economy, one that the reforms usually sought to address and minimise.   So what are the lessons that South Africa can learn from China’s “reform and opening up” period? To answer that question we need to examine how China did it.   Background   In 1978, Deng Xiaoping and his coterie of pragmatic modernisers replaced almost 30 years of rigid Maoist dogma, which in turn replaced “100 years of shame” and domestic turmoil, overturning and replacing Mao Zedong’s strict ideological purity with a practical, open-minded and flexible focus on economic development (Naughton, 2006, Part III). They looked to Japanese, Korean and Hong Kong economic development policies and history (which in turn were largely based on German economic history and the writings of Friedrich List) for inspiration. This created a broad intellectual bedrock on which to build and inspire new development policies that were tailor made for China’s needs.   Reopening trade and scientific exchange with the West, particularly the US, gave them access to a vast and wealthy market to drive export-led economic growth. It also allowed for the importation of productivity-enhancing technology that would enable this export-led growth model. A pivotal move marked by China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 accelerated growth further. Despite its entry into the WTO, China maintained various policy tools that effectively protected its own industries against foreign competition through subsidies and maintaining the low value of its currency.   High levels of domestic savings provided the capital to acquire the technology and capital goods necessary (Wang, 2018). This, along with the policy approach expanded on in this article, drove 40 years of powerful economic growth (averaging 9% a year) that lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty and resurrected one of the world’s great historical powers.   China’s strategic initiative, “Made in China 2025,” implemented in 2015, aimed to leverage its economic growth, propel a new era of reforms and policy objectives, and elevate the nation to developed nation status. The intention was to steer clear of the middle-income trap that currently challenges South Africa. Made in China 2025 sought to do this by encouraging investments in 10 key high productivity, high technology industrial sectors. These are: information technology; robotics and semiconductors; renewable energy and electric vehicles; aerospace; blue economy; railway equipment; power equipment; agricultural technology; medicine and new materials.   Made in China 2025 triggered alarm in Washington and Brussels, alienating China from its most important export markets and sources of technology imports. It fostered concern that China might be able to shed its technological dependency on the US in particular and the West in general. In this way, China failed to continue heeding Deng’s advice to “hide its strength, bide its time” under Xi’s now partially abandoned wolf warrior diplomacy.   A notable element of Made in China 2025 that caused considerable consternation in Washington was its focus on establishing import independence on microchip design and production, of which China imported hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth annually to fuel its vast electronics industry in the Pearl River Delta region. The policy prompted the Trump administration to adopt a more hostile economic and trade posture towards the country after the policy was declared a “threat to U.S. technological leadership” by the Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018). It, along with the later election of President Biden, also catalysed the development of new American industrial policy in the form of the CHIPS Act to fortify American dominance in this sector.   Despite pouring hundreds of billions of dollars into Made in China 2025 priority industries, the policy has produced mixed results, far from the levels of its 40-year rapid growth era. China’s dominance in renewable energy and electric vehicles has been successfully secured for the foreseeable future. However, its investments in aerospace have yet to produce a satisfactory, domestically designed and built commercial aircraft industry. A viable independent domestic aeronautics industry remains elusive.   The policy’s impact on semiconductor production has been mixed – working at the tiny scale required for the most advanced micro-chips is difficult. Whilst the hundreds of billions of dollars China has invested in developing its domestic semiconductor industry has produced some notable advances, such as the seven nanometres (nm) domestically produced Kirin 9000S chip, it has not yet been successful in establishing the strongly desired semiconductor independence or production capability at the bleeding edge 3nm level. [2]  American pressure on Dutch and Japanese suppliers of the extreme ultraviolet (EUV) photolithography machines, the super high-tech hearts of the multi-billion dollar foundries that produce cutting and bleeding edge microchips, has contributed to this outcome. It also illustrated the difficulty, enormous complexity and extreme cost needed to establish a competitive foothold in the rapidly evolving semiconductor industry.   Although this era of aggressive reform and opening up might be over now, in Xi Jinping’s China, instead of returning to the older obsession with ideological purity and state control, the lessons and legacy from this opening up period remain. The lessons for South Africa from Deng’s reforms can be broadly described as: be pragmatic; incentivise good accountable governance and innovative local government; develop a high functioning and professional bureaucracy; and ensure there is sufficient political will to successfully follow through in implementing economic development policies unhindered by unrelated policies.   Pragmatic governance – practicality ahead of ideology   No matter if it is a white cat or a black cat; as long as it can catch mice, it is a good cat. – Deng Xiaoping   This quote, mentioned in a number of Deng’s speeches, encapsulates this spirit of pragmatism when pursuing the goal of economic development. So much so that it evolved into an often touted slogan and a political theory of its own, one that can be summarised as “whether it is a planned economy or market economy, it is only a means of resource allocation and has nothing to do with the political system; capitalism can have a plan, and socialism can also have a market” (Ke, 2013).   This slogan acknowledged the political backdrop of Chinese Communist Party politics and the existing economic landscape, largely controlled by inefficient SOEs. Simultaneously, it acknowledged the tangible impact of privately-led capitalism, guided by government policy, in propelling economic development. All economic policy is driven by a desire to move up the industrial value chain through beneficiation, achieve economies of scale and adopt productivity-enhancing technology.   A pragmatic, government-guided approach adopted during Japan’s industrialisation, was inspired by German and American industrial policy of the 19th century, which in turn was inspired by early English industrial policy adopted during the reign of Henry VIII (1509-1547).   Unlocking the success of this type of industrial policy necessitates a practical approach that requires getting the basics right. Total factor productivity, [3]  the ratio of aggregate output to aggregate inputs, needs to be maximised to make beneficiated goods competitive on international markets. To achieve this, productivity needs to be increased, the domestic costs of inputs decreased, economies of scale established and transaction costs minimised.   Productivity was increased through the adoption of new technologies and investments in high-end capital goods, all underwritten with government subsidies and incentives. Input costs were similarly reduced domestically through a mix of government incentives and subsidies. This also required ensuring a reliable and cheap supply of electricity which, despite occasional brownouts due to rapidly increasing demand, has largely been achieved through long-term planning and the successful rollout of new power plants. This is an area where South Africa, plagued by ever-worsening loadshedding since 2007, has notably failed. Economies of scale were established through government policies and encouraging the formation of business clusters. A good example of this is the Chinese cities that specialise in specific economic services such as Yiwu’s dominance in small commodities or Hangzhou’s 1980s era economic cluster in sock production. This is already present to a limited extent in South Africa with cities such as Gqeberha with its automotive assembly, but greater potential exists to expand this phenomenon. The minimisation of transaction costs required trade agreements to reduce export tariffs (which is why the WTO accession was so important to China) whilst improving and streamlining the country’s logistical capacity. This required large and ongoing investments in rail, road and port infrastructure whilst ensuring strong and effective management that is well maintained and run. The effective management, investment and operation of ports and rail infrastructure is another area where South Africa requires urgent attention (Naughton, 2006).   An often celebrated model to come out of this practical approach has been the establishment of Special Economic Zones at easy access points to international markets. These are areas where normal laws and taxation policies are relaxed or otherwise modified to encourage international investment and export. South Africa already has an established policy encouraging this phenomenon with a number of Industrial Development Zones (IDZs) already in the country. A good example of this is the Freeport of Saldanha IDZ, which seeks to specialise in marine engineering. However, total factor productivity still needs to be improved to enhance the international competitiveness of these IDZs.   Innovative local government   “The mountains are high and the emperor is far away,” is a popular old Chinese saying that highlights the challenges of ruling a large country. China’s approach to solving this problem has been to decentralise decision-making and give greater autonomy to local authorities.   This empowers the government to formulate policies that are more attuned to local needs and expedite their implementation. The persistent challenge lies in overcoming the corruption and mismanagement that may accompany decentralised decision- making. Much of China’s governmental history is marked by endeavours of central government officials to monitor and address these issues. However, considering both China’s geographical vastness and the enhancement of local governance, this emerges as a more viable approach, one that South Africa could potentially learn from. Indeed, certain detrimental policy debacles, such as the Great Leap Forward, stemmed from centrally imposed decisions that disregarded local realities.   The Great Leap forward was Mao’s attempt to rapidly industrialise China from 1958 to 1962. It was one of the most famous failed industrialisation efforts in history resulting in the deaths of between 15 million and 55 million Chinese. An aggressive industrial plan that focused on heavy industry and agriculture, it was implemented in a ham-fisted top-down manner that operated independently of local realities, resulting in gross distortions on the ground (Naughton, 2006). It was during this period that Deng first started advocating for less ideologically driven policies. This advocacy work would result in his temporary banishment from Chinese politics.   Following Deng’s rise to power much of China’s growth and poverty alleviation has been driven by local governments doing practical things village by village and city by city. To do this they needed a political mandate and bureaucratic flexibility to implement and experiment with policies and projects. Special Economic Zones, most notably Shenzhen which was able to develop a symbiotic economic relationship with neighbouring Hong Kong, served as laboratories for experimentation.   Local autonomy, in conjunction with the lessons outlined in this article, not only provided local governments with the flexibility to leverage regional conditions but also enabled them to experiment with fostering specialised business clusters and identifying the unique economic strengths of their respective areas. To support these initiatives, the local government established networks facilitating the exchange of outcomes and insights from local development experiments and showcasing model projects and policies to inspire and motivate others.   Local governments are free to set up business development support offices that offer practical advice and services to local businesses. This can range from encouraging local businesses to take advantage of government business development programmes to helping them access international markets to support the export of their goods. In 2008, the author visited one such support office in a rural district of Hebei province which was known for exporting peaches and being one of the largest producers of violins in the world, an achievement that would not have been possible without the practical support of their high-functioning local government-run business support office.   This does come with some risk. Without systems of accountability and adequate monitoring, local officials are more likely to pursue unproductive vanity projects or become corrupt.   Accountable governance   If government officials are not accountable for delivering results and properly motivated, it is unlikely that anything will get done. Different countries have different ways of dealing with this problem. In most democracies it is the role of the electoral process to appoint politicians who will hold bureaucrats to account if they do not deliver.   Being a one party state China has sought to resolve this problem in a different way. By setting a few simple metrics, and rigorously measuring the performance of party and government officials against those metrics, officials are strongly incentivised to focus on development priorities. During China’s period of rapid growth these metrics were primarily focused on economic growth, and included the amount of private and foreign investment each municipality’s leadership could attract. Within the context of promoting economic growth the metric was purposefully left broad so as to allow for experimentation, innovation and taking advantage of local opportunities.   So long as economic growth was maximised within the rules of the law, the best performing officials stood a good chance of being promoted into higher levels of government. This provided an effective mechanism for ambitious officials to gain higher office whilst driving growth.   Much needed anti-corruption drives, along with a change in government policies to reduce pollution (also a much needed change), have altered this approach in recent years. However, the lesson remains that strong mechanisms incentivising good local government whilst punishing non-delivery are needed as are clear lines of accountability for both local decision-makers and the public servants that execute policy on the ground. This is something South Africa is in great need of.   Professionalised bureaucracy   China has a long established norm of trying to appoint the country’s best educated and most capable to government. Culturally, working in the civil service is seen as a high-status job, adding to the allure of government employment. The kējǔ or Imperial Examination for government helped establish this tradition during the Sui dynasty over 1,500 years ago. This policy, of always trying to hire the country’s best and brightest for government, has been continued by the Communist Party government. China is not the only country with a tradition of doing this, Japan and the United Kingdom are also reputed to have a similar culture.   This has ensured that there is a strong talent pool within government that can be recruited from and relied upon to implement government policies and projects. High quality, energetic and highly motivated government officials are especially needed when trying to implement projects at a local level. High-quality politicians with an intimate understanding of local needs and the power to hold bureaucrats accountable is also vital. However, even the most talented political figure needs highly effective bureaucrats to implement policies and deliver on political promises. South Africa, sadly, has never had a culture of recruiting its best and brightest for government. Nor do we have a culture of competitive examinations for the civil service. Whilst there are many highly capable and dedicated people working for government the culture within government, at least since the formation of the Republic, has been to use the recruitment of civil servants as a tool of implementing political goals (such as entrenching Afrikaner control over the state during apartheid) instead of building an effective government. By adopting a culture of recruiting our best and brightest into the civil service, the government’s ability to implement policies and do so efficiently is enhanced allowing the country to do more with less and increasing the chances that better implementation decisions will be made.   Political will   In China, effective political support for long-term strategic planning allowed China to leapfrog over the pre-established industrial dominance of developed countries through the early development of new technologies. Established industries in electronics and steel could transition to renewable energy and electric vehicles. China’s early investment in these technologies when they were new, 10 or 20 years ago, has given it a strong head- start over other nations. Now China increasingly dominates the global export of solar panels and electric vehicles, sectors in which it enjoys a strong competitive advantage (Lin, 2023).   At around the same time, South Africa established several factories making equipment for renewable electricity, but these closed when government withdrew the promised scale of support for renewables.   South Africa has the potential to be strong in this type of industrial planning.   The Department of Trade, Industry and Competition has a long legacy of producing industrial plans. But the political will to implement these plans, unhindered by other, often contradictory policies, has not been present in the current political climate. Until a political consensus that prioritises economic development emerges in South Africa, it is unlikely that even the best conceived industrial policies will be implemented successfully.   Caution   Despite China’s extraordinarily successful example, blindly copying China’s playbook would likely invite disaster. White elephant projects and unchecked corruption are serious risks that China has been trying to come to terms with over the past 10 years. Overinvesting in specific sectors, like the construction and steel industries, distorts markets and wastes capital. Unsustainable debt-fuelled growth has created a nasty hangover which, as in Japan, might take decades to work through. Growth has slumped in the past few years and this has been made worse by the end of the country’s demographic dividend, in addition to high rates of municipal debt, shifting trends in international trade and Western industrial policy, weak productivity growth, and an economy that is overly dependent on a stagnant and highly indebted construction industry. All of this is pointing to the possibility that China might be entering into a middle income trap and a long period of low growth (Magnus, 2018).   Conclusion   China is not alone in proving the success of applying the principles of pragmatism, professional government, political will to implement industrial policy and a culture of entrepreneurship. It is an extraordinary fact that, after preaching the minimal state, avoidance of debt in an unrestricted free market economy for 40 years, the United States under President Joe Biden has made the historic turn back to the state-driven industrial policy it applied when its economy was being built, and again during the New Deal under President Franklin D. Roosevelt following the Great Depression of the 1930s. Biden has revived exactly the policies applied when the US economy was thrust into becoming the foremost economy in the world.   Although the country is currently experiencing a period of significant political partisanship there remains a surprisingly strong, although seldom talked about, consensus that has emerged in industrial policy. Similar to the Made in China 2025 strategy, the Biden era CHIPS and Science Act have injected $250billion into a raft of high technology, high productivity industries over the next 10 years, partly with the intent to re-establish its once dominant semiconductor industry. The success of its implementation, with the majority of the investments going to more conservative Trump voting areas of the country, is an example of good industrial politics enjoying – however begrudgingly – bipartisan support and a broad political mandate. His interventions to promote the green economy have been no less substantial.   Other factors have also contributed to this period of American growth. Trump tax cuts created a period of growth before the Covid pandemic. Biden’s economic stimulus spending during the pandemic through the CARES Act unlocked an enormous multi-year-long consumer spending spree driven by excess savings. A boom in productivity-enhancing technologies such as AI, along with the easy availability of capital to deploy them, has significantly increased the productivity and competitiveness of American manufacturing. This process has been further stimulated by policies supporting the reshoring of manufacturing back to the US following the country’s panic resulting from the Made in China 2025 policy.   The success of implementing these acts and industrial policies required a pragmatic approach, strong political will, a culture of enterprise, as well as autonomous and responsible government. Although very different from China in many ways, the US provides a good example of the power of applying the same principles adopted by China to drive development.   Currently the economic picture is not as good in China as it once was, partly due to the country’s current leadership abandoning the ethos and reforming drive of the previous generation of Chinese leaders (Magnus, 2018). A generation of Chinese leaders, starting with Deng Xiaoping, created the conditions for one of the most significant economic success stories in history. China’s current slowdown is a cautionary tale: abandoning reforms stifles progress and Xi Jinping’s retreat from openness underscores this.   Despite this, the country’s official annual GDP growth rate remains above 5%, much to the envy of South Africa which has averaged a sluggish 1.08% between 2012 and 2022. This number is lower than our population growth rate [4] indicating that the average South African is getting poorer.   South Africa’s current approach, fixated on SOEs and centralised control, mirrors China’s pre-reform struggles. Learning from both China’s successes and failures requires embracing pragmatism, professional governance, political will for well-designed industrial policy, and a vibrant entrepreneurial spirit. Rather than fixating on political intrigue and SOEs, the focus should shift towards pragmatism, professionalisation, experimentation, regional autonomy, incentivisation and a robust political will to foster holistic development.   China’s rise from the shadows of Maoist dogma to an economic powerhouse is a testament to strategic reforms. Deng Xiaoping spearheaded transformative changes, overhauled SOEs, revolutionised property laws, and embraced global trade and investment. This laid the groundwork for its unprecedented economic growth. Crucially, China didn’t stop at traditional sectors. It strategically cultivated industries that allowed appropriate technological leaps. From the ubiquitous presence of social media giants like WeChat and TikTok to pioneering advancements in solar energy and electric vehicles, China strategically positioned itself as a global innovator.   As South Africa navigates its own development trajectory, the key lies not in replicating political models or fixating on SOEs, but in embracing a dynamic approach. China’s journey teaches us that prosperity stems from adaptability, strategic planning and a relentless pursuit of innovation, providing a blueprint for nations aspiring to lift millions out of poverty and onto the path of sustainable progress.   Learning from China’s successful period of “opening up and reform,” South Africa should strategically reorient its relationship with China to enhance its development prospects. It should use its positive relationship to study China’s lessons in job-creating rapid growth. This involves embracing a pragmatic approach, discarding ideological dogmas and making substantial investments in domestic infrastructure and human capital. South Africa should also engage in strategic diplomacy, diversifying its international partnerships beyond a singular focus on BRICS nations to maximize development options.   Focusing on sectors where mutual benefits and synergies exist between South Africa and the rest of the world is crucial. This strategic alignment ensures that collaborative efforts contribute to both national and global development. Geopolitically, South Africa should recognize that China, like any other country, prioritises its own interests. Hence, South Africa should prioritise its own interests first and reclaim its geopolitical agency.   South Africa’s access to the Chinese leadership through BRICS provides a tremendous opportunity to learn the right lessons, and set our diplomatic priorities clearly on economic development. This also applies to other BRICS members, particularly India.   Empowering all levels of government with a strong political mandate to implement both localised and national development strategies is essential. This decentralisation approach enhances adaptability and responsiveness to diverse development needs. South Africa should address the investment strike by fostering a constructive relationship with businesses, unlocking vital development capital for economic growth.   By combining these strategic initiatives, South Africa can recalibrate its association with China, leveraging pragmatism, global engagement and domestic empowerment to fuel comprehensive and much needed sustainable development.   References   Council on Foreign Relations, 2018. Why Does Everyone Hate Made in China 2025? Blog post by Lorand Laskai, 28 March. Available at https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-does-everyone-hate-made-china-2025 (accessed 15 February 2024.)   Ke, Huaqing, 2013. On Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic reform philosophy, 20 October. Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20220421061312/https://m.aisixiang.com/data/68735.html   (accessed 20 February 2024).   Lin, Chengyi, 2023. Three Drivers of China’s Booming Electric Vehicle Market, Harvard Business Review 3 January. Available at https://hbr.org/2024/01/3-drivers-of-chinas-booming-electric-vehicle-market (accessed 20 February 2024).   Magnus, G. 2018. Red Flags: Why Xi’s China Is in Jeopardy. Yale University Press.   Naughton, B. 2006. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Sun, Yun, 2016. Political party training: China’s ideological push in Africa? The Brookings Institution, 5 July. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/political-party-training-chinas-ideological-push-in-africa/ (accessed 15 February 2024).   Wang, Mengkui, 2018. Thirty Years of China’s Reform, Routledge Studies on the Chinese Economy, 1st Edition. 20 April. [1] This period starts with the assent to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1979 following the conviction of the ‘Gang of Four’ and concludes in October 2017 following the conclusion of the 19th Communist Party Conference during which presidential term limits were abolished. Although there is no consensus on the exact date upon which the reform and opening up period ends, the 19th Party Congress represents an important milestone in the entrenchment of Xi Jinping’s power at the expense of Deng appointed successors. [2] Because the semiconductor/microchip and software industries develop so fast, those industries have adopted the term “bleeding edge” to describe an edge that is further ahead than “cutting edge” or “leading edge”. It’s typically an edge that is about 16 months ahead of the cutting edge competitors and comes at a cost of increased risk from the unreliability of new technology. A good example in 2024 is Nvidia’s dominance in AI chip design and production. [3] Total factor productivity (TFP) is an economic concept that describes the portion of a company’s increased output that cannot be explained by increased capital or labour inputs and thus is considered a measure of operational efficiency. [4] Average of 1.2% per annum in the same period, World Bank data, accessed January 2024 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

Copyright © 2024 Print ISSN: 2960-1541 Online ISSN: 2960-155X Inclusive Society Institute PO Box 12609 Mill Street Cape Town, 8000 South Africa 235-515 NPO All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or those of their respective Board or Council members. JULY 2024 by Dr Ndiakhat Ngom   Abstract   The historical relationship between Africa and China exemplifies a successful model of South-South cooperation, marked by three critical phases: support for African independence and development, Africa's pivotal role in recognising China in global governance, and the formalisation and intensification of relations through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This paper, presented at the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum (CATTF) in Cape Town, reflects on the current state and future directions of China-Africa relations.   FOCAC has become the cornerstone of China-Africa cooperation, with both parties benefitting from strategic trade partnerships and shared geopolitical visions. However, this relationship also faces challenges, particularly in training, economic cooperation, environmental preservation, and global governance. The paper delves into these sectors, emphasising the importance of technology transfer, the transformation of natural resources, strengthening the African private sector, addressing environmental concerns in the mining and marine sectors, and supporting Africa's representation on the UN Security Council. The analysis includes case studies on Senegal's local content initiatives, Guinea's bauxite industry, and West Africa's fishing crisis. It underscores the necessity of less unequal economic cooperation and the importance of industrial autonomy for Africa's sustainable development. Additionally, the paper highlights the need for inclusive consultations and stricter measures to combat illegal fishing and environmental degradation.   Recommendations for enhancing the China-Africa partnership include establishing a CATTF alert and analysis department, conducting studies on migration and jihadism, and improving crisis impact assessments for FOCAC. Ultimately, the paper advocates for a dynamic and inclusive multilateralism, fostering wisdom, listening, and anticipation to ensure a mutually beneficial and equitable relationship between China and Africa.   Keywords: FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation); South-South Cooperation; Strategic Trade Partnerships; Sustainable Development; Technology Transfer   Introduction   Africa and China have historically maintained extremely fruitful relations. They significantly reflect a fine example of South-South cooperation. This relationship was built on three essential phases:   First, China accompanied African countries in their struggle for independence and their development programme. Then, Africa played a decisive role in the recognition of China in global governance. Its vote in 1971 allowed it to join the UN. Mao Zedong recognised this debt and expressed his gratitude. The last act, in 2000, is the formalisation and intensification of relations within an ambitious framework, FOCAC. The China Africa Think Tanks Forum (CATTF) is one of its branches.   More than 24 years after its creation, FOCAC has become the reference for China/Africa. For its industrial competitiveness, China sees Africa as a strategic trading partner, through the supply of raw materials, energy, fishing, agriculture, agroforestry, and mines. In return, African countries benefit from road, port, airport, and health infrastructures and from a diversification of training.   Geopolitically, both parties share the vision of a more just, equitable, and fraternal world. They support each other at the United Nations in order to influence decisions in favour of the Global South. Finally, the enlargement of BRICS to South Africa and Ethiopia in 2023 is a strong sign. We hope that other African countries will follow.   Despite these obvious successes, not everything is perfect in the relationship. Like France/Africa in the past, China/Africa raises questions, praise, fantasies, and criticism. This paper will highlight four sectors, which are training, the economy, the environment, and geopolitics, and will formulate recommendations.   Technology Transfer and Transformation of Natural Resources     During a meeting with African Heads of State invited to the BRICS summit on 23 August 2023, in Johannesburg, President Xi Jinping formulated a proposal that seemed crucial to us: "China will launch the China-Africa Talent Development Cooperation Plan. It plans to train 500 successful directors and teachers of vocational schools for Africa each year, as well as 10,000 talents who master the Chinese language and professional skills. China plans to invite 20,000 government officials and technical professionals from African countries to seminars or forums. To support the strengthening of African capacities in science, education, and innovation, China will implement the Cooperation Programme between 100 Chinese and African higher education institutions and launch 10 pilot projects between Chinese research institutes and African partners” (Xi, 2023).   Training and technology transfer are essential to the industrialisation and emergence of Africa. The African population is young, dynamic, and demanding training. It will double in 2050, from 1.4 billion inhabitants to 2.5 billion. Chinese direct investments in Africa totalled US$3.4 billion in 2022 (Agence Ecofin, 2023). China is the fourth-largest foreign investor in Africa. These investments bring growth, but they are mainly of interest in labour-intensive sectors. Africa needs less unequal economic cooperation in which China invests in industrial activities that require technology transfer. Its main sector of activity is construction and energy, an area of high demand for often low-skilled labour. Less imbalanced relationships are in high demand with China more investor than service provider and Africa more partner than customer. China is at the same time financier, service provider, customer, and supplier of goods.   Africa must step up efforts to achieve industrial autonomy. China has had a similar trajectory in the past and constitutes a perfect example for African countries. Today China has the most efficient TGVs in the world and an impressive network density, designed based on its own geographical and cultural standards. It surpasses countries such as France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Japan – which accompanied it in the 1980s. It has achieved technological feats on the naval and aeronautical levels. Its engineers are today autonomous in the design and production of innovative equipment, a guarantee of significant economic growth.   Africa dreams of this same model of cooperation. Investing in local skills in order to gradually gain autonomy is the central objective. Senegal is collaborating with the French group, Alstom, in the operation of a regional railway line. Other countries, such as Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Ghana, express the request to locally transform their natural resources.   Guinea Conakry is the second-largest producer of bauxite in the world, of which China is the leading customer for producing aluminium. The country has immense reserves of gold and diamonds, and one of the world's largest unexploited iron reserves. Unfortunately, the economic and social benefits are weak. Guinea is one of the poorest countries in the world. President Mamadi Doumbouya demanded from mining companies the local processing of bauxite, under the 1983 agreements, for the construction of aluminium smelters.   Guinea exports more than 87 million tonnes of bauxite worth US$500 billion (Bamba, 2022). Experts estimate that the installation of refineries should multiply these figures by five. The Chinese mining company TBEA GROUP had committed to building a 200,000 tonnes/year aluminium smelter in 2018. But in 2024, nothing concrete. The only positive result concerns Simandou iron for which Guinea obtained a significant stake in mines and railway and port infrastructure.   Its neighbours, Ivory Coast and Ghana, display the same ambition for autonomy. They produce 60% of the world's cocoa production, but they buy chocolate imported from Switzerland at a high price because of the big cocoa traders (Cargill, Nestlé, Olam, Callebaut) (Drout, 2023). Out of the US$100 billion generated by the chocolate sector, these two countries only earned six. It is to fight against this economic injustice that Presidents Alassane Dramane Ouattara and Nana Akufo-Addo initiated local transformation programmes targeting 100% of the production by 2050.   Only autonomy makes it possible to capitalise on the entire value chain and boost growth. In addition to the slogan "decolonising knowledge" in African universities, there is that of "decolonising industry" among activists, youth, and civil society. China's history is a great proof of autonomy, and President Xi Jinping demonstrated this well in his speech on skills. Africa cannot develop by remaining an eternal supplier of raw materials. Africa is poor with its richness; this is paradoxical. But it would be better off by valuing them itself. Progressive control of African resources would be the perfect sign of a win-win partnership between China and Africa.   Strengthening the Private Sector in Africa     The emergence of Africa depends on a strong private sector, benefitting from the trust of States and technical and financial partners. As Africa’s first partner, China has a vital role to play, since it is the world champion in foreign exchange reserves. In August 2023, the People's Bank of China held US$3,204 billion compared to US$800 billion for the Eurozone and US$150 billion for the Central Bank of the USA. Its investment skills are impressive.   In Senegal, the private sector is organising itself, helped by the government, through the promotion of “local content”. The initiative is supervised by the Public Order Regulatory Authority (ARCOP) to ensure compliance with tender standards for the execution of projects. In the execution of projects financed by development partners, 33% of the contract amount is granted to the private sector. But Eximbank and China Development Bank have infinite financing capacities, and their infrastructures are built by one of the 3000 Chinese companies in Africa.   This exclusivity weakens the local industry because the absence of tenders creates frustration. It is why the Senegalese Investors Club  (CIS) was created. It is an employers' union that brings together companies in the construction, energy, banking, agri-food, and transport sectors. Its objective is to finance and execute projects in the name of economic sovereignty. The group collaborates with financial institutions and has created an investment fund of US$34 million (CIS, 2018).   Three examples demonstrate its success:   Creation of West Africa Energy, a 300 MW gas-fired power plant project which aims for the country’s energy autonomy. At the investors forum in Paris in December 2018, the club committed to providing US$2 billion of the US$7.5 billion needed to finance the second phase of the “Sénégal Émergent” plan. It had positioned itself alongside major international financial institutions. Creation of a modern agricultural farm of 5,000 ha in the village of Ndingler using local financing and the promotion of local agronomic expertise in order to contribute to the food sovereignty of the country. (CIS, 2018) China should strengthen the African private sector by granting it a significant share of contracts. For example, Henan Chine carries out most of the construction sectors in Senegal, although there are three large local groups: CDE, CSE, and TALIX GROUP. They have several subsidiaries in Africa and carried out all the roadworks during the 13th OIC summit in 2008 in Dakar, for which a budget of US$600 million has been allocated. Local companies in Senegal are today isolated in the execution of Chinese contracts.   Globally, FOCAC has considerably accelerated the commercial dynamic between the two parties. Selling turnkey infrastructure is good; it boosts growth and creates jobs. But China can do better. With the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the planet has the largest global network of integrated infrastructures whose ambition is to secure the production, transport, and distribution of natural and industrial resources between China and the rest of the world.   The BRI is an incredible opportunity for the African private sector. Africa proposes the inclusion of special clauses, in the form of quotas, in favour of the private sector in the execution of BRI mega infrastructures. To reduce the trade imbalance between Africa and China, financing from Eximbank and China Development Bank should benefit the Chinese and African private sectors. There needs to be more fairness and more confidence for the African private sector. These two aspects are crucial for creating wealth, employment for youth, and the well-being of populations.   Accentuate Efforts in the Mining and Marine Environmental Sector     Environmental preservation is an important part of China/Africa. China is the leading producer of aluminium in the world thanks to bauxite from Guinea Conakry, which represents 50% of its needs. Bauxite is valuable for the automobile, naval, and food industries. Many Chinese companies are active in Guinea on the Boké-Kindia-Fria-Boffa axis, which holds two-thirds of the country's reserves. This coastal region holds most of the country's economic and industrial activity, but it also suffers a lot of environmental damage. The air, forests, and yards around mining companies are polluted. Agricultural, livestock, fishing activities, and the health of villagers are affected.   This is why this region is regularly shaken by riots, an expression of great frustration. Between April and September 2017, extreme violence shook the city of Boké (Tchimbakala, 2017). Young people accused mining companies of only being partially involved in the community’s well-being, of destroying biodiversity, and of impoverishing populations. The absence of the State, corruption, the power of mining companies, and mismanagement are indexed. There needs to be inclusive consultations between mining stakeholders in order to avoid a breakdown in trust. The numerous complaints from young people against mining in Guinea could lead to a similar situation in the Sahel, which has put the French in a difficult position.   The second subject on which China is expected is its involvement in the regularisation of the fishing sector in West Africa. This sector is strategic; the area is one of the world’s richest in fish. It contributes to food security, income, and employment. Unfortunately, it has the highest rate of illegal fishing in the world, due to undeclared catches, weak monitoring resources, and corruption in fishing licences. Foreign vessels practise piracy and overfishing with impunity through bottom trawling, a technique that often does not comply with standards. In addition, there are national flags that belong, in reality, to foreign companies. The losses are enormous for coastal economies. Fish are becoming scarce, fishermen are becoming poorer, tensions are breaking out with foreign ships, and maritime pollution is intensifying.   And there are dramatic consequences. Today, the image of Senegal is identified with the irregular immigration of thousands of Africans, from Dakar to the Canary Islands. They are only separated by 1300 km, which is the same distance as Johannesburg to Cape Town. The canoes leave from the fishing villages along the Senegalese coast (700 km), such as Cayar, Thiaroye, Bargny, Mbour, Saint Louis, and Cape Skirring. The traffickers are former fishermen who have retrained. Not all migrants are fishermen, but it should be noted that the fishing crisis in West Africa has a major impact on the migration crisis.   According to the Spanish NGO, Caminando Fronteras (2023), sub-Saharan Africa accounts for nearly two-thirds of illegal migrants from the Canary Islands. Nearly 6,618 people died or disappeared in 2023; these figures have tripled compared to 2022. This maritime route is one of the most dangerous in the world.   China cannot ignore this crucial problem, especially since its fleet, the largest in the region, is one of the flags in question. China is contributing significantly to the implementation of alternative programmes such as fish farming, but it is important to add that it made important efforts to fight against illegal fishing. According to a press release published in February 2018, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture withdrew fishing subsidies and licences from three Chinese companies involved in illegal fishing in West Africa. Since 2016, the cancellation of subsidies is approximately CN¥700 million (US$110.5 million) for 264 vessels belonging to 78 deep-sea fishing companies (EJF, 2018: 26).   China should step up its efforts, alongside African countries, the European Union, local associations, and NGOs. It must strengthen the means of geolocation of ships and intervention of the navy, but above all crack down hard on the corruption, which is plaguing the environment.    Supporting the African Union on the Security Council     The FOCAC and BRICS are privileged spaces for the design and execution of South-South programmes. The illustration is the involvement of China, followed by Russia, Cuba, and India, to provide medical equipment to African countries to fight against Covid-19. Medical diplomacy is one of the most beautiful proofs of solidarity in the Global South. At the UN, African countries consider China a powerful ally with whom they benefit from greater attention. China can count on Africa, in its Great South project, to reform global governance.   Africa is the ideal partner for this central objective of multilateralism. With 54 independent states, it is the largest bloc in the United Nations system, with 28% of the votes, compared to 27% for Asia, 17% for the Americas, and 15% for Western Europe. Africa holds a quarter of the votes in all United Nations governing bodies. Finally, it is the most important bloc in the WTO, the Group of 77, and the Non-Aligned Movement (Nantulya, 2023). China and Africa are working together to occupy important agencies at the UN. The rebalancing of global responsibilities, an old grievance in the South, is becoming a reality.   Observations on this theme concern two points: one is a concern; the other is a request.   The concern is about the principle of “non-interference” contained in the "Global Security Initiative (GSI)”. This programme aims for the sovereignty of States in the face of external pressures (military intervention, economic sanctions), and promotes pacifism and consultation to resolve conflicts. This was at the heart of the inaugural speech President Xi Jinping gave at the opening of the annual conference of the Boa Forum for Asia (21 April 2022) and at the third China Africa Summit on Peace and Security in Beijing (19 September to 2 August 2023).   It is important to remark that the GSI responds to the desire to deculturalise the concepts of international law inherited from the West, but realistically, the political and security context in Sahel is not favourable to this. Several facts justify the fears:   The first point is that the GSI encourages the confiscation of the electoral calendar, weakens the opposition and the populations who feel helpless in the face of the omnipotence of the military and dictators. The second point is that the GSI isolates dictatorship states from neighbouring countries and encourages the confiscation of liberties. For example, in Niger, there has been tension for several months between the military authorities and the Maison de la Presse Association, a group of 32 socio-professional media organisations. The Interior ministry suspended its activities because the group had harshly criticised the coup and the attacks on fundamental liberties. The third point is that the GSI is a threat to regional integration and solidarity. After the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Guinea, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted economic sanctions and considered sending military forces to Niger, before withdrawing. But these initiatives were judged as an attack on sovereignty by these countries, which nevertheless signed the ECOWAS charter on economic integration and the free movement of goods and people (1975).   Today, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are cross-border and heavily impacted by jihadist attacks. So, they have formed a mutual defence pact, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) (September 2023) and have withdrawn from ECOWAS (January 2024). The pretexts are the injustice of economic sanctions, the loss of the fundamental values of ECOWAS, and their isolation in front of jihadist attacks. ECOWAS is in a deep crisis today.   The second point is a request for reform of the United Nations Security Council. The world has changed between 1945 and 2024. There is a tipping point towards the South. The geopolitical divide, global warming, xenophobia, zoonotic diseases, extreme poverty, migration, and artificial intelligence are significant challenges that require a redefinition of global governance.   Africa remains largely absent from the UN Security Council. Since 2005, it has expressed its desire for profound reform in order to be better heard. In the name of the fight against global warming, financial institutions refuse to finance the exploitation of its rich energy deposits, while the African Union calls for a moratorium on fossil fuels. Africa is severely affected by global warming, even though it only contributes -5% of GHGs. By failing to transform its natural resources itself, it only contributes 3% to international trade. On a medical level, Covid-19 has shown Africa’s great fragility. In terms of security, it hosts seven of the 14 peacekeeping operations and supplies most of the blue helmets. These are all important subjects on which the international community takes the place of Africa and makes decisions in its place. In order to repair this geopolitical injustice, the African Union set up a committee of 10 (C10) composed of 10 heads of state and government mandated to negotiate the reform of the UN Security Council. These are Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Uganda, Senegal, Libya, Kenya, Zambia, Namibia, and Sierra Leone.   At the 10th C10 ministerial meeting in Brazzaville (12 January 2023), President Denis Sassou-Nguesso said: "A major player on the international scene, Africa must assert its rights and duties within the United Nations, hence the urgency of establishing a reformed and renovated security council, more transparent, more democratic and more representative of global cultural diversity" (Ambassade du Congo France, 2023). He added that Africa's objective is to obtain two seats as permanent members with the right of veto, two seats as non-permanent members, and under the 2004 United Nations convention, one or two languages as a working instrument. China and Germany have expressed their desire to support Africa’s project. All the conditions are met now. China should materialise it by lobbying with partners in the South and North. It is a unique opportunity to pay off the 1971 debt, thanks to which it accessed the Security Council. The China-Africa Think Tanks Forum is facing a great challenge.   Conclusion     From 44 countries in 2000, there are 53 in addition to the African Union Commission in 2024. FOCAC has become a success. However, despite its laudable intentions and significant economic and political achievements, FOCAC’s members must remain lucid. China was admitted late into international relations. It was preceded by the former colonisers who had exclusivity in Africa. The French precinct in French-speaking countries is a great example of the power of former colonisers in Africa. But the roles are reversed today. Three factors can explain it:   The arrival of new partners, China, Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey, with new offers, A more educated youth connected to globalisation, and The tremendous mobilisation capacity of social networks, especially TikTok.   A dynamic and inclusive multilateralism has emerged and become a breath of fresh air for African countries. French economic actors were supplanted by Chinese investments, and the Sahel’s populations forced the French army to leave. However, in recent years, African youth and civil society have sent strong signals that the West has not been able to dissect. The breakup was then inevitable. This is a turning point that deserves reflection.   China/Africa must take stock after a quarter of a century of companionship. Both parties have to be reactive and anticipate trends, aspirations, and new dynamics in Africa. The China-Africa Think Tanks Forum has a pioneering role to play: that of whistleblowers. FOCAC must learn from the mistakes of former African partners in order to avoid getting confused in its strategic options.   As a contribution to the Forum’s reflection, here are four recommendations:   The CATTF must set up a department for alert and analysis. For West Africa, it is imperative to carry out a study to evaluate the relationship between migration and the fishing crisis. A second study must be carried out to evaluate the worsening of jihadism in the Sahel in relation to the recruitment of young people. Reports on crises and their possible impacts on FOCAC will be given to the authority to help with decision-making.   In short, cultivating wisdom and a capacity for listening and anticipation within FOCAC is the message from Senegal and the Sahel.   Summary   Establishing the conditions for mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Africa, within the formal framework of FOCAC, is a highly beneficial but difficult approach. The relationship arouses hope, equitable cooperation, pooling intelligence, and prosperity in the name of a common vision of the Deep South: united and peaceful. China/Africa offers symptoms of an undeniable shift in global geopolitics towards the South.   But the intensification of exchanges also arouses criticism. Beyond the statistics, the achievements, and the good intentions, there is reason to point out aspects which appear problematic and to make recommendations on subjects related to training, the economy, the environment, and global governance.   The performances achieved over a quarter of a century plead in favour of a healthy relationship, based on trust and respect. But this should not prevent China/Africa actors from maintaining the lucidity necessary to avoid past mistakes that disadvantaged Africa with other partners.   References   Agence Ecofin. 2023. Les investissements directs chinois en Afrique ont totalisé 3,4 milliards $ en 2022 . [Online] Available at: https://www.agenceecofin.com/actualites/1406-109281-les-investissements-directs-chinois-en-afrique-ont-totalise-3-4-milliards-en-2022 [Accessed: 19 November 2023]   Ambassade du Congo France. 2023. 10ème réunion ministérielle du Comité des dix chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de l'Union africaine sur la réforme du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies: L'Afrique veut être mieux représentée au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies . [Online] Available at: https://ambacongofr.org/index.php/l-ambassade/actualites/929-10eme-reunion-ministerielle-du-comite-des-dix-chefs-d-etat-et-de-gouvernement-de-l-union-africaine-sur-la-reforme-du-conseil-de-securite-des-nations-unies-l-afrique-veut-etre-mieux-representee-au-conseil-de-securite-des-nations-unies [Accessed: 30 January 2024]   Bamba, M. 2022. Guinea - Bauxite: is the country ready to embark on local transformation?  [Online] Available at:   https://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-61106498.amp [Accessed: 11 March 2023]   Caminando Fronteras. 2023. Monitoring the right to life . [Online] Available at:    https://caminandofronteras.org/en/monitoreo/monitoring-the-right-to-life-2023/ [Accessed: 11 July 2024]   Drout, A. 2023. De puissance cacaoyère, la transformation de la Côte d’Ivoire en puissance chocolatière . [Online] Available at: https://www.entreprendre.fr/de-puissance-cacaoyere-la-transformation-de-la-cote-divoire-en-puissance-chocolatiere/ [Accessed: 27 December 2023]   Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF). 2018. China’s hidden fleet in West Africa: A spotlight on illegal practices within Ghana’s industrial trawl sector . [Online] Available at: https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/China-hidden-fleet-West-Africa-final.pdf [Accessed: 11 July 2024]   Karsenty, A., Garcia Herrero, A., Malm, J. & Pairault, T. 2022. Chinese Influences in Africa 2. Myths and Realities in Economic Relations . [Online] Available at:    https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/garcia_herrero_et_al_influences_chinoises_afrique_part_ii_2022.pdf [Accessed: 11 July 2024]   Nantulya, P. 2023. The role of Africa in China's multilateralism strategy . [Online] Available at: https://africacenter.org/fr/spotlight/le-role-de-lafrique-dans-la-strategie-de-multilateralisme-de-la-chine/ [Accessed: 16 December 2023]   Senegalese Investors Club ( CIS). 2018. Ensemble, pour un secteur privé national fort!  [Online] Available at:   https://clubdesinvestisseurs.org/index.php/le-cis/ [Accessed: 7 January 2023]   Tchimbakala, D. 2017. Guinée: La bauxite au cœur des émeutes de Boké . [Online] Available at:   https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/guinee-la-bauxite-au-coeur-des-emeutes-de-boke-26422 [Accessed: 5 December 2023]   Xi, J. 2023. Promouvoir ensemble la modernisation en vue d’un avenir meilleur pour la Chine et l’Afrique . [Online] Available at: http://www.focac.org/fra/ttxxsy/202308/t20230825_11132932.htm [Accessed: 23 December 2023] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za