Search

Occasional Paper 2/2024 This paper is published jointly by the  Inclusive Society Institute and School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University Copyright © 2024 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute and the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University. D I S C L A I M E R Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute or the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University. APRIL 2024 by Daryl Swanepoel Research Fellow, School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University This is the first in a series of three occasional papers on managing social cohesion in diverse communities. They will explore the mechanisms that Singapore, Finland and the United Arab Emirates have deployed in forging socially cohesive societies within their very different environments. The three papers will ultimately be integrated into a comprehensive synthesised report, with the objective of providing a menu of tools for South African policymakers to contemplate for purposes of strengthening their efforts within the South African context. Singapore Skyline istockphoto.com: Stock photo ID:1165735071 Abstract The Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey has revealed that social cohesion in South Africa has not made sufficient progress post-Apartheid. In fact, the level of cohesion has declined of late, reversing the early gains made at the onset of the democratic order initiated in 1994. This is worrying given the need for cohesion to underpin peace and security, and economic growth in a country, both of which are at worryingly low levels in South Africa. This occasional paper has as its objective the development of a menu of policy interventions aimed at advancing social cohesion, that the policymakers in South Africa may wish to ponder. The paper forms part of a broader study that explores the practices in other diverse communities, notably Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and Finland. This particular paper discusses proposals informed by the Singaporean case study. It discusses the findings thereof, and advances recommendations for South African policymakers to consider. 1.   INTRODUCTION In analysing its extensive 2023 GovDem Survey, the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI), an independent public policy research institute, came to the conclusion that thirty years into the new South African dispensation, social cohesion had not advanced to optimal levels. In fact, trends were worrying. In the poll, less than half (48 percent) of South Africans were of the view that a united nation could be forged out of all the population groups in the country. Thirty-one percent believed it possible. Eighteen percent did not express a view one way or the other. This sentiment held true across all the major race groups in the country. Only 46 percent of whites believed it feasible, 48 percent of blacks believed it so, and for Indians and coloureds it was 44 percent and 50 percent respectively (ISI, 2023). Even more disquieting is the finding that only 39 percent of South Africans were of the opinion that reconciliation in South Africa is moving in the right direction. This held true across all the race groups, where similar trends existed. In its definition of social cohesion, the Inclusive Society Institute includes dimensions wider than just race. It also considers religious tolerance, and attitudes towards immigrants, amongst other criteria, as contributors towards social cohesion. The Institute’s South African Social Cohesion Index (SASCI), currently in its development phase, is built on three pillars: demographic integration, extent of connectivity to the country, and sense of community (ISI, 2022). These pillars respond to the three dimensions of social cohesion as argued by Langer et al. (2017), namely inequality, trust, and identity. Figure 1: Social Cohesion Triangle (Langer et al., 2017) High levels of inequality, Langer et al. argue, threatens social cohesion in society, in that it erodes relationships, which, in turn, could cause conflict. When trust is missing between members of society, the ability for individuals to collaborate in order to build the nation is weakened. And a national identity, in contrast to group or ethnic identity, may cause aggressive behaviour amongst members of society to the detriment of stable co-existence. In South African society, trust amongst the various groups is worryingly low. For example: In the same GovDem Survey, only 40 percent of white South Africans completely or somewhat trusted their black compatriots, and similarly only 41 percent of black South Africans completely or somewhat trusted their white compatriots. Only 48 percent of South Africans completely or somewhat trusted people from a different religion to their own. Only 43 percent of South Africans completely or somewhat trusted people from different nationalities. Similar trends existed across all the major race groups. Of particular concern was the finding that 68 percent of South Africans did not trust immigrants from other African countries. So too, some 66 percent did not trust immigrants from overseas. And likewise, similar trends were registered across all the race groups. (ISI, 2023) These disappointingly low levels of trust suggest that, as a nation, in terms of demographic integration, South Africa has a long way to go in consolidating social cohesion in the country. That said, the ISI survey finds that South Africans are slowly starting to forge a nation. Already, 46 percent of South Africans – with similar trends across all race groups – are in favour of associating with compatriots across racial lines, as opposed to only 31 percent who do not like associating with people from different population groups. And already, 52 percent of South Africans – with similar trend across all race groups – are socialising (entertaining) with compatriots from across racial lines. Likewise, some 49 percent of South Africans – with similar trends form across all race groups – do attend the church/shul/mosque/religious services of their fellow South Africans. And 69 per cent of respondents indicated that they wanted a united South Africa. In considering the second pillar of the ISI’s SASCI, the extent of connectivity to the country, the findings of the survey were equally disappointing. Nine percent of the respondents indicated that they were seriously considering emigrating to another country in the next year or so. Of particular concern was the number of high income earners and those with tertiary education. Eleven percent of the high income earners and those with tertiary qualifications were considering emigration. South Africa is experiencing a critical skills shortage across almost all sectors (Business Tech, 2023). For the country to lose more skills and taxpayers would be quite tragic for the country. The minority communities are the most vulnerable. Fifteen percent and 14 percent of whites and Indians respectively were considering emigration, as opposed to 8 percent of black South Africans. There were two main reasons driving the sentiment: A lack of confidence in the ability of the economy to deliver jobs for themselves and their family. Twenty-five percent of respondents cited work opportunities as the reason for them contemplating emigration, and only 23 percent were confident that their children will be able to become part of the South African labour market and that they will find a good job. A sense that South Africa was failing. Twenty-one percent of respondents were of the view that the country was failing. Once again, with the exception of the coloured community, it was the minority communities – particularly the Indian community – that were most vulnerable. Twenty-three percent of whites and 41 percent of Indians cited South Africa’s failure as a state as the reason for them considering emigration. In considering the third pillar of the ISI’s SASCI, namely a sense of community, a far healthier picture emerged. Seventy-five percent of South Africans agreed or strongly agreed that it was important to get involved in the community in which they lived, 47 percent agreed or strongly agreed that it was important to actively work for the welfare of their community, and 58 percent said that they actively looked for ways in which they could support people that were less fortunate than themselves. Similar trends were registered across all the race groups. The survey was however silent as to the extent to which the individual race groups’ involvement extended across demographic lines. About the survey The aforementioned data is drawn from the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey, which forms part of the Ipsos Khayabus Survey, the methodology of which is illustrated in the diagrammes contained in Figure 2 below. Figure 2: The Ipsos Khayabus (ISI, 2023) Against this backdrop one has to ask: Is enough being done to promote, nurture and ensure social cohesion in South African society? The country’s National Development Plan (NDP) after all recognises that the strategy set out therein needs to be underpinned by social cohesion (NPC, N.d.). The NDP argues that “leaders throughout society have to balance the power they hold with responsibility, including … promoting social cohesion”, and that it is necessary to broaden social cohesion and unity while redressing the inequities of the past. “South Africa’s own history and the experiences of other countries”, it says, “show that unity and social cohesion are necessary to meet social and economic objectives”. It also argues that social cohesion in society is necessary to narrow the inequality divide (NPC, N.d.). The NDP is correct, because in socially cohesive societies, where there is a general absence of underlying social conflict, people work together as one towards the well-being of all in society. It works against exclusion and marginalisation, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its people the opportunity of upward mobility (SFRI, N.d.). It enables people to be engaged in “a common enterprise”, wherein they are able to face shared challenges as members of the same community (Maxwell, in SFRI, N.d.). It allows society as a whole to share equitably in its prosperity, because cohesive societies are politically stable, thereby allowing them to focus on economic growth (Bris, 2014). It is therefore encouraging that the National Planning Commission recently proposed the establishment of a Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Council, with the objective of “developing and monitoring strategies for the promotion of tolerance and the embracing of  diversity … for the emergence of a shared South African identity and pride” (NPC, 2023). Some progress has been made in setting up the structures and mechanisms to advance the goal of social cohesion in South Africa. The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (CRL Rights Commission) has been established in terms of Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution. The primary objectives of the CRL Commission is “(a) to promote respect for the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities; (b) to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tolerance and national unity among cultural, religious and linguistic communities, on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and free association; and (c) to recommend the establishment or recognition, in accordance with national legislation, of a cultural or other council or councils for a community or communities in South Africa” (RSA, 1996). Since its establishment the CRL Commission has tackled a number of topics that impede social cohesion. The full list of reports contained on the CRL Commission’s official website include: The commercialisation of religion and the abuse of people’s belief systems; Challenges that lead to deaths and injuries at initiation schools in South Africa; The reuse  of graves by local governments: Seeking a solution to the violation of cultural and religious rights of communities through the reuse of graves by local governments; Ukuthwala (the abduction that involves kidnapping a girl or a young woman by a man and his friends or peers in order to compel the girl or young woman's family to endorse marriage negotiations); The use of official languages by organs of state; Violations of religious rights by members/congregants of church missions; and Civil unrest in Phoenix that allegedly resulted in racially motivated deaths. (CRL Commission, N.d.) Scrutinisation of the annual and other reports will suggest that the bulk of the Commission’s work has been limited and reactive in nature. No wonder given that the Commission’s annual budget in the 2021/22 financial year amounted to a mere R46,4 million rand (CRL Commission, N.d.). Given the extent of the work needed to tackle the social cohesion deficit, it is clear that the Commission has not been adequately resourced to properly carry out their work. So too, the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture (DSAC), is mandated to lead nation-building and social cohesion through social transformation, but the unit tasked to carry out this mandate is inadequately resourced. The DSAC social cohesion programme includes activities such as the celebration of national days, advocacy platforms on social cohesion, and community conversations (DSAC, N.d.). The unit tasked with carrying out the social cohesion mandate comprises four members of staff (Anon., 2023) and the annual budget for 2024/25 amounts to a mere R59,8 million (Treasury, 2024). On paper it suggests that government is committed to securing social cohesion in South Africa. It forms an integral part of the NDP, a constitutionally committed commission has been established to promote and protect the rights of the country’s diverse communities, and DSAC has established programmes aimed at promoting social cohesion in South Africa. The lived reality tells a different story: activities are few and limited in nature, the programmes are wholly under-resourced and as evidenced in the ISI’s GovDem Survey, the level of social cohesion is disappointingly low. What to do? There are many other countries around the world that have/are faced/facing social cohesion challenges. Three come to mind, each with different mechanisms to nurture and promote social cohesion within their societies. These are Finland, the United Arab Emirates, and Singapore, which is the focus of this particular paper. The Singaporean experience may hold lessons for South Africa, the exploration of which is the object of this dissertation. Research question and methodology The departure point of this study, based on the empirical evidence contained in the Inclusive Society Institute’s GovDem Survey, as highlighted in the introductory chapter, is that: Social cohesion, of which, in the South African context, nation-building and reconciliation are crucial elements, is not at an acceptable level. South Africans desire a united nation in which the different communities that compose the nation can work together to build a common future. The South African Constitution places a high premium on a non-discriminatory environment underpinned by social cohesion. All three spheres of government – that is, the executive, legislative and judicial spheres – at its heart, recognise and promote the ideals of the Constitution, which is a united and reconciled South Africa culminating in a socially cohesive society. The current structures, programmes and resources allocated by the authorities have not yet – thirty years since the transition from Apartheid – delivered the desired level of social cohesion in South Africa. It recognises the importance of social cohesion in any society that wishes for harmony, stability, and prosperity. Thus, more needs to be done to promote such. What that is, is an open question. This paper examines the Singaporean model for managing diversity and social cohesion. It aims to provide new options for South Africa’s policymakers to contemplate, by identifying a set of practices that do not currently form part of the South African toolset. 2.   THE SINGAPOREAN CASE STUDY Singapore is a city-state of about 718 square kilometres on the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, in Southeast Asia. It gained independence on 9 August 1965, and has adopted a parliamentary democracy system (MOFA, N.d.). It is a “hyper diverse” state, with a racial composite that has remained stable over the last fifty years, notwithstanding significant inter-racial and transnational marriages. A large proportion of the population is comprised of transient labour (RSiS, 2024). According to the latest census (2020) the Chinese comprised 74,3 percent of the population, the Malays 13,5 percent, Indians, 9 percent, with the rest from a range of other ethnic groups. The relative stability of the ethnic breakdown of Singapore’s population can be seen in Table 1 below. Table 1: Ethnic composition of Singapore’s population: Source: RSiS, 2024 The historical context The British established trading posts in Penang (1786) and Singapore (1819), and captured Malacca from the Dutch (1795). In late 1818 they established a trading station at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula on the island of Singapore through a formal treaty concluded with Sultan Hussein of Johor and the Temenggong, the de jure and de facto rulers of Singapore. A second treaty was entered into in 1824 where outright ownership of the island was ceded to the British. And in 1867 Singapore became a Crown Colony of the Colonial Office in London (Singapore-Expats, N.d.). Singapore became a significant port of call for ships sailing between Europe and East Asia. And after the 1870’s following the development of rubber planting industry, it also became the main sorting and export centre for the global rubber trade. This led to unprecedented prosperity, which led to Chinese, Malay and Indian immigrants flocking to Singapore. The peace and prosperity ended when the Japanese conquered it during the Second World War (Singapore-Expats, N.d.). The British returned in 1945 and Singapore came under British Military Administration, and in 1946 the Straits Settlements was dissolved, which saw Singapore become a Crown Colony, whereas as Penang and Malacca became part of the Malayan Union, later the Federation of Malaya (Singapore-Expats, N.d.). Postwar Singapore no longer comprised transient immigrants and the people demanded a say in the government. Whilst constitutional powers vested in the Governor, who had an advisory council of officials and nominated non-officials, it evolved into the separate Executive and Legislative arrangements in 1948 with provision for six members to be elected by popular vote to the legislature (Singapore-Expats, N.d.). Self-government was attained in 1959. But it ushered in an uneasy period. The People’s Action Party (PAP) had come into power with the support of the communists, who controlled many mass organisations, especially the workers and students, with the shared objective of fighting British colonialism. The moderates pushed for full independence for Singapore as part of a non-communist Malaya, whereas the communists wanted a communist take-over. The two factions split in 1961, with the Malayans agreeing to Singapore's merger with them as part of a larger federation. This was, however, short-lived as Singapore separated from the rest of Malaysia in 1965 to become a sovereign, democratic and independent nation (Singapore-Expats, N.d.). Means taken to promote social cohesion Given the ethnic diversity, Singapore has taken a number of measures to ensure the meaningful political representation of the various groups, and they have instituted a number of constitutional safeguards to ensure social inclusion. These measures include: The Presidential Council on Minority Rights (PCMR), which advises on any Bill or subsidiary legislation that contains differentiating measures. And it also reports on matters that affect any racial or religious community that are referred to it by Parliament or the Government. The Presidential Council on Religious Harmony (PCRH), which advises on matters affecting religious harmony. Reserved presidential election to ensure multi-racial representation. Under this measure the election to the office of the president is reserved for a certain community, that is Chinese, Malay or Indian, if no person belonging to that community has held the office of the President for any of the last five terms of office. Group Representative Constituency, which ensures minority representation in parliament. Under this measure the electorate will, in their particular constituency, elect a group of individuals to be their member of parliament, of which at least one of the candidates must be from an ethnic minority (RSiS, 2024). Furthermore, there is a deep sense of heritage preservation, which emphasises and supports cultural and faith continuity. The Singaporean system accepts that the state and tribal identities are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. The CMIO (Chinese, Malay, Indian, Others) typology is a deeply entrenched frame of reference in policymaking (RSiS, 2024). Singapore also adheres to bilingual policy. All Singaporeans learn English as their main language, and a mother tongue according to their racial identity, that is Mandarin for Chinese, Bahasa Malay for Malays. And Tamil for Indians (RSiS, 2024). The state also supports Community Self-Help organisations. It recognises that social safety support along community lines can better address ethnic specific challenges. A number of such community schemes, for example the Chinese Development Assistance Council, the Council for the Development of the Singaporean Malay/Muslim Community – Malay-Mendaki – and the Eurasian Association,  are officially recognised and supported (RSiS, 2024). It is also recognised that there is an overlap between racial and religious identity. Accordingly, the major faith groups in Singapore take guidance from their respective domestic religious authorities, who interpret religious teachings through a Singapore-centric and progressive lens (RSiS, 2024). To this end, the Inter-Religious Organisation (IRO), which is comprised of the ten main religious groups, including, amongst others, Islam, Catholicism, Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism, was established in 1948 (RSiS, 2024). Coding integration into law The Singaporean authorities are strong proponents of social integration. This they believe is essential in order to maximise a shared experience and to forge a distinct Singaporean identity. It is, they believe, through social integration that a sense of belonging, pride and patriotism is engendered. To this end, a number of social policies have been coded into law. With regard to education policy, all Singaporean children are compelled to attend at least ten years of schooling, in which a standardised national curriculum is taught. Schooling is taught in English, but the curriculum includes a mother tongue as a second language. All scholars are taught to embrace national symbols such as the anthem and national pledge, which is recited at the onset of every school day. National service is also compulsory for all Singapore citizens and second generation permanent residents. They are obliged to serve two years conscription in the defence force. The rationale behind the enlistment is grounded on three principles: Firstly, the defence imperative is to fulfil a national need, not an ideology. Secondly, it is universally applied, with little or no exception. And thirdly, it is done in an equitable manner, in which servicemen/women are deployed according to operational needs and competency. Communal ties and cohesion are fostered through the Ethic Integration Policy. Under this policy, shared spaces and interaction across communities is promoted in order to avoid the formation of racial enclaves. A prime example of such a policy is the Singaporean public housing scheme (HDB flats), which is done against the backdrop of 80 percent of Singaporeans living in public housing. The workings of the scheme is explained hereunder: Every block of flats is allocated a racial quota according to the latest census on the racial identities of households in Singapore. This ensures that there is a racial mix in every block of flats and that the occupancy of the block reflects the national demography of the country. Home sellers are restricted from selling their apartment to buyers from another race in instances where the blocks have reached the maximum quota. For example, a Malay household is not allowed to sell the unit to a Chinese buyer in instances where the block has too many Chinese households, since the sale would further dilute the proportion of Malay residents. Similar quotas are imposed on permanent resident households in order to prevent immigrant enclaves. (RSiS, 2024) In short, there is a social compact between the individual and the state in Singapore. A balance is struck between heritage, agency, and continuity on the one hand, and a national super-ordinate identity on the other. There is a trade-off between individual autonomy and the national collective interest. And the small nuclear family, economic competition, individual-centric pursuits, and the retreat to communal psychological safety are overtly recognised as some of the key challenges to fostering cohesion. Figure 3: Singapore’s social compact (RSiS, 2024) Presidential Council for Minority Rights The Presidential Council for Minority Rights (PCMR) was established in 1970 but took its current name in 1973. It was established under Part 7 of the Singapore Constitution. It has as its purpose the safeguarding of minority rights and advising the Government and Parliament on these issues (Desker, 2024). It forms part of a structure in the President’s office comprising the Council of Presidential Advisors, the PCMR, and the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony (PCRH) (Desker, 2024). The objectives of the PCMR are to ensure: That legislation takes into account the diverse interests of Singaporean society from the perspective of ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity That the legislative process has considered the diverse elements in Singapore society so that minority groups do not feel that they are oppressed or excluded. (Desker, 2024) The role of the PCMR: The primary function is to scrutinise Bills that are before Parliament after the second reading in Parliament and after the first debate on the Bill. That is, before the third reading of the Bill, when it is adopted into law, if it is passed. The intention is that all Bills will be reviewed by the council to ensure that it does not discriminate against any ethnic or religious community. If there are differentiating measures, then the council will report its findings to Parliament and refer the Bill to it for reconsideration or revision. It also examines all subsidiary legislation and statutes. A secondary function is to take up other issues affecting social cohesion that are deemed necessary. The President also has the executive power to appoint the Chairperson of the PCRH. This body was established by the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act of 2001. This is done on the advice of the PCMR. (Desker, 2024) The composition of the PCMR: Up to twenty members can be appointed to the PCMR (Republic of Singapore, 2020). It may be comprised of up to ten permanent members (who may be appointed for life (Republic of Singapore, 2020), who could include the Prime Minister, as well as any previous Prime Ministers. The current council has six permanent members. It includes the current Prime Minister, the Minister for Law, three retired ministers – one of which is ethnic Indian and two that are ethnic Malay. It is currently chaired by the Chief Justice (Desker, 2024). The Chairperson is appointed for a three-year period, but is eligible for re-appointment (Republic of Singapore, 2020). There are also up to ten additional members that are appointed for three-year terms, which terms could be renewed. These ten members come from ethnic minorities, religious groupings, for example, the Muslim Mufti, the Catholic Cardinal, the head of the Buddhist community of Singapore are members of the council. Then there are representatives from the minority communities, for example, the Sikh community, the Eurasian ethnic minority, and a Malay Supreme Court Justice – whose father happened to be a former leader of the opposition (Desker, 2024). The President of Singapore has the executive power to appoint the members of the Council, on the advice of the Prime Minister (Desker, 2024). Eligibility for appointment to the PCMR: Members must be Singapore citizens residing in Singapore. They must be at least 35 years of age. There are no restrictions on the appointment of cabinet ministers or political office-bearers or members. (Desker, 2024) Meetings of the PCMR: The PCMR generally meets once a month. It could schedule additional meetings if there is a specific reason therefore, for example, as happened after a race riot in Little India. In that instance the PCMR reviewed actions taken by the government. The Prime Minister may authorise ministers and parliamentary secretaries to attend meetings, but that is not generally the case unless it is felt that there is a need to advise the Council. All meetings are held in private. The conclusions are recorded and conveyed to Parliament, but the discussions are not. This is to allow for the exchange of views that can sometimes be of a very sensitive nature in a society that has had race, linguistic and religious riots in the past. (Desker, 2024) Matters excluded from consideration by the PCMR: Money Bills Bills on defence and security Bills classified by the President as urgent. In such instances, if the Bill were to be passed into law and the PCMR subsequently discovers some or other differentiating measure, it may discuss the matter and make recommendations as how to remedy the Act. (Desker, 2024) Resources deployed to support the work of the PCMR: The budget is limited since it uses the facilities and staff of Parliament. The Clerk of Parliament acts as the Secretary to the Council. Unlike members of Parliament, there is no funding provision for the members of the Council to commission outside expertise to assist with their work, but there are no barriers or prohibitions excluding members from getting voluntary or externally funded support by expert individuals to assist them in their work. Members of the PCMR receive an honorarium, which is limited in nature. On its own it is not sufficient and requires the member to have external employment and/or resources. It is considered a contribution to society. (Desker, 2024) Working methodology: More often than not, the findings of the PCMR are in the form of a comment on what issues need to be considered or gaps in the legislation that need to be addressed. The findings could also take the form of drafting actual amendments to the legislation for Parliament to consider. (Desker, 2024) Example of a finding: There was a piece of legislation which restricted Indian workers coming into the city centre on their days off – at the weekends. This applied mainly to people from the South Asian sub-continent who came to work on one- or two-year contracts. They were housed outside the city, but tended to concentrate in Little India on the Sunday when they were off (Desker, 2024). Legislation was introduced after a major riot took place. The council played the role of attempting to ameliorate the impact of the legislation so that it did not completely prohibit the entry of people who came from these communities into Little India, but to rather ensure that it wasn’t done in a manner which would overwhelm Little India. It ensured that some other crowd control means were put in place and that, for example, bars could only sell alcohol after six in the evening. Before that, bars were open during the day and the workers would get inebriated, with consequential unruly behaviour (Desker, 2024). Presidential Council for Religious Harmony As already mentioned, the President also has the executive power to appoint the Chairperson of the PCRH. This body was established by the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act of 2001. The President makes the appointments on the advice of the PCMR. Some would argue that the PCRH is subsidiary to the PCMR, others argue that it functions in parallel to the PCMR (Desker, 2024). The objectives and role of the PCRH: The PCRH considers and reports to the Minister on matters that affect the maintenance of religious harmony. They also consider and make recommendations to the President on restraining orders against religious leaders or groups that cause “feelings of enmity, hatred, ill will or hostility between different religious groups”, or that carry out activities to promote a political cause or political party, or encourage disaffection against the President or the Government, under the guise of promoting or practicing any religious belief. (Republic of Singapore, 1990) Composition of the PCRH: The PCRH is comprised of a chairperson and at least 6 and not more than 15 other members. At least two-thirds of the PCRH members must be drawn from amongst the representatives of the major religions in Singapore. The others must be individuals that “have distinguished themselves in public service or community relations in Singapore”. As already pointed out, the members of the PCRH, including the Chairperson, are appointed by the President on the advice of the PCMR. They are appointed for a period of three years. (Republic of Singapore, 1990) Eligibility for appointment to the PCRH: To qualify for appointment, the individual must be a Singaporean citizen. He/she must be at least 35 years of age. He/she must be a resident of Singapore. Meetings of the PCRH and working methodology: The PCRH has the power to appoint a Secretary and any other officers it deems necessary to carry out its work in order to meet its objectives. It regulates its own procedures, provided that a quorum of at least half of its members need to be present at a meeting; and that the Chairperson (or if he is not available another member elected to chair the specific meeting) chairs the meeting. Its discussions are held in secret, with only its findings and recommendations reduced to writing. (Republic of Singapore, 1990) Impact and need for the measures on social cohesion In considering whether the measures taken to ensure social cohesion in Singapore are bearing fruit, this report defers to the 2022 report by Mathews, Key and Nah, titled Attitudes, actions, and aspirations: Key findings from the CAN-IPS survey on race relations, 2021. In this dissertation, only a snapshot of the survey’s findings is given, so as to provide a sense of the progress made in Singapore in promoting social cohesion. The full report on the survey can be accessed via the link below. Most respondents believe that meritocracy in Singapore is not contingent on race, with more than 80 percent believing that everyone can be successful, regardless of race. This is evidenced by the respondents’ beliefs about success and race as set out in Table 2 below. Ninety-seven percent are of the view that this will remain true and improve in the future. However, racial minorities and younger respondents are more likely to believe that majority privilege exists, and they are split on whether racism remains an important problem today – about 56,2 percent (up from 46,3 percent in 2016) feel that discrimination based on race will worsen. Table 2: Respondents’ beliefs about success and race (figures in brackets are from 2016 wave, where available) Source: Mathews, Key & Nah, 2022 Although a significant number of respondents (58,6 percent) disagreed with the notion of political leaders speaking openly about race in that it may cause unnecessary tension, most (88,8 percent) felt it important for them to do so. Most (70,2 per cent) do not believe that the majority race’s culture is privileged, but racial minorities are more likely to feel the converse is true. As for the next five years, most respondents of all races expect intercultural knowledge and willingness to accommodate differences to stay the same or even improve. In terms of the attitudes with regard to national unity, as can be gleaned from the responses in Table 3 below, only a small minority were of the view that the level of national unity would worsen. Table 3: Attitudes with regard to the level of national unity Source: Mathews, Key & Nah, 2022 With regard to racial prejudices and biases, respondents have become more likely to see themselves, their family, and their close friends as hardly or not at all racist. At 83,6 percent this is up from 73,6 per cent in 2016. But members of the majority race tend to perceive their own race as less racist than how racial minorities view them, whilst the same trend is not observed for Malay’s and Indian’s perceptions of people of their own racial groups. This is illustrated in Table 4 below. Table 4: Perceived racism of self, by respondents’ race (figures in brackets are from 2016) Source: Mathews, Key & Nah, 2022 Whilst some policies, such as Racial Harmony Day (8 out of 10 respondents) are well-received, others, such as the Special Assistance Schools (4 out of 10 respondents), are not. Most respondents (63 per cent) feel that the CMIO system (Chinese/Indian/Malay/Others) is effective in preserving racial harmony, whereas a lower proportion (38,6 per cent) feel that it is safeguarding minority rights. The other overarching race classification policy is also broadly viewed positively. Over three-quarters of respondents are of the view that legislation on race is able to preserve racial harmony. More than 7 in 10 respondents are of the view that the Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) and ethnic self-help groups help to preserve racial harmony. Six in 10 want to retain these policies as they are. Chinese respondents (81,3 percent) are, however, more likely than minorities (two-thirds) to believe the EIP preserves racial harmony. Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority, whether from the majority Chinese or minorities’ point of view, want the EIP to continue. The sentiments towards the various ethnic-based policies are set out in Table 5 below. Table 5: Sentiments towards ethnic-based policies Source: Mathews, Key & Nah, 2022 In terms of their lived experiences, only a small proportion of respondents experienced racial discrimination at work (less than 9 percent) and in the housing market (less than 3 percent). That said, minorities are more affected by such discrimination than Chinese. See Table 6 hereunder. Table 6: Experiences of discrimination and unfair treatment Source: Mathews, Key & Nah, 2022 And much of the population (41 per cent) say they have not been affected by race-related incidents highlighted in the news. A slight majority of respondents are tired of talking about issues of race and racism, whereas the rest are of the view that more public dialogue on these issues will be helpful. Regarding aspirations for the future, whilst many respondents indicated an indifference as to future developments to do with race, a highly welcomed development is greater intercultural understanding. As can be seen in Table 7 below, about 62,9 per cent were of the view that this greater understanding will be good for Singaporean society. With regard to discussions concerning racial issues, mixed sentiments were expressed. About half thought that by speaking up freely about their ethnic identity not being properly respected or about problems with different ethnic cultures, would be good; most of the rest felt it would make no difference. Table 7: Views on deeper intercultural understanding, by respondents’ race Source: Mathews, Key & Nah, 2022 Although more than half of all respondents think it would be beneficial for people to identify as Singaporeans as opposed to Singaporean-Chinese, Singaporean-Malay, Singaporean-Indian and so on, they are less supportive of policies that would move in a race-blind direction. This is illustrated in Table 8 below. Little India, Singapore istockphoto.com: Stock photo ID:1278570046 Table 8: Attitudes to future developments towards a race-blind society Source: Mathews, Key & Nah, 2022 China Town, Singapore istockphoto.com: Stock photo ID:614980556 3.  DISCUSSION Both Singapore and South Africa emerged from a colonial past. Singapore from British rule, and South Africa from a white minority oppressive Apartheid regime, which was also preceded by British colonial rule. So too, both jurisdictions have a multiracial demography, with a majority and a number of minority communities. In Singapore the Chinese community comprises around 74,3 percent of the population, the Malay 13,5 percent, the Indian 9 percent, and others around 3,2 percent (RSiS, 2024). In South Africa, according to the latest census (2022), similar trends emerge, albeit from different ethnic communities. Here, the black population form the majority with around 81,4 percent, followed by the coloured community at 8,2 percent, the white community at 7,3 percent, and the Indian/Asian community at around 2,7 percent (RSA, N.d.). The difference between the two countries is that the Chinese majority did not have to contend with the Apartheid laws and were therefore not favoured and excluded from the economy to the same extent as blacks were in South Africa. The result is that at independence, in Singapore there was greater equality between the races than was the case in South Africa. There is also a different philosophy as to the defining of the individual’s identity. In Singapore, group identity (ethnicity) is accepted and coded into law. That is, individuals identify as Singaporean-Chinese, Singaporean-Malay, etcetera. In the ‘new’ South Africa the “question constantly arises about what it means to be a South African … and whether you’re a South African first and then ‘black/white/coloured/Indian’ or vice versa” (Diergaardt, 2018). Until this question is settled in South Africa, there will be a constant debate as to whether the legislative and social construct should embody and reference race as a composite component of public policy. A national dialogue on what constitutes the South African identity seems overdue in light of the ISI’s GovDem Survey findings. The trust deficit between races, religious groups, indeed across all facets of South African society, evidenced in the GovDem Survey, would suggest that pro-active mechanisms need to be put in place to improve the levels of trust in the country. Some would argue that it should start in the political sphere, where minority communities often (rightly or wrongly) feel that their interests are being marginalised by the majority. One example is that although “Afrikaans is still maintaining its status of an official language, its speakers feel that it is being marginalised by the government. One of the reasons given is the enforcement of English in former Afrikaans institutions” (Snail, 2011). The architects of the new South Africa “chose a functionally single-district proportional representation electoral system and a federal executive structure to distribute power both racially and regionally” in order to maximise inclusiveness at the national and provincial levels of government. The main parties are broadly multiracial, but as elections have progressed, there has been a gradual emergence of racial politics. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) has, for example, escalated its racial appeals in its election rhetoric, and it has to a much larger degree filled its party lists with more black candidates. And it has of late disproportionately targeted the black voters in its campaigns (Macdonald, 2012), leaving many from the minority communities perceiving themselves to be largely excluded from mainstream political decision-making. Now the electoral system is under review, with an Electoral Review Panel set to be announced in the foreseeable future as provided for in the Electoral Amendment Act 1 of 2023. This panel will be tasked with designing a new electoral model for South Africa (RSA, 2023). It may be wise for the panel to consider some elements of Singapore’s Group Representative constituency system, which guarantees minority representation at the constituency level, with a view to ensuring multiracial representation at the constituency level, as opposed to a single-seat constituency system, which could marginalise opposition parties and those from the minority communities from constituency representation at the expense of social integration and cohesiveness. The perception of exclusion is being exacerbated through the inclusion of racial coding into South African law. A number of laws and policies have been introduced that have as their objective the remedying of historical injustices. These include, for example, the Employment Equity Act of 1998, the Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003, and the Black Industrialist programme of the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, amongst others. The noble and constitutional intentions of these laws are often overlooked when wrongly interpreted and implemented, which in turn builds distrust amongst some from the minority communities, and feeds their perception, rightly or wrongly, of alienation. Hence the high level of intent shown in the GovDem Survey by those from the minority communities to emigrate. Coding into law of racial quotas, per se, does not constitute an infringement of minority rights. It is often, as in the South African case, a necessary tool to remedy past injustices. It is when this legislation is introduced within an environment of low trust that perceptions of exclusion take root. The Singaporean case, where racial quotas are a feature of legislation and policy, proves the point. Singaporeans have embraced the notion to the extent that in the 2022 survey, covered herein, a majority of respondents indicated that they were not supportive of racially-blind policies, nor did they experience the quota system as threatening of their rights. The introduction of mechanisms in South Africa such as those embodied in the work of Singapore’s PCMR and PCRH may prove a differentiating feature capable of building trust. If a credible body with sufficient powers and regard were to ameliorate legislation that would differentiate on racial and/or religious grounds, it would serve, as the Singaporean case would suggest, to instil faith and build trust amongst minority and religious communities. However, a cautionary note. Singapore’s PCMR and PCRH are adequately resourced and are composed of individuals with gravitas and who command great respect. Should this route be charted in South Africa, great care will have to be taken in selecting the right calibre of individuals to be appointed to oversee the work, lest trust be further imploded. The choice must be such that it creates trust in society that their recommendations will be taken seriously by the lawmakers and not just fobbed off. As pointed out by Dr Mathew Mathews (2024) from the Institute of Policy Studies in Singapore in the course of an interview with him, in Singapore, as it relates to the PCMR, “it’s too high a council for anyone to ignore”. In this regard Singapore’s PCMR and PCRH cannot simply be cloned. South Africa will have to make its own adaptions in two main respects: Firstly, as it relates to the separation of powers. In Singapore the PCMR is comprised of, amongst others, members of the Executive such as the President, Prime Minister and ministers, and members from the judiciary, such as the Chief Justice. Furthermore, it is housed in the Parliament and makes use of its facilities. The Clerk of Parliament acts as its Secretary. Within the PCMR, these different arms of government work in partnership. The purists would argue that such machination would go against the separation of powers principle that is prescribed in the South African Constitution (RSA, 1996). So, in this regard one may have to consider re-mandating one of the Constitution’s Chapter 9 Institutions, the Commission for the Promotion of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (CRL Commission) possibly being the choice. This being the case, the eligibility for being appointed as a Commissioner, to provide for the necessary gravitas, respect and skills, and the mandate, to provide for the reviewing of legislation for recommendation to Parliament, will have to be revisited. And the fiscus will have to provide sufficient resources for the Commission to do its work effectively and independently – the current budgetary allocation to the CRL Commission is, when considering the importance of social cohesion for peace and stability and economic growth, quite frankly, a farce. Secondly, it is doubted that unfettered appointment powers by the President will, within the South African environment, pass constitutional muster. An open and transparent public participation and parliamentary process will have to be followed. More so, against the backdrop of cadre deployment across all spheres of the state, which the State Capture Commission has declared illegal and unconstitutional (Haffejee, 2022), public trust will be undermined should the process not be considered and embraced by the broader society as being credible. Masjid Sultan Mosque, Kampong Glam district, Singapore istockphoto.com: Stock photo ID:1445118179 4.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Social cohesion in a country is by no means a nice-to-have. It is an economic imperative, and a crucial requirement for peace and security. Otherwise stated, a lack of social cohesion will not garner the level of societal and investor trust needed for a growing economy, and it inevitably leads to social insecurity and instability. Evidence suggests that social cohesion in South Africa is backsliding, with disturbing trends developing. Whilst on paper structures and mechanisms exist to promote social cohesion, the lived reality tells a different story. South Africans are not confident in the country’s ability to come together as a united nation. And trust levels amongst the various race, religious, linguistic, nationalities, are worryingly low. Public policymakers can no longer sit by idly and allow social cohesion to slip any further. The stakes for the nation are simply too high. To this end the Inclusive Society Institute has commissioned a study on Managing Social Cohesion in Diverse Communities. The study explores how other nations with diverse populations are dealing with and building social cohesion. It has identified Finland, the United Arab Emirates and Singapore as countries from which South Africa could possibly learn. It provides a menu of options for policymakers to consider. This paper considers the Singaporean practices and tools deployed in this regard. Scoping of the Singaporean approach, the research suggest, has identified at least five areas from which South Africa can draw lessons, and accordingly, makes the following recommendations: That the custodianship of South Africa’s social cohesion programme be reallocated from the Department of Sports, Arts and Culture to the Presidency. And that the importance of social cohesion for the nation’s wellbeing be recognised by properly and sufficiently resourcing the programme. Social cohesion is far more than a cultural imperative. It affects all aspects of societal life. It is necessary for creating business and investment confidence, the prerequisite for economic growth and job creation; and it is necessary to ensure a peaceful and stable environment. It nurtures a sense of belonging, and creates hope for the future for all citizens, who then see a place for themselves in the country. This builds trust and patriotism amongst the various communities of the country, who then work together to build prosperity and a shared future. In the first instance, it requires a multidisciplinary, inter-departmental approach, best coordinated in the centrality of the Presidency. And by locating it in the Presidency it signals the importance and priority that government attaches to ensuring a socially cohesive South Africa. Re-evaluate and expand the mandate of the Commission for the Protection of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities to include the scrutinisation of Bills before Parliament and other secondary legislation for purposes of ensuring that it does not discriminate against any minority or religious community. And that should differentiation measures be necessary, for example, to ensure redress from past discrimination, that it is ameliorated in a manner that does not create social dissonance. To this end the CRL Commission’s budget will have to be materially overhauled, given that the current paltry budget is wholly inadequate to give credence to the Commission’s stated objectives. And the process of appointing commissioners will also need to be revisited. Currently, commissioners are selected by a panel appointed by the Minister (RSA, 2002). To ensure greater public faith and support in the work of the Commission, a more open and transparent parliamentary process – with meaningful public participation – ought to be followed. It is further recommended that the Commission, or at least the legislative review functions of the Commission, be chaired by a retired High or Supreme Court of Appeal judge. In that electoral reform is currently underway, it is recommended that an electoral system be designed that will adequately accommodate multiparty support at a constituency level. One such mechanism could be a Multi-Member Constituency (MMC) model. Whilst South African policymakers may not be persuaded to code racial quotas into the electoral system as is the case in Singapore, evidence suggests that South African political parties remain racially slanted in their composition. Thus, by guaranteeing multiparty representation at the constituency level, the probability is that the various demographic groups will be better represented in an MMC system compared to a straight-winner-takes-all single-seat constituency model. Furthermore, parties should be encouraged to voluntarily ensure that their MMC candidates adequately reflect the demographics of the particular MMC and the party supporters they serve. Social cohesion programmes and policies should be data-driven, and accordingly, regular extensive surveys related thereto need to be adequately resourced.   The Singaporean case study has highlighted the importance of securing broad public support for social cohesion engineering, the nature of which can sometimes be very sensitive. To ensure that public policymakers are able to ensure that support, they need to accurately understand the public mood and sentiments, to which end an empirical measurement tool is required.   It is recommended that an extensive independent but publicly funded annual social cohesion survey be undertaken, much along the lines of the Attitudes, Actions and Aspirations: CAN-IPS Survey on Race Relations, which measures these issues within the Singapore context. Independence is necessary to ensure that the issues are reported on in a non-biased manner, and public funding is necessary to ensure that the measurements can be done in a sustainable way. A national dialogue needs to be organised to tackle the question of what constitutes the South African identity.   The ISI’s GovDem Survey underscores the undeniable reality that the lived reality in South Africa is still race-driven. And studies have shown that there isn’t a unified understanding of what constitutes the South African identity. The research cited in this paper suggests that South Africans continue to grapple with the question as to whether they are South Africans that happen to form a particular race group, or whether they are white/black/coloured/Indian South Africans.   The answering of this question will have a profound impact on how policymakers can and should approach the design of public policy. Furthermore, a unified understanding and acceptance of what that identity entails will allow for a greater understanding and broader societal buy-in to what can sometimes be sensitive social-engineering policy manoeuvres. Social cohesion trends are currently heading in the wrong direction. But it is not all doom and gloom. Whilst it is so that only around a third of South Africans believe a united South Africa is achievable, nearly 70 percent of them want a united nation. What is lacking is the political will, policies, and tools to build the cohesion. The Singaporean case study encapsulated in this report suggests that by deploying the right  policy instruments and driving those policies with the necessary vigour and priority, a united, and socially cohesive multiracial society is possible. What South African policymakers now need to do is to refocus their efforts on achieving the Mandela rainbow nation dream, by better equipping themselves with the means to do so. And with the necessary urgency that it demands. References Austin, M. 2021. Desmond Tutu coined the phrase 'Rainbow Nation' and his hope lives on. [Online] Available at: https://news.sky.com/story/desmond-tutu-coined-the-phrase-rainbow-nation-and-his-hope-lives-on-12504006 [accessed: 7 February 2024] Bris, A. 2014. Social Cohesion – Why it matters. [Online] Available at: https://www.imd.org/research-knowledge/articles/com-april-2014/ [accessed: 7 February 2024] BusinessTech, 2023. There’s a critical shortage of these shills going into 2023. [Online] Available at: https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/653227/theres-a-critical-shortage-of-these-skills-in-south-africa-going-into-2023/ [accessed: 7 February 2023] CRL Commission. N.d. Annual and Other Reports. [Online] Available at: https://www.crlcommission.org.za/reports/ [accessed: 7 February 2024] Department of Sport, Arts and Culture (DSAC). N.d. Annual Performance Plan 2023/24. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.dsac.gov.za/sites/default/files/2023-05/DSAC%20APP%202023-2024.pdf [accessed: 7 February 2024] Fukuyama, F. 2001. 'Social capital, civil society and development', Third World Quarterly, 22(1): 7-20. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3993342 [accessed: 14 February 2024] Desker, B. 2024. Interview at R. Rajaratham School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, on 19 March 2024 with Barry Desker, a member of the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, Singapore Diergaardt, C.M. 2018. South African national identity as constructed by black and coloured South Africans in South Korea. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://scholar.sun.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/47b9e17c-4f89-488e-a7ad-eadf4957c7bd/content [accessed: 27 Marrch 2024] Haffejee, F. Cadre deployment unconstitutional and illegal – Commission’s bombshell finding on ANC’s key policy.  [Online] Available at: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-06-24-cadre-deployment-unconstitutional-and-illegal-commissions-bombshell-finding-on-ancs-key-policy/ [accessed: 27 March 2024] Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2022. Measuring Social Cohesion in South Africa. Results from the Inclusive Society’s 2021 GovDem survey. [Online] Available at: file:///C:/Users/dswan/Downloads/2022.04.22%20Measuring%20Social%20Cohesion%20in%20South%20Africa%20(2).pdf [accessed 7 February 2024] Inclusive Society Institute (ISI). 2023. GovDem Poll. Cape Town: Inclusive Society Institute Langer, A., Stewart, F., Smedts, K. & Demarest, L. 2017. Social Cohesion Index. [Online] Available at: https://www.socialcohesion.info/concepts/arnim-langer-/-francesstewart-/-kristien-smedts-/-leila-demarest [accessed: 7 February 2024] Mathews, M., Key, T.K. & Nah, S. 2022. Attitudes, Actions and Aspirations: Key findings from the CAN-IPS Survey on Race Relations 2021. Singapore: National University of Singapore Macdonald, G. 2012. The Emergence of Racial Politics in South Africa: Lessons for Peacebuilding. [Online] Available at: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/files/case-study-competition/20130322-The-Emergence-of-Racial-Politics-in-South-Africa.pdf [accessed: 27 March 2024] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). N.d. About Singapore. [Online] Available at: https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Overseas-Mission/Washington/About-Singapore [accessed: 25 March 2024] National Planning Commission (NPC). N.d. National Development Plan 2030. Our future – make it work. [Oline] Available at: ndp-2030-our-future-make-it-workr.pdf [accessed: 7 February 2024] National Planning Commission (NPC). 2023. Towards a Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion within the 2030 Timeframe of the NDP. Correspondence received from the National Planning Commission. Pretoria: National Planning Commission Republic of Singapore. 1990. Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, 1990. Singapore: Attorney-General’s Chambers Republic of Singapore. 2020 revised edition. Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. Singapore: The Law Revision Commission Republic of South Africa (RSA). N.d. People of South Africa. [Online] Available at:  https://www.gov.za/about-sa/south-africas-people [accessed: 27 March 2024] Republic of South Africa (RSA). 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Pretoria: Government Printer Republic of South Africa (RSA). 2002. Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities Act, 2002. Pretoria: Government Printer Republic of South Africa (RSA). 2023. Electoral Amendment Act 1 of 2023. [Online] Available at:  https://www.gov.za/documents/acts/electoral-amendment-act-1-2023-english-afrikaans-17-apr-2023 [accessed: 27 March 2024] S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSiS). 2024. Discussions held with an academic team from the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nan Yang Technological University, Singapore, on Tuesday, 19 March 2024. The team was led by Dr C.H. Leong and M. Nassir. Treasury. 2024. Vote 37: Sport, Arts and Culture. [Online] Available at: https://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2024/ene/ENE24-Vote37_ChapterTables.xlsx [accessed: 2 April 2024] Scanlon Foundation Research Institute (SFRI). N.d. What is social cohesion? [Online] Available at: https://scanloninstitute.org.au/what-social-cohesion [accessed: 7 February 2024] Singapore-Expats. N.d. Brief History of Singapore. [Online] Available at: https://www.singaporeexpats.com/about-singapore/brief-history.htm [accessed: 25 March 2024] Snail, M.L. 2011. Revising aspects of language in South Africa during the Apartheid era, Historia Actual Online, 24:65-91 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This paper is published jointly by the  Inclusive Society Institute and School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University www.inclusivesociety.org.za            www.sun.ac.za/english/faculty/economy/sp

This report was prepared by the Inclusive Society Institute on behalf of the Global South Perspectives Network, in collaboration with the other two convening institutions, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS) and HuminzaCom Copyright © 2024 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission in writing from the Inclusive Society Institute, FOGGS and HumanizaCom. DISCLAIMER Views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Inclusive Society Institute, FOGGS and HumanizaCom. April 2024 Author: Nicola Jo Bruns Bergsteedt Editor: Daryl Swanepoel 1. Introduction In the dynamic and ever-evolving arena of global governance, the Summit for the Future, set for 22-23 September 2024 in New York, emerges as a critical juncture in the quest for sustainable development and enhanced multilateral cooperation. With the United Nations (UN) spearheading this initiative, the summit aims to be a watershed moment, promising to recalibrate the global community's approach towards tackling the pressing challenges of our time. In preparation for delving into the intricacies of this pivotal event, this report endeavours to capture the essence of discussions and reflections that emanate from a gathering of esteemed minds under the Global South Perspectives Network on 1 March 2024. This report is structured to provide a comprehensive overview, beginning with an executive summary that distils the key insights and recommendations shared during the meeting. Following this are detailed accounts of two thought-provoking presentations delivered by Dr Georgios Kostakos, Executive Director of the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS), and Mr Zaheer Laher, Chief Director of UN Political, Peace, and Security at the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). These presentations offer a nuanced perspective on the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead in our collective pursuit of a more equitable and sustainable future. Moreover, the report includes four incisive responses from distinguished academics and practitioners who bring a wealth of knowledge and experience to the discourse. Prof Cilene Victor, Dr Adel Abdel-Sadek, and Prof María del Carmen Rico Menge, alongside Ms Buyelwa Sonjica, enrich the discussion with their diverse viewpoints, drawing attention to the multifaceted dimensions of global governance, human rights, and sustainable development. Their contributions underscore the critical role of inclusive dialogue and collaborative action in addressing the systemic issues that underpin the current geopolitical and socio-economic landscape. The meeting, chaired by Daryl Swanepoel, CEO of the Inclusive Society Institute in South Africa, served as a platform for rigorous debate and collective reflection on the Zero Draft of the Pact for the Future. This document, central to the Summit for the Future's agenda, aims to serve as a blueprint for invigorating the UN's role in global governance. However, as the participants noted, while the draft sets an ambitious framework for action, it falls short in detailing the practical measures required to effect tangible change, particularly in the face of persistent geopolitical tensions and humanitarian crises. As we navigate the path towards the Summit for the Future, the insights and recommendations articulated in this report aim to contribute to a more inclusive, equitable, and sustainable global order. The voices of the Global South, with their unique perspectives and lived experiences, are invaluable in shaping a future that truly reflects the collective aspirations of our global community. Link to the webinar recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S8ZaD7MUfsc&ab_channel=FOGGS 2. Executive Summary In the grand theatre of global diplomacy, the Summit for the Future, set to take place on 22-23 September 2024, stands as a beacon of hope, a promise of concerted action against the multifaceted crises that plague our world. With the United Nations at its helm, this summit has been portrayed as a pivotal moment to recalibrate, realign, and reinvigorate the global community's commitment to sustainable development and multilateral cooperation. Yet, as representatives from the Global South Perspectives Network convened on 1 March to deliberate on the Zero Draft of the Pact for the Future, their reflections cast a long shadow of doubt over the Summit's capacity to steer us away from impending calamities. The Summit of the Future presents a unique opportunity to strengthen collaboration on pivotal issues and bridge the gaps in international governance. It's a chance to reaffirm the United Nations Charter as the basis for international cooperation and recommit to key initiatives, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Building on the momentum of the SDG Summit in 2023, Member States are poised to explore strategies for laying down a stronger foundation for global cooperation capable of addressing both current and future threats. The Zero Draft, as envisioned, is meant to serve as a blueprint for consolidating United Nations activities, instilling a greater sense of urgency in addressing global challenges, and introducing novel initiatives, including the governance of cyberspace and outer space. These elements underscore a commitment to reinvigorating the UN's role at the centre of a revitalised and more effective multilateral system, which can make a real difference in people’s lives. Yet, as commendable as these objectives are, they merely skim the surface of the deeper, more systemic issues at play. The heart of the matter, as articulated by the Global South Perspectives Network, lies not in the ‘what’ but in the ‘how’. The Zero Draft sketches a broad outline of the urgent actions needed but stops short of delving into the institutional and financial aspects of implementation. This omission is particularly glaring against the backdrop of current geopolitical tensions and humanitarian crises, from the nuclear brinkmanship in North Korea and Iran to the enduring conflicts in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip. The question that looms large is: How do we move beyond rhetoric to effect real change in these dire situations? Patently amiss in the current draft is any proposal to reform the UN Security Council, most probably the most urgent, called for, and anticipated requirement to restore the credibility of the United Nations. It is proffered that future drafts will tackle this. The lack of the ‘how’ in the current draft does little to instil confidence that those proposals will indeed be responsive to the demands of the Global South. Time will tell. This sentiment was echoed in the words of the Chief Director of the UN Political, Peace, and Security Division, South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). Mr Zaheer Laher’s reflections on the Zero Draft highlighted both its potential and its limitations. While acknowledging the draft's role in consolidating UN efforts and fostering urgency, Mr Laher lamented its failure to address the practical pathways to resolving the kind of entrenched geopolitical conflicts and disasters that continue to ravage communities and destabilise regions across the globe. The Global South Perspectives Network’s critique extends beyond the immediate concerns of conflict resolution to encompass the broader challenges of global governance. The steady erosion of trust between nations, exacerbated by growing unilateralism and geopolitical rivalries, poses a significant barrier to international cooperation. The Zero Draft, for all its merits, seems to skirt around these foundational issues, offering up a vision for the future that, while aspirational, appears disconnected from the realities of our fragmented world. Moreover, the emphasis on new initiatives, such as policing outer space, while innovative and important, seems somewhat removed from the pressing needs of the Global South, whose communities are grappling with existential threats that demand immediate attention – poverty, inequality, climate change, and access to healthcare, to name but a few. The draft's failure to directly address these concerns, to provide a concrete roadmap for overcoming them, highlights a critical gap in its approach to shaping a more equitable and sustainable future. In calling for an action-orientated and inclusive Pact, the Global South points to the need for a global consensus that transcends mere agreement on principles. What is required is a commitment to actionable strategies that are grounded in the realities of those most affected by global crises. This entails meaningful reform of the international financial and debt architecture, bridging the digital divide, ensuring fair trade, and ramping up financing for climate adaptation and mitigation efforts. As we navigate the intricate landscape of global diplomacy, the voices from the Global South ring out with a clarity born of necessity and lived experience. Their insights offer not just critique but a roadmap for genuine engagement and collaborative problem-solving. It is through the lens of their collective wisdom that we can begin to unravel the complexities of our shared challenges, ensuring that solutions are not only proposed but enacted with equity and sustainability at their core. This brings into sharp focus the pivotal role that the Summit of the Future must play – not as a mere convener of nations but as a catalyst for transformative change. The Summit's success hinges on its ability to bridge the chasm between high-level declarations and the tangible needs of people on the ground. It demands a concerted effort to not just envision a better future but to lay the foundational stones that will lead there. In this endeavour, the principles of justice, equity, and inclusivity must be the guiding lights, illuminating the path toward a future where the promise of global cooperation becomes a lived reality for all. Standing at this crossroads, the Summit of the Future presents an opportunity to redefine the contours of global cooperation. But to seize this opportunity, the limitations of the Zero Draft must be confronted head-on. The eventual Pact for the Future, the Summit of the Future outcome, must forge a path that is not only ambitious in its vision but pragmatic in its execution – a path that truly addresses the how, not just the what, of tackling the formidable challenges the world faces. In the end, the success of the Summit will be measured not by the loftiness of its declarations but by the tangibility of its outcomes. It is incumbent upon all stakeholders, especially those from the Global South, to ensure that the Pact for the Future does not become a missed opportunity. Instead, it should mark the beginning of a renewed global commitment to action, solidarity, and an actionable shared vision for a more just and sustainable world. Only then can there be hope of steering the Summit from a track to nowhere to a path toward meaningful change. 3. A Global South Perspective on the Summit of the Future and the Zero Draft of the Pact for the Future Speech by Zaheer Laher, Chief Director: United Nations Political, Peace, and Security, DIRCO Thank you to the Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) of South Africa and the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS) for providing an opportunity to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation to participate in this discussion and address you on the upcoming United Nations Summit of the Future. This forum provides us with an opportunity to relay the Government of South Africa’s perspectives on the upcoming Summit, including our expectations. And importantly, it allows us an opportunity to engage with civil society. Before I get to that, I think it would be important for us to reflect on the current global geopolitical environment and the context in which we are engaging in the negotiations process on the Pact that is anticipated to be the outcome of the Summit. No doubt, the world is more globalised and the impact of a pandemic beginning in one part of the world, or a European border war can have an impact on the furthest corners of the globe. If we are to address global challenges, we have no choice but to resort to collective action. Even when countries have chosen to ignore the rest of the world, they eventually have had to come back and work with other nations to address the challenges confronting them. No one can live in the so-called ‘splendid isolation’ that some sought in the 19th and early 20th centuries. It is also clear that impediments to global cooperation are hindering relations between states and making it much more difficult to address our ever-increasing number of challenges, whether it be maintaining international peace and security, ensuring global sustainable development, addressing climate change and environmental challenges, or protecting human rights. A steady erosion of trust and competition between states, especially between countries in the Global South and the Global North, is weakening the ability of the international community to work together to address shared challenges. The obstacles we are facing include growing unilateralism; geo-political rivalries; inconsistent compliance with – and at times blatant violations of – international law and the application of double standards. There has also been a proliferation of alternate forums and side processes outside of established multilateral processes where decisions are taken amongst the few, thereby disenfranchising the many or to divert attention away from the non-delivery of multilateral commitments. When the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations was commemorated in September 2020, World Leaders adopted a declaration in which they declared their commitment to multilateralism, with the United Nations at its centre. This declaration contained 12 commitments, which included a request to the UN Secretary-General to prepare recommendations to advance our common agenda and to respond to current and future challenges. In response, in September 2021, the Secretary-General presented Our Common Agenda, a report highlighting challenges as well as opportunities to accelerate the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and the commitments made by Member States in the UN75 Declaration. The Our Common Agenda report also calls for global solidarity, a renewal of the multilateral system to accelerate implementation of existing commitments and to address the remaining gaps in global governance. The report called for a Summit of the Future (SOTF) to forge a new global consensus for the global community to be prepared for future threats and challenges. This Summit – which will take place during the High-Level Week of the 79th Session of the UN General Assembly in September – has already been preceded by a Ministerial Meeting, which took place on the side-lines of the United Nations General Assembly, High-Level Week, in September 2023. The Ministerial Meeting was an opportunity for Member States to set out their expectations and priorities for the Summit and its expected outcome: the Pact for the Future. The Ministerial Meeting also stressed the importance of having an ambitious, clear, and action-orientated outcome that can be achieved at the Summit of the Future. As an outcome of the Summit, Member States have committed to adopting a Pact for the Future to cement collective agreements and to demonstrate global solidarity for current and future generations. The practical consultations process is expected to have an outcome in the form of an “action-orientated Pact for the Future” that would be agreed on by Member States through intergovernmental negotiations on various issues. The Pact for the Future, which is being facilitated by the Permanent Representatives of Namibia and Germany in New York,  would comprise a chapeau and five chapters on: Sustainable development and financing for development; International peace and security; Science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation; Youth and future generations; and Transforming global governance. South Africa hopes that the Summit of the Future will be a key opportunity to focus on the implementation of the key multilateral outcomes that we have already adopted, including specifically the outcomes adopted in 2015. These are the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the SDGs), the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (dealing with financing for development), and the Paris Climate Change outcomes. We have stressed in engagements at the United Nations, that if we want this process to deliver real results, we have to start by engaging in some honest self-reflection. We have reached the halfway mark of the target date set for implementing the 2030 Agenda and more people are living in extreme poverty and going hungry than in 2015 when the SDGs were adopted. Why is violent conflict on the rise? How do we speak of reinvigorating multilateralism after decades of Summits and declarations have left us with so many commitments not yet implemented? What do we mean by restoring trust and finding solutions for a better tomorrow if we look away whilst a horrific genocide unfolds before our very eyes? The undertaking to hold a Summit of the Future should seek to do things differently as we seek decisive actions that make a positive impact in the lives of our people and transform international systems of power, governance, finance, debt, trade, and technology so that they work for all countries, and developing countries are not left out. For South Africa, and these are issues that developing countries negotiating within the context of the Group of 77 are calling for, we believe that some of the decisive actions that the Summit must focus on are a commitment to meaningful reform of the international financial and debt architecture; measures that go beyond GDP to inform access to development finance; harnessing the benefits of Science, Technology and Innovation for all; bridging the digital divide; achieving a fair pro-development multilateral trading system; and scaling up financing for adaptation, resilience, and loss and damage whilst ensuring that climate financing does not subtract from development financing. These essentially will give meaning to Goal 17, the means of implementation of the SDGs. The Pact of the Future should focus on securing urgent progress on nuclear disarmament, including through the fulfilment of the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States towards the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, which is key to upholding the non-proliferation regime and securing the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It also needs to address the importance of promoting conventional arms control, including curbing illicit trafficking and excessive accumulation of such arms; and avoiding the weaponisation of space, cyberspace, and other emerging domains. It is also vital to prevent excessive military spending, and instead redirect resources to the achievement of more urgent priorities such as the SDGs. For the SDGs to be fully realised, we need to address persistent challenges to peace and security because development and peace and security are interdependent, however, security measures should not be used as a pre-condition for development. The UN peace and security architecture must be revitalised to be able to effectively tackle threats to international peace and security. Of utmost importance is making meaningful progress in the negotiations for reforming the United Nations Security Council to make it representative and effective. We also need to consolidate the gains we have derived thus far in developing partnerships through Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The Pact of the Future must recognise the lack of progress in achieving gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls and must seek interventions to greatly enhance actions toward implementing and achieving SDG 5. We seek a future built around human rights as a central pillar and this includes a discussion of two specific areas of human rights that continue to be overlooked and neglected. Specifically, racism and the Right to Development. The Pact of the Future needs to reflect stronger action and commitment on the elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance. In this regard, the comprehensive implementation of, and follow-up to, the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA) remains a priority for South Africa. International action on this topic has been underwhelming and the international response thus far is tragically insufficient. We must have greater action that builds on and strengthens existing mechanisms to combat this scourge. We also firmly believe that the Pact of the Future without a real commitment and recognition of the Right to Development will not be able to address the needs of the future and those who follow us. To have a successful Summit we are going to have to find a way to tackle difficult and divisive issues, such as sharing technology, unilateral co-coercive measures, different views on gender, and the recent alarming tendency of walking away from long-standing agreements, such as the principles set in the Rio Declaration of equity and CBDR-RC. South Africa is committed to a successful Summit of the Future that bridges the development divide and provides new solutions to the challenges of tomorrow. We are actively engaging in the negotiations on the Pact, and we are hopeful that despite the geo-political challenges that exist, we can and must strive for an ambitious outcome. 4. Summit of the Future & Pact for the Future Presentation by Georgios Kostakos, Executive Director, FOGGS 5. Collective insights on Global Governance The discussion brings to light several critical points on the challenges and opportunities within global governance and humanitarian efforts. There is a unanimous recognition of the gap between the formulation of global agendas, such as the ‘Agenda for Humanity’ and ‘Agenda 2030’, and their practical implementation. The discourse underscores the necessity of moving beyond noble intentions to actionable strategies, emphasising the importance of the ‘how’ in achieving these global goals. A pivotal concern highlighted is the engagement of diverse global actors, from governments and civil society to academia, in effecting meaningful change. The need for clear, accessible communication is stressed, pointing out the barriers posed by complex jargon and the predominance of English, which limits wider engagement and understanding. The call for action over intentions resonates throughout, advocating for tangible progress across various spheres, including academia, government, and multilateral organisations. The discussions also address structural challenges within the United Nations, advocating for reforms that reflect the dynamic socio-economic landscape of the contemporary world. A vision for a reformed UN, with a more inclusive representation of the Global South and a reassessment of outdated international laws, is deemed essential for addressing global challenges effectively. The establishment of dedicated leadership to steer this transformation is suggested to ensure independence, objectivity, and high-level engagement from all global regions. Focusing on regional perspectives, particularly from the Middle East, the dialogue highlights the inadequacies of current global governance mechanisms and their impacts on regional conflicts and disparities. Including the younger generation in global dialogues is critical, considering their unique perspectives and the direct impact of governance flaws on their future. The necessity of a development-focused approach to address transborder challenges, such as illegal immigration, cyber-attacks, and poverty, is advocated over a security-centric one. The collective insights call for a holistic approach to solving global and regional issues, urging reforms in global governance to ensure fairness, justice, and sustainability. The significance of regional initiatives and cooperative efforts among countries is acknowledged as vital for establishing effective models and mechanisms to address global inequalities and foster sustainable development. The discussions culminated in a call for worldwide engagement in crafting actionable strategies and reforms, aiming to bridge the gap between ambitious global agendas and their realisation, of a more equitable and sustainable global order. The insights have been gleaned from the remarks by the panellists: Ms. Buyelwa Sonjica, former Cabinet Minister, South Africa Prof. Cilene Victor, Professor at Methodist University; Fapcom Communication College; FGV LAW; HumanizaCom Research Group Leader, São Paulo, Brazil Prof. Mohammed Taher Gholi Tabar, University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran Prof. Carmen Rico Menge, former Dean, Faculty of Social Communication and Director of InternationalRelations, Catholic University of Uruguay9 6. Epilogue We continue the engagement with the SOTF process and beyond to ensure that the Global South perspectives are taken into account when planning the future of global governance: a human-centred, inclusive, sustainable and resilient one. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This report has been published by the Inclusive Society Institute The Inclusive Society Institute (ISI) is an autonomous and independent institution that functions independently from any other entity. It is founded for the purpose of supporting and further deepening multi-party democracy. The ISI’s work is motivated by its desire to achieve non-racialism, non-sexism, social justice and cohesion, economic development and equality in South Africa, through a value system that embodies the social and national democratic principles associated with a developmental state. It recognises that a well-functioning democracy requires well-functioning political formations that are suitably equipped and capacitated. It further acknowledges that South Africa is inextricably linked to the ever transforming and interdependent global world, which necessitates international and multilateral cooperation. As such, the ISI also seeks to achieve its ideals at a global level through cooperation with like-minded parties and organs of civil society who share its basic values. In South Africa, ISI’s ideological positioning is aligned with that of the current ruling party and others in broader society with similar ideals. Email: info@inclusivesociety.org.za Phone: +27 (0) 21 201 1589 Web: www.inclusivesociety.org.za

The U.S. Consulate General in collaboration with The Desmond and Leah Tutu Legacy Foundation and the Ukrainian Association of South Africa held a special screening of 20 Days in Mariupol on Thursday, 28 March at The Labia Theatre in Gardens, Cape Town. The Inclusive Society Institute was invited and attended the screening. The Oscar and Academy Award winning documentary, 20 Days in Mariupol, shows the visceral images of the Russian invasion of Ukraine captured by an AP team trapped in Mariupol. Former Ukrainian President, Victor Yushchenko, was also in attendance and spoke at the event. He was joined U.S. Consul General Todd Haskell,  HE Liubov Abravitova, Ambassador of Ukraine to RSA, and Janet Jobson, CEO of the Desmond and Leah Tutu Legacy Foundation.

Embracing a society that is built on social and national democratic values Public Policy Research & Analysis Democratic Education, Briefings, Seminars & Conferences Publications & Liberation Archive Portal Featured Activity Conference Africa Consultative Meeting (ACM), 26-28 February 2024, Cape Town Our Latest Activities 2 days ago Release of Occasional Paper Managing Social Cohesion in diverse communities: Can South Africa draw lessons from Singapore Apr 11 Release of Report Reflections on the Zero Draft of the Pact for the Future Mar 28 Conference Inclusive Society Institute is participation in the C20 Brazil Up

Media Releases & Op-eds Apr 26, 2024 ​ Op-ed: Developing an instrument to assess levels of social cohesion in SA ​ by Klaus Boehnke and Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 17, 2024 ​ Media Release: Scrapping of Gauteng e-Tolls welcomed, but defaulters still have to pay ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Apr 16, 2024 ​ Op-ed: The manifold challenges facing SA's Higher Education government policy ​ by Dr Douglas Blackmur Up Apr 12, 2024 ​ Op-ed: Voter registration mechanism needs to change ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 12, 2024 ​ Op-ed: Managing social cohesion in diverse communities ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 3, 2024 ​ Op-ed: Misrepresenting Polls Does Democracy A Disservice ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 25, 2024 ​ Op-ed: UN summit of the future: On track to nowhere? ​ by Nicola Bergsteedt and Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 11, 2024 ​ Media Release: Mistrust in immigrants threatens social cohesion ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Mar 5, 2024 ​ Op- ed: A Critical Review of the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 21, 2024 ​ Op-ed: Embracing Flexicurity: Lessons from Denmark ​ by Nicola Bergsteedt Up Feb 9, 2024 ​ Op-ed: Navigating the complexities of coalition politics in South African municipalities ​ by Nondumiso Sithole Up Feb 9, 2024 ​ Op-ed: Growth drivers coming to the fore ​ by Roelof Botha and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 7, 2024 ​ Op-ed: Coalitions: Lessons from Finland ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 1, 2024 ​ Media Release: Intent to emigrate remains disturbingly high ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jan 23, 2024 ​ Op-ed: Who do we listen to? The human cost of war and its global impact ​ by Buyelwa Sonjica Up Jan 16, 2024 ​ Op-ed: Economic pandemic: Organised crime’s stranglehold on South Africa ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Dec 14 , 2023 ​ O p-ed: Leveraging Special Economic Zones for Growth ​ by William Gumede Up Nov 29 , 2023 ​ Op-ed: Many ethical hurdles to overcome in managing global population growth ​ by Motsamai Molefe Up Nov 28 , 2023 ​ Op-ed: Turnaround of construction sector is South African economy’s bellwether ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 20 , 2023 ​ Op-ed: The United Nations must reform to represent the interests of the Global South ​ by Klaus Kotzé Up Oct 18 , 2023 ​ Op- ed: Reimagining Global Governance: A Call for Equitable and Resilient Systems ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Oct 13 , 2023 ​ Op-ed: Why Building Global Resilience Is the Best Investment We Can Make Now ​ by Buyelwa Sonjica Up Oct 4 , 2023 ​ Op- ed: Re-modeling the BRICS New Development Bank ​ by William Gumede Up Sep 21 , 2023 ​ Op- ed: Growth drivers coming to the fore ​ by Roelof Botha & Daryl Swanepoel Up Sep 19 , 2023 ​ Op- ed: The Progressive Realisation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: Albie Sachs' Pioneering Role ​ by Nicola Jo Bergsteedt Up Aug 17 , 2023 ​ Op-ed: Ensuring Administrative Justice for a Truly Inclusive Society ​ by Inclusive Society Institute in collaboration with the Daily Maverick Up Jul 25 , 2023 ​ Op-ed: The Vital Role of Participatory Democracy in Building a Just and Inclusive Society ​ by Inclusive So ciety Institute in collaboration with the Daily Maverick Up Jul 12 , 2023 ​ Op -ed: The global development and security initiatives: Safeguarding our global village ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 12 , 2023 ​ Op -ed: Navigating China-Africa cooperation within a globally constrained environment ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 12 , 2023 ​ Op -ed: New global trade and investment thinking ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jul 3 , 2023 ​ Op -ed: Trust – the ‘glue’ that binds society together – is missing in SA ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 29 , 2023 ​ Op-ed: Gender inequality - Men’s involvement in care: Contemplating the glass escalator ​ by Nicole Daniels, Jodi Wishnia and Daryl Swanepoel Up May 22 , 2023 ​ Op-ed: The personal is political: our families are blueprints for society ​ by Jodi Wishnia and Daryl Swanepoel Up May 15 , 2023 ​ Op-ed: Understanding gender inequality in caregiving and families ​ by Nicole Daniels and Daryl Swanepoel Up May 9 , 2023 ​ Me d ia Release: Intent to emigrate decreases but remains a risk ​ Findings from the Inclusive Society Institute's GovDem Poll Up May 8 , 2023 ​ Op-ed: Beyond Colonialism: Türkiye's Unique Approach to Africa ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 2 , 2023 ​ Media Release: Mistrust in immigrants remains alarmingly high ​ Findings from the Inclusive Society Institute's GovDem Poll Up Apr 25 , 2023 ​ Med ia Release: An opposition coalition at the national level is highly unlikely ​ Findings from the Inclusive Society Institute's GovDem Poll Up Apr 17 , 2023 ​ Media Release: Comment on President Ramaphosa assents to the Electoral Amendment Bill ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 13, 2023 ​ Media Release: Writing off outstanding E-Tolls under the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 22, 2023 ​ O p-e d: A strong democracy comes with a price tag – and it’s worth every cent ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 22, 2023 ​ Op-e d: Social Cohesion: Getting Symbolism, Action and Rhetoric Right ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 8, 2023 ​ M edia Release : Inclusive Society Institute calls on President Ramaphosa to consider constitutionality of Electoral Amendment Bill ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 3, 2023 ​ Op-e d: Born free, but not fair: Solutions to tackle youth inequality and unemployment in South Africa - Considered solutions to closing the gap on youth inequality and unemployment ​ by Beth Vale and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 28, 2023 ​ Op-e d: Born free, but not fair: 5 ways we can support SA’s teens to stay in school w ithout interventions along their life cycle, kids could well become the “disaffected youth” as early inequality gets compounded from birth, through school, and beyond. ​ by Beth Vale and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 20, 2023 ​ Op-e d: Born free, but not fair: Setting the foundation for long-term learning and earning Interventions that support childhood development in the first 1,000 days of a child’s life have the potential to radically shift South Africa’s current inequality crisis. ​ by Michelle Flowers and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 16, 2023 ​ Op-e d: Multi-Member Constituency model trumps Single Seat Constituency model ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 14, 2023 ​ Op-ed: Born free, but not fair ​ by Nicole Daniels and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 8, 2023 ​ Op-ed: Coalitions must be built on trust and generosity ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 8, 2023 ​ Op-ed: Born free, but not fair: Understanding youth inequality Youth inequality accumulates over a life course, but there are critical moments where policy and programming can intervene to alleviate inequality and safeguard more just futures for young people ​ by Beth Vale and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 3, 2023 ​ Op-ed: Sustainable population and possible standards of living ​ by Anton Cartwright Up Feb 3, 2023 ​ Op-ed: Automatic voter registration: removing the thorn in the side of SA’s democracy ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 23, 2023 ​ Op-e d: African Philosophy and Social Justice: The inclusiveness and limitations of a continent’s political thought ​ by Mutshidz Maraganedzha Up Jan 20, 2023 ​ Op-e d: Rise civil society: A new year’s resolution ​ by Klaus Kotzé Up Jan 13, 2023 ​ Op-ed: End the Social Compact tug-of-war: Lessons from Denmark ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Nov 9 , 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Parliament persists in passing an unconstitutional Electoral Amendment bill ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Nov 2 , 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Democratising the United Nations ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 27 , 2022 ​ Op-Ed: A people-driven state is required for national renewal ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 24 , 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Contractionary fiscal consolidation versus expansionary stimulus implications for growth, employment and debt ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 16 , 2022 ​ Op-Ed: The world is on shaky ground, with South Africa no different ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 12 , 2022 ​ Op-Ed: UN Security Council Reform - A New Approach to Reconstructing the International Order ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Oct 06 , 2022 ​ Op-Ed: The need for an evidence-based response to addressing Xenophobia in SA. The importance of addressing the real drivers of Xenophobia and Xenophobic vilolence. ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Sep 15, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: SA must pull up its socks or tourism rebound may be short-lived ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Sep 08, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Challenges and solutions for local economic development in the City of Ekurhuleni ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Sep 05, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Climate change adaptation and resilience: An analysis of some Global and National Measures ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 29, 2022 ​ Media Release: Proposals to remedy current deficiencies in the proposed NHI bill ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 23, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Grease the gears so the economic wheels can turn ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jul 27, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: As long as we keep failing our youth, the cycle of inequality will remain unbroken ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jul 21, 2022 ​ Media Release: Trust deficit between civil society and SAPS is flaming lawlessness in South Africa ​ by Inclusive Society Institute Up Jul 05, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Challenges and opportunities to enhance social mobilisation to combat corruption ​ by Prof Evangelos Mantzaris Up Jun 28, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Towards a national commitment ​ by Dr Klaus Kotzé Up May 26, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Social Cohesion: Taking stock of South Africa’s socio-political strategy ​ by Dr Klaus Kotzé Up May 26, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Get the basics right to reboot growth ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up May 11, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: The preconditions for a South African welfare state ​ by Dr Klaus Kotzé Up Apr 11, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Leveraging ideas of hope to reduce inequality in South Africa ​ by Anja Smith, Jodi Wishnia, Carmen Christian and Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 11, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: The Russia-Ukraine conflict: Impact on South Africa, fellow BRICS members and Africa ​ by William Gumede Up Apr 07, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: The establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Agency for South Africa ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 06, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - a labour sector perspective ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 28, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Efficient logistics needed to keep agri-exports on the right track ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 14, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Back to basics to better economy - Getting fundamentals right will reverse economic woes ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 10, 2022 ​ Op-Ed: Crisis in Europe highlights critical importance of self-sufficient, secure and stable energy production ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 16, 2022 ​ Social Democracy: A pathway for South Africa's development ​ by Dr Klause Kotzé Up Feb 03, 2022 ​ WEF Global Risks Report 2022 suggests it cannot be business as usual ​ Up Feb 02, 2022 ​ Preventing corruption is the key ​ by Willie Hofmeyr Up Jan 31, 2022 ​ South Africa investing in the ICT sector is a no-brainer ​ by Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 28, 2022 ​ The effects of corruption ​ by Prof Pregala Solosh Pillay Up Jan 17, 2022 ​ Anti-corruption agencies need to be nurtured ​ by Prof Andrew Spalding Up Jan 13, 2022 ​ Different types of anti-corruption agencies ​ by Drago Kos Up Jan 12, 2022 ​ Construction sector: A friend in need is a friend indeed. Let the private sector help Up Dec 7, 2021 ​ Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - a retail sector perspective Up Dec 3, 2021 ​ Speech delivered by Vusi Khanyile, Chairperson of the Inclusive Society Institute, to the Integritasza Conference, Wellington, South Africa Up Nov 11, 2021 ​ ISI meets Deputy Minister of Finance - Present NHI and Inequality research outcomes Up Nov 8, 2021 ​ Op-Ed: Rejuvenating South Africa's economy - A SMME sector perspective Up Nov 8, 2021 ​ Op-Ed: South Africa needs an urgent national security and intelligence assessment Up Nov 2, 2021 ​ ANC support dips, but it is still best placed to win local government election Up Nov 2, 2021 ​ Op-Ed: SA's Jekyll and Hyde economy has investors second guessing Up Sep 16, 2021 ​ Op-Ed: Would you choose NHI as our universal health care scheme if you knew the costs twenty years from now? Up Sep 15, 2021 ​ Op-Ed: Local government challenges: How far have we come? Up Sep 8, 2021 ​ Op-Ed: South African courts: Are they guilty of judicial overreach or merely upholding the rule of law? Up Sep 6, 2021 ​ Op-Ed: Assessing crime intelligence in South Africa Up Aug 27, 2021 ​ Op-Ed: Rebuilding US-Africa relations under the Biden administration and its nexus with China Up Aug 26, 2021 ​ Achieving wellbeing equa lity for South Africans: a dream that shouldn’t be deferred ​ by the Inclusive Society Institute Up Aug 13, 2021 ​ Op-Ed: Reviving factories can fire up a much-needed growth engine Up Aug 11, 2021 ​ South Africa's developmental model: The significance of state-owned enterprises Up Jun 23, 2021 ​ Challenging climate change: The transition to a sustainable economy Up Jun 10, 2021 ​ No quick fixes for SA's woes but glimmer of hope on the horizon Up May 31, 2021 ​ Restoring faith in South Africa key to rejuvenating the economy Up May 5, 2021 ​ Survey suggests voter support for party system in SA Up Apr 8, 2021 ​ ISI presents electoral system proposals to IEC Up Mar 16, 2021 ​ COVID-19: Severe blow to long-term employment prospects Up Jan 28, 2021 ​ Speech by Daryl Swanepoel, CEO, Inclusive Society Institute, South Africa: International Conference on Poverty Alleviation: China's rationale, Beijing, China Up Jan 25, 2021 ​ Op-Ed: Slowing the population growth is vital for South Africa's economic recovery Up Dec 11, 2020 ​ Op-Ed: The US-China-Africa nexus under a Biden administration Up Dec 11, 2020 ​ Op-Ed: ISI Annual Lecture with Justice Albie Sachs ​ Prosperity through inclusivity Up Aug 13, 2020 ​ Op-Ed: South African and the 12th summit of BRICS Up Aug 12, 2020 ​ Op-Ed: Universal Health Coverage pathways for South Africa ​ Areas of misalignment between stakeholders on the NHI Bill require further engagement Up Aug 11, 2020 ​ Universal Health Coverage pathways for South Africa ​ Areas of misalignment between stakeholders on the NHI Bill require further engagement Up Aug 3, 2020 ​ Op-Ed: COVID-19 ​ US-China discord and its impact on Sino-South African relations Up Jul 21, 2020 ​ LGBT+ survey findings ​ Survey on everyday experience of the LGBT+ communicy finds inequality and discrimination still rife, and mental health potentially a crisis in the making Up Jul 14, 2020 ​ National health insurance Bill ​ Parliament's Portfolio Committee would be well-advised first to obtain legal clarity on constitutionality Up May 20, 2020 ​ COVID-19 ​ ANC members and supporters show overwhelming support for government measures and ANC leadership, but are concerned about the future of the economy Up Apr 17, 2020 ​ COVID-19 ​ Survey: COVID-19 and its impact on the SMME sector Up Up

Media Coverage - 2024 Apr 26, 2024 ​ Thirty and thriving - or barely surviving? ​ Mail & Guardian: Aarti Bhana Up Apr 25, 2024 ​ If voters compel us to work with the EFF we will, says IFP president ​ BuyPE Up Apr 25, 2024 ​ Trends suggest social cohesion is on downward slide ​ Mail & Guardian: Klaus Boehnke & Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 25, 2024 ​ E-tolls are gone. But who is on the hook now for over R60bn in historic debt? ​ News24: Na'ilah Ebrahim Up Apr 25, 2024 ​ E-tolls are gone but debts are not scrapped ​ Hot 102.7 FM Up Apr 23, 2024 ​ Debating the fate of historical e-toll debt: Should it vanish with e-tolls? ​ Primedia+: Amy Fraser Up Apr 23, 2024 ​ Both ballot papers are equally important ​ Cape Argus: Jørgen Elklit Up Apr 23, 2024 ​ Both national ballot papers equally important ​ The Star: Jørgen Elklit Up Apr 23, 2024 ​ Both national ballot papers equally important ​ Daily News: Jørgen Elklit Up Apr 23, 2024 ​ e-Tolls are gone but debts are not scrapped ​ 702 Up Apr 22, 2024 ​ Current Affairs: E-tolls are gone but debts are not scrapped ​ 702/Cape Talk: The Aubrey Masango Show Up Apr 22, 2024 ​ e-Tolls are gone but debts are not scrapped ​ 702/Cape Talk: The Aubrey Masango Show line up Up Apr 20, 2024 ​ Discussion | e-Tolls | 'Defaulters still have to pay' ​ eNCA: Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 20, 2024 ​ Call for government to seek legal opinion on e-Toll debt ​ eNCA: Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 20, 2024 ​ e-Toll: Defaulters still have to pay ​ eNCA: Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 17, 2024 ​ Critical lessons for SA from Singapore on managing social cohesion in diverse communities ​ Daily Maverick: Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 16, 2024 ​ La politica statale sull’istruzione superiore necessita di una valutazione urgente ​ IT ES Euro Up Apr 16, 2024 ​ La politique de l’État en matière d’enseignement supérieur doit être évaluée de toute urgence ​ News.dayFR Up Apr 16, 2024 ​ Intent to immigrate remains disturbingly high ​ Radio Al Ansaar Up Apr 16, 2024 ​ Higher education state policy needs urgent assessment ​ Mail & Guardian: Douglas Blackmur Up Apr 16, 2024 ​ To leave or not to leave | Intent to immigrate remains disturbingly high ​ Shafaqna: Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 16, 2024 ​ To leave or not to leave | Intent to immigrate remains disturbingly high ​ eNCA: Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 12, 2024 ​ Voter registration mechanism needs to change ​ IOL: Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 12, 2024 ​ Automatic registration will ensure voting rights ​ Daily News: Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 12, 2024 ​ Automatic registration will ensure voting rights ​ The Star: Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 12, 2024 ​ Automatic registration will ensure voting rights ​ Cape Argus: Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 12, 2024 ​ Fewer births may spur SA's growth ​ Mail & Guardian: Sarah Smit Up Apr 4, 2024 ​ Reporting about a series of polls all predicting big changes in our elections ​ SAfm: Daryl Swanepoel Up Apr 3, 2024 ​ Polls reporting misleading ​ The Citizen: Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 27, 2024 ​ Wanvoorstelling met peilings ’n ondiens aan demokrasie ​ Netwerk24: Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 27, 2024 ​ 'n Ondiens aan demokrasie ​ Volksblad: Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 27, 2024 ​ 'n Ondiens aan demokrasie ​ Die Burger: Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 27, 2024 ​ 'n Ondiens aan demokrasie ​ Beeld: Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 22, 2024 ​ Amend Poll Bill to be fairer, say civil groups ​ Graaff-Reinet Advertiser Up Mar 22, 2024 ​ Amend Poll Bill to be fairer, say civil groups ​ George Herald Up Mar 22, 2024 ​ Amend Poll Bill to be fairer, say civil groups ​ Mossel Bay Advertiser Up Mar 22, 2024 ​ Amend Poll Bill to be fairer, say civil groups ​ Oudtshoorn Courant Up Mar 22, 2024 ​ Amend Poll Bill to be fairer, say civil groups ​ South Cape Forum Up Mar 19, 2024 ​ UN Summit On The Future A Catalyst For Change ​ Cape Argus: Nicola Bergsteedt & Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 19, 2024 ​ UN Summit On The Future A Catalyst For Change ​ The Star: Nicola Bergsteedt & Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 19, 2024 ​ UN Summit On The Future A Catalyst For Change ​ Daily News: Nicola Bergsteedt & Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 12, 2024 ​ Mistrust of immigrants from Africa deepened ​ Channel Africa: Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 12, 2024 ​ Mistrust of immigrants from Africa deepened in recent times ​ SAfm: Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 4, 2024 ​ Die fundamentele hervorming van die Suid-Afrikaanse staat – motivering en strategie ​ LitNet: André Duvenhage Up Mar 4, 2024 ​ South Africa needs national security, but not at the expense of constitutional rights ​ Daily Maverick: Daryl Swanepoel Up Mar 2, 2024 ​ President won't call the shots in determining disclosure thresholds for political party donations ​ News24: Jan Gerber Up Mar 2, 2024 ​ 共同为中非合作贡献智慧 ​ 中国经济网首页: 杨海泉 Up Mar 1, 2024 ​ 非洲智库协商会议在开普敦举办 ​ 经济日报新闻客户端: 杨海泉 Up Mar 1, 2024 ​ ATC240301: Report of the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs on the Electoral Matters Amendment Bill [ B 42 - 2023](National Assembly – sec 75)] ​ Parliamentary Monitoring Group Up Mar 1, 2024 ​ Losing our dairy brains ​ The Dairy Mail: Fidelis Zvomuya Up Feb 29, 2024 ​ African think-tanks join hands to form unified voice on issues facing continent ​ IOL: Shakirah Thebus Up Feb 29, 2024 ​ African Think Tanks Join Hands In Network ​ Cape Argus: Shakirah Thebus Up Feb 27, 2024 ​ African Think Tanks Unite in Cape Town to Shape the Continent's Future ​ BNN Up Feb 27, 2024 ​ Inaugural think tank gathering to commence today ​ IOL: Shakirah Thebus Up Feb 27, 2024 ​ Inaugural Africa Thinktank Gathering To Begin In City Today ​ Cape Argus: Shakirah Thebus Up Feb 26, 2024 ​ Embracing Flexicurity - Labour Lessons From Denmark ​ Business Day: Nicola Bergsteedt Up Feb 22, 2024 ​ SA’s skilled youth flocking to these countries – Why? ​ The South African: Marzanne Janse van Rensburg Up Feb 19, 2024 ​ Young South African Professionals Eye Emigration Amid Job Dilemma ​ Rateweb Up Feb 19, 2024 ​ Emigrasiewaarskuwing: Suid-Afrika se jong professionele persone wil uit ​ Die Suid-Afrikaner: Lorne Philpot Up Feb 19, 2024 ​ Skilled professionals are leaving South Africa ​ SA People News: Lorne Philpot Up Feb 19, 2024 ​ Emigration Alert: South Africa’s young professionals want out ​ The South African: Lorne Philpot Up Feb 18, 2024 ​ Skilled youth in South Africa are flooding to these 5 countries – and here’s why ​ Business Tech Up Feb 15, 2024 ​ Motsoaledi de fends presidential power grab to set party donation limits in new bill ​ My Vote Counts Up Feb 14, 2024 ​ Electoral Matters A/B: further DHA response to public submissions & deliberations (with Mi nister) ​ Parliamentary Monitoring Group Up Feb 12, 2024 ​ Fix special economic zones for growth in South Africa ​ Banoyi: William Gumede Up Feb 12, 2024 ​ Fix special economic zones for growth in South Africa ​ Mail & Guardian: William Gumede Up Feb 10, 2024 ​ Motsoaledi defends presidential power grab to set party donation limits in new bill ​ News24: Jan Gerber Up Feb 9, 2024 ​ Growth drivers coming to the fore ​ Business Day: Roelof Botha and Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 9, 2024 ​ Fix special economic zones for growth ​ Mail & Guardian: William Gumede Up Feb 9, 2024 ​ Navigating complexities of coalition politics ​ Daily News : Nondumiso Sithole Up Feb 9, 2024 ​ Navigating complexities of coalition politics ​ The Star: Nondumiso Sithole Up Feb 9, 2024 ​ Navigating complexities of coalition politics ​ Cape Argus: Nondumiso Sithole Up Feb 8, 2024 ​ 2024 SONA ​ Chai FM Up Feb 8, 2024 ​ Electoral Matters Amendment Bill back in the spotlight ​ IOL: Mashudu Sadike Up Feb 8, 2024 ​ Is this Ramaphosa's final SONA? ​ News24: Jan Gerber and Jason Felix Up Feb 7, 2024 ​ Survey shows top political parties support not affected by newcomers ​ Pretoria FM Up Feb 7, 2024 ​ 'Verwerp Wetswysigings Oor Finansiering' ​ Volksblad: Christiaan du Plessis Up Feb 7, 2024 ​ 'Verwerp Wetswysigings Oor Finansiering' ​ Die Burger: Christiaan du Plessis Up Feb 7, 2024 ​ 'Verwerp Wetswysigings Oor Finansiering' ​ Beeld: Christiaan du Plessis Up Feb 7, 2024 ​ Uproar Over Proposed Powers To Manage Donation Disclosure ​ Business Day (Late Final): Linda Ensor Up Feb 7, 2024 ​ Skilled people want to leave South Africa ​ Daily Investor Up Feb 7, 2024 ​ Wetswysigings oor finansiering van partye ‘moet verwerp word’ ​ Netwerk 24: Christiaan du Plessis Up Feb 7, 2024 ​ G’n immuniteit vir Trump, en SA het nou 27,4 miljoen kiesers ​ Vrye Weekblad: Willem Kempen Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ Electoral Matters A/B: joint public hearings; Marriage Bill: update; Constitutional Court Order on the Wyngaard matter ​ Parliamentary Monitoring Group Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ South Africa's Political Landscape: Limited Impact from New Parties, Survey Indicates ​ The Custom Reports Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ New Ipsos poll: ANC plummets to 40%, EFF challenging DA to be the official opposition ​ News24: Siyamtanda Capa Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ Civil society critical of president getting powers to determine party funding thresholds ​ News24: Jan Gerber Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ Coalition building is no easy task, South Africa should look carefully at success stories like Finland ​ Daily Maverick: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ Intent to emigrate remains disturbingly high ​ CapeTalk: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ Proposed powers to manage disclosure of donations spark outrage in parliament ​ Business Day: Linda Ensor Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ Nuwe navorsing wys dat die ANC opdraende gaan kry in die komende verkiesings ​ RSG: Mari Harris Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ Survey shows top political parties support not affected by newcomers ​ Ekurhuleni FM Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ Nuwe partye sal nie top ses beïnvloed ​ Die Vryburger Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ New political parties will have little impact on votes ​ Kingfisher FM Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ Bulk of vote shared by ANC DA EFF IFP Action SA ​ Wild Coast FM Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ ANC to lose support, top 6 parties dominate, smaller ones get 4% of vote - survey finds ​ Chai FM Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ ANC to lose support, top 6 parties dominate, smaller ones get 4% of vote - survey finds ​ Ground News Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ E lectoral Matters Amendment Bill ​ Umhlobo Wenene FM: Prof Zweli Ndevu Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ “Nuwe partye sal nie top ses se steun beïnvloed nie” ​ Pretoria FM Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ “Nuwe partye sal nie top ses se steun beïnvloed nie” ​ Pretoria FM - Audio Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ ANC to lose support, top 6 parties dominate, smaller ones get 4% of vote - survey finds ​ news24: Siyamtanda Capa Up Feb 6, 2024 ​ ANC to lose support, top 6 parties dominate, smaller ones get 4% of vote - survey finds ​ Newstral Up Feb 5, 2024 ​ Surge in SA professionals app lying to move abroad ​ Radio Tygerberg: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 5, 2024 ​ Political Analysis: Intent to emigrate remains disturbingly high ​ 702 FM: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 5, 2024 ​ Political Analysis: Intent to emigrate remains disturbingly high ​ 702 FM: Daryl Swanepoel Up Feb 5, 2024 ​ South Africa's Political Landscape: Limited Impact from New Parties, Survey Indicates ​ BNN: Israel Ojoko Up Feb 5, 2024 ​ Concern over rise in youth emigration ​ e.TV Up Feb 4, 2024 ​ Concern over rise in youth emigration ​ eNCA Up Feb 4, 2024 ​ Surge in Sa professionals applying to move abroad ​ eNCA Up Feb 4, 2024 ​ New poll confirms ANC slide – desperate South Africans want new options ​ Daily Maverick: Ferial Haffajee Up Feb 2, 2024 ​ Civil groups: Amend poll Bill to be fairer ​ News365: Omie Chester Up Feb 2, 2024 ​ Amend poll Bill to be fairer, say civil groups ​ South Cape Forum: Brian Sokutu Up Feb 2, 2024 ​ Amend poll Bill to be fairer, say civil groups ​ George Herald: Brian Sokutu Up Feb 2, 2024 ​ Amend poll Bill to be fairer, say civil groups ​ Mossel Bay Advertiser: Brian Sokutu Up Feb 2, 2024 ​ Amend poll Bill to be fairer, say civil groups ​ Graaff-Reinet Advertiser: Bri an Sokutu Up Feb 2, 2024 ​ Amend poll Bill to be fairer, say civil groups ​ Knysna-Plett Herald: Brian Sokutu Up Feb 2, 2024 ​ Amend poll Bill to be fairer, say civil groups ​ Oudtshoorn Courant: Brian Sokutu Up Feb 2, 2024 ​ Amend poll Bill to be fairer, say civil groups ​ The Citizen: Brian Sokutu Up Jan 31, 2024 ​ ANC sal beywer vir ‘n meerderheid ​ Kosmos Nuus Up Jan 25, 2024 ​ Experts say that Electoral Matters Amendment Bill is flawed and aim to influence necessary changes ​ SAfm: Daryl Swanepoel Up Jan 23, 2024 ​ Election date tightrope ​ The Citizen Up Jan 23, 2024 ​ Human cost of war and its global impact ​ Cape Argus: Buyelwa Sonjica Up Jan 23, 2024 ​ Human cost of war and its global impact must be ended ​ Daily News: Buyelwa Sonjica Up Jan 23, 2024 ​ Human cost of war and its global impact must be ended ​ The Star: Buyelwa Sonjica Up Jan 7, 2024 ​ ANC aiming for outright majority win in this year’s polls: Makhura ​ The Voice of the Cape Up Jan 7, 2024 ​ ANC aiming for outright majority win in this year’s polls: Makhura ​ SABC News Up Up