11/2026: The power of the electorate will count this time around: Evaluating governance, coalition politics, and civic agency in South African municipalities

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Title: The power of the electorate will count this time around: Evaluating governance, coalition politics, and civic agency in South African municipalities

Author(s): Nondumiso Alice Sithole & Noleen Sukhessan-Dawson

Publication type: Occasional Paper

Publication date: October 2026

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Sithole, N.A. & Sukhessan-Dawson, N. 2026. The power of the electorate will count this time around: Evaluating governance, coalition politics, and civic agency in South African municipalities. Cape Town: Inclusive Society Institute.

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Abstract

The South African local government sphere stands at a critical juncture as the nation approaches the 2026 municipal elections. Since the 2021 general elections, the proliferation of "hung councils" has fundamentally altered the political landscape, shifting the country toward a permanent era of coalition governance.

While proponents argue that coalitions necessitate consensus-building and ideological diversity, evidence suggests that the absence of a robust, institutionalised framework for coalition governance has led to administrative paralysis, budget contestation, and a decline in institutional integrity. The analysis highlights that the "nexus" between civil society and local government has weakened, largely due to a lack of transparency in coalition negotiations and the failure of municipalities to uphold fiduciary duties.

In multiparty and coalition governance systems, the blurring of lines of responsibility often diminishes the "clarity of responsibility", complicating the electorate's ability to assign praise or blame for government performance. Under Section 157(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution), municipal council members are elected through proportional representation based on party candidate lists. However, the proliferation of hung councils has frequently subverted this direct democratic link. Behind-the-scenes coalition negotiations, exemplified by appointments of minor parties holding negligible vote shares to powerful executive positions in metros like Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni, often marginalise the electorate's will and incite public outrage (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Pholoma 2024).

This paper employs a document analysis methodology to critically evaluate governance, coalition politics, and civic agency in South African local governments. By synthesising legislative prescripts, the Auditor-General of South Africa's performance reports, and policy frameworks regarding municipal institutional capability, this research interrogates the stability and efficacy of current coalition arrangements. This critically explains the evolution of the tripartite relationship between civil society, government, and local communities during this transition.

The findings of the study, as they relate to the Auditor-General’s findings, consistently point to systemic failures in financial management, performance reporting, and legislative compliance and the electorate's role in the democratic accountability loop. By contrasting the promise of local democratic participation with the realities of poor service delivery and administrative instability, these findings challenge the assumption that the electorate possesses the necessary information to exercise their vote effectively.

Therefore, the study concludes that the 2026 elections represent a pivotal moment where the electorate must transition from passive observers to active stakeholders, utilising their vote as an instrument of consequence management and a means to enforce change. Furthermore, the findings underscore the urgency for a recalibration of the relationship between the state and its citizens to ensure that the power of the electorate is not merely exercised but effectively translated into accountable and developmental local governance.

Keywords: Local Government, Coalition Politics, South African Municipalities, Auditor-General, Electoral Participation, Civic Accountability.

Abbreviations

1 Introduction

The South African local government stands at a critical juncture as the country approaches the 2026 municipal elections. Since the watershed Local Government Elections (LGE) of 01 November 2021, South Africa has entered an unprecedented period of political fragmentation. Municipal governance has shifted from a landscape historically dominated by a single ruling party to one increasingly defined by widespread hung councils. The conclusion of the current five-year municipal mandate in late 2026, ahead of elections scheduled for 04 November 2026, will test the country’s democratic maturity and institutional stability (De Vos, 2021; Ndou, 2022; Rulashe et al., 2025).

The shift from single-party dominance to multiparty coalition arrangements was at first hailed as a sign of the maturation of South Africa’s democratic landscape. It pledged more oversight, ideological diversity, and an end to unilateral executive power. But in practice, the results have often been marked by administrative paralysis, incoherence of policy, and consistent failures of service delivery (Isabirye & Mkhabela, 2026; Ndou, 2022).

The key challenge for the sector is that while the legal framework, grounded in the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act (Act No. 32 of 2000) as amended and the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act (Act No. 56 of 2003) as amended, demands high standards of fiduciary duty, ethical conduct, and credible performance reporting, the reality in many South African municipalities is systemic instability (Municipal Systems Act [Act No. 32 of 2000] as amended; Municipal Finance Management Act [Act No. 56 of 2003] as amended).

The recent audit results from the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) for the 2024-2025 cycle reflect ongoing challenges within municipal administration. While there has been improvement in the timely submission of financial statements, institutional capacity to produce reliable and informative performance reports remains inadequate. The AGSA noted that only 15% of municipalities received clean audits, and recurring declines in financial and performance reporting suggest systemic issues with institutional integrity that extend beyond political considerations (AGSA Online, 2026a).

The "triangle" of accountability, consisting of civil society organisations, the state, and the community, is currently fractured. Coalition governments, often formed out of necessity rather than shared ideological conviction, have frequently devolved into sites of intense political contestation. This leads to instability, which permeates the administrative layer where frequent changes in leadership and the politicisation of budget processes have undermined service delivery and long-term infrastructure planning. Additionally, the reported poor performance by the AGSA further indicates that the administrative foundation of South African local governments lacks a standardised framework for coalition management. Therefore, the nexus between the government and the governed loses its concrete basis (Ndou, 2022; Schwarz, 2014; Tladi et al., 2026). 

This paper interrogates whether the South African electorate is positioned to break this cycle of dysfunction. As the 2026 LGE approaches, the critical question is not merely which political party gains the most seats, but whether the electorate can effectively exercise their right to vote as an instrument of consequence management. In addition to the above, the paper considers what has transpired since the LGE in 2021 by analysing legislative requirements alongside the information provided by the AGSA. This paper argues that the power of the electorate must transition from a passive ritual to an active mechanism of accountability. Prior to entering the voting booth, citizens must be thoroughly educated on municipal audit outcomes, voting records, and political oversight of departments in their respective municipalities to evaluate political parties based on objective performance rather than blind loyalty. By strategically withholding support from non-performing political parties, an informed electorate can transform the ballot into a powerful instrument of democratic consequence management.

The upcoming elections represent a defining moment where the informed vote is not only a democratic right but a necessary intervention to recalibrate the state’s commitment to its residents, ensuring that municipal leadership is held to the highest standards of ethics, competence, and service (AGSA Online, 2026a; Bågenholm (ed.) et al., 2021; Tladi et al., 2026).

2 The Theoretical Framework: The Tripartite Nexus

The consistent reduction of voter turnout over the last decade due to unresolved economic inequalities, corruption, and poor service delivery has contributed to the erosion of a single-party majority within South African local governments. This phenomenon has normalised the proliferation of coalition governments. Notably, South Africa's transition to coalition politics has occurred without a legislative framework, in contrast to established democracies where coalitions are governed by formal and principled agreements (Beukes, 2025; Mchunu, 2025; Ndou, 2022).

Legislative interventions such as the Draft Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill of 2024 (MSAA Bill of 2024), which is currently under review and may potentially be enacted by November 2026, have been introduced to promote institutional stability. These initiatives aim to establish mandatory written agreements for coalition arrangements, implement robust dispute resolution mechanisms, and set threshold requirements to address systemic vulnerabilities that currently exist (Municipal Structures Amendment Bill of 2024; PMG Online, 2024). 

In light of the above background of shifting voting patterns and the rise of coalition politics, assessing local governments’ structural health is crucial, especially considering the state-citizen interactions.

2.1 The Triangle: Civil Society, The State, and The Community

The tripartite nexus consists of three mutually dependent and mutually constituting actors, namely, (1) Civil Society, (2) The State (represented by the municipal councils in local governments, i.e. municipalities, administrations, and political leadership), and (3) The Community (the localised populace receiving or denied access to municipal services within these local governments) (Nzo, 2021).

This triangle acts as a feedback loop that enhances accountability. The State derives its mandate and legitimacy from the Community through periodic elections. It is the responsibility of the State to provide these basic services and to promote local economic development through the use of legislative prescriptions and public resources. This means that the elected political parties establish the municipal councils, and the controlling political parties drive the strategic agenda to ensure service delivery is provided to the residents of the respective local governments. Civil Society – in the form of non-governmental organisations, civic associations, ratepayers’ organisations, and community-based movements – is an important intermediary bridge. It tracks state performance, aggregates community grievances, and demands accountability (Nzo, 2021; Polsci Institute Online, 2025; Rulashe et al., 2025).

The structural integrity and functional consistency of this tripartite nexus is deeply anchored in two foundational public administration and sociological frameworks: social cohesion theory and the efficiency of services theory.

2.2 Social Cohesion Theory and the Tripartite Nexus

Social cohesion theory asserts that the sustainability of societies relies on shared values, institutional trust, and active social solidarity. This theory emphasises both horizontal connections among community members and vertical relationships between the governed and the governing. State legitimacy is maintained not only through periodic elections but also through continuous civic inclusion. Civil society serves as the primary institutional mechanism that converts communal solidarity into constructive dialogue with the state. When political volatility and administrative instability undermine this trust, social cohesion deteriorates, transforming the vertical relationship into a realm of alienation (Dragolov & Boehnke, 2024).

2.3 Efficiency of Services Theory and the Tripartite Nexus

The theory of efficiency of services, which complements the social cohesion theory, provides the material basis for the tripartite nexus by positing that the primary mandate of local government is the optimal mobilisation of resources to ensure equitable basic service delivery. This theory directly links the political legitimacy of the state to its administrative performance, with the community acting as evaluators, civil society serving as performance monitors, and the state functioning as the accountable provider. While functional efficiency fosters a virtuous cycle of civic compliance and collaborative planning, failures in structural service delivery disrupt this feedback loop. As a result, deficits in institutional capability undermine the social contract, compelling communities and civil society to adopt adversarial positions against an incapacitated state (Ndou, 2022).

The institutionalisation of fragmented politics within South African local governments has transformed the interface between these three entities from a collaborative developmental partnership to an environment characterised by significant contestation, alienation, and reciprocal distrust. Civil society organisations are frequently excluded from coalition negotiations that lack transparency, while communities who are discontented with persistent shortcomings in service delivery are increasingly perceiving local government not as a developmental collaborator, but rather as an adversarial institution primarily focused on maintaining the interests of its leadership (Gumede, 2018).

2.4 The Concept of Accountability: The Missing Link of Consequence

Management

At the core of the South African local governance crisis is a severe institutional accountability deficit, which is a direct consequence of the historical and current lack of systematic consequence management within local government administrations. Accountability in local government is multi-dimensional. There is political, financial, and administrative accountability. The MFMA as amended and the MSA (Act No. 32 of 2000) as amended are legally clear on the fiduciary duties of local government leadership and officials to act in the best interest of the state and safeguard public resources (Beukes, 2025; Mchunu, 2025; Municipal Finance Management Act [Act No. 56 of 2003] as amended; Municipal Systems Act [Act No. 32 of 2000] as amended).

Despite the existence of comprehensive statutory provisions, the practical situation reveals a prevailing culture of impunity. South African local governments lack effective consequence management in the administration of public funds, which should consistently and lawfully involve imposing penalties for financial misconduct, administrative failures, and poor performance. When political appointees or administrative officials violate statutory regulations, mismanage public funds, or fail to meet performance objectives, disciplinary measures are often delayed due to political patronage, extended litigation, or changes in coalition power dynamics. In coalition governments, where the vote of a single political party can determine an executive majority, accountability is frequently sacrificed for political survival. This systemic protection of underperformance directly compromises the integrity of the State and diminishes public trust (AGSA Online, 2026a; Isabirye & Mkhabela, 2026).

2.5 Coalition Politics in Theory Versus the South African "Hung

Council" Experience

Coalition governments are founded on shared ideological values, advanced political cultures, and entrenched institutional norms. Within these jurisdictions, coalition agreements function as formal public policy contracts that commit parties to predetermined legislative agendas, thereby ensuring administrative continuity and the neutrality of the civil service, irrespective of changes in political majorities (De Vos, 2021).

In contrast, the South African experience with coalition governance, especially following the significant "hung council" results of the LGE in November 2021, has deviated markedly from international theoretical standards. Instead of being formed based on principled ideological alignment or developmental agendas, South African local government coalitions have predominantly emerged as tactical, numerical alliances focused on elite accommodation and the narrow survival of political parties (De Vos, 2021).

The transactional model of coalition politics has resulted in several distinct structural pathologies within local government. First, administrative instability is characterised by frequent turnover among Mayoral Executive Committees, Municipal Managers, and Chief Financial Officers, disrupting long-term institutional planning and the execution of capital projects. Second, the politicisation of the bureaucracy occurs when coalition partners allocate municipal departments as political rewards, thereby undermining the professionalisation of the public service and marginalising merit-based appointments. Third, policy paralysis arises in councils with shifting majorities, where excessive time is devoted to internal political conflicts, motions of no confidence, and budget disputes, leading to the neglect of basic service delivery infrastructure (De Vos, 2021; Mamokhere et al., 2026).

As a result, while the concept of coalitions suggests that multiparty governance can enhance inclusivity and consensus, the occurrence of "hung councils" in local governments in South Africa has, thus far, contributed to institutional deterioration. This circumstance has highlighted the vulnerability of local government administrative frameworks to fluctuating political configurations.

In this theoretical framework of a fragmented tripartite relationship, insufficient consequence management within the administration, the lack of enforcement thereof, and unstable coalition dynamics, this document analysis evaluates the institutional capacity of South African local governments as it relates to voter response in the upcoming local government elections to be held in November 2026.

3 Legislative Prescripts and the Anatomy of

Governance

3.1 The Legal Architecture

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Constitution), defines the powers and functions of municipalities but does not explicitly address their rights and duties. Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution outline the scope of local government's authority. According to Section 152 of the Constitution, local governments must sustainably provide communities with fundamental services and a democratic and accountable form of local government. Local Governments undertake several essential functions that significantly affect the daily lives of South African residents, with service delivery governed by the Constitution as well as national and provincial legislation (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Maserumule, 2024).

The Local Government Transition Act No. 209 of 1993 (LGTA) established the post-apartheid local government framework, but it was not intended to serve as the definitive model for local government. Rather, the LGTA functioned as an interim mechanism to facilitate the process of democratising and introducing racial inclusivity within local governance structures. South Africa’s government functions according to its Constitution, which establishes a separation of powers, includes a Bill of Rights, and supports a multiparty system (Maserumule, 2024; The Local Government Transition Act No. 209, 1993).

The MFMA, as amended, is a core piece of legislation that serves as a fundamental component of South Africa's local government framework following the former era of apartheid. The MFMA provides the main legislative framework for municipal financial sustainability, transparency, and accountability. It oversees all aspects of budgeting, supply chain, and asset or liability management in municipalities. It provides for regulating and overseeing municipalities’ financial operations to lessen some of these difficulties. It sets out important budgeting principles, including the requirement that municipalities may only use funds included in the approved budgets outlined in Section 15 (Maserumule, 2024; Municipal Finance Management Act [Act No. 56 of 2003], as amended).

The MFMA, in theory, is meant to hold municipal officials strictly accountable for irregular, unauthorised, or fruitless and wasteful expenditure. It mandates rigorous monthly and annual reporting to provincial and national treasuries. The failure to comply with the MFMA can result in disciplinary action. Section 32 is aimed at holding officials liable for unauthorised, irregular, or wasteful expenditure and Section 133 states that municipal officials may be disciplined or removed for financial mismanagement. There are additional pieces of legislation that are there to complement and entrench provisions of the MFMA, namely the Municipal Budget and Reporting Regulations, 2009. This legislation establishes standard budget formats and financial reporting (Maserumule, 2024; Municipal Finance Management Act [Act No. 56 of 2003], as amended).

The 2014 Municipal Standard Chart of Accounts in South Africa (mSCOA) Regulations mandate a uniform accounting system for municipalities whilst the Public Finance Management Act (No. 1 of 1999) (PFMA) guides financial practices nationally and provincially. This piece of legislation was developed to enforce public consultation regarding budgeting in the local sphere of government. In accordance with the findings of the AGSA, the implementation and enforcement of these acts is not occurring in most municipalities in South Africa, and this is driven mainly by corruption and poor managerial oversight (AGSA Online 2026a; Maserumule 2024; Kakaza 2006; Municipal Standard Chart of Accounts in South Africa; (Public Finance Management Act No. 1 , 1999) 

The Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000 (MSA of 2000) emphasises community involvement in local government, recognising it as essential for effective interaction between the government and citizens. This participation is closely linked to performance management, service delivery, and planning. The Act details the principles, processes, and tools necessary to promote the social and economic development of local communities, aiming for progressive local governance. Section 21 specifically highlights the need to develop values that support mechanisms and procedures for community participation, including public notification of council meetings and clear communication channels between the council and the community (Maserumule 2024; Municipal Systems Act (Act No. 32 of 2000) as amended).

The two aforementioned pieces of legislation, along with other key legislation such as the Municipal Structures Act No. 117 of 1998 as amended (MSA of 1998), as well as others, construct a cohesive legal framework. The MSA of 1998 prescribes both the obligations and organisational structures required of municipalities, while the MFMA provides the necessary financial governance and controls to ensure legality and sustainability. Although South Africa's local government legal system is widely recognised as progressive, its efficacy is hindered chiefly by limited political will, difficulties in legislative implementation, administrative intervention by political figures, and widespread corruption, rather than shortcomings inherent in the legislative provisions themselves (Municipal Structures Act (Act No. 117 of 1998; Maserumule 2024; Kakaza 2006).

3.2 The 2026 Electoral Mandate

There is an acknowledgement that South Africa’s electoral system requires an overhaul. It is conceded that the proportional representation system was a requisite for the country’s transition from the old regime to democracy, ensuring inclusivity and broad representation during a fragile political transition (Mongale & Nkwatle, 2025).

One of the major issues with coalition governments at the local level is that multiple political parties often have to unite their seats to form a majority in the council. This sometimes leads to coalitions made up of ten or more parties, many of which may only hold a single council seat. In certain cases, these parties gain seats without meeting the full seat quota by taking advantage of the next-highest-remainder rule. This system allows opposition parties to convince smaller parties to leave coalitions in exchange for positions or other political rewards. As a result, parties with minimal municipal support can act as “kingmakers”, giving them the ability to disrupt entire governments and negatively affect service delivery for the communities that elected them (Mpho, 2024).

The draft MSA Bill, commonly known as the Coalition Bill, seeks to stabilise local governments operating under coalition arrangements. It aims to create a standardised framework for municipal coalitions by making coalition agreements legally binding and moving coalition-led municipalities from a mayoral executive system to a collective executive model. This shift is intended to promote proportional representation among all council parties, and support shared governance where no single party holds a majority. The Bill had proposed a 1% threshold for party representation in municipal councils. This threatened significant constitutional questions, particularly in relation to political rights, proportional representation, rationality, and equality. The draft Bill sought to limit the circumstances in which Mayors and Speakers may be removed through motions of no confidence (PMG, 2024; Quinot, 2024).

The clause of the 1% threshold was seemingly not going to pass the constitutional muster. The limitation on representation is a violation of section 19 of the Constitution, which guarantees political rights. According to Quinot (2024), the proposed 1% would not pass the general rationality test for all legislative enactments due to the arbitrariness of the exact figure of 1%. There is no legitimate explanation regarding why there must specifically be a 1% threshold. The threshold conflicts with section 157 of the Constitution, which requires local council representatives to be elected through proportional representation. By excluding parties that receive less than 1% of the valid votes, voters who supported those parties lose representation, and as a result, the election's outcome cannot truly be considered proportional for that municipality (Quinot, 2024).

It is suggested that perhaps a minimum number of votes or council seats required to formally introduce a motion of no confidence should be formally introduced. This is to prevent the weaponisation of frivolous or frequent motions. The paper recommends a statutory initiation threshold requiring at least [e.g., 20% or 25%] of sitting councillors to formal votes before a motion of no confidence can be tabled.

Further to the above, the passing threshold (the voting requirement) is the percentage of votes required to carry the motion and remove an official. Passing a motion of no confidence against an Executive Mayor or Speaker should require [e.g., a strict majority of 50% + 1, or a two-thirds special majority] of all council seats, rather than a simple majority of the members present on the day of the vote.

The Bill, which is not yet in force, has been revised and approved by Cabinet and is currently with Parliament. It aims to address several key issues: requiring public disclosure of coalition agreements to enhance transparency and accountability; introducing a structured framework with dispute resolution mechanisms to formalise coalitions and help resolve conflicts; imposing limits on no confidence motions by restricting how often and under what circumstances they can occur, in order to promote stability; and extending the post-election negotiation period beyond the current fourteen (14) days, so that more comprehensive coalition agreements can be reached and greater stability ensured (PMG, 2024).

3.3 Document Analysis of Performance Mandates

A significant gap exists between statutory fiduciary requirements and the actual performance of local governments, mainly due to persistent failures in political-administrative cooperation, insufficient accountability, and a lack of consequence management. Oversight reports from bodies like the AGSA and National Treasury point to a deep-rooted governance crisis. Non-governmental organisations, business forums, and resident associations are increasingly taking failing local governments to court across South Africa to compel basic service delivery, correct administrative paralysis, and force provincial and national interventions under Section 139 of the Constitution. There is high non-compliance with legislation, and the requirements of sound financial management, supply chain management, cost controls, and standard project management are deeply rooted in local governments across South Africa (AGSA Online, 2025, 2026a; Manko et al., 2024).

3.4 The rise of judicial oversight in Local Government

In the recent Afriforum NPC v Ngwathe Local Municipality and 14 Others (2264/2024) [2025] ZAFSHC 184; 2025 (6) SA 566 (FB) (20 June 2025), a case wherein a non-profit organisation and a community group filed a lawsuit over ongoing problems with service delivery in the Ngwathe Municipality, the proceedings highlighted serious municipal dysfunction, including water and sewage issues, financial instability, and frequent changes in management (Afriforum NPC v Ngwathe Local Municipality and 14 Others, 2025; Deneys, 2025).

Rather than merely requesting the court to acknowledge the crisis, the applicant sought to have the court actively monitor the situation to ensure effective actions would be implemented to address the service delivery concerns. The application requested a declarator, stating that the municipality had violated its constitutional, legislative, and regulatory duties to its residents. The argument presented was that adequate jurisdictional facts supported the necessity of provincial intervention in the Municipality's affairs. It further asserted that the provincial respondents failed to discharge their duties to intervene appropriately and address the issues facing the Municipality in question (Afriforum NPC v Ngwathe Local Municipality and 14 Others, 2025).

The court decided that the Municipality's failures warranted intervention by the province due to the concerns raised regarding service delivery, unstable management, and a financial emergency as the Municipality was placed under administration. The court concluded it should monitor the case as a “watchdog” due to previous uncooperative and slow responses from the provincial authorities. The court also granted the structural interdict directing the provincial government to implement certain intervention measures.

In Mbambisa and Others v Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality [2024] ZASCA 151, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) wherein the case was related to the liability of municipal officials employed by the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality (Municipality) under section 32 of the MFMA. The officials had all contributed to the appointment of a service provider in breach of the applicable legislation and in contravention of the Municipality’s supply chain management policy. As a result, the Municipality irregularly paid an amount of R 7,638,177.10 to an unlawfully appointed service provider. The SCA held that the term “liable” in section 32 must be interpreted to include monetary liability and not just accountability in the broad sense. With respect to liability, it also held that liability arises as soon as an official intentionally or negligently incurred the unsecured expenditure (Mbambisa and Others v Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality [2024] ZASCA 151, 2024).

Furthermore, the court clarified that while municipal officials are afforded protection against liability to third parties for losses or damages arising from the bona fide exercise of their powers or functions under section 175 of the MFMA, this safeguard does not preclude the Municipality from seeking recovery of losses or damages caused by intentional or negligent actions of municipal officials pursuant to section 32 of the MFMA. The Supreme Court of Appeal determined that section 32 operates as an independent provision, establishing statutory liability for municipal officials and political office bearers in cases of unauthorised expenditure (Manko et al., 2024; Mbambisa and Others v Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality [2024] ZASCA 151, 2024; Municipal Finance Management Act [Act No. 56 of 2003], as amended).

The above cases demonstrate that there is a persistent disjuncture between what is legally prescribed in respect of the mandate of local municipalities and what is entrusted to both political leaders as well as administrators, and what is actually occurring. The court’s willingness to issue a structural interdict signals an evolving judicial appetite to play an active role in ensuring that constitutional obligations are fulfilled, especially where oversight has failed. These examples show how failing coalition governments have led civic organisations such as AfriForum to take municipalities to court.

4 Evaluating Institutional Capability: The Auditor-

General’s Lens

To accurately assess the condition of South African local government, it is essential to transcend political rhetoric and scrutinise empirical administrative data. The statutory mandate of the AGSA, as executed under the South African Constitution, the Public Audit Act of 2004 and the MFMA, offers a critical analytical framework (AGSA Online, 2026a).

Through its annual audits, the AGSA systematically assesses the operational frameworks of municipalities to determine whether their institutional structures support lawful, transparent, and developmental governance. The AGSA's reports consistently highlight a direct correlation between municipal performance and institutional capacity. In assessing the state of local governance nationwide, particularly during the challenging administration leading up to the 2026 electoral cycle, the AGSA examines municipal performance across three primary audit facets: financial statements, reporting on predetermined objectives, and compliance with key legislative requirements (AGSA Online, 2026a, 2026b; Isabirye & Mkhabela, 2026).

4.1 The Three Facets of Audit:

4.1.1 Financial Statements

The initial facet evaluates the credibility, accuracy, and reliability of a municipality's financial records. Financial statements are intended to offer a transparent account of the utilisation of public funds, rates, and conditional grants, detailing assets, liabilities, revenue streams, and instances of unauthorised, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure (AGSA Online, 2026a).

Historically, as corroborated by successive consolidated audit reports, most municipalities encounter difficulties in producing financial statements devoid of material misstatements upon initial submission. While there has been some improvement in the timeliness of report submissions, concerns remain regarding the reliability of underlying data. When financial statements receive qualified, adverse, or disclaimed audit opinions, it signifies that the municipality lacks the fundamental internal controls and accounting disciplines necessary to monitor public funds. As a result, oversight structures, provincial treasuries, and communities are left without the ability to verify whether public money has been allocated for service delivery or lost to inefficiency and leakage (AGSA Online, 2026a; Isabirye & Mkhabela, 2026).

4.1.2 Reporting on Predetermined Objectives

The second facet assesses the reporting on predetermined objectives, examining whether the reported service delivery aligns with the municipality's original plans as outlined in its Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) (AGSA Online, 2026a).

An analysis of the AGSA findings reveals persistent systemic deficiencies in this domain. Municipalities consistently encounter difficulties in producing credible, reliable, and verifiable performance information. Reported achievements are often unsubstantiated by documentation or fail to accurately represent actual service delivery conditions. This lack of reliability undermines the value of performance reports, leaving oversight entities, civil society, and communities without the empirical evidence necessary to evaluate municipal progress  (AGSA Online, 2026a).

As a result, when the state fails to transparently report on its predetermined objectives, the accountability mechanism is compromised, preventing citizens from holding political and administrative leaders accountable for unmet developmental mandates. According to Isabirye and Mkhabela (2026), there have been several protests, frequently violent, related to water, sanitation, housing and electricity, demonstrating the public’s deep frustration with these persistent problems and these findings are closely tied to entrenched corruption, financial mismanagement, and governance shortcomings in the municipal councils. 

4.1.3 Compliance with Legislation (Integrity)

The third facet evaluates compliance with the comprehensive legislative framework that governs local government, encompassing the MFMA and the MSA of 2000. Compliance audits assess the institutional integrity of a municipality, focusing on whether leadership and officials consistently exhibit ethical behaviour, implement transparent supply chain management processes, and act in the municipality's best interest (Municipal Finance Management Act [Act No. 56 of 2003] as amended; Municipal Systems Act [Act No. 32 of 2000] as amended).

The AGSA's findings from these audits reveal a widespread disregard for legislative mandates. Procurement irregularities, uncompetitive or unfair tender processes, and pervasive failures in contract management are frequently treated as administrative oversights rather than serious legal violations. The persistent occurrence of material irregularities, where financial loss, substantial harm, or suspected fraud arises from non-compliance, underscores a significant deficit in institutional integrity. Laws intended to safeguard public resources are consistently compromised by administrative shortcuts and political interference (AGSA Online, 2026a, 2026b; Isabirye & Mkhabela, 2026).

4.2 Systemic Failure

An essential analytical insight derived from this document analysis is that systemic institutional failure transcends party-political affiliations. Popular political discourse frequently seeks to attribute municipal collapse to the ideological stance or administrative incompetence of particular political parties. Nevertheless, the longitudinal data from the AGSA indicates that institutional failure is systemic rather than partisan.

In a recent article, the AGSA states that the Mayors and Municipal Councils of the 6th administration have not done much over the past four years to enhance governance and improve service delivery. They posit that residents and businesses still suffer from poor service delivery, environmental hazards, and decaying infrastructure. They also acknowledged that recent findings suggest many municipalities are in financial decline. This limited progress is, among others, reflected in the fact that only thirty-nine (39) municipalities (15%) received a clean audit. Since 2020-21, thirty-eight (38) municipalities representing 24% of the total local government expenditure budget have regressed, including municipalities that previously received clean audits and three metros. The audit findings and performance of the eight (8) metropolitan municipalities continue to slump and affect the daily lives of millions of people (AGSA Online, 2026a).

However, it should be noted that regardless of whether a municipality is governed by a single-party majority or a fragile multiparty coalition, similar structural vulnerabilities are evident, such as inadequate record-keeping, weak internal control environments, dependence on costly external consultants for drafting basic financial statements, and a complete lack of proactive risk management. This evidence suggests that municipalities lack the foundational institutional capability necessary for effective governance, irrespective of the political party in control. The institutional framework of local government has become depleted, lacking the technical competencies and administrative depth required to fulfil complex developmental mandates (AGSA Online, 2026a, 2026b).

4.3 The Cost of Instability caused by Coalition Governments

Notwithstanding that the AGSA acknowledged a systemic failure across the board within local governments in South Africa, it must be noted that municipalities with coalition governments are at a greater risk. In its report, the AGSA highlights that the prevailing crisis in local government is characterised by a complex interconnection of factors. The AGSA noted that unstable coalition politics contribute to frequent changes in leadership, which in turn undermine institutional capability. In "hung councils", characterised by unstable coalitions and frequent motions of no confidence, Municipal Managers and Chief Financial Officers often face arbitrary suspensions, political purges, or resignations.

This continual turnover of political and administrative leaders undermines institutional memory and financial discipline as it is evident in the form of compromised financial statements, ineffective performance reports, and widespread legislative non-compliance. Strategic planning is supplanted by short-term political survival strategies. Long-term capital infrastructure projects are delayed as changes in mayoral committees lead to budget reprioritisation to accommodate new coalition partners. Additionally, when accounting officers and senior managers operate at the discretion of unstable political majorities, internal controls deteriorate, consequence management is neglected, and financial mismanagement becomes rampant (AGSA Online, 2026a; Rulashe et al., 2025).

This structural situation sets the context for the 2026 municipal elections, positioning the forthcoming vote as not merely a choice among political parties, but as a critical referendum on the survival of institutions and the maintenance of public accountability (AGSA Online, 2026a; De Vos, 2021; Rulashe et al., 2025; Tladi et al., 2026).

5 The Electorate’s Dilemma: From Passive to Active

5.1 The Shifting Political Landscape: From Dominance to

Fragmentation

The structure of local government in South Africa has undergone a significant transformation, evolving from a largely predictable single-party system to a contested, unstable, and very fragmented multiparty system. For decades following the democratic transition in 1994, municipal politics was largely characterised by the predominance of a single political party across most metropolitan and local councils. This pattern provided administrative stability; however, it was frequently associated with complacency, limited responsiveness to public concerns, and a decline in internal municipal controls (De Vos, 2021; Ndou, 2022; Reddy, 2023; Rulashe et al., 2025).

The local government elections held in November 2021 significantly disrupted the existing political equilibrium. The emergence of "hung councils", where no single political party secured an outright majority, initiated a period in which municipal authority relied on unstable, multiparty coalitions in many local governments across South Africa. Tladi et al. (2026) posit that the local government elections of 2021 saw an increase of sixty-six (66) “hung councils” throughout South Africa, which was a significant upsurge from the 2016 local government elections of twenty-one (21) “hung councils” (Municipal Structures Amendment Bill of 2024; Reddy, 2023; Tladi et al., 2026).

As discussed in previous sections, these coalitions have largely failed to emulate the stable, policy-orientated governance observed in established international democracies. Instead, they have devolved into transactional alliances characterised by political expediency, elite accommodation, and persistent executive instability (Beukes, 2025; De Vos, 2021; Reddy, 2023; Von Treskow et al., 2026).

This evolving political environment has presented an unprecedented governance challenge for the electorate. Voters now participate in elections within a political framework where the party they support may not ultimately govern, or where their preferred candidate's administration can be abruptly dismantled through opaque negotiations, floor-crossing tactics, or shifting voting alliances. The political landscape is no longer delineated by distinct lines of political accountability between a governing majority and an opposition. Instead, it is characterised by a decentralised diffusion of responsibility, wherein political actors habitually attribute systemic administrative failures to coalition partners (Beukes, 2025; Mngomezulu & Phetha, 2025; Ndou, 2022; Pholoma et al., 2024; Von Treskow et al., 2026).

5.2 Information Asymmetry: The Opacity of Coalition Agreements

A major impediment to effective democratic accountability within this fragmented environment is the prevalence of information asymmetry.  In traditional single-party systems, the connection between voters' preferences and the governing party's policy implementation, albeit sometimes indirect, was generally identifiable. Conversely, the current era of coalitions in South Africa is characterised by limited transparency. Coalition agreements, when formalised, are typically negotiated by national or provincial party leaders rather than local representatives, thus limiting public oversight and community participation. As a result, voters are largely unable to access or understand the underlying compromises, power-sharing frameworks, and policy negotiations that shape local governance. Additionally, legislation has not addressed the concerns of public coalition agreements as yet (Beukes, 2025; De Vos, 2021; Ndou, 2022; Pholoma et al., 2024; Tladi et al., 2026; Von Treskow et al., 2026).

Citizens are now subjected to the repercussions of these non-transparent agreements, including deadlocked council meetings, unapproved municipal budgets, abrupt alterations in mayoral committees, and declining service delivery standards, without a clear understanding of the origins or mechanisms of these structural crises (Beukes, 2025; De Vos, 2021; Ndou, 2022; Pholoma et al., 2024).

This imbalance of information weakens voters' ability to make well-informed choices significantly. When political shifts take place after elections without consulting the public, it breaks the essential democratic agreement between voters and their elected officials. Residents of local governments cast their votes based on promises for local development, only to witness these promises overshadowed by broader coalition negotiations. Such a lack of openness leads to deep public mistrust, disengagement from politics, and growing distance between local governments and the communities they are meant to serve (Beukes, 2025; De Vos, 2021; Ndou, 2022; Tladi et al., 2026).

5.3 The Vote as a Mechanism for Institutional Correction

Confronted with this intricate scenario of administrative deterioration, legislative non-compliance, and opaque coalition politics, the forthcoming 2026 municipal elections necessitate a fundamental rethinking of the electoral process.

The electoral process should be redefined from a mere expression of traditional party allegiance or passive civic engagement to a critical tool for institutional reform and accountability. Empirical evidence from the AGSA indicates that local governments in South Africa are at a critical juncture, where administrative inefficiency and inadequate institutional capacity jeopardise the developmental state's integrity (AGSA Online, 2026a; Isabirye & Mkhabela, 2026).

If municipal leaders and administrative officials act with impunity and without accountability, protected by unstable political networks and unaddressed audit violations, the electorate remains the sole mechanism to avert systemic collapse. The electorate becomes the safeguard against systemic failure. To disrupt this cycle of instability, the electorate must evolve from passive observers to proactive, demanding participants in order to break this pattern. This necessitates an informed voting public that assesses political parties based on their demonstrated ability to uphold ethical governance, ensure financial compliance, and deliver services effectively (Isabirye & Mkhabela, 2026).

Prior to casting their ballots in the 2026 municipal elections, the electorate must be thoroughly educated on the actual performance records of political parties within their respective municipalities rather than relying on uncritical, habitual party loyalty. Voters can use the power of their vote to isolate and penalise the specific coalition partners that directly managed failing service departments like electricity, housing, sanitation and water during the previous term. Furthermore, citizens can dismantle the disproportionate leverage of erratic fringe parties by withholding their vote from opportunistic "kingmaker" factions that prioritise self-enrichment over administrative stability and smaller political parties with limited ability to address their real service delivery concerns. Informed voters must also scrutinise legislative voting records, tracking how parties voted on critical budgets and motions of no confidence to weed out silent accomplices to financial mismanagement.

Ultimately, shifting from blind political allegiance to evidence-based accountability ensures that the ballot box functions as an effective instrument to reward institutional integrity and penalise poor performance. This means that by using their vote as a strategic tool for managing consequences, citizens can indicate that political fragmentation must not compromise administrative integrity, ethical leadership, and financial responsibility. The electorate's influence in the 2026 municipal elections will be significant only if voters understand that their ballot serves as a direct mechanism to restructure the tripartite nexus (Isabirye & Mkhabela, 2026; Nzo, 2021; Schwarz, 2014).

It is of utmost importance that voters in the 2026 LGE educate themselves thoroughly to fully understand the inner workings of their local municipalities prior to going to the ballot box. This voter education is the key to understanding the power of the electorate. It is through demanding transparency, penalising non-performance, and insisting on accountable coalition governance with transparent coalition agreements that the electorate can compel a realignment of local governments throughout South Africa. This process can transform municipalities from fragile arenas of political contestation into functional, responsive entities dedicated to public service and community development (AGSA Online, 2026a; Beukes, 2025; Ndou, 2022; Tladi et al., 2026; Von Treskow et al., 2026).

6 Discussion and Synthesis

6.1 Synthesis: The Fractured Foundation of the Government-Society

Nexus

An analysis of the primary documents and legislative frameworks considered in this study demonstrates an undeniable structural reality: the foundation of the government-society nexus in South African local governance is no longer concrete. The current municipal administrations, analysed through the theoretical frameworks of social cohesion and efficiency of services, are distinguished by deep fractures that make the traditional social contract largely inoperative (Mamokhere et al., 2026; Ndou, 2022; Nzo, 2021).

The analysis of the documents indicates a clear link between systemic institutional decay and the erosion of public trust. The statutory frameworks such as the MFMA and the Municipal Systems Act outline specific fiduciary responsibilities that emphasise ethical leadership, financial stability, and legislative compliance. However, repeated AGSA reports highlight persistent weaknesses in municipal institutions across South Africa. The failure to generate credible financial statements, reliable performance reports on predetermined objectives and legal supply chain management is widespread and points to an administrative apparatus that is unable to meet its developmental responsibilities (AGSA Online, 2026a; Ndou, 2022).

This administrative crisis has been exponentially compounded by the rise of fragile, opaque coalition politics since 2021. Municipal councils have become sites of political expediency and constant turnover of the executive in the absence of institutionalised rules of legislation governing coalitions prior to recent legal reforms. As a result, the tripartite nexus among civil society, the state, and the community has ruptured. Communities no longer see the state as an efficient, accountable provider of basic services but as an incapacitated entity that is rife with political infighting and financial mismanagement (Municipal Structures Amendment Bill of 2024; Ndlovu et al., 2025; Pholoma et al., 2024; Reddy, 2023; Tladi et al., 2026).

In response, civil society and local communities have been driven out of collaborative development spaces and resorted to adversarial postures, litigation, and service delivery protests. The interactive relationship has dissolved, leaving a fragile structural environment in which state legitimacy is constantly challenged (Isabirye & Mkhabela, 2026; Ndlovu et al., 2025; Nzo, 2021; Tladi et al., 2026).

6.2 Implications for the 2026 Elections and the Imperative of

Consequence Management

The outcomes are crucial for the upcoming general municipal elections in 2026. With South Africa’s Local Government Elections scheduled for November 2026, voting will play a key role in shaping institutional change. These elections represent more than just the regular administrative process of renewing municipal councils; they act as a decisive referendum on the future of local democracy and the effectiveness of multiparty governance (Rulashe et al., 2025; Tladi et al., 2026; Von Treskow et al., 2026).

The wider implication of this analysis of documents is that the electorate cannot afford to approach local elections through the lens of passive political loyalty anymore. The AGSA has proved that bad governance directly affects the socio-economic well-being of citizens with its documented systemic failures, from unaccounted expenditure and unchecked material irregularities to administrative paralysis in “hung councils”. The real costs are paid by local communities when political parties and coalitions compete for survival rather than for basic service delivery (AGSA Online, 2026a; Beukes, 2025; Ndou, 2022).

Consequently, the upcoming Local Government elections represent a critical historic opportunity for the electorate to restore a culture of consequence management through their electoral choices. When internal administrative accountability is absent and corrupt or non-performing officials are rarely punished because of political protection, the vote is the ultimate tool of civic sanction. The onus is on the voters to be educated on the performance of various political parties within their local governments and to use their power at the ballot box to represent their needs (AGSA Online, 2026b; Nzo, 2021; Von Treskow et al., 2026).

To rebuild the concrete foundation of the tripartite nexus, the electorate must shift from passive onlookers to educated, critical, and demanding stakeholders. This requires voters to rigorously assess political aspirants based on demonstrated institutional competence, accountability, and ethical compliance rather than mere political rhetoric. The ballot is a decisive tool of consequence management that citizens can use to send a message that political fragmentation and institutional incapacity will not be rewarded anymore (AGSA Online, 2026a; Beukes, 2025; Nzo, 2021).

The 2026 municipal elections will be the moment of truth to see if the power of the South African electorate can indeed force a recalibration of local governance, forcing political actors to rebuild a responsive, transparent, and truly developmental state (Mamokhere et al., 2026; Municipal Structures Amendment Bill of 2024; Rulashe et al., 2025).

7 Conclusion and Summary of Findings

7.1 Summary of Findings

This paper critically examines the interplay of local governance, coalition dynamics, and institutional accountability as the country moves towards the 2026 local government elections. The investigation reveals a deep systemic crisis characterised by the breakdown of the tripartite nexus between civil society, the state, and the community. The study, based on empirical evaluations from the AGSA, indicated that municipalities have pervasive institutional capability deficits, as demonstrated by unreliable financial statements, failure to report on predetermined objectives, and chronic legislative non-compliance. These bipartisan issues point to the fact that there is systemic decay rather than partisan failure. Moreover, the instability has been compounded by the rise of fragile, uninstitutionalised coalition politics in the wake of the 2021 elections, turning municipal councils into arenas of political expediency and high turnover at the top  (AGSA Online, 2026a; Beukes, 2025; Mamokhere et al., 2026; Nzo, 2021; Pholoma et al., 2024; Tladi et al., 2026; Von Treskow et al., 2026).

Institutional instability has undermined the public’s trust in the state and local governments and brought to attention the fact that the local governance systems need the active intervention of a well-informed and politically conscious electorate (Nzo, 2021; Pholoma et al., 2024; Rulashe et al., 2025; Von Treskow et al., 2026).

Ultimately, the 2026 local government elections serve as a definitive litmus test for the maturity and resilience of South African democracy. As citizens head to the polls, the ballot box stands as the ultimate instrument of institutional correction. By transitioning from passive spectators to discerning and educated stakeholders who demand accountability, integrity, and developmental efficacy, the electorate holds the definitive power to rebuild the fractured foundations of local governance and ensure that public service delivery truly serves the constitutional aspirations of the South African people (AGSA Online, 2026a, 2026b; Beukes, 2025; Nzo, 2021; Rulashe et al., 2025).

Based on the research findings, this research paper proposes the following recommendations:

Civil society organisations, independent academic institutions, and electoral authorities must spearhead localised civic education campaigns ahead of the 2026 polls. These initiatives must move beyond basic voter registration mobilisation to actively educate citizens on how to decode municipal audit outcomes, track service delivery indicators, and evaluate the specific legislative voting records of political parties within their councils.

Voters must be equipped with the analytical tools to look past historical party loyalties and examine how individual political parties utilised their executive portfolios, executive powers, and coalition leverage during the preceding five-year term. Public awareness programmes should explicitly highlight how administrative failures such as unpassed budgets and failing roads,  transport, water or sanitation sectors trace back to specific political decisions.

By institutionalising access to transparent municipal performance data, citizens can enter the ballot box prepared to withhold support from non-performing parties or erratic "kingmakers". Empowering the electorate with this practical, evidence-based understanding ensures that the vote transitions from a habitual civic ritual into a powerful democratic mechanism capable of forcing political parties to respect the public trust and deliver accountable local governance.

Additionally;

The state must enforce mandatory, public, and legally binding coalition agreements by addressing recent legislative reforms such as the MSAA of 2021 and the MSAA Bill of 2024. This requires clear statutory thresholds and dispute resolution mechanisms to be institutionalised and enforced without fear to curb the abuse of motions of no confidence and prevent executive paralysis (Beukes, 2025; Municipal Structures Amendment Act [Act No.3 of 2021]; Municipal Structures Amendment Bill of 2024).

Municipalities must institutionalise proactive disclosure mechanisms regarding coalition negotiations, budgetary allocations, and supply chain management. Information asymmetry must be dismantled to ensure that civil society and local communities have open access to decision-making processes and public engagements (Beukes, 2025; Ndou, 2022).

Local government structures must formally integrate or incorporate civil society organisations, ratepayers' associations, and community-based movements into participatory governance frameworks which focus on increasing valuable public participation and engagement – strengthening local civil society to function effectively as performance watchdogs, ensuring that municipal leadership remains accountable to the communities that elected them to power and which they serve (Beukes, 2025; Nzo, 2021, 2022; Rulashe et al., 2025). 

Lastly, provincial and national oversight bodies must rigorously enforce consequence management against financial malfeasance and material irregularities, removing political patronage as a shield for administrative non-performance (AGSA Online, 2026a, 2026b; Isabirye & Mkhabela, 2026).

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